Catherine Belsey s Critical Practice a Critical Analysis

CRITICAL PRACTICE

Catherine Belsey

“This is a valiant attempt to explain the principles and some of the intricacies of structuralist

criticism. It throws a good deal of light on some of the terms, which can baffle the

uninitiated…. This is… a helpful introduction to a subject which has loomed large in recent

years”

Terence Hawkes

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Qaisar Iqbal Janjua, Contact: (92) 300 94 678 [email protected],

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CATHERINE BELSEY THE POST-MODERN CRITIC

Catherine Belsey’s ‘Critical Practice’, which is fundamentally an anthology of essays in the

series of ‘New Accents’, presents a modern rather post-modern observation of critical

methods. Belsey has criticised the traditional orthodox ways of criticism and has made a

scientific analysis of the techniques and styles of the works of last century’s artists. Her

criticism demonstrates, although traditional criticism masquerades as a ‘common sense’,

obvious and uncontroversial approach to literature, it is in fact a product of particular

theoretical discourse isolated in time and space, which can make no valid claims to

universality of ‘truth’. She goes on to describe various critical positions, which have been

set up in oppositions to the orthodoxy-New Criticism, Archetypical Criticism, Reader

Theory and the Aesthetic of Reception. However, all these, though productive, are shown to

fail because they adopt similar theories of language to the conventional criticism to which

they object. The project of the remainder of the book is to explore the possibilities for a new

critical practice, which fully takes into account the pioneering work of Saussure and makes

use of subsequent advances in the field of semiotics, Marxist theory and psychoanalysis.

During the perusal of ‘Critical Practice’ several responses emerge - responses documented

and grounded in specific examples are discussed in detail in here, The terms "modernism,"

"postmodernism," "rationalism," "empiricism," "idealism," etc. do not mean in the

"aesthetic domains" (art, architecture, and now literary critical theory) what they mean in

philosophy. The sense of liberation from an oppressive "modernity" or "modernism" in the

aesthetic domains makes great sense - given what "modernity" and "modernism" have

meant in those domains. By contrast, "modernity" and "modernism" in philosophy are

sufficiently different that it is difficult to make direct comparisons between the aesthetic and

the philosophical. • In the philosophical world, what the aesthetic postmodernist rejection of

"modernity" and "rationalism" appears to mean is really a rejection of Cartesian rationalism

and Descartes' propensity to think dualistically. But this is in many ways a major theme of

philosophical inquiry since Parmenides made so abundantly clear the limits of dualistic

thought in the early 6th ct. B.C.E. Similarly, Belsey is most interesting as she works

towards what appears to be a pluralistic theory of interpretation - one which runs between

the assumption of a single, transcendent, fixed, universal Truth and sheer relativism.

Perhaps this is "post-modern," if the assumption of a single transcendent truth is somehow

"modern" in the terms of literary theory. But it is by no means uniquely "postmodern" in the

philosophical domain. On the contrary, much of the work of the major Western

philosophers - Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and their contemporary representatives (e.g.,

Habermas) - is precisely the project of overcoming dualistic modes of thinking and

establishing pluralistic middle grounds between dogmatic assertions of single universal

truths and (equally dogmatic) relativistic assertions of there existing no truth whatsoever.

Finally, while Belsey in some ways seems to be stretching towards an explicitly

philosophical approach to literary theory - she does not make the complete plunge into

philosophy and its traditions. By stepping only halfway towards the philosophical domain,

she thereby cuts herself off from the tools and insights, which would serve her so well in

her project. Correlatively, despite her explicit interest in logic and logical consistency, she

consistently falls prey to a number of common logical fallacies (question-begging, false

dilemma, etc.). And her lack of awareness regarding the many philosophical versions of the

sort of pluralistic

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middle ground she interested in leaves her to reinventing the wheel without the aid of these

earlier and contemporary counterparts.

A CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL PRACTICE

Catherine Belsey’s observations on critical theory vis-à-vis "common sense" run in close

parallel to Robert Dreier and Christi Lewis' observations on the resistance to philosophy in

art and architecture:

“Common sense approaches literature not as a self conscious and deliberate practice, a

method based on a reasoned theoretical position, but as the 'obvious' mode of reading, the

'natural' way of approaching literary works. Critical theory accordingly appears as a

perfectly respectable but to some degree peripheral area, almost a distinct discipline, a

suitable activity for graduate students or perhaps as a special option for undergraduates,

having no necessary connection with the practice of reading itself. At best it is seen as a

way of explaining in theoretical terms what we already - and on the whole without

encountering any difficulties - do when we read; at worst it is held to be misleading,

interfering with the natural way of reading, perplexing the minds of readers with nice

speculations of philosophy and so leading to overingenuity, jargon and a loss of direct and

spontaneous contact with the immediately perceptible reality of the text”. Over against the

self-evident assumption of the common sense view, she will urge the view of Saussure, that

"common sense itself is ideologically and discursively constructed, rooted in a specific

historical situation and operating in conjunction with a particular social formation." Her

critique, we note, is squarely logical and philosophical: "In reality, common sense betrays

its own inadequacy by its incoherencies, its contradictions and its silences." Indeed, she

makes the essential philosophical point: over against the anti-theoretical pretensions of the

common sense approach, she states "But there is no practice without theory, however much

that theory is suppressed, unformulated or perceived as 'obvious'." She uses ideology in a

specific way: My use of the term, derived from Althusser's, assumes that ideology is not an

optional extra, deliberately adopted by self-conscious individuals ('Conservative ideology',

for instance), but the very condition of our experience of the world, unconscious precisely

in that it is unquestioned, taken for granted. Ideology, in Althusser's use of the term, works

in conjunction with political practice and economic practice to constitute the social

formation, a formulation which promotes a more complex and radical analysis of social

relations than the familiar term, 'society', which often evokes either a single homogenous

mass, or alternatively a loosely connected group of autonomous individuals, and thus offers

no challenge to the assumptions of common sense. Her comment on the strategy of common

sense in response to the new terms of her (ostensibly more radical) critical theory is worth

reproducing: ...the last resort of common sense is to dismiss as 'unnecessary jargon' any

discourse which conflicts with its own. This is an easy way of evading conceptual

challenges, of course (and of eliciting reassuring sneers), but it negates the repeated liberal

humanist claim to open-mindedness and pluralism.... To resist all linguistic innovation is by

implication to claim that we already know all we need to know.

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As she provides a definition of the common sense view, however, she illustrates a point

we've already seen in our discussion of architecture: the use of terms in one discipline may

be only vaguely related to their use in another. Consider: Common sense proposes a

humanism based on an empiricist-idealist interpretation of the world. In other words,

common sense urges that 'man' is the origin and source of meaning, of action, and of history

(humanism). Our concepts and our knowledge are held to be the product of experience

(empiricism), and this experience is preceded and interpreted by the mind, reason or

thought, the property of a transcendent human nature whose essence is the attribute of each

individual (idealism). These propositions, radically called in question by the implications of

post-Saussurean linguistics, constitute the basis of a practice of reading which assumes,

whether explicitly or implicitly, the theory of expressive realism. This is the theory that

literature reflects the reality of experience as it is perceived by one (especially gifted)

individual, who expresses it in a discourse, which enables other individuals to recognize it

as true. This necessarily general picture paints with such a broad brush that the key terms

humanism, empiricism, idealism, and reality - are necessarily equivocal, if they are to refer

to any of the many currents of thought which use these terms as labels and organizing

categories. As but one example: in the philosophical tradition, empiricism and idealism are

generally opposed notions of how knowledge emerges - two distinct traditions of reflections

on epistemology which Belsey joins neatly together without further comment. While such a

conjunction vaguely recalls Kant (who is not named here) - the Kantian synthesis of

idealism and empiricism excludes in turn Belsey's use of "transcendent" here to describe

human nature. From a philosophical perspective, then, the terms are used so broadly here as

to jumble together what in philosophy is carefully kept separate. This is not to say that

Belsey cannot use the terms in this way - only to say that we should be careful not to

assume that her use of the terms perfectly matches their use in philosophy. Accordingly,

whatever conclusions she may draw about idealism, empiricism, etc. may hold quite nicely

in the domain of literary theory - but not necessarily beyond the bounds thereof. This same

problem reappears later when she criticizes the New Criticism for failing to confront "the

idealist assumption that the text constituted an expression of an idea, a presence which

existed in some shadowy realm of subjectivity anterior to and independent of the text itself."

Just what sort of "idealism" is this? Platonic? Kantian? Neither? Both? For that, following

her summary of the emergence of the expressive realist position point to the precisely

philosophical character of the questions she wants to address: ...expressive realism presents

a number of problems not easily resolved within the framework of common sense.

Difficulties, which have emerged, include the problem of access to the idea or experience,

which is held to precede the expression of it. What form does it take? Do ideas exist outside

discourse? Is the idea formulated in one discourse (a letter or a diary) the same as an idea

formulated in different words in another discourse (a literary text)? In what sense is fiction

'true', and what constitutes evidence of that truth? What is the relationship between a text (a

discursive construct) and the world? To what extent is it possible to perceive the world

independently of the conventional ways in which it is represented? To what extent is

experience contained by language, society, history? To our eyes, these are the questions a

philosopher would raise regarding epistemology, (our account of knowledge and theories of

truth, including the role of perception), ontology or metaphysics (what is real? what are the

relationships between realities?), and philosophy of language. Yet Belsey will not take up

the theoretical approaches and lessons of philosophy to address these questions, but will

rather remain

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within the frameworks of literary theory and critical theory. From my - admittedly biased -

perspective, she thereby cuts herself off from a variety of theoretical tools, which would

prove useful in addressing her questions. And in remaining within the framework of literary

theory and critical theory, she further cuts herself off from the history of philosophy - and

from a full appreciation of logic. She does not recognize, for example, in her quoting

Wimsatt and Beardsley (as representative new critics), that they echo Plato's critique of

writing in the Phaedrus. Recognizing this connection not only would have helped enrich her

understanding of the long history of the recognition that words, once written down, are no

longer the property of the author; thereby, she would be able to observe that the apparently

contemporary debate between what she takes to be the common sense approach and her

own, allegedly more radical approach, is by no means an entirely new thing under the sun.

Indeed, it is conceivable that understanding the larger historical context - and in particular,

some of the earlier responses to Plato's critique of writing (including Plato's own as the

obvious author of many written works...) - would suggest still other responses to this debate

than she is able to uncover. As a specific example: she criticizes the New Criticism on the

problem of meaning: Within the expressive theory the text could be seen to possess a single,

determinate meaning, however complex, and the authority for this meaning was the author.

Meaning was what the author put into the text. Not only does Belsey (following Saussure)

reject this view - so does Plato after a fashion. Moreover, the insistence on a single meaning

seems to a turn regarding language made in the rejection of certain forms of equivocal

language (analogical equivocals, for example) by John Duns Scotus in the Middle Ages.

Ever since Scotus, Western philosophers and scientists have largely argued that univocal

terms are preferable to ambiguous terms - despite the observation made in Plato and

Aristotle that language is perhaps intrinsically ambiguous, and some forms of ambiguity

(analogical equivocals) may reflect important structures of connection and difference in

both language and reality. This failure to recognize the more nuanced and complex

understanding of language in history seems to contribute to a simple dichotomy

fundamental to Belsey's project. This simple dichotomy runs the risk of amounting to a false

dilemma. In her analysis of expressive realism in general and New Criticism in particular,

she pushes the understanding of meaning in expressive realism to an overly simple extreme:

...the continued assumption that meaning is single, and the continued quest for a guarantee

of this single meaning results in a conviction that the meaning of any text is timeless,

universal and trans-historical: 'though cultures have change and will change, poems remain

and explain'. This extreme version of some sort of idealism - or is it simply

fundamentalism? - is then countered by her alternative, introduced here in a question-

begging way: The problem is...the failure to recognize that meaning exists only within a

specific language, or more precisely within a specific discourse, and that it cannot therefore

inhere timelessly within the words on the page. This is Belsey's post-Saussurean view - but

it is a view which is yet to be demonstrated. To assume it, as she does here - and then

criticize an alternative view for failing to see this point, is to beg a very important question.

And to return to the initial problem, Belsey seems to present us with a simple either/or:

Either a single, timeless, universal, and trans-historical meaning exists

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Or meaning is solely constructed within and is thus valid only in relation to a given,

historically-conditioned discourse. But is this really the only choice? Or are these but the

poles on a continuum of choices - including choices which include both the recognition of

the role of history, culture, and subjectivity and independent frameworks and realities in the

construction of meaning? Belsey repeats this dichotomy later on, as she approves of

Northrop Frye for glimpsing the "fact" that "...meaning is conventional, a matter of

familiarity rather than intuition." Without demonstration that (a) in fact these are the only

two (exclusive) alternatives and (b) that the second alternative is more likely to be true - to

presume the truth of the second alternative remains question-begging. Belsey does this on

the next page as she again critiques the New Critics as they are forced back on a naive

empiricism-idealism which maintains that words stand either for things or for experiences,

and that these inhere timelessly in the phenomenal world or in the continuity of essential

human nature. Thus history becomes an anticipation of the present in all important aspects,

and the specific, ideologically constructed experience of the twentieth century is

universalized as the unchanging natural order.... SIMILARLY The weakness of the theory

originates in the attempt to locate meaning in a single place, in the words of the text, 'on the

page'. In reality texts do offer positions from which they are intelligible, but these positions

are never single because they are always positions in specific discourses. It is language,

which provides the possibility of meaning, but because language is not static but perpetually

in process, what is inherent in the text is a range of possibilities of meaning. Texts, in other

words, are plural, open to a number of interpretations. Meanings are not fixed or given, but

are released in the process of reading, and criticism is concerned with range of possible

readings. Beyond the question-begging - we need to notice a distinction which Belsey does

not make: it is one thing to argue for an infinite range of possible meanings/interpretations

(in a kind of hermeneutical relativism - the position we see Belsey heading towards) - and

another thing to acknowledge that texts may issue in a perhaps very large but essentially

limited plurality of possible meanings. The latter position does not force us into relativism -

and is characteristic of such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, etc. (I'm not sure about

Nietzsche: let us see!) Belsey's question-begging takes an irritating turn when she

comments: New Criticism thus constitutes a contradictory moment, in a sense a liberation

from the authoritarianism of the expressive theory, but inhibited from taking advantage of

this liberation by its own commitment to empiricism and a concomitant idealism. We may

have missed something - but how does expressive theory get linked up with

authoritarianism? Moreover, while we generally endorse liberation - why is liberation

clearly good, and authoritarianism clearly bad? "It is disappointing, therefore, to discover

that this rich plurality is destined to be contained within a repressive pluralism which argues

that conflict between points of view only inhibits the advancement of learning." Why is

such a pluralism repressive? Another example of question-begging: Belsey critiques

Northrop Frye's "liberal humanism," not only as it is ostensibly founded on empiricism-

idealism, but also as it, "as part of a liberal education, can make it possible to conceive of a

free and classless society, transcending the world we know, 'clear of the bondage of

history'." Belsey takes this independence of the determinism of history to mean a kind of

transcendence which makes such conceptions ultimately irrelevant to the world we live in:

"The human mind, forever isolated from the social formation in which in reality it is

constructed, is seen as unable to influence the course of history in any substantial way."

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The question-begging at work in "the social formation in which in reality it is constructed"

is made more explicit in her concluding paragraph: No theoretical position can exist in

isolation: any conceptual framework for literary criticism has implications which stretch

beyond criticism itself to ideology and the place of ideology in the social formation as a

whole. Assumptions about literature involve assumptions about language and about

meaning, and these in turn involve assumptions about human society. The independent

universe of literature and the autonomy of criticism are illusory. Again, she asserts here a

position she has to prove - and one that confronts us with a simple either/or: either meaning

and criticism are thoroughly imbedded in and thus relative to a specific historical moment -

or they are utterly independent (and thus irrelevant). Beyond the logical fallacy of false

dilemma at work here - the dilemma is disappointing because it misses the philosophical

response to this dilemma as worked out by Plato, Aristotle, and subsequent philosophers.

The third possibility which Belsey's dilemma overlooks is the Platonic ideal which is both

transcendent of ordinary existence and intimately connected with it (through "participation,"

to use the Platonic phrase). This third possibility makes it possible to have a ground distinct

from what is - i.e., a ground on which one stands in achieving a critical distance from the

status quo, which may offer conceptions of important values such as justice, goodness,

equality, etc. which fund both a critique of the status quo and provide standards towards

which individuals and societies may move - while yet not entirely divorcing oneself from

the ordinary world (and thus becoming irrelevant to it). We suspect, in fact, that Belsey

seeks to occupy this third position - but as her very limited understanding of Western

philosophy prevents her from seeing it, I'm not sure she succeeds in occupying this third

position entirely consistently. Another quibble: we simply don't follow Belsey's

understanding of philosophers and philosophical schools. Example: Where they (the New

Critics) are atomistic and detailed, he is categorical and sweeping; where they are

Aristotelian, he is Neoplatonic, seeing literature as realizing a potential golden world rather

than imitating a brazen one. As we understand him, realizing the potential of the ideal is at

least as much Aristotle as it is Neoplatonic; furthermore, Aristotle is more likely to be

categorical rather than atomistic - while he is also quite detailed. All of this is to say:

beware of the oversimplifications regarding philosophy introduced by literary theorists who

apparently do not intend to become overly familiar with philosophical approaches and

frameworks. Yet: Belsey (perhaps inevitably) strains towards the philosophical. The point

of her summary of recent literary criticism is to make the argument: The Anglo-American

tradition of critical theory begins to appear as a series of such developments [i.e., faltering

efforts to overcome the limits of expressive realism], based on a recognition of the

inadequacies of the commonsense account of literature, but unable to resolve the problems

it presents from within the empiricist-idealist conceptual framework. What is needed is a

fundamental break with the empiricist-idealist position. Countless philosophical steps have

been made through the realization that the problems with a given theory issue not so much

from a mistaken development of basic premises (what Aristotle called the first principles) -

especially as these are often implicit, inarticulate, and thus not available for critical

inspection - but with the limitations of the premises/first principles themselves. Belsey,

perhaps without knowing it, is directly adopting that historical structure in her presentation

of expressive realism as a tradition

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whose limits can only be overcome by moving beyond its fundamental principles. Aristotle

(as one of the first to explicitly argue in this fashion - e.g., with his many references to the

Presocratics and his explicit debates with Plato) would be pleased. But this leads to one of

my central points of discomfort with much of the argument I see in literary theory: while

straining in this (and other ways) towards the philosophical - by remaining within the

boundaries of literary criticism, such theorists cut themselves off from a whole tradition

whose tools and lessons might well be essential to a more productive engagement with the

ultimately philosophical issues raised. MORE QUESTION-BEGGING AND FALSE

DILEMMA At its best, interest in the reader is entirely liberating, a rejection of authorial

tyranny in favour of the participation of readers in the production of a plurality of

meanings... This question-begging is further at work in the language Belsey herself uses to

discuss other views. It is, as these and earlier examples ('liberation') already make clear, the

language of political power. So she goes on from here to critique Walter J. Slatoff as

holding to a position marked by "authoritarianism" which she sees in his terms defining

"...the practices of 'good readers and critics', who learn to 'submit' to the work and let their

'responses' be 'directed and limited' by it. "Now why is this "authoritarianism"? And on the

next page, she accuses the empiricist-idealist position as guilty of "suppression of

language," something she says is by now familiar. But, by my reading, this is the first time

she's suggested such a thing. She also does not like Stanley Fish, despite his account of a

dialectical relationship between reader and text: A dialectical presentation...is disturbing, for

it requires of its readers a searching and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in and

live by. It is didactic in a special sense; it does not preach the truth, but asks that its readers

discover the truth for themselves, and this discovery is often made at the expense not only

of a reader's opinions and values, but of his self-esteem....For the end of a dialectical

experience is (or should be) nothing less than a conversion, not only a changing, but an

exchanging of minds.) This account, we might notice, seems consistent with Platonic

notions of dialogue and dialectical readings of the dialogues. But for Belsey, this account is

still lacking: Its weakness, however, is its failure to recognize that a plurality of readers

must necessarily produce a plurality of readings. Fish's reader is disarmingly singular... She

further asserts that such a singular reader amounts to a "suppression of differences" - one

that is appropriated from Anglo-American, specifically Chomsky's, linguistics, over against

Saussure. Again, there's a questionable either/or: either a single reader or the suppression of

differences / or a plurality of readers. I'm not sure it's that simple. A similar simplicity:

"...literary competence is learned, and as a result it cannot possibly be trans-historical." Like

the most elementary (and fallacious) arguments for relativism, this conclusion follows only

if we assume that either there is a single, trans-historical truth which is immediately

accessible to all human beings in a perfectly identical form/content - or everything is

learned and thus utterly relative to specific histories/cultures. A (Socratic/ Platonic/

Aristotelian/ Thomistic/ Kantian) middle is possible: what if there are trans-historical truths

understood/applied/interpreted in different was in different histories/cultures? This is a

logical possibility - and such truths, further, would involve "learning" of some sort,

including the appropriation of a given language.

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Given the possibility of such a middle, we can see that Belsey's either/or further confuses

necessary with sufficient conditions. Given the possibility of such a Socratic-Kantian

middle, such a middle might require learning as a necessary condition for understanding.

But it would also require a second condition - namely, its own transhistorical existence.

This is different from taking learning as a sufficient condition for acquiring such

understanding - in which case, learning would fully determine such understanding, and such

understanding would be entirely relative to a specific history/culture. Finally, Belsey turns

to the German Aesthetic Response School of literary criticism, represented by Iser - one she

still finds lacking, again in terms of political power: ...Iser's theory suppresses the

relationship between language and experience. This is because, apparently, Iser doesn't

explicate that relationship. But is silence the same as suppression? Couple this with her

intended project, now that she has ostensibly demonstrated the inadequacies of Iser's theory

- "To liberate new ways of reading which overcome the theoretical problems and the

practical limitations I have discussed...." Again, an either/or: we either suppress or liberate.

Obviously, most of us would value the latter.

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MOST EXPECTED QUESTIONS

Q: Q: Q: Ans: The article “Subject and The Text” deals with individual or subject and

ideology and inter-relationship of these two entities in a classical realist setting. Belsey has

made a convincing relationship between the subject and the text. Her explanation is

conspicuous regarding modern interpretations of classical topics. Catherine Belsey being

modern critic and competitive authority over literature sets changed definitions which may

be considered as new-fangled layers of meanings of the classical terms. According to her

ideology, a capitalist system emphasizes a lot on individual freedom and “assumes a world

of non-contradictory individuals whose unfettered consciousness is the origin of meaning

knowledge and action.” But the important aspect is that, the role of ideology in a system is

to suppress the role of language in the construction of the subject – since that would be a

direct threat to the existing order. According to Catherine Belsey, Classical Realism that is

promoted by text print and electronic media represents a world of subjects which are the

origin of meaning, or knowledge. But they are able to appreciate a classical realist literature

due to the fact that the text available is relatively easily intelligible. Belsey points out that

the ‘I’ of the Romantics is different from classical realist fiction in the sense that it directly

involves the individual to respond to that text or a piece of poetry. However, in fiction as a

classical realist fiction whether drama or novel, there is a lack of direct authorial presence.

The given statement is somewhat paradoxical, since the author presents it as a shadow

which cannot be separated from the body of the text. Belsey here says that, WHAT DOES

CATHERINE BELSY BRING FORWARD IN HER DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT

AND THE TEXT? WHAT IS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUBJECT AND THE

TEXT ACCORDING TO BELSEY? WHAT IS ILLUSIONISM IN CLASSICAL

LITERATURE? HOW CATHERINE BELSEY DEFINES IT?

“The form of the classical realist text acts in conjunction with the expressive theory and

with ideology by interpreting the reader as subject. In this way a classical realist constitutes

an ideological practice in addressing itself to readers as subjects, interpreting them in order

that they freely accept their subjectivity and their subjection.” Belsey further elaborates that

apart from illusionism, which is already evident from above discussion, from a paradoxical

development of a subject within ideology and which is normally present in classical realist

texts, there are certain other questions within the narrative techniques which ensure this

subjectivity and subjection. These are closures and literacy of discourses, which combine to

establish a “truth” of the story. In Barthes view, closure is something which tends to form a

very regular order or pattern in classical realist literature. Techniques like murder, love

triangles etc. provide the destructive element in the text. But it eventually leads to an

ideologically accepted closure, where a subject feels a certain relief and the order of things

is re-established. According to Belsey, “The moment of closure is the point, at which the

events of the story become fully intelligible to the reader” it means that the closure is such

point in a story when the fog starts to clear away and the real picture or the situation

becomes clear to the reader.

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The second aspect of illusionism in classical realism to the “hierarchy of discourses” is in a

text i.e. the existence of a privileged discourse outside the inverted comas, which develops

strong author reader relationship. It also makes “obvious” in the involvement of a reader as

a source of meaning through the use of discourse within inverted commas. The discourse

existing outside the commas is indirect authorial intrusion. This hierarchy of discourse is

responsible for a distinction between ‘Discourse’ and ‘History’, according to Benveniste:

Because history relates without the intervention of a speaker as there are no ‘you’ or ‘I’

involved in it. The presence of events or ideas through a first person narrative is not

necessarily a way of evading authorial power or authority. But, in fact, they provide reader

with an opportunity to involve in first person narrative and seemingly create the meanings

of their own. The presence of third person narrative, however, acts as the indirect authorial

presence, which ensures the continuation and reaffirmation of the existing ideology.

Catherine Belsey is of the view that Classical Realism presents individuals whose traits of

character, understood as essential and predominantly given, constrain the choices they make

and whose potential for development depends on what is given. Human nature, thus, seems

as a system of character differences existing in the world but one very clear and distinct

closure. She says that:

Q: Q:

Q: Ans:

“Initially constructed in discourse, the subject finds in the discourse of the classic realist

text a confirmation of the position of autonomous subjectivity represented in ideology as

‘obvious’. It is possible to refuse that position, but to do so at least at present, is to make a

deliberate and ideological choice.” PROVIDE A DETAILED BACKGROUND TO

LINGUISTIC CRITICISM. WHAT IS POSTSAUSSUREIAN LINGUISTICS? GIVE A

DETAILED DEPICTION OF EVOLUTION OF THE LINGUISTICS BEFORE AND

AFTER SAUSSURE. WHAT IS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND

IDEAOLOGY? GIVE AN EXAUSTIVE OVERVIEW.

Linguistics has had a major impact on 20th century literary theory, and criticism, primarily

through the influence of the Swiss Linguist Ferdinand De Saussure (Died 1913). Saussure

argued that linguistics should move from a diachronic study of language i.e. how language

develops historically to a synchronic study i.e. treating language as a system within one

temporal plane. He divided language into Langue, the underlying system that governs

linguistic usage and Parole, how language is actually used in practice. The basis of Langue

is that words are arbitrary signs, in that the relation between a word and what it signifies to

arbitrary, i.e. almost entirely determined by conventions. What determines the meaning is

not that the word refers to the word or to the ideas or concepts that exist outside the

language. It is the difference between linguistic signs and themselves that create meaning.

Saussuries shift of linguistic emphasis to language as a signifying system paralleled

development in formalists. Criticism and his work have been most influential on those who

follow a formalist approach. According to C. Belsey, Post Saussuries linguists challenge the

expressive realism. Imprecise idealist’s stances in critical practice regarding the relationship

between language and the world and also in the development of this linguistic approach.

Saussure’s concept plays very important role in the trial practice. In fact, he builds a basis

for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between language and the

word.

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Saussures’s “Course in General Linguistics” is a very important contribution not only in the

field of linguistics but also in the development of the science of signs, i.e. semiotics. The

concepts of signifying system have influenced the critical study of literature, which after

Saussure is treated as a signifying practice. Saussure’s concepts have proved to be very

important and have removed many discrepancies and ambiguities regarding a relation

between language and the ideology of the word. Catherine Belsey discuses a lot of

important ideas and concepts given by Saussure and highlights their consequences in the

study of literature as a signifying system. The first important point is Saussure’s insistence

about the role of language as not being just a tool to name different things but, in fact, in

language the stresses, is a system of differences with no positive terms which means that

language has been taken through ages as a naming device for already established concepts.

He refused this superficial idea that language serves as a system of naming existing things.

Saussure gives out the concept that language, in fact, comes before the very existence of

independent concepts. The word is a continuum independent entity which is differentiated

through the signifying system. Thus without language this continuum cannot be easily

deciphered. According to Saussure, language is a system of signs. He divides these signs

into two basic components, a signifier, which is a sound-image, or the specific written word

combination, which is the concept that is being given to the sound of the written shape.

“Language can be compared with a sheet of paper; thought is the front and sound the back;

one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time; like wise in language,

one can neither divide sounds from thought nor thought from sounds.” She wants to say that

language gives individual identity to the thought or the concept, thought or idea exists first

and then comes language that makes this concept clear to the viewer or the listener. When

someone says the word “eglantine“ or “rose”, the very utterance of the word the signifier;

sound image, brings forward the concept related to that sound. Saussure believes that

language precedes the identity of individual. Man is the part of social fact and through the

use of language as a signifying system; we make this concept clear by giving it a specific

sound that relates us to the concept whenever we utter that very sound. The signifier, sound

image makes the difference clear between things. The concept “Rabit” is signified by the

word “Rabit”. Saussure was an atheist, a man who believed that man lives in a Godless

world. So he can give the idea that language makes clear the concept and language gives

existence to concept, whereas in reality concept is not bound to language. Concept stands

first or the thought comes first and then comes language. Saussure is of the view that since

the signifier and signified are inseparable for example the sound image ‘Rose’ belongs to

the concept ‘Rose’, leads to an illusive paradox and nature of language is overlooked due to

this illusion. Saussure says, “If words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have

exact equivalents in meaning from one language to the next, but this is not true” Saussure

means to say that pre-existing concepts are not responsible for meaning. The belief, that a

concept would have the same meaning or the same concept in every language, is not true,

because different languages perceive the word in different ways.

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He gives the example of the French word “mouton” which means both mutton and sheep at

the same time. If it has been the pre-existing concept, then the same word has been easily

translated with the same meaning in English language. But we observe that in English we

have two different words, i.e. “sheep” for the “animal” and “mutton” for its “meat”, which

clearly establishes the importance of language as a signifying system preceding the

existence of independent entity. The word is a continuum and the sign is responsible,

though the signifier and signified, to differentiate and distinguish between different entities

in this continuum. This theory of Saussure is not applicable to religious ideology. Because

the word God stands for the concept Supreme Power, the Almighty, signifies word God is

signified by concept God. But the concept of God is beyond human comprehension. If we

do not name Him, “God” He will be there and will always make His presence felt. The

concept “God” can be identified in different words in different religions. The next important

element in Saussure’s theory is that language is a social fact and only a certain community

can generate signs, means that language cannot be produced in isolation. The particular sign

in a language is arbitrary since it has no logical connection with the signified. But language

being a social fact gives a particular signified or a particular signifier. Language, thus, also

becomes a matter of convention and the arbitrary nature of signs explains the social fact

which generates a social system, but although the signifying system as a whole is not

arbitrary. Because meaning in a social construct, it is directly influenced by a particular

social formation. This brings us to the valuable benefit of ideology, which is a product of a

particular social system and it is inscribed in signifying practices i.e. it is inscribed in a

language to a certain extent depending upon the signifying practices as discourses myths,

presentations and representations of the way things are. Belsey, here, opines that ideology

cannot be reduced to a language and, likewise, language can certainly not be reduced to

ideology, but signifying system can play a very important role in naturalizing and

describing ideas and concepts. Thus, language, being a social fact is directly connected with

ideology and ideology is inscribed in language. Another important fact of post-Saussurean

linguistics is that language is a system, which pre-exists the individual, in which the

individual produces meaning. Thus a child learns a particular set of differentiating concepts,

which identify not given entities but socially constructed signified. This classifies the point

that language pre-exists the individual, since the individual being born in a social fact is

before-hand provided with a particular signifying system. It is important to note that

language is not the only signifying system. Images, gestures, social behaviours etc. are all

part of symbolic order. But language is a most practical way of communication and any

threat from any symbolic order to an existing ideology is challenged and stopped within a

language. Thus, ideology, being an important component of social thought or, in fact,

ideology being a social fact is closely connected with language. The given analysis briefly

sums up the post Saussurean linguistic development. Belsey is of the view that:

“From this post Saussurean perspective, it is clear that the theory of literature as expressive

realism is no longer tangible, because, since realism reflects the word constructed in

language.” But in fact, language precedes the individual. Language in ideology has a very

strong connection, likewise language and thought has a very strong connection. Therefore,

“the subjectivity of a specific perspective authority is no guarantee of the authority of a

specific perception of the word”.

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Q: Ans:

WHAT IS CONCEPT OF THE PLURALITY OF MEANINGS IN BELSEY’S

“CRITICISM AND MEANING”?

In her article “Criticism and Meaning” Catherine Belsey basically deals with the concept of

plurality of meaning or with the quality of language as having numerous or infinite

possibilities of interpretations. Belsey does not simply elaborate this point but brings

forward the different conceptions of Expressive Realism, New criticism and Northrop Frye

etc. and their attempt to find a device or method of interpretation of meaning aided by

certain methodologies. Catherine Belsey elaborates the importance of post saussurean

Linguistics for its questioning of different critical practices regarding their attempt to locate

a guarantee of the meaning of a text, especially without historical and ideological

influences. For example Expressive Realist finds the guarantee of the particular meaning in

author’s mind. Thus he understands the quality of language as having a varied potential for

interpretation and critical appreciation. Likewise, Belsey elaborates that New Criticism is

also unable to locate this guarantee of meaning due to its incomplete understanding and

vision regarding language and human experience. Negating ideology and history in

particular, it undermines the evaluation of a text and gives an incomplete account of the

linguistic possibility. Language being a social fact is subject to a variety of major and minor

changes even within a single social system. Belsey gives an excellent example of a sentence

i.e.

“Democracy will ensure that we extend the boundary of civilization.” It’s an excellent

example to bring out the potential for meaning and the ideological and historical impacts on

its interpretation. For example a person of a developing country like Pakistan would

interpret, “Democracy” in a different manner, owing to the historical and ideological

influences. Whereas a person in one of the African tribes does not even know about

Democracy and if he is told, would appreciate it according to the verdict given by the local

witch-doctor. Democracy and civilisation carry totally different concepts in a developed

country. For examples the Scandinavian States (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland)

have a freedom level of individuality to an extent that would be unthinkable in the states

like Iran. This example of the word “Democracy” makes evident the fact that language is a

social fact and a meaning of a sentence in a discourse will be directly influenced by

different influences which could be of an ideological or a historical or a purely linguistic

nature. Thus, this is evident again that the meaning in a particular sentence is plural.

Therefore, to pose an individual subject as an authority for a single meaning is to ignore a

degree to which subjectivity itself is a discursive construct. To find a guarantee of meaning

in the world or in experience is to ignore the fact that our experience of the world is itself

articulated in language. Thus Catherine Belsey elaborates the plurality of meaning and its

crucial significance in “Critical Practice”. Q: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A

SUBJECT AND IDEALOGY IS EXPRESSED IN “ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT” BY

CATHERINE BELSEY? Ans: “Addressing The Subject” by Catherine Belsey, deals with

the relationship of a subject to an ideology that is given forth in a particular fact and how

text promotes a particular set of mode or ideology. Catherine Belsey makes it clear that,

how by the use

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of particular ideological practices, the cutter makes the reader to believe in his individuality

without realizing that he is being motivated by the particular ideology. Text makes

something “obvious” to the reader and reader thinks that he or she is reading a text as an

individual. In fact, what the reader does not realise is that instead of promoting individual

thought, the text is actually strengthening the existing ideology. According to Belsey,

classical Realism of 19th and 20th century in capitalist systems is excellent example of the

practice of promoting a certain ideology without making the reader to realise it. As already

discussed in post-Saussurean Linguistics and also evident in this article that although the

discussions of Althusser and Lacan, Language is supreme and the subject is constructed

within language, as Lacan mentions in the studies of Freudian concept of the self and the

development of the child and realisation of child as an individual ‘I’ so the subject is

constructed in a language which makes him able to distinguish between “I” and ‘you’. So

language is supreme and prime that as within language an individual can differentiate

between ‘I’ and ‘You’ and feels the identity of his own self and others as well. Ideology

plays very important role in a community and staying within language gives a particular

mode of usage to it. There are several apparatuses in the society that Althusser calls as

Ideological State apparatuses (ISAs) in a capitalist system, which consist of the educational

system. ISA is responsible for the usage of language, which promotes a particular ideology.

As mentioned by Catherine Belsey in Chapter 2, that language and ideology has strong

interaction, without being subservient to one another. This obviously demonstrates the fact

that since subject is situated within a language, ideology has a strong interrelationship,

therefore, it can be deduced that the subject can never be separated from a particular set of

ideology. As discussed in the article, science is that branch of knowledge, which can lie

outside the boundaries of ideology and can leave to the development of knowledge, which

can challenge a particular ideology. Thus new branches of knowledge evolve through a

dialectical process within ideology. The subject or the self also faces the problem of having

inherent contradiction, because the ‘I’ of the conscious state may be within ideology but the

‘I’ of conscious may lie outside it. The inherent dialectic will eventually lead to a

development of new modes of knowledge despite the suppression by existing ideological

practices within language. Functions of literature are diverse. It may primarily encourage or

sustain a particular ideological practice and ensure the continuity of a particular ideological

set up. Literature on the other hand, provides unlike Classical Realism, new modes of

thought which instead of being obvious to the reader may challenge the existing ‘I’ system

and thus provide space for the development of new knowledge to the subject. Q: WHAT IS

CATHERINE BELSEY’S IDEA OF EXPRESSIVE REALISM? Q: PROVIDE A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF “EXPRESSIVE REALISM” BY CATHERINE BELSEY. Q:

HOW EXPRESSIVE REALISM HAS EVOLVED THROUGHOUT THE AGES? Ans:

Catherine Belsey define, Expressive Realism as “the theory that literature reflects the reality

of experience, as it is perceived by one individual, who expresses it in a discourse which

enables other individuals to recognise it as true.”

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Expressive Realism can be divided into two parts. The first part deals with 19th century,

especially the 2nd half of 19th century, (Victorian age). The most famous critic of this time

is Ruskin. This age is also the age of industrial capitalism. Capitalism is the system of free

economy, where there is minimum interference of government in economic affairs of the

country. The industrial revolution occurred in Europe through rapid development of

industry. This industrial development actually was the real beginning of the modernism

through industrialisation. Expressive Realism exists in the period of industrial capitalism in

the writings of Ruskin. Expressive Realism is influenced by the Aristotelian concept of art

as “mimesis”. Mimesis as elaborated by Aristotle is translated as limitation. It is evident

from Aristotle’s attention plotting that he does not by mimesis mean that art should be a

literal or photographic representation of reality. In representation of reality material from

life has to be selected and carefully organised. Thus imitation in literature will evidently and

inevitably be the imitation of real life. So the first historical component of Expressive

Realism is “mimesis” by Aristotle as “Imitation of reality” in literature or art. The 2nd

historical component of Expressive Realism is Representation. The concept of

representation in Expressive Realism is derived from the critical concept of the Romantics

that Poetry (imaginative literature) is “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” or

emotions. The idea of representation as given by the Romantics can be summed up in the

following lines where Wordsworth in his “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” says that:

“The sum of what was said is that the poet is chiefly distinguished from other men by the

greater promptness to think and feel without immediate external excitement. And the

greater power in expressing such thought and feelings as are produced in that manner. But

these passions and thoughts and feelings are the general questions and thoughts and feelings

of men.” By the mid-nineteenth century, the Expressive Realism became widely established

theory not only in literature but also in painting and especially in landscape painting,

through the works of the major post Romantic theorist like Ruskin. According to Ruskin the

artist must both represent faithfully the objects portrayed and express the thoughts and

feelings that evoke in him or her. The beginning of the concept of Expressive Realism can

be found in Ruskin’s book “Modern Painters” in 1840 where he is treating poetry

(imaginative synonymous literature) and painting as similar Ruskin actually combined both

Aristotelian idea and Romantic concept together, because both poetry and painting represent

reality. Catherine Belsey critical examines both concepts of Expressive Realism, she is of

the view, “Whereas truth to nature is universally pleasing the representational aspects of art

will delight everyone. The expressive aspects are apparent only to the few” So, in the

imitation of reality, although reality will be portrayed by the artist but every reader will not

be able to appreciate the powerful overflow of emotions on a similar level as expressed by

the author. Expressive Realism falls short on the level of perception of reader as the

depicted reality in the form of imitation . “Ruskin’s criticism will concentrate first on the

question of truth to nature, since although it is possible to reach what I have stated to be the

first end of art, the representation of facts, without reacting the second, the representation of

thoughts, yet it is altogether impossible to reach the 2nd without having previously reached

the first. Mimetic accuracy is the foundation of all arts ‘nothing can atone for the want of

truth.”

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In Ruskin’s point of view both parts of Expressive Realism i.e. the imitation of reality and

its representation are not different quantities, they in fact, are art is mimetic and expressive

and Ruskin goes on to again that the two qualities are in fact, not two but one. Because

whenever the truth will be represented to the reader, it will remain same for all of them and

they will appreciate the imitation of reality in the form of a piece of art, just at that level as

the author has done. But Catherine Belsey says that it is not possible for all readers to

appreciate the imitations of reality on the same level as author has appreciated and

represented. So it is not but as Ruskin says that because reality is portrayed in the form of

limitation so it will be same for all of the reality and its representation will help the reader to

see it in that sense what the author wanted to portray or convey. Another difficulty in

Ruskin’s view as presented by Catherine Belsey is the difference of perception from author

to reader or artist to spectator. Although reality is in front of all of them but how they

perceive it, makes the real difference Belsey says “Already, however, Ruskin glimpses the

problem in his empiricist idealist position. The facts of nature are there for every one to see

and to be plainly expressed; some people perceive these facts more keenly and if they are

artist, portray them invested with a nobility not apparent to every one, represent them

differently.” Catherine Belsey here means to say that “truth” itself can not be perceived and

imitated by all authors in like manners. They may perceive truth according to their own

level of perception and mental and emotional capacities. So, “the work of art may be read in

different ways by different spectators.” In Belsey’s view Ruskin falls back on an uneasy

separation of ‘the representation of facts’ from ‘the representation of thought.’ By the

1960’s Expressive Realism had to face many challenges, among those C. Belsey mentions

some of them for instance Russian formalism and semiotics. Following the brief idea of

difference from Expressive Realism, Russian formation rejected the unsystematic and

critical approaches, which have previously dominated critical studies. The formalists were

interested, therefore, in the representational or expressive aspects of literary texts. They

focused on those elements of texts, which they thought to be uniquely literary in their

character. To Formalists Representation is not very important, what matters to them is the

literariness of the text, that what philosophical or literary ideas are conveyed in the text. The

imitative quantities are not important what is presented is important. Likewise the

Semioticians insisted that the word itself, as it relates to the human mind, consists entirely

of sign, since there can be no unmediated relationship with reality. To Semioticians, the

representation also does not matter, unless we do not study the signs of language. Essence

of the text that is conveyed by words and symbols is more important, the emotions and

feelings come later. First comes language and the use of language within a text. The first

critic in 20th century is Barbra Hardy who directly and indirectly takes an expressive

realities stance. For example she writes.

“The novelist, whoever he is and whenever he is writing, is giving form to a story, giving

form to his moral and metaphysical views and giving form to his particular experience of

sensations, people, places and society.” In Hardy’s view a novelist is giving form of words

to his experiences, his feelings and his emotions and the experience which he got from his

society, he evolved it in his mind in the form of words and words and feelings were finally

presented in the form of text is the reader and experience made an image in the mind of the

writer it was imitation of reality, he, then combined it with the emotions and feelings and

formed Expressive Realism.

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Belsey states almost Barbra Hardy that,

“The statement I have quoted, however, apparently innocent, depends on certain quite

specific assumptions. It assumes the existence of a story, views and experiences in the mind

of the novelist prior to and independent of the formation of them. These pre-exist the

narrative and are “expressed” in it.” Hardy’s statement is structure based and she takes

ideology of the author and reader inferior to the form and in sum case of the text. Here,

ideology makes the form of the text not its ideology. Barbra Hardy is of the view that if

truth is imitated just like the objective imitation of reality, combined with experience and

emotions, the truth will be the same for all. We find a similar stance in Hardy as we find in

Ruskin, i.e. the imitation of experience takes an important position and is culminated

through expressions. The 2nd expression realist critic in 20th century is F. R. Leavis.

Leavis’ approach is important in this regard that it is not formulated in a specific theory or

in organised structure. In this evaluation of Henry James’ works he adopts an approach

which is expressive realists approach. For example he writes about the novels of James as

having the quantity for “the vivid concreteness of the rendering of this world of individuals

centres of consciousness we live in”, i.e. in felt life are present both the concepts of

imitation and representation, when applied in literature. The word ‘rendering’ here carries

the direct concept of Expressive Realists’ representation i.e. Henry James consciousness as

represented in his novels rests or in derived from his “most vital experience” (for Leavis the

felt life or felt experience is important as it is important for B. Hardy). Catherine Belsey

further elaborates that “the text is seen as a way of arriving at something” interior to it: the

convictions of the author or his or her experience as part of that society at that particular

time. To understand the text is to explain it in terms of the author’s ideas, psychological

state or social background. Thus, the felt experience of author becomes crucial in his

imitations of reality and in its representation, which is a result of his felt experience. So

Ruskin, Hardy and F. R. Leavis, are one of the same views that the author is presenting to

the reader a particular idea with a belief that the reader will perceive it in the same way as

author has tried to convey. That is why the autobiographical note is given for the readers

before the text so that the reader can easily relate to the idea, which the author has tried to

project in his text. Catherine Belsey concludes that the expressive realist portion has been

subject to a series of challenges and in some cases by theories which have since become

authorities in their own right. In this way, it has become apparent that expressive realism

presents a number of problems not easily resolved within the framework of common sense.

Difficulties, which have emerged, include the problem of access to the idea or experience,

which is held to precede the expression of it, what form does not take. Does idea exist

outside its course? Is the idea formulated in one discourse the same as an idea of formulated

in different words in another discourse? Further, what do we mean by ‘realism’? In what

sense is fiction ‘true’, and what constitutes evidence of that truth? What is the relationship

between a text and the word? To what extent is it possible to perceive the word

independently of the conventional ways in which it is represented? To what extent is

experience contained by language, society, history? Q: WHAT ARE NORTHROP FRYE’S

DICTUMS OF LITERARY CRITICISM? Q: WHAT ARE FRYE’S VIEWS REGARDING

REALISM IN LITERATURE? Ans:

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Northrop Frye is one of those critics whose illustrations are more persuasive. Man believes

in overall generalization when he traces limited patterns of significance by corelating the

phase of dawn spring and both with the myths of revival, resurrection and creation and

finding there in the archetype of romance, or by co-relating the phase of Zenith, summer

and marriage with myths of entering into the paradise and finding there in the archetypes of

comedy, pastoral; the sender cannot but feel that an elaborated schedule of the obvious is

being manufactured. Catherine Belsey has discussed Northrop Frye in much detail and there

is relatively less space given to her own critical appreciation in this article. For the purpose

of simplification we shall discuss several points separately which have been united in a

whole very beautifully. Frye believes that criticism should be a systematic and organised

study. In “Fables of Identity” 1963, he claims that much supposed criticism is sonorous

(resonant) nonsense that contributes nothing to a systematic structure of knowledge. As for

those who primarily practice structural analysis this stop short of recognising that literary

criticism needs a coordinating principle by which what is seen in an individual work can be

grasped as a part of a vast whole. In short an immense source of critical enlightenment

awaits us if we recognise that there may be much more in a poem than even poet may

himself be aware of. Fry rejects Realists stance that we cannot perceive all that is conveyed

in the text by just looking at it (the text) in relation to author’s thoughts, because there can

be more than what author had the intention to convey in his text. Text gives an author a

chance to trace what author may not has perceived so the text and its meaning to the reader

occupy most of the importance in literary criticism. The key to understanding lies in

recognition of archetypes which represent a unifying category of literature or literary

criticism. Frye observes that how random and peripheral is the critical experience which is

produced by mediocre works of art, which the masterpiece seems to draw to appoint in

which we can see an enormous number of converging patterns of significance. The first

major point in the structure of any literary composition, as opposed to the ideas of Northrop

Frye is that criticism is not a parasitic activity but, in fact, it is a systematic study and

evaluation of texts. Frye is of the view that

“criticism should become a coherent and systematic study, and the elementary principles of

which could be explained in any intelligent nineteen years old.”

Frye tried to classify literary criticism. Thus he endeavours in the “Anatomy of Criticism”

to classify the different modes, symbols, mythic symbol and genre for a classification

between comparative study of authors and periods. Another important point raised by

Northrop Frye is, his insistence on the depiction of realism in literature as being undesirable

and distasteful. He is of the view that a literature based on realistic appreciation, i.e. a

literature which is not primarily about the world is simply not a literature underlying his

formalism is the concept of immature and culture, which sees let as imitating not the world

but rather the total deem of man it should be based on imagination not the reality. Frye also

puts an end to realist’s stance by his insistence that the writer’s aim is to produce the

structure of the words for its own sake. And there-by, he discards the authorial power as

celebrated in Expressive Realism. Frye himself describes his own procedure as “Archetypal

criticism”. He defines these archetypes as recurring images or symbols, which connect one

text with author and constitute a source of the intelligibility of the text, thus developing a

very strong concept

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of comparative critical approach. His ideas about archetypal criticism maintained that

human nature being constant, these archetypes and the different symbols in different texts

can be compared without keeping in view their historical settings. Belsey is of the view that

Frye’s consistence upon the particular point takes him much closer to New Criticism,

because applying his ideas means that let transcends history and ideology give expression to

the timeless aspiration of an essentially unchanging human nature. Frye’s instance upon the

idea of let from history and ideology shows that the meaning of a text and above the

limitations of time and place in other words the meaning of a text will be single. It reflects

the stance of new critics as they also insisted upon the single meaning of a text. So, while

rejecting New Critics’ view, Frye is also one of them. But in reality the meaning of text or

these archetypes never remain the same as time makes changes in the attitude and behaviour

of people towards any text. Frye’s formation also gives attention to the language of literary

works. According to Northrop Frye, language is not just a simple conveying of this but it is

its condition. The production of meaning is possible within language only. Meaning for

Frye remains bound timelessly in verbal structures because the readers “recognise in them

the echo of their own wishes and anxieties” so the meaning of a text is available in the body

of a language. Belsey is of the view that Frye has not properly discussed the relationship

between language of a text and its meanings. Frye insists upon the plurality of meanings

within a text and Catherine Belsey critically appreciates his efforts in this regard. Frye

rejects the idea of the author as guarantee of the single meaning of the text. He is of the

view that a critic should not look upon a literary text in the context of the intention of

author. He should not assume the concept of the text as the author intended to show. Frye

opines;

“The critic is assumed to have no conceptual framework. It is simply his job to take a poem

which a poet has diligently stuffed a specific number of beauties or efforts and

complacently extract them one by one.” So, in the quest of meanings, a critic or reader

should not look up to the intentions of the author. The rejection of the authorial power in the

quest of the meanings of the text focuses our attention upon the plurality of the meanings of

a text. “Text is inevitably plural, open to a number of readings” and “to opt for a single

pattern is to narrow the possibilities arbitrarily and unnecessarily”. Frye’s view is that the

meaning of a text is subject to a change because in different times with the development of

a number of schools of critical theory, they keep on emphasizing different aspects of a text.

A text keeps in it plurality of meaning as every reader finds a specific meaning present and

intelligible to him at a certain time period. To Frye the plurality of meaning is a healthy

stance in criticism as the plural meaning of the text and not in conflict with one another but

complementary each contributing to our understanding of the work as a (single) who can.

Catherine Belsey finally analyses Frye’s stance as having appreciative qualities but also

having certain major drawbacks, such as Frye’s lack of appreciation of the important

concept of ideology and history and their influence on the meaning of a text over a passage

of time. This in brief, is the account of Frye’s concepts about criticism as discussed by C.B.

Major points of Frye’s critical dictums are: 1. Criticism is considered as systematic and

organised study of literature. 2. Literature based on imagination and ideal factory ‘the total

dream of man is not the realistic depiction of life and world (Not good option as man cannot

transcend from his social and historical values, he has to live in reality, let not escape from

reality)

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3. Introduction of the Archetypes as they help in understanding the text by composition with

the other. 4. Negation of the Expressive Realist stances by author as he is guarantee of the

meanings of text. 5. Plurality of meanings within a text language as a condition to the

expression of thoughts relationship between long remedy. Q: Ans: New Criticism was a

reaction against the orthodoxy of Expressive Realism. In 1940s and 50s the New Critics in

USA put their whole emphasis on “the text” as text if became a central plank in what was

known as New Criticism. Here we will have a brief gaze upon some of the critics that

uphold the structure of New Criticism. John Crowe Ransom wrote a book “The New

Criticism”, in which he proclaims: WHAT IS NEW CRITICISM? HOW CAN IT BE

CONSIDERED AS THE MODERN METHOD OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS?

“Criticism is the attempt to define and enjoy the aesthetic or characteristic value of

literature” Ransom has developed a distinction between texture and structure, the structure

is the story, the object or situation or whatever, which gives us the argument of the poem,

the texture is the thingness of the thing by which it is particularized. For example, Ransom

allows for “studies are technique of art which in the case of poetry would concentrate on

those devices which distinguish it from prose; structure, scene, description, basic setting of

the text or poem: texture the emotions combined with the structure is texture, it carries the

creative element that makes the poem superior. The basic idea of thought based on emotions

and feelings is texture and the way of conveying that certain idea is structure. Wimsatt and

Beardsley have also played an important role on this regard. Both of them published their

book the “Verbal Icon Studies in the Meaning of Poetry” (1954). Wimsatt and Beardsley

insist that no poem can be judged by reference to the poet’s intention (authorial power

denies). The meaning of the text is something internal which can be discovered from the

text of the poem, (shift from another is text in quest of meaning) that is public, which

everything that is “external” and not the part of a work as a linguistic fact is private and

idiosyncratic. For example for critical purposes it is better to study Coleridge’s “Kubla

Khan” with a dictionary in your hands, rather than with the elaborate investigation into

Coleridge’s reading made by professor Lowes in “Road to Xanadu”. Cleanth Brooks says

that literature is a description and evaluation of the object. It concerns itself as a work itself.

In reply to those who argue that this isolation of the work cuts it loose from its author and

his life and from its reader and their response, Brooks insists that what belongs to biography

and psychology may be interesting but it is not to be confused with an account of the work.

In short we can put New Critics in these points that: 1. They denied the authorial power. 2.

Focus on text as meaning of text can be found “on the page” and text as a “public property”.

3. Meaning of the text is timeless universal and Trance historical”. Although New Critics

focused on a scientific approach for critical studies by denying the authorial power and

Belsey agrees with them at that point. But she does not agree that text is a public property

and the meaning of the text lies on the page. In her view, due to historical changes the

words of the text as presented on the page will change, because every reader will analyse

and understand the text or the words of text in the light of his own age and ideology. She

also rejected that meaning of the text are

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universal because the words will convey the same message to all its readers in all ages. She

proves it by saying that as meanings of a text are bound to the language; language is subject

to change, so when language will change the meaning of the text will obviously change.

Along with this, the perception of the reader can be different from one person to another.

Belsey quotes the example of Paradise Lost by Milton that when it was written Satan was

considered as a villain and devil, by the readers of that time. But in Renaissance age, Satan

was placed at a high status and he occupied the stature of a hero. So, it is clear that the

meaning of the text changes with the passage of time. Belsey beautifully proves that the

meaning of a text changes from one person to the other and from the age to another. Q: Q:

Ans: The role of the reader in relation to literary text gained importance and significance as

one of the challenge to Expressive Realism through the works of several critics in the

beginnings of the 1960s. The reader’s response criticism, as they propounded, has become

significant development in 20th century critical practice. Belsey has summarised the

benefits of this approach as, WHAT BELSEY WANTS TO PROVE IN HER ESSAY,

“READER POWER”? WHAT IS POWER OF A REDER IN CRITICISM? MAKE A

CONVINCING CASE.

“As its best interest in the reader is entirely liberating a rejection of authorial tyranny in

favour of the participation of the reader in the production of plurality of meanings and its

these effects as supporting and developing a raw authority figure which she describes as,

Reader theory mainly constructs a new authority figure as guarantee of a single meaning, as

unless transcendent highly trained model reader who cannot be wronged.” In the article

Reader Power, Catherine Belsey analysis briefly the development of this theory starting

with W.J. Slatoff and concluding with Iszer. According to Belsey, Slatoff‘s most important

contribution is his propounding of the idea that text cannot be read in a similar manner, by

all the readers because they cannot determine across history where is no possibility of

identical interpretation of texts by various readers. What Slatoff, here, is giving the idea of

individual reader and his perception misses on this very important component where as and

believes that critic has an undivided power based on liking or disliking etc. to evaluate the

text, there is no mention as such of an analysis of ideological and discussive difference.

Slatoff, like Wayne Booth’s concept of the implied author does not make any difference

from the empirical author. Slatoff identifies readings which do not produce a required level

of understanding between the reader and the writer as male adjustments indirectly and

involuntarily justifying, once again author interventions. Slatoff does not point at the

ideology, sometimes; there can be no compatibility between reader and author. Catherine

critically scrutinizes this point remarking that the production meaning by the reader is this

essential movement by the reader is his thread towards the position of the author. What is

lacking from Slatoff’s analysis is any concept of the role of assumptions and expectations in

the productions of meaning. Stanley Fish is a famous critic of modern age, he is a strong

supporter of reader’s response theory and he has given several important dimensions. His

important dictum is about the development and appreciation of reader powers. His first

major idea regarding their power is the emphasis on the experience of the reader and

connected with the

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concept is the idea that what does the text will cause reader. Experience by the reader is

subject to variation and no text will do the same thing, produce the same effect for the

readers. Thus establishing the authority of the reader as separate reader as mater of critically

evaluates the text. Another important contribution by Fish is concentration on the text as on

discourse. He challenges the reader to face area of difficulty regarding the reading and calls

it dialectical, thus it seizes reader as active participant in the process of the construction of

meaning but there is no obvious recognition that experience is ideologically constructed.

The relationship between experience, language ideology and history is not clearly discussed

by Fish, lending is the antithesis or reverse reaction in which the reader assumes the

position as a new authority figure.

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Catherine Belsey s Critical Practice a Critical Analysis

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