Case Write

7/27/2019 Case Write

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CITY OF MANILA VS.CHINESE COMMUNITY

40 Phil 349 31 Oct 1919

FACTS

The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portionprivate cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims

that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the

private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other

routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would

create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in

the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the

particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to

exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and

determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of

the expropriation.

HELD:

The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the

actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The

moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred,

it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for

conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent

domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the

municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the

conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right toinquire to.


2/8

REPUBLIC VS.PLDT

26 SCRA 320 27 Jan 1969

FACTS:

The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government

powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant,

PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains

a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone

system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines

of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an

agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby

BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained

to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT hadused trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons

or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the

plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering

the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the

facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as

the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not

compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

HELD:

Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public

ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not

require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just

compensation is paid.


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PEOPLE VS.FAJARDO

104 Phil 443 29 Aug 1958

FACTS:

The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating among others that construction of

a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be

destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a

written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building

adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located

along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request

was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the

view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building

permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceededwith the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of

residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto

they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation

of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable andoppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their

own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of

appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern

tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and

happiness of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,

regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because

it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellantswould, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious

purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that

result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be

heard.


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CITY OF BAGUIO V.NAWASA

106 Phil 31 Aug 1959

FACTS:

Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public

corporation, created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within

its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional

because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said water works

without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to

dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent

domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer. The

court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot

be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchangeof the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is

unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration

was denied hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain

HELD:

R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does notconfiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It

merely directs that all water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal

districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing

them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their

efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate them because it directs that

they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.

The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public

property HELD in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is aproperty of a municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public

use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.


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NATIONAL POWER CORP.VS.GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 60077 18 Jan 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the

construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of

land traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a

right of way.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case

will be entitled just compensation.

HELD:

The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives

Respondents of their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed

below the transmission lines. Because of high tension current conveyed through the

transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the

property is entitled to just compensation.


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REPUBLIC VS.CASTELVI

58 SCRA 336 15 Aug 1974

FACTS:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a

lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to

terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding

against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation

proceedings for the land in question.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that

just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of

that year.

The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the

entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of

authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public usemust be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the

property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that

when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the

commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing

of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of

the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the

Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on

August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determiningthe just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when

the complaint for eminent domain was filed.


7/8

EPZAVS.DULAY

148 SCRA 305 29 Apr 1987

FACTS:

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export

Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San

Antonio Development Corp., in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the

lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the

compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the

commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the

payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15/sqm, which was objected to by

the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and

according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to beexpropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent

Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the

commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus

enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just

compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD

1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes

impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile

in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination.

The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in

determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to

what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of

just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature maymake the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the

Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just

compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own

determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be

precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.


8/8

AMIGABLE VS.CUENCA

43 SCRA 360 29 Feb. 1972

FACTS:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer

Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any

right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the

government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo

Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting

payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th

Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of

the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways

for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, theaction was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General.

According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already

prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff

had no cause of action against the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD:

When the government takes away property from a private landowner for public

use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the

aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating

the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar,

since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of

title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the

government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to

recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes ofownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been

used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due

compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

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