Cases for succession dela paz (2).docx

8/10/2019 Cases for succession dela paz (2).docx

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Cases for succession

G.R. No. 44837, Ledesma and Ledesma v. Mclachlin et al., 66 Phil. 47

G.R. No. 44837

!"C"RR" L#$#!M% and %N% &'()C" L#$#!M%, *lainti+s a**ellees,

vs.

C"NC-()% MCL%C-L(N, #) %L., defendants a**ellants.

%driano ). de la Cru for a**ellants.

!imeon /itan0a for a**ellees.

1(LL% R#%L, 2.

)his case is efore us 5 virtue of an a**eal ta en 5 the defendants ConchitaMcLachlin, Loren o &uitco, 2r., !a ina &uitco, Rafael &uitco and Marcela &uitco,from the decision of the Court of irst (nstance of "ccidental Ne0ros, the dis*ositive*art of hich reads

or the fore0oin0 considerations, the court renders 9ud0ment in this case declarin0%na &uitco Ledesma an ac no led0ed natural dau0hter of the deceased Loren o M.&uitco, for le0al *ur*oses, ut a solvin0 the defendants as to the *ra5er in the :rstcause of action that the said %na &uitco Ledesma e declared entitled to share inthe *ro*erties left 5 the deceased #use io &uitco.

%s to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to *a5 to the*lainti+ !ocorro Ledesma, 9ointl5 and severall5, onl5 the sum of one thousand :ve

hundred *esos;P, ith le0al interest thereon from the :lin0 of this com*laintuntil full5 *aid. No *ronouncement is made as to the costs. !o ordered.

(n su**ort of their a**eal, the a**ellants assi0n the follo in0 errors alle0edl5committed 5 the trial court in its aforesaid decision


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u*on his death, administration *roceedin0s of said *ro*erties ere instituted in thiscourt, the said case ein0 no n as the D(ntestate of the deceased #use io &uitco,Dcivil case No. 6< 3 of this court.

'*on the institution of the intestate of the deceased #use io &uitco and thea**ointment of the committee on claims and a**raisal, the *lainti+ !ocorroLedesma, on %u0ust @6, , and as the -onora le 2ose Lo*e 1ito, *residin0 over the irst/ranch, returned said consulta and refrained from 0ivin0 his o*inion thereon;#?hi it C>, the aforesaid commissioners on claims and a**raisal, alle0in0 lac of

9urisdiction to *ass u*on the claim, denied he same ;#?hi it ->.

"n Novem er


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*rovided in section 64@ of the Code of Civil Procedure, authori in0 a creditor toinstitute said case throu0h the a**ointment of an administrator for the *ur*ose of collectin0 his credit. More than ten 5ears havin0 thus ela*sed from the e?*iration of the *eriod for the *a5ment of said de t of P


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efore the committee on claims and a**raisal, a**ointed in the intestate of hisfather, and the *ro*ertiesinherited from the latter 5 the children of said deceaseddo not ans er for the *a5ment of the inde tedness contracted durin0 the lifetime of said *erson.

Eherefore, the a**ealed 9ud0ment is reversed, and the defendants are a solvedfrom the com*laint, ith the costs to the a**ellees. !o ordered.

G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951

In the Matter of the wi of !N"#R$ M#R%!&$, 'e(ea)e'. R$*!RI$ G!R%I!, petitioner,vs.+ LI!N! L!% #*"!, #" !L., respondents.

Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.

!R!*, C.J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercadodated January 3, 19 3. The will is written in the !locano dialect and contains the following attestation

clause"

#e, the undersigned, $y these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of AnteroMercado was signed $y himself and also $y us $elow his name and of this attestation clauseand that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. %age three the continuation of thisattestation clause& this will is written in !locano dialect which is spo'en and understood $y thetestator, and it $ears the corresponding num$er in letter which compose of three pages andall them were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in thepresence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.

!n testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousandnine hundred forty three, (19 3) A.*.

(+gd.) -M /!A 0 A 2 !+TA (+gd.) 4/0+ *A C0/T +

(+gd.) 5!5!A A ! 2!5


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The will appears to have $een signed $y Atty. 6lorentino Javier who wrote the name of AnteroMercado, followed $elow $y 4A reugo del testator4 and the name of 6lorentino Javier. AnteroMercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals,reversing the 7udgement of the Court of 6irst !nstance of !locos orte, ruled that the attestationclause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at theend of the will $y Atty. 6lorentino Javier at the e8press re uest of the testator in the presence of the

testator and each and every one of the witnesses& (:) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator $y Atty. Javier at the former;s re uest said testator has written a cross at the end of hisname and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof& (3)to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of thetestator and of each other.

!n our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercadocaused Atty. 6lorentino Javier to write the testator;s name under his e8press direction, as re uired $ysection


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G "I#RR# , +R. J.

This is a petition for review of the orders issued $y the Court of 6irst !nstance of +outhern eyte,5ranch !!!, in +pecial %roceedings o. /B1 13, entitled 4!n the Matter of the %etition for %ro$ate ofthe #ill of *orotea %ere>, *eceased& Apolonio Ta$oada, %etitioner4, which denied the pro$ate of the

will, the motion for reconsideration and the motion for appointment of a special administrator.

!n the petition for pro$ate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last willand testament of the late *orotea %ere>. #ritten in the Ce$uanoB isayan dialect, the will consists oftwo pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or$ottom of the page $y the testatri8 alone and at the left hand margin $y the three (3) instrumentalwitnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the ac'nowledgment issigned at the end of the attestation clause $y the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left handmargin $y the testatri8.

+ince no opposition was filed after the petitioner;s compliance with the re uirement of pu$lication,

the trial court commissioned the $ranch cler' of court to receive the petitioner;s evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner su$mitted his evidence and presented icente Tim'ang, one of thesu$scri$ing witnesses to the will, who testified on its genuineness and due e8ecution.

The trial court, thru then %residing Judge /amon C. %amatian issued the uestioned order denyingthe pro$ate of the will of *orotea %ere> for want of a formality in its e8ecution. !n the same order, thepetitioner was also re uired to su$mit the names of the intestate heirs with their correspondingaddresses so that they could $e properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement ofthe estate.

!nstead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and or

motion, e& parte praying for a thirtyBday period within which to deli$erate on any step to $e ta'en as aresult of the disallowance of the will. De also as'ed that the tenBday period re uired $y the court tosu$mit the names of intestate heirs with their addresses $e held in a$eyance.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the pro$ate of the will.Dowever, the motion together with the previous manifestation and or motion could not $e acted upon$y the Donora$le /amon C. %amatian due to his transfer to his new station at %asig, /i>al. The saidmotions or incidents were still pending resolution when respondent Judge Avelino +. /osal assumedthe position of presiding 7udge of the respondent court.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

+u$se uently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestationand or motion filed e& parte . !n the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of specialadministrator was li'ewise denied $ecause of the petitioner;s failure to comply with the orderre uiring him to su$mit the names of; the intestate heirs and their addresses.

The petitioner decided to file the present petition.


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6or the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article =@? of the Civil Code re uire that the testatri8and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at t$e end of the will and in the presenceof the testatri8 and of one anotherE

Article =@? of the Civil Code provides"

very will, other than a holographic will, must $e su$scri$ed at the end thereof $y thetestator himself or $y the testator;s name written $y some other person in hispresence, and $y his e8press direction, and attested and su$scri$ed $y three ormore credi$le witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person re uested $y him to write his name and the instrumentalwitnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,e8cept the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall $e num$ered correlativelyin letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the num$er of pages used upon which the will is written,and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused someother person to write his name, under his e8press direction, in the presence of theinstrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed the will and thepages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

!f the attestation clause is in a language not 'nown to the witnesses, it shall $einterpreted to the witnesses, it shall $e interpreted to them.

The respondent Judge interprets the a$oveB uoted provision of law to re uire that, for a notarial willto $e valid, it is not enough that only the testatri8 signs at the 4end4 $ut an the three su$scri$ing

witnesses must also sign at the same place or at t$e end , in the presence of the testatri8 and of oneanother $ecause the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself $ut also thesignature of the testator. !t is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will isfound, at the left hand margin of that page.

0n the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article =@? of the Civil Code does not ma'e it acondition precedent or a matter of a$solute necessity for the e8trinsic validity of the wig that thesignatures of the su$scri$ing witnesses should $e specifically located at the end of the wig after thesignature of the testatri8. De contends that it would $e a$surd that the legislature intended to placeso heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures are to $e found as longas this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and

the honest frailties of human nature.

#e find the petition meritorious.

-ndou$tedly, under Article =@? of the Civil Code, the will must $e su$scri$ed or signed at its end $ythe testator himself or $y the testator;s name written $y another person in his presence, and $y hise8press direction, and attested and su$scri$ed $y three or more credi$le witnesses in the presenceof the testator and of one another.


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!t must $e noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists inwitnessing the testator;s e8ecution of the will in order to see and ta'e note mentally that those thingsare, done which the statute re uires for the e8ecution of a will and that the signature of the testator e8ists as a fact. 0n the other hand, su$scription is the signing of the witnesses; names upon thesame paper for the purpose of !dentification of such paper as the will which was e8ecuted $y the

testator. (/agsdale v. Dill, :ales v.

2on>ales, 9@ %hil. , 9).

The law is to $e li$erally construed, 4the underlying and fundamental o$7ective permeating theprovisions on the law on wills in this pro7ect consists in the li$erali>ation of the manner of their e8ecution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in e8pressing his last wishes $utwith sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the e8ercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This o$7ective is in accord with themodern tendency in respect to the formalities in the e8ecution of a will4 ( #eport of t$e 'odecommission, p. 1@3).

%arenthetically, Judge /amon C. %amatian stated in his uestioned order that were not for the

defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient toesta$lish the validity of the will.

The o$7ects of attestation and of su$scription were fully met and satisfied in the present case whenthe instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all thetestamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly !dentified $y su$scri$ing witness

icente Tim'ang to $e the same will e8ecuted $y the testatri8. There was no uestion of fraud or su$stitution $ehind the uestioned order.

#e have e8amined the will in uestion and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state thenum$er of pages used in writing the will. This would have $een a fatal defect were it not for the fact

that, in this case, it is discerni$le from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of onlytwo pages duly signed $y the testatri8 and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the firstpage which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed $y the testatri8 at the endor at the $ottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which ismar'ed as 4%agina dos4 comprises the attestation clause and the ac'nowledgment. Theac'nowledgment itself states that 4This ast #ill and Testament consists of two pages including thispage4.


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!n "ingson v. Florentino, et al. (9: %hil. 1e the testatri8 on account of the inadvertence of asingle witness over whose conduct she had no control where the purpose of the lawto guarantee the !dentity of the testament and its component pages is sufficientlyattained, no intentional or deli$erate deviation e8isted, and the evidence on recordattests to the fun o$servance of the statutory re uisites. 0therwise, as stated in da.de 2il. s. Murciano, 9 0ff. 2a>. 1 ?9, at 1 9 (decision on reconsideration);witnesses may sa$otage the will $y muddling or $ungling it or the attestation clause.

#D / 60/ , the present petition is here$y granted. The orders of the respondent court whichdenied the pro$ate of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of pro$ate, and the motionfor appointment of a special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow thepro$ate of the wig and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this decision. opronouncement on costs.

+0 0/* / *.


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2./. o. B? 919, May 3@, 19=

2 /A /- " imited 7urisdiction of the pro$ate court

GC %T!0 " #here practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will $e passedupon, even $efore it is pro$ated, the court should meet the issues.

6ACT+"

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Dermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, enita %aguia,/emedios ope>, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir isDermogenes, he e8ecuted an Affidavit of Ad7udication, ad7udicating unto himself the entire estate of

Adoracion.

ater that same year, enita filed a petition for repro$ate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an American citi>en and that the will was e8ecuted in teh -+. Adoracion died inManila while temporarily residing in Malate.

#hile this case was still pending, Dermogenes died and left a will, appointing %olly Cayetano as thee8ecutri8. Dence, this case.

!++- s" #hether or not the will was valid

#hether or not the court has 7urisdiction over pro$ate proceedings

D *" As a general rule, the pro$ate court;s authority is limited only to the e8trinsic validity of thewill, the due e8ecution thereof, the testatri8;s testamentary capacity and the compliance with there uisites or solemnities prescri$ed $y law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the courthas declared that the will has $een duly authenticated. Dowever, where practical considerations


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!ssue" #hether or not the failure of one of the su$scri$ing witnesses to affi8 his signature to a pageis sufficient to deny pro$ate of the will

/- ! 2" o, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. +ince theduplicated $ore the re uired signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. ven if theoriginal is in e8istence, a duplicate may still $e admitted to pro$ate since the original is deemed to $edefective, then in law, there is no other will $u the duly signed car$on duplicate and the same can $epro$ated.

The law should not $e strictly and literally interpreted as to penali>e the testatri8 on account of the

inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. #here the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is nointentional or deli$erate deviation e8isted.

ote that this ruling should not $e ta'en as a departure from the rules that the will should $e signed$y the witnesses on every page. The car$on copy duplicate was regular in all respects.

2./. o. B @:@ +eptem$er :=, 19=

/0+A H. HA A#, petitioner,

vs.

D0 . J-*2 5 JAM! / 0 A, %residing Judge of the C6! of 5atangas, 5ranch !, ipa City,and 2/ 20/!0 H. HA A#, respondents.

eandro D. 6ernande> for petitioner.

Antonio Fuintos and Jose M. Iacat for respondents.


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M C!0BD // /A, J."

0n +eptem$er 1, 19 1, private respondent 2/ 20/!0 H. HA A#, claiming to $e the sole heir of his deceased sister, atividad H. Halaw, filed a petition $efore the Court of 6irst !nstance of 5atangas, 5ranch !, ipa City, for the pro$ate of her holographic #ill e8ecuted on *ecem$er : ,19


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January :9, 19:

2./. o. :


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found after his death. !t will not $e presumed that such will has $een destroyed $y any other personwithout the 'nowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation $y the testator, while varying greatly, $eing wea' or strong according to thecircumstances, is never conclusive, $ut may $e overcome $y proof that the will was not destroyed $ythe testator with intent to revo'e it.

!n view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not $e found after the death of the testator MiguelMamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had $een cancelled, we are forced to theconclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence.!n a proceeding to pro$ate a will the $urden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to esta$lish notonly its e8ecution $ut its e8istence. Daving proved its e8ecution $y the proponents, the $urden is onthe contestant to show that it has $een revo'ed. !n a great ma7ority of instances in which wills aredestroyed for the purpose of revo'ing them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should $e

admitted $y the courts with great caution. #hen it is proven, however, $y proper testimony that a willwas e8ecuted in duplicate and each copy was e8ecuted with all the formalities and re uirements of the law, then the duplicate may $e admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the originalhas $een lost and was not cancelled or destroyed $y the testator. (5orromeo vs. Cas ui7o, 2./. o.: aw 0ffice for petitioners.


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Ceni>a, /ama Associates for private respondents.

% A A, J."

!. 6ACT+"

This is a case of hereditary succession.

Alvaro %astor, +r. (%A+T0/, +/.), a +panish su$7ect, died in Ce$u City on June ?, 19


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0n *ecem$er , 19 @, F- MA*A as special administrator, instituted against %A+T0/, J/. and hiswife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the propertiessu$7ect of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses %A+T0/, J/. and his wife, Maria

lena Achaval de %astor, who claimed to $e the owners thereof in their own rights, and not $yinheritance. The action, doc'eted as Civil Case o. : B/, was filed with the Court of 6irst !nstance

of Ce$u, 5ranch !G.

0n 6e$ruary :, 19 1, %A+T0/, J/. and his sister +06!A filed their opposition to the petition for pro$ate and the order appointing F- MA*A as special administrator.

0n *ecem$er ?, 19 :, the %/05AT C0-/T issued an order allowing the will to pro$ate. Appealedto the Court of Appeals in CAB2./. o. ?:9


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:. . %elae>, +r. ...................................1?.@N

3. 5. Fuemada ....................................... .?N

0n August :@, 19=@, while the reconveyance suit was still $eing litigated in 5ranch !G of the Court of 6irst !nstance of Ce$u, the %/05AT C0-/T issued the now assailed 0rder of 8ecution and2arnishment, resolving the uestion of ownership of the royalties paya$le $y AT A+ and ruling ineffect that the legacy to F- MA*A was not inofficious. KThere was a$solutely no statement or claimin the 0rder that the %ro$ate 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 : had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.L

The order of August :@, 19=@ found that as per the holographic will and a written ac'nowledgment of %A+T0/, J/. dated June 1 , 19ed to retain ?N for himself as legatee and to deposit :?N with a reputa$le$an'ing institution for payment of the estate ta8es and other o$ligations of the estate. The 33Nshare of %A+T0/, J/. and or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated

legacy of F- MA*A from the time of %A+T0/, +/.;s death, which amounted to over two millionpesos.

The order $eing 4immediately e8ecutory4, F- MA*A succeeded in o$taining a #rit of 8ecutionand 2arnishment on +eptem$er , 19=@, and in serving the same on AT A+ on the same day.

otified of the 0rder on +eptem$er


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assailed the 0rder dated August :@, 19=@ and the writ of e8ecution and garnishment issuedpursuant thereto. The petition was denied on ovem$er 1=, 19=@ on the grounds (1) that its filingwas premature $ecause the Motion for /econsideration of the uestioned 0rder was still pendingdetermination $y the %/05AT C0-/T& and (:) that although 4the rule that a motion for reconsideration is prere uisite for an action for certiorari is never an a$solute rule,4 the 0rder

assailed is 4legally valid. 4

0n *ecem$er 9, 19=@, %A+T0/, J/. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal;sdecision of ovem$er 1=, 19=@, calling the attention of the appellate court to another order of the%ro$ate Court dated ovem$er 11, 19=@ (i.e., while their petition for certiorari was pending decisionin the appellate court), $y which the oppositors; motion for reconsideration of the %ro$ate Court;s0rder of August :@, 19=@ was denied. KThe ovem$er 11 0rder declared that the uestions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had $eenfinally ad7udicated $y the final and e8ecutory 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 :, as affirmed $y the Court of

Appeals and the +upreme Court, there$y rendering moot and academic the suit for reconveyancethen pending in the Court of 6irst !nstance of Ce$u, 5ranch !G. !t clarified that only the 33N share of %A+T0/, J/. in the royalties (less than .?N share which he had assigned to F- MA*A $efore%A+T0/, +/. died) was to $e garnished and that as regards %A+T0/, +/.;s :N share, what wasordered was 7ust the transfer of its possession to the custody of the %/05AT C0-/T through thespecial administrator. 6urther, the 0rder granted F- MA*A


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0n 0cto$er 1=, 19=:, the Court (6irst *ivision) adopted a resolution stating that 4the petition in factand in effect was given due course when this case was heard on the merits on +eptem$er , (should$e 0cto$er :1, 19=1) and concise memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments on the meritsof the case were filed $y the parties pursuant to the resolution of 0cto$er :1, 19=1 . . . 4 and deniedin a resolution dated *ecem$er 13, 19=:, private respondent;s 40mni$us motion to set aside

resolution dated 0cto$er 1=, 19=: and to su$mit the matter of due course to the presentmem$ership of the *ivision& and to reassign the case to another ponente.4

-pon Motion for /econsideration of the 0cto$er 1=, 19=: and *ecem$er 13, 19=: /esolutions, theCourt en $anc resolved to C0 6!/M the uestioned resolutions insofar as hey resolved that thepetition in fact and in effect had $een given due course.

!!. !++- +"

Assailed $y the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the 0rder of e8ecution andgarnishment dated August :@, 19=@ as well as the 0rders su$se uently issued allegedly toimplement the %ro$ate 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 :, to wit" the 0rder of ovem$er 11, 19=@declaring that the %ro$ate 0rder of 19 : indeed resolved the issues of ownership and intrinsicvalidity of the will, and reiterating the 0rder of 8ecution dated August :@, 19=@& and the 0rder of *ecem$er 1 , 19=@ reducing to %:,:?1,?1


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course, the uestion assumes that F- MA*A;s entitlement to the legacy was finally ad7udged in the%ro$ate 0rder.

0n the merits, therefore, the $asic issue is whether the %ro$ate 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 : resolvedwith finality the uestions of ownership and intrinsic validity. A negative finding will necessarily render moot and academic the other issues raised $y the parties, such as the 7urisdiction of the %ro$ateCourt to conclusively resolve title to property, and the constitutionality and repercussions of a rulingthat the mining properties in dispute, although in the name of %A+T0/, J/. and his wife, really$elonged to the decedent despite the latter;s constitutional dis ualification as an alien.

0n the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail thevalidity of the order of e8ecution and the implementing writ.

!!!. *!+C-++!0 "

1. !ssue of 0wnership O

(a) !n a special proceeding for the pro$ate of a will, the issue $y and large is restricted to thee8trinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, $eing of sound mind, freely e8ecuted the will inaccordance with the formalities prescri$ed $y law. (/ules of Court, /ule ?, +ection 1& /ule vs. Court of Appeals, 91 +C/A ? @.L

($) The rule is that e8ecution of a 7udgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive partof the decision. (%hilippineBAmerican !nsurance Co. vs. Donora$le 6lores, 9 +C/A =11.) Dowever,in case of am$iguity or uncertainty, the $ody of the decision may $e scanned for guidance inconstruing the 7udgment. (Deirs of %resto vs. 2alang, = +C/A ?3 & 6a$ular vs. Court of Appeals,119 +C/A 3:9& /o$les vs. Timario. 1@ %hil. =@9.)


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The 0rder sought to $e e8ecuted $y the assailed 0rder of e8ecution is the %ro$ate 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 : which allegedly resolved the uestion of ownership of the disputed miningproperties. The said %ro$ate 0rder enumerated the issues $efore the %ro$ate Court, thus"

-nmista'a$ly, there are three aspects in these proceedings" (1) the pro$ate of the holographic will(:) the intestate estate aspect& and (3) the administration proceedings for the purported estate of thedecedent in the %hilippines.

!n its $road and total perspective the whole proceedings are $eing impugned $y the oppositors on 7urisdictional grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent;s residence and e8istence of properties in the%hilippines have not $een esta$lished.

+pecifically placed in issue with respect to the pro$ate proceedings are" (a) whether or not theholographic will ( 8hi$it 4J4) has lost its efficacy as the last will and testament upon the death of

Alvaro %astor, +r. on June ?, 19


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solemnities prescri$ed $y law. et, therefore, a certificate of its allowance $e prepared $y the 5ranchCler' of this Court to $e signed $y this %residing Judge, and attested $y the seal of the Court, andthereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and recorded $y the cler'. et attestedcopies of the will and of the certificate of allowance thereof $e sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining *evelopment Corporation, 2oodrich 5ldg., Ce$u City, and the /egister of *eeds of Ce$u or of

Toledo City, as the case may $e, for recording.

($) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of administration for as amatter of fact, no regular e8ecutor and or administrator has $een appointed up to this time and B theappointment of a special administrator was, and still is, 7ustified under the circumstances to ta'epossession and charge of the estate of the deceased in the %hilippines (particularly in Ce$u) untilthe pro$lems causing the delay are decided and the regular e8ecutor and or administrator appointed.

(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later on an e8ecutor and or administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court;s declaration that the oppositors are theforced heirs and the petitioner is merely vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the e8tent of the $ounty given to him (under) the will insofar as the same will not pre7udice the legitimes of theoppositor for the following reasons"

1. To su$mit a complete inventory of the estate of the decedentBtestator Alvaro %astor, +r.

:. To administer and to continue to put to prolific utili>ation of the properties of the decedent&

3. To 'eep and maintain the houses and other structures and $elonging to the estate, since theforced heirs are residing in +pain, and prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good order after partition and when directed $y the Court, $ut only after the payment of estate and inheritance ta8es&

(d) +u$7ect to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real andpersonal properties in Civil Case o. : BT $efore 5ranch !G of the Court of 6irst !nstance of Ce$u,the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it is duly proven $y theoppositors that de$ts of the decedent have already $een paid, that there had $een an e8tra7udicialpartition or summary one $etween the forced heirs, that the legacy to $e given and delivered to thepetitioner does not e8ceed the free portion of the estate of the testator, that the respective shares of


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the forced heirs have $een fairly apportioned, distri$uted and delivered to the two forced heirs of Alvaro %astor, +r., after deducting the property willed to the petitioner, and the estate and inheritanceta8es have already $een paid to the 2overnment thru the 5ureau of !nternal /evenue.

The suita$ility and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special administrator or administrator of the other properties of the estate of the decedent, which properties are not directly or indirectlyaffected $y the provisions of the holographic will (such as $an' deposits, land in Mactan etc.), will $eresolved in another order as separate incident, considering that this order should have $een properlyissued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will.( mphasis supplied.)

owhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. 0n the

contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. 6or it confined itself to the uestionof e8trinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator.Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win 4with respect to its e8trinsic validity, the samehaving $een duly authenticated pursuant to the re uisites or solemnities prescri$ed $y law.4 !tdeclared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed 4 su$7ect to the outcome of thesuit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case: BT $efore 5ranch !G of the C6! of Ce$u.4 K%arenthetically, although the statement refers only tothe 4intestate4 aspect, it defies understanding how ownership $y the estate of some properties could$e deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, $ut not so for intestate purposes.Can the estate $e the owner of a property for testate $ut not for intestate purposesEL Then again, the%ro$ate 0rder (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated

that the intestate administration aspect must proceed 4unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to$e given and delivered to the petitioner does not e8ceed the free portion of the estate of thetestator,4 which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity)was in fact not resolved. 6inally, the %ro$ate 0rder did not rule on the propriety of allowingF- MA*A to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered $y the holographicwill, 4considering that this (%ro$ate) 0rder should have $een properly issued solely as a resolutionon the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. 4

(c) That the %ro$ate 0rder did not resolve the uestion of ownership of the properties listed in

the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very su$7ect of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in 5ranch !G of the Court of 6irst !nstanceof Ce$u.

(d) #hat, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the +upreme Court affirmed en totowhen they reviewed the %ro$a$le 0rder were only the matters properly ad7udged in the said 0rder.


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(e) !n an attempt to 7ustify the issuance of the 0rder of e8ecution dated August :@, 19=@, the%ro$ate Court in its 0rder of ovem$er 11, 19=@ e8plained that the $asis for its conclusion that the

uestion of ownership had $een formally resolved $y the %ro$ate 0rder of 19 : are the findings in

the latter 0rder that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he was receiving royalties from AT A+&(:) he had resided in the %hilippines since preBwar days and was engaged in the mine prospecting$usiness since 193 particularly in the City of Toledo& and (3) %A+T0/, J/. was only acting asdummy for his father $ecause the latter was a +paniard.

5ased on the premises laid, the conclusion is o$viously farBfetched.

(f) !t was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing 0rders to conclude that the %ro$ate0rder ad7udged with finality the uestion of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, andthat, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said %ro$ate 0rder directed thespecial administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

:. !ssue of !ntrinsic alidity of the Dolographic #ill B

(a) #hen %A+T0/, +/. died in 19


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(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the de$ts of the decedentand his estate. !ndeed, it was only in the %ro$ate 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 : where the %ro$ateCourt ordered thatB

... a notice $e issued and pu$lished pursuant to the provisions of /ule =< of the /ules of Court,re uiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the5ranch Cler' of this Court.4

(d) or had the estate ta8 $een determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of *ecem$er ?,19 :.

(e) The net assets of the estate not having $een determined, the legitime of the forced heirs inconcrete figures could not $e ascertained.

(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possi$le to determine whether thelegacy of F- MA*A B a fi8ed share in a specific property rather than an ali uot part of the entire netestate of the deceased B would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

(g) 6inally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. !t was o$viously for this reason that as late as March ?, 19=@ B more than years after the%ro$ate 0rder was issued the %ro$ate Court scheduled on March :?, 19=@ a hearing on the intrinsicvalidity of the will.

3. %ropriety of certiorari O

%rivate respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of thedisputed 0rder of e8ecution. De contends that the error, if any, is one of 7udgment, not 7urisdiction,and properly correcti$le only $y appeal, not certiorari.


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-nder the circumstances of the case at $ar, the challenge must $e re7ected. 2rave a$use of discretion amounting to lac' of 7urisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the pro$ate courtto $e overloo'ed or condoned.

(a) #ithout a final, authoritative ad7udication of the issue as to what properties compose theestate of %A+T0/, +/. in the face of conflicting claims made $y heirs and a nonBheir (MA. A

ACDA A * %A+T0/) involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the a$sence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in uestion, there was no $asis for the %ro$ateCourt to hold in its %ro$ate 0rder of 19 :, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to thepayment of the uestioned legacy. Therefore, the 0rder of 8ecution of August :@, 19=@ and thesu$se uent implementing orders for the payment of F- MA*A;s legacy, in alleged implementationof the dispositive part of the %ro$ate 0rder of *ecem$er ?, 19 :, must fall for lac' of $asis.

($) The ordered payment of legacy would $e violative of the rule re uiring prior li uidation of theestate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all de$tsand e8penses, $efore apportionment and distri$ution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.(5ernardo vs. Court of Appeals, +C/A 3< .)

(c) either has the estate ta8 $een paid on the estate of %A+T0/, +/. %ayment therefore of thelegacy to F- MA*A would collide with the provision of the ational !nternal /evenue Codere uiring payment of estate ta8 $efore delivery to any $eneficiary of his distri$utive share of the

estate (+ection 1@ KcL)

(d) The assailed order of e8ecution was unauthori>ed, having $een issued purportedly under /ule ==, +ection < of the /ules of Court which reads"

+ec.


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The a$ove provision clearly authori>es e8ecution to enforce payment of de$ts of estate. A legacy isnot a de$t of the estate& indeed, legatees are among those against whom e8ecution is authori>ed to$e issued.

... there is merit in the petitioners; contention that the pro$ate court generally cannot issue a writ of e8ecution. !t is not supposed to issue a writ of e8ecution $ecause its orders usually refer to thead7udication of claims against the estate which the e8ecutor or administrator may satisfy without thenecessity of resorting to a writ of e8ecution. The pro$ate court, as such, does not render any

7udgment enforcea$le $y e8ecution.

The circumstances that the /ules of Court e8pressly specifies that the pro$ate court may issuee8ecution (a) to satisfy (de$ts of the estate out of) the contri$utive shares of devisees, legatees and

heirs in possession of the decedent;s assets (+ec.


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the petition for certiorari states against re uiring her to go through the cum$ersome procedure of as'ing for leave to intervene in the pro$ate proceedings to ena$le her, if leave is granted, to appealfrom the challenged order of e8ecution which has ordered the immediate transfer and or garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which she is the duly registeredowner and or grantee together with her hus$and. +he could not have intervened $efore the issuance

of the assailed orders $ecause she had no valid ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties su$7ect of the e8ecution was then still $eing litigated in another court in areconveyance suit filed $y the special administrator of the estate of %A+T0/, +/.

i'ewise, at the time petitioner %A+T0/, J/. Med the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,appeal was not availa$le to him since his motion for reconsideration of the e8ecution order was stillpending resolution $y the %ro$ate Court. 5ut in the face of actual garnishment of their ma7or sourceof income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. Theyneeded prompt relief from the in7urious effects of the e8ecution order. -nder the circumstances,

recourse to certiorari was the feasi$le remedy.

#D / 60/ , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA 2./. o. +%B113 3B/ is reversed. The0rder of e8ecution issued $y the pro$ate Court dated August :@, 19=@, as well as all the 0rdersissued su$se uent thereto in alleged implementation of the %ro$ate 0rder dated *ecem$er ?, 19 :,particularly the 0rders dated ovem$er 11, 19=@ and *ecem$er 1 , 19=@, are here$y set aside& andthis case is remanded to the appropriate /egional Trial Court for proper proceedings, su$7ect to the

7udgment to $e rendered in Civil Case o. : B/.

+0 0/* / *.

*ecem$er :9, 19 3

2./. o. == @

/ +T0 M. 2- A/A, petitionerBappellant,

vs.

/0+A/!0 2- A/A and her hus$and % */0 5-!+0 , respondentBappellees.


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The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following manner"

(d). O Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arri$a descrito, de la e8tension superficial apro8imadade ciento veintinueve (1:9) hectareas setenta ( @) areas, y veiticinco (:?) centiares, con todas susme7oras e8istentes en la misma, de7o y distri$uyo, proBindiviso, a mis siguientes herederos comosigue"

A mi hi7o legitimo, rnesto M. 2uevara, ciento ocho (1@=) hectareas, ocho (=) areas y cincuenta ycuatro (? ) centiareas, hacia la parte ue colinda al 0este de las cien (1@@) hectareas referidas enel inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento, como su propiedad a$soluta y e8clusiva, en la cual

e8tension superficial estan incluidas cuarenta y tres ( 3) hectareas, veintitres (:3) areas y cuarentay dos ( :) centiareas ue le doy en concepto de me7ora.

A mi hi7a natural reconocida, /osario 2uevara, veintiun (:1) hectareas, sesenta y un (a. I una ve> legali>ado este testamento, y en cuanto sea posi$le, es mideseo, ue los herederos y legatarios a ui nom$rados se repartan e8tra7udicialmente mis $ienes deconformidad con mis disposiciones arri$a consignadas.

+u$se uently, and on July 1:, 1933, ictorino . 2uevarra e8ecuted where$y he conveyed to himthe southern half of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed $y the will a$ovementioned, inconsideration of the sum of %1 and other valua$le considerations, among which werethe payment of all his de$ts and o$ligations amounting to not less than %1


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0n +eptem$er : , 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case o. 1?1of the Court of 6irst !nstance of %angasinan, and pursuant thereto original certificate of title o.?1


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!

#e cannot sanction the procedure adopted $y the respondent /osario 2uevara, it $eing in our

opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will andtestament of the decedent. The Code of Civil %rocedure, which was in force up to the time this casewas decided $y the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions"

+ec.


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The foregoing provisions are now em$odied in /ule < of the new /ules of Court, which too' effecton July 1, 19 @.

The proceeding for the pro$ate of a will is one in rem, with notice $y pu$lication to the whole worldand with personal notice to each of the 'nown heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (sectioned and given effect $y means of a certificate of its allowance, signed $y the 7udge and attested $y the seal of the court& and when thewill devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must $erecorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (+ection 1:, /ule , andsection


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+ection 1. 8tra7udicial settlement $y agreement $etween heirs. O !f the decedent left no de$ts andthe heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented $y their 7udicial guardians, theparties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they

see fit $y means of a pu$lic instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should theydisagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. !f there is only one heir or one legatee, hemay ad7udicate to himself the entire estate $y means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. !t shall $e presumed that the decedent left no de$ts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.

That is a modification of section ?9< of the Code of Civil %rocedure, which reads as follows"

+ec. ?9es the e8tra7udicial or 7udicialpartition of the estate of a decedent 4without securing letter of administration.4 !t does not say that incase the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves withoutthe necessity of presenting the will to the court for pro$ate. The petition to pro$ate a will and thepetition to issue letters of administration are two different things, altho $oth may $e made in thesame case. the allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration(section , /ule =). 0ne can have a will pro$ated without necessarily securing letters testamentary

or of administration. #e hold that under section 1 of /ule , in relation to /ule


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attempted to $e done in the instant case. A$sent legatees and devisees, or such of them as mayhave no 'nowledge of the will, could $e cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of theheirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the e8clusion of others.

!n the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants hadreceived their respective legacies or that they had 'nowledge of the e8istence and of the provisionsof the will. Their right under the will cannot $e disregarded, nor may those rights $e o$literated onaccount of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for pro$ate.

ven if the decedent left no de$ts and no$dy raises any uestion as to the authenticity and duee8ecution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with thatwill without first securing its allowance or pro$ate $y the court, first, $ecause the law e8pressly

provides that 4no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in theproper court4& and, second, $ecause the pro$ate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot $edispensed with the su$stituted $y any other proceeding, 7udicial or e8tra7udicial, without offendingagainst pu$lic policy designed to effectuate the testator;s right to dispose of his property $y will inaccordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the meansprovided $y law, among which are the pu$lication and the personal notices to each and all of saidheirs and legatees. or may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such anaction for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.

#e therefore $elieve and so hold that section 1 of /ule , relied upon $y the Court of Appeals,does not sanction the procedure adopted $y the respondent.

The case of eaQo vs. eaQo (:? %hil., 1=@), cited $y the Court of Appeals, li'e section 1 of /ule ,sanctions the e8tra7udicial partition $y the heirs of the properties left $y a decedent, $ut not thenonpresentation of a will for pro$ate. !n that case one %aulina er e8ecuted a will on 0cto$er 11,19@:, and died on ovem$er 1, 19@:. Der will was presented for pro$ate on ovem$er 1@, 19@:,and was approved and allowed $y the Court on August 1


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The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in deciding that the heirsand legatees of the estate of *Qa. %aulina er had voluntarily divided the estate among themselves.

K2./. o. 1 1==:. March 11, :@@?L

J. .T. A2/0, ! C., represented $y its Manager, J- !A . T +, petitioner, vs. A T0 !05A A +A2 and D! A/!A CA*AI*AI, respondents.

* C ! + ! 0

T! 2A, J."

0nce again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims $etween two sets ofheirs, a conflict ironically made grievous $y the fact that the decedent in this case had resorted togreat lengths to allocate which properties should go to which set of heirs.

This is a /ule ? petition assailing the *ecisionK1L dated 3@ +eptem$er 1999 of the Court of Appealswhich reversed the *ecisionK:L dated May 1993 of the /egional Trial Court (/TC), 5ranch ?, of5ais City, egros 0riental.

The factual antecedents follow.

*on Julian . Teves (*on Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia 5aena (Antonia), andafter her death, with Milagros *onio Teves (Milagros *onio). *on Julian had two children with

Antonia, namely" Josefa Teves scaQo (Josefa) and milio Teves ( milio). De had also four ( )children with Milagros *onio, namely" Maria velyn *onio Teves (Maria velyn), Jose Catalino*onio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros /eyes Teves (Milagros /eyes) and %edro /eyes Teves

(%edro).K3L

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fiftyBfour (9? ) s uaremeters, 'nown as ot o.


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scaQo v. Julian Teves, milio 5. Teves, et al.SK L Milagros *onio, the second wife of *on Julian,participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise

AgreementK?L which em$odied the partition of all the properties of *on Julian.

0n the $asis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of 6irst !nstance(C6!) of egros 0riental, 1:th Judicial *istrict, rendered a *ecisionK


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Meanwhile, Milagros *onio and her children had immediately ta'en possession over the su$7ect lotafter the e8ecution of the Compromise Agreement. !n 19 , they entered into a yearly leaseagreement with spouses Antonio 5alansag and Dilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.K1 L 0n ot

o.


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The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation ofparagraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.K:@L !t added that the direct ad7udication of theproperties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of *on Julian and his two children$y the first marriage, Josefa and milio.K:1L %aragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the

terms of the ad7udication in favor of *on Julian and his two children $y the first marriage.

According to the trial court, the properties ad7udicated in favor of Josefa and milio comprised theirshares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of *on Julian upon the latterVs death. Thus, upon *on JulianVs death, Josefa and milio could notclaim any share in his estate, e8cept their proper share in the Dacienda Medalla Milagrosa whichwas ad7udicated in favor of *on Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the propertiesad7udicated in favor of *on Julian, e8cept Dacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forcedlegitimary rights of Josefa and milio, and *on Julian was under no impediment to allocate thesu$7ect lot, among his other properties, to Milagros *onio and her four ( ) children.K::L

The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words Rshall $e,S the ad7udication in favor ofMilagros *onio and her four ( ) children was not final and operative, as the lot was still su$7ect tofuture disposition $y *on Julian during his lifetime.K:3L !t cited paragraph 1 K: L of the Compromise

Agreement in support of his conclusion.K:?L #ith ot o.


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#ith costs against defendant J. .T. Agro, !nc. represented $y its Manager, Julian . Teves.

+0 0/* / *.K:=L

%er the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in C6! decision dated 31 January19< , particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, ad7udicated and reserved to *on JulianVs twosets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate e8cept as regards his (*on JulianVs) share inDacienda Medalla Milagrosa.K:9L The two sets of heirs ac uired full ownership and possession of theproperties respectively ad7udicated to them in the C6! decision and *on Julian himself could nolonger dispose of the same, including ot o.


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6or the inheritance to $e considered Rfuture,S the succession must not have $een opened at the timeof the contract.K3es a testator to partition inter vivos hisproperty, and distri$ute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor atestament, $ut an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revoca$le at any time $y


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premature if not irrelevant to spea' of preterition prior to the death of *on Julian in the a$sence of awill depriving a legal heir of his legitime. 5esides, there are other properties which the heirs from thesecond marriage could inherit from *on Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in theCompromise Agreement are indicative of *on JulianVs desire along this line.K =L Dence, the totalomission from inheritance of *on JulianVs heirs from the second marriage, a re uirement forpreterition to e8ist, is hardly imagina$le as it is unfounded.

*espite the de$un'ing of respondentsV argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately riseor fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected $y *on Julian to petitioner. ota$ly, *on Julianwas also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa,was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohi$ition against such a transfer to a familycorporation. Iet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove

ot o. ed mode of signature.K?1L

The truth, however, is that the replacement of 0CT o. ?:@3 in the name of Julian $y T.C.T. o. TB3 ? is marred $y a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodo8,conventional and normal process esta$lished $y law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on theface of $oth titles. #here, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to securethe issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to $e presented to the /egistry of*eeds. This is evident from +ections ?3 and ? of %residential *ecree (%.*.) o. 1?:9 or the%roperty /egistration *ecree. The sections read, thus"

+ C. ?3. %resentation of ownerVs duplicate upon entry of new certificate. W o voluntary instrumentshall $e registered $y the /egister of *eeds unless the ownerVs duplicate certificate is presentedwith such instrument, e8cept in cases e8pressly provided for in this *ecree or upon order of thecourt, for cause shown. ( mphasis supplied)


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Acting *eputy /egister of *eeds !!

( mphasis supplied)K?:L

#hat the entry indicates is that the ownerVs duplicate of 0CT o. ?:@3 was lost, a petition for thereconstitution of the said ownerVs duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an order for thereconstitution of the ownerVs duplicate and its replacement with a new one. 5ut if the entry is to $e$elieved, the court concerned (C6!, according to the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a newtitle which is TCT o. TB3 ? although the original of 0CT o. ?:@3 on file with the /egistry of *eedshad not $een lost.

2oing $y the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order thereconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. +ince what was lost is the ownerVscopy of 0CT o. ?:@3, only that ownerVs copy could $e ordered replaced. Thus, the /egister of*eeds e8ceeded his authority in issuing not 7ust a reconstituted ownerVs copy of the originalcertificate of title $ut a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. 5ut if

the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of titleOeven designating the very num$er of the new transfer certificate of title itselfOthe order would $epatently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original of the0.C.T. which has not $een lost,K?3L as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss merelyof the ownerVs duplicate of the 0CT

Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to effect thetransfer of title to the su$7ect lot in its name, instead of the +upplemental *eed which should $e itsproper course of action. !t was so constrained to do $ecause the +upplemental *eed does notconstitute a deed of conveyance of the Rregistered land in fee simpleS Rin a form sufficient in law,S as

re uired $y +ection ? of %.*. o. 1?:9.

A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the +upplemental *eed discloses that the assignmentis not supported $y any consideration. The provision reads"

. . . .

#D / A+, in the *eed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of ia$ilities e8ecuted $yJulian . Teves, milio 5. Teves and Josefa T. scaQo at *umaguete City on 1


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#D / A+, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the *ecision made in the Court of 6irst!nstance of egros 0riental, 1:th Judicial *istrict 5ranch !!, on *ec. 31, 19< pertaining to CivilCase o. 3 3 the following properties were ad7udicated to *on Julian . Teves. #e uote.

6rom the properties at 5ais

Ad7udicated to *on Julian .Teves

. . . .

ot o.


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6inance Corporation, not of petitioner.K?=L Clearly, said mortgage, e8ecuted as it was in favor of the/eha$ilitation 6inance Corporation and there $eing no showing that petitioner itself paid off themortgate o$ligation, could not have $een the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.

Article 131= of the ew Civil Code enumerates the re uisites of a valid contract, namely" (1)consent of the contracting parties& (:) o$7ect certain which is the su$7ect matter of the contract& and(3) Cause of the o$ligation which is esta$lished.

Thus, Article 13?: declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effectwhatsoever. Those contracts lac' an essential element and they are not only voida$le $ut void orine8istent pursuant to Article 1 @9, paragraph (:).K?9L The a$sence of the usual recital ofconsideration in a transaction which normally should $e supported $y a consideration such as theassignment made $y *on Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the factthat the assignee is a corporation of which *on Julian himself was also the %resident and *irector,

forecloses the application of the presumption of e8istence of consideration esta$lished $y law.K


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!n the case at $ar, although the +upplemental *eed appears in a pu$lic document,K


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Camus and *elgado for appellee.

/0M-A * , J."

The partition of the estate left $y the deceased Joseph 2. 5rimo is in uestion in this case.

The 7udicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre 5rimo, one of the $rothers

of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositorBappellant assigns are"

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition& (:) denial of his participation in the inheritance& (3) thedenial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition& ( ) the approval of thepurchase made $y the %ietro ana of the deceased;s $usiness and the deed of transfer of said$usiness& and (?) the declaration that the Tur'ish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure

not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased;s $usinessto %ietro an>a until the receipt of the depositions re uested in reference to the Tur'ish laws.

The appellant;s opposition is $ased on the fact that the partition in uestion puts into effect theprovisions of Joseph 2. 5rimo;s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Tur'ishnationality, for which reason they are void as $eing in violation or article 1@ of the Civil Code which,among other things, provides the following"

evertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well asto the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall $eregulated $y the national law of the person whose succession is in uestion, whatever may $e thenature of the property or the country in which it may $e situated.

5ut the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not inaccordance with the Tur'ish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the


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Tur'ish laws are on the matter, and in the a$sence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to$e the same as those of the %hilippines. ( im and im vs. Collector of Customs, 3< %hil., :.)

!t has not $een proved in these proceedings what the Tur'ish laws are. De, himself, ac'nowledges itwhen he desires to $e given an opportunity to present evidence on this point& so much so that heassigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition untilthe receipt of certain testimony re uested regarding the Tur'ish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.!t is discretionary with the trial court, and, ta'ing into consideration that the oppositor was grantedample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no a$use of discretion on the part of thecourt in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of thetestator Joseph 2. 5rimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in uestion which, not $eingcontrary to our laws in force, must $e complied with and e8ecuted. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

!n regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the e8clusion of the herein appellant as alegatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must $e ta'en intoconsideration that such e8clusion is $ased on the last part of the second clause of the will, whichsays"

+econd. ! li'e desire to state that although $y law, ! am a Tur'ish citi>en, this citi>enship having $eenconferred upon me $y con uest and not $y free choice, nor $y nationality and, on the other hand,having resided for a considera$le length of time in the %hilippine !slands where ! succeeded inac uiring all of the property that ! now possess, it is my wish that the distri$ution of my property andeverything in connection with this, my will, $e made and disposed of in accordance with the laws inforce in the %hilippine islands, re uesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, ! annuland cancel $eforehand whatever disposition found in this will favora$le to the person or persons whofail to comply with this re uest.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legateesmust respect the testator;s will to distri$ute his property, not in accordance with the laws of hisnationality, $ut in accordance with the laws of the %hilippines.


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!f this condition as it is e8pressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as theherein oppositor who, $y his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,as e8pressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, $eing contrary to law, for article 9: of the civilCode provides the following"

!mpossi$le conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall $e considered as not imposedand shall not pre7udice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testatorotherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law $ecause it e8pressly ignores the testator;s national law when,according to article 1@ of the civil Code a$ove uoted, such national law of the testator is the one togovern his testamentary dispositions.

+aid condition then, in the light of the legal provisions a$ove cited, is considered unwritten, and theinstitution of legatees in said will is unconditional and conse uently valid and effective even as to theherein oppositor.

!t results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and tothe condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, $eing contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and re uests are perfectly valid andeffective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator;s national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distri$ution of this estate$e made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre 5rimo as one of the legatees,and the scheme of partition su$mitted $y the 7udicial administrator is approved in all other respects,without any pronouncement as to costs.

+o ordered.

2./. o. 1 9@1 ovem$er :=, :@@=


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A T /AIM- *0,petitioner,

vs.

T 06!+TA !+A20 *A. * +-A/ , *A ! 0 !. +-A/ , -6/0C! A +-A/ , MA/C 0 !.+-A/ , J/, I +-A/ , T A ., respondents.

* C ! + ! 0

ACD-/A, J."

This petition, filed under /ule


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#D / A+, the minors %!*!0, +-A/ , *A ! 0 +-A/ , I +-A/ , MA/C 0+-A/ , J/. and / 22! 0 +-A/ are represented herein $y -6/0C! A +. A */ +, inher capacity as the guardian and legal administrator of the property of the said minors&

#D / A+, there are no 'nown de$ts or financial o$ligations of whatever nature and amountagainst the estate of the deceased&

0#, TD / 60/ , in consideration of the foregoing premises, the %arties have agreed to settleand li uidate the assets of the con7ugal partnership $etween the deceased and T 06!+TA !+A20 ,and to settle and ad7udicate the estate of the said deceased, $y and pursuance to these presents, inthe following manner, to wit"

1. That T 06!+TA !+A20 , as the surviving spouse and partner of the deceased, shall receive ina$solute and e8clusive ownership the following properties as her lawful share in the assets of thecon7ugal partnership of gains $etween her and the deceased, to wit"

(a) Dalf (1 :) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered $y Ta8 *eclaration o. al&

($) Dalf (1 :) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered $y Ta8 *eclaration o. al&

(c) Dalf (1 :) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered $y TCT o. 3=:91, situated at5arrio /osario, Municipality of %asig, %rovince of /i>al&

(d) Dalf (1 :) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered $y TCT o. 3=:9@, situated at5arrio /osario, Municipality of %asig, %rovince of /i>al&

(e) T# TD0-+A * 6! D- */ * TD!/TI % +0+ A * ! TI (%1:,[email protected]@) depositedwith the Commercial 5an' and Trust Company of the %hilippines, and TD!/TIB ! % +0+(%39.@@) deposited with %rudential 5an'.


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:. That the %arties T 06!+TA !+A20 , -6/0C! A +. A */ +, %!*!0 +-A/ , *A ! 0+-A/ , I +-A/ , MA/C 0 +-A/ , J/. and / 22! 0 +-A/ , shall each andall receive and $e entitled to a share e uivalent to oneBseventh (1 ) of the estate of the deceasedMA/C 0 +-A/ , which estate is comprised of the following properties, to wit"

(a) A parcel of land covered $y TCT o. 3@al, with an assessed value of % ,1?@.@@.

($) Three (3) parcels of land covered $y TCT os. 339=:, 339=3 and 339= , situated at 5arrio%ineda, Municipality of %asig, %rovince of /i>al, with an assessed value of %?


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(h) T# TD0-+A * (1:,@@@) shares of stoc' of the Consolidated Mines, !nc. represented $yCertificate o. 1B?B5 (for 1,@@@ shares) and Certificate o. 1: 3< (for 11,@@@ shares).

%/0 !* *, that their title to the properties hereina$ove mentioned shall $e in common and theshare of each heir $eing pro indiviso.

Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, e8plicitly identified in the 8tra7udicial+ettlement of state as forming part of Marcelo;s and !sagon;s property regime, remained in thecouple;s name. ot surprisingly, Teofista continued to administer and manage these properties. 0nthe whole, apart from those now owned e8clusively $y Teofista, all the properties were held proindiviso $y Teofista and her children& and respective titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista asde facto administrator thereof.

!n 19 ?, /i>al /ealty Corporation (/i>al /ealty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (9@N)of the former;s shares of stoc', were sued $y petitioner alente /aymundo, his wife ioleta, irginia5anta and Maria Concepcion ito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for /escission of Contract and*amages, doc'eted as Civil Case os. :1 3< to :1 39. Thereafter, in 19 ?, the then Court of 6irst!nstance (C6!) of /i>al, 5ranch 1, rendered 7udgment" (1) rescinding the respective contracts ofplaintiffs with /i>al /ealty and Teofista, and (:) holding the two defendants solidarily lia$le toplaintiffs for damages in the aggregate principal amount of a$out % @,@@@.@@.9

#hen the 7udgment of the C6! $ecame final and e8ecutory, herein su$7ect properties were levied

and sold on e8ecution on June : , 19=3 to satisfy the 7udgment against Teofista and /i>al /ealty.The aforementioned plaintiffs were the highest $idder, and $ought the levied properties for theamount of %9 ,1 @.@@. As a result, a certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in theirfavor on August 1, 19=3. 0n July 31, 19= , the %rovincial +heriff of /i>al issued a final deed of saleover the su$7ect properties.

%arenthetically, $efore e8piration of the redemption period, or on June :1, 19= , herein respondentsfiled a revindicatory action against petitioner alente, ioleta, irginia and Maria Concepcion,doc'eted as Civil Case o. ?1:@3, for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownershipof the levied properties. ssentially, respondents alleged in their complaint that they cannot $e held

lia$le for the 7udgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having $een impleaded therein&and conse uently, the su$7ect properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither$e levied nor $e sold on e8ecution.

Meanwhile, the /TC, 5ranch 1?1, formerly the C6!, 5ranch 1, in Civil Case os. :13 < to :13 9,issued an 0rder1@ directing Teofista" (1) to vacate the su$7ect properties, (:) to desist fromdespoiling, dismantling, removing or alienating the improvements thereon, (3) to place petitioner


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0n the other litigation front concerning Civil Case o. ?1:@3, a writ of preliminary in7unction wasissued $y the /TC %asig, 5ranch 1??, on 6e$ruary :?, 19=?, en7oining petitioner alente, ioleta,

irginia and Maria Concepcion from transferring to third parties the levied properties $ased on itspreliminary finding that the auctioned properties are coBowned $y Teofista and herein respondents.

+u$se uently, however, Civil Case o. ?1:@3 was dismissed $y the /TC, 5ranch 1??, at theinstance of petitioner alente for failure of herein respondents to prosecute. 5ut in yet another turn of events, the /TC, 5ranch 1??, lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of aliassummons.

Thus, it was now petitioner alente;s, ioleta;s, irginia;s and Maria Concepcion;s turn to file apetition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the various orders of the /TC, 5ranch 1??, which allre7ected their $id to dismiss Civil Case o. ?1:@3. The CA granted their petition, thus"

And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of Teofista da. de +uare> andsupposedly not parties in Civil Case os. :13 < B :13 9 does not preclude the application of thedoctrine of res 7udicata since, apart from the re uisites constitutive of this procedural tenet, theywere admittedly the children of Teofista +uare>, who is the real partyBinBinterest in the previous final

7udgment. As successorsBinBinterest of Teofista +uare>, private respondents merely stepped into theshoes of their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property. erily, there is identity of parties, notonly where the parties in $oth actions are the same, $ut where there is privity with them as in thecases of successorsBinBinterest $y title su$se uent to the commencement of the action or wherethere is su$stantial identity.

6inally, the action to annul the 7udicial sale filed $y herein private respondents is not thereinvindicatory suit, much less the third party claim contemplated $y +ection 1 of /ule 39.

#D / 60/ , the petition for certiorari is here$y granted and the uestioned orders dated 6e$ruary:?, 19=?, May 19, 19=9 and 6e$ruary : v. Court of Appeals,13 we reversed the appellate court, thus"

ven without touching on the incidents and issues raised $y $oth petitioner Kherein respondentsL andprivate respondents Kpetitioner alente, ioleta, irginia and Maria ConcepcionL and thedevelopments su$se uent to the filing of the complaint, KwLe cannot $ut notice the glaring errorcommitted $y the trial court.


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!t would $e useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the e8ecution and the mannerof pu$licly selling en masse the su$7ect properties for auction. To start with, only oneBhalf of the ?parcels of land Ksu$7ect propertiesL should have $een the su$7ect of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article of the Civil Code, the law applica$le at the time of the institution of thecase"

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.4

Article === further provides"

4The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of oneBhalf of the hereditary estateof the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, su$7ect to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.4

Article =9:, par. : li'ewise provides"

4!f there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall $e entitled toa portion e ual to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.4

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is e ual to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners Kherein respondentsL in the levied and auctioned property isdifferent from and adverse to that of their mother KTeofistaL. %etitioners Kherein respondentsL $ecamecoBowners of the property not $ecause of their mother KTeofistaL $ut through their own right aschildren of their deceased father KMarcelo +r.L. Therefore, petitioners Kherein respondentsL are not$arred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.


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#D / 60/ , the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July : , 199@ as well as its /esolution of August :=, 199@ are here$y / /+ * and set aside& and Civil Case o. ?1:@3 is reinstated onlyto determine that portion which $elongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to saidportion.

!t was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present petition.

-pon our reinstatement of Civil Case o. ?1:@3, each and every pleading filed $y hereinrespondents, as plaintiffs therein, was hotly contested and opposed $y therein defendants, includingpetitioner alente. Moreover, even at that stage, when the case had $een remanded with a directiveto 4determine that portion which $elongs to Kherein respondentsL and to annul the sale with regard tosaid portion,4 Civil Case o. ?1:@3 had to $e reBraffled and transferred, for varied reasons, to the

different court $ranches in %asig City. !n $etween all these, petitioner alente, along with the otherdefendants, repeatedly filed a Motion to *ismiss Civil Case o. ?1:@3 for the purported failure ofherein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to *ismiss were denied.

#ith each transfer of Civil Case o. ?1:@3, the 7udge to which the case was raffled had to study therecords anew. 8pectedly, part of the records went missing and were lost. 0n April 1:, 1993, theCler' of Court of /TC, 5ranch 1, to which Civil Case o. ?1:@3 was remanded, filed a report onthe records of the case, to wit"

1. The first volume of the record in the a$oveBentitled case was recorded as received on June :@,199@, $y +heriff Ale7andro 0. o uinario&

:. That the staff of 5ranch 1 at this time was sharing a small room with 5ranch 1


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?. That 7ust $efore the Christmas vacation in 1991, the $ranch was forced to hastily move all of itsrecords and e uipment to $ranch


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!n this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for /econstitution of /ecords1? of the case. !nitially,petitioner alente, and the other defendants BB ioleta, irginia and Maria Concepcion BB opposed themotion.1< Dowever, the trial court eventually granted the motion for reconstitution, and orderedpetitioner alente and the other defendants to su$mit a copy of their Answer filed thereat and copiesof other pleadings pertinent to the case.1

Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off $y the parties; pleadings, are worthmentioning, to wit"

1. A Motion for eave to 6ile and Admit +upplemental Complaint1= filed $y herein respondents. The+upplemental Complaint additionally prayed that the levy and sale at pu$lic auction of the su$7ectproperties $e annulled and set aside, as the $id price was unconsciona$le and grossly inade uate tothe current value of the su$7ect properties. The +upplemental Complaint further sought a reB$iddingwith respect to Teofista;s share in the su$7ect properties. 6inally, it prayed that TCT o.


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0n these incidents, the records reveal the following 0rders issued $y the different $ranches of the/TC"

1. 0rder dated March 1 , 199?, issued $y %residing Judge /odrigo 5. oren>o of 5ranch :


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a. The auction sale of the five (?) parcels of land and all prior and su$se uent proceedings inrelation thereto are declared null and void.

$. Transfer Certificate of Title o.


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This last 0rder and therein defendants; -rgent Motion spawned another contentious issue $etweenthe parties. !n this connection, Judge strella issued an 0rder:? re uiring the parties to file theirrespective position papers due to the 4divergent views on the nature of the hearing that should $econducted in compliance with4 our decision in +uare>. 5oth parties duly filed their position papers,

with herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the 8tra7udicial +ettlement of state e8ecuted$y the heirs of Marcelo +uare> in 19? .

!n resolving this latest crossfire $etween the parties, the /TC, 5ranch < , issued an 0rder datedJanuary 11, :@@@, which reads, in part"

This Court is of the view that the Donora$le +upreme Court is not a trier of facts, precisely it directedthat the records of this case $e remanded to the /egional Trial Court for further proceedings.

8 8 8 8

!t is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed in the /egional Trial Court. 888The +upreme Court reversed the 7udgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement ofCivil Case o. ?1:@3. aturally, there was no trial on the merits $efore this Court that allowed theparties to adduce evidence to esta$lish their respective claims in the plaintiffs; Kherein respondentsLcomplaint and in the defendants; Kincluding petitioner alenteL counterBclaim, respectively. !t is in this

conte8t that the Donora$le +upreme Court reinstated the 4action Kof herein respondentsL to annul theauction sale to protect their Kherein respondentsL own interest.

#hile this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for the purpose of giving theplaintiffs Kherein respondentsL a chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and thedefendants Kincluding petitioner alenteL to prove their defense, consistent with the directive of theDonora$le +upreme Court (in its *ecision promulgated on +eptem$er , 199:), the Court is,however, confronted with the very recent decision of the Donora$le +upreme Court in 4Deirs of2uido Iaptinchay, et al. vs. *el /osario, et al., 2./. o. 1: 3:@, March :, 19994 where it held that B

The declaration of heirship must $e made in an administration proceeding, and not in anindependent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in +olve vs. Court of Appeals (1=: +C/A 119,1:=). The trial court cannot ma'e a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that sucha declaration can only $e made in a special proceeding. -nder +ection 3, /ule 1 of the 199/evised /ules of Court, a civil action is defined as 4one $y which a party sues another for theenforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong4 while a specialproceeding is 4a remedy $y which a party see's to esta$lish a status, a right, or a particular fact.4 !t


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is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can $e made only in a special proceedinginasmuch as the petitioners here are see'ing the esta$lishment of a status or right.

!n as much as the leading case on the matter is that of 4Deirs of Iaptinchay v. *el /osario, 2./. o.1: 3:@, March :, 19994 it is left with no choice $ut to o$ey said latter doctrine.

#D / 60/ , the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds that in the light of the doctrinelaid down in the case of 4Deirs of Iaptinchay vs. *el /osario, 2./. o. 1: 3:@, March :, 19994 thiscase is dismissed without pre7udice to the plaintiffs; Kherein respondents;L filing a special proceedingconsistent with said latest ruling.: v. Court of

Appeals.3? True, this Court is not a trier of facts,3< $ut as the final ar$iter of disputes,3 we foundand so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo +r.This having $een settled, it should no longer have $een a litigated issue when we ordered a remandto the lower court. !n short, petitioner alente;s, ioleta;s, irginia;s, and Maria Concepcion;s

representation in the /TC that our ruling in +uare> re uired herein respondents to present evidenceof their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo +r., is wrong.

As was set forth in the dispositive portion of +uare>, 4Civil Case o. ?1:@3 is reinstated only todetermine that portion which $elongs to Kherein respondentsL and to annul the sale with regard tosaid portion.4 The

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