CHALLENGES IN THE LICENSING OF NEW NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, AND SERVICE LIFE

EXTENSION OF OPERATING ONES

Safeguards, safety and security aspects

Kristóf Horváth, PhD

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority Co-authors: M. Lehota, G. Petőfi

Paks Nuclear Power Plant

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Paks NPP

Four VVER-440/213 type reactors

Commissioned in 1983, 84, 86, 87, designed for 30 years

Six-loop, horizontal steam-generators

Provides cca. 40% of domestic electric energy production

Load factor – overall: 80-90%

Power increase in two steps to 500-510 MWe completed

LTO to 50 ys is underway

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Licensing of new NPP units

3

The first steps towards a new NPP

30 March 2009

Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy 7. § (2) Preliminary consent in principle of the Parliament shall be required for the commencement of preparatory actions for the construction of a new nuclear facility or radioactive waste repository, or for the expansion of an existing nuclear power plant with an additional unit containing nuclear reactors.

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New National Energy Strategy

Goal: to ensure the long term

sustainability, security and

economic competitiveness of

energy supply in Hungary

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the long-term preservation of

nuclear energy in the energy mix

‘Nuclear-Coal-Green’ scenario

LTO New Units

14 Febr 2012

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6

New National Energy Strategy New Units

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Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

1. Preparation and regular review of Regulation

2. Regulatory control (authorization,

inspection, assessment, enforcement) of nuclear installations and storage facilities (HAEA NSD) of nuclear and radioactive materials (HAEA GND)

3. Emergency response and preparedness

4. Technical support

5. International relations

6. Public information

Safety

Security

Safeguards

The Nuclear Safety

Regulation

in Hungary Gov.

Decree No. 118/2011

Act No.

CXVI/1996 about

Nuclear Energy

Nuclear Safety Codes

Safety Guidelines

Local Regulations

Other regulations

1 2 3 … 10 9 …

Non legally binding

Legally binding

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Key events

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2008: New Energy Policy Concept

30th March, 2009: decision-in-principle of the Hungarian Parliament on new NPPs

2012: New National Energy Strategy (‘Nuclear-Coal-Green’ scenario)

2012: establishment of MVM Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant Development Ltd

2013- : Collation with the EC based on Euratom Treaty

January 2014: Intergovernmental agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy by Russia and Hungary -> Act II/2014

• Two VVER-1200 type reactors at the Paks site

• Russian loan for the 80% of construction costs

Key events

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March 2014: Financial IGA about the interstate loan for the extension of Paks NPP –> Act XXIV/2014

June 2014: Nomination of a government commissioner on the Paks-2 project

December 2014: Implementation agreements with Russia

• MVM Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant Development Ltd.

• Russian Joint-Stock Company Nizhny Novgorod Engineering Company Atomenergoproekt

o EPC contract

o Operation and maintenance support contract

o Agreement detailing fuel supply and the handling of spent fuel

Assessment of Candidates

EPR

AES

2006 ATMEA

APR-1400

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Assessment of the AES-2006

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Paks 1-4

Paks 5-6

The main sources of revision

• lessons from use of existing regulations,

• recently issued IAEA standards, guides

• WENRA, OECD NEA,

• EUR, MDEP documents,

• recommendations from the international reviews

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Lessons learned from Fukushima

DS462 - Amendments to the IAEA Safety Requirements:

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The main sources of revision

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Experience of the ongoing licensing and construction activities

France • Flamanville 3

Finland • Olkiluoto 3

Russia • Novovoronyezs-II • Leningrád-II

USA – ESP, COL, DC • Vogtle • VC Summer

UK – Generic Design Assessment

New sets of Regulation

Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy

Government Decree No. 118/2011. (VII. 11.) (on the nuclear safety requirements of nuclear facilities and related regulatory activities)

Annexes (Nuclear Safety Regulation)

Guidelines

NPPs Research and

Training Reactors

Spend Fuel Storage Facilities

Volume 1. – Regulatory procedures of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 2.– MS of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 3. Design of op. NPPs

Volume 4. Operation of NPPs

Volume 5. Design and

Operation of Research and

Training Reactors

Volume 6. Design and

Operation of Spend Fuel

Storage Facilities

Volume 7.– Siting of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 8.– Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 10.– Terminology

Volume 9.– Construction of New Nuclear Facilities

Volume 3a. Design of new NPPs

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Planned time schedule for the project

Planned milestones of the licensing process:

2014: site assessment and program licence

2015: environmental licence (pending due to Espoo procedure)

2016: site permit

2017: construction licence

Planned milestones of the design and construction process: 2014: EPC contract

2015: general design and detailed design by the general contractor

2016: review of design

2018: start of construction

2025: start of commercial operation at Unit 1

2026: start of commercial operation at Unit 2

Environmental licence

Site permit

Construction licence

EPC contract

general design by the general

contractor

Review of design

Detailed design

site assessment and program

licence

Licence of MEKH

Start of construction

start of commercial operation at

Unit 1

2014 2017 2015 2016 2018 2021 2019 2020 2022 2025 2023 2024

The main licensing steps

Site Evaluation

Licensing of Site Investigation and Evaluation

Licensing of the Site

Construction licence

Licensing on level of SSCs

Commissioning licence

Operational licence

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Determination of Design Bases Threats

Licensing of Physical Protection Plan

Safety Security

Site Investigation

and Evaluation

Construction

Commissioning

Operation

Preliminary supplying data

Preliminary supplying data

Safeguards registration (7m prior the fuel)

Safeguards

4th meeting of MDEP VVER TESG FUKU

March 8-10, 2016 Helsinki, Finland

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Program Natural External Hazards

Earthquakes and permanent surface displacements

Geotechnical hazards

• Slope instability

• Collapse, slumping, settlement, or emergence of the surface of the site

• Soil liquefaction

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Extreme weather conditions,

Meteorological phenomena

Nebraska NPP, USA, Missouri, 2011

Balparti gát Duna főmeder Jobbparti gát Hidegvíz csatorna

1 23

4

5

6 7, 8

10

11

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No. Megnevezés Szint (Bf m)

11 Atomerőművi telephely feltöltési szintje 97,15

10 Árvízvédelmi töltéskorona a jobb parton 96,30

9 Tervezési alap szerinti jegesárvíz 96,07

8 Árvízvédelmi töltéskorona a bal parton 95,80

7 Jégtorlasz mögött várható maximális vízszint 95,90

6 Tervezési alap szerinti jégmentes árvíz 95,51

5 Tipikus tavaszi vízállás 91,00

4 Tipikus őszi vízállás 87,00

3 Számított vízszint a hidegvíz csatornában méretezési kisvízhozamkor 84,04

2 Kondenzátor hűtővízszivattyúk működéséhez minimálisan szükséges 83,60

1 Biztonsági hűtővízszivattyúk működéséhez minimálisan szükséges 83,50

(Bf m) – a Balti-tenger szintje feletti magasság

Kondenzátor hűtővíz Biztonsági hűtővíz

Program Natural External Hazards

Flooding

• Due to rainfall or flood

• Hazards caused by damage of water structures

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Human-made external events

• Aircraft crash (unintentional)

• Explosion of hazardous chemical agents, cloud of toxic gases, smoke and thermal impacts

• Other significant human-made events (neighbouring nuclear and other industrial facilities, forest fire and car fires, road-, river-, rail transport, electromagnetic interference, …)

Program Man-made External Hazards

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Dispersion of radioactive materials

• Atmospheric dispersion of radioactive materials

• Dispersion of radioactive materials via surface waters

• Dispersion of radioactive materials via subsurface waters

Program

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Determination of site characteristics for emergency plans

• assessment of feasibility of the emergency actions

Program

Regional investigation

Investigation of the neighbouring area of the site

Investigation on the site

Survey Areas

Survey on the site

4th meeting of MDEP VVER TESG FUKU

25 March 8-10, 2016 Helsinki, Finland

Licensing of LTE of operating units

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Key events

2000- NPP declares its intention

2001- strategy decision

2001- HAEA starts preparation

2002- NPP reliability study

2006- environmental license

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HAEA preparation

Limited international references

Development of regulations and guidelines

Combined approach

License renewal

Periodic Safety Review

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Four legs of LTE

Design basis

Ageing management

Equipment qualification

Maintenance effectiveness monitoring

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New regulations

NPPs Research and

Training Reactors

Spend Fuel Storage Facilities

Volume 1. – Regulatory procedures of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 2.– MS of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 3. Design of NPPs

Volume 4. Operation of NPPs

Volume 5. Design and

Operation of Research and

Training Reactors

Volume 6. Design and

Operation of Spend Fuel

Storage Facilities

Volume 7.– Siting of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 8.– Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

Volume 10.– Definitions

Volume 9.– Construction of New Nuclear Facilities

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Two-step approach

Approval of the LTE programme Establishment of conditions Five years prior to submission of LTE

application Common for four units Check the way forwards Licensing of LTE Individually for each unit Application to be submitted 1 year in

advance Based on the approved programme

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International validation

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Service life extension of unit 2

EXECUTION OF THE

PROGRAM

1984

START OF

OPERATION

UNIT 2.

STRATEGIC

DECISION ON LTE

at PAKS NPP

2001

2002

ISSUING

GUIDELINES

For the lifetime

extension

1997 2004

2003 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009 2011 2013

2010 2012

LIFETIME EXTENSION

PROGRAM SUBMITTAL

ORIGINAL DESIGN

LIFETIME

ACCEPTING

THE 2nd PSR

2014 2016 2018

2015 2017

ACCEPTING

THE 3rd PSR

PREPARATION OF THE

LIFETIME EXT. PROGRAM

NEW OPERATING

LICENSE

UNIT 2.

END OF EXTENDED

LIFETIME

2034

CONTINUOUS EXECUTION OF

LIFETIME CYCLE PROGRAM

Unit 3, 4

EXTENDED OPERATING LIFETIME

2044

SAFETY

MARGIN

SUBMITTAL

OF LICENCE

APPLICATION

SUBMITTAL

OF 3rd PSR

1996

ACCEPTING

THE 1st PSR

30 years

Environmental approval

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Challenges

Determination of the scope

Ageing management programme

Time-limited safety analyses

Equipment qualification

Maintenance effectiveness monitoring

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Lessons learned: SLE programme

No major obstacle for later licensing 315 findings and 101 further comments Programme follow up

Regular progress reports Special emphasis: maintenance

effectiveness monitoring, AMPs, TLAAs Specific technical issues

scoping (system boundaries), replacement of secondary piping containing copper, service cycle numbers, thermal stratification, primary piping support problems, carbon steel collectors remained in the steam generators

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Lessons learned: SLE programme

Both parties benefited to better prepare for licensing complex documentation technical and administrative issues devote due time and resources authority opinion and requirements

conducted the operator Targeted inspections

time limited ageing analyses maintenance effectiveness monitoring environmental qualification of electric equipment

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SLE application review

Same project structure

Documentation

>21000 pages (+ 50000)

Still with lacking information…

Public hearing (inhabitants within impact area of 3 km)

Competent environmental co-authority procedure

Modification of other documents (EP, TS, FSAR etc.)

Disaster management co-authority for EP

Changes legal background (new Govt. Decree in 2011)

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Lessons learned during review of license application

Many TLAAs were not real TLAAs, the scope was wider than in any other known international examples

In many case, a one-time review could not be possible

Review was mainly focused on safety class 1 components

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Lessons with SLE licensing

Most problematic areas

Introduction of maintenance rule

Equipment qualification

DB reconstruction strength calculations

Several supplements and parallel procedures

1 year regulatory procedure (15.12.11-15.12.12)

21000 pages + supplements (over 50000)

25 inspectors, at least 750 inspector-days

Impossible to be overviewed by a single person

Involvement of environmental authority

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Stress tests vs. Service life extension

Post-Fukushima stress tests completed in 2011

Safety improvements have been decided by operator

Approved and supplemented by authority

Results were confirmed by international peer review Not interconnected with life extension, shall be carried out

as part of „normal business” Some preconditions were accelerated (H-recombiners) Additional inspections served also SLE purposes

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Thank you for your attention!

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