Cavanagh Et Al_Ethics of Organizational Politics

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    of Management Review 1981. Vol. 6. No. 3. 363-374

    The Ethics of OrganizationalGERALD F. CAVANAGHUniversity of Detroit

    DEN NIS J. MOBERGMANUEL VELASQUEZUniversity of Santa ClaraPolitical uses of power demand explicit consideration of ethical restraints,in part because current managem ent theory focuses on the value of o ut-comes rather than on the value of the means chosen. We have developed anormative model of ethical analysis that can be helpful in determining whatthese restraints are. T he mo del integrates three kinds of ethical theories:utilitarianism, theories of mora l rights, and theories of justice.

    Power is the cornerstone of both managementre fundamental to the study of organ izations,

    Organizational PoliticsThe contempo rary view of power in organizationsthat it is the ability to mobilize resources, energy,

    exist only when there is conflict over means ords [D ra k e , 1979 ; P fe f fe r, 197 7] . Mo re

    e wish to thank D avid Caidweli, And re Delbecq, Peter Mills,

    !9SI by the Academy of Managem ent 0363-742 5

    specifically, this view of power is based on two fundamental propositions:amental propositions:1. Organizations are composed of individuals andcoalitions that compete over resources, energy,information, and influence [Hickson, Hinings,Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Thompson,1967].2. Individuals and coalitions seek to protect theirinterests through means that are unobtrusivewhen compared to existing controls, norms, and

    sanctions [Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick, &Mayes, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974].This pe rspec t ive has led some authors todistinguish between political and nonpolitical useof power [Gandz & Murray, 1980]. For exampleMayes and Allen [1977] d raw the distinction in termof organizational sanctions: nonpolitical uses ofpower are those that involve sanctioned means fosanctioned ends, and political uses involve unsanctioned means, or sanctioned means for unsanction

    ed ends. That is, when individuals and coalitionchoose to move outside of their formal authorityestablished policies and procedures, or job descriptions in their use of power, that use is politicalWhen they use power within these sanctions for endthat are not formally sanctioned through goastatements, this too is a political use of power, according to the Mayes and Allen definition.Unlike more encompassing conceptualizations

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    that equate politics with any use of power [e.g.,Martin & Sims, 1956], the Mayes and Allen defini-tion underlines the discretionary nature of organiza-tional po litics. In spite of formal systems designed tocontrol the use of power, organizational memberscan and do exercise political power to influence theirsubordinates, peers, superiors, and others [Schein,1977]. And coalitions may employ politics in theirreaction to policy changes that threaten their owninterests [Crozier, 1964; Pettigrew, 1973].When individuals and coalitions move outsideformal sanctions, the traditional authority/respon-sibility linkage is broken, and important ethicalissues emerge. However, current treatments oforganizational politics either beg the ethical issuesentirely [e.g., Kotter, 1977] or offer simplisticethical criteria. For example. Miles asserts that "it is. . . importan t to recognize that politics need not bebad, though common parlance uses the term in a pe-jorative sense. The survival of an organization maydepend on the success of a unit or coalition in over-turning a traditional but outdated formal organiza-tion objective or policy" [1980, p. 155]. However,there are a host of political actions that may bejustified in the name of organizational survival thatmany would find morally repugnant. Among theseare such Machiavellian techniques as "situationalmanipulation," "dirty tricks," and "backstabbing."

    There is, then, a clear need for a norm ative theo ryof organizational politics that addresses ethicalissues directly and from the standpoint of the exer-cise of discretion. Unfortunately, the business andsociety literature, where one might expect to findsuch issues discussed, offers little guidance in thisregard. The emphasis in this literature is on institu-tional interactions (e.g., government regulations)and on broad human resource policy issues (e.g.,affirmative action), and not on the day-to-day poli-tical decisions made in the organization.Discussions of political tactics in the managementliterature also offer little guidance. The literature is,of course, rich with political guidelines: there areleadership theories, lateral relations prescriptions,notions about how to design and implement rewardand control systems, conflict resolution strategies,and the like, all of which provide fodder for thedevelopment of political behavior alternatives(hereinafter PBA). How ever, the form of these theo-retical notions tends to reduce decisions to cal-culations based on effect that is, they provide the

    man ager w ith an understan ding and p redictwhat PBAs are likely to evoke in terms of acome or set of outcom es. Armed with contempleadership theories, for example, managerpresumably determine the type of face-to-face tion that will result in the desired level of perance and satisfaction. This calculative empdefines theoretical debate over ethics in termsdesirability of outcomes and tends to ignorvalue of the activities, processes, and behaviovolved, independent of the outcomes achWhat a manager should do is thus determined desirability of the outcomes and not by the qof the behaviors themselves. Such an emphasevitab ly leads to a kind of ends-justify-the-logic that fails to provide guidance for manbeyond linking alternatives to outcomes. Conthe following case.Lorna is the produ ction man ager of a noncowork group responsible for meeting a deadlinwill require coordinated effort among her s

    dinates. Believing that the members of the group will pull together an d m eet the deadlinehave a little com petition, Lorna decides in favPBA. She tries to create the impression amonsubordinates that members of the sales deparwant her group to fail to meet the deadline ssales can gain an edge over production in upcobudgetary negotiations.How might we evaluate this PBA? Managtheory tends to focus our attention on consequOne might argue that if it works arid Loma's pulls together and meets the deadline, it's okaymore critical observer might argue that even ifjective is accomplished, an im portan t side effecbe the loss of a cooperative relationship betwesales and production departments. What we tlose sight of, though, is that "creating an impreis a euphemism for lying, and lying may ethically acceptable in this situation.This example illustrates what may be termeteleological or goal-oriented form of managtheory [Keeley, 1979; Krupp, 1961; Pfeffer, 1This leads managers and management scholarto restrict normative judgments about orgtional behavior to outcomes (e.g., performsatisfaction, system effectiveness) rather thansider the ethical quality of the means employIn contrast, the field of normative ethics profertile ground on which to develop a norm

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    theory of organizational politics. We will thereforeturn to the literature of this field in order to draw outa set of principles that can provide the basis for anormative analysis of organizational politics thatmay reduce the ethical uncertainty surrounding thepolitical use of power.

    Ethical Criteria Relevant toPolitical Behavior Decisions

    Work in the field of normative ethics during thisntury has evolved from three basic kinds of m oral

    Aristotle and Plato first formulated theories

    Utilitarianism holds that actions and plans shoulde judged by their consequences [Sidgwick, 1874;, 1973] . In i t s c lass ica l fo rm ula t ion ,

    imate the effect of each alternativ e on all the pa r-

    What can be said about the ethical quality of

    groups that are affected by each PBA, but aselecting the PBA that optimizes the satisfactions these constituencies. Obviously, this can amounta calculative nightmare.Accordingly, there are several shortcuts that mbe used to reduce the complexity of utilitarcalculations. Each of these involves a sacrifice elegance for calculative ease. First, a decision macan adopt some ideological system that reducelaborate calculations of interests to a series utilitarian rules. For example, some religious idologies specify rules of behavior that, if followare supposed to result in an improved human contion (e.g., the Golden Rule). Certain organizatioideologies, like professionalism, allow complutilitarian calculations to be reduced to a focus critical constituencies [Schein, 1966]. Second,decision maker can adopt a simplified frame reference in evaluating the interests of affected pties. For example, an economic frame of referenpresupposes that alternatives are best evaluated terms of dollar costs and dollar benefits. In this wautilitarian calculations can be quantified. And thira decision maker can place boundaries on utilitaricalculations. For example, a decision maker can cosider only the interests of those directly affected bydecision and thus exclude from analysis all indirect secondary effects. Similarly, a decision maker cassume that by giving allegiance to a particulorganizational coalition or set of goals (e.g., "officgoals"), everyone's utilities will be optimized.

    Calculative shortcuts like these do not autmatically free decision makers from moral resposibility for their actions. Normative ethiciatypically suggest that decision makers shouperiodically assess these simplifying strategies assure themselves that certain interests are not beinignored or that decision rules do not lead to subotimal outcomes [e.g., Bok, 1980].Whatever form of utilitarianism is employed, twtypes of PBAs are typically judged unethical: (those that are consistent with the attainmen t of somgoals (e.g., personal goals) at the expense of thothat encompass broader const i tuencies (e .gsocietal goals), and (2) those that constitute comparatively inefficient means to desired ends. Takthe case of an employee of a company who uses pesonal power to persuade policy makers to granunusually high levels of organizational resources ta project by systematically excluding important i

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    formation about the progress of the project. ThisPBA is unethical if other resource allocationschemes would better satisfy a greater number ofindividuals or if persuasion of this kind is less effi-cient than being more open about how the project isprogressing.Theory of Rights

    A theory of moral rights asserts that human be-ings have certain fundamental rights that should berespected in all decisions. Several fundamentalrights have been incorporated into the Americanlegal system in the form of the Constitutional Bill ofRights. In light of these Constitutional guarantees,advocates of moral rights have suggested the follow-ing:

    1. The right of free consent. Individuals within anorganization have the right to be treated only asthey knowingly and freely consent to be treated[Bennis & Slater, 1968; Hart, 1955].2. The right to privacy. Individuals hav e the right

    to do whatever they choose to do outside wo rk-ing hours and to control information about theirprivate life, including information not intendedto be made public [Miller, 1971; Mironi, 1974;Wasserstrom, 1978].3. The right to freedom of conscience. Individualshave the right to refrain from carrying out anyorder that violates moral or religious norms towhich they adhere [Ewing, 1977; Waltzer, 1967].4. The right of free speech. Individuals have theright to criticize conscientiously and truthfullythe ethics or legality of the actions of others so

    long as the criticism does no t violate the rights ofother individuals [Bok, 1980; Eells, 1962;Walters, 1975].5. The right to due process. Individuals have theright to a fair and impartial hearing when theybelieve their rights are being violated [Ewing,1977, 1981; Evan, 1975].Making decisions based on a theory of rights ismuc h simpler than with ut i l itar ian theory . One needonly avoid interfering with the rights of others whomight be affected by the decision. This can be com-

    plicated, of course, but generally a theory of rightsdoes not involve the decision complexi t ies thatut i l itar ianism requires.Theory of Justice

    A theory of justice requires decision makers to beguided by equity, fairness, and impartiality. Canons

    of justice may specify three types of moral prestions: distributive rules, principles of administrules, and compensation norms.

    Distributive rules The basic rule of distribjustice is that differentiated treatment of indivishould not be based on arbitrary characterisindividuals who are similar in the relevant respshould be treated similarly, and individuals whofer in a relevant respect should be treated differin proportion to the differences between t[Perelman, 1963]. This rule is the basis for cotions that certain resource allocations are "When applied to salary administration, for examit would lead to a distribution of rewards suchthose whose jobs are equal in terms of importadifficulty, or some other criterion receive rewards.

    A second distributive rule is that the attriband positions that command differential treatshould have a clear and defensible relationshgoals and tasks [Daniels, 1978]. Clearly, it is uto distribute rewards according to differeunrelated to the situation at hand.

    Principles of administering rules Justice reqthat rules should be administered fairly [Feinb1973; Fuller, 1964]. Rules should be clearly sand expressly promulgated. They should be sistently and impartially enforced. They shouldcuse individuals who act in ignorance, under duor involuntarily [Rawls, 1971].

    Compensation norms A theory of justicedelineates guidelines regarding the responsibilitinjuries [Brandt, 1959]. First, individuals shouldbe held responsible for matters over which they no control. Second, individuals should be comsated for the cost of their injuries by the responsible for those injuries.

    While a theory of justice does not require the plicated calculations demanded by utilitatheory, it is by no means easy to apply. There iproblem of determining the attributes on whichferential treatment is to be based. There arefinding challenges associated with administerules. And there is the thorny problem of estabing responsibility for mistakes and injuries.

    However, as applied to political behavior sions, these cannons of justice are useful in clarifsome ethical issues. First, PBAs for the purpoacquiring an advantageous position in the dist

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    Table 1Ethical Theories Relevant to Judging Political Behavior Decisions

    ntham, Ricardo ,Strengths as an Ethical Guide

    1. Facilitates calculative shortcuts (e.g.,owing loyalty to an individual, coalition,or organization).2. Promotes the view that the interestsaccounted for should not be solelyparticularistic except under unusualcircumstances (e .g. , perfect compe-tition).3. Can encourage en t repreneursh ip ,innovation, and productivity.1. Specifies minimal levels of satis-faction for all individuals.2 . Establishes standards of socialbehavior that are independent ofoutcomes.1. Ensures that a l locations of re-sources are determined fairly.2. Protects the interests of thosewho may be underrepresented inorganiza t ions beyond accord ingthem minimal rights.

    Weaknesses as an Ethical Guide1. Virtually impossible to assess the effecof a PBA^ on the satisfaction of aaffected parties.2. Can result in an unjust allocation oresources, particularly when some idividuals or groups lack representatioor "voice."3 . Can result in abridging some pesons' rights to accommodate utilitariaoutcomes.1. Can encourage indiv idua l is t icselfish behavior which, taken to an etreme, may result in anarchy.2. Reduces poli t ical prerogatives thamay be necessary to bring about jusor utilitarian outcomes.1. Can encourage a sense of entitlementhat reduces entrepreneurship, innovation, and productivity.2. Can result in abridging sompersons' r ights to accommodate thcanons of justice.

    f resou rces are ethically que stionable if the re islegitimate basis for the adv anta ge. Second, PBAs

    An Analytical Structure forEvaluating Political Behavior DecisionsEach of the three kinds of ethical theories hasng and w eak po ints, as depicted in Table 1. Mostrtant for o ur pu rposes , each can be shown to be

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    another. Utilitarian theory cannot adequately account for rights and claims of justice [Lyons, 1965]Rights theories proved deficient in dealing with sociawelfare issues [Singer, 1978]. And theories of justichave been criticized for both violating rights [Nozick1974] and diminishing incentives to produce goodand services [Okum , 1975]. On e solution to the pro blem of theoretical inadequacy is to combine thesthree theories into a coherent w hole.To that end, we have incorporated all three normative theories in a decision tree, diagrammed inFigure 1. The three categories of ethical criteria thabear on a political behavior decision are arbitrarilyarranged in the diagram. In addition to incorporating all three theories, the decision tree accountfor overwhelming factors that preclude the application of any of these criteria. These overwhelmingfactors will be specified after two cases illustratingthe use of the decision tree have been presented.

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    Does the PBA (political behavior alternative) resultin the efficient optimization of the satisfactions ofinterests inside and outside the organization?Yes

    Does the PBA respect the rights of all the af-fected parties?Yes

    >r

    Does the PBA respect the canons of justice?Yes

    f

    Accept PBA

    N o

    >Yes Are there overwhelming factors that justisuboptimizing these goals and satisfaction

    N o

    >Yes

    Nf

    Reject PB

    f

    Are there overwhelming factors that justifyabrogation of a right?

    N o

    >Yes

    N o

    Reject PB

    f

    Are there overwhelming factors that justifyviolation of a canon of justice?

    >

    N o

    Reject PB

    Figure 1A Decision Tree for Incorporating Ethics into Political Behavior Decisions368

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    Illustrative CasesSam and Bob are highly m otivated research scien-tists who w ork in the new-produ ct development labat General Rubber. Sam is by far the most technical-ly competent scientist in the lab, and he has beenesponsible for several patents that have netted the

    le Bob lacks the technical track record Sam has ,is work has been solid.th ou gh unim aginative.trative position in the lab in the next few years.According to lab policy, a $300,000 fund is

    any and to society if the proposal is accepted,views that bo th prop osals are equally m eritorious .

    ny significant results. M oreover, the proposed line

    After submitting his proposal, Sam takes no fur-e outcome of the bidding process. In contra st. Bobgins to wage what m ight be termed an open cam -

    his proposal to individuals who mightsome influence over the decision. So effective is

    cision on behalf of Bob's prop osa l. B ob's proposa lfunded and Sam's is not.An ethical analysis of Bob's action in this case

    1. The first question in the sequence requires alitarian analysis. Clearly, Bob's interests are bet-sals seems to require one of the two to be

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    judged equivalent in the blind reviews. Consquently, it is app ropriate to answer the first questiaffirmatively.The second question inquires into the rights spected by Bob's beha vior. Here again, the evidenseems persuasive that no one's rights were violateSam did not have (did not create) the same oppotunity to point out the advantages of his proposal those at whom Bob directed his lobbying campaigbut Bob's open campaign involved no deceit, aSam's inaction may be taken as implied consent.It is in light of the third question that Bob's actioare most suspect. Justice would have best beserved in this case if there had been a clear situatiorelevant difference between the two proposals. Tblind reviews found them equivalent, so some othbasis for differentiating between the proposapresum ably had to be found. Bob's efforts served create irrelevant differences between them. anything, Sam's superior technical track recowould have been a more relevant factor than Bobinitiative and social skills in determining w ho shoube favored to perform a technical task. Bob's actionin this regard were therefore unjust. Interestinglhad the proposals required supervision of others the ability to persuade others, Bob's approacwould have been justified.

    Let us examine another case. Lee, 61, has beeDirector of Engineering for American Semicondutor for 14 years. He is very bright and a fine supevisor but he has not kept abreast of new deveopments in technology.American Semiconductor's manufacturing process creates substantial quantities of toxic materialsLee's rather casual attitude toward the disposal othese chemicals has resulted in a number of environmental citations. The firm is now tied up icourt on two cases and will probably be forced tpay a considerable amount in damages. Yet, Lee stidoes not perceive the disposal problem as urgentFor three years, Charlie, the executive vice president, has tried to persuade Lee to make this a priority issue but has failed. Charlie has reluctantly concluded that Lee must be taken out of his position aDirector of Engineering.

    Charlie recognizes that it would demoralize thother managers if he were to fire Lee outright. SoCharlie decides that he will begin to tell selected individuals that he is dissatisfied with Lee's workWhen there is open support for Lee, Charlie quietly

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    sides with Lee's opposition. He casually lets Lee'speers know that he thinks Lee may have outlived hisusefulness to the firm. He even exaggerates Lee'sdeficiencies and failures when speaking to Lee's co-workers. Discouraged by the waning support fromhis colleagues. Lee decides to take an early retire-ment.In response to the first question in the decisiontree, we can conclude that getting Lee out of his posi-tion may indeed bring about the "greatest good forthe greatest number," presuming a suitable replace-ment can be found. Not only is Lee hindering theachievement of the apparent goals of the organiza-tion, but he is also causing external diseconomies inthe disposal of the toxic wastes. Both of these prob-lems, especially when taken together, bring us to theconclusion that Lee is hurting both AmericanSemiconductor and many other people. Thus,Charlie's PBA seems to pass utilitarian criteria.On the issue of rights, however, there are somedifficulties with Charlie's PBA. Namely, Lee's rightof free consent was violated. Lee has the right to betreated honestly and forthrightly and Charlie's at-tempt to destroy Lee's reputation behind his backfailed to respect this right.

    Overwhelming FactorsA still-unexplained qualification in the decisiontree we have described is the concept of an "over-whelming factor" i.e., a situational factor thatmay, in a given case, justify overriding one of thethree ethical criteria: utilitarian outcomes, in-dividual rights, or distributive justice. What countsas an overwhelming factor?Conflicts between criteria As we have sug-gested, the three criteria are intended to sys-tematically focus our attention on three kinds ofdecision factors: (1) the congruence between the

    decision and the efficient satisfaction of the greatestnum ber of people, (2) the effect of the decision on in-dividuals who have rights, and (3) the distributionalconsequences of the decision. Obv iously, these threefactors may come into conflict. As in the AmericanSemiconductor case, the decision maker may befaced with a situation in which a choice must bemade between, on the one hand, a course of actionthat achieves the greatest good for the greatest370

    number but at the price of violating an indivirights, and, on the other hand, a course of athat respects the individual's rights but at the pa substantial reduction in the achievement greatest good.There are no well-defined rules for solvinmoral dilemmas that these conflicts pose. The mas can be resolved only by making a consijudgment concerning which of the conflcriteria should be accorded the most weight given situation. In some cases the judgment measier than in others. Suppose, for exampleviolating an employee's right to privacy on thethe only way to stopping continuing theftdeprive thousands of customers from getting qpharmaceutical products. Then the uti l i tcriterion m ay be given greater weight than thecriterion employee's rights must be sacrificthe "greatest good."Although there are no hard and fast ruleresolving m oral dilemm as of this sort, thersystematic procedure for handling them thciple of double effect. Stated simply, this prinholds that it is acceptable to m ake a decision thtwo effects, one good and one bad, provided thdecision m aker's dom inant mo tivation is to athe good effect and provided that the good effimportant enough to permit the bad effect [G1970].Conflicts within criteria Not only may thecriteria conflict with each other, but each mayflict with itself as well. First, there may be cbetween the utilitarian consequences of thovolved or w ith the m eans chosen to accompliappropriate goals. This is probably typicorganizations that have coalitions with conflgoals or where there is conflict among coalabout the appropriate means to consensual g

    Second, there may be conflict between therigcompeting individuals. The decision maker mforced to choose between permitting one perspreserve the right to privacy and allowing anperson to exercise the right of free speech.there may be a conflict between different canojustice. Administering a rule with literal cotency, for example, may conflict with the printhat individuals who differ in relevant ways shbe treated differently. Or there may be a conflitween individuals. A situation may, for exam

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    call for hard choices between using seniority orusing merit as the basis for deciding who is to begiven preference.As with conflicts between ethical criteria, thereare no w ell-defined rules for resolving the dilemmaswithin ethical criteria. Again, the decision maker isforced to employ a weighting procedure. For ex-ample, when rights come into conflict, the decisionmaker must make a conscientious judgment con-cerning the relative im portance of the interests pro -tected by one right as compared to the interests pro-tected by the conflicting right. Although sometimes

    Lack of capacity to employ the criteria Three

    firsf, the decision maker may legitimately layide a certain ethical c riterion if there is no freedom

    ought to bear on the decision. O r a decision m aker

    Second, the decision maker might legitimately failemploy a certain ethical criterion owing to a lackf adequate information for using that criterion. Ase have seen, this is mo re often the case with the

    Third, the decision maker who has strong andasonable doub ts about the legitimacy of an ethical

    ecific ethical criteria proposed in this article . They

    raining norms being employed, as long as they areFaced with any of these three kinds of incapaci-cord a lesser weight to one c riterion. T he u nderly-

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    matters about which they are ignorant or sincerin doubt. However, determining whether a decisimaker's lack of freedom, lack of information, lack of certitude is sufficient to abrogate ethiresponsibility requires one to make some exceeingly difficult judgments.

    ImplicationsAn important implication of any research ethics lies in the area of education and developm eThis is particularly true regarding the subject organizational politics. Presented in an ethicabland fashion, theories of organizational polititend to evoke an unfortunate combination cynicism, defeatism, and paranoia. Without ethicparad igm s, individuals too often infer that successcontrolled by others or attained only by those w

    engage in unproductive behavior. In contrast, cofronting the ethical issues in organizational politileads individuals to assume responsibility for thepolitical behavior decisions. It is unlikely that suan approach will enable individuals to solve all tethical dilemm as they will face in their careers, bu tmay stimulate "moral" development [Kohlber1973].Several lines of research are also suggested by tforegoing analys is. First, there would be some valuin further developing ethical paradigms for othareas of d i sc re t ion faced by organiza t ionmembers. For example, the areas of obediencwhistle blowing, self-promotion, and bottom-usocial intervention all cry out for ethical guidancSecond, there is a need to conduct em pirical researcregarding what rights, canons of justice, anutilitarian rules are commonly accepted in generand in specific dilemmas. Third, the process oethical judgment about politics and other issueneeds empirical work. For example, what antecdent conditions are associated with ethical actionsSimilarly, how do ethical codes formalized in aorganization influence political behavior decisions

    Concluding RemarksAs should be clear from this discussion, reducinthe ethical uncerta inty surrounding pol i t icabehavior decisions places significant cognitiv

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    burdens on the decision maker [Simon, 1976]. Judg-ing the norm ative equality of PBAs can involve con-fronting complicated ethical dilemmas. Yet, thereseems to be no satisfactory substitute for individualdiscretion that addresses these complexities directlyand to the limits of one's cognitive capabilities.As we have seen, managemen t theory offers littleguidance in this regard. Its calculative form in-fluences us to be ethically m yopic when we eva luatepolitical behavior. Instead of determining whetherhum an rights or standard s of justice are violated, weare often content to judge political behavior ac-cording to its outcomes. This orientation invitescynicism about what are termed the poli t ical

    realities of organ izational life [Nord, 1978]. Fample, in describing a pa tently unethical politicone writer asserted "many people think it is wrtry to influence others in this way, even peoplewithout consciously recognizing it, use this techthemselves" [Kotter, 1977], as if to justify the aWe do no t intend to replace cynicism of this kinPolyanna assertions that ethical managers (cians) will be more successful than unethical They may or may not be, but that is really npoint. Ethics involves standards of conducguidelines for personal gain. When it comes ethics of organizational politics, respect for jand h uman rights should prevail for its own s

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    Gerald F. Cavanagh is Professor of Management, University ofDetroit.

    Dennis J. Moberg is Associate Professor of Management,Graduate School of Business and Administration, University ofSanta Clara, Santa Clara, California. He is presently serving asVisiting Professor of Management, Netherlands School ofBusiness, B reuklen, Th e N etherlands.

    Manuel Velasquez is Assistant Professor of Philosophy , School ofHumanities, University of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, California.Received 6/23/80

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