THIRD DIVISION 

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,                   Petitioner,               -  versus  -   RAMON P. JACINTO,

                 Respondent.

 G.R. No. 154622

 Present:

 

    CARPIO MORALES, J.,

               Chairperson,

BERSAMIN,

ABAD,*

VILLARAMA, JR., and

MENDOZA,** JJ. Promulgated:August 3, 2010

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DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank in the aggregate amount of P400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement[6] dated August 22, 1997.  As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land Bank nine (9) postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against FWCC’s account at the Philippine National Bank.  Later, before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several letter agreements which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring Agreement on June 3, 1998.  Under the new agreement, the loan obligation contracted under the Credit Line Agreement of August 22, 1997 was restructured, its terms of payment, among others, having been changed or modified.  When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured.  However, all the checks were dishonored or refused payment for the reason “Payment Stopped” or “Drawn

Against Insufficient Funds.”  Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands. 

Hence, on January 13, 1999, Land Bank, through its Assistant Vice President, Udela C. Salvo, Financial Institutions Department, filed before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office a Complaint-Affidavit[7] against respondent for violation of B.P. 22.  Respondent filed his Counter-Affidavit[8] denying the charges and averring that the complaint is baseless and utterly devoid of merit as the said loan obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the Restructuring Agreement.   

In a Resolution[9] dated March 3, 1999, Prosecutor George V. De Joya dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that the letter-agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement.  It was held that there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22.

On June 21, 1999, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.[10]

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the DOJ for review.  On April 10, 2000, the DOJ issued a Resolution[11] dismissing the appeal. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, the DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a Resolution dated October 25, 2000 holding that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability.   Thus, the DOJ held that:

WHEREFORE, there being probable cause to hold respondent triable for the offense of violation of BP 22 (nine (9) counts), the Department Resolution dated April 10, 2000 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor, Makati City, dismissing the complaint should be, as it is, hereby REVERSED. Said office is directed to file the appropriate informations for violation of BP 22 (nine (9) counts) against respondent.  Report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the above Order but it was denied in a Resolution dated December 18, 2000. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

On November 28, 2001, the CA, in the assailed Decision, reversed the Resolution of the DOJ and reinstated the Resolution of Prosecutor De Joya dismissing the complaint.  While the CA ruled that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation.  Also, the CA found merit in respondent’s assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because the issue of whetherthe original obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements entered into by FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case No. 98-2337 (entitled, “First Women’s Credit Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines” for Declaration of Novation) pending before the CA.  The CA also gave consideration to respondent’s assertion that the Order dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC proscribing FWCC from paying its debts constitutes as a justifying circumstance which prevents criminal liability from attaching.     

Essentially, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA erred in reversing the Resolution of the DOJ finding probable cause to hold respondent liable for violation of B.P. 22.

Petitioner asserts that the June 3, 1998 Restructuring Agreement did not release FWCC from its obligation with Land Bank.[14]  It merely accommodated FWCC’s sister company, RJ Ventures and Development Corporation.[15] Whether there was novation or not is also not determinative of respondent’s responsibility for violation of B.P. 22, as the said special law punishes the act of issuing a worthless check and not the purpose for which the check was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In ruling that the Order dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. M-4686 constituted a justifying circumstance, the CA failed to take judicial notice of Section 86-B (4)[16] of Republic Act No. 7907 which excludes the proceeds of the checks from the property of the insolvent FWCC.   

Respondent counters that there was novation which occurred prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him and that if proven, it would affect his criminal liability.[17] Respondent averred that if the CA would judicially confirm the existence of novation in the appeal of Civil Case No. 98-2337 before

it, then it would follow that the value represented by the subject checks has been extinguished. Respondent argues that the consideration or value of the subject checks have been modified or novated with the execution of the Restructuring Agreement. The payment of the obligation supposedly already depended on the terms and conditions of the Restructuring Agreement and no longer on the respective maturity dates of the subject checks as the value or consideration of the subject checks had been rendered inexistent by the subsequent execution of the Restructuring Agreement. He maintains that the subject checks can no longer be the basis of criminal liability since the obligation for which they were issued had already been novated or abrogated.

We grant the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[18]  The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (i) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[19]

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.[20]  Not every defense raised in a civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.   If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[21]  Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. [22]

In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is not determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. 

Respondent’s contention that if it be proven that the loan of FWCC had been novated and restructured then his liability under the dishonored checks would be extinguished, fails to persuade us. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is released fr bvvom his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC and Land Bank expressly provide that respondent’s JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan obligation  and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation.   In fact, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, out of the nine (9) checks in question, eight (8) checks were dated June 8 to October 30, 1998 or after the execution of the June 3, 1998 Restructuring Agreement. If indeed respondent’s liability on the checks had been extinguished upon the execution of the Restructuring Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the return of the checks.[23]  However, there was no proof that he had been released from his obligation.  On the contrary, the Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which states that “This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements, promissory notes, solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties and shall continue in full force and effect modified only by the provisions of this Agreement.”[24]

Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22.[25]  Thus, this Court has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.[26]  The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.[27] Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.   Thus, even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.

As to the issue of whether the Order dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC of Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-4686 for Involuntary Insolvency constitutes as a justifying circumstance that prevents criminal liability from attaching, we rule in the negative.  As stated at the outset, the said order forbids FWCC from paying its debts as well as from delivering any property belonging to it to any person for its benefit.  Respondent, however, cannot invoke this Order which was directed only upon FWCC and is not applicable to him.  Therefore, respondent, as surety of the loan is not exempt from complying with his obligation for the issuance of the checks.                    

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.   The November 28, 2001 Decision and August 6, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62773 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Resolution dated October 25, 2000 of the Department of Justice directing the filing of appropriate Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against respondent Ramon P. Jacinto is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD. 

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtManila

THIRD DIVISION JESSE Y. YAP,                                     Petitioner, 

                             - versus -               

    G.R. No. 159186 

 

     Present:   YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

 HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO,                                      Respondents. 

Chairperson,CARPIO,*

CORONA,**

NACHURA, andPERALTA, JJ.  Promulgated:

                       June 5, 2009 

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DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision[2] dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company Primetown Property Group. Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the “Account is Closed.” Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks. On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.[3] OnDecember 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.[4]

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.)   22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.[5]

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.[6] Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved. The MTCC, in its Orders[7] dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration[8] relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.[9] The subsequent motions were denied in the Order[10] dated October 18, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[11] before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[12] denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.[14]

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[15] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250. On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision [16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[17]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[18] which was denied in the Order[19] dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.[20]

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in

order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris   et  de   jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[22]

          If  both  civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question

would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[23] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[24]

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.

          The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.

          In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.[25]

          In Jose v. Suarez,[26] the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that “whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks.  In fact, the primordial question posed before the

court hearing  the  B.P.  Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.”

          Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,[27] that:

            The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

             x x x x x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.            

         To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[28]

 

          Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul[29] is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an

alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case. 

           The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance. 

         Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the  determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper. 

          Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed “trial.”  Thus, all the defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.          In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA ESTRELLANES,respondents.

 

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.

The present controversy arose from the following antecedents:

On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.

Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations.

The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives.

On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 July 1991.

Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of Local Government, et al."

On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses REYNALDO V. TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That during the period from February 1989 to February 1991 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the performance of their official functions and taking advantage of their public positions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and conspiring and confederating with each other did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury to Sectoral Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of NINETY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00) representing respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 2

On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. 3

The trial court expounded thus:

The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7 companion cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792, 87935, 88072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990, ruled that:

B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the Secretary of the Department of Local Government) may appoint members of the local legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned.

The Supreme Court further ruled —

For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code even prescribe the time and manner by which such determination is to be conducted by the Sanggunian.

Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant representation, there will absolutely be no basis for the designation/appointments.

In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector concerned to warrant representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a pre-requisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector are the ones primarily interested in being represented in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body) as a condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation.

Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of private defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.

This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases, the Supreme Court invariably nullified the designations where the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not complied with. Just to cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:

There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of Valenzuela that the sectors concerned are of sufficient number to warrant representation and there was no consultation whatsoever with the associations and persons belonging to the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private respondents Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez are null and void (Romeo Llanado, et al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4

Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, where the same is currently pending resolution.

Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Said respondent Sandiganbayan:

Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that the private complainants have been rendering services on the basis of their respective appointments as sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity. Having rendered such services, the private complainants are

entitled to the salaries attached to their office. Even assumingarguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide that the said appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are entitled to their salaries and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for the reason that before such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at least de facto public officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities. In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered in Civil Case No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld salaries for the services they have actually rendered as sectoral representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by the accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution in view of the decision promulgated by the trial court nullifying the appointments of private respondents but it was, likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification that the grounds stated in the said motion were a mere rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the case in abeyance.  6 The dispositive portion of its order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the accused which was scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K. Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from service hereof why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for arraignment.

In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is to be filed by the counsel for the defense, set this case for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED. 7

On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an order holding consideration of all incidents pending the issuance of an extended resolution. 8

No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the scheduled hearing today which We deem to be excusable, reset this case for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the merits on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones. Considering that the accused come all the way from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no postponement will be allowed.

SO ORDERED. 9

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the pendency of a prejudicial issue before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;

B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e., the validity of the appointments of private respondents and their entitlement to compensation which is already pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and

C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents arede jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process. 10

ISSUE: In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the legality or validity of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. 11

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.12 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 13

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.  14 It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

HELD: Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action.

Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office.  17 Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. 18

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. 19

WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-36703 July 31, 1974

GOTARDO FLORDELIS and RAFAEL BOLLOZOS, the latter in his capacity as Asst. Fiscal of Tagbilaran, Bohol,petitioners, vs.THE HON. HERACLEO CASTILLO, as City Judge, Branch I, Tagbilaran, Bohol, MERLIN O. MAR, MARCELINO T. MACAPOBRE, JR., DELFIN EPE, GRACIANO LIGAN, PHILIP COLLYER and ANTONIO CUAJAO, respondents.

Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioners.

Paulino Clarin for private respondents. Hon. Heracleo Castillo for and in his own behalf.

 

CASTRO, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the resolution of March 30, 1973 of the City Court of Tagbilaran, Bohol (Branch I) in its criminal case 4640, ordering "the provisional dismissal of this case" in view of the alleged existence of an unresolved pre-judicial question in an administrative case.

The essential facts are not controverted.

On November 29, 1972 the private respondent teachers of the Bohol School of Arts and Trades of Tagbilaran City, namely, Merlin O. Mar, Marcelino T. Macapobre, Jr., Delfin Epe, Graciano Ligan, Philip Collyer and Antonio Cuajao (hereinafter referred to as the private respondents), lodged with the Department of Education and Culture a sworn administrative complaint against the petitioner principal teacher Gotardo Flordelis (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), that recites several counts, one of which accuses the latter as "a tax evader by refusing to pay his income tax for many years now and for misdeclaring the sales of his business under the pretext of his son's name."

The petitioner reacted by filing a complaint for perjury against the private respondents. After a preliminary investigation at which testimonial and documentary evidence was adduced by the parties, the second assistant city fiscal (Rafael Bollozos) of Tagbilaran, Bohol resolved (1) that the administrative complaint imputes to the petitioner two distinct and separate criminal offenses, namely, income tax evasion, and misdeclaration of the sales of his business (sale of furniture); (2) that upon the evidence submitted, the allegation that the petitioner misdeclared the sales of his business "has some semblance of truth which can be the basis of good faith;" and (3) that with respect, however, to the charge that the petitioner had evaded his income tax obligations, the private respondents "failed to adduce evidence to substantiate their charge." An information for perjury was accordingly filed against the private respondents, which information pertinently recites as follows: .

That, on or about the 29th day of November, 1972, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and moved by hate and personal resentment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with malice aforethought and with deliberate attempt to bismirch the good name, reputation and integrity of one Gotardo Flordelis, Principal In-Charge of the Bohol School of Arts and Trades, write, execute and sign a verified administrative complaint against said Gotardo Flordelis and have it filed with the office of the Honorable Secretary of Education and Culture, declaring therein a false statement, particularly under Count No. 11 thereof, which charges said Gotardo Flordelis that "He (referring to Mr. Flordelis) is a tax evader by refusing to pay his income tax for many years now ..." which statement the accused herein fully well know to be false and malicious and constitutive of an untruthful narration of facts ....

On March 27, 1973 the private respondents, upon arraignment before the City Court of Tagbilaran, pleaded not guilty. Contemporaneously they filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds (1) that the facts recited therein do not constitute an offense; and (2) that it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification.

On March 30, 1973 the respondent judge, resolving the said motion, provisionally dismissed the case and ordered the release from custody of the private respondents, on the sole ground that the tax evasion issue pending resolution in the administrative case before the Department of Education and Culture constitutes a pre-judicial question which should first be resolved before the criminal action may proceed.

On April 23, 1973 the petitioner, joined by the assistant city fiscal, filed the present petition for review. They here contend (1) that the doctrine of pre-judicial question was incorrectly applied below; and (2) that the criminal case should have been merely suspended as provided in section 5, Rule 111, infra, of the Rules of Court, instead of being provisionally dismissed, which dismissal may later be pleaded by the private respondents as a bar in double jeopardy.

1. We rule that the doctrine of pre-judicial question has no application to the situation below.

Article 36 of the new Civil Code states:

Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal action may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

The implementing provision of the Rules of Court is section 5 of Rule 111, which reads:

Sec. 5. Suspension by reason of pre-judicial question. — A petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during the trial of the criminal action. (emphasis supplied)

As clearly delineated in the aforecited provisions of the new Civil Code and the Rules of Court, and as uniformly applied in numerous decisions of this Court, 1 the doctrine of pre-judicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action both pend and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

In the case at bar, no civil action pends, nor has any been instituted. The complaint is merely an administrative one. Moreover, neither success nor failure of the private respondents to prove their tax evasion charge against the petitioner in the administrative case can attain the character of a final determination binding and conclusive upon the court in the criminal action so as to foreclose the issue of guilt or innocence of the private respondents upon the perjury indictment..

2. The petitioner's apprehension that double jeopardy may set in is unwarranted. The record shows that the quashal of the information below was explicitly and actively sought by the private respondents.

When a criminal case is dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because the defendant's action in having the same dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy as he thereby prevented the court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.  2

The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver : the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same offense. 3

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of the court a quo of March 30, 1973 is set aside, and the said court is hereby ordered to reinstate the perjury case against the private respondents and to proceed with the trial thereof in accordance with law. No costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-32293 January 24, 1974

ROBERTO OCAMPO, petitioner, vs.FERNANDO BUENAVENTURA, JOSE VASQUEZ, ADOLFO BELDEROL, POTENCIANO ADOBAS, JR., and JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondents.

Rafael D. de la Victoria for petitioner.

Seno, Mendoza and Associates for respondents.

 

ESGUERRA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul the order dated June 1, 1970, of respondent Judge Hon. Mateo Canonoy, then of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend the trial of its Civil Case No. R-11320, entitled "Fernando Buenaventura, et al. v. Roberto Ocampo", including the order denying his motion for reconsideration thereof. Petitioner further prays this Court to make permanent the preliminary injunction issued on October 9, 1970, restraining respondent Judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No. R-11320.

The records of this case establish the following facts:

On September 11, 1966, respondents Fernando Buenaventura, Jose Vasquez, Adolfo Belderol and Potenciano Adobes, Jr., all members of the Cebu Police Department, arrested and detained in the City Jail of Cebu, Edgar Ocampo (petitioner's son) and Paul, Jade, Cesar and Julius, all surnamed Ocampo (his nephews), together with one George Namok (a friend of the Ocampo boys), all minors, for an alleged violation of Section 1 of Ordinance No. 345 which amended Ordinance No. 228 fixing curfew hours. This Ordinance penalizes the "wandering, sauntering or loitering of minors in any street, wood or alley." Pursuant to said arrest, the City Fiscal of Cebu filed an information in the city court and the minors were convicted for violation of the said ordinance. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, however, Judge Tantuico, on March 3, 1969, noting the exception under Section 3 of Ordinance 228 which provides:

The provisions of Section 1 hereof shall not be applicable to minors attending or participating in, or going home from, purely scholastic functions, commencement exercises, convocations, educational and religious programs or in wholesome and decent assemblage, and during yuletide masses, New Year's eve and Holy Week cults, during the hours mentioned therein.

acquitted the accused minors, ruling that since they came from a birthday party considered as a wholesome and decent assemblage, the minors fell within the exception and committed no violation of the ordinance in question.

Meanwhile, petitioner Roberto Ocampo on September 19, 1966, filed a complaint with the City Mayor's office charging the respondents policemen with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority and commission of a felony. On August 8, 1967, the Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 157 exonerating the policemen. On March 17, 1969, a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission (POLCOM) for serious misconduct, abuse of authority and commission of an act constituting a felony, which administrative case is still pending up to the present.

On June 4, 1969, respondents herein filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. On May 22, 1970, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of the case on the merits on the following grounds: (1) existence of a prejudicial question and (2) that the action is premature. This motion was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated June 1, 1970. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof having been also denied, the instant petition was filed.

In the meantime respondent Fernando Buenaventura died and he was substituted herein by his widow, Guillerma Cosca Buenaventura, and his heirs, Carlos, Cora, Eva Araceli, Fernando, Jr., Rene Victor, Helen Grace, Flora Vicente, and Jose Adolfo, all surnamed "Buenaventura".

The main question to be resolved is whether or not the court a quo abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend the trial of the case on the merits. The first ground thereof (prejudicial question) is entirely inapplicable. In accordance with Article 36 of the Civil Code, a prejudicial question must be decided before any criminal prosecution based on the same facts may proceed.<äre||anº•1àw> There is no prejudicial question here since there is no criminal prosecution involved, the petitioner's case before the POLCOM being administrative in nature and the respondents' case before the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a simple civil suit for damages not based on a crime but on alleged harassment by the petitioner in charging them administratively before the City Mayor and cbefore the POLCOM. A careful consideration of the record discloses that the principal issue in the complaint for damages is the alleged malicious filing of the administrative cases by the petitioner against the policemen respondents. The determination of this question is primarily dependent on the outcome of the administrative case before the POLCOM. The respondents' complaint for damages is based on their claim that the administrative case filed against them before the POLCOM is malicious, unfounded and aimed to harass them. The veracity of this allegation is not for us to determine, for if We rule and allow the civil case for damages to proceed on that ground, there is the possibility that the court a quo in deciding said case might declare the respondents victims of harassment and thereby indirectly interfere with the proceedings before the POLCOM. The respondents' case for damages before the lower court is, therefore, premature as it was filed during the pendency of the administrative case against the respondents before the POLCOM. The possibility cannot be overlooked that the POLCOM may hand down a decision adverse to the respondents, in which case the damage suit will become unfounded and baseless for wanting in cause of action. Of persuasive force is the ruling in William H. Brown vs. Bank Of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas, 101 Phil. 309, 312, where this Court said:

... In effect, plaintiff herein seeks to recover damages upon the ground that the detainer case has been filed, and is being maintained, maliciously and without justification; but this pretense affects the merits of said detainer case. Should final judgment be eventually rendered in that case in favor of the plaintiffs therein, such the one rendered in the municipal court, the validity of the cause of action said lessors against Brown, would thereby be conclusively established, and, necessarily, his contention in the present case would have to be rejected. Similarly, we can, not sustain the theory of Brown in the case at bar, without prejudging the issue in the detainer case, which is still pending: Until final determination of said case, plaintiff herein cannot, and does not, have, therefore, a cause of action — if any, on which we do not express our opinion — against the herein defendants. In short, the lower court has correctly held that the present action is premature and, that, consequently, the complaint herein does not set for a cause of action against the defendants.

On the ground that the suit for damages is premature, the trial court, instead of denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend the trial on the merits, should have held action thereon in abeyance pending determination of the case before the POLCOM.

Respondents likewise plead res judicata to defeat this action, contending that the administrative case before the POLCOM should have been dismissed as it is barred by a prior judgment — that embodied in the City Mayor's Administrative Order No. 157 — exonerating herein respondents policemen. The argument is devoid of merit. A review of the essential requisites of res judicata, 1 viz: (1) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (2) the former judgment must be final; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; (4) there must be between the 1st and 2nd actions [a] identity of parties; [b] identity of subject matter; and [c] identity of cause of action, exposes the glaring weakness of respondents' contention. On the first requisite alone, that of jurisdiction, respondents miserably failed to meet the requirements of the rule invoked. The City Mayor of Cebu was without jurisdiction to try, hear and decide administrative cases either under Republic Act No. 557 (An Act Providing For the Suspension or Removal of the Members of the Provincial Guards, City Police and Municipal Police by the Provincial Governor, City Mayor Or Municipal Mayor), or under Republic Act 4864 (An Act Creating the Police Commission, Amending and Revising the Laws Relative to the Local Police System, and For Other Purposes). In Manuel v. De la Fuente, etc., et al., 2 this Court said: "Of course, it should not be understood that the City Mayor, for the purpose of determining whether he should exercise his power of suspension conferred by Republic Act 557, may not conduct his own investigation; but this inquiry cannot replace the investigation that should be conducted under Republic Act No. 557 by the Municipal Board and which should form the basis for final administrative action or decision by said Board appealable to the Commissioner of Civil Service." The Court further said: "... the obvious innovations introduced by Republic Act No. 557 lie in the fact that the Municipal Board had been granted the exclusive power to investigate, with the Mayor being conferred only the power to prefer charges against a member of the city police ...; that the Municipal Board, not the Mayor, decides the case; and that the decision may be appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, instead of to the Secretary of the Interior." 3 (Emphasis Ours). The power to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM.

In the motion to dismiss filed before the Board of Investigators of the Police Commission, 4 respondents alleged that the proceedings in the city mayor's office cannot be attacked, invoking for the purpose Section 26 of the Police Commission Act, to wit:

Section 26. Saving Clause.— All pending administrative cases involving police service and personnel shall be absorbed by the Police Commission one hundred days after the publication of the Police Manual containing rules and regulations relative to such matters.

The trust of their argument is that the city mayor then had jurisdiction because his decision was rendered on August 8, 1967, while the Police Manual was promulgated later on December 30, 1967. But the ruling in Police Commission v. Hon. Judge Eloy Bello,et al. 5 where this Court had occasion to elucidate on the "saving clause" of the POLCOM Act, is relevant to the issue and disposes of the respondents' argument. This Court said:

Section 26 of the Police Act is, as expressly stated therein, a mere saving clause, and refers solely to the administrative cases involving police service and personnel which were pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act.

The Police Commission was required to absorb the said pending cases within 100 days after it shall have published a Police Manual. The said Section 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators of each city or municipality and the Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purposes of the Act until after the lapse of the said 100 days, because Section 28 provides that '(t)his Act shall take effect upon its approval.' Since the Act was approved on September 8, 1966, it became effective immediately on that date. (Emphasis Ours.)

Lastly respondent Judge in his order in question dated June 1, 1970, gave the following reason for denying the motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of the case on the merits: "... considering that the said defendant has already filed his answer, containing special defenses embodying the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss

and/or suspension of the trial ..., the said motion to dismiss and/or suspension of trial is hereby denied." The denial is apparently predicated on the prior filing of an answer.

As a general rule a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads (Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action, 6 as in the case at bar where the complaint failed to state a cause of action as alleged by petitioner in his very motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial. The respondent Judge therefore, erred in denying said motion. The surrounding circumstance at the time of the filing of said motion warranted suspension of the trial on the merits.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from, dated June 1, 1970, denying the motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of the case on the merits, including the order denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, is hereby set aside. The hearing of Civil Case R-11320 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, shall be held in abeyance pending determination of the administrative case against the respondents before the POLCOM.

The Court's writ of preliminary injunction dated October 9, 1970, restraining respondent court from proceeding with the damage suit against petitioner shall stand until the POLCOM decides the said administrative case; if it is decided adversely against respondents, the injunction shall become permanent, while if it is decided in their favor, then this damage suit may proceed to trial and determination on its merits by respondent court.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14534             February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation.

On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year. 1äwphï1.ñët

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner, vs.HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.

 

FERNAN, J.:

This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure questions of law pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The antecedents are as follows:

In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged that private respondents were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure Administration [which later became the Land Authority, then the Department of Agrarian Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter began the construction of a house thereon; and that these acts of petitioner, which were unlawful per se, entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary injunction and to the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his Answer to the complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein and averring that the Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior possession over the questioned lot had already been cancelled by the Land Authority in an Order signed by its Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case before the Office of the Land Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of land. In said administrative case, petitioner disputed private respondents' right of possession over the property in question by reason of the latter's default in the installment payments for the purchase of said lot.

Petitioner asserted that his administrative case was determinative of private respondents' right to eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial action until after its termination.

After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was the recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case.

Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with injunction against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of Malabon and private respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until after the resolution of said petition. As prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order enjoining further proceedings in the ejectment case.

In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to the sound discretion of the CFI in the disposition of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the administrative case did not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved merely the question of possession.

Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.

Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in toto by Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal filed by petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with the Court of Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.

The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 1 The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. 2

While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.

Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document shall have

been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on the administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

"As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision." 3

If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events occuring during the pendency of this petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated that the intervenor Land Authority which later became the Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a decision in the administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affiriming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of private respondents. With this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.