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Transcript of Casualty Investigation Report
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16th June 2006
File No. 26206
This Report has been presented without prejudice and with the exercise of due care and diligence. In accepting this report of Certificate, it is
agreed that the extent of the obligation of this firm with respect thereto is limited to furnishing a Surveyor believed to be competent, and in
making this Report or Certificate, the Surveyor is acting on behalf of the person requesting the same, and no liability shall attach to this
Firm for the accuracy, errors and omissions thereof.
CASUALTY INVESTIGATION
REPORT( Investigation of Death @ Sea )
M.v. “ NYK SPRINGTIDE ”
Voyage :- 32E17
YIT Terminal @ Los Angeles, California
12th May to 7 th June 2006
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Ship Particulars
1.1 General Data
Name: M.v. NYK Springtide
Owners: Ulala Maritime S.A. Panama, R.P.
IMO Number: 9017044
Port of Registry: Panama
Call Sign: H O C Z
Type of Ship: Container Carrier (Capacity: 3054 TEU)
Deadweight Tonnage: 39404 (MT)
Length overall: 253.38 m
Breadth (Moulded): 21.20 m
Extreme Draft: 11.50 m
Means of Propulsion: Diesel
Engine Power: 45,000 PS
Service Speed: 23.4 knots
Delivery: 30 June 1992
Radio: SAT “F” 764118236, SAT “C” 435312610
Electronic Positioning: GPS
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2 Documents To Be Produced
a) Statement of Master;
b) Statement of Chief Officer;
c) Copies of Official Log Book pages
d) Copies of Deck Log Book pages (3 May, 3 May Retard Day, 4 May);
e) Copy of Master’s Night Orders from 5/3/06;
f) Copy of Panama Seaman’s Document for Jai Kumar Shah;
g) Copy of Master’s Certificate for Capt. Peter Damian Misquitta;
h) Copy of Ship Registry & most recent Tax Payments to Panama
Maritime Authority;
i) Marine Note of Protest;
j) Crew List & Ship’s Particulars;
k) Copies of Nautical Chart 4522 used during incident;
l) Copies of four (4) pages of parallel search pattern;m) Copies of weather and position log pages;
n) Weather Charts received on the vessel;
o) Weather Reports received on the vessel;
p) GMDSS Radio Log Summary;
q) Daily Record Summary of all communications;
r) Copy of Distress messages sent via GMDSS;
s) Copy of list of satellite phone call records; &
t) Copy of Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist.
3 Particulars of Voyage
The NYK Springtide was on an eastbound transpacific passage between the port of
Sendai, China, and Los Angeles, CA on Voyage 32E17, and nearing the
International Dateline at the time of the incident. The date at which Cadet Shah
was last seen was May 3rd
2006. In the morning when he was discovered missing,
was again May 3rd
in what is sometimes knows as Dateline Day or Repeated Day.
The Master reports that the vessel sailed from the port of Sendai with a full load of
containers, and a GM of 0.97m.
4 Particulars of Personnel Involved in Incident
Master: Capt. Peter D. Misquitta
Chief Officer: Mr. Vikram Yadav
Third Officer: Mr. Ankush Chowdhury
Bosun: Mr. Rodolfo E. Rosal
FMA: Mr. Eljube T. Lunggakit
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5 Particulars of Sea State, Weather and Tide
During the night of the incident, the vessel was passing to the south of a low
pressure system which was moving to the NNE. The proximity of the low pressure
center was causing strong winds from the SSE which moved to the South during
the night. Seas were described in the log book as “high sea and swell.” During the
night in which Cadet Shah went missing, and the following day when the search
started the visibility was at least two miles at all times. The logbook describes
conditions as follows:
Time Wind Force Swell
2100 SSE 7 S 3 m
2200 SSE 7 S 3 m
2300 SSE 7 S 3 m
Midnight SSE 7 S 3 m0100 S’ly 8 S 3 m Retard Day
0200 S’ly 8 S 3 m
0300 S’ly 8 S 3 m
0400 S’ly 7 S 3 m
0500 SSW 7 S 3 m
0600 SSW 7 S 3 m
0700 S 7 S 3 m
0800 S 7 S 3 m
0900 S 7 S 3 m1000 S 7 S 3/4 m
1100 S 7 S 3 m
Noon S 7 S 3 m
1300 SW 7 S 4 m
1400 SW 6 S 4 m
1500 SW 6 S 4 m
1600 SW 6 S 4 m
1700 SW 5 S 4 m
1800 WSW 6 S 4 m
1900 WSW 5 S 4 m
Following this time darkness set in. Wind and sea conditions remained similar
through the next night and day with the wind gradually coming around to the West.
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6.1 Type of Incident
Marine Casualty: the death of a person that is caused by, or in connection with, the
operations of a ship.
6.2 Date, Time and Place of Incident
The incident (apparent loss of a person over the side) took place at sometime
between the hours of 03/1000Z (when Mr. Shah was last seen) and 03/2030Z
(when it was discovered that he was missing).
6.3 Details of Incident and of the Events Leading Up To It and Following It
During the last day that Cadet Jai Shah was seen on the vessel, he worked (under
the direction of the Chief Officer) with the Bosun cleaning in cargo hold bilges.Following that work he was assigned by the Chief Officer to monitor the ballasting
of a tank in the Ballast Control Room as the tank filled by gravity. He reportedly
stopped the operations below the tank top level. He reportedly informed the Chief
Officer (via ships telephone to the Bridge) when this was completed at
approximately 03/1730 LT (03/0630Z). He was told by the Chief Officer to “knock
off” and get dinner. He was told to start work again in approximately two hours
(1940) to make a fire round of the interior areas of the ship.
Following his fire round, Cadet Shah reportedly came to the Bridge to make atelephone call to India. This happened at approximately 2045 (LT). During this
time period, ships clocks were being moved forward 20 minutes per watch. The
Third Officer was on the Bridge at this time. Another Crewmember was using the
phone at the time. Cadet Shah reportedly told the Third Officer that he would go
below for a few minutes and come back when the phone was free.
Cadet Shah reportedly came back to the Bridge and made his phone call to a family
friend in India. The ships phone records show that this call was made at 03/2136Z.
This would have been at approximately 03/2100 LT. The Third Officer reports that
he did not overhear any noticeably loud or stressed conversation during the phonecall. He reported that Cadet Shah came onto the Bridge (from behind the blackout
curtain) and wished the Third Officer a good night. When the Third Officer
returned good night wishes, Cadet Shah left the Bridge. According to internal
interviews with all crewmembers by the Master and Chief Officer (and confirmed
by the Investigator), that was the last time that anyone on the ship saw Cadet Jai
Kumar Shah.
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During the night, the records do not indicate any incidents. The Chief Officer
reports that all crewmembers (including Cadet Shah) were warned about heavy
weather, and told not to go out on deck. There is a notation in the deck logbook
that “Checklist for navigating in heavy weather completed with rough seas and
swell.” A copy of this checklist is included in this report. It is noteworthy that
there is no requirement for the posting of signs on all internal doors warning
about not going on deck during heavy weather.
On the following morning, the first official notice of Cadet Shah being missing is
in the statement of the Chief Officer. He states that he was informed at 0815 hours
by the Bosun that the Cadet had not reported for work. The Bosun stated that he
had called the cabin of the Cadet (10-15 rings) with no reply. The Chief Officer
then went to the cabin. He found the door open, went inside, but did not find the
Cadet there.
The Chief Officer then went to ask the crew directly if they had seen the Cadet. At0830 the Chief Officer informed the Bridge (and the Master) that the Cadet was
missing. At that time, a search was begun with the Chief Officer, Bosun and deck
gang. When the Cadet was not found at 0900 the General Alarm was raised, the
crew mustered, and a head count showed the Cadet as still missing. A full-scale
intensive search of the vessel from bow to stern was then launched with all hands.
This was the first of four such searches during that day. At 1028 the vessel was
turned to a reciprocal course to head back towards the last position when the cadet
had been seen.
The ocean search for the missing Cadet Jai Kumar Shah took place over the next
33 hours. Communications took place with Company officials, and with the USCG
providing SAR assistance. The details of the ocean search follow with times in
UTC:
• 03/2110 Phoned NYK Cell Manager Mr. Chadha to inform of the incident
• 03/2200 Completed physical search of vessel
• 03/2226 Received call from Capt. Nakaya of NYK who told to reverse
course
• 03/2228 Reversed to reciprocal course to return to last known position
• 03/2230-2400 Conducted a second search of vessel for missing Cadet
• 04/0100 Commenced third search of vessel for missing cadet
• 04/0100 Received phone call from Mr. Richards of USCG RCC Honolulu.
Informed that 2 aircraft had been dispatched (from Honolulu and Alaska)
• 04/0155 Informed by RCC Honolulu that C-130 aircraft would search the
area starting around 04/0600
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• 04/0500 Received call from NYK Captains A Singh and Joshi asking for
telephone numbers for cadet.
• 04/0518 Informed by RCC Honolulu (Lt. Taylor) that SAR aircraft would be
over the area and stay on site for approximately one hour
• 04/0600 Commenced fourth physical search of the vessel
• 04/0730 Darkness setting in. Search suspended. Proceeded to position of last
sighting to resume search at daybreak
• 04/0900 Informed passing vessel MV TANGO of missing crewmember and
asked to keep sharp lookout
• 04/1015 Informed by RCC Honolulu that due to fuel constraints, aircraft
were returning to their home stations
• 04/1740 Resumed search for missing cadet in position 38-333.5N 171 38.9E
in parallel search pattern
• 05/0145 Informed by USCG RCC Honolulu that they were suspending
search
• 05/0730 As darkness fell, suspended the search for missing crewmember
Cadet Jai Kumar Shah, and resumed voyage to Los Angeles, CA
6.4 Details of the Performance of Relevant Equipment
There is no evidence of any equipment failures relevant to the incident. However,
it will be noted in another section of this report that a chain link rail was not in
place over the port bunker rail (located just aft of the Accommodation House), andthe chain over the starboard bunker rail did not have proper tension, and added
little height to the rail at that position.
6.5 Persons on Bridge
During the time period in which the incident apparently took place, the Bridge was
manned by a Watch Officer (3rd
Officer, 2nd
Officer and Chief Officer) and a
lookout.
6.6 Persons in Engine Room
During the time period in which the incident apparently took place, the engine
room was in UMS condition and unmanned. Security rounds were made
periodically of the area, but Cadet Shah was not seen in the Engine Room.
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6.7 Whereabouts of the Master
The Master was not on the Bridge when Cadet Jai Shah was last seen. He later
came to the Bridge to write Master’s Night Orders at 2300 LT, and then retired to
his quarters for the remainder of the evening. The Master was notified that Mr.
Shah was missing at approximately 03/0830 LT after he failed to report to the
Chief Officer.
6.8 Extracts from all Relevant Documents
The documents which were required to be produced are listed in Section 2 of this
report. Where the contents of these documents are deemed relevant, quotations are
inserted at points where they are relevant.
6.9 Details of Communications Made Between Vessel and Radio Stations
The details of all communications between the vessel and radio stations are noted
in the “details of the incident” section of this report. Copies of radio logbook
entries and other documents are attached.
6.10 Details of Any Injuries/Fatalities
There were no injuries noted as a result of this casualty. As to fatalities, the subject
of this report is the status of the missing crewmember, Cadet Jai Kumar Shah. Mr.
Shah is missing and believed to be deceased.
7 Assistance After the Incident
The Master received assistance after the discovery of the missing crewmember
from the following:
• Mr. Chadha – NYK Shipmanagement Cell Manager
• Capt. Nakhaya – NYK Shipmanagement Casualty Response Center
• Mr. Richards - USCG RCC Honolulu (for SAR advice)
• Lt. Taylor – USCG RCC Honolulu (arranging for dispatch of two rescue
aircraft)
• Passing vessel M.V. EVER ULTRA
• Passing vessel M.V. TANGO (LAPN-5)
• Capt. Anuraj Singh – NYK Shipmanagement
• Capt. Joshi – NYK Shipmanagement
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• LES Santa Paula (land radio station)
• CAMSPAC Station (MF/HF DSC Urgency Messages)
• AMVER positions reported
8 Authentication of Documents
All of the documents listed in this report, and attached to the report were reviewed
by the investigating officer with the Master of the NYK Springtide. Captain Peter
Damian Misquitta verified the copies as having been directly copied from various
ship records. The investigating officer reviewed the chart which was in use at the
time of the incident, and also reviewed the original copies of many of the
documents to ensure their authenticity.
9 Interviews (Crew or Witness)
Master: Capt. Peter D. Misquitta
Chief Officer: Mr. Vikram YadavThird Officer: Mr. Ankush Chowdhury
Bosun: Mr. Rodolfo E. Rosal
FMA: Mr. Eljube T. Lunggakit
10 Analysis and Conclusions
10.1 Human Element
10.1.1 People Factors
Cadet Jai Kumar Shah was reportedly on his first ship after graduating from
maritime college. He had been on the ship for almost 5 months before the incident.
It is noted that the Chief Officer apparently took great care not to assign Mr. Shah
to any hazardous areas of work, and duly noted his relative lack of experience. All
persons interviewed indicate that they find it difficult to believe that Cadet Shah
would venture outside of the Accommodations House in a storm.
An email from the brother of Cadet Shah indicates that the he was looking forward
with great anticipation seeing his brother again after more than a year apart. There
is no other indication of any suicidal impulses by Cadet Shah.
Several interviews indicate that Mr. Shah was well-liked by the crew. It is
noteworthy that the person who is presumed to be the best friend of Cadet Shah on
board (FMA Eljube Lunggakit) shared memories of the two friends singing songs
from their respective countries. There is no indication of any likelihood of foul
play.
10.1.2 Organization on Board
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It appears that Cadet Shah was well-supervised on board by the Chief Officer and
persons assigned by the Chief Officer. While cadets often are well-supervised
during their working hours, they are normally left alone to work, study and sleep in
their individual cabins during off-duty hours.
10.1.3 Working and Living Conditions
As noted, the deck cadet on the NYK Springtide is assigned to a single cabin on D
Deck. The cabin was found to be clean, with no indications of any unusual
activities. It is noted that when the Investigator looked at the cabin, it had already
been inspected by USCG officials. It is believed that the USCG investigators left
the room in a somewhat messy condition.
The national makeup of the crew was typical for this NYK Shipmanagement with
officers coming from India, and ratings/junior officers from the Philippines. Thereis no indication of any racial tension or other issues on the ship.
10.1.4 Ship Factors
While the ship obviously is operating well, and in most respects has no apparent
problems, the following issues were noted by the Investigator:
• The chain over the top of the rounded bunker station rail on the Starboard
side was sagging, and provided little extra protection from falling over-the-side from the main deck. The top rounded rail is approximately 25-30 cm
lower than the top rail around the remainder of the Main Deck.
• The chain over the top of the Port Bunker rail was missing, and was
reportedly not in place at the time of the incident.
• The ship does not routinely place signs on the inside of doors leading out of
the ship during heavy weather.
Recommendations to address these issues will be provided in the following section
of this report.
10.1.5 Shore Side Management
It is noted that the “Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist” which apparently came
from the Company ISM Manual does not contain a requirement for placing signs
on interior doors warning not to go out on deck during heavy weather.
10.1.6 External, Influences and Environment
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The strong winds and large seas during the time that Cadet Shah went missing
made it extremely unlikely that Cadet Shah would be found if not one actually saw
him go over the side. It is virtually certain that the only other person outside during
this time period would have been the lookout on the Bridge wing. The fact that the
wing is 20 meters above the main deck and 30 meters above the ocean; combined
with the noise of the wind would make it virtually impossible for any outcry from a
person going over the side would be heard on the ship.
11 Recommendations
It is apparent that all crewmembers on the NYK Springtide are devastated from the
loss of a friend and fellow crewmember. It is also apparent that Cadet Shah was
well-supervised during his working hours on the ship. There is no reasonable way
that any crewmember (even a young and inexperienced one such as Cadet Shah)
can be watched and supervised 24 hours a day. However, it is the opinion of the
Investigator that the two Ship Factors noted in the previous section should be
addressed. His recommendations follows:
• Chain rails over the rounded bunker rail should always be replaced before a
vessel leaves port. These chains should be stretched tightly over this space
so that the effect is to have a rail at the same height as the rest of the railing
on the main deck.
The Company should institute a requirement that all interior doors which lead to
the outside (at all decks) should have warning signs placed on them during periods
of heavy weather. The placement of these warning signs should be a requirement
of the “Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist.”
Summary
Casualty Investigation of M/V NYK Springtide
The container vessel M/V Springtide suffered the loss and presumed death at sea of
a crewmember during the evening of May 3rd
, 2006. May 3rd
was a repeated day on
the vessel as it transited Eastbound across the Pacific and the International DateLine. The vessel was enroute from Sendai, China to Los Angeles, CA on Voyage
32E17 and approaching the International Date Line at position 38 42.0N 176 26.0E
at 0830 LT (03/2030Z) when it was discovered that Cadet Jai Kumar Shah had not
reported for duty.
After an unsuccessful physical search of the vessel and consultation with Company
and other officials, at 1028 LT (03/2228Z) the Master ordered the ship to be turned
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around to go back over the course traveled during the previous night and begin an
ocean search of the waters traveled. A total of four complete physical searches of
the entire vessel were conducted over the course of the day. The ocean search of
the waters traveled, and a parallel ocean search under the direction of the USCG
Search and Rescue (SAR) unit was conducted until searching was abandoned as
darkness fell on the second search day on 4 May 2006 at 1930 LT (05/0730Z).
Interviews with the Master and a number of crewmembers indicate that the last
time anyone saw Cadet Shah on the ship was at approximately 02/2100 LT
(03/2140Z) on the bridge where he had made a ship-to-shore phone call to a friend
in India. Thus, there was a period of more than 11 hours in which his whereabouts
were unknown.
The vessel was in relatively heavy weather during the night of the disappearance,
with winds from the SE at force 7 increasing to force 8 from the south during the
night. A log book entry during the 00-04 watch indicates that the vessel completedthe checklist for maneuvering in heavy weather. There are no other log book
entries as to heavy weather procedures; however the Master and Chief Officer
indicate that verbal warnings were given to crewmembers not to go on deck during
the night. The ship apparently does not use warning signs on the doors to attempt
to prevent anyone from going out on deck.
During the investigation, we reviewed all relevant documents, charts, and records,
and conducted a thorough inspection of the ship from the Navigation Bridge
(where Mr. Shah was last seen), to Mr. Shah’s cabin, inside and around the outsideof the Accommodation House of the vessel, around the Main Deck, and through
the entire system of port and starboard tunnels. We also conducted interviews with
the Master, Chief Officer, 3rd
Officer, Bosun, and the FMA (Fitter Assistant) who
was known to be the best friend of Mr. Shah on board.
There are four possible conclusions to draw from a person missing on a ship at sea:
• The person committed suicide (planned or unplanned)
• The person was the victim of foul play
• The person was hidden away on board, not found, and managed to leave the
ship un-noticed when it reached port
• The person met with an accident while out on deck and was washed (or fell)
over the side
It is the conclusion of this investigation that Mr. Shah is missing and presumed
deceased. The most likely occurrence of the four possibilities listed above is that
Cadet Jai Kumar Shah mistakenly went out on deck and accidentally went over the
side where he perished.
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During the time period when the whereabouts of Mr. Shah became unknown, the
deck officer on the bridge was operating inside the wheelhouse. The lookout was
on the wing of the bridge, but due to the noise of the wind and the distance above
the water, the chances of the lookout hearing any shout from a person going over
the side would be highly unlikely. The exact cause which led Mr. Shah to leave his
cabin at night to go out onto a dark and windy deck in the dark will likely never be
known.
The temperature of the water at the time is this incident was listed in the ship
logbook as 15 degrees Celsius. All of the survival gear on the ship was reported to
be in place by the Master and ships officers. Given this situation, the amount of
time that a person could be expected to survive in the sea would certainly be less
than 2 hours, and would likely be measured in minutes. The sea was also quite
rough during this time period.
The Master conducted a search of the waters where Mr. Shah could most likely beexpected to be found for approximately 33 hours, and with consultation with SAR
officials, it appears to have been a reasonable decision to abandon the ocean
search, and reach the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Jai Kumar Shah had perished
at sea.
USED ABBREVIATIONS
AIS Automatic Information System
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
COG Course Over Ground
GPS Global Positioning System
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISM International Safety Management (Code)
OOW Officer on Watch
SAR Search and Rescue
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
UTC Universal Coordinated Time (also known as Z)
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FOREWORD
The Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine,
Department of Navigation and Maritime Safety appointed the firm of K Fitter &
Associates to investigate the accident on May 12, 2006. The on-board investigation
took place on the vessel NYK Springtide at the YIT Terminal in Los Angeles CA
beginning at 1100 hours (LT) 5/12/2006.
Panama Maritime investigation authorities acted in accordance to the IMO
Resolution A.849(20) concerning accident investigation as the leading party of the
investigation.
Capt. Allan R. Breese representing K Fitter & Associates to conduct the on-board
investigation. All interviews, inspections and other actions by Capt. Breese took
place in the presence of Mr. Anuraj Singh (Senior Personnel Manager Crewing
Department), Mr. Erich P. Wise (an attorney representing the Company), and
either the Master or Chief Officer. At the insistence of Company officials the brother of the missing Cadet and his fiancé were also present.
Statements Concerning the Investigation Report
In accordance with IMO Resolution A.849(20) concerning investigations of marine
casualties and incidents, this report is submitted to the Panama Maritime Authority
Directorate General of Merchant Marine. The statements from the Master and
Chief Officer have been noticed in this text. All received statements, documents
and records are attached.
Issued without prejudice,
CAPT. KHUSH FITTER
K .P. Fitter & Associates, Inc.
California U.S.A. Office
KPF-LB/ KPF-CAPT. ALLAN BREESE-LB
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Photographs;
Resume of the Investigator;
Statement of Master;
Statement of Chief Officer;
Copies of Official Log Book pages;
Copies of Deck Log Book pages; (3 May, 3 May Retard Day, 4 May);
Copy of Master’s Night Orders from 5/3/06;
Copy of Panama Seaman’s Document for Jai Kumar Shah;
Copy of Master’s Certificate for Capt. Peter Damian Misquitta;
Copy of Ship Registry & most recent Tax Payments to Panama
Maritime Authority;
Marine Note of Protest;
Crew List & Ship’s Particulars;
Copies of Nautical Chart 4522 used during incident;
Copies of four (4) pages of parallel search pattern;
Copies of weather and position log pages;
Weather Charts received on the vessel;
Weather Reports received on the vessel;
GMDSS Radio Log Summary;
Daily Record Summary of all communications;
Copy of Distress messages sent via GMDSS;
Copy of list of satellite phone call records; &
Copy of Heavy Weather Navigation Checklist.
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PHOTOGRAPHS
M.v. NYK Springtide
Voyage No :- 32E17
Vessel Alongside YIT Terminal @ Los Angeles - California.
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PHOTO 1: Stateroom of Cadet Jai Kumar Shah (5/12/06)
PHOTO 2: Desk of Cadet Jai Kumar Shah
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PHOTO 3: Notebook Found In Room of Cadet Jai Kumar Shah
( Only Routine Note From Cadet Studies Found )
PHOTO 4: Last Page of Notes Found in Notebook
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PHOTO 5: Email From Brother: Sharn Kumar Shah
Asking About Next Meeting Date
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PHOTO 6: Mobile Phone Found in Cabin
PHOTO 7: Cash Found in Cabin Desk Drawer
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PHOTO 8: Wallet Found in Desk Drawer
PHOTO 9: Cash Found in Wallet
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PHOTO 10: Lifejacket/PFD Found in Cabin
PHOTO 11: Cadet Cabin is Close to Door to Outside Ladderway
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PHOTO 12: Satellite Phone on Bridge Last Place Where
the Cadet was Seen
PHOTO 13: Starboard Ladderwell and Window of Cadet
Stateroom at Bottom of Photo
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PHOTO 14: Starboard Ladderwell as Seen From Main Deck Below
PHOTO 15: Chain Over Starboard Bunker Station Does Not
Stretch Tightly Across Opening
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PHOTO 16: Bunker Station Rail on Port Side Does Not Have a
Chain Stretched Across top to Provide Protection from Accidental Fall
PHOTO 17: Vessel @ Dock Demonstrates the Height on the Main
Deck Area Above the Water. The Height of the Bridge Wing
Above the Water Estimated More Than 30 Meters
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Resume
of the
Investigator
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Resume of the Investigator
Name: Captain Allan R. Breese
Career Summary
During his time as a deck officer and ship master, Capt. Breese transited every ocean in
the world, making port calls in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. His primaryfocus was in the Pacific Basin, with dozens of trans-Pacific crossings. His time as Master
was spent on large containerships, but he has also sailed as a deck officer on CrudeCarriers, Product Carriers, Bulk Carriers, Break Bulk ships, and Passenger Vessels out of
all major ports on the U.S. West Coast and to Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, andSingapore. As Master he made more than 100 transits of the treacherous Straits of
Malacca.
As a safety, quality, environmental and security auditor of merchant ships, Capt. Breese
has evaluated the working practices of seafarers from around the world. He has
participated in dozens of ride-along audits where he has been able to consult and advisecaptains, mates and engineers on the latest and best practices of seafarers. His primary
focus has been on bridge-team management, and operation of an effective bridge. He hasevaluated maintenance programs, including computerized preventive maintenance
programs, and has evaluated the operation of cargo, ballast, and stability systems on all of
the ships he has visited. He has also trained hundreds of mariners in the principles of safety and quality operations, and the use of management systems to improve shipboard
life.
Management of projects has been his focus for the past 4 years. His recent work includesa security gap analysis for the country of Jordan, and the development of security
processes for Exxon Mobil for their FPSO fleet. He is a certified lead auditor in ISM, ISO
9001 and ISO 14001, and has developed safety management systems for maritimeterminals and ships. He has extensive experience with Oil Spill Cleanup exercises and
plans, have my 40 hours hazmat certification, and fully trained in ICS.
Capt. Breese has a bachelor’s degree in Broadcast Journalism. This has assisted him in
his writing, training, and his ability to speak in front of large groups. Capt. Breese is
married, with two grown children. He lives with his wife in Fountain Valley, California.
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Investigator/ Assessor
Captain Breese was a Subject Matter Expert as part of a team that developed a Port
Security Assessment Tool for the USCG shortly after 9/11/2001. Following development
of the tool, he participated in security assessments at the ports of Philadelphia, SanDiego, and Portland, OR.
Capt. Breese has conducted safety and security assessments on ships and at facilitiesaround the world. Capt. Breese developed methodology for vulnerability and risk
assessments of U.S. flag and international vessels, as well as ports and port facilities. He
either led teams, or participated in investigations and audits for the following:
• Matson Navigation vessels
• Matson Navigation Hawaii Port Facilities
• Alaska Tankers Fleet
• Louis Dreyfus fleet vessels• Offshore Marine Service Association vessels (more than 200)
• Exxon Mobile’s Kizomba A FPSO
• Port of Gothenburg
• Port of Aqaba, Jordan
• Ports of Oman
• Ports of Nigeria
• Victoria Ship Management vessels
• Penn Terminals, Philadelphia, PA
• Chemoil Terminals, Long Beach, CA
Capt. Breese has conducted dozens of audits of port, port facility, and vessel security
plans around the world, and has trained more than a thousand persons to becomeSSO/VSO, CSO, and PFSO under the requirements of the IPSPS Code.
Representative: K . P. Fitter & Associates, Inc
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Statement of Master;
&
Statement of Chief Officer;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copies of
Official Log Book
pages;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copies of
Deck Log Book
pages;( 3 May, 3 May Retard Day, 4 May );
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copy 0f Master’s
Night Orders
5/3/06;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copy of Panama Seaman’s Document for
Jai Kumar Shah;
&
Copy of Master’s Certificate for
Capt. Peter Damian Misquitta;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copy of Ship Registry
&
most recent Tax Payments to
Panama Maritime Authority;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Marine
Note of Protest;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Crew List
&
Ship’s Particulars;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copies of Nautical Chart 4522 used during
incident;
Copies of four (4) pages of parallel search
pattern;
Copies of weather and position log pages;
&
Weather Charts received on the vessel;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Weather Reports received
on the vessel;
&
GMDSS Radio Log
Summary;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Daily Record Summary
of all communications;
&
Copy of Distress messages
sent via GMDSS;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copy of list
of satellite phone call
records;
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ATTACHMENTS
Attached to this report and made part of hereto are the
following:
Copy of
Heavy Weather
Navigation Checklist.
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