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![Page 1: “Challenges of Secure Routing in MANETs: A Simulative Approach using AODV-SEC” Analysis of a technical report from Stephan Eichler and Christian Roman,](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051517/5697bf851a28abf838c87388/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
“Challenges of Secure Routing in MANETs:A Simulative Approach using AODV-SEC”
Analysis of a technical report from Stephan Eichler and Christian Roman, IEEE International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems, 2006.
Presented by Martin DimkovskiCSE 6950November 8th, 2010
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Agenda of the Presentation
1. Part I: Security in MANET Routing2. Part II: AODV-SEC as a Solution
3. Part III: Simulation and Results
4. Part IV: Conclusions and Ideas
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Part I: Security in MANET Routing
Trouble for routing is a DoS
MANETs are different:– Open air– Dynamic topology– Link breaks– Channel availability
Novel attack models = Novel security approach needed
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Easier Physical Access=> Careful what is Shared
The symmetric / asymmetric dilemma– Shared keys could compromise everyone– But asymmetric several times more expensive
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In-line Tampering
2: Change
Hop count, DSN
RREQRREP
RERR
1: DropControl or Data
Packets
Hop Count tampering:– Make itself the desired next hop
To eavesdrop To drop packets
– Invalidate routes
DSN tampering:–Outdate good route–Wraparound numbering
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Sybil Attack – Bad Identities
Forged identities– Pretending to be someone else– Eavesdropping makes this easy
Multiple identities–Causing confusion–Bypassing protocol logic
OR
In-Line
Out-out-bound
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Blackhole and Greyhole Attacks
Blackhole = Drop all packets– Drop them itself, or– Make them loop to max TTL
Greyhole = Drop packets selectively
Can be achieved with– Tampering
And/Or – Bad identities
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Wormhole Attack
DA B C
Tunnel frames
E
(A) thinks (E) is a neighbor
(E) thinks (A) is a neighbor
Invisible to higher layers Current solution = Add packet leashes (marks)
– Time– Geographic
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Previous Workon MANET Routing Security
Any work on sensor networks applicable SEAD SRP ARIADNE (based on DSR) ARAN (based on AODV) SAODV
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Agenda of the Presentation
1. Part I: Security in MANET Routing
2. Part II: AODV-SEC as a Solution3. Part III: Simulation and Results
4. Part IV: Conclusions and Ideas
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Part II: AODV-SEC as a Solution
1. AODV-SEC Motivation2. Public Keys Signed with External CA
Certificates3. Encryption and Signatures4. Hash Chains on Hop Count5. Compact New Certificate Type6. AODV-SEC Implementation7. Solved Problems8. Open Problems
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AODV-SEC Motivation
Specific use case for vehicular networks
Occasional fixed network connection
Asymmetric cryptography (no shared keys)
Central CA for subscription services
Real cryptography simulation
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Unique ID: BUnique ID: A
Public Key of A
CA trust pre-loaded= CA connectivity needed only to issue and revoke
MANET GatewayAny node connected to the outside
at any point
Private Key of A
MANET
External CA
A’s CertificateSigned by CA:
“This Public Key belong to ID A”
Private Key of B
Public Key of B
B’s CertificateSigned by CA:
“This Public Key belong to ID B”
CACertificate
CACertificate
Certificates exchangedInside routing protocol packets
AODV-SEC control packets
Public Keys Signed with External CA Certificates
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Encryption and Signatures
Senders use private keys to sign messages Receivers use certified public keys to verify
signature
Unique ID: BUnique ID: A
Public Key of A
Private Key of A
MANET
A’s CertificateSigned by CA:
“This Public Key belong to ID A”
Private Key of B
Public Key of B
B’s CertificateSigned by CA:
“This Public Key belong to ID B”
CACertificate
CACertificate
Certificates exchangedInside routing protocol packets
AODV-SEC control packets
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Public/Private key algorithm = RSA
Private key signatures protect– Authenticity (origin)– Integrity of message
2 Signatures in each routing packet– Originator, and – Last hop
Encryption and Signatures (2)
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Hash Chains on Hop Count
SHA-1 hash chains:
– Provide a “chain of custody” on hop count Going back to the originator
– No intermediate node can lower the countEven if a valid MANET member
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“Top Hash” field = h(h(..h(seed)..))– h applied Max_Hop_Count times– Set by originator
“Hash” field – Start with h(seed)– Each node: Hash = h(Hash) AND Hop_Count++
Receiver’s verification: ? h(h(..(Hash)) = Top Hash– where h is applied Max_Hop_Count – Hop_Count
Hash Chains on Hop Count (2)
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Compact New Certificate Type
Bad performance with X.509 due to its size– Fragmentation on each control packet
New certificate type created – mCert.
mCert keeps only critical data and achieves a 50% size reduction (450 B vs ~1000 B).
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AODV-SEC Implementation
Existing AODV extension options
Existing AODV code from Uppsala University
Only controller code module required mod. – Interoperable with insecure AODV
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Improved: Physical Access Risks
No private keys are shared
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Solved: In-line Tampering
Cannot Change Hop count, DSN
RREQRREP
RERR
All fields signed back to originator
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Solved: Sybil Attack – Bad Identities
OR
In-line
Out-of-bound
Unique, centrally certified IDs
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Solved:Blackhole and Greyhole Attacks
Blackhole = Drop all packets– Drop them itself, or– Make them loop to max TTL
Greyhole = Drop packets selectively
Prevents sybil attacks and tampering
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Solved: Wormhole Attack
DA B C
Tunnel frames
E
(A) thinks (E) is a neighbor
(E) thinks (A) is a neighbor
Packet leashes signed back to originator
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Open Problem:DoS from Signed Control Packets
If nodes cannot check signatures line speed:
Queue Overload
Flood of bogus signed packets
Queue Overload
Queue Overload
Queue Overload
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Open Problem:Sleep Deprivation Torture
Bad keysto be verified
in routing packetsBattery
Battery
Battery
Battery
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Agenda of the Presentation
1. Part I: Security in MANET Routing
2. Part II: AODV-SEC as a Solution
3. Part III: Simulation and Results4. Part IV: Conclusions and Ideas
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Simulation Environment
NS-2 simulator DSSS, 11 Mbps, 170m range 802.11 DCF Random Waypoint Model (0 to 600 s) CBR, 512B packets, 25-50% of nodes as
senders 2 scenarios:
– 900 x 200 m, 20 nodes– 1500 x 300 m, 50 nodes
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End-to-End Delay
• With only 16 sources:• Impractical for real-time applications at moderate load
• Ex: ITU-T G.114: voice requires < 0.15 s
- Not Scalable
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Larger Network ExperimentConfirms Serious Scalability Issues
• Dramatic increase• Problem even for non-real-time applications
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End-to-End Delay a Problem?
Authors see these results as promising– Maybe they are not considering real-time aspects in their
specific scenario. They acknowledge cryptographic latency
– but not as a significant problem
We believe the results are concerning And that the main problem is cryptographic
performance
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Cryptography Performance Factor
Per node crypto latency (in ms)
Based on this – Authors say 60 ms average not a problem
However for an end-to-end total we need:– Times each node– For both the RREQ and RREP direction
This can explain the delays in the results
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Route Acquisition Times
• Shows good results
• But for home many sources?
• Inefficiency as per end2end delay comes with many sources
•And number of hops should go up to group size
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Already Bad Overhead Can Get Much Worse
• With only 16 nodes• Overhead at 50% with moderate load
• Lighter cryptography (smaller packets) identified as a need
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Mobile as Much as AODV (but at what load?)
• Must be at low load• Based on previous
• Nevertheless, as such:Maintains mobility excellence of AODV
•X.509 results irrelevant after mCert introduction
• Need load dependency
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Succeeds in Blocking Malicious Nodes
• Attack scenario:• Attackers spoofing RREQs• No mobility / 16 sources
• AODV-SEC prevents the bad RREQs
• Peculiar why both drop above 70%?
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Packet Delivery RatioConflicting Results? (load data needed?)
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Agenda of the Presentation
1. Part I: Security in MANET Routing
2. Part II: AODV-SEC as a Solution
3. Part III: Simulation and Results
4. Part IV: Conclusions and Ideas
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Part IV: Conclusions & Ideas
Feasible protocol, especially for smaller, lighter scenarios
We need to improve cryptography performance – Currently induced latency is concerning
We need to improve cryptography efficiency– Large routing packet size is a problem
But probably not the main one
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Future Improvement Ideas
Evaluate securing only replies Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), would
improve:– Certificate size / packet size– Calculation times– Better security
More powerful simulation systems More efficient simulation models
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Questions
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Appendix 1:Example Extension (RREP Single)
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Appendix 2Cryptography Library Selection
Crypto++ and libcrypto benchmarked– libcrypto (OpenSSL) won
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X.509 vs mCert