Cases for Family Relation

8/11/2019 Cases for Family Relation

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But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the

forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will

and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

Categories

ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIAG.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia.He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had be en using her mothers middlename and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that

Stephanies middle name be changedto Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia bechanged to Catindig hi s surname.The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code,the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to usethe surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitionersmotion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to usethe surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name whenshe is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapterfor all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA8557.Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname ofher father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code andFamily Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother shouldimmediately precede the surname of the father.

Landingin v republic

FACTS : Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a

resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and

Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother

(deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second

marriage and no longer communicated with her children .


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ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?

HELD:

No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental

relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the bestinterests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep.

Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents

cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner,

that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written

consent of their legal guardian.

Quintana vs lerma 24 phil 285

Facts: In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of the lower courtgranting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly due her based on acontract they made for support.

As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and entered, in February 1905, into a writtenagreement of separation, renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugalproperty between them and the defendant undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth ofmonthly support and maintenance to be given within the first three days of each month.

In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right to support by

committing adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out by the court on the ground thatunder Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized ground upon which obligation tosupport ceases.

The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it in his amendedcomplaint.

Issue: W/N the written agreement made by parties is void W/N adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support

Ruling: Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that in default of expressdeclarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during


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marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article50. However, the wife has a right of action against defendant under the Code.

Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the defendant may also setup adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved and sustain will defeat the wifes action. Judgment reversed; cause remanded for new trial with instructions to permit theinterposition of the special defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaintand answer as may be necessary to carry the judgment into effect.

Support Art 194-208

[G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004]

JOSE LAM, pet i t ioner, vs . ADRIANA CHUA, re sponden t .

D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing theDecision [1] dated June 11, 1997 and the Resolution dated October 27, 1997 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV. No. 51107, entitled, Adriana Chua,Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jose Lam, Respondent- Appellant.

The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition fordeclaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in theRegional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in thepetition that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of saidmarriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologicallyincapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage butsaid incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Josebecame manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequentlyfailed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, suchas, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what wasleft of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on thedissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of presentand future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial
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Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; theyhad long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custodyof their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adrianaprayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void butshe failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite thelapse of fifteen days after service of summons, no responsive pleading wasfiled by him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order dated April 13, 1994,directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigationfor determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties andto submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrerafiled his Report stating that there seems to be no collusion between theparties . [2]

The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged byher parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was abnormalbecause Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and insteadkept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also theone spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul . [3] After hertestimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. Noevidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by JohnPaul or the capacity of Jose to give support.

On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open [4] on the

ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence which weresignificant, material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial court grantedthe motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception ofadditional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the MarriageContract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, andanother Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one EvanLock , [5] showing that Jose had been married twice before he married Adrianain 1984.

On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision [6] the dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the marriage

between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Office of theCivil Registrar General are hereby ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana
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Chua and Jose Lam celebrated on January 13, 1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja of theMetropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.

Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his sonJohn Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED .[7]

On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration [8] thereofbut only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in theamount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision forsupport of the child as embodied in the decision [9] dated February 28, 1994 ofthe Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contributeP250,000.00each to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:

8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties withrespect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain careand custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised throughmutual arrangements.

9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Partyand the Second Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, tobe increased as required , to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of theirson. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party,subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches majority age .[10]

Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fundhad even amounted to P500,000.00.

On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lamsmotion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered intoby the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage wasdeclared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment andcannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court.

Jose then appealed the Pasay RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals,assigning only a single error of the trial court:

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TOGIVE A MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P20,000.00 TO HIS SON BECAUSE THISWOULD, IN EFFECT, REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE MONTHLYSUPPORT FOR HIS CHILD. BESIDES, THE LOWER COURT HAS DULYADMITTED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DECISION ISSUED BY
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agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the MakatiRTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment forsupport is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of thechild and the capabilities of the parents to give support.

Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award supportfor the child in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the childsparents, this Court will now discuss the propriety of the proceedingsconducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered, as affirmed by theCourt of Appeals.

The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of theproceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court.

First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity ofmarriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity

of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child. Adriana presented,formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the casefor decision as of May 12, 1994 . [14] But on a motion to re-open filed by heron June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on July6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of twoprevious marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that themarriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. Itis only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimedsupport for John Paul when she testified in open court.

The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by theadmission of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of themarriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that ofexistence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women with anadditional claim for support of the child. Such substantial changes were notreflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment wasever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase And forrespondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this HonorableCourt may deem just and reasonable [15] found at the ultimate paragraph of thepetition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to show

that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.

Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be presenton July 6, 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute thesame. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice ofhearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the record does not show that hereceived the notice in due time; neither does the record show that he was
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notified of the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adrianapresented the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their childsans the presence of Jose.

Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order

dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her to present herevidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages withdifferent women.

Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim forsupport for John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a validbasis upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the monthly amountof P20,000.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.

A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of

substantially amended or supplemental pleadings .[16]

Considering that in casesof declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be nodefault pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Cour t[17] inrelation to Article 48 of the Family Code , [18] it is with more reason that petitionershould likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.

Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Courtin Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates , [19] to wit:

It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice andvoid. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond theprayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is notmerely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to collateralattack.

The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject within itsgeneral jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any statement or claim ofthe parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity.(Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court tohave rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it wasbeyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect thenew issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as toauthorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and

Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have
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been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition servedupon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprivedpetitioner Lam of due process.

Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana andJose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the PasayRTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its

jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the declarationof nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration whichhe filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appealsand with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the PasayRTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages withother woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by

Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of

nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose nulland void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictionalquestion may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exceptionwhere estoppel has supervened . [20]

Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose inthe present petition for review on certiorari which is the award of support forhis child, John Paul.

The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount

of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to theresources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuantto Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with thefinancial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or

vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses ingoing to and from school, or to and from place of work.

Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 [21] and196 ,[22] shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to thenecessities of the recipient.
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Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced orincreased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities ofthe recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.

It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on theevidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity orresources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children asprovided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expensesincurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, educationand transportation of the child.

In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regardingher claim for support of the child is her testimony, which is quoted below inverbatim:

Atty. Lorbes:

Q - After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid marriages prior toyour marriage, how do you feel about it?

A - I felt it is unfair to my life.

Q - Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband with you, what doyou want to request to the Honorable Court?

A - I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to support my little boy.

Court:

Q - How much support do you want?

A - P20,000.00 to P25,000.00Q - Is there a prayer for support?

Atty. Lorbes:

A - None, Your Honor.

Court:

Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for the support of the boy.

A - Yes, Your Honor . [23]

Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by thechild nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.

We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodiedin the decision of the Makati RTC, portions of which read as follows:

8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties withrespect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain care
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and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised throughmutual arrangements.

9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Partyand the Second Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to

be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of theirson. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party,subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches majority age.

WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order, and not beingcontrary to law, morals or public policy, the same is herebyAPPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between thesaid spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation is established inaccordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code ofthe Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with theconditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall, as

between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in the matters treated inthe aforesaid settlement.

Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in the properlocal civil registries and registries of property at the expense of the herein petitioners

pursuant to Article 139 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.

GIVEN this 28 th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila .[24]

The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed outbefore the Makati RTC as it was the court that approved the Compromise

Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the petition for declaration ofnullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the interest of orderlyadministration of justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on supportshould be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the childwas initiated by Adriana.

The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6,1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and inserted in the petitionfiled by respondent Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and noticeupon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived ofdue process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on a motion tore-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite notice and theopportunity to refute the new claim against him.
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Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of supportawarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.

Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to reverse thedecision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of

support is concerned and order the remand of the case to Pasay RTC forfurther proceedings as to the issue regarding support.

WHEREFORE , the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. TheDecision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107,dated June 11, 1997 and October 27, 1997, dismissing the appealand denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby SET

ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor of John Paul ChuaLam is concerned . The Decision dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of theRegional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995,are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null and void, likewise only insofaras the matter on support is concerned.

Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the RegionalTrial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trialof Civil Case No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of Adriana Chua againstJose Lam for the support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct hearings forfurther reception of evidence for the proper determination of the properamount of support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua Lam.

SO ORDERED

SECOND DIVISION

EDWARD V. LACSON, G.R. No. 150644 Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson, - versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ.

MAOWEE DABAN LACSON


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and MAONAA DABAN Promulgated: LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem , LEA DABAN LACSON, August 28, 2006

Respondents. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters MaoweeDaban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother andguardian ad-litem, LeaDaban Lacson, has come to this Court via this petition forreview under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal and setting asideof the Decision [1] dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV

No. 60203, as reiterated in its Resolution [2] of October 18, 2001 denying his motionfor reconsideration.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, andother pleadings, the Court gathers the following facts:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate

daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea

Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less

than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal

home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently

for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas

mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her

brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later

to the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their

mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from

one dwelling place to another not their own.
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It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her

husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in

a note datedDecember 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned

out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas effortstowards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward

occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the

years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also

gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of

whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College inIloilo City. In the early

part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against

Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,

Maowee was about to graduate.

In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended ,[3] docketed as CivilCase No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their fatherEdward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuablelands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing toyears of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time,

borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had

received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficientsum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular incomeand the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for hisfailure at times to give regular support. He also blamed financial constraint for hisinability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint.

As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sistersMaowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to theschedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the courts corr espondingorder of May 13, 1996 .[4]

Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court,
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following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendantfather Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18years, of support in arrears. The fallo of the trial courts decision [5] reads:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support inarrears in the amount of TWO MILLION FOURHUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00)PESOS from which amount shall be deducted ONEHUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS thatwhich they received from defendant for two years and thatwhich they received by way of support pendent lite;

2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND(P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and

3) Pay costs.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketedas CA-G.R. CV. No. 60203 .

Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13,2001 ,[6] dismissed Edwards appeal, disposing as follows;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is herebyDISMISSED and the appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is herebyAFFIRMED.

Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied bythe appellate court in its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001 .[7]

Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred -
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I. XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN

ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994.

II. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORTBY RESPONDENTS UNCLE NOEL DABAN.

III. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IFPETITIONER IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDINGTHE SA ME TO RESPONDENTS.

IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORTTO XXX RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATIONTO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELYSATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HISEXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BYTHE RESPONDENTS.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to bothrespondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, thathe should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e ., from 1976 to 1994, no

previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by therespondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to completehis point:

Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandablefrom the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it formaintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial orextrajudicial demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision startsfrom the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment canit be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.


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Petitioners above po sture has little to commend itself. For one, it

conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent

sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be

sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tenderyears to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact

that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get

in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have

been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in

the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor

commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would

pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his

obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand

because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found

that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been made in this case

and said so in its decision, thus:

From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their[paternal] grandmothers house by their father and asked for support; thisnotw ithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose which thelatter embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-oneyears that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligationfor only two (2) years.

xxx xxx xxx

Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for thesupport of his children, the [respondents] herein but failing,

plaintiffs mother asked extrajudic ially for her childrens support since1976 , when she went to her mothers house. .[8] (Words in bracket andunderscoring added.)

The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle,formulating the same in the following wise:
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We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] postureof trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughterssim ply because their mother did not make a formal demand thereforfrom him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand fromhis wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of andcommitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his ownhandwriting. Said note [stating that he will sustain his two daughtersMaowee and Maonaa] also stated as requested by their mother thus

practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by[respondents] mother. The tria l court thus correctly ruled that[petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from1976 .[9] (Words in bracket added).

The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of

the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made onthe petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and soundappellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality,save for the most compelling and cogent reasons .[10] Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear toobtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for areview of the CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award ofsupport in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the

petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it beoverlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, isgenerally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate isthe rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again theevidence already considered in the proceedings below ,[11] except when, as earlierindicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawnfrom such evidence.

Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory

holding that respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for theirsupport. Again, petitioners lament on the matter is a veritable call for review offactual determinations of the two courts below. It need not, accordingly, detain uslong. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives, the respondentsappeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel Daban. Noteworthy also isthe fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token
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amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable forsustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education ,[12] or, in short,whatever is necessary to keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thrutheir mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education

when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it isnot amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that Noel Daban who,owing to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Leamoney to support her children.

Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exactreimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses orfails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third personmay furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursementfrom the person obliged to give support.

Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridicalrelationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract ,[13] anequitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense ofanother.

As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb theabsolute figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to bereasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the finalnumbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court

before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the varying needs ofthe respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial

resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matterof law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and familyrelationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to theresources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient .[14]
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Art 213

WILSON SY, G.R. No. 124518

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J ., - versus - Chairperson ,

CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and

COURT OF APPEALS, VELASCO, JR., JJ . Regional Trial Court of Manila,Branch 48, and MERCEDES TAN UY-SY, Promulgated:

Respondents. December 27, 2007

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J .:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorar i[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure, petitioner Wilson Sy assails the Decision [2] dated 29 February

1996 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 38936 and its

Resolution [3] dated 15 April 1996 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The following are the antecedents:

On 19 January 1994, respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for

habeas corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 94-69002. Respondent
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prayed that said writ be issued ordering petitioner to produce their minor children

Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after hearing, their care and

custody be awarded to her as their mother .[4]

In his answer, petitioner prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to

him instead. Petitioner maintained that respondent was unfit to take custody of the

minors. He adduced the following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her

family in 1992; secondly, she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide

proper care to the children .[5]

After trial, the trial court caused the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and

awarded custody of the children to respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered maintaining to the petitionerthe custody of the minors Vanessa and Jeremiah, all surnamed Uy-Sy, without,however, prejudice to thevisitorial rights of the father, herein respondent, and thetemporary arrangement of the custody made by the parties during pendency ofthis proceeding is hereby revoked, and without any further effect. The Courtfurther orders the respondent to pay by way of monthly support for the minors,the amount of P50,000.00 payable to petitioner from [the] date of judgment forfailure on the part of respondent to show by preponderance of evidence that the

petitioner is unfit to the custody of the minor children who are only 6 and 4 yearsold .[6]

Petitioner appealed the order of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

Before the appellate court, he alleged that the trial court erred: (1) in awarding the

custody of the minor children solely to respondent; and (2) in ordering him to

provide respondent support in the amount of P50,000.00 per month .[7]

The Court of Appeals found no merit in the appeal and affirmed the decisionof the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not find any reason to disturb the

conclusions of the trial court, particularly petitioners failure to prove by

preponderance of evidence that respondent was unfit to take custody over the

minor children.
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The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not able to substantiate his

contention that respondent was unfit to have custody of the children. On

respondents supposed abandonment of the family, the appellate court foundinstead that respondent had been driven away by petitioners family because of

religious differ ences. Respondents stay inTaiwan likewise could hardly be called

abandonment as she had gone there to earn enough money to reclaim her children.

Neither could respondents act of praying outdoors in the rain be considered as

evidence of insanity as it may simply be an expression of ones faith. Regarding

the allegation that respondent was unable to provide for a decent dwelling for the

minors, to the contrary, the appellate court was satisfied with respondents proof of

her financial ability to provide her children with the necessities of life .[8]

As to the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals held that

questions as to care and custody of children may be properly raised in a petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, petitioner was properly heard on the matter

relative to the issue of support. He was questioned about his sources of income for

the purpose of determining his ability to give support. As to the propriety of the

amount awarded, the appellate court was unwilling to alter the trial courtsconclusion for petitioner did not forthrightly testify on his actual income. Neither

did he produce income tax returns or other competent evidence, although within

his power to do so, to provide a fair indication of his resources. At any rate, the

appellate court declared that a judgment of support is never final and petitioner is

not precluded at any time from seeking a modification of the same and produce

evidence of his claim .[9]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals

decision but the same was denied .[10] Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein

petitioner asserts that: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the custody of

the minor children solely to respondent; (2) the Court of Appeals had no
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jurisdiction to award support in a habeas corpus case as: (a) support was neither

alleged nor prayed for in the petition; (b) there was no express or implied consent

on the part of the parties to litigate the issue; and (c) Section 6, Rule 99 of the

Rules of Court does not apply because the trial court failed to consider the CivilCode provisions on support; and (3) the award of P50,000.00 as support is

arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable and tantamount to a clear deprivation of property

without due process of law .[11]

For her part, respondent claims that petitioner had lost his privilege to raise

the first issue, having failed to raise it before the appellate court. Anent the second

issue, respondent takes refuge in the appellate courts statement that the questions

regarding the care and custody of children may properly be adjudicated in a habeas

corpus case. Regarding the third issue, respondent maintains that the amount of

support awarded is correct and proper .[12]

There is no merit in the petition regarding the question of care and custody

of the children.

The applicable provision is Section 213 of the Family Code which statesthat:

Section 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take intoaccount all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over sevenyears of age, unless the parent is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of the minor children

shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in

the interest of the minor children .[13] But when the husband and wife are living
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separately and apart from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall

award the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest,

permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to live with if he is over

seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of thechild by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty .[14]

In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost

consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child

concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral

situations of the contending parents .[15]

However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to havecustody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care,

supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mothers love and

devotion for which there is no substitute .[16] Generally, the love, solicitude and

devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child

of tender years than all other things combined .[17] The Civil Code Commission, in

recommending the preference for the mother, explained, thus:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy wherea mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deepsorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exceptionallowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child:those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. Ifshe has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the(relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her.Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is asyet unable to understand the situation .[18]

This preference favoring the mother over the father is even reiterated in

Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (the Rule on Adoption and Custody of

Minors) underscoring its significance, to wit:
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SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from eachother, and the question as to the care, custody and control of a child or children oftheir marriage is brought before a Regional Trial Court by petition or as anincident to any other proceeding , the court, upon hearing the testimony as may

be pertinent, shall award the care, custody and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers tolive with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to takecharge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,incapacity, or poverty. If upon such hearing, it appears that both parents areimproper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the child, the court mayeither designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest

brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of suchchild, or commit it to any suitable asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society.The court may in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code order either or

both parents to support or help support said child, irrespective of who may be its

custodian, and may make any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit the child or have temporarycustody thereof. Either parent may appeal from an order made in accordance withthe provisions of this section. No child under seven years of age shall beseparated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compellingreasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)

The above-quoted provision expressly acknowledges and authorizes that the

matter of care and custody of the children may be raised and adjudicated as an

incident to any proceeding, such as a case for habeas corpus.

Evidently, absent any compelling reason to the contrary, the trial court was

correct in restoring the custody of the children to the mother, herein respondent,

the children being less than seven years of age, at least at the time the case was

decided. Moreover, petitioners conte ntion that respondent is unfit to have custody

over the minor children has not been substantiated as found by both courts below.

Thus, it is already too late for petitioner to reiterate the assertion for onlyquestions of law may be raised before this Court. Furthermore, the determination

of whether the mother is fit or unfit to have custody over the children is a matter

well within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless it is shown that said

discretion has been abused the selection will not be interfered with .[19]
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Consequently, the Court affirms the award of custody in respondents favor.

Now, the issue of support.

Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is

demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it

for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or

extrajudicial demand. The case of Jocson v. The Empire Ins. Co.

and Jocson Lagniton [20] explains the rationale for this rule:

x x x S upport does include what is necessary for the education andclothing of the person entitled thereto (Art. 290, New Civil Code). But supportmust be demanded and the right to it established before it becomes payable (Art.298, New Civil Code; Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil. 215). For the right to supportdoes not arise from the mere fact of relationship, even from the relationship of

parents and children, but from imperative necessity without which it cannot bedemanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless supportis demanded (Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p. 181,citing 8 Manresa 685). In the present case, it does not appear that support for theminors, be it only for their education and clothing, was ever demanded from theirfather and the need for it duly established. The need for support, as already stated,cannot be presumed, and especially must this be true in the present case where itappears that the minors had means of their own .[21]

As intimated earlier, the Court agrees with the courts below that Section 6,

Rule 99 [22] of the Rules of Court permits the ventilation of the question regarding

the care and custody of the children as an incident to any proceeding, even a

habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner would have us believe, however, that since

respondents peti tion did not include a praye r [23] for support of the children in

accordance with the above-quoted Family Code provision, the trial court was not

justified in awarding support in respondents favor. In addition, petitioner claims

that he did not give consent to the trial and the threshing out of the issue as it was

not raised in the pleadings .[24] He claims that in fact, he testified on his financial

status only to prove that he is financially able to provide for his children and not
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for the purpose of determining the amount of support .[25] Besides, he contends that

the trial court did not order the amendment of the pleadings to conform to the

evidence presented pursuant to Section 5 [26] Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, an aspect that supports his contention that the parties never consented,expressly or impliedly, to try the issue of support .[27]

The Court is not convinced. Contrary to petitioners assertions, respondent

testified during trial, without any objection on petitioners par t, regarding the need

for support for the childrens education and other necessities, viz:

ADDL DIRECT EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS

MERCEDES TAN UY-SY

Q: With the kind permission of this Honorable Court. Q: Ms. Sy, the custody of the two minors[,] of course[,] require some

expenses on your part notwithstanding that you said you have savingsintended for them, is it not?

A: Yes, sir. Q: And what is the nature of these expenses that you expect to disburse for

the children? A: For the medicine or health care.

Q: What else? A: For education, for emergency expenses, for basically for food.

Q: In your estimate, how much would these expenses be per month? A: Well, I think, perhaps P50,000.00, sir.

Q: Which the respondent should furnish? A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. CORTEZ

That is all for the witness, Your Honor .[28]

Moreover, based on the transcript of stenographic notes, petitioner was

clearly made aware that the issue of support was being deliberated upon, to wit:
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WITNESS:

WILSON SY: will be testifying under the same oath .[29]

x x x x

ATTY. ALBON: Q: In the hearing of July 23, 1994 as appearing on page 3,

Mercedes Sy testified that she would be needing P50,000.00 a monthexpenses for her children, what can you say about that?

A: That is a dillusion [ sic ] on her part .[30]

The trial court judge even propounded questions to petitioner regarding his

sources of income for the purpose of determining the amount of support to be

given to the children:

COURT: I want to find out how much his income now for the purposes of givingsupport to the children. Please answer the question.

WITNESS:

A: Shares of stocks.

ATTY. CORTEZ:

Q: A shares [ sic ] of stock is the evidence of your investment in thecorporation. My question is: What investment did you put in to enableyou to get a share, was it money or property?

A: There is no money but it was given by my father.

COURT:

Q: Upon the death of your father you just inherited it?
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A: Before.

Q: After the death, did you not acquire some of the shares of your father? A: No, your Honor.

Q: What happened to the shares of your father?

A: It is with my mother.

x x x x

COURT:

Never mind the share of the mother. What is material is his share.

ATTY. CORTEZ:

Q: How many shares do you have in the corporation?

A: Right now I have only ten (10) shares.

Q: What is the value of that [ sic ] shares? A: I [do not] give any importance.

COURT

Q: For purposes of this case, the Court is asking you how much is yourshare?

A: I [do not ] how to appraise.

Q: More or less, how much? Use the word more or less, is that one millionmore or less, 2 million, more or less, 10 million, more or less? Anyway,this is not a BIR proceeding, this is a Court proceeding?

A: I want to speak the truth but I [do not] know. I did not even see theaccount.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. CORTEZ

x x x x

Q: At that time of your fathers death[,] you were [ sic ]already holding ten(10) shares or was it less?


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A: More.

Q: More than ten (10) shares? A: Yes, sir.

COURT

Q: What is the par value of that one (1) share? A: I [do not] know, your Honor.

x x x x

COURT:

Let it remain that he owns ten (10) shares.

ATTY. CORTEZ:

x x x x

A: Yes, 10 shares. The other shares I already sold it.

Q: How many shares did you sell? A: I only have 10 shares now. I dont know how many shares that I have

left. I only know the 20 shares .[31]

Applying Section 5 ,[32] Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since

the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties, it should be

treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And since there was

implied consent, even if no motion had been filed and no amendment had been

ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the

issue .[33]

Significantly, in the case of Bank of America v. American RealtyCorporation ,[34] the Court stated:

There have been instances where the Court has held that even withoutthe necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validlyawarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the factsshown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the
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complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings wereactually not amended. Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical erroror non substantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine

Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco v. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), westressed that the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularlywhere no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recentcase of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), weheld that w here there is a variance in the defendants pleadings and theevidence adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading asamended to conform with the evidence .[35]

The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as support for the minor

children. As found by both courts, petitioners representations regarding hisfamilys wealth and his capability to provide for his family more than provided a

fair indication of his financial standing even though he proved to be less than

forthright on the matter .[36] In any event, this award of support is merely

provisional as the amount may be modified or altered in accordance with the

increased or decreased needs of the needy party and with the means of the giver .[37]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 February 1996 of the Eleventh

Division of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 38936 and its

Resolution [38] dated 15 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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Cases for Family Relation

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