Challenges for Russia’s Democracy

Robert OrttungResource Security Institute

Three Goals

1. Make sense of recent developments in Russian politics

A. Key trends in Russian political developmentB. Federal electionsC. Governors’ electionsD. Local electionsE. Recent reform proposals

2. Make sense of recent efforts to make sense of developments in Russian politics

3. Future scenarios

Freedom House NIT Russia Scores2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Electoral Process

4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.50 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75

Civil Society 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.75

Media 4.75 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.25

Governance 4.50 5.00 5.25 5.00 5.25 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

National Governance

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.50

Local Governance

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75

Judicial 4.25 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.50

Corruption 6.25 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.25

Democracy Score

4.58 4.88 5.00 4.96 5.25 5.61 5.75 5.86 5.96 6.11

Changes in Electoral Law

• Constant fine tuning to increase control• Presidential, parliamentary terms extended• Parliamentary elections based on party lists• Threshold moved to 7% from 5%• Only registered parties (now down to 7)

Changes in Electoral Law (cont.)

• “Against all” choice eliminated• Minimum turnout also eliminated• Duma parties don’t have to collect signatures• Elimination of option to put up cash to get on

ballot• Parties get money per vote• Parties winning less than 3% have to

reimburse free publicity

Elected Governors, 1996-2004

• Powerful regional leaders– Luzhkov, Shaimiev, Rakhimov, Nazdratenko, Lebed

• Reformers– Nemtsov, Prusak, Titov

• Communists• Businessmen– Trutnev, Khloponin, Ilyumzhinov

Elected Governors

• Rogues’ gallery of leaders• No shining examples of democracy• Provided a balance to federal

government• Gave locals some ways to hold leaders

accountable• Started to build a culture of democracy

Kremlin and Governors, 2004 -

• After Beslan, president appoints governors– No regional legislature challenges Putin or Medvedev

• At first, mainly kept on old governors– Main objective was stability– Fired only those who had lost control

• Now making more appointments of loyalists– No apparent logic behind appointments: some removed

for scandal, others not (Darkin, Mari-El)– Removing Yeltsin-era heavyweights (Rossel, Shaimiev)

Appointed Governors• Governors are now focused on pleasing Moscow rather

than locals– Regions are more manageable from Moscow– Less dependent on business groups– Elected leaders would be more flexible in reacting to regional

problems; serve local interests• No good system of recruiting leaders in Russia

– United Russia plays nominal role• 57 percent of Russian voters support the return to

gubernatorial elections, 20 percent prefer the current practice and 23 percent had no opinion (Levada Center)

Kaliningrad Demonstration

Demonstration

• Possible sign of trouble for regime?• Moscow now responsible for everything that

happens in the country• Logical thing to do is remove governor• Putin does not like to act under clear public

pressure– Strongly supports Boos

• Could open the way for more protests

October 2009 Elections

• Of the 42,361 regional and local offices filled that day, United Russia won 29,687 or 70%

• Opposition walkout from Duma• Denied registration: 0.5% United Russia; 54%

Patriots of Russia; 26% Right Cause; 33% Yabloko (Central Electoral Commission)

• Medvedev: Outcome reflects the real balance of forces in the country

March 2010 Elections

• United Russia won 68% of the seats up for election

• However, won less than 50% of the seats in 4 of 8 regional legislatures

• Denied registration: United Russia: 0.17%; Yabloko 15.3%

• “Fake pluralism” rather than “shameless fix” – Brian Whitmore

Reform Proposals• Boos called for reinstating “against all” so

authorities can judge their popularity; retracted• Yurgens, Gontmaker report – reinstate many of

the things taken away (terms, Duma districts, 5% barrier, governors’ elections)

• Meeting of Security Council on political reform– Putin told the meeting there is no need for reform

• Medvedev praises October local elections• Only reform is to give parties winning 5-7%

representation in legislatures

Explanation I – Hybrid Regime

• Hybrid Regime – Overmanaged Democracy (Petrov, Lipman, Hale)

• Putin wins votes because voters agree with him; leadership qualities; projects competence. Putin/Medvedev must appeal to the electorate to beat opposition (Colton/Hale)

Explanation II – Non-democratic Consolidation

• Vote only confirms decisions made elsewhere, no opposition (Gel’man)

Explanation III – Authoritarian State Building

• Building and continuing Russia’s authoritarian regime means applying means of repression, ensuring elite unity, and maintaining a ruling party that shapes the political environment (Way)

Explanation IV – Virtual Politics

• With passive electorate, elite controls information flows in absence of international intervention (Andrew Wilson).

Explanations V – Why Vote?

• Ritual support for myth of stability; people realize elections are falsified, but want to go on believing

• People “turn up and cast their votes because campaigns are always accompanied by certain

hand-out of gifts and promises.“ -- Aleksei Grazhdankin of the Levada-Center

Explanation VI - FraudOblasts Republics

• 10 million suspect votes in the 2004 and 2007 elections; 2008 was not even an election (Myagkov/Ordeshook/Shakin)• Conditions placed on OSCE prevent monitoring

Conclusions

• Authoritarian regime• No opposition, though people can register

discontent – Irkutsk mayor

• PR is increasingly central feature of regime– President– Parliament– Policies (corruption, modernization)

• Information processing

Future Challenges• Unstable point for the elite – can’t address the

problems people are complaining about; yet afraid to introduce substantive political reforms

• Possible causes for change– Duma elections in 2011/Presidential elections in 2012– Economic problems– Energy prices– Incompetent response to natural disaster– North Caucasus– Decline in police discipline– Fewer feedback links = greater fragility