SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6408.  August 31, 2004]

ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-METEORO respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for deceit and non-payment of debts.

A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra only.  It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the criminal charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checks which were in the possession of complainants; the title covered an area of 5,000 square meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client; complainants checked the property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to respondent pursuant to a transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with respondent over the phone but the latter was always unavailable, thus the present complaint.[1]

On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order[2] of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation but said amount had already been paid and replaced with new checks; Isidra signed a document attesting to the fact that the subject of her letter-complaint no longer exists;[3] she also issued in favor of Olivia several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting toP67,000.00 for the payment of a pre-existing obligation; the checks which were the subject of the complaint filed at the City Prosecutor’s Office in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and the criminal case filed by complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3 was already dismissed; the Informations for

Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-03[4] were never filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit of desistance; respondent did not send text messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she present any title in exchange for her bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since all dealings were made with Olivia; and the present complaint was initiated by Isidra only because she had a misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to extract money from respondent.[5]

Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:

1.  That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines docketed as CBD case no. 01-840;

2.  That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was brought about by some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the account of Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;

3.  That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my co-complainant Isidra Barrientos;

4.  That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the corresponding checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;

5.  That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was brought about by a case of some mistakes in the records;

6.  That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and submitted the same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;

7.  That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I have also executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;

8.  That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that I have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.[6]

On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to appear before it on September 6, 2001.  On said date, both parties appeared and agreed to settle their misunderstanding.[7]

On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a staggered basis.  Another hearing was then set for February 5, 2002.  Respondent failed to appear in said

hearing despite due notice.  It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that should respondent fail to appear, the case shall already be submitted for resolution.[8]

Respondent appeared in the next two hearings.  However, this time, it was complainant who was unavailable.  In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was warned again that should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall resolve the case.  On said date, respondent did not appear despite due notice.[9]

On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of the July 31 order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she had already paid complainant the amount ofP64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondent’s father was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to settle her remaining balance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able to fully settle the balance of her debt up to this date.   Respondent prayed  that  she  be  given  another  60  days  from August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant.[10]

On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondent’s motion and setting aside the order dated July 31, 2002.  It noted that while respondent claims that she already paid complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted evidencing payment amount only to P45,000.00.[11] A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003 at which time respondent was directed to present proof of her payments to the complainant.  The hearing was however reset several times until August 20, 2003 at which time, only complainant appeared.  Respondent sent somebody to ask for a postponement which the commission denied.  The commission gave respondent a last opportunity to settle her accounts with complainant.  The hearing was set for October 7, 2003 which the commission said was “intransferrable.”[12]

On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared.  The commission noted that respondent was duly notified and even personally received the notice for that day’s hearing.  The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.[13]

On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his report pertinent portions of which read as follows:

The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  This Office holds that she has.  More particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity.  She has shown herself to possess poor moral characters.  In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the respondent made a false assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of her indebtedness but the receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00.  What is more disconcerting is that while she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office respondent has seemingly ignored the same deliberately.  Finally, the respondent has not offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainant’s charge that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of title (TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to a transaction which the former had with the Quedancor where respondent was

formerly employed.  Based on all the foregoing findings and the deliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her accountabilities, inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to attend the scheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but also the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must constantly be of good moral character and unsullied honesty.[14]

He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice of law for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos.[15]

On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that: she was not able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol attending to pressing personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25, 2003 and it was only then that she got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very beginning, respondent never intended to ignore the Commission’s hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial crisis which hit her family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the expenses incurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in full by her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by the bank; respondent’s husband has been confined recently due to thyroid problems and respondent  herself had sought medical help on several occasions due to her inability to conceive despite being married for more than five years; if not for said reasons, respondent could have already paid the complainant despite respondent’s knowledge that the amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely the interest of her debt since she already returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased and she already paid for those that she was not able to return.  Respondent prays that the resolution of the case be deferred and that she be given another 90 days from said date or until January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after proper accounting and presentation of receipts.[16]

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67CBD Case No. 01-840Isidra Barrientos vs.

Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent’s glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and Restitution ofP84,000.00 to complainant.[17]

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for the bounced checks that were in their possession.

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.[18] Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.  They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.[19] They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.  They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[20] Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra Barrientos.  Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a staggered basis.  Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.[21]

After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the payment thereof.  Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise.  She did not appear in most of the hearings and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after the IBP-CBD Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution.  She claimed that she got sick days before the hearing and asked for sixty days to finally settle her account.  Again, she failed to fulfill her promise and did not appear before the Commission in the succeeding hearings despite due notice.  After the case was submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending to personal matters.  Again she asked for another ninety days to settle her entire debt.  This repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity and moral character.  Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by the commission and her belated pleas for reconsideration also manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case and to make full use of the mechanisms of administrative proceedings to her benefit.

She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutor’s office in Cabanatuan City.  Her only excuse is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the payment of her debt, which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.  It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.[22] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.[23] It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.[24]

Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures.  As we explained in Co vs. Bernardino:[25]

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity.   Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.

The evidence on record clearly shows respondent’s propensity to issue bad checks.  This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt…[26] (Citations omitted).

She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her husband also had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay.  She however did not present any proof to substantiate such claims.  She also did not appear personally before the complainant and the commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to make arrangements for the payment of her debt considering the circumstances that befell her family.  Instead, she waited until the case was submitted for resolution to allege such facts, without presenting any proof therefor.

We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainants’ charge that she tried to negotiate with them a transfer certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she should be held liable therefor.  Basic is the principle that if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving her cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove her exception or defense. [27] Simply put, the burden is not on the respondent to prove her innocence but on the complainants to prove her guilt.  In this case, complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together with their letter-complaint, which according to complainants was the title respondent tried, through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for the bounced checks in their possession.[28] No other evidence or sworn statement was submitted in support of such allegation.  Respondent in her answer, meanwhile, denied having any knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion was made on the matter, not even in the

hearings before the commission.[29] For this reason, we hold that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT to complainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts and the issuance of worthless checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself admitted.

We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.[30]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent’s misconduct.  The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.  In Lao vs. Medel,[31] which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate.  Unlike in the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts amounting to P50,000.00.  Thus we deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision, and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP as well as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION[A.C. No. 5113.  October 7, 2004]

DOLORES SILVA Vda. DE FAJARDO, complainant, vs. Atty. REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers must be completely truthful, more so when they plead their own causes against former clients.  In the present case, the lawyer misrepresented facts in his claim for attorney’s fees; hence, he must be sanctioned.

The Case

The administrative case before the Court stems from a Complaint[1] filed by Dolores Silva vda. de Fajardo, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Rexie Efren A. Bugaring for untruthful statements in allegedly trying to fleece her ofP3,532,170 in attorney’s fees.  The Complaint and respondent’s Comment[2] thereon were referred[3] by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala’s Report[4] recommending the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one year was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its June 21, 2003 Resolution No. XV-2003-348.  On June 30, 2003, the Notice of the IBP Resolution[5] and the records of the case -- including the Commissioner’s Report -- were forwarded to this Court by Atty. Julio C. Elamparo, director for bar discipline of the IBP.[6]

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the investigating commissioner in her Report as follows:

“Complainant alleged that she had known respondent since 1989 when she, together with her co-heirs, were trying to sell [the] properties which they inherited from their predecessors, Jose and Buenaventura Silva x x x.  [They] were encountering disputes with the heirs of Alfredo Silva Cruz (‘Cruz Family’), then represented by one Atty. Ricardo Dantes, and with their tenants, over x x x Lots 2434 and 2454 located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, [which they were trying to sell]  to Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation.

“Atty. Bugaring was recommended by Atty. Dantes to complainant to assist her and her co-heirs with the legal aspects of the disputes they were encountering.  Atty. Bugaring and Atty. Dantes were close associates and they hold and belong to the same law office of Bugaring, Tugonon and Associates Law Offices.  Whenever complainant and her companion Maria Luisa Tamondong would go to the office of Atty. Bugaring to see him, they also see Atty. Dantes at

the same office.  Thinking that Atty. Bugaring was an honest and honorable man, complainant accepted the recommendation.  At that time, complainant thought that there was nothing wrong or anomalous in she being represented by Atty. Bugaring, who belong to the same law office as that of Atty. Dantes, counsel of the Cruz family with which complainant and her co-heirs were then having disputes over Lots 2434 and 2454.  She did not know that it was improper and unethical for lawyers of the same firm to handle conflicting interests of clients.

“Initially, Atty. Bugaring assisted complainant with their problems with the tenants of Lots 2434 and 2454.  The tenants then had the preferential right to purchase the said properties they were occupying x x x. [T]hey [had] verbally expressed their non-interest in purchasing the same but refused to vacate the premises [and] demanded that they be given 1/3 of the total land area of the two lots before they agree to vacate.  Atty. Bugaring wrote, on behalf of the complainant and her co-heirs, the said tenants and the Agrarian Reform Office.  Meanwhile, the dispute of complainant and her co-heirs with the Cruz family later led to the filing of the case entitled ‘Alicia Cruz, et al., vs. Dolores Fajardo, et al.’ with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3472 (hereinafter the ‘Mother Case’).  The Cruz family was asserting an alleged right over Lots 2434 and 2454.  Atty. Bugaring represented the complainant and her co-heirs for purposes of this case.

“Every time there was a hearing in the ‘Mother Case’ in Laguna, the driver of complainant would fetch Atty. Bugaring at 5:00 o’clock in the morning from his residence/office in Quezon City, and would likewise drive him back after the hearing.  Complainant paid Atty. Bugaring every hearing an appearance fee of P1,000.00, whether hearings were postponed or not, treated him to lunch and used to send him off with vegetables, candies and other goodies.

“Complainant had always asked Atty. Bugaring how much [he would] charge for his professional fees, but Atty. Bugaring would just answer: ‘Huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon.  Para ko na kayong nanay o lola.’  All along, complainant was swayed to believe that Atty. Bugaring was nice and courteous.

“Later, the dispute of complainant and her co-heirs with the Cruz family got worse.  The ‘Mother Case’ soon branched out to more and more cases, about eleven (11) cases in all, which were but the offshoots of the ‘Mother Case,’ (Civil Case No. 3472).  Atty. Bugaring continued to represent the complaint and her co-heirs in the foregoing cases and as in the ‘Mother Case,’ whenever there were hearings, Atty. Bugaring was fetched back and forth by complainant’s driver x x x, [was paid] an appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing, [was] treated to lunch and sent x x x off [with] some goodies.  In all these cases, complainant had asked Atty. Bugaring of his professional fees, but the complainant would get the usual reply of: ‘Huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon.  Para ko na kayong nanay o lola.’  With the rate things were going on then, Atty. Bugaring all the more earned the trust and respect of the complainant more than anybody else.

“In November 1992, complainant had a meeting with her co-heirs and the latter expressed their discontent with the way Atty. Bugaring was handling the ‘Mother Case’ and the offshoot cases because the cases were derailing their intended sale of Lots 2434 and 2454 to Golden Bay

Realty and Development Corporation.  Complainant was hounded by questions regarding her arrangement with Atty. Bugaring to which complainant could not give any answer because there really was no contract or agreement between her and Atty. Bugaring, who refused to discuss any arrangement with complainant.  After their meeting, complainant told Atty. Bugaring of the discontent of her co-heirs, and Atty. Bugaring told complainant that he can draw a fictitious ‘Contract’ for his services which complainant can show to her co-heirs.  Indeed, Atty. Bugaring drew up two (2) fictitious ‘Contract of Services’ both dated 11 December 1992.  One specifically states that it was for the ‘Mother Case’ and the other was for the case of ‘Catalina Roberto, et al. v. Dolores Fajardo, et al.’  Each of said fictitious contracts stipulate[d] x x x an acceptance fee of P50,000.00, per appearance fee ofP1,000.00 and upon the termination of the case, an additional attorney’s fee ‘equivalent to 25% of the value of the subject property in litigation.’  When the fictitious contracts were shown to complainant, she was assured by Atty. Bugaring that the contracts were not valid and binding and told her ‘Ito ho ay para lamang may maipakita kayo sa kanila, pero hindi ito totoo.’  With that assurance, complainant signed the contract and was given a copy of the same.

“Around 1992, complainant and her co-heirs entered into separate compromise agreements with the tenants of Lots 2434 and 2454 and with the Cruz family.  The agreement with the Cruz family was later put into writing with the execution of a Compromise Agreement dated 7 June 1992, which was submitted to the court before which the ‘Mother Case’ was pending. [I]t became the basis of the Judgment dated 22 November 1993 x x x [and the dismissal of] all the offshoot cases x x x.  [On the other hand,] the Compromise Agreement reached with the tenants of Lots 2434 and [2454] consisted of an agreement totally ceding Lot 2454 to the tenants as [d]isturbance [c]ompensation.  Complainant and her co-heirs decided not to reveal these agreements [to Atty. Bugaring] until they were finalized because they knew that [he] did not want such settlement for reasons known [only] to him.

“With the settlement of the disputes over Lots 2434 and 2454, the sale of the remaining property (Lot 2434) to Golden Bay [R]ealty and Development Corporation materialized on 2 March 1994.  Complainant was accompanied by Atty. Bugaring and Maria Luisa Tam[o]ndong to the office of Golden Bay Realty when the sale was finalized.  When complainant received the proceeds of the sale, they went to see Atty. Bugaring to settle their account with him.  They tendered to Atty. Bugaring the amount of P100,000.00 which they believed was commensurate for his services considering [that] the cases ended x x x by compromise agreement.  However, Atty. Bugaring rejected the amount.  On said occasion, Atty. Bugaring requested the companions of complainant to step out of the room first and said he wanted to talk to complainant alone.  Atty. Bugaring proposed to complainant a deal to the effect that onlyP85,000.00 will be paid to him by complainant and he will charge the estate or the complainant’s co-heirs the amount ofP1,200,000.00.  [C]omplainant vehemently objected to [this] because the estate or her co-heirs did not have that amount of money.  The co-heirs of complainant maintained that they would only pay Atty. Bugaring P100,000.00, which [amount] the latter rejected.

“x x x [C]omplainant did not hear x x x from Atty. Bugaring [since April 1994].  [However, almost three years later], she learned that her property in Tandang Sora was already attached by Atty.

Bugaring.  Unknown to complainant, Atty. Bugaring had filed the case entitled ‘Rexie Efren A. Bugaring vs. Dolores Fajardo’ docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29422 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, for Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment for x x x collection of his legal x x x fees.  Atty. Bugaring specifically prayed for the attachment of complainant’s properties and other assets to answer for his claim ofP3,532,170.00 plus 12% interest per annum for x x x unpaid attorney’s fees, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and such amount equivalent to 25% from the total claim as attorney’s fees plus P2,000.00 per court attendance as appearance fee plus other proven litigation expenses.

x x x                          x x x                             x x x

“Atty. Bugaring, by way of comment, avers that from 1991 to May 1994, complainant retained his services as her personal legal consultant and x x x lawyer in nineteen (19) court cases.  Considering that Civil Case Nos. B-3472 and 3[8]96 before the RTC, Biñan, Laguna, involved various real estate properties, complainant asked Atty. Bugaring to prepare a written contract for his attorney’s fees, which was thereafter signed by the complainant x x x.  [The] Contract of Services dated 11 December 1992 x x x provide[d] that complainant will pay Atty. Bugaring an (1) acceptance fee of P50,000.00; (2) appearance fee for every court appearance of P1,000.00 and (3) attorney’s fee equivalent to 25% of the value of the properties in litigation.  [As to] all the other cases [he] handled, [Atty. Bugaring charged] a minimum amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 appearance fee [for] every court attendance.  Under these conditions, considering the complexities of the cases, Atty. Bugaring laboriously and painstakingly represented the rights and interest of the complainant, and thereby successfully terminated all cases, except Civil Cases Nos. B-3971 and 3[8]96, which were still under litigation.

“Due to the failure and adamant refusal of complainant to settle and pay Atty. Bugaring x x x his accumulated professional fees, he was constrained to make verbal, and finally, written demands on 30 April 1994 and 6 May 1994.  Notwithstanding the receipts of the demand letters, which explicitly indicated to her the computation of the amount of professional fees demanded, complainant simply remained silent about the matter, thereby signifying her adamant refusal to settle and pay her legitimately contracted obligations to Atty. Bugaring.  With no other extra-judicial recourse, and after Atty. Bugaring was able to save an amount for payment of filing fees, attachment bond and other initial expenses (P100,000.00 more or less) for a collection case on the matter, x x x Atty. Bugaring instituted an action for sum of money with damages against complainant before RTC Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29442 [on 11 November 1996].  After receiving complainant’s Answer to the Complaint, the trial court set the case for [p]re-trial conference on 3 June 1997.  However, due to the failure of complainant and her counsel to appear, the court declared complainant in default and  Atty. Bugaring was allowed to present evidence ex-parte x x x on 6 June 1997.  On 15 October 1997, the court rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Bugaring.  As no appeal was undertaken by complainant, Atty. Bugaring on 14 July 1998 filed his Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution thereto which was granted by the court on 28 September 1998.  When the Writ of Execution was issued on 24

December 1998, complainant filed [a] Petition for Certiorari with Temporary Restraining Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 49866, questioning the trial court’s orders dated 3 and 13 February 1998, as well as the resolution dated 28 September 1998. The Court of Appeals, finding no merit in the petition, dismissed the same and affirmed the trial court’s Resolution on 4 February 1999.  Complainant, finding the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 26 April 1999.  Complainant also filed a Motion dated 15 July 1999 asking for the issuance of a Cease, Desist and Refrain Order against the [p]ublic [a]uction sale [scheduled] on 30 July 1999 [by] the deputy sheriff of the trial court.  Acting on complainant’s motion, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 29 July 1999.  [H]owever, on 30 September 1999, the appellate court finally issued its resolution denying complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration.”[7]

Evaluation and Recommendation of the IBP

Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for making untruthful statements and for misleading the trial courts on several occasions in Civil Case No. Q-96-29422 and Civil Case No. B-3896. Respondent allegedly lied to and misled these courts in the following instances:

1.  When he included in his claim for attorney’s fees in Civil Case Q-96-29422 25 percent of the value of two lots (atP3,670,000 and P750,000), which were not among the properties in litigation in the “Mother Case” and had already been sold in 1987 and 1968, respectively

2.  When he concealed the fact that Lot 2454 had been given to complainant’s tenants as disturbance compensation

3.  When he failed to disclose that the Contract of Service for the “Mother Case” was executed six months after it had already been settled by a Compromise Agreement on June 7, 1992

4.  When he led the RTC of San Pedro Laguna (Branch 93), to believe in his Petition for Recording and Enforcement of Attorney’s Lien in Civil Case No. B-3896 that no other action or claim was pending except his case for collection

5.  When he made two inconsistent statements regarding the date when his professional services had actually been engaged by complainant

Commissioner Maala also found that respondent had not completely been honest with the Commission.  According to his Comment,[8] he decided to forego his professional fees amounting to P2 million in Civil Case No. B-3896; actually, those fees were included in his collection case.  It was also in the said case that he filed a Petition for the Recording and Enforcement of Attorney’s Lien.

Commissioner Maala held that respondent had violated his sworn duty to tell no falsehood in court.  Hence, she recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of IBP.

Respondent’s Administrative Liability

Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.  Accordingly, Rule 10.01 requires a member of the bar “not [to tell] any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.”

Moreover, Section 20(d) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer must employ “such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

In his September 28, 2003 Comment/Opposition[9] to the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, respondent points out alleged distortions in the findings of fact.  Upon a review of the records, however, the Court finds the investigating commissioner’s conclusions to be in order.

Falsehood

Indeed, respondent has not completely been honest when he claimed that the entire estate of Adela Silva was the subject of litigation in the case for partition.  First, it is clear that Lots 2434 and 2454 were the only properties mentioned in the Complaint[10] for partition, which we quote:

“x x x.  The late Adela Silva died intestate, single and without surviving heirs except the herein plaintiffs and defendants.  She died  x x x leaving as her estate the two (2) parcels of land located at Bgy. Platero, Biñan, Laguna.  The first known as Lot 2434 of the Biñan Estate is covered by TCT No. RT-1702 (N.A.) while the second known as Lot 2454 of the same Biñan Estate is embraced by TCT No. Rt-1703 (N.A.) issued by the Register of Deeds (Calamba branch) of Laguna;”[11]

Second, the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment in the “Mother Case” for partition did not indicate that the subject of partition was the late Adela Silva’s estate, but they did refer to the other properties belonging to her, including the 73,404 square-meter agricultural land in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite; and the 150 square-meter residential lot in Sampaloc, Manila. 

What appears from the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment is that these properties were enumerated merely to show that Lots 2434 and 2454 were part of the said estate.  That only these lots were referred to is plain from the terms and conditions of the Judgment:

“1.  That the parties herein hereby agree to refrain from discussing whether their claims and counter claims over Lot 2434 (TCT 12702) and Lot 2454 (TCT 1703) are meritorious or not, and further agree to put an end to all their litigations x x x.  Thus to this effect, all their claims are hereby waived and abandoned subject to the following terms and conditions:

a.    That the defendant Dolores Silva Fajardo hereby agree[s] to pay the plaintiffs’ representative Alicia Cruz, the sum of four hundred thousand (P400,000.00) pesos Philippine currency upon signing of this Agreement.

b.    That the defendant Dolores Silva Fajardo be authorized to consummate the sale of Lot No. 2434, and Lot 2454, covered by TCT No. 1702 and 1703, respectively of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba branch, and to execute all the necessary documents in favor of the Vendee, Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation.”[12]

Third, it was adequately established that the Cavite and the Sampaloc lots mentioned in the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment had already been sold long before the advent of Civil Case B-3472.  There is no reason to doubt that respondent, as complainant’s counsel, knew this fact.

Lastly, we note that the failure of respondent to include all the properties of the estate in his claim for attorney’s fees runs counter to his other claim that complainant’s entire estate was in litigation.  If it were so, should he not then have also asked for 25 percent of the value of all such properties enumerated in the Judgment?

As regards his professional fees, we stress that the proper time to deal with this delicate issue is upon the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.  In this case, respondent should have determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees in 1991 at the latest, when he was first retained by complainant as her counsel in the partition case.  Such prudence would have spared the Court this controversy over a lawyer’s compensation, a suit that should be avoided except to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.[13]

To be sure, a lawyer is entitled to the protection of the courts against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of legitimate attorney’s fees. [14] However, such protection must not be sought at the expense of truth.  Complete candor or honesty is expected from lawyers, particularly when they appear and plead before the courts for their own causes against former clients, as in this case.  With his armada of legal knowledge and skills, respondent clearly enjoyed the upper hand.  More important, he had the sole opportunity to present evidence in the collection case after complainant was declared in default, and after he was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

Respondent is thus reminded that he is first and foremost an officer of the court.  His bounden duty is to assist it in rendering justice to all.[15] Lest he has forgotten, lawyers must always be disciples of truth.[16] It is highly reprehensible when they themselves make a travesty of the truth and mangle the ends of justice.  Such behavior runs counter to the standards of honesty and fair dealing expected from court officers.

Equally without merit are respondent’s other arguments that the real issue herein is his claim for attorney’s fees, whose merit has already been adjudicated in court, as well as of his allegation that complainant has engaged in forum shopping to delay the execution of the judgment against her for attorney’s fees.

To start with, this proceeding is not about the merits of respondent’s fees, but about his conduct as an officer of the court.  It has been emphasized in a number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action.[17] In Re Almacen[18] explained this basic principle:

“x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings x x x are sui generis.  Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not -- and does not involve -- a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers.  Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.  It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.  Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.  Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.  x x x.”[19] (Italics supplied) 

Clearly then, this disbarment case may proceed independently of the civil action for collection, without running afoul of the prohibition against forum shopping.  Moreover, the elements of forum shopping[20] are conspicuously absent.  Between these two cases, there is no identity of parties, as the complainant is in no sense a party to the administrative proceeding.  Obviously, there is neither identity of rights asserted nor reliefs prayed for.  Lastly, the judgment in the disbarment proceeding would not bar the collection case.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Rexie Efren A. Bugaring is found LIABLE for gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective upon the finality of this Decision.  He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or of a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

 

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5151.  October 19, 2004]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondent’s certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and respondent’s acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.

Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the public’s sense of morality.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.  Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.

Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by respondent’s counsel.

Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows:  He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.  Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza.  Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente.  Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas Valderia.  He also received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register.  Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia.  In respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated.  Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente.  In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.

On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows:  He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political parties.  It was not respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the present case.  Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent.  It was only after respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against him that he decided to file an administrative case against respondent.[1]

On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were against the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that they are both still legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]

The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness Melgar.  On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar.  He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding respondent’s immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at that time.[3]

Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondent’s counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondent’s immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia,[5]the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995,[8] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998,[9] Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10] and the editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.

Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence have no probative weight.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELYfrom the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:

FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits “A” to “H”.

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any evidence.  Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore because according to him “there is none to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the private complainants.”  Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue his position.  As can be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted, respondent’s counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and that

the birth certificates Exhibits “D” and “D-1” which were offered to show that respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.  The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits “A” and “B”] particularly in paragraph 2 that “Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife.”  In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that “respondent has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife.”   These categorical statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted.  Respondent chose not to rebut them.

Exhibit “E,” the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia.  As shown by Exhibit “H”, a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos.  Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits “D” and “D-1”, we believe that they are competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings.  The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures.  The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure.  A person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case.  Exhibits “D” and “D-1” which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children.  These facts we repeat have not been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented.  Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife.  The evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character.  That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious allegations made against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position before the Commission.  As between the documents and positive statements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the

evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay.  The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondent’s wife.  Again their categorical statements taken together with the other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.   The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law [ Mortel vs. Aspiras   100 Phil. 586 (1956);   Cordova vs. Cordova   179 SCRA 680 (1989);   People vs. Tuanda   181 SCRA 682 (1990)].   The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes “mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage” [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage.  Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit “F” that he is separated from his wife.  This fact and statement without any further explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain in good standing.  Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.  Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through unjust and unfounded accusations.  However, in the instant case the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented.  The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing.  He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction.[12]

Witness Melgar’s testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing

respondent as one of Naujan’s public servants, and stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.[13] It should be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof.  Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to be edited out.

With regard to respondent’s argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for respondent’s filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for themselves.  The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facieevidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410 [14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:

Rule 24.  Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. –

(1)  The records of a person’s birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of the child’s parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and

c. in case of the person’s death, the nearest of kin.

(2)  Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.”  There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.  The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth

certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence.  On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures.  It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. [15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.  Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged “warrantless search” made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer’s office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures. 

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply. 

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. 

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent.  Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time. 

In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:

.   .   .   good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.  Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.  The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

.   .   .    that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.  Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.  That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]

We must rule in the same wise in this case before us.  The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character.  Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr ., [21]  we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar.  They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address and entered in his record as attorney.  Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 6298             May 27, 2004(CBD Case No. 03-1071)

FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainant, vs.ATTY. EDDIE R. BANSIL, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On March 17, 2003, Atty. Federico D. Ricafort filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), a verified complaint against respondent Atty. Eddie R. Bansil for misconduct and for violation of the Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1071, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala for investigation, report and recommendation.

The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized by the Investigating Commissioner as follows:

Complainant alleged that respondent has been commissioned as a Notary Public for Guagua, Pampanga, with the obligation to submit his notarial book and documents every month and each time he applies for a re-commission to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga.

According to the RTC Clerk of Court of Guagua, Atty. Jorge Bacani (‘Atty. Bacani’), respondent submitted his notarial book and documents but the same were returned to him for safekeeping considering that there was no space in the Office of the Clerk of Court to accommodate the notarial books and documents. However, they are required to bring them to the Clerk of Court when needed for inspection/verification of documents upon request.

Complainant has requested the Clerk of Court, Atty. Bacani, to send word to respondent that he wanted to verify some documents purportedly notarized by respondent particularly the documents contained in Notarial Book No XV, Series of 2002 and to bring the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court. The request was made to respondent on several occasions, the last of which was on 20 May 2003. Atty. Bacani repeatedly

called up respondent regarding the request of complainant but respondent repeatedly failed and refused to heed the request.

On 20 February 2003, complainant sent a formal letter reiterating his request to examine respondent’s Notarial Book XV, Series of 2002 for verification purposes at the office of the clerk of court on 28 February 2003. However, despite the fact that respondent received the said letter on 3 March 2003, respondent still failed and refused the request without any justifiable reason and did not even responded (sic) to the said letter. Hence, this complaint.

In his Answer, respondent states that there was no failure and refusal to heed the request, and the reason of inability to bring for verification the said Notarial Book CXV, Series of 2002 is the fact of lost (sic) thereof attributable to heavy flooding from July 6 to 20, 2002.

The letter-request was lately shown to him by a member of his household, however, complainant did not mention any particular document or he could have readily extended the desired help for verification or certification. Respondent contends that he is ready and willing to be of help to complainant if shown the particular document necessitating verification and/or certification.

Complainant claims that how can respondent help verify the genuineness or veracity of the documents notarized by him, if respondent alleged that the same were lost in a flood. Complainant avers that the certification issued as to the existence of flood in Guagua, Pampanga in 6 to 20 July 2002 deals only with the flood in the town proper and did not say that the house of respondent in San Antonio, Guagua, was hit by the flood. The streets were flooded but not the house of respondent which is situated on a higher ground. The town of Guagua, Pampanga has been perennially flooded during rainy season for which reason respondent who had to bring his notarial books at his house in San Antonio, Guagua, could have guarded the same against such contingency. A Notary Public should always place his books and documents in a safe place at his residence, otherwise this could aggravate the suspicion that he was grossly negligent in keeping his books which are public documents and destruction of public documents is punishable by law.

At the hearing held on 4 June 2003 only complainant appeared. Respondent’s notice for the reason of his absence was belatedly received by the office. Parties were directed to submit their Position Paper and thereafter the case was submitted for report and recommendation.

In her Report and Recommendation submitted to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found the respondent administratively liable for his failure to attend to the request of complainant to look into his notarial book and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

In its resolution dated October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but reduced the recommended penalty to a mere reprimand; and referred the same to this Court.

Except for the penalty recommended, the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be held administratively liable for not attending to complainant’s request to look into his notarial book.

Before delving into the main issue of the case, we deem it proper to discuss two preliminary matters.

First, it is noted that at the hearing scheduled on June 4, 2003, only the complainant appeared.1 As a matter of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner should have proceeded with the investigation ex parte pursuant to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.2 The Investigating Commissioner should have required the complainant to present evidence to substantiate his allegations. However, instead of proceeding with the hearing, the Investigating Commissioner issued an order requiring both parties to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from the date of issuance of the order, with respect to the complainant, and within 15 days from notice with respect to respondent. Despite due receipt of the said order on June 18, 2003, respondent failed to submit the required memorandum. The Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation was dated September 16, 2003 while the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving said Report and Recommendation was passed on October 25, 2003. The records of the case do not show that from June 18, 2003 until October 25, 2003, respondent had taken any action or that he submitted the required memorandum. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived not only his right to file said memorandum but also the right to a hearing.

Second, the complaint against respondent is in connection with the discharge of his functions as a notary public, and not as an elected barangay chairman. Thus, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees invoked by complainant will not apply to the present administrative complaint against respondent. Respondent, as a lawyer and a notary public, is covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics.

Coming to the main issue in the instant case, despite absence of reception of evidence, as required by Sec. 8, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, we find the following admissions made by the respondent in his Answer to the complaint, to wit:

(1) He has been commissioned as a Notary Public for Guagua, Pampanga with obligation to submit his notarial book and documents every month and each time he applies for a commission to the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga;3

(2) His notarial books covering 2001-2002 were presented before the Clerk of Court for the renewal of his notarial commission for the succeeding year but was returned to him

after verification because of limited working space in the office of the Clerk of Court which is shared by Branch 53, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga;4

(3) He was notified by Clerk of Court Bacani regarding the request of complainant to examine some notarized documents in his notarial book;5

Sufficient to hold him liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent likewise admitted in his Answer that he received complainant’s letter-request dated February 20, 2003. However, he claims that said letter-request was belatedly shown to him by a member of his household. We find this a lame excuse. Granting that complainant’s letter-request was belatedly shown to respondent, elementary rules of courtesy still dictate that respondent should have, at the least, responded to complainant’s request to look at his notarial book. This is expected from respondent especially when the one requesting is a colleague in the same profession. Moreover, respondent admitted that Clerk of Court Bacani had earlier notified him of the request of complainant. Respondent simply ignored the requests of both complainant and Clerk of Court Bacani.

Even if the subject notarial book was, as claimed by him, indeed lost by reason of flooding in his place of residence, although there is no evidence to prove this belated self-serving assertion, respondent could have easily written a letter or called up Clerk of Court Bacani to inform him of such loss so that the complainant may be informed thereof in due time.

Respondent further contends that he could have easily helped complainant had the latter personally gone to see him and showed him the particular document that needed to be verified. Respondent’s contention and inaction smacks of arrogance and dereliction of his duty to bring the notarial books and documents to the Clerk of Court upon request of the latter. Worse, it speaks of his failure to live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded from each and every member of the legal profession as mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Professional Ethics.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides that the conduct of a lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. Indeed, the obligations of a member of the bar include the observance of honorable, candid and courteous dealing with other lawyers, fidelity to known and recognized customs and practices of the profession, and performance of duties to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.6

Thus, respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.7

Under the circumstances, a mere reprimand is not sufficient. We deem it proper to impose on respondent a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 not only for his unprofessional conduct but also because his unjustified failure to heed complainant’s request or to inform complainant or the Clerk of Court that the subject notarial books were lost in the flood, forced the latter to go to the extent of filing the instant administrative case thereby wasting the time and resources not only of the complainant and the IBP, but also of the Court.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Eddie R. Bansil GUILTY OF UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with a warning that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Once again, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is admonished to see to it that Section 8, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is observed by its Investigating Commissioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6403. August 31, 2004

RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and ATTY. RUDEGELIO D. TACORDA, complainants, v. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On November 23, 2000, Rudecon Management Corporation and Atty. Rudegelio D. Tacorda filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho for knowingly committing forum-shopping, in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 in relation to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The factual antecedents leading to the instant complaint are as follows:

On September 3, 1998, Sisenando Singson, represented by herein respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint against herein complainant Rudecon Management Corporation for damages and reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35444.[1 The case was originally raffled to Branch 79, RTC, Quezon City (Branch 79 for brevity) but was eventually re-raffled to Branch 85 of the same court.

On September 21, 1998, Singson, again represented by Atty. Camacho, filed with Branch 78, RTC, Quezon City (Branch 78 for brevity) a Motion for Intervention (With Attached Answer in Intervention With Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim) in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, entitled, Rudecon Management Corporation, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon M. Veluz, defendant-appellant, a case for unlawful detainer on appeal before said court.[2

On October 1, 1998, Rudecon filed a motion before Branch 78 seeking to cite Singson and his counsel, Atty. Camacho, for contempt for having allegedly violated the rule against forum shopping. Rudecon contends that the answer-in-intervention filed before Branch 78 involves the same issues already raised in the complaint filed with Branch 79.

On November 6, 1998, Branch 78, issued an order, with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, finding appellees herein Motion to be well taken, this Court finds would-be-intervenor, Sisenando Singson and his counsel, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho to have violated the rule on forum-shopping and holds them liable for contempt of Court under Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court in relation to Rule 71 and hereby reprimands both of them without prejudice to any administrative and appropriate action against would-be-intervenors counsel.

SO ORDERED.[3

Singson and Camacho did not appeal the order.

On the basis of the above-cited order, Rudecon and Tacorda filed the instant complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Camacho. Complainants submit that aside from disregarding the rule against forum shopping, contained in Supreme Court Administrative

Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondent is also guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[4

Respondent filed his Answer to the instant complaint. He denies the allegations of complainant and contends that he is not guilty of forum shopping. He claims that the Answer in Intervention filed with Branch 78 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 and the Complaint filed with Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 do not involve the same issues and reliefs prayed for and that he did not resort to the filing of both actions in order to increase the chances of his client obtaining a favorable decision.[5

The case was docketed by IBP as CBD Case No. 00-779 and was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP to an Investigating Commissioner for investigation, report and recommendation.

On October 24, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report to the IBP Board of Governors with the following findings and recommendation:

. . . . .

Two court cases gave rise to the present complaint. The first is Sisenando Singson vs. Rudecon Management Corp., Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 before Quezon City, RTC Branch 79 and the other case is Rudecon Management Corp. vs. Ramon M. Veluz, Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 before Quezon City, RTC Branch 78.

The respondent does not deny the existence of an Order dated November 6, 1998 issued by RTC Branch 78 of Quezon City in the case entitled Rudecon Management Corp. vs. Ramon M. Veluz, Civil Case No. Q-98-35326. Respondent does not deny also that this Order has become final and executory. What the respondent asserts is that he is not guilty of forum shopping because the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 are different from the cause of action and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 are different.

When respondent failed to contest the Order dated November 6, 1998, the same was rendered final and executory. This office is therefore devoid of any jurisdiction to review the factual finding of the trial court which give rise to said order finding the respondent guilty of forum shopping. This office has no other option but to recognize the validity of said order.

. . . . .

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the penalty of warning be meted out against the respondent for violating the prohibition against forum shopping, specifically, Supreme Court Adm. No. 04-94, paragraph 2 and Section 5, Rule 7, paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[6

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Elamparo.[7

We do not entirely agree with the IBP Resolution.

Based on the records, there are two issues to be resolved: (1) whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping; and (2) whether respondent may be held administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. As to the second issue, we rule in the negative.

Anent the first issue.

Respondent maintains that he is not guilty of forum shopping. However, it is not disputed that the RTC found respondent and his client guilty of forum shopping, on the basis of which it held both of them in contempt. This order has become final and executory for failure of respondent to appeal the same. The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.[8 When a final judgment becomes executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, directly or indirectly, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this Court.[9 The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course where the judgment is void.[10 The instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions. Indeed, it has been held that controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting error of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen.[11 In the present case, since the order of the trial court dated November 6, 1998 has already attained finality, we are now precluded from seeking otherwise.

Anent the second issue.

After a perusal of the records before us, we agree with respondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court by concealing the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 in Branch 79 when they filed the Motion for Intervention and Answer in Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 in Branch 78. Indeed, the first paragraph of the said Answer in Intervention shows that respondent and his client called the trial courts attention with respect to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. Herein complainant, which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, does not dispute respondents allegation that the latter and his client attached to their Answer in Intervention a copy of their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444.

Rules 1.01, 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide as follows:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

. . . . .

CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for his having allegedly violated the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7[12 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.[13 Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof.[14In the present case, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct in violation of the standards of honesty as provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanction against him.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 dated February 27, 2004 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE and the instant administrative case filed against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.