Facts

Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps on March 18, 1948. He was turned over to the Phil Commonwealth Government for appropriate disposition. His case was decided on by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration who declared him as an illegal alien. The Board ordered his immediate deportation. In the meantime, he was placed in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back home to Russia. Two Russian boats have been requested to bring him back to Russia but the masters refused as they had no authority to do so. Two years passed and Mejoff is still under detention awaiting the ship that will take him home.

This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent held that the Mejoff should stay in temporary detention as it is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens. It further states that is has the right to do so for a reasonable length of time.

Issue

Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison awaiting his deportation.

Ruling

The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but be placed under reasonable surveillance of the immigration authorities to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines in its constitution adops the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nations. Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations in its Resolution entitled “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in proclaiming that life and liberty and all other fundamental rights shall be applied to all human beings. The contention that he remains a threat of to the security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the Phils are no longer at war.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts

This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of

Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle

owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away

from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of

instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative

Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. 

This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order

are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal

protection of the law and undue delegation of police power. 

Issue

Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order

issued is unconstitutional

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are

deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as

such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of

instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction

mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on

Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that

such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to

stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state

immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has

moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not

consented.

FACTS:

1.    USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base

in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the

said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because

they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to

bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.    USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force

Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after

investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the

vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter

referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and

recommended his dismissal.

3.    USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust

operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the

Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners

testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his

employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because

of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.

4.    USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US

military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat

them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and

claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the

injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for

acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted

principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even

without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of

international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by

the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every

civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.

All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the

doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also

applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed

by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such

officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the

suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level

of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its

implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a

blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the

other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely

because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official

functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly

waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private

capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its

sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver

may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by

the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court

would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO,

except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant

of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded

to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake

of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary

capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental

activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into

the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it

impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still

dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary

about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly

in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their

official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified

against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they

cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its

consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer

study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants

were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when

the incident occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may

assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:

1.  A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN

INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS

CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS

CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs

Guinto)

   Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No

implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion

Facts:

On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition

of Persons who have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on

The Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution.

On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the

Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of

U.S.A. It was ratified by the Senate.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign

Affairs of U. S. a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who

are charged in the U.S. with the violation of the following: conspiracy, attempt to evade

tax, false statement or entry, election contributions in the name of another.

Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on

July 1, 1999, requested copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.

Government as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be

given ample time to comment on the request after he shall received copies of the

requested papers.

Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:

1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;

2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the

request, and to present evidence is support of the opposition;

The Depart of Justice Denied the request.

On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice,

Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them

to furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.), Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of

Justice letter dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from

considering the extradition request).

On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered:

The Secretary of Justice et al …ordered to maintain the status quo by refraining from

committing the acts complained of.

Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:

1. …by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained

of (i.e to desist from refusing Mark Jimenez access to the official extradition request and

documents.)

2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under

the extradition treaty and the Philippine Extradition Law.

Issue:

Would Mark Jimenez’ entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of

the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government

under the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

Held:

Petition Dismissed.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a

reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of

the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the

domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law

and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is

to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally

accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the

above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made

between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that

municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts

are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain

to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the

municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees

that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,

national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate

priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In

states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the

Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the

constitution

83 Phil. 171 – Political Law – Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines

during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission,

headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against

non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to

Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and

prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is

questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the

Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the

Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we

cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on,

national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance

of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states “the

Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The Hague

Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are

hence considered as part of the law of the land.

 

Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287Facts

: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on thefollowin

g grounds:1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case

doesn’t say)2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and

not through the modeof a plebiscite as provided in the Constitution3) The Constitution

provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in aplebiscite by all

voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by amajority or

votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those provinces andcities where

a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in theAutonomous

Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces

and cities which do not have the same cultural andhistorical heritage and other relevant

characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional

guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some itsprovisions run counter to the

Koran6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the

ARMM iscontrary to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous

region hingessolely on the result of the plebiscite7)R. A. 6734 says “…that only the

provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebisciteshall be included in the ARMM.

The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not

votefor inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrativere

gions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination,

mergethe existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional

mandatethat, “No province city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided,

merged,abolishedor its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with

the criteria established withthelocal government code and subject to approval by a

majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite in the unitsdirectly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10,

1987 Constitution)

Held

: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the

Tripoli Agreement, being asubsequent law to the Tripoli Agreement (though in my

opinion it wouldn’t matter if R. A.6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement)2) The

transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess nobodyreads the

transitory provisions)3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the

majority of votes must comefrom each of the constituent units and not all the votes of the

provinces and cities (I couldn’tunderstand how the justices arrived at this conclusion)4) It

is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion

of provinces and cities which Abbas claims should not be included in a plebiscite5) There

is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only apotential

one6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in

thetimely creation of the ARMM7) The power of the President to merge administrative

regions is inherent in his power

of general supervisionover local governments. Besides, administrative regions are notterri

torial or political regions. Examples of administrative regions are Regions I to XII and

theNCR

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in

public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated:

petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy

51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a

Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number

of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to

match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10,

paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of

rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the

State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II.    THE ISSUES

1.   Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2.     Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3.    Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10,

paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and

4.   Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the

petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale

of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III.   THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1.    YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it

is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style.  But, certainly, the legislature is

not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long

as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.  Minor details may be left to

the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art.

XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which

undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed.  If the first and third

paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to

encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the

first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over

foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a

fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not

by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in

the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and

patrimony.  A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-

executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive

command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or

implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.  From its very words the provision does

not require any legislation to put it in operation.  It is per se judicially enforceable.  When

our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions

covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified

Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.  And when our

Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may

be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the

subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such

constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,

and from which all legislations must take their bearings.  Where there is a right there is a

remedy.  Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2.    YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our

patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the

Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of

the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,

but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs

and  failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public

interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence

and nationhood.  Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and

patrimony.  For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the

constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone

who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel.  In

this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on

which the hotel edifice stands.  Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that

the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51%

of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon

which the building stands.

3.    YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10,

paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior

approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.  [T]his fact

alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.”  In

constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are

considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in

is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the

private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the

government has approved or authorized the action.  It is evident that the act of respondent

GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third

categories of “state action.”  Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered

into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the

constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the

government as elements of the State.  After all, government is composed of three (3)

divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial.  Accordingly, a constitutional

mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of

government.  It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is

addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a

government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4.    YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the

winning bidder.  The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be

declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,

and secured the requisite approvals.  Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the

Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid

is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning

bidder.  Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under

obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.  For in choosing the awardee

respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions

of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason  the Highest

Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified

Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing

to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate

itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder

notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid.  In fact, we cannot

conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding

concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy

and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the

Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.  And if the Filipino

matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino.  It must be so if we

are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987

Constitution.  For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the

bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.  To ignore it

would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

TAÑADA VS. ANGARA

272 SCRA 18

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry

and a representative of the Philippine government, signed in the Final Act Embodying the

Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. Bys signing the Final Act,

the Philippines agreed to submit the agreement establishing the World Trade

Organization that require the Philippines, among others, “to place nationals and products

of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products”. To that effect,

the President ratified and submitted the same to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to

Section21, Article VII of the Constitution. Hence the petitioner assailed the WTO

Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant

and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give

preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,

domestic materials and locally produced goods”.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Art. II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII,

all of the 1987 Philippines Constitution.

Held:

The court ruled the petition in favor of the respondents.

Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These

principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for

enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the

exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

The provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general principles

relating to the national economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regard to “the

grants or rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony”

and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. While the Constitution mandates a bias in

favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the

need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and

reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition

and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to

pursue an isolationist policy.

On the other hand, there is no basis on the contention that under WTO, local industries

will all be wiped out and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy, in fact,

WTO recognizes need to protect weak economies like the Philippines.