Cases on New Assignment

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 74135 May 28, 1992M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS, petitioners,vs.

AURORA I. RARANG and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:The pivotal issue in this petition centers on the extent of the "immunity fromsuit" of the officials of a United States Naval Base inside Philippine territory.In February, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrativeofficer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer ofthe U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent

Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshalassigned as merchandise control guard.M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S.Naval Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD)which was published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featuredimportant announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters ofinterest to military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the"action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD published, under the"NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" the following:

Question: I have observed that Merchandise Controlinspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming for their ownbenefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel.The observation is even more aggravated by consumingsuch confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffsPUBLICLY. This is not to mention "Auring" who is in herself,a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the ProvostMarshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask ifthe head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of thismalpractice?

Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all otherpersonnel are prohibited from appropriating confiscateditems for their own consumption or use. Two lockedcontainers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit ofconfiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controlsaccess to these containers.Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their mealsat their worksite due to heavy workload. Complaintsregarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions

may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for

immediate and necessary action. Specific dates and timealong with details of suspected violations would be mostappreciated. Telephone 4-3430/4-3234 for furtherinformation or to report noted or suspected irregularities.Exhibits E & E-1. (Rollo, pp. 11-12)

The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in theOffice of the Provost Marshal. That the private respondent was the same"Auring" referred to in the POD was conclusively proven when on February 7,

1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent"publication. The private respondent then commenced an action for damagesin the Court of First Instance of Zambales (now Regional Trial Court) againstM. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She allegedthat the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libeltending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to publichatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulatedin the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Basepersonnel. She prayed that she be awarded P300,000.00 as moral damages;exemplary damages which the court may find proper; and P50,000.00 asattorney's fees.In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismissanchored on three grounds:

1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams actedin the performance of their official functions as officers of theUnited States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit;2. The United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of theUS government which cannot be sued without its consent;and3. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter aswell as the parties in this case. (Record on Appeal, pp. 133-134)

The motion was, however, denied.In their answer, the defendants reiterated the lack of jurisdiction of the courtover the case.In its decision, the trial court ruled that the acts of defendants M. H. Wylieand Cpt. James Williams were not official acts of the government of theUnited States of America in the operation and control of the Base butpersonal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that asovereign country cannot be sued in the court of another country without itsconsent. In short, the trial court ruled that the acts and omissions of the twoUS officials were not imputable against the US government but were done inthe individual and personal capacities of the said officials. The trial courtdismissed the suit against the US Naval Base. The dispositive portion of thedecision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiff and against the defendants jointly and severally, as

follows:


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1) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. JamesWilliams to pay the plaintiff Aurora Rarang the sum of onehundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos by way of moral andexemplary damages;2) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. JamesWilliams to pay the plaintiff the sum of thirty thousand(P30,000.00) pesos by way of attorney's fees and expensesof litigation; and

3) To pay the costs of this suit.Counterclaims are dismissed.Likewise, the suit against the U.S. Naval Base is ordereddismissed. (Record on Appeal, p. 154)

On appeal, the petitioners reiterated their stance that they are immune fromsuit since the subject publication was made in their official capacities asofficers of the U. S. Navy. They also maintained that they did not intentionallyand maliciously cause the questioned publication.The private respondent, not satisfied with the amount of damages awardedto her, also appealed the trial court's decision.

Acting on these appeals, the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court ofAppeals, modified the trial court's decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court below is modifiedso that the defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointlyand severally, the sum of P175,000.00 as moral damagesand the sum of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages. The restof the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.Costs against the defendants-appellants. (Rollo, p. 44)

The appellate court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by thepetitioners.Hence, this petition.In a resolution dated March 9, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.The petitioners persist that they made the questioned publication in theperformance of their official functions as administrative assistant, in the caseof M. H. Wylie, and commanding officer, in the case of Capt. James Williamsof the US Navy assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Subic Bay, OlongapoCity and were, therefore, immune from suit for their official actions.In the case ofUnited States of America v. Guinto (182 SCRA 644 [1990]), wediscussed the principle of the state immunity from suit as follows:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent,now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles ofinternational law that we have adopted as part of the law ofour land under Article II, Section 2.

xxx xxx xxxEven without such affirmation, we would still be bound by thegenerally accepted principles of international law under the

doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by

the majority of states, such principles are deemedincorporated in the law of every civilized state as a conditionand consequence of its membership in the society ofnations. Upon its admission to such society, the state isautomatically obligated to comply with these principles in itsrelations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity isbased on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there

can be no legal right against the authority which makes thelaw on which the r ight depends." (Kawanakoa v. Polybank,205 U.S. 349) There are other practical reasons for theenforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign statesought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the addedinhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habetimperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert

jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, inthe language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace ofnations." (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171)While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against thestate without its consent, it is also applicable to complaintsfiled against officials of the state for acts allegedly performedby them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the

judgment against such officials will require the state itself toperform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as theappropriation of the amount needed to pay the damagesawarded against them, the suit must be regarded as againstthe state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.(Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120) In such a situation,the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the groundthat it has been filed without its consent.The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royalprerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grantsthe state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simplyinvoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least indemocratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrantunmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, thedoctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may notbe sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rulesays that the state may not be sued without its consent,which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.The consent of the state to be sued may be manifestedexpressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied ina general law or a special law. Consent is implied when thestate enters into a contract it itself commences litigation.

xxx xxx xxx


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The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consentis effected only by the will of the legislature through themedium of a duly enacted s tatute. (Republic v. Purisima, 78SCRA 470) We have held that not all contracts entered intoby the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereignand proprietary acts. (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136SCRA 487) As for the filing of a complaint by the

government, suability will result only where the governmentis claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v.Brownell, 107 Phil. 345) (at pp. 652-655)

In the same case we had opportunity to discuss extensively the nature andextent of immunity from suit of United States personnel who are assignedand stationed in Philippine territory, to wit:

In the case of the United States of America, the customaryrule of international law on state immunity is expressed withmore specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article IIIthereof provides as follows:

It is mutually agreed that the United Statesshall have the rights, power and authoritywithin the bases which are necessary for theestablishment, use, operation and defensethereof or appropriate for the control thereofand all the rights, power and authority withinthe limits of the territorial waters and airspace adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, thebases which are necessary to provideaccess to them or appropriate for theircontrol.

The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, (57 SCRA1) along with several other decisions, to support theirposition that they are not suable in the cases below, theUnited States not having waived its sovereign immunity fromsuit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:

The invocation of the doctrine of immunityfrom suit of a foreign state without itsconsent is appropriate. More specifically,insofar as alien armed forces is concerned,the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a1945 decision. In dismissing a habeascorpus petition for the release of petitionersconfined by American army authorities,Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court,cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it wasexplicitly declared: "It is well settled that a

foreign army, permitted to march through a

friendly country or to be stationed in it, bypermission of its government or sovereign,is exempt from the civil and criminal

jurisdiction of the place." Two years later,in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Courtrelied on the ruling in Raquizav. Bradfordand cited in support thereofexcerpts from the works of the following

authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall,Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde,and McNair and Lauterpacht. Accuracydemands the clarification that after theconclusion of the Philippine-AmericanMilitary Bases Agreement, the treatyprovisions should control on such matter,the assumption being that there was amanifestation of the submission to

jurisdiction on the part of the foreign powerwhenever appropriate. More to the pointis Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffsas lessors sued the Commanding General ofthe United States Army in the Philippines,seeking the restoration to them of theapartment buildings they owned leased tothe United States armed forces station in theManila area. A motion to dismiss on theground of non-suability was filed and upheldby respondent Judge. The matter was takento this Court in a mandamus proceeding. Itfailed. It was the ruling that respondentJudge acted correctly considering that the"action must be considered as one againstthe U.S. Government." The opinion ofJustice Montemayor continued: "It is clearthat the courts of the Philippines includingthe Municipal Court of Manila have no

jurisdiction over the present case forunlawful detainer. The question of lack of

jurisdiction was raised and interposed at thevery beginning of the action. The U.S.Government has not given its consent to thefiling of this suit which is essentially againsther, though not in name. Moreover, this isnot only a case of a citizen filing a suitagainst his own Government without the

latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an


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action against a foreign government withoutsaid government's consent, which rendersmore obvious the lack of jurisdiction of thecourts of his country. The principles of lawbehind this rule are so elementary and ofsuch general acceptance that we deem itunnecessary to cite authorities in supportthereof."

xxx xxx xxxIt bears stressing at this point that the above observations donot confer on the United States of America a blanketimmunity for all acts done by it or its agents in thePhilippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that theyare also insulated from suit in this country merely becausethey have acted as agents of the United States in thedischarge of their off icial functions.There is no question that the United States of America, likeany other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived itsnon-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietaryor private capacity. It is only when the contract involves itssovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver maybe implied. This was our ruling in United States of Americav. Ruiz, (136 SCRA 487) where the transaction in questiondealt with the improvement of the wharves in the navalinstallation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmentalfunction, we held that the contract did not operate to divestthe United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In thewords of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:

The traditional rule of immunity excepts aState from being sued in the courts ofanother State without its consent or waiver.This rule is a necessary consequence of theprinciples of independence and equality ofStates. However, the rules of InternationalLaw are not petrified; they are constantlydeveloping and evolving. And because theactivities of states have multiplied, it hasbeen necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts(jure imperii) and private, commercial andproprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result isthat State immunity now extends only to acts

jure imperii. The restrictive application ofState immunity is now the rule in the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom and other states

in Western Europe.

xxx xxx xxxThe restrictive application of State immunityis proper only when the proceedings ariseout of commercial transactions of the foreignsovereign, its commercial activities oreconomic affairs. Stated differently, a Statemay be said to have descended to the levelof an individual and can thus be deemed to

have tacitly given its consent to be sued onlywhen it enters into business contracts. Itdoes not apply where the contract relates tothe exercise of its sovereign functions. Inthis case the projects are an integral part ofthe naval base which is devoted to thedefense of both the United States and thePhilippines, indisputably a function of thegovernment of the highest order; they arenot utilized for nor dedicated to commercialor business purposes.

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver theyhave acted in the discharge of their official functions asofficers or agents of the United States. However, this is amatter of evidence. The charges against them may not besummarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their actsare imputable to the United States of America, which has notgiven its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants aresought to be held answerable for personal torts in which theUnited States itself is not involved. If found liable, they andthey alone must satisfy the judgment. (At pp. 655-658)

In the light of these precedents, we proceed to resolve the present case.The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commandingofficer, U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay. The administrative assistant, amonghis other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. On February 3,1978, when the questioned article was published in the POD, petitioner Capt.James Williams was the commanding officer while petitioner M.H. Wylie wasthe administrative assistant of the US Naval Station at Subic bay.The NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY is a regular feature of the POD. It is atelephone answering device in the office of the Administrative Assistant. The

Action Line is intended to provide personnel access to the CommandingOfficer on matters they feel should be brought to his attention for correctionor investigation. The matter of inquiry may be phoned in or mailed to thePOD. (TSN, September 9, 1980, pp. 12-13, Jerry Poblon) According toM. H. Wylie, the action line naming "Auring" was received about three (3)weeks prior to its being published in the POD on February 3, 1978. It wasforwarded to Rarang's office of employment, the Provost Marshal, for

comment. The Provost Marshal office's response "... included a short note


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stating that if the article was published, to remove the name."(Exhibit 8-A, p.5) The Provost Marshal's response was then forwarded to the executiveofficer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of theCommanding officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative

Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A certain Mrs. Dologmodin, a clerk typistin the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of thePOD. Finally, M. H. Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smoothcopy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to "Auring" in the actionline inquiry. (Exh. 8-A, pp. 4-5, Questions Nos. 14-15).There is no question, therefore, that the two (2) petitioners activelyparticipated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of theirofficial functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of theirofficial functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that thepetitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication.It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personalcapacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.The question, therefore, arises are American naval officers who commit acrime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by theprinciple of state immunity from suit? Pursuing the question further, does thegrant of rights, power, and authority to the United States under the RP-USBases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts? Ouranswer is No.Killing a person in cold blood while on patrol duty, running over a child whiledriving with reckless imprudence on an official trip, or slandering a personduring office hours could not possibly be covered by the immunityagreement. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do notallow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty.The case ofChavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991] gives the lawon immunity from suit of public officials:

The general rule is that public officials can be heldpersonally accountable for acts claimed to have beenperformed in connection with official duties where they haveacted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.

xxx xxx xxxMoreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunityproviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 alsoextends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of theimmunity clause does not ipso facto result in the chargesbeing automatically dropped.In the case ofPresidential Commission on GoodGovernment v. Pea (159 SCRA 556 [1988] then ChiefJustice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of theimmunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) ofExecutive Order No. 1 as follows:

With respect to the qualifications expressed

by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate

opinion, I just wish to point out twothings: First, the main opinion does not claimabsolute immunity for the members of theCommission. The cited section of ExecutiveOrder No. 1 provides the Commission'smembers immunity from suit thus: "No civilaction shall lie against the Commission orany member thereof for anything done oromitted in the discharge of the taskcontemplated by this order." No absoluteimmunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos inhis Constitution for himself and hissubordinates is herein involved. It isunderstood that the immunity granted themembers of the Commission by virtue of theunimaginable magnitude of its task torecover the plundered wealth and theState's exercise of police power wasimmunity from liability for damages in theofficial discharge of the task granted themembers of the Commission much in thesame manner that judges are immune fromsuit in the official discharge of the functionsof their office.. . . (at pp. 581-582)

xxx xxx xxxImmunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility andnon-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimedby any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as SolicitorGeneral, acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the privaterespondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGGcommissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filingagainst him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of thelatter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417),there can be no question that a complaint for damages doesnot confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of theCivil Code on Human Relations may be taken against publicofficers or private citizens alike. . . . (pp. 289-291)

We apply the same ruling to this case.The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978mentions a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to the Officeof the Provost Marshal." The same article explicitly implies that Auring wasconsuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and

foodstuffs. There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was


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the private respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of theProvost Marshal. Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondentwas investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, the privaterespondent had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors forhonesty in the performance of her duties.It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of thenaval base is far removed in the chain of command from the offensivepublication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible foreverything which goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a generalrule. In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensivepublication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approvedit. The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records. Thepetitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for thefindings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in thisparticular case and why their decisions should be reversed.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages causedby a person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage toanother, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay forthe damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is nopre-existing contractual relation between the parties, iscalled a quasi-delictand is governed by the provisions of thisChapter.

"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable bylaw" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary ornegligent." (Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damagesmay be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Ineffect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from theguilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in additionto punitive or exemplary damages. (Occena v. Icamina, 181 SCRA 328[1990]). In another case, Heirs of Basilisa Justiva v. Gustilo, 7 SCRA 72[1963], we ruled that the allegation of forgery of documents could be a

defamation, which in the light of Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code could byanalogy be ground for payment of moral damages, considering the woundedfeelings and besmirched reputation of the defendants.Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978is a defamation against the character and reputation of the privaterespondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the ProvostMarshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the articlewere published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because undertheir direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring."Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was atortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of thepetitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered

besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social

humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. Thepetitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages theycaused the private respondent.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decisionand resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of

Appeals, are AFFIRMED.Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT ofENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,SAMAR, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIOABUGANDA, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J .:For review is the decision

1dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitionersforcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order datedMay 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Orderhad denied petitioners' (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by hereinprivate respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration ofthe Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for aWrit of replevin.

2

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team ofthe Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of theDENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:

1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand

and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valuedat P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [acertain] Jose Vargas.2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousandtwo hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet ofillegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by oneConstancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. .. .

3

Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed topresent proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending teamseized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial

Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4Seizure receipts
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were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.5Felipe Calub,

Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before theProvincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against

Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78],Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwiseknown as the Revised Forestry Code.

6

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabonand Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR OfficerCalub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabonand Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the PublicProsecutor.

7

On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbaloganand Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at BarangayBuray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with anequivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub dulyfiled a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia,and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.

8

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abugandawere acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial courtordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, inorder that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagaraoand all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle andordered that cut timber be loaded on it.

9

Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicleowner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for therecovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an applicationfor replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trialcourt granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ inan Order dated April 24, 1992.

10Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which

was denied by the trial court.11Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the presentPetition forCertiorari, Prohibition andMandamus with application forPreliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Courtissued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting furtherproceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondentsfrom taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest productsseized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed thepetitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest productsseized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, saidproperty being incustodia legis and subject to the direct order of the SupremeCourt.

12In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred

said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition.13

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit.It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authoritygranted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According tothe appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR orhis duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition ofillegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purposeis not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, orpolicies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR AdministrativeOrder No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said.For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and dispositionof conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277.

14

Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed toobserve the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, seriesof 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENRSecretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render areport of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover,petitioners' failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR

Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admissionof petitioners' counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to theseizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing tofollow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehiclescould not be considered in custodia legis.

15

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners' claim thatprivate respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.

Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle ofstate immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit hadnot yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be nopecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against thegovernment. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegallyor beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against

the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing orwithholding the possession of the property of another.

16

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners basedon the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custodybecause they were contradicted by its own findings.

17Their petition was

found without merit.18

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:

19

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERESEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A[78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIALEGIS;
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(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THATTHE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECTCONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFULSEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OFP.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THECOMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS ISNOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with platenumber FCN 143, is in custodia legis.(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession ofimpounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit againstthe State.

We will now resolve both issues.The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyancesused in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78states:

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or OtherForest Products without License. Any person who shall cut,gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from anyforestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or fromprivate land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forestproducts without the legal documents as required under existingforest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penaltiesimposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of thegovernment of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where thetimber or forest products are found.

This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest productswithout the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the

penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 ofthe Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles wereloaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly nopermit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forestproducts was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegallysourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of theRevised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the personsresponsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the publicprosecutor.The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used inthe commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the RevisedForestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They

read as follows:

Sec. 78-A.Administrative Authority of the Department Head or HisDuly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In allcases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules andregulations, the Department Head or his duly authorizedrepresentative, may order the confiscation of any forest productsillegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and allconveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission ofthe offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinentlaws, regulations or policies on the matter.Sec. 89.Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest officer oremployee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of thePhilippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest evenwithout warrant any person who has committed or is committing inhis presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shallalso seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools andequipment used in committing the offense. . . [Emphasis supplied.]

Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implementsSections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:

Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. Allconveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained orgathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] ofP.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government ordisposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policieson the matter.Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. The Secretaryor his duly authorized representative such as the forest officersand/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENRareauthorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies andguidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel andofficials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forestproducts and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR fieldoffices, and turn oversaid forest products and conveyances for

proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension ismade by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited withthe nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, forsafekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasissupplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported withoutpertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of saidtimber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load wasallowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined inDENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a

written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following


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10/25

Rizal Park,1

but actually administered by high profile civic leaders andjournalists. Whoever in NPDC gave such "verbal" accommodation to privaterespondents was unclear, for indeed no document or instrument appears onrecord to show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents tooccupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the national hero'smemory.Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well askiosks area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M.Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General

Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of theprofits derived from operating the kiosks,

2without again anything shown in

the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used orspent.With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the newChairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In awritten notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondentson February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreementwith GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks itran privately within the public park.

3In another notice dated March 5, 1988,

respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate.4

The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president,allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who istotally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He wasallegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that hewas merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias aspresident was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages andinjunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner, Villanueva, and "allpersons acting on their behalf".

5The trial court issued a temporary

restraining order on the same day.6

The TRO expired on March 28, 1988. The following day, GABI was finallyevicted by NPDC.GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by

the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the Statewhich could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruledthat GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreementsince GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it couldonly recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from theconclusion. The trial court noted that no such proof waspresented.1wphi1.ntOn appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government officialis being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official fromliability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.

7Granting that

petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and

capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal

wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages"8

according to theCourt of Appeals.The Court of Appeals noted that, as the trial court observed, the eviction ofGABI came at the heels of two significant incidents. First, after privaterespondent Iglesias extended monetary support to striking workers of theNPDC, and second, after Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter onNovember 26, 1987, denouncing alleged graft and corruption in theNPDC.

9These, according to the Court of Appeals, should not have been

taken against GABI, which had been occupying Rizal Park for nearly 20years. GABI was evicted purportedly for violating its verbal agreement withNPDC.

10However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that NPDC failed to

present proof of such violation.11

The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable for damages under Articles 19,21, and 24 of the Civil Code.

12

The Court of Appeals absolved from liability all other persons impleaded inGABI's complaint since it appeared that they were merely acting under theorders of petitioner. The new officers of NPDC, additionally impleaded byGABI, were likewise absolved from liability, absent any showing that theyparticipated in the acts complained of. Petitioner was ordered to pay privaterespondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.Hence, this petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOTHOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT

AGAINST PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 88-43887, IS IN EFFECT ASUIT AGAINST THE STATE WHICH CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUTITS CONSENT.II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOTHOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S ACT OF TERMINATINGRESPONDENT GABI'S CONCESSION IS VALID AND DONE INTHE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.

13

Petitioner insists that the complaint filed against him is in reality a complaintagainst the State, which could not prosper without the latter's consent. He

anchors his argument on the fact that NPDC is a government agency, andthat when he ordered the eviction of GABI, he was acting in his capacity aschairman of NPDC. Petitioner avers that the mere allegation that he wasbeing sued in his personal capacity did not remove the case from thecoverage of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity.Petitioner points out that Iglesias signed the notice of eviction to indicate hisconformity thereto. He contends that as evidence of private respondents' badfaith, they sued petitioner instead of complying with their undertaking tovacate their library and kiosk at Rizal Park.Petitioner adds that during the actual eviction, no untoward incident occurred.GABI's properties were properly inventoried and stored.


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According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals' observation that the evictionwas prompted by Iglesias' support for striking NPDC workers and the letter-complaint sent to the Tanodbayan is merely conjectural.Finally, petitioner avers that the move to evict GABI and award the spaces itoccupied to another group was an executive policy decision within thediscretion of NPDC. GABI's possession of the kiosks as concessionaire wasby mere tolerance of NPDC and, thus, such possession may be withdrawn atany time, with or without cause.On the other hand, private respondents aver that petitioner acted beyond thescope of his authority when he showed malice and bad faith in orderingGABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Quoting from the decision of the Court of

Appeals, private respondents argue that petitioner is liable for damages forperforming acts "to injure an individual rather than to discharge a publicduty."

14

While private respondents recognize the authority of petitioner to terminatethe agreement with GABI "if [the contract] is prejudicial to the interest of theNPDC,"

15they maintain that petitioner's personal interest, and not that of the

NPDC, was the root cause of GABI's ejecment.The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed againstpublic officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule isthat the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction ofthe judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itselfto perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary topay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.

16

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his officialcapacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights ofothers.

17Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from

liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.18

Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in hisofficial capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained ofmay have been committed while he occupied a public position.We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDCchairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private

respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of theNPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in thatcapacity.

19Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that

petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering theejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.

4. Defendant AMADO J. LANSANG, JR., the Chairman of theNational Parks Development Committee, acting under the spirit ofrevenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment against

plaintiffJOSE IGLESIAS, served on the plaintiff corporation a letter,dated February 23, 1988 terminating plaintiffs lease agreement witha demand for the plaintiff corporation to vacate its office premises. ..20

(Emphasis supplied.)

The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment ofGABI from their office and kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute thatpetitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked toadminister Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the agreement withGABI

21and order the organization's ejectment. The question now is whether

or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of privaterespondents.We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. Asearlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, couldnot be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no writtencontract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kioskspaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previousadministrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validlydiscontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who maybe ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot anddoes not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent Iglesias moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, we find no evidence onrecord to support Iglesias' claim that he suffered moral injury as a result ofGABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Absent any satisfactory proof upon whichthe Court may base the amount of damages suffered, the award of moraldamages cannot be sustained.22Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only beawarded in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatorydamages.

23We also disallow the award for attorney's fees, which can only

be recovered per stipulation of the parties, which is absent in this case.There is no showing that any of the exceptions justifying the award ofattorney's fees absent a stipulation is present in this case.

24

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27244 is hereby SET ASIDE, and theDISMISSAL of the complaint for damages by the trial court for want of meritis AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,vs.FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision

1of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order2of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-
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341-MK, denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The complaint filed byrespondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of itsconstitutional rights arising from petitioners issuance of RevenueMemorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declaredinvalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.

3

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of InternalRevenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entityengaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among whichare "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654),which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brandsChampion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected toan ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or twodays before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying"Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearinga foreign brand subjectto the 55% ad valoremtax.

4RMC 37-93 in effect

subjected "Hope," "More," and"Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,

5(c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes

which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposesan advalorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be lessthan Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."

6

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.Deoferio, Jr. sent viatelefaxa copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but itwas addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobaccoreceived, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20,1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall ofRMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.

7The same letter

assessed respondent forad valorem tax deficiency amountingto P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demandedpayment within 10 days from receipt thereof.

8On August 3, 1993,

respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining theimplementation of RMC 37-93.

9In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the

CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable andfurther enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessmentissued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.Court of Appeals.

10It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen

short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint

11for

damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contendedthat the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the CivilCode considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutionalright against deprivation of property without due process of law and the rightto equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12

contending that: (1) respondent has nocause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in theperformance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. Sheclaimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore thelatter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause ofaction for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certificationagainst forum shopping was signed by respondents counsel in violation ofthe rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismissholding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurelydecide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to presentevidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forumshopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretaryscertificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forumshopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion todismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and themotion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion todismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are bothdenied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to fileher answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of thisOrder.SO ORDERED.

13

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under

Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did notact with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38,Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability ofpublic officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law thatgoverns the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not bealleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTCthat the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by thesubmission of the corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to its

counsel to execute the same.Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit isgrounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a publicofficer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code whichshould be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there isa clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averredthat the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damagesfor violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of publicofficers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special lawon the superior public officers liability, such that, if the complaint, as in theinstant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the sameis dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the
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certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construethe rules and to dismiss the complaint.Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general thepublic officers "acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law;while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public off icers violation ofconstitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whetherthe complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case ofLim v. Poncede Leon,

14respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is

enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffand it is not required that said public officer should have acted with malice orin bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failedto allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a causeof action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are notnecessary to hold petitioner liable.The issues for resolution are as follows:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity foracts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/heroffice?(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38,Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determiningwhether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with therule on certification against forum shopping?(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable fordamages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of hisofficial duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.

15An officer who

acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/sheheads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as itwould virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to

judgment for monetary claims without its consent.16

However, a public officeris by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for actsdone in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no

longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.17Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liabilitymay arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part ofa superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civilliability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterizedby willfulness or negligence. Thus

Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shallnot be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his officialduties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or grossnegligence.x x x xSection 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate

officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good

faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable forwillful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law,morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under ordersor instructions of his superior.

In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18

that apublic officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights ofanother, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Codeeven if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued inhis/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of thefunctions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, badfaith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutionalright of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondentstated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32of the Civil Code.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places anddoes not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. Aspecial statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates toparticular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section ofthe state only.

19

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes inparimateria and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, ifpossible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there aretwo acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which,if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with thespecial act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intentmore clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intendedto affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless itis absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words anymeaning at all.

20

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the generalact does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be

regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; andwhere the general act is later, the special statute will be construed asremaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or bynecessary implication.

21

Thus, in City ofManila v. Teotico,22

the Court held that Article 2189 of theCivil Code which holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable fordeath or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other publicworks, is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic

Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for defectivestreet conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damagesor injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provisionof the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or

attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:
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Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over thelatter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intendedexclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a generallaw, applicable to the entire Philippines.The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, wethink, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application isconcerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Codea general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of theprovisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishesa general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of"city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other lawor ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, MunicipalBoard, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce saidprovisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Codeconstitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities andmunicipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injurysuffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of the defectivecondition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other publicworks under their control or supervision." In other words, saidsection 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,

regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governsliability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since thepresent action is based upon the alleged defective condition ofa road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

23

In the case ofBagatsing v. Ramirez,24

the issue was which law shouldgovern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, aspecial act which treats ordinances in general and which requires theirpublication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a generallaw, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes,fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after approval.In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidatedthat:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila isa special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas theLocal Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to alllocal governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universalrule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating toparticular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said isthat a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequentgeneral law. The fact that one is special and the other generalcreates a presumption that the special is to be considered asremaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of theland, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rulereadily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a

subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular.

Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaksof "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature andscope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Coderelates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or othercharges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances ingeneral, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtlessdominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when itapproaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes,fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Codecontrols. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to aparticular provision. Special provision governs.

Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of theCivil Code provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in anymanner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties ofanother person shall be liable to the latter for damages:x x x x(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process oflaw;

x x x x(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;x x x x

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the CodeCommission, as follows:

"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, AttorneyCirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make apublic official liable for violation of another persons constitutionalrights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. TheCode Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil orcriminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or

bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purposeof Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of

justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse bythe plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in thenature of a tort."Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articlesintroduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There isno real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made thearticle so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse ofindividual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a

matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who
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openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. Inmost cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce thelaw to comply with ones duty. And so, if we should limit the scope ofthis article, that would practically nullify the object of the article.Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuseswhich are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases theplea of officials abusing individual rights."

25

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officersbut also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumeratedin Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant underthis Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it woulddefeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

26

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27

A tort is a wrong, atortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an actby one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly orindirectly, in person, property, or reputation.

28There are cases in which it has

been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not bythe mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under whichthe motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reasonsometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the

alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the actwas wrongful.

29Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil

motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion ofanothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact thatdefendant acted without evil intent.

30

The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct causeof action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespectiveof the motive or intent of the defendant.

31This is a fundamental innovation in

the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to theexercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could nothave intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.InAberca v. Ver,

32it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the

principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquiresadded meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superiorofficial relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates,secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressionscommitted by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights andliberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power inFebruary 1986 was the widely held perception that the government wascallous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violationsof human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violatorsof human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damagesuits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,

responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code,laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate publicofficers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superiorand subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, andnegligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Notethat while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of governmentofficials, the subject thereof is general, i.e.,"acts" done in the performance ofofficial duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise toa civil suit against the official concerned.Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocalterms a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action fordamages against a pub

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