Chancellorsville Staff Ride Briefing Book

7/30/2019 Chancellorsville Staff Ride Briefing Book

1/82

CHANCELLORSVILLE

STAFF RIDE

BRIEFING BOOK

U.S. ARMY CENTEROF

MILITARY HISTORY


2/82


3/82

F O R E W O R D

"To hear from [H ooker's] own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of hislieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and Iretired from his presence with the belief that my comm anding genera l was a beaten man ."MG Darius N. CouchComm anding General, II CorpsArmy of the Potomac

Karl von Clausew itz, in On W ar, saw coup d'oeil and resolution a s the essential personal traits of thetrue military genius. He describes coup d'oeil as an intellect which even in the midst of intense obscuritysees traces of light w hich lead to the truth, and re solution as the inner strength n eeded to follow tha t faintlight resolutely through the fog of war a nd un der the intense pressure of comb at.M ajor Gen eral "Fighting Joe" Hook er seems to have lacked both qualities during the Battle ofChancellorsville. Although Hooker skillfully executes a well-conceived plan and out-flanks his adversary,he becom es confused when Lee's actions are not wha t he had anticipated. M onths of offensive planningare shelved as Hook er suddenly orders his Arm y of the Potomac on the defensive. Needless to say, Leeseizes the initiative and achieves w hat has often been called his most brilliant victory. How could thishappen when Hooker's army outnum bers that of Lee 2 to 1 an d is far superior in artillery and logistics?Wh y does Hooker seem to suffer a mental paralysis as he confronts Lee? Answers to these and otherquestions concerning leadership, com mun ications, use of terrain, and the psychology of men in battle, areoften discovered by personal reconn aissance of the actual battlefield.In 1906, M ajor Eben Swift took twelve officer-students from Fo rt Leavenworth's Gen eral Service andStaff School on the A rmy 's first staff ride to the Chickam auga B attlefield. Since then staff rides have beenused to varying degrees in the education of Arm y officers to narrow the g ap between peacetime trainingand w ar. That gap is of special concern in today's Arm y in which few leaders have experienced thestresses of comba t. The staff ride, therefore, not only assists participants to un derstand th e realities of war,it teaches warfighting, and in turn enhances unit readiness. It is a training method w hich comm anders canuse for the professional development of their subordinates and to enliven the unit's esprit de corps --constant objectives of all comma nders in peacetime.At some time in their careers most officers have m emorized ma ny well-known m axims of the militaryart, probably without fully understanding or an alyzing them. Now , whether you think of yourself as atactician, operational artist, strategist, or just a soldier as you wa lk this battlefield, you sh ould search forthose operational principles and h uman characteristics wh ich do no t change over time. Place yourself in theminds of the leaders in the battle and analyze the factors involved in their decisions and determine if theycould have don e better. On ly in this way can you fix in your mind the though t processes that mu st besecond nature to you in the crisis of combat.W e are convinced that the staff ride is one of the best w ays to do this.

Ted Ballardilly A rthur


4/82


5/82

CH A NCELLOR SV ILLE STA FF RIDEBRIEFING BOO KT A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

SUBJECTAGEOverview of the Chancellorsville Campaign-7Maps - Chancellorsville Campaign-1 7Hooker's Theater-Level Situation Report8Lee's Theater-Level Situation Report8Order of Battle - Army of the Potomac9-28Order of Battle - Army of Northern Virginia9-34Casualties5Organization6-37Civil War Small Arms8-39Civil War Artillery0-44Tactics5-46Logistics7-50Selected Biographical Sketches of Union Leadersin the Chancellorsville Campaign:Lincoln1-52Stanton53-54Hooker4-55Couch5-56Howard6-58Meade8-59Reynolds0-61Sedgwick1-62Sickles2-63Slocum3-64Stoneman5-66Selected Biographical Sketches of Confederate Leadersin the Chancellorsville Campaign:Davis66-67Lee8-69Anderson9-70McLaws1-72Jackson2-73Stuart73-74Chronology of Events of the Civil War -18635ii


6/82


7/82

T H E C H A N C E L L O R S V IL L E C A M P A IG N(Extracted from the West Point Atlas of American Wars, Volume I, 1689-1900, and printed

with the permission of the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy).

When Joseph Hooker had relieved Ambrose Burnside after the disastrous Fredericksburgcampaign, he found the Army of the Potomac in a low state of morale. Desertion wasincreasing, and the army's own interior administration - never good - had deteriorated.

Hooker was a boastful, ambitious man, apt at intrigue - yet a commander who had set ahigh record for personal bravery and aggressive combat leadership. Now he unexpectedlyshowed himself an outstanding organizer and administrator. Food, living conditions, andhospitals were improved, a system of furloughs introduced, training and discipline tightened,and an efficient military intelligence organization established. (One of Hooker's mosteffective innovations was the introduction of distinctive corps and division insignia.)

Hooker reorganized the Army of the Potomac into seven infantry corps and one cavalrycorps. This consolidation of cavalry - much of which had previously been attached toinfantry corps and divisions - rapidly increased the efficiency of the horsemen. Stuart'sconstant harassment of Union outposts had irritated them all winter; on 17 March, BGWilliam W. Averell crossed the Rappahannock with his cavalry division at Kelly's Ford anddrove them back - though he failed to overwhelm - BG Fitzhugh Lee's smaller command. Onthe other hand, Hooker made a serious mistake in decentralizing tactical control of hisartillery to his corps commanders. As a result, Federal artillery in the coming Battle ofChancellorsville was not properly massed.

In planning his offensive, Hooker had the problem of crossing the Rappahannock against adangerous opponent. Lee had carefully fortified the south bank, from Port Royal to Bank'sFord, with detached works guarding United States Ford farther upstream. Hooker knew,however, that he possessed a decided numerical superiority, since he had learned that Lee -alarmed by reports that the Federal IX Corps was aboard transports at Hampton Roads - hadsent Longstreet south with two divisions to guard the Virginia-Carolina coast.

Hooker's decision was to move up the Rappahannock and turn Lee's left flank (see Map 1,page 8) . His first plan was to try to force Lee to retreat from Fredericksburg by sending theFederal cavalry, under BG George Stoneman, ahead on a raid to destroy Confederatecommunications. This accomplished, he would follow up with his infantry, hoping to trapLee between it and Stoneman. Stoneman moved out slowly on that mission, but was haltedby bad weather.

Hooker then recast his plan into one better. Following demonstrations at Kelly's Ford andPort Royal, MG Henry Slocum marched on 27 April with the V, XI, and XII Corps. Hesurprised the Confederate outposts at Kelly's Ford and continued on across the Rapidan River.The day after Slocum's departure, MG John Sedgwick took the I and VI Corps ostentatiouslyforward to the river, crossing just below Fredericksburg on the 29th. MG Darius N. Couch,with two divisions of his II Corps, went into concealed positions opposite Bank's Ford (histhird division - BG John Gibbon's - was left behind, since its original camp was visible toConfederate observers). The III Corps, under BG Daniel E. Sickles, was alerted but lefttemporarily in reserve. The cavalry was still to destroy Lee's communications.

1


8/82

Lee himself had been planning an offensive movement in the Shenandoah Valley. Now theextent of Hooker's movements temporarily baffled him; he concluded that Slocum might bestriking at Gordonsville. The Federal advance had gotten between him and Stuart, so that ittook considerable time for the latter's dispatches to reach him (Though Stuart had soondetected Slocum's march). On 29 April, Lee moved the three divisions of his right flankcloser to Fredericksburg and sent Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville. Once there, Andersondisliked the low position and withdrew about three miles, to the intersection of the Turnpikeand Mine roads. There, he began entrenching on higher ground. Stuart, meanwhile,detaching one brigade to watch Stoneman, clung to Slocum's flank.

By 3:00 P.M., Hooker had three corps in Lee's rear near Chancellorsville, and Couch's twodivisions (called forward from Bank's Ford) were close behind (see Map 2, page 9). Aprompt advance would have gotten this force into more open ground, cleared Bank's Ford,and halved the distance between it and Sedgwick. Hooker, however, halted the three corps toawait reinforcements.Chancellorsville was a lone brick house at a minor crossroads in a waste area appropriatelyknown as "the Wilderness." Thick second growth pine and oak, tangled with under-growth,severely limited visibility and made movement off the few roads difficult for individuals andnext to impossible for formed bodies of troops. The area was further cut up by manyswampy little streams. The dominating terrain, such as it was, was the hill at Hazel Grove.In such an area, artillery and cavalry could seldom operate except along the roads; the fullforce of numbers could not be deployed because there was little opportunity to deploy ormaneuver.

Nevertheless, Hooker delayed in the area and did not advance from Chancellorsville untilabout 11:00 A.M. on 1 May. Apparently he had given up the idea of promptly seizingBank's Ford when, late on 29 April, he had ordered Couch to move from his positionopposite the ford to Chancellorsville.

Meanwhile, Lee had faced a series of problems. Even after he had learned that Andersonhad retreated from Chancellorsville, he was still uncertain as to which wing of the Unionarmy he could more profitably attack. As usual, it did not occur to him to stand on thedefensive. He and Jackson first reconnoitered Sedgwick's bridgehead below Fredericksburgbut concluded that the Union position - supported as it was by artillery on Stafford Heights -offered no real chance for victory. Lee then decided to leave Early's division, reinforced byone brigade, to hold Sedgwick while he moved the rest of his army against Hooker.

So far, except for delay due to bad weather, Hooker had experienced only one majordifficulty. Having no cavalry with him except one of Pleasonton's brigades, which couldseldom penetrate Stuart's counter-reconnaissance screen, he had to advance blindly for thegreater part of the time. Nevertheless, he came forward in three columns, moving along theRiver Road, the Orange Turnpike, and the Orange Plank Road. Sickles' corps, which hadarrived that morning, covered the rear of the army (see Map 3, page 10).The initial clashes were indecisive. Sykes, on the turnpike, forced McLaws back untilConfederate reinforcements outflanked him and drove him, in his turn, back throughHancock's division; Hancock stopped the Confederate advance. On the Union right, Slocumalso generally held his ground along the Plank Road. Both he and Hancock had gotten intorelatively open country and reached strong positions. Meanwhile, Meade, on the River Road,

2


9/82

met no resistance and was soon across the flank of the Confederate line (see Map 4, page11). Hooker's observations balloons had detected Lee's movement and the weakness ofEarly's forces on Marye's Heights.And then - with every opportunity at hand for a decisive victory - Hooker's courage failed.

Over the indignant protests of his corps commanders, he ordered the troops back into theirpositions of the night before around Chancellorsville (see Map 5, page 12). Later, hecountermanded the order, but by then his troops had withdrawn. Meanwhile, Sedgwickreceived several conflicting orders, and so did nothing aggressive. It is difficult to explainHooker's unwarranted surrender of the initiative under such favorable circumstances. He waspersonally brave; he had built up a splendid army; and he had planned skillfully. It may havebeen that it was difficult for him to visualize and assess properly a military operation on sucha large scale that many of its phases were beyond the range of his direct control. Possibly itwas the inward knowledge of this inadequacy which, at this critical moment, weakened hisdetermination. Later, as a corps commander in more restricted operations, he again proved tobe a fine leader. When the Union forces withdrew, the Confederates followed carefully,puzzled and suspicious of such an easy victory. Hooker having ordered the Chancellorsvilleposition fortified, the Federal troops rapidly constructed log breastworks and obstaclesconsisting of interlaced felled trees (called "abatis"). Lee considered these defensesformidable and confined his operations during the afternoon to skirmishing andreconnaissance. He fully appreciated the extreme seriousness of the prevailing situation. Hecould not hope to assault Hooker's position east and south of Chancellorsville successfully;and Early would not be able to stop Sedgwick if the latter attacked vigorously. Somethinghad to be done quickly; consequently, a weak point in Hooker's defenses must be found.While awaiting the reports of various staff officers he had sent to scout the Federal position,Lee began to consider a possible attack on Hooker's right. Then Stuart appeared with thenews that the Union right was exposed and vulnerable to a surprise attack. Lee now made hisplans. Jackson, with 26,000 men, screened by Stuart's cavalry, would circle around the Unionposition and attack it from the west; Lee, meanwhile, with the approximately 17,000remaining men, would keep Hooker engaged on the present front. Jackson's maneuver was adangerous one, for he would have to march fourteen miles by narrow roads across the front ofthe Union army. But even more risky was the entire Confederate enterprise. Alreadyoutnumbered more than two to one by the opposing Union forces, the Confederate armywould be divided into three segments, each out of supporting distance of the others. IfHooker or Sedgwick took the offensive, the army might be destroyed in detail. There wasalso the possibility that Gibbon might cross suddenly at Bank's Ford, and so Lee sent BGCadmus M. Wilcox to take station there. Only two such commanders as Lee and Jackson,possessing perfect confidence in one another, could carry off such a stroke.

Meanwhile, Stoneman, with the divisions of Averell and Buford, had begun his cavalryraid. Stoneman lacked dash (and at this time was reportedly suffering from piles). Averellwas sent towards Gordonsville, where he became involved in chasing the brigade Stuart hadleft behind to maintain contact with Stoneman. He was finally recalled by Hooker.Stoneman broke up Buford's division into several detachments and sent them raiding deepinto Virginia. In so doing, he failed to carry out Hooker's instructions and missed anexcellent opportunity to destroy most of Lee's trains and supplies, which were concentrated

3


10/82

under a very sma ll guard at Guiney's Station, approximately f ifteen miles south ofFredericksburg. To the east , Sedgwick, lacking definite orders, remained inactive.Jackson began his march at about 6:00 A.M ., 2 M ay. Hooker had occup ied the highground a t Hazel G rove, strengthened his l ines, and called in Reynolds' I Corps an d A verell'scavalry division. His troops w ere in good spirits, but his behavior the previous day hadshaken the confidence of his corps commanders. Advised about 9:00 A.M. of Jackson'smarch, he im mediately suspected an attempt to turn his right flank and w arned M G Oliver 0.How ard, who com m anded the XI Corps there. Unfortunately, he did not visit How ard'ssector to inspect th e latter's dispositions.The sight of Jackson's long parade p assing steadily across the Union front caused Sickles tourge an attack against it . Som etime after noon, Sickles f inally got perm ission to m ake areconnaissance in force. He converted this into an attack, which did som e dam age but couldnot halt Jackson's march (see Map 6, page 13). This action pulled Howard's reserve brigade(BG Francis C. Barlow) forward to cover Sickles' f lank.For som e unfathom able reason, Sickles' s light success convinced H ooker that Jackson w asactually retreating towa rd Go rdonsville. He gav e orders to prepare for a pursuit and orderedSedgwick and Gibbon to attack on their fronts.Jackson had com pleted his movem ent and had begun forming for his attack about 2:30P.M. Bu t the heavy brush ma de this slow wo rk, and it was som e three hours later before hewas satisfied with his deployment. His activities had been no secret to a large number of XICorps off icers. One patrol after another reported the impending attack. But H oward w as nottroubled. A brave and devoted soldier, he was a lso an opinionated individual and so ignoredrepeated w arnings. Nor was H ooker's headquarters any more receptive to such reports.At approxim ately 6:00 P.M . - only two hou rs before dark - Jackson attacked [BG R . E.Rodes, one of Jackson's division commanders, gives the time as 5:15 p.m.]. The right-flankbrigades of the XI Corps w ere quickly routed, f leeing to the rear in disorder. COL AdolphusBuschbeck's brigade, how ever, holding a l ine of rif le pits at right angles to the Turnp ike,checked Jackson for over half an hour. Th en, with both f lanks turned, i t withdrew in goodorder. In the time gained, How ard and H ooker built a new line comprising the hard core ofthe XI Corps, two brigades from M G Hiram G. Berry's division, another brigade from the IICorps, and al l available arti llery. Reynolds hurried forward to anchor the right f lank. Rou ghterrain, hard fighting, and a series of errors by subordinate com ma nders had taken m ost of thedrive out of Jackson's attack. His rush was finally stopped west of Fairview Hill. Lee,mean while, was mak ing l imited attacks against the Union left to pin down as man y Federalsas po ssible.

Darkness fel l , but Jackson, seeking to exp loit his success, went forward in search of a routethat would enable him to cut Hook er off from United States Ford. Returning, he was shotdown by his own m en, who w ere apparently jum py from an earlier chance clash with a Unioncavalry regiment m oving north from Hazel G rove. Shortly thereafter, A. P. Hill, next incomm and, was w ounded, and C onfederate operations against the Union right came to aconfused halt (Jackson died on 10 M ay).

Hooker later ordered Sickles to make a night attack from H azel Grove against the rightflank of Jackson's command. This attack lost its way, got involved in a fight with otherUnion troops around Fairview, and fell back to Hazel Grove. Thus, Hook er's one aggressivemove during the batt le came to naught.4


11/82

On the morning of 3 May, Hooker again had a splendid opportunity to defeat Lee. TheConfederate army around Chancellorsville was completely split, with its two halves almost aday's march apart (see Map 7, page 14). Furthermore, the arrival of Reynolds' I Corps, andthe relatively prompt rally of most of Howard's XI Corps gave Hooker an approximately two-to-one numerical superiority in the area. Nevertheless, he made no effort to regain theinitiative. Instead, he ordered a secondary line of defense prepared north of Chancellorsville.The night before, after Jackson's attack had been stopped just west of Fairview Hill, Sickleshad returned from Catharine Furnace and had taken up a position which included the highground at Hazel Grove. This high ground dominated that at Fairview Hill and thesurrounding area. Hooker visited Hazel Grove early on the 3d, and should have perceivedthat a Federal attack from Hazel Grove could strike the flank of either half of Lee's army.Nevertheless, he ordered the Hazel Grove position abandoned, and Sickles fell back toFairview. This withdrawal was probably the greatest of Hooker's blunders. It left theConfederates free to use the Dowdall's Tavern-Catharine Furnace road, thus reuniting theirseparated army. It also gave up the dominating terrain in the area. Stuart (who had takenover Jackson's command) advanced at daybreak on the 3d, rapidly got thirty-one guns - laterincreased to fifty - on the abando ned hilltop, and opened a destructive enfilade fire against the

lines of both Sickles and Slocum. At the same time, the Confederates attacked both sides ofthe Union perim eter, especially from the w est, where Stuart sent in charge after charge againstthe Federal earthworks. After several hours of furious fighting, Federal ammunition began torun short, and the Confederate attacks slowly gained ground.Hooker had been little more than a passive spectator. Now at the height of the Confederateassault, he was leaning against one of the front-porch pillars of the Chancellor house. As if inironic justice, a Confederate shell fired from the battery at Hazel Grove struck the pillar andknocked him unconscious. When revived, he was in great pain and partially paralyzed.Couch, a stark fighter, was next in command; the I and V Corps were fresh and ready toattack; the XI Corps was only lightly engaged. Lee's forces, on the other hand, were almostcompletely committed and had taken heavy losses. But Hooker did not relinquish thecommand, and the Union medical director, Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, would not take theresponsibility of ruling him too disabled to exercise it. At about 9:30 A.M., Hooker orderedCouch to pull the army back to the prepared line north of Chancellorsville. Lee, on his part,pushed his tired troops forward in an attem pt to complete his success.To the east, Sedgwick had received Hooker's order to attack at about midnight of 2-3 May.Pushing back some light Confederate outposts, he occupied Fredericksburg by 5:00 A .M.Another pontoon bridge was thrown into position to enable Gibbon to join him there. Atdaybreak, the Federals attacked the thinly held Confederate position (which had been stronglyfortified since Burnside's attack) behind the town. The first three Union assaults wererepulsed. Then Wilcox arrived from Bank's Ford to strengthen the left of the Confederatedefenses. He had moved to the sound of the cannon on his own initiative, upon noticing thatthe Union troops opposite Bank's Ford were increasing in numbers and that those whoremained were wearing their full equipment, as if in readiness to move off. But in spite ofWilcox's arrival, Sedgwick's fourth effort - a combined penetration and envelopment - carriedMarye's Heights and overran part of the Confederate artillery there.Hooker's withdrawal enabled Lee to occupy the ruins of Chancellorsville and reunite his

5


12/82

army along the line of the Turnpike. Though the new Union position was naturally strong,and was further strengthened by field fortifications, Lee moved aggressively against it - onlyto be stopped by a report that Sedgwick was on Marye's Heights. He immediately sentMcLaws with four brigades to meet this new threat (see Map 8, page 15).Under the sudden surge of Sedgwick's assault, Early retreated southward along TelegraphRoad. Wilcox, however, fell back toward Chancellorsville, seeking to delay the Unionadvance. Sedgwick followed along the Turnpike about 2:00 P.M., leaving Gibbon's divisionto hold Marye's Heights in his rear but requesting that an alternate line of communications beestablished by way of Bank's Ford, in the event that he was cut off from Fredericksburg.McLaws reached Salem Church before 3 :00 P.M. and took up position there; Wilcox joinedhim shortly thereafter. Approximately an hour later, Sedgwick came up and - probablyconcluding logically that Hooker was engaging practically all of Lee's army - attackedimmediately with his leading division, directly from his column of march. Initiallysuccessful, the attacking Union division was fmally checked and thrown back by superiornumbers. Sedgwick's second division, in tum, checked McLaws. As darkness approached,both forces bivouacked on the battlefield.

During the day, Hooker ordered Averell to come forward on the Union right, but Averellsoon returned, reporting the country impassable for cavalry. Hooker thereupon relieved him.Pleasonton was then given command of Averell's division, in addition to his own.During the night, Hooker's troops had strengthened their already strong position. Judgingthis to be an indication that Hooker intended to remain on the defensive, Lee decided toconcentrate against Sedgwick, in the hope of destroying his corps. Consequently, he leftStuart with 25,000 men to contain Hooker's 75,000, while he moved with 21,000 men againstSedgwick's 19,000.Sedgwick was a slow and conscientious general; he might lack the necessary dash andimagination for his present assignment, but he would take care of his command. During thenight, he had established communication with the north bank of the Rappahannock by meansof a pontoon bridge laid by Army of the Potomac engineers at Scott 's Ford. A detachedbrigade from the II Corps set up a protective bridgehead on the south bank. Early in themorning of the 4th, Sedgwick received a message from Hooker stating that Hooker intendedto await Lee's attack in his new position and that Sedgwick had permission to go either toBank's Ford or Fredericksburg, if the safety of his corps required it.As Lee's concentration got under way, Early returned along Telegraph Road and advancedagainst Marye's Heights. Gibbon, heavily outnumbered, retired into Fredericksburg.Sedgwick set up a horseshoe-shaped defense and prepared hasty fortifications, hoping to holdout until night and then withdraw. His skillful organization of the ground, which - amongother advantages - denied the Confederates the use of the Plank Road to maintaincommunication among their units, greatly delayed Lee's deployment. Not until 5:30 P.M. didthe Confederates attack; then their effort, though gallant, was piecemeal and straggling (seeMap 9, page 16). Sedgwick gave at least as good as he received, and made an unmolestedcrossing at Scott's Ford during the night. .

Meanwhile, Hooker, even with the sound of Sedgwick's cannon plainly audible, made noeffort to advance. Apparently, he had not yet recovered from his injury, but - lacking anyaction by a competent medical officer - he remained in full command of the Army of the6


13/82

Potomac, if not of himself.During the early morning of 5 May, Gibbon skillfully recrossed to the north bank of theRappahannock, and all pontoon bridges downstream from United States Ford were taken up.Lee determined to crush Hooker. The latter 's position was by now Ii formidable mass offield fortifications, yet Lee - with that same stubborn aggressiveness that had cost him dearlyat Malvern Hill, and would cost him even more at Gettysburg - concentrated every availableman for an assault at sunrise on the 6th.Hooker, however, had lost all his former combativeness. About midnight of 5-6 May, hecalled his corps commanders to a council of war to determine whether to advance orwithdraw. Meade, Reynolds, and Howard voted to advance; Sickles, stating that he was anamateur soldier and could not speak with authority, voted for retreat; Couch bitterly chose toretreat because Hooker intended to continue in command; Slocum was absent. Hooker thentook upon himself the responsibility of ordering the withdrawal.Meade's V Corps received the mission of serving as a rear guard to cover the withdrawal.The rest of the army was massed near the river, and the difficult operations began. Hookercrossed with the artillery during the night. His infantry began to cross at 5:00 A.M., 6 May(see Map 10, page 17). Then the river rose as a result of continual rains and threatened tobreak loose the pontoon bridges, which rapidly became too short as the river widened. Couchhad been left in command on the south bank. He proposed that there might still be a chanceto fight a real battle. However, Hooker, possibly guessing his second in command's intent,sent an emphatic order to withdraw. The two bridges were made into one, and the crossingcontinued during the morning. This movement took Lee completely by surprise. Only a fewof his advance scouts even made contact with the withdrawing Federals.Stoneman's raiding parties gradually returned to the army, some by way of the Federalposts along the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay, after riding close to Richmond andcreating a scare in the Confederate capitol. They did some damage to railroads and supplydepots but had no effect on the outcome of the campaign.

Confederate losses were approximately 13,000; Federal, 17,000. Proportionately, Leesuffered by far the worse damage - even without considering the loss of the irreplaceableJackson. Actually, his brilliant and daring maneuvers had defeated only one man - "FightingJoe" Hooker. Few battles have ever more clearly exemplified Napoleon's maxim: "TheGeneral is the head, the whole army." The Army of the Potomac was much more humiliatedthan hurt.Hooker's plan - except for his employment of his cavalry as a raiding force - had beenexcellent up to that moment when he fell back into the Wilderness and went on the defensive.Even then, with Lee forced to gamble on securing a quick victory, Hooker had every chanceof repulsing Lee's attack and then crushing the Confederates with a counterattack. The first,Hooker's troops accomplished; the second, he could not nerve himself to order.

Other factors contributing to his defeat were Howard's stubborn carelessness, Hooker's owninexplicable blunder in giving up Hazel Grove, and his failure to coordinate properly the twowings of his army so that their attacks would be mutually supporting. Finally, in spite ofLincoln's injunction to "this time, put in all your men," Hooker allowed nearly one-third ofthis army to stand idle during the heaviest fighting. Consequently, Lee was able to masssuperior forces against Howard and later, Sedgwick.7


14/82

\ If BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILL.--"1--. Hooker's Strategic Turning Movemen27-30 April 1863

I 0- , ,SeAL[ 4 '.11..

H O O K E R ~(100,000)

/ ~.SEDGW(20,00

____________ v ___ ~ ______ ~ ~ ~ ________ ~ ____ ____________ = ~ __


15/82

o . v~ \ L O E R N E S So . o

t '

" ""ti {)0

J.

o

o o 0 .

~" ,

Q , 0 ,

o

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILSituation, 3:00 p.m., 30 April 186

1 o 1 2 Miles


16/82

. 0 .' . (i O . .. \ . : . . '. 'a" .. 0 . ,.") . ' . -- . ' .. . . " . 0: ' '0 "0 ' . . , . . " .

. ~ \ LDERN .E SS..... .0 '. ' 0-

..

o

u . .G'

.

0 . ' O.

o

e '.. ." oo .'

:) . . . .,.

. .o ' 9 ' :'.0 ."

a .

--J--E

o

... .

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILSituation, 12:30 p.m., 1 May 186

1 o 1 2 Miles


17/82

b D 0 . 0. \) (j 0

D D. . (1 .. 0 . o. . ' o 0:O 'V

. ~ \ LOERNE 550 ' 0 ' e {) .

' 0."'.,.

o . c.J ...0

D '0 .' .', . ', 0 '.,

()0

..

' . , 0

ti ' f) . 90 BATI'LE OF CHANCELLORSVIL~ .e' W - - 1 I -- a Situation, 1:30 p.m., 1May 1863. "

~..

, 0 . O .t 0 1 o 1 2 Miles

:0


18/82

. :

. o . . .. GO '. .' . . : . c;) . . . .' . . . . . . . ' ..0 . . ', ' ' . '!.: . .. ... : ' .

. \ LOERNE.SS. .... . '. : 0-".... . . G'

, .' . .. ,)

. ."0:t

"o

:) . ' .

o ...

O . .

o0 .

.0, .

N

- - I - -K

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILSituation, Dark, 1 May 18631 o 1 2 Miles


19/82

. e )' . . ... . . ' .. . .. . . 0:.

'. .


20/82

.... 0 ' . 0:O Q~ \ L O E R N E S S

.... , 0 . 0

o

J, ..

. ,co

e ,o

o o.o

0 ' 0

. O .. . . f.?

.0. " .

N

w--ii--

. "

BATILE OF CHANCELLORSVILSituation, Daylight, 3 May 1863

1 o 1 2 Miles


21/82

c, ' D , o , 0,.' '.) , .." , ' . ' ,D. "-0 , ' , '." ,0:, ~ \ L D E R N E S S

',' ,0 ', ,' 0'

. . ' . (' i , ' ".:.. ,

0 '.'

0 ,

, . :

' ,"

o0 '

,0 . ' 0 ,.

0 ,

K

w - ~ I - - E

"

..


1 o 1 2 Miles


22/82

N

'. w--I --o


1 o 1 2 Miles


23/82

{)". : ' " , . " "~ .... . ~ + ~ ..................... ...... ..- ... ...0 ' , ~ , ' , ' ~ ~M

w--I--R

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSvaSituation, 5:00 a.m., 6 May 1863

1 o 1 2 Miles


24/82

HOOKER'S THEATER-LEVEL SITUATION REPORTHooker to President Lincoln, 11 April 1863:

"After giving the subject my best reflection, I have concluded that I will have more chanceof inflicting a heavier blow upon the enemy by turning his position to my right, and, ifpracticable, to sever his connections with Richmond with my cavalry force and such lightbatteries as it may be deemed advisable to send with them. I am apprehensive that he willretire from before me the moment I should succeed in crossing the river, and over the shortestline to Richmond, and thus escape being seriously crippled. I hope that when the cavalryhave established themselves on the line between him and Richmond, they will be able to holdhim and check his retreat until I can fall on his rear, or, if not that, I will compel him to fallback by way of Culpeper and Gordonsville, over a longer line than my own, with his suppliescut off. The cavalry will probably cross the river above the Rappahannock Bridge, thence toCulpeper and Gordonsville and across to the Aquia Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity ofHanover Courthouse. They will probably have a fight in the vicinity of Culpeper, but not onethat should cause them much delay or embarrassment. I have given directions for the cavalryto be in readiness to commence the movement on Monday morning next. While the cavalryare moving, I shall threaten the passage of the river at various points, and, after they havepassed well to the enemy's rear, shall endeavor to effect the crossing..."

LEE'S THEATER-EVEL SITUATION REPORTLee to Jefferson Davis, 16 April 1863:

"Information derived from our scouts has shown that a movement on the part of theenemy's cavalry was in contemplation...On Monday evening they were seen moving up theRappahannock, and on Tuesday morning they appeared at Kelly's Ford with intention tocross. They were however, repulsed by our dismounted skirmishers, but forced a passage atthe Rappahannock Bridge where they were soon driven back...Prisoners report they wererationed for eight days...General Stuart thinks the movement a feint to cover other operations.He can learn of no force moving towards the Blue Ridge, but thinks from the reports of hisscouts that General Hooker intends to transfer his army to the White House on the Pamunkeyor to the south side of the James River. My own impression has been that the movement wasintended to draw us to the upper Rappahannock that Fredericksburg might be seized and thebridges across the river rebuilt. I do not think that General Hooker will venture to uncoverWashington by transferring his army to the James River unless the force in front ofAlexandria is greater than we suppose, or unless he believes this army incapable of advancingto the Potomac. My only anxiety arises from the present immobility of the army, owing tothe condition of our horses and the scarcity of forage and provisions. I think it all importantthat we assume the aggressive by the first of May, when we may expect General Hooker'sarmy to be weakened by the expiration of the term of service of many of his regiments, andbefore new recruits can be received..."

18


25/82

ORDER OF BATTLEARMY OF THE POTOMAC

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER, COMMANDING1-6 MAY 1863

GENERAL HEADQUARTERSCOMM AND OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL(Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick)93d New York Infantry6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Companies Eand I8th U.S. Infantry, Companies A, B , C,D, F, and GDetachment Regular Cavalry

Patrick's Brigade (Col. William F. Rogers)Maryland Light Artillery, Battery B21st New York Infantry23d New York Infantry35th New York Infantry8oth New Y ork Infantry (loth Militia)Ohio Light Artillery, 12th Battery

Engineer Brigade (Brig. Gen. Henry W.Benham)15th New York5oth New YorkBattalion United States

Signal Corps (Capt. Samuel T Cushing)Ordnance Detachment (Lieut. John R.Edie)Artillery (B rig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt)Artillery Reserve (Capt. William M .Graham)(Brig. Gen. Robert 0. Tyler)1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B1st Connectucit Heavy, Battery MNew Y ork Light, 5th BatteryNew York Light, 15th BatteryNew Y ork Light, 29th B atteryNew Y ork Light, 3oth BatteryNew York Light, 32d Battery1st United States, Battery K3d United States, Battery C

4th United States, Battery G5th United States, Battery K32d Massachusetts Infantry, Company C

19


26/82

FIRST ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds)

First Brigade (Col22d New York24th New York3oth New York84th New York

First Division (Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth)Walter Phelps, Jr.)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lysander

Cutler)7th Indiana76th New York95th New York147th New York56th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Gabriel R.Paul)

22d New Jersey29th New Jersey3oth New Jersey31st New Jersey137 th Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade (Brig. Gen. SolomonMeredith)

19th Indiana24th Michiganzd Wisconsin6th Wisconsin7th Wisconsin

Artillery (Capt. John A. Reynolds)New Hampshire Light, ist Batteryist New York Light, Battery L4th United States, Battery B

Second Division (Brig.First Brigade (Col. Adrian R. Root)

16th Maine94th New York1o4th New Yorkio7th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Col. Samuel H. Leonard)13th Massachusetts83d New York (9th Militia)97th New Yorknth Pennsylvania88th Pennsylvania

Third Division (MajFirst Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas A.Rowley)121st Pennsylvania

135th Pennsylvania142d Pennsylvania151st Pennsylvania

Gen. John C. Robinson)Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. HenryBaxter)

12th Massachusetts26th New York9oth Pennsylvania136th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom)Maine Light, zd Battery (B)Maine Light, 5th Battery (E)Pennsylvania Light, Battery C5th United States, Battery C

Gen. Abner Doubleday)Second Brigade (Col. Roy Stone)

143d Pennsylvania149th Pennsylvania15oth Pennsylvania

Artillery (Maj. Ezra W. Matthews)1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery Bist Pennsylvania Light, Battery Fist Pennsylvania Light, Battery G

20


27/82

SECOND ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch)First Division (Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. John C.econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas F.Caldwell)eagher)5th New Hampshire8th Massachusetts61st New York3d New York81st Pennsylvania9th New York48th Pennsylvania8th New York116th Pennsylvania (battalion)Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Samuel K.Zook)52d New York57th New York66th New York4oth Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade (Col. John R. Brooke)27th Connecticutad Delaware64th New York53d Pennsylvania145th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Capt. Rufus D. Pettit)ist New York Light, Battery B4th United States, Battery C

Second Division (Brig.First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully)

(Col. Henry W. Hudson)(Col. Byron Laflin)

19th Maineisth Massachusettsist Minnesota34th New York82d New York (2d Militia)

Third Brigade (Col. Norman J. Hall)19th Massachusettsloth Massachusetts7th Michigan42d New York59th New York127th Pennsylvania

Gen. John Gibbon)Second Brigade (BrigOwen)

69th Pennsylvania71st Pennsylvania72d Pennsylvaniaio6th Pennsylvania

Gen. Joshua T.

Artilleryist Rhode Island Light, Battery Aist Rhode Island Light, Battery B

Sharpshootersist Company Massachusetts

21


28/82

Third Division (Maj. Gen. William H. French)First Brigade (Col. Samuel S. Carroll)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. William

14th Indianaays)24th New JerseyCol. Charles J. Powers)28th New Jersey

4th Connecticut4th Ohio2th New Jersey8th Ohioo8th New York7th West Virginia3oth PennsylvaniaThird Brigade (Col. John D. MacGregor)(Col. Charles Albright)ist Delaware4th New York132d Pennsylvania Artilleryist New York Light, Battery Gist Rhode Island Light, Battery GReserve Artilleryist United States, Battery I4th United States, Battery A

THIRD ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles)First Division (Brig. Gen. David B. Birney)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Charles K.econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. H. HobartGraham)ard)(Col. Thomas W. Egan)oth Indiana57th Pennsylvaniad Maine63d Pennsylvaniath Maine68th Pennsylvania8th New Yorkio5th Pennsylvaniaoth New York114th Pennsylvania9th Pennsylvania141st Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Col. Samuel B. Hayman)17th Maine3d Michigan5th Michiganist New York37th New York

Artillery (Capt. A. Judson Clark)New Jersey Light, Battery Bist Rhode Island Light, Battery E3d United States, Batteries F and K

Second Division (Maj. Gen. Hiram G. Berry)(Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph W.(Col. William Blaisdell)evere)

ist MassachusettsCol. J. Egbert Farnum)nth Massachusettsoth New York16th Massachusetts1st New Yorknth New Jersey2d New York26th Pennsylvania3d New York74th New York12oth New York22


29/82

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. GershomMott)

(Col. William J. Sewell)5th New Jersey6th New Jersey7th New Jersey8th New Jersey2d New Yorkii5th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Capt. Thomas W. Osborn)ist New York Light, Battery DNew York Light, 4th Batteryist United States, Battery H4th United States, Battery K

Third Division (Maj. Gen. Amiel W. Whipple)(Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham)

First Brigade (Col. Emlen Franklin)econd Brigade (Col. Samuel M.86th New Yorkowman)124th New York2th New Hampshire122d Pennsylvania4th Pennsylvania

noth PennsylvaniaThird Brigade (Co)' Hiram Berdan)

ist U.S. Sharpshooters2d U.S. Sharpshooters

Artillery (Capt. Albert A.von Puttkammer)

(Capt. James F. Huntington)New York Light, loth BatteryNew York Light, nth Batteryist Ohio Light, Battery H

FIFTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. George G. Meade)Gen. Charles Griffin)

Second Brigade (Col. James McQuade)(Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer)

9th Massachusetts32d M assachusetts4th Michigan14th New York62d Pennsylvania

First Division (Brig.First Brigade (Brig. Gen. James Barnes)

2d Maine18th Massachusetts22d Massachusetts2d Co. Massachusettsist Michigan13th New York (battalion)25th New York118th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Col. Thomas B. W.Stockton)

loth MaineMichigan Sharpshooters16th Michigan12th New York17th New York44th New York83d Pennsylvania

Artillery (Capt. Augustus P. Martin)Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C)Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E)ist Rhode Island Light, Battery C5th United States, Battery D

23


30/82

Second Division (Maj Gen. George Sykes)First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Romeyn B.econd Brigade (Col. Sidney Burbank)Ayres)d United States, Companies B, C, F, I,

3d United States, Companies B, C, F,nd KG, I, and Kth United States, Companies D, F, G,

4th United States, Companies C, F, H,

, and Iand Kth United States, Companies A, B, E,12th United States, Companies A, B, C,nd ID, and G (First Battalion), and A, C,oth United States, Companies D, G,and D (Second Battalion)nd H14th United States, Companies, A, B,th United States, Companies B, C, D,D, E, F, and G (First Battalion), and, F, and G (First Battalion), and CF and G (Second Battalion)nd D (Second Battalion)17th United States, Companies A, C,D, G, and H (First Battalion), and Aand B (Second Battalion)

Third Brigade (Col. Patrick H. O'Rorke)rtillery (Capt. Stephen H. Weed)5th New Yorkst Ohio Light, Battery L14oth New Yorkth United States, Battery I146th New York Third Division (Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys)First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler)econd Brigade (Col. Peter H. Allabach)91st Pennsylvania23d Pennsylvania126th Pennsylvania31st Pennsylvania129th Pennsylvania33d Pennsylvania134th Pennsylvania55th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Capt. Alanson M. Randol)ist New York Light, Battery Cist United States, Batteries E and G

SIXTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick)First Division (Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks)

First Brigade (Col. Henry W. Brown)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph J.(Col. William H. Penrose)artlett)(Col. Samuel L. Buck)th Maine(Col. William H. Penrose)6th New Yorkist New Jersey7th New York2d New Jersey21st New York3d New Jersey6th Pennsylvania15th New Jersey23d New Jersey

24


31/82

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. DavidRussell)18th New York32d New York49th Pennsylvania95th Pennsylvania119 th Pennsylvania

A.rtillery (Maj. John A. Tompkins)Massachusetts Light, ist Battery (A)New Jersey Light, Battery AMaryland Light, Battery A2d United States, Battery D

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe)Second Brigade (Col Lewis A. Grant)hird Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas H.26th New Jerseyeill)2d Vermontth Maine

3d Vermont1st New Jersey4th Vermontoth New York5th Vermont3d New York6th Vermont9th New York77th New York

Artillery (Maj. J. Watts de Peyster)New York Light, ist Battery5th United States, Battery F

Third Division (Maj. Gen. John Newton)First Brigade (Col. Alexander Shaler)econd Brigade (Col. William H.

65th New Yorkrowne)67th New YorkCol. Henry L. Eustis)122d New Y orkth Massachusetts

23d Pennsylvaniaoth Massachusetts82d Pennsylvania7th M assachusetts36th New Yorkzd Rhode IslandThird Brigade (Brig. Gen. FrankWheaton)62d New York93d Pennsylvania98th Pennsylvaniaiozd Pennsylvania139th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy)ist Pennsylvania Light,

Batteries C and Dzd United States, Battery GLight Division (Col. Hiram Burnham)

6th Maine31st New York43d New York61st Pennsylvania5th WisconsinNew York Light Artillery, 3d Battery

25


32/82

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard)First Division (Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.)

(Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean)First Brigade (Col. Leopold von Gilsa)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C.

41st New YorkcLean)45th New YorkCol. John C. Lee)54th New York7th Connecticut153d Pennsylvania5th Ohio55th Ohio75th Ohioto7th OhioUnattached8th New York (one company)Artillery

New York Light, 13th Battery

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr)First Brigade (Col. Adolphus Buschbeck)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Francis C.29th New Yorkarlow)154th New York3d M assachusetts27th Pennsylvania34th New York73d Pennsylvania36th New York73d Ohio

Artilleryist New York Light, Battery I

Third Division (Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz)First Brigade (Brig. Gen. AlexanderSchimmelfennig)82d Illinois

68th New York157th New Y ork61st Ohio74th Pennsylvania

Unattached82d OhioArtillery

ist Ohio Light, Battery I

Second Brigade (Col. W. Krzyzanowski)58th New York119th New York75th Pennsylvania26th Wisconsin

Reserve Artillery (Lieut. Col. LouisSchirmer)New York Light, 2d Battery

ist Ohio Light, Battery Kist West Virginia Light, Battery C

26


33/82

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum)First Division (Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Knipe)econd Brigade (Col. Samuel Ross)5th Connecticutoth Connecticut28th New Yorkd Maryland46th Pennsylvania23d New York128th Pennsylvania45th New YorkThird Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas H.Ruger)27th Indiana2d Massachusetts

13th New Jersey1o7th New York3d WisconsinArtillery (Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh)

ist New York Light, Battery Kist New York Light, Battery M4th United States, Battery F

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard)First Brigade (Col. Charles Candy)econd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas L5th Ohioane)

7th Ohio9th Pennsylvania29th Ohioo9th Pennsylvania66th Ohionth Pennsylvania28th Pennsylvania24th Pennsylvania147th Pennsylvania25th PennsylvaniaThird Brigade (Brig. Gen. George S.Greene)both New York78th New York102d New York137th New Y ork

149th New YorkArtillery (Capt. Joseph M. Knap)

Pennsylvania Light, Battery EPennsylvania Light, Battery F

27


34/82

CAVALRY CORPS* (Brig. Gen. George Stoneman)First Division (Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton)

First Brigade (Col. Benjamin F. Davis)econd Brigade (Col. Thomas C. Devin)8th Illinoisst Michigan, Company L3d Indianath New York8th New Yorkth Pennsylvania9th New York7th PennsylvaniaArtilleryNew York Light, 6th BatterySecond Division (Brig. Gen. William W. Averell)First Brigade (Col. Horace B. Sargent)econd Brigade (Col. John B. McIntosh)1st Massachusettsd Pennsylvania4th New Yorkth Pennsylvania6th Ohio6th Pennsylvaniaist Rhode Island

Artilleryzd United States, Battery A

Third Division (Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg)First Brigade (Col. Judson Kilpatrick)econd Brigade (Col. Percy Wyndham)1st Maine2th Illinoiszd New Yorkst Maryland

loth New Yorkst New Jerseyist Pennsylvania

Regular Reserve Cavalry Brigade (Brig.Gen. John Buford)

6th Pennsylvania1st United Stateszd United States5th United States6th United StatesArtillery (Capt. James M. Robertson)

zd United States, Batteries B and Lzd United States, Battery M4th United States, Battery E

The Second and Third Divisions, First Brigade, First Division, and the Regular Reserve Brigade, with Robertson'sand Tidbars batteries, on the 'Stoneman Raid: April 29 - May 7.

28


35/82

ORDER OF BATTLEARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, COMMANDING1-6 MAY 1863

FIRST CORPS*McLaws' Division. (Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws)

Wofford's Brigade (Brig. Gen. W. Tershaw's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph B.Wofford)ershaw)16th Georgiad South Carolina18th Georgiad South Carolina24th Georgiath SOuth CarolinaCobb's Georgia Legionth South CarolinaPhillips' Georgia Legion5th South Carolina3d South Carolina BattalionSemmes' Brigade (Brig. Gen. Paul J.arksdale's Brigade (Brig. Gen. WilliamSemmes)arksdale)

loth Georgia3th M ississippi5oth Georgia7th Mississippi51st Georgia8th Mississippi53d Georgia1St MississippiArtillery (Col. H. C. Cabell)Carlton's (Georgia) Battery (TroupArtillery)Fraser's (Georgia) BatteryMcCarthy's (Virginia) Battery (1stHowitzers)

Manly's (North Carolina) Battery

Anderson's Division (Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson)Wilcox's Brigade (Brig. Gen. C. M.ahone's Brigade (Brig. Gen. WilliamWilcox)ahone)8th Alabamath Virginia9th Alabama2th Virginialoth Alabama6th V irginianth Alabama1st Virginia14th Alabama1st VirginiaWright's Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. R.Wright)

3d Georgia22d Georgia48th Georgia2d Georgia Battalion

Posey's Brigade (Brig. Gen. CarnotPosey)

12th M ississippi16th Mississippi19th Mississippi48th Mississippi

Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with H ood's and Pickett's divisions and Dearing'r and H enry's artillery battal-ions, in Southeastern Virginia.29


36/82

Perry's Brigade (Brig. Gen. E. A. Perry)2d Florida5th Florida8th Florida

ArtilleryAlexander's Battalion (Col. E. P.

Alexander)Eubank's (Virginia) BatteryJordan's (Virginia) BatteryMoody's (Louisiana) BatteryParker's (Virginia) BatteryRhea's (South Carolina) BatteryWoolfolk's (Virginia) Battery

Artillery (Lieut. Col. J. J. Garnett)Grandy's (Virginia) BatteryLewis' (Virginia) B atteryMaurin's (Louisiana) BatteryMoore's (formerly Huger's( (Virginia)Battery

ReserveWashington (La.) Artillery (Col. J. B.

Walton)Eshleman's 4th CompanyMiller's 3d CompanyRichardson's 2d CompanySquires' ist Company

SECOND CORPS (Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson)(Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill)(Brig. Gen. R. E. Bodes)(Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart)

Hill's Division (Maj.(Brig.(Brig.(Brig.

Heth's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Henry Heth)(Col. J. M. Brockenbrough)

4oth Virginia47th Virginia55th Virginia22d Virginia Battalion

Thomas' Brigade (Brig. Gen.E. L. Thomas)14th Georgia

35th Georgia49 h Georgia45 tth Georgia

Gen. A. P. Hill)Gen. Henry Heth)Gen. W. D. Pender)Gen. J. J. Archer)

McGowan's Brigade (Brig. Gen.S. McGowan)

(Col. 0. E. Edwards)(Col. A. Perrin)(Col. D. H. Hamilton)

ist South Carolinaist South Carolina12th South Carolina13th South Carolina14th South CarolinaArcher's (Fifth) Brigade (Brig. Gen.

J. J. Archer)(Col. B. D. Fry)13th Alabama5th Alabama Battalionist Tennessee7th Tennessee14th Tennessee

30


37/82

Lane's (Fourth) Brigade (Brig. Gen.J. H. Lane)

7th North Carolina18th North Carolina28th North Carolina33d North Carolina37th North Carolina

Pender's Brigade (Brig. Gen.W. D . Pender)13th N orth Carolina16th North Carolina22d North Carolina31st North Carolina38th North Carolina

Artillery (Col. R. L . W alker)Brunson's (South C arolina) B atteryCrenshaw's (Virginia) BatteryDavidson's (Virginia) B atteryMcG raw's (Virginia) B atteryMarye's (Virginia) Battery

D. H . Hill 's Division (Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes)(Brig. Gen. S. D. Ramseur)Rodes' Brigade (Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes)oles' Brigade (Brig. Gen. George Doles)(Col. E. A. O'Neal)th Georgia(Col. J. M. Hall)2th Georgia3d AlabamaISt Georgia5th Alabama4th Georgia6th Alabama12th Alabama26th AlabamaColquitt 's B rigade (Brig. Gen.A. H. Colquitt)

6th Georgiatoth Georgia23d Georgia27th Georgia28th GeorgiaRamseur's Brigade (Brig. Gen. S. D.Ramseur)(Col. F. M. Parker)

2d North Carolina4th North Carolina14th North Carolina3oth North Carolina

Iverson's Brigade (Brig. Gen. AlfredIverson)

5th North Carolina12th North C arolinaloth North Carolina23d N orth Carolina

Artillery (Lieut. Col. T. H. Carter)Reese's (Alabama) B atteryCarter's (Virginia) Battery (KingWilliam Artillery)Fry's (Virginia) Battery (OrangeArtillery)Page's (Virginia) Battery (MorrisArtillery)

31


38/82

Early's Division (Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early)Gordon's Brigade (Brig. Gen. John B.mith's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William

Gordon)mith)13th Georgia3th Virginia26th Georgia9th Virginia31st Georgia2d Virginia38th Georgia8th Virginiaboth Georgia61st GeorgiaHoke's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Robert Eays' Brigade (Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays)Hoke)th Louisiana6th North Carolinath Louisiana21st North Carolinath Louisiana54th North Carolinath Louisiana57th North Carolinath Louisianaist North Carolina Battalion

Artillery (Lieut. Col. R. S. Andrews)Brown, (Maryland) BatteryCarpenter's (Virginia) BatteryDement's (Maryland) BatteryRaine's (Virginia) Battery

Trimble's DivisionPaxton's (First) Brigade (Brig. Gen.

E. F. Paxton)(Col. J. H. S. Funk)

2d Virginia4th Virginia5th Virginia27th Virginia33d Virginia

Jones' (Second) Brigade (Brig. Gen.J. R. Jones)

(Col. T. S. Garnett)(Col. A. S. Vandrventer)

2ISt Virginia42d Virginia44th Virginia48th Virginia5oth Virginia

(Brig. Gen. R. E. Colston)Colston's (Third) Brigade (Col.

E . T. H. Warren)(Col. T. V. Williams)(Lieut. Col. S. T. Walker)(Lieut. Col. S. D. Thruston)(Lieut. Col. H. A. Brown)

ist North Carolina3d North Carolinaloth Virginia23d Virginia37th VirginiaNicholls' (Fourth) Brigade (Brig. Gen.

F. T. Nicholls)(Col. J. M. Williams)

ist Louisiana2d Louisianaloth Louisiana4th Louisiana15th Louisiana

32


39/82

Artillery (Lieut. Col. H. P. Jones)Carrington's (Virginia) Battery

(Charlottesville Artillery)Garber's (Virginia) Battery (Staunton

Artillery)Latimer's (Virginia) Battery (Courtney

Artillery)Thompson's Battery (Louisiana GuardArtillery)

Artillery Reserve (Col. S. Crutchfield)Brown's Battalion (Col. J. ThompsoncIntosh's Battalion (Maj.Brown). G. McIntosh)Brooke's (Virginia) Batteryurt's (Alabama) Battery

Dance's (Virginia) Battery (Powhatanohnson's (Virginia) BatteryArtillery)usk's (Virginia) B attery

Graham's (Virginia) Batteryooding's (Virginia) Battery (Danville(Rockbridge Artillery)

rtillery)Hupp's (Virginia) Battery (SalemArtillery)

Smith's Battery (3d RichmondHowitzers)

Watson's Battery (2d RichmondHowitzers)

RESERVE ARTILLERY (Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton)Sumter (Ga.) Battalion (Lieut. Col.

A. S. Cutts)Patterson's Battery (B)Ross' Battery (A)Wingfield's Battery (C)

Nelson's Battalion (Lieut. Col.W. Nelson)

Kirkpatrick's (Virginia) Battery(Amherst Artillery)Massie's (Virginia) Battery (FluvannaArtillery)

Milledge's (Georgia) Battery

33


40/82

CAVALRY (Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart)First Brigade (Brig. Gen. W ade

Hampton)ist North Carolinaist South Carolina2d South C arolinaCobb's Georgia LegionPhillips' Georgia Legion

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. W . H. F. Lee)2d North Carolina5th Virginia9th Virginialoth Virginia13th Virginia15th Virginia

Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee)ist Virginiaid Virginia3d Virginia, Col. Thom as H. Owen4th Virginia, Col. Williams C.Wickham

Fourth Brigade (Brig. Gen. William E.Jones)

1st Maryland B attalion6th Virginia7th Virginianth Virginia12th Virginia34th Virginia Battalion35th Virginia Battalion

Horse Artillery (Maj. R. F. B eckham)Lynchburg BeauregardsStuart Horse ArtilleryVirginia BatteryWashington (S. C.) Artillery

HOOKER'S HEADQUARTERS AT CHANCELLORSVITATURDAY MORNING, MAY 2 - THE HOUSEFACES SOUTH. FROM A WARTIME SKETCH.34


41/82

CASUALTIESEstimates of numbers engaged in Civil War battles vary, and statistics on killed, wounded,

captured and missing are incomplete. Participants attempted to fill gaps as they wrote theirofficial reports, and historians have tried to refine the data. The tabulation below is drawn fromthe Official Record, and from Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War inAmerica, 1861-1865 (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901).

Battle of Chancellorsville1-6 May 1863

Army ofEngaged Killed Wounded Captured/Missing Aggregate

the Potomac 104,891 1,575 9,559 4,684 15,818Army ofNorthern 48,080 1,581 8,700 2,018 12,299Virginia

STAYING JACKSON'S ADVANCE, SATCRDAY EVENING, MAY 2, WITH ARTILLERY PLACED ACROSSTHE PLANK ROAD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

35


42/82

O R G A N I Z A T I O N

The infantry regiment w as the basic adm inistrative and tactical unit of the Civil W ararmies. Regimental headquarters consisted of a colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, adjutant,quarterm aster, surgeon (with rank of major), two assistant surgeons, a chaplain, sergeantmajor, quartermaster sergeant, comm issary sergeant, hospital steward, and two p rincipalm usicians. Each regimen t was staffed by a captain, a first l ieutenant, a second lieutenant, afirst sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, and one wagoner.The authorized strength of a Civil War infantry regiment was about 1,000 officers and m en,arranged in ten companies plus a headquarters and (for the first half of the war at least) aband. D ischarges for physical disability, disease, special assignm ents (bakers, hospital nurses,or wagoners), court martials, and battle injuries all combined to reduce effective combatstrength. Before too long a typical regimen t might be reduced to less than 500.Brigades were m ade up of two or more regiments, with four regiments being mostcomm on. Union brigades averaged 1,000 to 1,500 men, wh ile on the Con federate side theyaveraged 1,500 to 1,800. Union brigades were designa ted by a num ber within their division,and each C onfederate brigade w as designated by the nam e of its current or formercommander.Divisions w ere formed of tw o or m ore brigades. Union divisions contained 2,500 to 4,000men , while the Confederate division w as somew hat larger, containing 5,000 to 6,000 men . Aswith brigades, Union divisions were designated by a num ber in the Corps, wh ile eachConfederate division took the nam e of its current or former comm ander.

Corps w ere formed of two or more divisions. The strength of a Union corps averaged9,000 to 12,000 off icers and m en, those of Confederate armies m ight average 20,000. Two ormore corps usually constituted an army, the largest operational organization. During the CivilW ar there were at least 16 armies on the Union side, and 23 on the C onfederate side .

In the Eastern Theater the two principal adversaries were the Union Arm y of the Potomacand the Confederate Arm y of Northern Virginia. There w ere generally seven corps in theUnion Arm y of the Potom ac, although by the spring of 1864 the num ber was reduced to four.From the Peninsula campaign through the Battle of Antietam the Confederate Army ofNorthern Virginia was organized into Longstreet's and Jackson's "commands," of about20,000 men each. In November 1862 the Confederate Congress officially designated thesecomm ands as corps. After Jackson's death in M ay 1863 his corps was divided in two, andthereafter the A rmy of Northern Virginia consisted of three corps.

36


43/82

CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATION

ARMYGeneral (CSA)Major General (USA)

CORPSLieutcn. nt General(CSA)

Major General (USA)

DIVISIONMajor General

BRIGADEBrigadier General

BATTALION(less than10 companies)

Lieutenant Colonelor Major

REGIMENT(10 companies)

Colonel orLieutenant Colonel

COMPANYCaptain COMPANY75-100 men

3 7


44/82

M1861 U.S. Rifled-Musket, .58 caliber

M1853 Enfield Rifled-Musket, .577 caliber

SMALL ARMS

During the Civil War the typical infantry weapon on both sides was a 9 1/4-lb., muzzle-loaded, rifled-musket. Loading procedure required the soldier to w ithdraw a paper cartridge(containing powder and bullet) from his cartridge box, tear open one end with his teeth, pourthe powder into the m uzzle, place the bullet in the muzzle and ram it to the breech using ametal ramrod. A copper percussion cap was then placed on a hollow cone at the breech. Tofire the weapon the hammer was cocked, and w hen the trigger was pulled the hamm er struckthe cap and ignited the powder charge. E ach soldier was expected to be capable of loadingand firing three aimed shots per minute.With the beginning of the Civil W ar a shortage of rifled-muskets on both sides forced theNorthern and Southern governments to issue older smooth-bore weapons, or purchaseweapons from European nations, the English Enfield, caliber .577, being the most popular.As the w ar progressed most soldiers were armed with rifled-muskets, although as late as thebattle of Gettysburg some troops on both sides still carried smooth-bores.

38


45/82

The basic ammunition load for each infantry soldier was 40 rounds in the cartridge box.Wh en a large action was expected 20 additional rounds might be issued to each soldier, whoplaced them in his uniform pockets or knapsack. In addition, 100 rounds per man were held inthe brigade or division trains and 100 rounds in the corps trains.T Y P I C A L C IV IL W A R S M A L L A R M S

W E A P O NAX RANGEFF. RANGEATE OF FIREINFANTRY:U.S. Rifled-000 yds00-300 ydsrds per minMusket, muzzle-loaded, cal .58English Enfield100 yds00-300 ydsrds per minRifled-Musket,muzzle-loaded,cal .577Smooth-bore Musket,00 yds0-60 ydsrds per minmuzzle-oaded,caliber .69A C U R R E N T I N F A N TR Y W E A P O N I S S H O W N F O R C O M P A R IS O N :Rifle,30 round mag.,breech-loaded,cal .223(M16A2)CAVALRY:Spencer Carbine,seven-shot m agazine,breech-loaded,caliber .52Sharps Carbine,single-shot, breech-loaded, caliber .52Colt and Remington Revolver,six-shot,calibers .36 & .44

3900 yds00-600 yds-shot burst150-200 ydsrds per 20 sec150-200 ydsrds per min20-50 yds 39


46/82

1 Handler2 Ammunition. Chest.1 Corer/or lid/4. Corner plates .S Tkumbuckle,6 Harp .

7 Back strap.3 .Pole prop chain..8. Front do.4. Pole prop/Socket .1-4,m/el9 Stay pins. Keys. d.S Splinter bar10 Stay forAntrnY Chest.6 foot boards.11.End bands orsplintenbar 17 Foot board brackets12. Trace /looks.8 Hounds. 19 stele boey.20 Azle tree.21 fluter strap21.Prittft hook.2.7 Fole.24.Prolong e. The shoulder michcm. Linchpins Lurchwa.thor and tekweir or mre nrfor the Gun carriage .2S.Foleyoke.26 Pole strap.27 Polo pal.Field Artillery

Civil War field artillery was organized into batteries of four or six guns. Regulationsprescribed a captain as battery commander, while lieutenants commanded two-gun "sections."Each gun made up a platoon, under a sergeant ("Chief of the piece") with 9 gun crewmenand six drivers.During transportation each gun was attached to a limber, drawn by a six-horse team. Thelimber chest carried thirty to fifty rounds of ammunition, depending on the type of guns inthe battery. In addition to the limbers, each gun had at least one caisson, also drawn by asix-horse team. The caisson carried additional ammunition in its two chests, as well as aspare wheel and tools. A horse-drawn forge and a battery wagon with tools accompaniedeach battery. A battery at full regulation strength, including all officers, noncoms, buglers,horse holders and other specialized functions, might exceed 100 officers and men. Withspare horses included, a typical six-gun battery might have about 100-150 horses.

A train battery could unlimber and fire an initial volley in about one minute, and each guncould continue firing two aimed shots a minute. The battery could limber up in about three

40


47/82

minutes. Firing was by "direct fire," that is fire in which the target is in view of the gun.The prescribed distance between guns was fourteen yards from hub to hub. Therefore, a six-gun battery would represent a normal front of a little over 100 yards. Depth of the batteryposition, from the gun muzzle, passing the limber, to the rear of the caisson, was prescribedas 47 yards. In practice these m easurements might be altered by terrain.

CIVIL W AR FIELD A RTILLERY - STATISTICS

W E A P O N CAL. (in.) S H E L L W T . E F F . R A N G E

6-Pdr 3.67 4-6 lbs 1500 ydsSmooth-bore3.67 in. bore12-Pdr 4.62 8-12 lbs 1600 ydsSmooth-bore (Napoleon)4.62 in. bore10-Pdr 2.9* 9-10 lbs 1800 ydsRifled (Parrott)3.00 in. bore20-Pdr 3.67 17-20 lbs 1900 ydsRifled(Parrott)3.67 in. bore3-inch 3.0 8-10 lbs 1800 ydsRifled (Ordnance)3.00 in. boreCURRENT FIELD HOWITZER:105MM.133.0 lbs5,700 ydsHowitzer(M119)

*Caliber of M1 861 is 2.9 in.; M 1863 is 3.0 in.41


48/82

ARTILLERY PROJECTILESFour basic types of projectiles were employed by Civil War field artillery:

ShotoltSOLID PROJECTILE: Round (spherical) projectiles of solid iron for smooth-bores are

commonly called "cannonballs" or just plain "shot." When elongated for rifled weapons, theprojectile is known as a "bolt." Shot was used against opposing batteries, wagons, buildings,etc., as well as enemy personnel. While round shot could ricochet across open ground againstadvancing infantry and cavalry, conical bolts tended to bury themselves upon impact with theground and therefore were not used a great deal by field artillery.

Spherical Shellifled ShellSHELL: The shell, whether spherical or conical, was a hollow iron projectile filled with ablack powder bursting charge. It was designed to break into several ragged fragments.

Spherical shells were exploded by fuses set into an opening in the shell, and were ignited bythe flame of the cannon's propelling discharge. The time of detonation was determined byadjusting the length of the fuse. Conical shells were detonated by similar timed fuses, or byimpact. Shells were intended to impact on the target.

42


49/82

Spherical Case Shotifled Case ShotCASE SHOT: Case shot, or "shrapnel" was the invention of Henry Shrapnel, an Englishartillery officer. The projectile had a thinner wall than a shell and was filled with a numberof small lead or iron balls (27 for a 12-pounder). A timed fuse ignited a small burstingcharge which fragmented the casing and scattered the contents in the air. Spherical case shotwas intended to burst from fifty to seventy five yards short of the target, the fragments beingcarried forward by the velocity of the shot.

Canister

CANISTER: Canister consisted of a tin cylinder in which was packed a number of smalliron or lead balls. Upon discharge the cylinder split open and the smaller projectiles fannedout. Canister was an extremely effective anti-personnel weapon at ranges up to 200 yards,and had a maximum range of 400 yards. In emergencies double loads of canister could beused at ranges of less than 200 yards, using a single propelling charge.

43


50/82

1 5 y ' 1 / 4 ,;:-/!4?

UP-HILL WORK.

eI

44

T A B L E O F F I R E .I G H T 1 2 - P O U N D E R G U N . M O D E L 1 8 5 7 .SHOT.

Charge 24 Pounds.SPHERICAL CASE SHOT.

Charge 24 Pounds.SHELL

Charge 2 Pounds.RANGEIn Yard.

ILSVATIONIn Decrees

, . , .

TIME or PLIGHT.13conda

ItANOEIn Yank

ELEVATIONIn D ogma

TIMI OF FLIGHTIn &mond&

HANOIIn Yard.

ELXVI TEMY Deem.O0000

0P--VCDt:

323 00 50' 1 " 300 0 0"75 300620 1 1'75 575 030 1"25 425875 130' 21,5 635 1 1,75 6151200 2 3" 73() 130' 2"25 7001325 3 4" 960 2 275 7851680 330' 4"75 1080 230' 35 925340' 5" 1135 3 4" 108030 45' 5" 1300

Use SHUT at masses of troop& and to batter, from 600 up to 2.0110 yards.se SHELL for firing buildings, at troops posted in woods, in pursuit, awlto produce a moral rather than a physical effect; greatest effective range 1,500 yards.se SPHERICAL CASE SHOT at masses of troops. at not less ,Mao500 yards: generally up to 1.500 yardsANISTER is not effective at 600 yards; it should not be used beyond 5 00 yards, and but very seldom :aidover the most favorable ground at that distance; at short ranges (less than 200 yards,) in emergency. use double canister, with single chargets notemploy RICOCHET at less distance than 1,000 s, 1.100 yards.CARE O F A M M U N IT I O N C H E S T .

Ist. Keep every-thing out that does not belong in them, e xcept bunch of cord or wire for breakage; lieare of loose tacks. nails, bolts, s',. scraps.2cL Keep friction primers in their papers, tied up.he pouch containing those for in \taut service must he closed, and so placed as to be secure.Take every precaution that primers do not get loose : single one may cause au explosion.se plenty of tow in packing.(This sheet is to be glued on to the inside of Limber Chest Cover.)

Reproduction of table of fire which was glued to inside of limber chest cover


51/82

TACTICS

The tactical legacy of the eighteenth century had emphasized close order formations ofsoldiers trained to maneuver in concert and fire by volleys. These "linear" tactics stressedthe tactical offensive. Assault troops advanced in line, two ranks deep, with cadenced steps,stopping to fire volleys on command and finally rushing the last few yards to pierce theenemy line with a bayonet charge.These tactics were adequate for troops armed with a single-shot, muzzle-loading, smooth-bore musket, with an effective range of about eighty yards. The close-order formation wastherefore necessary to concentrate the fire power of these inaccurate weapons. Bayonetcharges might then succeed because infantry could rush the last eighty yards before thedefending infantryme n could reload their m uskets after firing a volley.The U.S. Army's transition from smooth-bore muskets to rifles in 1855 would have twomain effects in the Civil W ar: it would strengthen the tactical defensive and increase thenumber of casualties in the attacking force. With an effective range of over 500 yardsdefenders firing rifles could d ecimate infantry form ations attacking according to lineartactics.During the Civil War the widespread use of the rifle caused infantry assault formations toloosen up somewhat, with individual soldiers seeking available cover and concealment.

45


52/82

Band

MAJIdjutant L LTC I(CO L S

E

However, because officers needed to maintain visual and verbal control of their commandsduring the noise, smoke and chaos of combat, close-order tactics to some degree wouldcontinue to the end of the war.Rapid movement of units on roads or cross country, was generally by formation of acolumn four men abreast. The speed of such columns was prescribed as 2 miles per hour.Upon reaching the field each regiment was typically formed into a line two ranks deep, theshoulders of each man in each rank touching the shoulders of the man on either side. Aregiment of 500 men (250 men in each rank), might have a front of about 200 yards. Thedistance between ranks was prescribed as 13 inches. Both front and rear ranks were capableof firing, either by volley or individual fire.

A typical combat fbrmation might be six companies in the main line, with two in reserve,and two out in front in extended skirmish order. During battle additional companies mightbe fed into the skirmish line, or the skirmishers might regroup on the main line.

Legend:PT c i 1 L TN 1 SG cl 2 LTc i 4 4 4 4 4 Ci 4 CI4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4C

F H K

6 arearrankfrontrank Co. A !)(aRegimental and National colorsand color guard FRONT

Regiment Formed Into Line of B attle

46


53/82

LOGISTICS

BUR EAU SYST EM . Bureau chiefs and heads of staff departments were responsible forvarious aspects of the Arm y's administration and logistics and rep orted directly to theSecretary of War. Th e division of responsibility and authority over them am ong theSecretary of W ar, the Assistant Secretaries, and the G eneral in Chief was never spelled out,and the supply departments functioned independently and w ithout effective coordinationthroughout most of the Civil War, although mu ch improved after Grant took comm and.Logistical support was entrusted to the heads of four sup ply departm ents inWashington: the Quarterm aster General, responsible for clothing and eq uipment, forage,anima ls, transportation, and housing; the Com missary G eneral for rations; the Chief ofOrdnance for w eapons, ammu nition, and miscellaneous related equipment; and the SurgeonGen eral for medical supplies, evacuation, treatment, and hosp italization of the wounded .For other support there were the A djutant General, the Inspector G eneral, thePaym aster General, the Judge A dvocate General, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief ofTopographical Engineers.The m ilitary department w as the basic organizational unit for administrative andlogistical purposes, and the com mander of each departm ent controlled the support in that areawith no intervening level between his departmental headq uarters and the bureau ch iefs inW ashington. There were six departments wh en the war started (East, West, Texas, NewM exico, Utah, and P acific); however, later on, boun daries changed and several geographical

47


54/82

departments might be grouped together as a military "division" headquarters.Army depots were located in major cities: Boston, New York, Baltimore,Washington, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco.Philadelphia was the chief depot and manufacturing center for clothing. Advanced andtemporary supply bases were established as needed to support active operations. Until 1864most depots were authorized the rank of captain as commander, who despite their low rankand meager pay, had tremendous resources of men, money, and material under their control.There were a few exceptions, notably COL Daniel H. Rucker at the Washington QM Depotand COL George D. Ramsay at the Washington Arsenal. The primary function of the depotswas to procure supplies and prepare them for use in the field by repacking, assembling, orother similar tasks.Procurement was decentralized. Purchases were made on the market by low-bidcontract in the major cities and producing areas by depot officers. Flour and some othercommodities were procured closer to the troops when possible. Cattle were contracted for atspecific points, and major beef depots were maintained at Washington (on the grounds of theunfinished Washington Monument), Alexandria, VA, and Louisville, KY. TheSubsistence Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof tothe immediate rear of the armies in the field, to be slaughtered by brigade butchers andissued to the troops the day before consumption.The Confederate Army used a similar system with depots at Richmond, Staunton,Raleigh, Atlanta, Columbus (GA), Huntsville, Montgomery, Jackson (MS), Little Rock,Alexandria (LA), and San A ntonio.SUPPLY OPERATIONS. Most unit logistics were accomplished at regimental level. Theregimental QM was normally a line lieutenant designated by the regimental commander. Hisduties included submitting requisitions for all QM supplies and transport, accounting forregimental property including tentage, camp equipment, extra clothing, wagons, forage, andanimals; issuing supplies and managing the regimental trains. The regimental commissaryofficer, also designated from the line, requisitioned, accounted for, and issued rations. Theregimental ordnance officer had similar duties regarding arms and ammunition and managedthe movement of the unit ammunition train.In theory, logistical staff positions above the regiment were filled by a fully qualifiedofficer of the supply department concerned, However, experienced officers were inperpetual short supply, and many authorized positions were filled by officers andnoncommissioned officers from line units or left vacant, the duties performed by someone inaddition to their own. This problem existed in both armies, where inexperience andignorance of logistical principles and proced ures generally redu ced levels of suppo rt.The S oldier's Load: About 45 lbs. (Union) - Musket and bayonet (14 lbs.), 60 rounds, 3-8days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat, shelter half, ground sheet, mess gear (cup, knife,fork, spoon, skillet), personal items (sewing kit, razor, letters, Bible, etc.). Confederatesusually had less, about 30 lbs.

48


55/82

Official US Ration: 20 oz. of fresh or salt beef or 12 oz. of pork or bacon, 18 oz. of flouror 20 of corn meal (bread in lieu if possible), 1.6 oz. of rice or .64 oz. of beans or 1.5 oz ofdried potatoes, 1.6 oz of coffee or .24 oz. of tea, 2.4 oz. of sugar, .54 oz. of salt, .32 gill ofvinegar.Union Marching Ration: 16 oz. of "hardtack," 12 oz. salt pork or 4 oz. fresh meat, 1 oz.coffee, 3 oz. sugar, and salt.Confederate Ration: Basically the same but with slightly more sugar and less meat, coffee,vinegar and salt, and seldom issued in full. For the Army of Northern Virginia usually halfof meat issued and coffee available only when captured or exchanged through the lines forsugar and tobacco. During the Maryland campaign foraging was disappointing, soConfede rate soldiers supplemented the issue ration with corn from the fields and fruit fromthe orchards.Forage: Each horse required 14 lbs. of hay and 12 of grain per day; mules needed the sameamount of hay and 9 lbs of grain. No other item was so bulky and difficult to transport.Union A nnual Clothing Issue: 2 caps, 1 hat, 2 dress coats, 3 pr. trousers, 3 flannel shirts,3 flannel drawers, 4 pr. stockings and 4 pr. bootees (high top shoes). Artillerymen andcavalrymen were issued jackets and boots instead of bootees. Allowance = $42.Confederate: Officially, the Confederate soldier was almost equally well clothed, but theQM was seldom able to supply the required items and soldiers wore whatever came to hand,the home-dyed butternut jackets and trousers being characteristic items. Shortages of shoeswere a constant problem.Tents: Sibley (tepee) held 20 men feet to center pole; early in war Union introduced thetente de'Abri (shelter half), used by the French Army, and called "dog" tent by wittysoldiers, now pup tent.Baggage: Enlisted men of both armies were required to carry their own. Union order ofSep 1862 limited officers to blankets, one small valise or carpet bag and an ordinary messkit. Confederate standards allowed generals 80 lbs., field officers 65 lbs., and captains andsubalterns 50 lbs.Wagons: Union's standard 6-mule Army wagon could haul 4,000 lbs on good roads in thebest of conditions but seldom exceeded 2,000 or with 4 mules 1,800 lbs. at rate of 12-24miles a day. Confederates often used 4-mule wagon with smaller capacity.Army of the Potomac authorized w agons as follows:corps hqdiv and bde hqregt of Infarty bty and cav 49


56/82

One w agon per regim ent was reserved for hospital stores and one for grain forofficers' horses.The Army of Northern Virginia used 4-mule wagons as follows:div hq

bde hqregt hqregt's medical storesregt's ammunition1/100 men per regt for baggage,camp equipmen t, rations, etc .Num bers of supply wagons per 1,000 men:Army of the Potomac (1862)29Jackson in the Valley (1862)7Army of Northern Virginia (1863) - 28Army of the Potomac (1864) - 36Sherman's March to the Sea (1864) - 40Napoleon's standard - 12.5

50


57/82

SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHESOF UNION LEADERS IN THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN

LINCOLN, Abraham.1809-65, Ky.

Lincoln was born in Kentucky and raised on the edge of thefrontier, growing up with scant formal education. His familythen settled in Ill., where Lincoln held various clerking jobs,and was partner in a grocery store that failed and left himheavily in debt. He then studied law and his forceful characterand honesty made him a favorite in the community and elected himto the state legislature as a Whig. Licensed as a lawy er in1836, he settled in Springfield where he married Mary Todd in1842. After one term in Congress (1847-49) he was not returnedby his constituents and retired from public life.While a lawyer for the Illinois Central Railroad he becameacquainted with George McClellan (vice-president) and AmbroseBurnside (treasurer). It was also during this time he becameacquainted with Edwin Stanton, having been temporarily hired byStanton's law firm. In opposition to Stephen A. Douglas and theKansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln entered into the growing debate ofsectionalism, joining the Republican party in 1856.The famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 ended in Douglas'election to the Senate, but Lincoln emerged as a powerfulnational figure. He was a serious contender for the Republicanpresidential nomination in 1860, and after his campaign managersstruck a deal with Pennsylvania political boss Simon Cameron,that if elected he would name Cameron secretary of war, Lincolngained the nomination (In Jan '62 Lincoln, unhappy with Cameron'sperformance, replaced him with Edwin Stanton).When Lincoln was elected on 6 Nov '60 the South saw the end oftheir political power in the Union, and southern states beganseceding. After the attack on F ort Sumter, S.C., in Apr '61, hecalled upon the various states to furnish 75,000 volunteers toput down the rebellion. Frequently advised by governors and

51


58/82

congressmen, Lincoln selected many generals from among leadingpoliticians in order to give himself a broader base of politicalsupport. Some political generals, such as John A. Logan andFrancis P. Blair, distinguished themselves, whereas others provedmilitary hindrances. Other commissions were given to Regulars onactive duty, former West Pointers like McClellan, who hadresigned to pursue a business career, or those who had heldvolunteer commissions in the Mexican War.During the war Lincoln appointed and discarded a secession ofcommanding generals as he was subjected to repeated humiliationin the defeat of Union arms. After McDowell's defeat at FirstManassas in Jul '61, he made McClellan commander-in-chief of allarmies, and acquiesced in that commander's oblique movement withthe Army of the Potomac against Richmond via the Peninsula.After this unsuccessful campaign, however, Lincoln relievedMcClellan of supreme command and put John Pope in command of aseparate Army of Virginia.After Pope's defeat at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62) Lincolnreconsolidated all forces under McClellan, who led the hastilyassembled army to block Lee's invasion of Maryland.In Jul '62 Lincoln had drafted a proclamation freeing slavesin the rebellious states but withheld it because, after Unionreverses, it might appear an act of desperation. WhenMcClellan's army successfully halted Lee at Antietam (17 Sep'62), the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, changing thewar's focus (heretofore fought to preserve the Union and not todisrupt the South's social fabric) to include ending slavery.When McClellan failed to pursue Lee after Antietam Lincolnrelieved him. The failure of McClellan's successors - Burnsideat Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) and Hooker at Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) - added to Lincoln's perplexity and tended todiscredit his ability in military matters. Meade's success atGettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) was marred by the failure to pursue andcrush Lee's army. Even under Grant, whom Lincoln brought East inthe spring of 1864, there were months of sanguinary fighting withhope deferred.H

Chancellorsville Staff Ride Briefing Book

Documents

Transcript of Chancellorsville Staff Ride Briefing Book