Alcantara v. Alcantara(G.R. No.

167746 August 28, 2007)

FACTS:A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging thaton December 8, 1982 she and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel, who assisted their wedding for a fee and get married for that same day. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony which was celebrated without themarriage license at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with thelocal civil registrar. They then have a child in 1985. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment beissued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Respondent praysthat the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Respondent, and dismiss the Petitionfor lack of merit.Petitioner then submits at the C.A that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he andrespondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a ³fixer´ who arranged everything for them.

The wedding took place at the stairsin Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.

He and respondent did not goto Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondentwas a resident of the place.ISSUE:1.)

Was the absence of the marriage license before the marriage shall render the marriage void?

Whether or not the marriage license issued in Carmona Cavite was valid.HELD:To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on themarriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In thiscase, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a residentof Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent¶s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license ina city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior tothe completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administrativelyliable.The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario onDecember 8, 1982.Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a ³fixer´ who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a

Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizingofficer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizingofficer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said officialhas fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

WHEREFORE

, premises considered, the instant Petition is

DENIED

for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are

AFFIRMED

. Costs against petitioner.

Republic vs Dayot

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they

executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Balogbog vs CA

Balogbog vs. CA

GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents’ estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parent’s marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a “receipt” presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in

accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that “marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.

HELD:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents’ estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

AGAPAY vs. PALANGG.R. No. 116668July 28, 1997

Facts:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16,1949. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in Hawaii. Miguel

and Carlina’s only child,

Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964to the Philippines, he stayed with his brother in Zambales. The trial court found that as earlyas 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel contracted with second marriage with 19 yrold Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of

agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan,Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee. On October 1975, Miguel andCornelia Palang executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. Theparties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang. Migueland Erlinda had a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of

Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel

died.On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action forrecovery of ownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located atBinalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with ErlindaAgapay. The RTC dismissed the case and ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the

respondent court reversed the trial court’s decision and declared Carlina and Herminia

Palang the owners of the properties in question.Issue(s):

1.Whether or not the court erred in granting the ownership of the two parcels of land to Carlina and Herminia Palang?

2.Whether or not the court erred in not declaring Kristopher Palang as Miguel’sillegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit Miguel’s estate?

3.Whether or not Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant inthe civil case?Decision:

1.No. Under Art 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, only properties acquiredby both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property,or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respectivecontributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required in this

provision. In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed moneyto the purchase of the Riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, the court finds no basisto justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, theRiceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnershipproperty of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.

2.No. The issue is resolved in the respondent court’s pronouncement regardingKristopher’s heirship and filiation “inasmuch as question as to who are the heirs

of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determinationof the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the properprobate court or in a special proceeding instituted for that purpose and cannot

be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action xxx.”

3.Yes. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, wastherefore not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem

for he was not involved in the case at bar.Wherefore, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.

Estate of Melodia FerrarisFilomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.

Gaudencia FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants.G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965

FACTS:

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) an aunt and half-sister of decedent’s father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children of Melodia’s only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, who is the decedent’s half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action.

ISSUE:

Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him? Or will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent’s brother or will the former be excluded by the latter.

RULING:

As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Art. 975.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS: On July 27, 2000, Alejandro Estrada filed a complaint with Judge Coijes against court interpreter Soledad Escritor for living with a man not her husband and having a child with him despite of her being married to another man, and his live-in partner, Luciano Quilapio Jr, married to another woman. Escritor testified that she was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999, and that her husband died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. She also admitted that Quilapio was also married to another woman. But being members of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, they were able to contract a conjugal arrangement in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of the elders in their congregation. On July 28, 1991, they executed a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." This Declaration may only be entered by parties who want to enter a marital

relationship with a person belonging to the same religious sect, but cannot contract such due to legal impediments. However, witnesses from the congregation attested that an investigation will first be conducted by their members to check whether or not the parties contracting the Declaration are already separated from their spouses. In the case at bar, the congregation found out that Escritor is separated from her husband who has another woman, and Quilapio, also separated from his wife. Hence, they were qualified to execute the Declaration in conformity to their religious belief.

ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor is guilty of immoral conduct for living with a man not her husband

HELD: Pursuant to the Freedom of Religion clause of the Constitution, the law recognizes actions which are in accordance to religious beliefs. Escritor executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness inconformity with her religion, Jehovah’s Witness. Escritor is not guilty of immoral conduct and her conjugal agreement with Quilapio is valid.