LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

Ernesto B. Asuncion for petitioner.

Onofre P. Tejada for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; SEC. 532 (a), PROVIDES WHICH LAW SHALL COVER AND WHICH GOVERNING BODY SHALL, SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF THE SK ELECTIONS. — Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz; "Sec. 78, Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election." In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus: "Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.

2. ID.; ELECTIONS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURES; PROVIDES FOR THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COMELEC. — Formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure: "Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional respondents or protestees. Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date

of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with. Sec. 3. Form of pleadings, etc. — All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper shall be in English or Filipino. . . ." Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SANCTION A PLEADING FILED BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION. — A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, in exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

4. ID.; ID.; KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN; SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK); COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF OFFICE. — The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sanggunian Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government Code of 1991.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS; OF MEMBERS; OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS. — Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2824 DEFINED HOW A MEMBER OF THE KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN BECOMES A QUALIFIED VOTER AND AN ELECTIVE OFFICIAL. — For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in

Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATIONS; DISTINGUISHED. — A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day, of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. (Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.) The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT MORE THAN 21 YEARS OF AGE; CONSTRUED. — The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day, of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-days cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday. Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with

Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.

10. ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATION, A QUESTION OF ELIGIBILITY; CONSEQUENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE; CASE AT BAR. — The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next higher number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months." The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J p:

Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. aisadc

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. 3

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. 6

On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. The order reads as follows:

"Acting on the Fax 'Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy' by petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, a copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex 'A';

6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified; that her certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be cancelled;

xxx xxx xxx"

the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of votes for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].

Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.

SO ORDERED." 9

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. 10 In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order or the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." 12 On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 13

Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.

I

Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:

"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election." cdrep

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. 15

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the

COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:

"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission." 17

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18

II

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These requirements are:

"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional respondents or protestees.

Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.

Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino.

xxx xxx xxx"

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.

III

To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.

The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age." prcd

The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30

Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:

"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary."

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:

"Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least

one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude."

Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:

"Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person must be:

a) a citizen of the Philippines;

b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections."

xxx xxx xxx

"Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:

a) a qualified voter;

b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final."

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not-more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a

resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections. cdpr

A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. 31 The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. 32

The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. 35 In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. 37

Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time President Aquino assumed power. 38 They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21 years 39 and the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:

"Sec. 423. Creation and Election. — a) . . .;

b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected."

The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday. 40 Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.

In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but

definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections. llcd

The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. 42 The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. 43

The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. 44 A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. 45 Moreover, despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. 47

Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, 49 is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."

The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term. casia

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J ., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Annex "D" to Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, pp. 57-58; Annex "A" to Petition, Rollo, pp. 15-16.

2. Annex "3" to the Comment for the Private Respondent, Rollo, pp. 109-112.

3. The judge was then boarding in the house of petitioner (Comment for the Private Respondent, p. 2, Rollo, p. 89).

4. Annex "F" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, pp. 61-62.

5. Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo p. 18; Annex "G" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 63.

6. Annex "D" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 19; Annex "H" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 64.

7. Annex "I" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 66.

8. Through the PT & T.

9. Annex "L" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 71-73.

10. Comment of Private Respondent Florencio Sales, Jr., p. 14, Rollo, p. 101.

11. Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, par. 18, Rollo, p. 41.

12. Annex "R" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 82.

13. Annex "S" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 83.

14. Section 532 (a) of the Code (B.P. 881) was amended by R.A. 7808 which in pertinent part reads:

"Sec. 1. . . .

The conduct of the sangguniang kabataan elections shall be under the supervision of the Commission on Elections.

The Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of the sangguniang kabataan."

15. Rule 23 provides:

"Section 1. Ground for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. — A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.

Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.

Section 3. Summary Procedure. — The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.

Section 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. — The Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence."

16. Section 5 [b] and [c], Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

"Sec. 5. . . .

(b) When sitting in Divisions, two (2) Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum to transact business. The concurrence of at least two (2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling. If this required number is not obtained the case shall be automatically elevated to the Commission en banc for decision or resolution.

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the Division which shall be resolved by the Division which issued the order."

17. See also Section 3, Article IX [C] of the Constitution.

18. Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 307, 131-134 [1992].

19. One copy was filed by registered mail and the other by facsimile. Third and fourth copies were sent by registered mail to petitioner Garvida and the COMELEC officer (Annex 5-B to the Comment of Private Respondent, Rollo, p. 116).

20. "Facsimile Transmission," The New Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 651, vol. 4, 15th ed. [1992].

21. Id.

22. "Facsimile," The New Webster's International Encyclopedia, p. 375 [1996]; "Facsimile," Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 813 [1971].

23. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 531, 5th ed. [1979].

24. Sections 1 and 4, P.D. 684.

25. Whereas clauses, Sec. 1, P.D. 684; Mercado v. Board of Elections Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas, 243 SCRA 422, 426 [1995].

26. Section 2, P.D. 684.

27. Section 423, Chapter 8, Title I, Bk. III, R.A. 7160.

28. Sections 423, 428, Chapter 8, Title I, Bk. III, R.A. 7160.

29. Section 430, Id.

30. Section 429, Id.

31. Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.

32. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 142-143 [1990].

33. The Local Government Code speaks of the requirements for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan, not the qualifications of a voter.

34. Civil Code, Article 13; National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 29 SCRA 70, 74 [1969].

35. Erwin v. Benton, 87 S.W. 291, 294; 120 Ky. 536 [1905].

36. Section 2, P.D. 684.

37. Feliciano v. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159-1160 [1957].

38. Pimentel, A.Q., The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development, p. 440 [1993].

39. It is worth noting that it is only in the case of SK candidates that the Local Government Code sets a maximum age limit. It sets a minimum age for the rest of the elective officials, e.g., members of the sangguniang barangay, sangguniang panlungsod or bayan, sangguniang panlalawigan, mayor and governor (Sec. 39, Chapter I, Title II, Bk. I, Local Government Code of 1991).

40. Pimentel, supra, at 440.

41. Castañeda v. Yap, 48 O.G. 3364, 3366 [1952].

42. Sanchez v. del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102, 1106 [1961]; Feliciano v. Aquino, Jr., 102 Phil. 1159, 1160 [1957].

43. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245, 255 [1989].

44. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400, 423, 429 [1995]; Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 211 SCRA 297, 311 [1992]; Sanchez v. del Rosario, supra, at 1105.

45. Id.

46. Comment of Private Respondent Florencio Sales, Jr., pp. 14-15, Rollo, 101-102.

47. cf. Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 311.

48. Section 435 of the Local Government Code provides:

"Sec. 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies. — (a) In case a sangguniang kabataan chairman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months, the sangguniang kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding shall assume the office of the chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to the office. In case the said member refuses to assume the position or fails to qualify, the sangguniang kabataan member obtaining the next highest number of votes shall assume the position of the chairman for the unexpired portion of the term.

xxx xxx xxx"

49. "Failure to qualify" means a public officer's or employee's failure to take the oath and/or give the bond required by law to signify his acceptance of the office and the undertaking to execute the trust confided in him (Martin and Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers and Election Law, p. 140 [1983]; Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 253, p. 162; Words and Phrases, "Failure to Qualify," citing State v. Boyd, 48 N.W. 739, 751, 31 Neb. 682).

50. Gaerlan v. Catubig, 17 SCRA 376, 378 [1966]; Feliciano v. Aquino, Jr., supra.

51. People v. Yanza, 107 Phil. 888, 890 [1960].

52. Separate Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300, 398 [1995].

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996.]

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Matias Pangilinan Bansale Tan Feliz Alberto Hernal Buazon & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General and Jose P. Balbuena for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RECALL; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SK ELECTION; FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL, SK ELECTION IS NOT A REGULAR ELECTION UNDER SECTION 74 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. — The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides — "SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term

of office for loss of confidence, (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election," as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum . . . ." TSEAaD

2. ID.; REGULAR LOCAL ELECTION; CONSTRUED. — Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

3. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A TOO LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW LEADS TO ABSURDITY WHICH CANNOT BE COUNTENANCED. — Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: "We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in 'the letter

that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth' . . ." The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. EDIHSC

DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RECALL; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SK ELECTION; THE SK ELECTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A "REGULAR LOCAL ELECTION" FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL UNDER SECTION 74 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ARE NOT CONSIDERED LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; REASON. — The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides: SEC 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: . . . (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 113-118). Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424 Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local). Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code. cIaHDA

R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J p:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

"SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."

[Emphasis added.]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. cdasia

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to “enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

"We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in 'the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth' . . ." 8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office

held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. dctai

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ ., concur in the majority and separate concurring opinions.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:

SEC 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One

of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118)

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).

Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.

Footnotes

1. COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995.

2. RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo, p. 28.

3. Rollo, pp. 64-66.

4. Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464, 467.

5. Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617, 627.

6. Id. at p. 628.

7. PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674

8. People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.

9. Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardorne v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 109713. April 6, 1995.]

JOSE M. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF IBAAN, PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CRISANTO P. PANGILINAN and HON. CONRADO R. ANTONA, respondents.

Mayo Ebora Austria Mayo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER SEC. 252 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PAR. 2, SEC. 2 OF ART. IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION; CONTESTS ON ELECTION OF SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK) OFFICIALS, NOT INCLUDED. — Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts. These were the laws on elective barangay officials which the Constitutional Commission took into account when it debated on that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution relating to contests involving elective barangay officials. It is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.

2. ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION NO. 2499 CREATING AND CONFERING JURISDICTION ON BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS IN CONTESTS INVOLVING SK ELECTIONS; DECISIONS MAY BE APPEALED TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS. — The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus, we hold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in election controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner, it is a basic principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts. It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. The Court

further holds that there was no need for the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies; firstly, because Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 did not provide for recourse to a higher administrative body; and secondly, the petitioner's cause falls within the exception to the rule in that his petition in Civil Case No. 3565, aside from raising pure questions of law and jurisdiction, also alleges deprivation of due process.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

The novel issues presented in this petition may be reduced to (1) the legality and constitutionality of Section 24, Resolution No. 2499 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) creating, for purposes of the elections in the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK), the Boards of Election Supervisors (BES) and making it the final arbiter of all election protests, and (2) the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts over contests involving sangguniang kabataan elections.

Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 4 December 1992 election for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. The proclamation was made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET), acting as the Board of Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one vote (49 to 48) over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan. 1

Mercado's victory was, however, short-lived. Immediately after Mercado's proclamation as the winner by the BET, Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the BES questioning the results of the election. He alleged that the BET Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting, had invalidated some votes without consulting the other board members. The BES ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES, which issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation.

Mercado then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City a petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the annulment of Pangilinan's proclamation by the BES, and for the issuance of an order to compel the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to recognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay Mabalor and to allow him to take his oath of office and discharge his duties as such.

In his petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3565, Mercado assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by Pangilinan as the ground cited therein was allegedly in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. He further claimed that, assuming that the BES has jurisdiction over the protest, the grounds raised therein were deemed waived by Pangilinan's failure to invoke them at the level of the BET, and that the BES acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner of due process when it ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recounting of the votes without affording him the opportunity to be heard.

In its Order dated 13 January 1993, the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court stated that it was not aware of any law by which it could act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition since Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies affecting Sangguniang Kabataan elections, constituting instead the BES, which is under COMELEC jurisdiction, as the final arbiter of all election controversies within its level.

Mercado moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal order. He argued that the RTC was competent to act on his petition because: (a) one mode of seeking judicial review is through the writ of certiorari which may be issued by the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129; (b) under its Resolutions Nos. 2499 and 2520, the COMELEC was to provide only technical assistance in the conduct of the SK election and therefore could not grant any relief from the action of the BES; moreover, under said Resolution No. 2499, no appeal to a higher administrative level was allowed from the action of the BES; and (c) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case at bar, the jurisdictional and due process issues raised therein being legal in nature.

Unconvinced, the RTC, in its Order dated 2 March 1993, denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It ruled that the reopening of the ballot box for Barangay Mabalor and the recounting of the votes cast therein were perfectly within the ambit of the BES's authority, and that Mercado should have gone to the DILG which has direct control and supervision of the SK elections.

Hence, Mercado's present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for the review on pure questions of law of the Orders of 13 January 1993 and 2 March 1993 of the Batangas RTC. He initially raises the same issues he presented in Civil Case No. 3565 on the competency of the BES to take cognizance of Pangilinan's protest and his right to due process, and he reiterates the arguments he adduced in his motion for reconsideration regarding the jurisdiction of the RTC over Civil Case No. 3565. However, in refutation of the Solicitor General's defense of the BES jurisdiction as conferred by COMELEC Resolution No. 2499, Mercado, in his Consolidated Reply, now contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article I of the said Code which explicitly provides that "it shall govern all elections of public officers"; and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title I, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code.

The issues presented require a flashback into the history of the SK. It was initially organized by P.D. No. 684 (15 April 1975) as the Kabataang Barangay (KB), a youth organization composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years of age which aims to provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders, who should at least be 15 years of age or over but less than 18. The then Secretary of Local Government and Community Development was authorized to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations.

Pursuant to P.D. No. 1191 (1 September 1977), the Pambansang Katipunan ng Kabataang Barangay ng Pilipinas was constituted as "a body corporate" with "the powers and attributes of a corporation" and placed directly under the Office of the President. Its affairs were to be administered by the Executive Committee which was empowered to promulgate rules and regulations governing the KB. This youth organization was recognized in B.P. Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), 2 which raised the maximum age requirement of the members from 18 to 21.

Under R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) , the Kabataang Barangay was changed to the Sangguniang Kabataan. 3 It remains as a youth organization in every barangay, composed of a chairman and seven members to be elected by the katipunan ng kabataan, and the secretary and the treasurer to be appointed by the SK chairman with the concurrence of the SK. 4 The katipunan ng kabataan is composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six months who are 15 but not more than 21 and who are duly registered in the list of the SK or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary. 5 The chairman, upon assumption of office, shall automatically become an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay. 6

Under subparagraph (5), paragraph (e), Article 203, Rule XXVII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, 7 the conduct and administration of the elections for sangguniang kabataan members shall be governed by the rules promulgated by the COMELEC.

Pursuant to such authority and for purposes of the SK election authorized under Section 532 of R.A. No. 7160, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2499 which closely followed the pattern set in the Constitution of the Kabataang Barangay providing for a Board of Election Supervisors and Board of Election Tellers, with the former having direct general supervision in the conduct of such election and as the final arbiter of all election protests. Article V of Resolution No. 2499 expressly provides:

ARTICLE V

BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS AND

BOARD OF ELECTION TELLERS

SECTION 24. Board of election supervisors. — There shall be created a board of election supervisors (BES) in every city or municipality composed of the following: a) city/municipal local government operations officer as chairman; b) city/municipal election officer as member; and c) city/municipal secretary as member.

The board shall have direct general supervision in the conduct of elections for sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall act as final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests.

No pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the election of sangguniang kabataan chairman and members.

The petitioner contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is illegal and unconstitutional because it makes the BES the final arbiter of election contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252 of

the Omnibus Election Code which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial court original jurisdiction over such contests and, on a more fundamental ground, in contravention of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution which lodges on such courts exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials. 8

This contention is without merit for it assumes that the SK election is an election involving elective barangay officials within the purview of the aforesaid statutory and constitutional provisions.

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. 9 They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. 10 They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines 11 on election of barangay officials. 12 Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts. 13

These were the laws on elective barangay officials which the Constitutional Commission took into account when it debated on that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution relating to contests involving elective barangay officials. During such debates, the following discussions took place:

MR. MAAMBONG:

Madam President and members of the Committee, I understand from the sponsorship speech that in matters of contests of barangay, municipal and provincial officials, the jurisdiction is all exclusive to the Commission on Elections. Under the present law that we have, cases involving election contests of barangay officials are initiated in the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court, subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court whose decision is final. In other words, "when it comes to barangay officials, the COMELEC has nothing to do at all with the election contest. In the case, however, of municipal officials, under the present law, the Omnibus Election Code, the original jurisdiction is with the Regional Trial Court, and the decision is appealable to the Commission on Elections. We are suggesting — and we would like the Committee to take note of this that while we admit that in all contests, whether it be barangay, municipal, provincial or city officials, the sole authority should be the Commission on Elections — that there should be a two-tiered resolution of cases in the sense that when it comes to barangay officials, the municipal trial court or the metropolitan trial court should have jurisdiction first, then it is appealable to the COMELEC.

In the case of municipal officials, we are thinking that the regional trial court should have jurisdiction, and then it is appealable to the COMELEC. And in the case of provincial or city officials, the first jurisdiction, which is exclusive, would be the COMELEC. I wonder if the Committee would take that into consideration considering these facts. If we will allow the COMELEC to have executive [sic]

jurisdiction over cases involving barangay and municipal officials, one can just imagine the difficulty of the COMELEC, considering that we have thousands of barangay and municipal officials. And as I understand from my private conversation with the Chairman of the COMELEC, the Honorable Ramon Felipe, when it comes to contests involving barangay and municipal officials, the COMELEC may have to send hearing officers; whereas if we will allow the municipal trial court and the metropolitan trial court to have jurisdiction over these cases, they will be given the proper consideration by the court. In the case of contests involving municipal officials, the regional trial court, which is also a court, should have jurisdiction, not the hearing officers of the COMELEC. So, we have a two-tiered situation here which we lawyers think would be the best remedy considering again my allusion to the fact that there are so many barangays and municipalities all over the country.

That is just my suggestion. I do not know if the Committee could respond to it so that we could perhaps present some amendments.

MR. REGALADO:

In other words, insofar as the appellate jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections is concerned, it is still preserved despite the fact that it involves barangay, municipal, city or provincial officials.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Yes, we would rather insist on that because that is a constitutional mandate.

MR. REGALADO:

The Commissioner's proposal is only with respect to the original jurisdiction; that is, insofar as election contests involving barangay officials are concerned, the municipal trial courts have the original jurisdiction; whereas in the case of city and provincial officials, the original jurisdiction is vested in the regional trial courts.

MR. MAAMBONG:

No, Madam President. In the case of provincial and city officials, the original and exclusive jurisdiction should be with the Commission on Elections.

MR. REGALADO:

In the case of municipal officials then it will be the regional trial courts which will exercise original jurisdiction.

MR. MAAMBONG:

That is correctly put, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO:

But altogether, in the ultimate analysis on appellate jurisdiction, they will all have to go to the Commission on Elections eventually.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Yes, Madam President. They will still be the sole judge of all election contests. 14

xxx xxx xxx

MR. REGALADO:

May I ask Commissioner Maambong a question?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Yes, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO:

Is it his concern that we vest in the municipal trial courts the matter of election contests for barangay officials and in the regional trial courts election contests involving municipal officials thereby requiring a judicial officer to handle these cases, heightened by the fact that the decisions of the municipal trial court or the regional trial court in those election contests involving barangay and municipal officials are final and immediately executory?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Under the present law, when it comes to appeals from the municipal trial court to the regional trial court, these become final and executory, and we feel that in this regard, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC has been diluted. And we do not like that, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO:

Thank you. 15

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG:

In that case, Madam President, may I proceed to propose this amendment in collaboration and with the advice and consent of Commissioner de los Reyes and Commissioner Rodrigo.

THE PRESIDENT:

What is the amendment?

MR. MAAMBONG:

On line 9, Section 2(2), delete the words "Be the sole judge of" and in its stead insert the words EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER. On line 11, before the word "provincial," insert the word REGIONAL and a comma (,). After the word "provincial" on line 11, insert the word AND. After the word "city," delete the comma (,) and the words "municipal and barangay." After the word "official," place a comma (,) and insert the following: AND OF ALL CONTESTS INVOLVING MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY OFFICIALS ON APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AND FROM THE METROPOLITAN OR MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, RESPECTIVELY.

I move for the approval of the amendment, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

Is this amendment accepted by the Committee?

MR. REGALADO:

Yes, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

So, this is an amendment jointly submitted by Commissioners Rodrigo, Maambong and de los Reyes.

MR. MAABONG:

Yes, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

Is there any objection to the amendment on Section 2(2), line 9 and 11? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved. 16

In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members 17 who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.

The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus, we hold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in election controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner, it is a basic principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts. prLL

It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 18

The Court further holds that there was no need for the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies; firstly, because Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 did not provide for recourse to a higher administrative body; and secondly, the petitioner's cause falls within the exception to the rule in that his petition in Civil Case No. 3565, aside from raising pure questions of law and jurisdiction, 19 also alleges deprivation of due process. 20

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 3565 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 3565 is REINSTATED for further proceedings. The Hon. Judge Conrado R. Antona is directed to proceed with the case with deliberate dispatch, and if necessary, to conduct a recount of the ballots to determine once and for all the true winner in the 4 December 1992 Sangguniang Kabataan Elections in Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. This decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., is on official travel.

Footnotes

1. There being only one voting precinct in Barangay Mabalor, the BET also acted as the Board of Canvassers in accordance with Section 36, COMELEC Resolution. No. 2499.

2. Chapter 10, Title One, Book II.

3. Chapter 8, Title One, Book III.

4. Sections 423, 424, 430, and 431, R.A. No. 7160.

5. Sections 423 and 424, Id.; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development 440-441 [1993 ed.]

6. Section 430, Id.

7. Authorized under Section 533 of the Code. R.A. No. 7808, approved on 2 September 1994, amended Section 532 (a) of R.A. No. 7160 by, inter alia, expressly providing that "[t]he conduct of the sangguniang kabataan elections shall be under the supervision of the Commission on Elections."

8. It provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

9. The title and numbers of the elective barangay officials had undergone several changes. In R.A. No. 2370 (An Act Granting Autonomy to Barrios of the Philippines [20 June 1959]), elective barrio officials were the barrio lieutenant and four council members and the exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to their election was vested in the justice of the peace courts. In R.A. No. 3590 (Revised Barrio Charter), the elective barangay officials were the barrio lieutenant and six barrio councilmen. By virtue of P.D. No. 557, the barrios were converted to barangays and the official designation of the elective officials were changed to barangay captain and barangay councilmen. Thereafter, B.P. Blg. 222 changed the titles of the barangay captain to punong barangay and the barangay councilmen to kagawad ng sangguniang barangay.

10. Section 4, R.A. No. 2370; Section 10, R.A. No. 3590; Section 43, B.P. Blg. 337.

11. Approved 3 December 1985.

12. Sections 37 to 51, Article VI (Election of Barangay Officials).

13. Section 252.

14. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. One, 626.

15. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. One, 624-625.

16. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. One, 643.

17. Section 390, R.A. No. 7160.

18. San Miguel Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor, 64 SCRA 56 [1975].

19. Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio, 123 SCRA 81 [1983]; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, 160 SCRA 751 [1988]; Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 [1988]; Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989].

20. Reyes vs. Subido, 66 SCRA 203 [1975]; Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio, supra note

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127318. August 25, 1999.]

FRANCIS KING L. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NOLI C. DIAZ, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80, Muntinlupa City, and LIBERTY SANTOS, respondents.

Antonio A. Navarro III and Cristela Wednesday N. Patdu for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Julita F. Escueta-Gonzales for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondent filed an election protest before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City impugning the election of petitioner as SK Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City, on the ground that the latter is disqualified by age to the office of SK Chairman. Thereafter, the MeTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding petitioner to refrain from taking his oath of office. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the election protest on ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the trial court's jurisdiction is confined only to frauds, irregularities and anomalies in the conduct of the SK elections and that the determination of eligibility or qualification of a candidate for SK elections is vested with the election officer concerned under Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. The MeTC ordered the dismissal of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and set the hearing of the case. Hence, petitioner filed a petition before the respondent Commission imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC when it assumed jurisdiction over the disqualification proceedings. On November 19, 1996, the COMELEC issued a Resolution upholding the jurisdiction of the MeTC, ruling that the disqualification case having been filed after the election and proclamation of the winning candidate, the governing law, therefore, is the second paragraph of Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, which confers upon the trial court the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present disqualification case. Hence, this petition. SCEDaT

In affirming the resolution of the COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that Sections 252 and 253 of the Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. Thus, any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the chairman) — whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election — is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 applies only to proceedings before the election. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases became quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs. Moreover, quo warranto proceedings involving elective barangay officials are cognizable by the MTC, MCTC or MeTC. To contend that quo warranto proceedings involving SK Chairman should be brought in the Regional Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK Chairman more important than the chairman and elective barangay officials. Furthermore, if election protests involving SK officers are cognizable by the MTCs, there is no reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same officers should not be cognizable by the same courts.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ELECTION PROTESTS INVOLVING SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS ARE COGNIZABLE BY THE MTCs, MCTCs, AND MeTCs. — Any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the chairman) — whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election — is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which provides that: "cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates [of SK] shall be decided by the city/municipal Election officer (EO) whose decision shall be final," applies only to proceedings before the election. This is evident from the use of the word "candidates" in Section 6 and the phrase "winning candidates" in Section 49. The distinction is based on the principle that it is the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the jurisdiction of election officials. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer or EO as he is called in Section 6. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases become quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs.

2. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; RULING IN MERCADO CASE (243 SCRA 423) IS NO LONGER CONTROLLING IN CASE AT BAR. — The case of Jose M. Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors, in which this Court ruled that election protests involving SK elections are to be determined by the Board of Election Supervisors was decided under the aegis of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499, which took effect on August 27, 1992, Article V, Section 24 of which provides: "The said board [of election supervisors] shall have direct general supervision in the conduct of elections of sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall act as final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests." However, COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which took effect on February 6, 1996 and was passed pursuant to R.A. 7808, in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the OEC, has since transferred the cognizance of such cases from the BES to the MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs. So that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, now provides that: "the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final . . ." Thus, the doctrine of Mercado is no longer controlling.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT; HAS JURISDICTION OVER QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN OFFICERS. — It is also argued that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution applies only to election protests, and does not include quo warranto suits. As already stated, quo warranto suits are now cognizable by the MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs pursuant to Art. 253 of the OEC and RA 7808. Section 49 of Resolution 2824 must be understood to cover both election protests and quo warranto cases, otherwise, to limit it only to election protests would leave parties in an SK election to file their quo warranto cases in the Regional Trial Court because of the absence of a specific provision. First, quo warranto proceedings involving elective barangay officials, such as the Barangay Chairman and seven [7] members, are cognizable by the MTC, MCTC or MeTC. To contend that quo warranto proceedings involving an SK Chairman should be brought in the Regional Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK Chairman, who is just an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay, more important than the Chairman and elective members of the same Sangguniang Barangay. Second, if election protests involving SK officers are cognizable by the MTCs,

there is no reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same officers should not be cognizable by the same courts. If the objection to the election of an SK Chairman involves a question both as to his eligibility for the office and of fraud in his election, two petitions would have to be filed in different fora — one in the RTC (for the quo warranto suit) and another one in the MTC (for the election protest). The same objection to the splitting of jurisdiction which has led to a reform in our law of procedure can thus be made to this interpretation. EHSADc

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J p:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Francis King L. Marquez, assailing the 19 November 1996 Resolution 1 of the COMELEC En Banc 2 in SPR No. 15-96, entitled "Francis King L. Marquez vs. Noli C. Diaz, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80, Muntinlupa City, and Liberty Santos", which Resolution upheld the jurisdiction of respondent Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) to hear and decide the case of disqualification by reason of age against the herein petitioner. LexLib

The COMELEC Resolution sets forth the relevant facts as follows:

"During the May 6, 1996 SK elections, Francis King L. Marquez and Liberty Santos ran as candidates for the position of SK Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Marquez garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed SK Chairman on election day, May 6, 1996.

On May 16, 1996, private respondent filed an election protest before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 80, Muntinlupa City, which protest was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 3255. Private respondent (then protestant) impugned the election of petitioner (then protestee) on the ground that the latter is disqualified by age to the office of SK Chairman.

In its order of May 24, 1996, the trial court found the protest sufficient in form and substance. It issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding petitioner to refrain from taking his oath of office as SK Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. However, on May 27, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the election protest with prayer for the cancellation of hearing. He stated that the averments in the election protest are limited only on the issue of whether or not Marquez is eligible or qualified to assume the office of SK Chairman such that private respondent's right of action is a quo warranto proceeding although captioned as election protest. He sought the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action and that protestant failed to comply with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

As to his first assignment of error, he contended that the May 6, 1996 SK elections are primarily governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 to the effect that the trial court's jurisdiction is confined only to frauds, irregularities and anomalies in the conduct of the SK elections and that the determination of eligibility or qualification of a candidate for SK elections is vested with the election officer concerned under Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. And as to the second assignment of error, petitioner

alleged that private respondent did not mention that she had previously filed a petition involving the same issue and parties with the Election Officer of Muntinlupa whose office according to petitioner, is considered a quasi-judicial agency of the government.

In his (sic) opposition, private respondent argued that the term "election protest" should not be taken in such restrictive sense as to limit its definition to only such acts pertaining to the manner or conduct of the election and the attending circumstances surrounding the casting and counting of ballots. Such term, according to her, should be given the widest possible scope as to include all such questions arising from or relative to the election held. On the question of non-compliance with the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94, she stated that the failure of the election officer of Muntinlupa to resolve the question of qualification of Marquez prompted her to file an election protest such that upon the filing of the same, there is no pending action over the same issue lodged with any tribunal or agency to speak of.

On June 4, 1996, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the Motion to Dismiss and set the hearing of the case accordingly. The trial court interpreted the provision of Sec. 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824 as referring to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not cover those cases filed after the election of candidates. It ruled that quo warranto proceedings fall under its jurisdiction within the purview of Sec. 253, par. 2 of the Omnibus Election Code, and that the failure of the Election Officer of Muntinlupa to act on the complaint warranted the filing by the protestant Liberty Santos of a petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan Trial Court o Muntinlupa under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies." 3

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid Resolution, petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that:

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 80, MUNTINLUPA CITY, PRESIDED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE, HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE A DISQUALIFICATION CASE, BY REASON OF AGE IN RELATION TO THE MAY 6, 1996 SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK) ELECTIONS.

Petitioner contends that Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is controlling.

Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 4 provides:

"Qualifications of Elective Members — An elective official of the SK must be:

(a) a registered voter;

(b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

(c) able to read and write Filipino, any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO), whose decision shall be final." cdll

On the other hand, Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

"Petition for Quo Warranto — Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court or Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election."

We hold that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code applies. R.A. 7808, which took effect on September 2, 1994 provides that "the Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan." This means that the election of Sangguniang Kabataan shall be governed by the following provisions of the OEC:

SECTION 252. Election contest for barangay offices. — A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final.

SECTION 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

It was pursuant to this provision of R.A. 7808 in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the OEC that in its Resolution No. 2824, promulgated on February 6, 1996, the COMELEC provided in Section 49 as follows:

"Finality of Proclamation. — The proclamation of the winning candidates shall be final. However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final. The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required, which shall be refundable if the appeal is found meritorious." [underscoring supplied].

Thus, any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the chairman) — whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election — is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which provides that:

"cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates [of SK] shall be decided by the city/municipal Election officer (EO) whose decision shall be final."

applies only to proceedings before the election. This is evident from the use of the word "candidates" in Section 6 and the phrase "winning candidates" in Section 49. The distinction is based on the principle

that it is the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the jurisdiction of election officials. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer or EO as he is called in Section 6. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases become quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs.

The case of Jose M. Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors, 5 in which this Court ruled that election protests involving SK elections are to be determined by the Board of Election Supervisors was decided under the aegis of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499, which took effect on August 27, 1992, Article V, Section 24 of which provides:

"The said board [of election supervisors] shall have direct general supervision in the conduct of elections of sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall act as final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests."

However, COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which took effect on February 6, 1996 and was passed pursuant to R.A. 7808, in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the OEC, has since transferred the cognizance of such cases from the BES to the MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs. So that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, now provides that:

"the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final. . ."

Thus, the doctrine of Mercado is no longer controlling.

It is also argued that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution applies only to election protests, and does not include quo warranto suits. As already stated, quo warranto suits are now cognizable by the MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs pursuant to Art. 253 of the OEC and RA 7808. Section 49 of Resolution 2824 must be understood to cover both election protests and quo warranto cases, otherwise, to limit it only to election protests would leave parties in an SK election to file their quo warranto cases in the Regional Trial Court because of the absence of a specific provision.

First, quo warranto proceedings involving elective barangay officials, 6 such as the Barangay Chairman and seven [7] members, are cognizable by the MTC, MCTC or MeTC. To contend that quo warranto proceedings involving an SK Chairman should be brought in the Regional Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK Chairman, who is just an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay, more important than the Chairman and elective members of the same Sangguniang Barangay. cdtai

Second, if election protests involving SK officers are cognizable by the MTCs, there is no reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same officers should not be cognizable by the same courts. If the objection to the election of an SK Chairman involves a question both as to his eligibility for the office and of fraud in his election, two petitions would have to be filed in different fora — one in the RTC (for the quo warranto suit) and another one in the MTC (for the election protest). The same objection to the splitting of jurisdiction which has led to a reform in our law of procedure can thus be made to this interpretation.

Mindful of the jurisprudence aforecited, and after a careful study and examination of the records on hand, we are therefore led to the conclusion that the Commission on Elections correctly upheld the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City over private respondent's petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. SP 3255. The following disquisition of respondent Commission on Elections is noteworthy:

"We are in accord with the trial court’s interpretation that cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates refer to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not cover those that are filed after the election of SK candidates. The disqualification case having been filed after the election and proclamation of the winning candidate, the governing law therefore is second paragraph of Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which confers upon the respondent court the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the disqualification case filed against Marquez. Corollarily, while Sec. 49 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824 speaks of finality of the proclamation of the winning SK candidates, it does not prevent the herein respondent court from exercising original jurisdiction in the event an election protest is filed which in our opinion includes matters which could be raised in a quo warranto proceedings against a proclaimed SK candidate.

Emphatically, the contention of herein petitioner that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he assumed jurisdiction over the disqualification proceedings has no legal and factual basis considering that the election protest which, admittedly, is in the nature of a disqualification proceeding sought to be dismissed, was filed after the SK election, within the reglementary period of ten (10) days after proclamation of the results of the election, and duly filed by virtue of the inaction of the election officer of Muntinlupa.

On the assertion that Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code is not applicable on the ground that the same applies only to barangay elective officials, we hold that such contention is off-tangent considering that an SK Chairman is considered a barangay official under Sec. 387 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code (sic) which provides:

"SECTION 387. Chief Officials and Offices. — (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary, and a barangay treasurer."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC in SPR No. 15-96 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. LLjur

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., took no part; was Comelec Chairman.

Footnotes

1. Annex "A," Petition; Rollo, pp. 231-37.

2. Composed of Commissioners Bernardo P. Pardo (Chairman), Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios S. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Julio F. Desamito, Teresita D. L. Flores, and Japal M. Guiani, (Members).

3. COMELEC's Resolution, pp. 1-3; Annex "A", Petition, Rollo, pp. 231-33.

4. Officially entitled as "In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the May 06, 1996 Elections of the Officials of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK), Per R.A. 7808;" Published in Manila Standard on February 28, 1996.

5. 243 SCRA 423 (G.R. No. 109713, April 6, 1995); Penned by J. Hilario G. Davide, Jr.

6. Section 387, RA 7160; otherwise known as "Local Government Code of 1991."