Cases for Law of Public Officers(Poli Rview)

8/10/2019 Cases for Law of Public Officers(Poli Rview)

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CASES FOR LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY et.al. vs. CONCERNEDRESIDENTS OF MANILA

BAY (Ministerial Function)

December 18, 2008

FACTS: The government agencies namely, MWSS, LWUA, DENR, PPA, MMDA, DA, DBM,DPWH, DOH,

DECS, and PNP did not take notice of the present danger to public health and the depletion and

contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay. According to the Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, the

condition of Manila Bay did not matched to the intended SB level standard of water quality in such a

way that swimming, ski diving and etc. are unallowable. Thus ,the RTC ordered the government agencies

to participate in cleaning the Bay. Authorities from DENR and MWSS testified in favor of the petitioners

that the bay is in safe-level bathing and that they are doing their function in reducing water pollution.

However the RTC decided in favor of the respondents and ordered the government agencies in violation

of PD 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code to rehabilitate the bay.The petitioners argued to the CA

that PD 1152s provisions only pertain to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover

cleaning in general. However, CA affirmed the RTCs decision.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not cleaning Manila Bay is the ministerial act of the petitioners that canbeinduced by mandamus.(2) Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of Presidential Decree 1152only pertain to the specific cleaning ofpollution (and not general cleaning).

RATIO DECIDENDI: (1) The cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelledby Mandamus. Petitioners claimed that it is not their ministerial duty to clean up the bay because forthem it is a discretionary duty which cannot be compelled by mandamus. According to the Supreme

Court, the obligations to perform the duties (as defined by law) of the petitioners and on how they carryout such duties are two distinct concepts. The former pertains to the discretionary duties of thepetitioners while the latter is their ministerial duty. As for this case, it is the discretion of the petitionersto choose not to perform or to perform their duties as defined by law. And when they have chosen toperform their duties, the way they carry out those duties are called ministerial acts. It is very clear intheir charters that aside from performing their main function as an agency, they are also mandated toperform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection,and preservation of the Manila Bay.

(2) In the second issue, the Supreme Court held that Sections 17 and 20 of P.D. 1152 include cleaning ingeneral. Section 17 provides that in case the water quality has deteriorated, the government agencies

concerned shall act on it to bring back the standard quality of water. On the other hand, Section 20 alsomandates the government agencies concerned to take action in cleaning-up in case thepolluters failedto do their part. In the succeeding section 62(g) and (h) of the same Code, provide thatoil spilling is the cause of pollution that should be done in clean-up operations. This provision actually,expanded the coverage of Sec. 20 because it included oil-spilling as one of the causes of pollutions thatneed to be cleaned-up by the government agencies concerned. Moreover, Sec. 17 emphasizes thatgovernment agencies should clean that water for the sake of meeting and maintaining the right quality


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standard. This presupposes that the government agencies concerned have the duties of cleaning thewater not only in times when the water is polluted.

Moreover, even without such provisions, it is the inescapable duty of everyone to protect the water andprevent pollution, because of the tenable need of present and future generations as provided in Art. 2Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution, that the State shall protect and advance the right to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Ferdinand Topacio v Assoc Justice of the Sandiganbayan ( Qou Warranto)

Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main,to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of aSandiganbayan Associate Justice.

It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1]the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007,enjoined Ong fromaccepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Courtor assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully

completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show thathe is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.[2]

Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint[4]of September 5, 2007, imploredrespondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste aquo warrantoproceeding againstOng in the latters capacity as an incumbentAssociate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The OSG, by letterof September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it cannot favorably act on *his+ request for the filing of

a quo warrantopetition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality.[7] Petitionerassails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongs

continuous discharge of judicial functions.

Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null hisappointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his appointment,and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informsthat he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicialstatesmanship.[9]

The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warrantoproceedings; and itcannot be assailed collaterally,[28]even through mandamus[29]or a motion to annul or set asideorder.[30] In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,[31]the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire intothe validity of the appointment of a public officer.

[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers,

cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warrantoor be rightfully called upon to perform any of thefunctions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right toact cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the persondispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder tocease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by whichto determine the title to an office.[32]
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A quo warrantoproceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contestedpublic office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.[33] It is brought against the person who isalleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office,[34]and may becommenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any personclaiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised byanother

The Ofc of Ombudsman v Ramon Galicia (Jurisdiction)

GENERALLY, the Ombudsman must yield to the Division School Superintendent in the investigation ofadministrative charges against public school teachers.

Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School(MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted forming part of his 201file, Galicia graduated from the Far Eastern University with a degree in civil engineering but failed topass the board examinations. He also represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in

education in school year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR) from theCaloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers Professional Board

Examination (TPBE) given on November 22, 1987.

Subsequently, on December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then Principal of the MBASHS, reviewedthe 201 files of his teaching staff. He took note that the TOR submitted by Galicia was not an originalcopy, but only stamped with verified correct from the original signed by Administrative Officer Rogelio

Mallari. Pursuant to a Division Memorandum, Yamsuan required Galicia and other teachers with similarrecords, to secure authenticated copies of the TOR that they submitted. All of the teachers who weregiven the said instruction complied, with the exception of Galicia.

After the parties submitted their reply, rejoinder, and respective memoranda, the Ombudsman gavejudgment with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding Galicia RAMON C. GALICIA,Guilty of Dishonesty for which the penalty of Dismissal From the Service, Forfeiture of Leave Credits andRetirement Benefits and Temporary Disqualification for Re-employment in the Government Service for aperiod of One (1) Year from the Finality of this Decision, is hereby imposed, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) OF THE Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936).[7]

While stating that Galicia presented the original of the questioned documents during the preliminaryconference,[8]the Ombudsman nevertheless found that the absence of a certification from the College

Registrar destroyed the TORs credibility. Said the Ombudsman:

Galicia further challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by invoking Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 orthe Ombudsman Act[12]which enumerates the instances when the Ombudsman may not conduct anadministrative investigation. Under the said provision, the Ombudsman may not conduct investigationif the following requisites concur:

1. Complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
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2. The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;3. The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;4. Complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or5. The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained

of.[13]On January 20, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,[17]disposing as

follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decisiondated October 18, 2002 as well as the Order dated July 28, 2003 of public respondent are herebyREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered REINSTATED to his former position and is herebyawarded backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until he is reinstated and also all othermonetary benefits that may have accrued to him during the period of his unjustified dismissal.[18

We are mindful of Our decision in Lumancas v. Intas,[41] where two government employees submittedTORs and Special Orders as proof of their educational attainment. Upon verification with the CHED, itwas found that there were no records with the Department of Education that respondents were

enrolled with the named school during the period. Consequently, the decision of the Ombudsmanfinding them guilty of falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct was upheld.

We find, however, that Lumancasis not applicable to this case. In Lumancas, it was the CHED whichissued the negative certification, a public document of a government institution which enjoys thepresumption of regularity.[42] Here, what was presented to the Ombudsman was a certification not fromthe CHED but from a college, and that does not enjoy the same evidentiary value.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the

complaint.[43] Absent substantial evidence to prove the falsity of the TOR presented by Galicia dulysigned by the College Registrar at that time, We are constrained to uphold his innocence of the

charges of falsification.

Galicias original TOR, although belatedly submitted, is positive evidence that, indeed, he took up 18

units of education at the CCPC. The present College Registrars certification of the absence ofGaliciasrecords in her office, is negative evidence to the contrary. Following the general rule that positiveevidence is more credible than negative evidence, We find more reason to uphold the findings of the CA

LIWAYWAY CHATO V FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP( Statutory liability under the Civil Code).[44]

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locallymanufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valoremtax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to

effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all

manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearingforeign brand subject to the 55%ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
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In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violatedits constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equalprotection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismissthat respondent has no cause of actionagainst her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within thescope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore thelatter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause ofaction for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the groundthat under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in

connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative

Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person maysuffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not

liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against theRepublic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, apublic officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faithwhich, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle ofimmunity forofficial actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liabilitymay arise where there is bad faith,malice, orgross negligenceon the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the sameBook, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness ornegligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutionalrights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his actswere not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity foracts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional rightof the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, whichprevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).


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Article 32 was patterned after the tort inAmerican law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which hasbeen defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receivessome injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has beenstated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of thetortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been renderedimmaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of thealleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence ofgood motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwisean invasion of anothers legal right; that is,liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendantacted without evil intent.

OCA V EMMA ARAFILES(Habitual Tardiness)

The Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a Report of Tardiness onDecember 6, 2007 stating that Ms. Emma Annie D. Arafiles, Court Legal Researcher, Metropolitan TrialCourt(MeTC), Branch 48, Pasay City, incurred tardiness in September and October 2007. She was tardy

11 times in September and 16 times in October. The Report was docketed as A.M. No. 08-107-MeTC(Habitual Tardiness of Emma Annie D. Arafiles, MeTC, Branch 48, Pasay City.)Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepa (through a 1st Indorsement dated January 14, 2008) required Ms.Arafiles to comment on the report within ten (10) days from receipt.Ms. Arafiles complied with a letter-comment dated January 30, 2008. She admitted the tardiness andgave various explanations, specifically: that she had no maid; that she had to attend to the needs of herschool children ages eight (8) and two (2) years; and that she was hypertensive. She asked for "humanconsideration" and apologized for her tardiness, promising that she would no longer be tardy in thefuture.Court Administrator Elepa evaluated Ms. Arafiles' explanation and found no justification for her habitualtardiness. The Court Administrator recommended (1) that the Report be redocketed as a regular

administrative matter, and (2) that Ms. Arafiles be given a reprimand with a warning that a repetition ofthe same offense would warrant the imposition of a moresevere penalty.The law requires all government officials and employees to render not less than eight (8) hours of workper day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours of work per week, exclusive of time forlunch. As a rule, these hours are from eight (8) o'clock in the morning to five (5) o'clock in theafternoon.1Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, S. 1991,2an officer or employee of the civil service isconsidered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times amonth for at least two (2) months in a semester or for at least two (2) consecutive months during theyear.We have previously ruled that non-office obligations, household chores, traffic problems, and health,domestic and financial concerns are not

sufficient reasons to excuse or justify habitual tardiness.3These are the types of reasons Ms. Arafilesgave; hence, we cannot free her from liability for her infractions.Time and again, we have reminded officials and employees of the Judiciary that by reason of the natureand functions of their office, they must be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutionalprinciple that public office is a public trust.

A way of doing this is through the strict observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use ofevery working moment, if only to give back the true worth of what the Government, and ultimately, the
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people, pay in maintaining the Judiciary.4In short, in the public service, punctuality is a virtue,absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible.5chanrobles virtual law libraryWe agree with Court Administrator Elepao that "(B)y being habitually tardy, she [respondent] hasfallen short of the stringent standard conduct demanded from everyone connected with theadministration of justice" and thus merits the prescribed penalty. Under Section 52(c)(4), Rule VI of CSCMemorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows: first offense,reprimand; second offense, suspensionfor 1-30 days; and third offense, dismissal from the service.WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ms. Emma Annie D. Arafiles, Court Legal Researcher, MeTC, Branch48, Pasay City, GUILTY of habitual tardiness. Pursuant to Section 52(c)(4), Rule VI of CSC MemorandumCircular No. 19, Series of 1999, this first offense merits the penalty of REPRIMAND with the WARNINGthat a more severe penalty shall be imposed for the repetition of the same or a similar offense in thefuture.SO ORDERED.

RUBEN GALERO V THE HONORABLE CA (Simple Neglect of duty)

For review is the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 dated April 26, 2001

affirming the Resolution[2]of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0565 findingpetitioner Ruben S. Galero guilty of Dishonesty, Falsifying Official Documents and Causing Undue Injuryto the Governmentand imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all benefits andperpetual disqualification to hold public office. Likewise assailed is the CAs Resolution[3]datedDecember 21, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.

On May 31, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) issued a Resolution[12]against petitioner, thepertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Office finds Ruben Galero guilty of Dishonesty,for Falsifying Official Documents, and for causing undue injury to the government, thus metes upon him,

the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, and PERPETUALDISQUALIFICATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989of the Civil Service Commission.[13]

SO RESOLVED.

Ombudsman concluded that the petitioner, being his immediate superior who verified his DTRs, wasaware of such irregularity.[14] Hence, the extreme penalty of dismissal as to the petitioner. Mr. Elizalde,on the other hand, was exonerated for lack of evidence to show conspiracy. Petitioners motion for

reconsideration was also denied on December 10, 1999.[15

Petitioner likewise failed to obtain a favorable judgment from the CA when his petition for review was

denied.[16] The appellate court declared that petitioners verification of Mr. Geocadins DTRs wassufficient to hold him guilty as charged. His verification, according to the court, enabled Mr. Geocadinto receive from the government such amounts not due him. The court did not give credence to theaffidavits of some security guards that Mr. Geocadin was indeed their station commander. Neither didthe appellate court consider the affidavit of retraction executed by one of the witnesses.[17] Inconclusion, the court said that there was substantial evidence to establish petitioners guilt.
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Aggrieved, petitioner comes before this Court in this petition for review raising the followingerrors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THEOMBUDSMAN WHICH FINDING IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, SURMISES ORCONJECTURES.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILS (SIC) TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS WHICH, IFPROPERLY CONSIDERED, WILL JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS

DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[18]

The powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman are set forth in Section 15(3) of Republic Act No.6770 (R.A. 6770) otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 which substantially restates

Section 13(3),[22]Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,functions and duties:

x x x x

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at faultor who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, andrecommendhis removal,suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce itsdisciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act;Provided, That the refusal by any officerwithout just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,censure or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act ordischarge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.[23]

The restrictive interpretation of the word recommend had long been rejected by this Court for

being inconsistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of the

Ombudsman.[24] Instead, to be faithful to the constitutional objective, the word has been construed tomean that the implementation of the Ombudsmans order of dismissal, suspension, etc., is mandatorybut shall be coursed through the proper officer.[25]

While not totally exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against him, a modification of the natureof petitioners administrative liability as well as the penalty that was correspondingly imposed, is in

order. The only basis of petitioners liability for dishonesty, etc., was the presumed collusion betweenhim and Mr. Geocadin. This stemmed from the unproven fact that Mr. Geocadin was a ghost employee
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and that petitioner was receiving part of his (Mr. Geocadin) salary. There was nothing in the recordwhich establishes petitioners collusion or conspiracy with Mr. Geocadin to defraud thegovernment. For the purpose of sustaining the Ombudsmans findings, it would have been necessarythat the alleged conspiracy or collusion be established by independent, competent and substantialevidence. Since the records are bereft of this evidence, what remains is only petitioners verification ofMr. Geocadins false DTR. With this as sole basis, petitioner can be held administratively liable only forsimple neglect of duty --- not for dishonesty, for falsification of official document, or for causing undueinjury to the government.

Simple neglect of dutyis defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from anemployee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.[31] Had petitioner performed the taskrequired of him, that is, to monitor the employees attendance, he would have discovered that indeed

Mr. Geocadin was dividing his time between PPA and Napocor. Though not required to know everydetail of his subordinates whereabouts, petitioner should have implemented measures to make sure

that the government was not defrauded. As he was required to sign Mr. Geocadins DTR, petitionershould have verified the truthfulness of the entries therein. Indeed, petitioner neglected his duty whichcaused prejudice to the government in that Mr. Geocadin was paid twice for his services. These facts,

taken together, are sufficient to make petitioner liable for simple neglect of duty, but insufficient tomake him answer for charges of dishonesty and falsification of document.

As to the proper penalty imposable, simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offensepunishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.[36] Thecircumstances surrounding the instant case, considering that it appears to be petitioners first offense,

warrant the imposition of suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 26, 2001 and its Resolutiondated December 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 are herebyMODIFIED. We find petitioner GUILTYofSimple Neglect of Duty instead of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Causing Undue Injury

to the Government, and is meted the penalty of suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1)day, instead of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from publicoffice.

MANICAM BASCASAR V CSC (Good faith defense)

Petitioner Manicam M. Bacsasar (petitioner) filed this Petition for Certiorariseeking to nullify theResolutions dated June 26, 2007[1]and October 2, 2007[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.01508.

On May 7, 2003, petitioner was charged with dishonesty by the Civil Service Commission-Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (CSC-ARMM), committed as follows:

1. That in your Personal Data Sheet (PDS), dated February 20, 2001, you indicated that you passedthe Career Service Professional examination on November 28, 2000 with a rating of 87.54% conductedin Quezon City;

2. That the same eligibility was used to support the issuance of an appointment in your favor byMayor Hadji Ali MB. Munder of Bubong, Lanao del Sur as Municipal Assessor under Permanent status;and
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3. That a verification from Civil Service Regional OfficeNational Capital Region in QuezonCity yielded a response that your name is not included in the Master List of passing and failing list ofNCR-CSP dated November 28, 2000.[3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No.062250[8]dated December 19, 2006. Petitioner received CSC Resolution 062250 on January 8,2007. On January 23, 2007, she requested a thirty day-extension of time, or until February 22, 2007, tofile a petition for review. Petitioner, however, failed to file the intended petition within the extendedperiod.[9]

On June 26, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for having been tardily filed and for lack of merit. Itheld that the failure of the petitioner to file the intended petition for review within the extended periodrendered the CSC decision final and executory. Accordingly, it had been divested of jurisdiction toentertain the petition. The CA also affirmed the CSC finding that there is substantial evidence on recordto establish petitioners culpability. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the CA denied iton October 2, 2007.

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failureto conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and beyond thepower of the Court's review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final andexecutory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. Such decisionor order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have been.

Petitioner was charged with dishonesty which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in amatter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty.[2

Indisputably, when petitioner applied for the position of Municipal Assessor, she submitted a Certificate

of Eligibility purportedly issued by the CSC certifying that she passed the Career Service Professionalexamination on November 28, 2000 with a rating of 87.54%. She also submitted a PDS dated February21, 2001 stating that she passed the Career Service Professional examination on November 28,2001 with a rating of 87.54%. Upon verification, it was found that her Certificate of Eligibility wasspurious. Clearly, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish that petitioner is, indeed, guilty ofdishonesty.

We cannot accept petitioners simplistic claim that she used the fake eligibility in good faith because she

was not aware that the same was spurious.

Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedomfrom knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to

abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law,together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transactionunconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is somethinginternal, we can ascertain a persons intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.[23]
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NAB V MAMAUAG(Who can appeal)

Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that a disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be

final and executory. Under Section 45, a disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a

demotion or dismissal from the service. If the disciplinary action is less than a demotion or dismissalfrom the service, the disciplinary action shall be final and executory as Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly

mandates. Thus, a decision imposing suspension on a PNP member is not subject to appeal to a higherauthority.Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty.[17]If the decision exonerates therespondents or otherwise dismisses the charges against the respondents, there is no disciplinary actionsince no penalty is imposed. The provision that a penalty less than demotion or dismissal from serviceis final and executory does not apply to dismissal of charges or exoneration because they are notdisciplinary actions. This gives rise to two crucial questions.

First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority dismissing the charges against aPNP member? Second, if a decision dismissing the charges against a PNP member is appealable, whocan appeal the PNP or the private complainant, or both?Before the case of CSC v. Dacoycoy,[18]case law held that dismissal of the charges or exoneration of the

respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even by thegovernment. Thus, in Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission,[19]et al., the Court held:Section 37, paragraph (a), of PD 807, the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides:(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involvingthe imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirtydays salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from officexxx (Italics supplied).Interpreting the above provision, we held in Mendez v. CSCthat:xxx xxx xxxIt is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in themanner and in accordance with the provision of law. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs.Office of thePresidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 318).

Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision xxx (italicssupplied) (p. 104, Rollo)The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whomthe administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form ofsuspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case,Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondentin the administrative case below.Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city major, as head of the city government,is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for onemonth and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the

respondent is found guilty of the charges files against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of

said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and heldrespondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to theSupreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the

complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil

Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously
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prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the

Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extantjurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government

employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which maytake the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office andnot included are cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or

fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary or when the respondent is exonerated of thecharges, there is no occasion for appeal.In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that theCivil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from

administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service

Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export

Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.

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