Certification of Subsea Technology: ”Why Failure occur” · PDF fileCertification...
Transcript of Certification of Subsea Technology: ”Why Failure occur” · PDF fileCertification...
Certification of Subsea Technology: ”Why Failure occur”
Experiences from offshore failure analysis”
Gustav Heiberg, DNV Materials Technology and Failure Investigation, Høvik, Noway2005-12-05
Version Slide 205 December 2005
Outline
How are failures examined ?
Why do failures occur, root causes and project context ?
Learning from failures, Examples
How are lessons learnt incorporated in new projects and ongoing operations ?
Version Slide 305 December 2005
How are offshore failures examined ?
Damage assessment based available information, system configuration and experience with relevant failure modes
Version Slide 405 December 2005
How are offshore failures examined ?
Damage assessment based available information, system configuration and experience with relevant failure modes
Field inspection
Version Slide 505 December 2005
How are offshore failures examined ?
Damage assessment based available information, system configuration and experience with relevant failure modes
Field inspection
Laboratory examination / testing of retrieved failed components
Version Slide 605 December 2005
How are offshore failures examined ?
Damage assessment based available information, system configuration and experience with relevant failure modes
Field inspection
Laboratory examination / testing of retrieved failed components
Verification of repair solutions
Version Slide 705 December 2005
How are offshore failures examined ?
Damage assessment based available information, system configuration and experience with relevant failure modes
Field inspection
Laboratory examination / testing of retrieved failed components
Verification
Qualification testing
Version Slide 805 December 2005
Why does this happen?
Edit in Veiw > Header and footer Slide 9Edit in Veiw > Header and footer
Conclusions from failure analyses:
Material selection - Qualification program for material and weldments did not reveal relevant failure modes
Fabrication - Machining of weldments reduced the area such that all straining occurred in the weldments- Critical types and locations of defects was not covered by the NDT procedure and set-up
Operation- Operational conditions differed from design basis
- Larger strains or stresses than anticipated - Not designed for the purpose- Environmental changes
“We never thought about this”, “Nobody told us”, “This has worked before”
All aspects are not covered in design basis, and changes with one supplier does not affect others
Distributed responsibility – lack of overview
Version Slide 1005 December 2005
How are failure modes adressed ?
Materials selection
Specification / Standard
Failure modes covered by this
Fabrication, welding, NDE
Material properties / metallurgical features
Acceptance criteria
Failure modes not covered by spec or standard
Load cases not covered in design
Operational conditions not covered by spec or standard
Choice of materials or components which has proven fit for service under slightly different conditions
Unclear interfaces / code breaks
Design basis Interface definition
Environment
Loads and stressesDesign
Definition of load cases and environmental conditions
Resistance to applied stresses / strains from selected load cases
If generic:
New JIP to establish Standard or RP
From failure mode to guideline
2 Case studies
Hydrogen Induced Stress Cracking (HISC) of duplex stainless steels
Version Slide 1305 December 2005
3rd largest oil spill in Norway, May 2003
• 15 MUSD capex sub-sea satellite tie-back
• 750 m3 oil spilled to sea after only 2 years of operation
• Crack in transition piece between manifold and pipeline
• Expensive repair and deferred production
• Associated costs;• Repair, procedures and training
• Emergency response operation
• Environmental impact
• Brand impact
Version Slide 1405 December 2005
Version Slide 1505 December 2005
NotchWeld
Failure Investigation
90 degreeAngle
Duplex Stainless Steel
High global tensile stresses from pipeline
Local areas with high stress concentration
No coating in the fracture area
Undesired microstructure
Material StressHydrogen/ Cathodic Protection
Hydrogen induced stress cracking (HISC)
Version Slide 1605 December 2005
Prevention of future failures
R&D work:
JIP on testing of Duplex and 13%Cr Stainless Steel susceptibility to HISC
JIP on development of design guideline for use of Duplex Stainless Steels exposed to cathodic protection
Partners:
Shell, Statoil, Hydro, ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, Total, BP, FMC, Vetco Gray, Kværner, Technip
Project specific work
Project specific design verification work
Manufacturing follow up
Alternative solutions ?
Version Slide 1805 December 2005
Lined and Clad PipeOvermatching filler materials for girth welds
Non-destructive testing
Reel installation and snaking –local buckling
Pressure containment
Reel installation and snaking –fracture capacity and fatigue
Corrosion testing
Corrosion resistant alloy wall thickness requirements
Gripping force
Induction bending
Reeling of pipelines
Version Slide 2005 December 2005
Some Failure Modes
Local Buckling
Ductile crack growth at welds
Ovalization
Version Slide 2105 December 2005
Prevention of failuresR&D work:
JIP on testing related to reeling of pipelines
JIP on development of Recommended Practice for reeling of pipelines and incorporation of relevant requirements in the DNV pipeline standard DNV OS-F101
DNV OS-F101DNV RP-F108
How can lessons learnt be incorporated in new project and ongoing operations
Version Slide 2305 December 2005
Project Risk Management
A systematic approach to predict and manage un-certainties to reach the project goals:- Profit, cost, schedule, quality, performance, safety, environment
Assisting the project team to:- Identify, evaluate and rank project threats and opportunities- Develop strategies for risk mitigation and loss control; i.e. identify which preventive measures should
be implemented- Focus on key risk drivers, i.e. the parameters that have a make-or-break effect on the project
I.e. better decisions through:- better perception of risks and their interactions- proactive risk management
Version Slide 2405 December 2005
Qualification of new Technology
Make Decisions
New Concept
Introduction of New Technology
Define Qualification BasisFailure Mode Identification
and Risk Ranking
Analysis and Testing
Reliability Analysis
Concept Improvement
Selection of Qualification Methods
Version Slide 2505 December 2005
Deep Water TechnologyDisciplines
Coupled analysis
Failure investigation
Subsea Components
Materials Technology
Pipelines
Risk & Safety
MarineOperations
Hydraulics &Process
Inspection & Quality Surv.
Environment
MANAGING RISK
Risers
©Statoil
Structural Integrity
Laboratories
Flow Assurance
Version Slide 2605 December 2005