Challenges to TraditionalMorality

Altruism

Behavior that benefits others atsome cost to oneself and that ismotivated by the desire to benefitothers

Some Ordinary AssumptionsAbout Morality

(1) People sometimes behavealtruistically.

(2) We sometimes have an obligationto behave altruistically.

Challenges to TheseAssumptions

(PE) Psychological Egoism: Allhuman actions are motivated (and canonly be motivated) by selfish desiresor self-interest.

(EE) Ethical Egoism: We ought to pursueonly our own self-interest.

Psychological vs. Ethical Egoism

• PE is a descriptive (non-normative) claim.

• EE is a prescriptive (normative) claim.

• But if “ought” implies “can”, then PE impliesthat no ethical theory other than EE can betrue.

Gyges’ Ring(pp.497-8)

• Thought experiment: imagine a ring thatcould make its wearer invisible. Nowsuppose that a decent man and a bad maneach get a hold of one of these rings.

• There’s no question that the bad man will usethe ring to commit crimes with impunity.Will the decent man do the same? (Whatdoes Glaucon say?)

• Should he do the same? (Glaucon’s view?)

Two Versions of PE

Weak PE (about valuing): The only thing wevalue (or can value) for its own sake is thesatisfaction of our own interests.

Strong PE (just about motivation): Our self-interest is always at least a necessary part of themotive behind our actions; if it were absent,we wouldn’t act.

Which one is Feinberg concerned with?

Psychological Egoistic Hedonism (PEH)

• More specific version of PE• Claims that all human actions are (& can

only be) motivated by the desire for one’sown pleasure

• Like PE, PEH has a strong and a weak form.Can you state each one?

• Feinberg considers two main arguments forPEH.

One Argument for PEH

(P) We get pleasure from performingapparently unselfish acts.

(C) Therefore our motivation forperforming such acts is really thepleasure we receive from them.

Objections?

• Is the premise true? Feinberg doesn’tthink so. Can you come up with acounterexample?

• Even if the premise is true, does theconclusion necessarily follow? (I.e., isthe argument valid?) Again, Feinbergthinks not. Why?

A Second Argument for PEH

(P) The only way to teach people to doright and refrain from doing wrong isby rewarding them with pleasure andpunishing with pain.

(C) Therefore, the only motivation peoplehave is to seek pleasure and avoid pain.

Assessing the SecondArgument for PEH

• How does Feinberg reply to thisargument? (See 482.) How strong is hisreply?

• Can you think of other objections to theargument?

Three Arguments Against PEH

(1) Lincoln Story

(2) Hedonist Paradox

(3) Two Meanings of Pleasure

Lincoln Story• How does Lincoln explain his own motive for

saving the pigs?• Why does Feinberg think that Lincoln must

be wrong?• Thought experiment: what would Lincoln say

if he were offered an amnesia pill? Whatdoes this suggest about strong PEH?

• What do you think he would say if we madehim take a pleasure-erasing pill before savingthe pigs? What does this suggest about weakPEH?

Hedonist Paradox (HP)HP: “If you aim exclusively at pleasure itself…

pleasure will never come.”

An argument based on HP(P1) Suppose that we only desired our own

pleasure. (PEH)(P2) If we only desired our own pleasure, we

would never gain any pleasure. (HP)(P3) But we do gain pleasure.(C) Therefore, PEH cannot be true.

Two Meanings of Pleasure

(P1) “Pleasure” must mean either (a)“pleasant physical sensations” or (b)“desire-fulfillment”.

(P2) If “pleasure” means (a), then PEH isimplausible. (Why?)

(P3) If “pleasure” means (b), then PEH isconfused. (Why?)

(C) Therefore, PEH is untenable.

An Argument for PE (though notPEH specifically)

(P) Every desire that a person has is thatperson’s desire (i.e., it originates inhimself).

(C) Therefore, every desire that an agenthas is a selfish desire.

Objections & RepliesObjection #1: Conclusion doesn’t follow from the

premise. Just because a desire originates in me doesn’tmean that it’s a selfish desire (i.e., that the desire aimsat my own benefit).

PE’s Reply: Conclusion does follow from the premisebecause what it means for my motives to be “selfish” isthat those motives are mine; they originate in me.

Objection #2: If so, then PE isn’t an empirical claim.(What does this mean?)

PE’s Reply: PE isn’t supposed to be an empirical claim.Objection #3: Then what’s the use of it?

Rachels on Ethical EgoismI suggest we distinguish:• Ethical Egoism: Each person ought to pursue

his self-interest exclusively. Genuinealtruism is irrational.

• Ethical Minimalism: It’s always permissibleto pursue one’s own self-interest, but it’sequally permissible, rational, and often goodto be genuinely altruistic. (It’s just notrequired; it’s supererogatory.)

Three Arguments for EE

(1) If everyone pursues her own self-interest,society will be better off.

(2) Ayn Rand’s argument: EE is the onlyphilosophy that properly respects the valueof the individual.

(3) Ethical Egoism underlies commonsensemorality. The reason a person is obligatednot to lie, cheat, steal, etc. is that doing thesethings would be harmful to himself.

Argument (1) for EE

(P) Everyone will be better off if we alljust look out for ourselves.

(C)Therefore, we should all just look outfor ourselves.

• Questions:– Is the premise true? Can you think of a

counterexample?– Is there a hidden premise here? What is it?

Argument (2) for EE• Source: Ayn Rand. (See, e.g., Atlas Shrugged.)• The argument:

(P1) Our choice is between EE and the “morality of sacrifice”,which calls on us to sacrifice our own good for the good ofothers.(P2) The highest goal for humans is to perfect one’s ownabilities.(P3) The “morality of sacrifice” is incompatible with this goal.(C)Therefore, we should reject the “morality of sacrifice” andchoose EE instead.

• Problems:– False dichotomy: there are other alternatives than the two

Rand describes.– Straw man: no significant philosopher has ever endorsed

what Rand calls the “morality of sacrifice”

Argument (3) for EE(P) To do what commonsense morality demands is

always to do what is in your own best interest.(C) EE is therefore the source of our commonsense

moral obligations.• Possible objections:

– Premise does not hold true in all cases. Can you think of asituation in which it doesn’t pay to do the right thing?

– Conclusion doesn’t follow from the premise. Even if doingwhat commonsense morality demands always benefited us,it wouldn’t follow that the reason it is right to do the whatcommonsense morality demands is that it is right to do whatbenefits us. Cf. the “pleasure effect” argument for PE.

Some Arguments Against EE

(1) Inconsistent Outcomes Argument(2) No Relevant Differences Argument(3) Paradox of Egoism(4) Argument from Counterintuitive

Consequences

N.B. (3) & (4) are not discussed in Rachels’article.

Inconsistent Outcomes Argument• Imagine that you and I are eating pizza. There’s only

one slice left and we’re both still hungry. EE will saythat you are obligated to take the last piece andprevent me from getting it. At the same time,according to EE, I am obligated to try to get the lastpiece and I should do what I can to prevent you fromgetting it.

• This may seem to be a problem for at least two reasons:(a) It may seem that by recommending inconsistent outcomes, EE

fails to fulfill a necessary function of any moral theory--namely, that it give us a way to resolve conflicts.

(b)It may seem logically inconsistent to say that it is both right forme to try to get the piece of pizza and right for you to try toget the piece of pizza.

How the Egoist can reply:

• To (a): A moral theory need not provide a way ofresolving conflicts. It is more like the Commissionerof Boxing than a courtroom judge.

• To (b): There’s no logical inconsistency here. Again,this is easy to see if we think of the situation as akinto a competitive sports event or chess match, inwhich we believe all the contestants have a right totry to win.

• By the way, to say that it is right for both me and youto try to get the last piece of pizza is not the same assaying that it is both right and wrong for me to try toget the last piece of pizza. It is only right--not wrong.

No Relevant DifferencesArgument

(P1) It is right to value the interests ofsome groups more than others’ only ifthere is some relevant “factual”difference between the members of thetwo groups.

(P2) There is no relevant factualdifference between oneself and others.

(C) Therefore, contra EE, it is not right tovalue one’s own interests more thanothers’.

Assessing the NRD Argument

• Rachels thinks this argument “comes closestto an outright refutation of Ethical Egoism”.

• Question: Does the argument prove toomuch? Rachels seems to assume that the onlymorally relevant differences are intrinsicdifferences. But aren’t there some groups ofpeople (e.g., our family) whose interests weought to value more than others’, but whodon’t differ from us with respect to anyintrinsic properties?

Paradox of Egoism(P1) EE says that we are always obligated to do what is

in our best self-interest.(P2) It is in the the everyone’s best interest to experience

true friendship.(P3) True friendship requires genuine altruism--that is,

caring about another’s interests for their own sake.(C) Therefore, EE is paradoxical, because it tells us both

that we should never behave altruistically and thatwe should sometimes behave altruistically.

• How might the Egoist reply to this argument?

Argument from CounterintuitiveConsequences

(P1) According to EE, I would be wrong to do anythingthat I have nothing to gain from, including makingan effort to preserve the environment for futuregenerations and saving all of Europe fromdestruction by pushing a button.

(P2) But clearly there is nothing wrong with doing thesethings.

(C ) Therefore, EE entails unacceptable consequences.

• How is the Egoist likely to respond to this?• Even if this argument does pose a threat to Ethical

Egoism, it doesn’t threaten Ethical Minimalism.

The Difficulty of Answering theEgoist

• The challenge of Egoism amounts to the question,Why be moral? (This is the essence of Glaucon’schallenge to Socrates in Republic II, and Plato spendsthe remainder of this famous dialogue trying toanswer it.)

• To give an answer to this question that would satisfythe Egoist, we would need to explain how it isprofitable to be moral. But, according to somephilosophers, even if we could give such anexplanation, it wouldn’t convince the Egoist that heought to be moral; it would only make him want to bemoral.

• Thus, some philosophers think the question is simplywrongheaded. There is no further reason why we aremorally obligated to do certain things, so it ispointless to ask for such a reason.

Two Skeptical Accounts of theOrigins of Morality

(1) Glaucon’s Social Contract Theory

(2) Nietzsche’s “Geneology ofMorals”

Background to Glaucon’s Account:The Prisoner’s Dilemma

• Scenario: You and your neighbor have been arrested, chargedwith a crime, and taken to separate rooms for questioning. (Itdoesn’t really matter whether you’re innocent or guilty, butassume you’re both innocent.)

• You each have two options, and no way of knowing whichoption the other has chosen: you can either keep mum or betrayyour neighbor and say that he did it while maintaining thatyou’re innocent.

• There are three possible outcomes: (1) one of you betrays whilethe other keeps mum; (2) both of you betray; (3) both of youkeep mum.

• The result of (1) is that the betrayer goes free while the betrayedgets two years in prison. The result of (2) is that both of you getone year in prison. The result of (3) is that both of you will begiven a $500 fine. These results are summarized in thefollowing chart.

You: 1 year inprisonNeighbor: 1 yearin prison

You: Go freeNeighbor: 2 yearsin prison

Betray

You: 2 years inprisonNeighbor: Goesfree

You: $500 fineNeighbor:$500fine

Keep Mum

BetrayKeep Mum

You

Your Neighbor

• Assume the following preferences: 1: Go free

2: $500 fine3: 1 year in prison4: 2 years in prison

• Question: What is the purely self-interestedlyrational thing for each of you to do?

• What will the result be if both of you choosethis course of action?

• How could you both get a better result?

• Now consider how a parallel situation might arise in asocial context: suppose you and your neighbor are in astate of nature, and a situation arises where each of youwill have the opportunity to take something valuablefrom the other.

• Assume the following preferences:1: You take your neighbor’s stuff and keep your own.2: You both keep your own stuff.3: You take your neighbor’s stuff but lose your own.(Worse than 2 because violating others doesn’t makeup entirely for the injury of being violated oneself.)4: You lose your own stuff and get nothing in return.

• The following chart summarizes the possibilities.

You: 3Neighbor: 3

You: 4Neighbor: 1

Take

You: 1Neighbor: 4

You: 2Neighbor: 2

Refrain

TakeRefrainYour Neighbor

You

• What is the rational thing for each of you to do?• What will the outcome be if both of you choose this course of action?• How could you improve on this outcome?

Glaucon’s Account of the Originsof Morality

• According to Glaucon, justice (=morality) is a set ofrules that people agree to follow in order to avoidthe worst outcome--suffering injustice and notcommitting it. While being just allows us to moveup the ladder of preferences, however, it does notget us the best outcome, which is to commitinjustice without suffering it in return.

• On this account, what reason do we have to be justif we can get away with injustice?

Some Background to Nietzsche• One of philosophy’s greatest polemicists.• Some recommended reading: Beyond Good and Evil,

Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Geneology of Morals• Alleged association with Nazis: It’s easy to see how

any ambitious nationalistic movement might’vetaken inspiration from N’s writings, but there’snothing in N that supports the specific anti-Semiticprogram of the Nazis.

• N on women: N’s writings are notoriouslymisogynistic; it’s probably safe to ignore everythingN says about women.

Nietzsche’s Project• responding to a society that he thinks “has become unanimous

in all major moral judgments”, which to his mind include an“opposition to any special claims, special rights, or privileges”,a “mistrust of punitive justice”, a “hatred against suffering” andexploitation—basically, the fundamental principles of modernliberal democratic society and Judeo-Christian ethics.

• argues (1) that these attitudes and beliefs represent only oneamong many possible forms of morality, and (2) that theyrepresent an unhealthy, degenerate form of morality.

• attempts to make both these points by giving a “geneology” ofmorals—that is, by unearthing the historical origins of modernmorality.

• finds that there has been a “value inversion” at some point inhistory calls for a “revaluation of values”.

Master Morality vs. Slave Morality• originates in the dominant

class—i.e., the elite, thearistocracy

• based on an oppositionbetween good and bad, wheregood = noble and arises out ofadmiration for the excellence ofthe elite, and bad = despicableand designates those who aremediocre and weak in contrastto the elite

• values pride, hardness,devotion to one’s own friendsand family; disdainsselflessness, pity, impartiality

• originates in the oppressedclass, the “herd”

• based on an oppositionbetween good and evil, wherethe idea of evil arises out ofresentment and fear of theelite, and attaches to thosequalities that are regarded asgood by the master morality.(This is the “inversion” ofvalues that N talks about.)Good, meanwhile, designatesthose qualities that are useful inalleviating the pain of theherd’s existence.

• values pity, humility, freedom;condemns suffering, inequality,exploitation

Conclusions

• Is there an argument in all this? If so, whatmight it look like?

• Questions to consider: Is there some form ofegalitarian society in which great men andgreat achievements can be realized? Is thekind of exploitation and power disparitiesthat Nietzsche celebrates really necessary forexcellence and achievement? Can there beflourishing without exploitation?