Case

1NC Frontline

Surveillance doesn’t affect the majority of Muslim populations — poll data backs us upSidhu 7 — Dawinder S. Sidhu, Associate Professor of Law, B.A. 2000 from University of Pennsylvania, M.A. 2003 from Johns Hopkins University, J.D. 2004 from The George Washington University, Member of the Maryland Bar, served as a fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States, received a Distinguished Service Award, taught at the Georgetown University Law Center and University of Baltimore School of Law, held visiting research posts at the Oxford University Faculty of Law and Georgetown University Law Center, held fellowships at Harvard University and Stanford University research centers, presented at various law schools, including the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Stanford Law School, participated in programs at leading think tanks, such as the Aspen Institute and Council on Foreign Relations, served as a legal observer of the military commissions at Guantanamo, cited by the Solicitor General of the United States and U.S. Department of Justice, cited in briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, 2007 (“The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans,” 7 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class, Available online at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/margin7&collection=journals&page=375, Accessed on 6/21/15)

Identity: Of the 311 respondents, all identified themselves as Muslims.83

General Internet Usage: A vast majority of respondents (80.1%) used the Internet prior to 9/11, while the rest did not. After 9/11, the Internet usage of the respondents increased 7.7 %, with 87.8% stating that they have used the Internet after the terrorist attacks, while only 11.9% reporting that they have not. The trend towards greater Internet usage continued, as 90.4% of respondents note that they "currently use" the Internet, and only 9.3% state that they do not.

Views Regarding Government Surveillance: 71.7% of respondents believe (48.9% strongly, 22.8% somewhat) that the government is currently monitoring the activities of Muslims in the United States. By contrast, only 4.2% (1.6% somewhat and 2.6% strongly) disbelieve that such monitoring is taking place. Similarly, 70.7% of respondents believe (45.0% strongly, 25.7% somewhat) that the government is currently monitoring the Internet activities of

Muslims in the United States. Only 4.8% disbelieve (2.9% somewhat, 1.9% strongly) that such monitoring is taking place.

Alterations in Behavior--Generally: 86.8% of respondents said they have not changed at all their

general activities after 9/11 due to a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. Only 11.6% of respondents changed their general activities (6.1% made slight changes, 2.3% made moderate changes, 1.6% made many changes, 1.6% made significant changes) due to this concern.

65.9% of respondents stated that they were not personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their general activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. 25.4% of respondents stated they were personally

aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their general activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities.

Alterations in Behavior-Internet Usage: 89.1% of respondents said they have not changed their

Internet usage at all -the sites they visit or the amount of time they spend on the Internet-after 9/11 due to a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. Only 8.4% of respondents changed their Internet usage (3.9% made slight changes, 1.6% made moderate changes, 1.9% made many changes, 1.0% made significant changes) due to this concern. Of those who stated that they have made changes in their Internet usage, 57.6% noted that they did not visit websites after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their online activities.

77.2% of respondents stated that they were not personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their Internet usage after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. 11.9% of respondents stated they were personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their Internet usage after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. Of these respondents, 45.6% stated that they are personally aware of other Muslim-Americans who have not visited certain web sites after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their online activities.

This card is probably takes out the aff McMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, “Eye on Islam: Judicial Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance Spectrum”, [http://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=ustlj ]VIGNESH

Immediately after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft converted the Federal Bureau of

Investigation into a counterterrorism agency: "That day, in those early hours," said Ashcroft in a 2002 press conference announcing the Bureau's reorientation, "the prevention of terrorist acts became the central goal of the law enforcement and national security mission of the FBI."l But, while Ashcroft may have properly redirected the FBI toward confronting the primary threat to United States safety and security, his identification of our enemy was not as particular as it could have been. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission aimed for further clarity: [T]he enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism -especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology. 2 Indeed, no characteristic unites the perpetrators of recent terrorist acts so much as their Muslim identity. Middle Eastern nationality may be thought to provide the link, but this trait proves to be underinclusive: to name just a few examples, Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," is a Muslim who was born and educated in the United Kingdom,3 as were the four July 7th London Underground bombers.4 Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person to be charged and convicted by United States courts in connection with the September 11th terrorist attacks, is a French Muslim.5 Earnest James Ujaama, an indicted al-Qaeda associate, is a Muslim convert who was born in Denver and

raised in Seattle.6 Furthermore, of the twenty-six terrorists currently on the FBI's Most Wanted List, three are from the Philippines; two are from Kenya; one, Abdul Rahman Yasin, is from Indiana-all are Muslims.7 Nor does Arab ethnicity serve as a reliably accurate terrorist-identifying characteristic: on December 5th,

2005, a white woman who was raised as a Catholic in Belgium became the first European Muslim suicide bomber when she detonated herself in Baquba.8 Indeed, the use of stereotype-defying terrorist operatives is entirely consistent with al-Qaeda's expressed intent to employ deceptive tactics in carrying out its attacks.9 Of course, the one characteristic that Islamist radicals cannot obscure by selective conscription is Islamic identity. Accordingly, Muslim identity should be considered the attribute that correlates most positively with terrorist involvement; or, in the words of Abdel Rahman aI-Rashed, the

general manager of Al-Arabiya, a top pan-Arab television station in the Middle East,10 "It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists. but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims."11 Our question then becomes, what is the proper role for Muslim identity in our law-enforcement offIcials' preventive counterterrorism efforts? It is a question that calls for a survey of our Constitution as well as our conscience, as the answer may compel us to contemplate taking permissible but regrettable measures against a particular religious group. In 1785, James Madison wrote: "[A just government] will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property."12 But what shall be done when those two ideals are incompatible, when protecting persons and their property requires the government to take action that may infringe on others' religious enjoyment? We are faced with bad (ostracizing Muslims) and worse (suffering another terrorist attack) choices, a predicament expressed in the dour words of the reliably relevant Winston Churchill, who, speaking in a different context, said, "We seem to be very near the bleak choice between War and Shame. My feeling is that we shall choose Shame, and then have War thrown in a little later on even more adverse terms than at present." 13 To assist legal and law enforcement authorities in avoiding both Shame and War, this Article will aim to provide a legal framework allowing law enforcement officials greater flexibility in targeting religious groups. In doing so, it will focus exclusively on religious-group targeting and will not address the related issues of racial and ethnic profiling, which have been adequately covered by other commentators. I will begin by discussing the difference between acts of religious profiling and acts of suspect description reliance, and then discuss how most acts of religious-group targeting can be plausibly characterized as either. Finally, I will recommend that courts adopt a view toward religious-group targeting that allows law-enforcement officials greater flexibility in countering the Islamist

terrorist threat .

Solvency is impossible—Muslims will always be unsure of whether they are being surveyed and any policy will be circumvented Kundani 14 [Arun Kundani, The Guardian, March 28, 2014, “No NSA Reform can fix the American Islamophobic Surveillance Complex”, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillance-complex ] JMOV

Friday 28 March 2014 11.02 EDTLast modified on Friday 3 October 201409.03 EDT¶ Share on Facebook¶ Share on Twitter¶ Share via Email¶

Share on LinkedIn¶ Share on Google+¶ Shares¶ 1,972¶¶ B etter oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus may finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records . The debate opened up by Edward Snowden's whistle-

blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and stores and metadata.¶ These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those living in so-called "suspect communities" – Muslim Americans, left-wing campaigners, "radical"

journalists – the days of living on the receiving end of excessive spying won’t end there.¶ How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about the lives of ordinary people being spied upon ? While we have been rightly outraged at the

government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less interested in the consequences of mass surveillance

for those most affected by it – such as Muslim Americans.¶ In writing my book on Islamophobia and the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the congregation. Others spoke about federal

agents turning up at colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim. All of them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by government officials . ¶ There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on Somali-American political opinions. ¶ There were the Muslim students at the City University of New York who discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been informants all along,

working for the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no reasonable suspicion of any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association.¶ And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The government had no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical

views of the US government.¶ These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two "hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred toby outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher.¶ A study published last year by the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break down. As one

interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they informants?"¶ This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability of state power . Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals intelligence" – the surveillance of our digital communications – but equally important is "human intelligence", the result of informants and undercover agents operating within communities.¶ Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of other

minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists – but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one.¶ So let's reform the NSA and its countless collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000 intelligence analysts working on counter- terrorism and the 15,000 paid informants helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance . Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're always being watched.¶

Alt cause — local policies enforce racist surveillance, plan can’t reform theseAP 12 — Samantha Henry, Matt Appuzzo, Wayne Perry, reporters for the Associated Press, American multinational nonprofit news agency, 2012 (“New Jersey Muslims Angry Over NYPD Surveillance Findings,” The Huffington Post, May 25, Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/25/new-jersey-muslims-cangry-nypd-surveillance_n_1545319.html, Accessed on 6/14/15)

TRENTON, N.J. -- Muslim leaders in New Jersey say they are angry but uncertain what their next step will be after the state's attorney general found that New York City police did not violate any laws in its surveillance of Muslim businesses, mosques and student groups

in New Jersey. Several mosque leaders who attended a meeting Thursday with Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa said they were

shocked he found no violation of state criminal or civil laws by the NYPD in operations that many Muslims considered unjustified surveillance based solely on religion. "This is a big violation of our

civil rights , and we need to go to our communities and explain it?" Imam Mohammad Qatanani, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center

of Passaic County said Thursday as he left the meeting. Qatanani said he would not tell his congregants to stop collaborating with law

enforcement, but added, "We need from them to show us the same seriousness and honesty in building bridges with the Muslim community." Chiesa had been asked by Gov. Chris Christie, who appointed him, to look into operations in New Jersey that were part of a widespread NYPD program to collect intelligence on Muslim communities both inside New York and beyond.

Undercover officers and informants eavesdropped in Muslim cafes and monitored sermons, even when there was no evidence of a crime. They infiltrated Muslim student groups, videotaped mosque-goers or collected their license plate numbers as they prayed. The result was that many innocent

business owners, students and others were cataloged in police files. The interstate surveillance efforts, revealed by The Associated Press earlier this year, angered many Muslims and New Jersey officials. Some, like Newark Mayor Cory Booker and the state's top FBI official, criticized the tactics. Others, like Christie, focused more on the fact that the NYPD didn't tell New Jersey exactly what it was up to. In response, Chiesa launched what he described as a fact-finding review. Further, authorities found that New Jersey has no laws barring outside law enforcement agencies from secretly conducting operations in the state, representatives of the attorney general's office told the AP. However, New York police have agreed to meet with New Jersey law enforcement regularly to discuss counterterrorism intelligence and operations, the attorney general said.

NSA reforms can’t solve racist targeting — too deeply ingrained to changeKundnani 14 — Arun Kundnani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College, has been a Visiting Fellow at Leiden University, Netherlands, an Open Society Fellow, and the Editor of the journal Race and Class, author of The End of Tolerance: Racism in 21st Century Britain, 2014 (“No NSA reform can fix the American Islamophobic surveillance complex,” The Guardian, March 28, Available online at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillance-complex, Accessed on 6/20/15)

In writing my book on Islamophobia and the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at colleges to question every student who happened to

be Muslim. All of them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students at the City University of New York who

discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York

Police Department's Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no reasonable suspicion of

any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association. And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI,

leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The government had no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US government. These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two "hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred to by outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs

and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this

kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and

relationships of trust start to break down. As one interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not knowing whom to trust,

choosing your words with care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our

attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals intelligence" – the surveillance of our digital communications – but equally important is "human intelligence", the result of informants and undercover agents operating within communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption

that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists – but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one. So let's reform the NSA and its countless

collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000 intelligence analysts working on counter-terrorism and the 15,000 paid informants helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance. Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're always being watched.

Aff can’t solve — Anti-Arab sentiment is entrenched in mainstream media and historySalaita 6 — Steven George Salaita, scholar, author and public speaker, received his B.A. in political science from Radford University in 1997, his M.A. in English from Radford in 1999, and completed his Ph.D. at the University of Oklahoma in Native American studies with a literature emphasis, became an assistant professor of English at University of Wisconsin in Whitewater, where he taught American and ethnic American literature until 2006, associate professor of English at Virginia Tech, won a 2007 Gustavus Myers Outstanding Book Award for writing the book Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where It Comes from and What it Means for Politics Today, 2006 (“9/11, Anti-Arab Racism, and the Mythos of National Pride,” Beyond Orientalism and Islamophobia, Fall, Available online at https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v006/6.2salaita.pdf, Accessed on 6/23/15)

My second observation that anti-Arab racism is not confined to the political right also is worth analysis. Racism, as

writers from Elizabeth Cook-Lynn to bell hooks have illustrated, is never limited to particular social or discursive movements, nor is it ever rooted in consistent sites of cultural or linguistic production. Any comprehensive survey of popular opinion in the United States over the past decade (a time frame that

purposely straddles 9/11) will demonstrate that the blatant anti-Arab racism of the political right is , using a

vocabulary appropriate to specific political agendas, reinscribed continually in the discourse , or at least the ethos,

of mainstream and progressive media . For instance, leftist liberal publications such as Dissent, Tikkun, and

MoveOn.org have been guilty of expressing racist attitudes either in the form of support for Palestinian dispossession or by

totalizing all Arabs and Muslims as potential terrorists; or the racism arrives subtly by precluding Arabs from speaking on their own behalf. A similar guilt is shared by mainstream (supposedly liberal) publications such as the New York Times, Newsweek, Los

Angeles Times, and Slate.com, which, given their corporate obligations, cannot realistically be expected to attack anti-Arab racism when it is so fundamental to the interests of American capitalism (and to the survival of the publications). Of major concern to this essay is the recognition that, in keeping with the seminal work of Louis Althusser and

Terry Eagleton, we cannot seriously interrogate racism by attributing it solely to one political ideology without analyzing how the racism is interpolated through a multitude of discourses at the benefit of various ideologies. Beyond this intercultural observation, we can say that anti-Arab racism has specific historical dimensions that render it unique even as it has been an inheritor of countless tensions and anxieties.

Some of those dimensions—travel narratology, Orientalist scholarship, imperialism—have been discussed by others in some detail; the dimension I invariably find most interesting is the relationship of anti-Arab racism with settler colonization, both in the New World and Holy Land. This relationship indicates that a centuries-old Holy Land mania in the United States not only facilitated what Cook-Lynn (2001) calls “anti-Indianism,” but has allowed the antiIndianism to evolve into support for a new Messianic conquest that positions today’s Arabs in a fascinating theological continuum. If Natives were the first victims of racism in

North America, then Arabs, the new schematic evildoers, are merely the latest to be the first .

Security GoodSecurity endorsement is necessary to explore human becoming and open space for life possibilities Booth 2005 (Ken – visiting researcher – US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22)

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around.

What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life-determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure , to the extent their life choices and changes are taken away ; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats –whether these are the lack of food for one’s children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the re lationship between insecurity and a determined life is tha t a degree of security creates life possibilities . Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming –the capacity to have some choice about living differently–consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities

to be explored. Second, security is not synonymous simply with survival . One can survive without being secure (the

experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus , the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people (s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security –and security is

always relative – gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become,

other than merely surviving as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

Realism Realism and securitization are inevitableThayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota (Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76)

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental

cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced

to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior . Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador.

My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchi c ; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great —so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human.

Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in -group/ out -group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power , defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

AT: Threatcon -> WarConstruction of threats does not cause warsKaufman 09 (Stuart J, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives , group fears, and opportunity ar e strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed . Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking

hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side’s felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual

threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war . Even if hostile narratives , fears, and opportunity

exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence : this is consociationalism. 17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

Terror Apoc goodCritical terror studies are garbage Jones and Smith 9 – * University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND ** King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,“We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 – 302, Taylor and Francis)

The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state actors that might have

recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead, the journal's ambition is to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word “terror,” its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of “orthodox” terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have

any substance?¶ Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard Jackson , suggested some uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. Critical Studies on Terrorism appeared last on a list where the first choice was Review of Terror Studies. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve?¶ What it Means to be Critical¶ The editors and contributors explore what it means to be “critical” in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is “a growth industry,” observing with a mixture of envy and disapproval that “literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year” (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective.¶ Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation “terror” is, for the

critical theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains, “acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few thousand casualties per year over the entire world ” (original italics) (p. 1). The United States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects.1 At the same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been “silenced from public and

… academic discourse” (p. 1).¶ The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism” (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten “myths” informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a “state centric security focus,” where analysts rarely consider “the violence perpetrated by the state” (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is “central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as political action,” that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to be “the terrorist's best friend” (p. 7).¶ Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on … grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political

communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.¶ Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position . Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).¶ Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes “the single,” all

embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby lack turns

toexcess” (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65-79),

reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).¶ Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the

ubiquitous assertion of state bias : assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact

seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual

reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary

logical fallacy petitio principii. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.¶ Alleging a constitutive weakness in

established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity ” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated

accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors , along with later claims by Zulaika and

Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of Meibion Glyndwr who would as a matter of principle avoid pob sais like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that Studies in Conflict and Terrorism first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.¶ A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with “the particular dynamics of the political world” (p. 70). Analogously, Stohl claims that “the US and English [sic] media” exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces “structural and political problems” into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics.¶ By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the Shorter Oxford Dictionary would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, “reflexivity” is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity “to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling … is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation” (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore, somewhat repetitively, its implications.¶ Reflexive or

Defective? ¶ Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse , the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce ex cathedra, “refers to the response to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.¶ In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism'” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke “questions the question.” This intellectual potpourri apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).¶ Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the

symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning

of language denies this possibility.¶ The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal

democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language. ¶ The

problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of

speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.¶ It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.¶ What is To Be Done?¶ This ontological confusion notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics . “[C]ritical knowledge,” Booth declares, “involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions” (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with “big-picture navigation aids” (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, “God Almighty only gave us ten”). When not

stating the staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory. Critical theorists thus should “avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,”3 “recognize that states can be agents of terrorism,” and “keep the long term in sight.” Unexceptional advice to be sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she or he lives within “Powerful theories” that are “constitutive of political, social, and economic life” (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to “stand outside” prevailing ideologies (p. 78).¶ In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an “academic international relations” whose role “is not only to interpret the world but to change it” (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academic—or more precisely, critical—international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists.¶ The political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar transformative praxis and this leads “critical global theorizing” into a curiously confused empathy with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between “those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify it—is not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press” (p. 66). The gap “between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm” (p. 66). So, while “terrorist actions are always—without exception—wrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable” (p. 66). From this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable.¶ On the basis of this worrying relativism a further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an “attractive force.” To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, “its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness.”4¶ The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their “responsible research ethics.” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the “ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other.” For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing “with the ethic of responsibility” faced by those who, “in extremis” “have some explosives” (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a

critically self-conscious normativism requires the analyst, not only to “critique” the “strategic languages” of the West, but also to “take in” the “side of the Other” or more particularly “engage” “with the highly developed forms of thinking” that provides groups like Al Qaeda “with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity” (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the “other,” but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his Messages to the West and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto Milestones not only offer “well observed” criticisms of Western decadence, but also “converges with elements of critical theory” (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape.¶ Histrionically Speaking¶ Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.¶ On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives … or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that

terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).¶ At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore , Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.¶ In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “terror has multiple forms” (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the engagee intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).¶ Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development

whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its

“strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation : sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create

an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).¶ In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical

theory, it advances a n ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya . ¶ In analogous

visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle

for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision . ¶ Overall, the

journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this

transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6¶ It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean —neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study . Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.¶ Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity¶ Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in

some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies . It is

ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and critical contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.¶ Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any

context, without any necessary moral value being involved.¶ Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid

claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”¶ Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great

political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.¶ Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream strategic doctrines are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never

eliminate an abstract noun.¶ Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed

understandings of those whom they criticize . Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical

terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.¶ Conclusion¶ In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they

must be discursively engaged.¶ At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama Boston Legal Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant , jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber . ”

The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of Critical Studies on Terrorism are its natural home.

Internal Link Defense

The aff is woefully inadequate the deep-rooted anti-Muslim bias is rooted in american psyche, discourse, and alternate policy—question the effectiveness of the affirmatives methodAli 12 [Yaser, Managing Attorney at Yaser Ali Law and J.D at University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, “Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America”, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 8-1-2012, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4176&context=californialawreview] alla

One would assume that anti-Muslim sentiment reached its high water mark after 9/11. To the

contrary, however, it has increased dramatically in the third phase of Islamophobia, which began

during President Obama’s 2008 campaign . If Volpp’s contentions about Muslims’ being relegated to second-class citizenship were true in 2002, then today that distinction has crystallized even further.136

Whereas a vast majority of the incursions in the second phase occurred under the umbrella of national security, Islamophobia has now evolved beyond simply encouraging profiling and other surveillance techniques aimed at Muslims under the professed interests of national security. An institutionalized version of Islamophobia in this third phase now focuses on the "creeping threat of Shariah" and, in the process, more explicitly threatens the foundational conceptions of citizenship

described by Professor Bosniak. Further, while citizens enjoy some fundamental level of respect for their individual beliefs and practices, this is no longer the case with regard to Muslims, both in journalism

and politics today. Whereas it is widely recognized as socially unacceptable to be openly disparaging

toward minority groups, the privilege reflected in that norm is increasingly denied to Muslims . In this

third phase of Islamophobia , mainstream discourse now explicitly challenges the notion that American Muslims deserve the same liberal notions of rights that other citizens enjoy. One might surmise

that since the contours of this phase cannot easily be demarcated, the third phase is in fact a difference in degree rather than in kind. It is true that unlike the transition from the first to the second phase, there is no single demonstrable event or tipping point that represents the transition from the second to third period; however, there was a gradual progression that increased in intensity since the

presidential campaign of 2008 when the term "Muslim" was actually converted into a slur , as political

opponents "accused" then-Senator Obama of secretly being a Muslim. The suggestion that a Muslim citizen would be less suited for office represents the deep-seated fear and mistrust of Muslims in the American

consciousness . President Obama's opponents recognized this fact and knew that it would be a powerful tool for discrediting him. Yet

what was perhaps most striking about the "allegations" was not the partisan claims themselves, but the responses that President Obama and

other government leaders offered. Obama felt compelled to reject the "accusations," doing his best to distance himself from the Muslim community and choosing not to make any campaign stops in mosques or meet with any Muslim organizations during the campaign (despite making numerous stops at churches and

synagogues). President Obama did not state, that although he was not a Muslim, there was nothing wrong with Muslims per se. Instead, he

reiterated the bias by referring to the accusations on his website as a "smear." Further, during one campaign

rally, his aides asked two young Muslim women dressed in headscarves to exit the stage area where he would be speaking. Arguably, the

pervasiveness of such insidious discourse from the President helped normalize the notion to the public that American

Muslims are not "citizens," but indeed "others ."

Strict Scrutiny Standard Defense

Strict Scrutiny is arbitrary which undercuts solvency—status quo legal standards are better

Riccucci 7 [Norma Riccucci, Rutgers University, June 2007, “Moving Away From a Strict Scrutiny Standard for Affirmative Action Implications for Public Management”, http://arp.sagepub.com/content/37/2/123.short] JMOV

This article addresses the concept of strict scrutiny, the burden of persuasion test used by the courts to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action. Through a systematic analysis of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, it illustrates that strict scrutiny has been applied in an inconsistent, arbitrary manner and, therefore, should not serve as the basis for judicial review of affirmative action programs . It shows that the rule of law established under the Civil Rights Act provides an equally if not more compelling basis for judging the legality of affirmative action programs. Relying on the legal standards advanced by the courts under civil rights statutes provides managers with greater flexibility in developing and implementing affirmative action programs. In effect, the ability of governments to promote diversity of their workforces is greatly enhanced.

Seriously it sucks

Riccucci 7 [Norma Riccucci, Rutgers University, June 2007, “Moving Away From a Strict Scrutiny Standard for Affirmative Action Implications for Public Management”, http://arp.sagepub.com/content/37/2/123.short] JMOV

The constitutional litmus test for judging affirmative action is a failure—it gets an unequivocal “F.” It lacks reliability, validity, and hence legitimacy, characteristics that even the most basic civil service tests are required to demonstrate. More over, it becomes almost impossible for policymakers in educational or employment settings to develop affirmative action policies that will meet some rule of law, when those rules are hollow and inconstant. It must be questioned at this point in the history of affirmative action: why does the Court continue to wrestle with appropriate standards of review, when it will ultimately disregard those standards on a whim or apply them in an erratic, illogical manner? Perhaps strict scrutiny is simply one area where the Court will expressly continue to “legislate from the bench.” As argued here, the framework advanced under Title VII is much less cryptic, arcane, and mercurial, and therefore, could be applied more broadly to all questions of law concerning affirmative action programs and policies. This will greatly facilitate the work of managers and policymakers who are striving to create culturally diverse environments for public employees and students in public universities. As the composition of the Supreme Court has changed since the 2003 Grutter ruling, it becomes imperative for public administrators and policymakers to engage in a dialogue around the irrelevance of strict scrutiny.

Strict scrutiny fails—specifically in the context of Muslim SurveillanceFigueroa 12 (Tiffani B. Figueroa, associate in Morrison Foerster’s Litigation Department, J.D. magna cum laude from Hofstra University School of Law, "ALL MUSLIMS ARE LIKE THAT": HOW ISLAMOPHOBIA IS DIMINISHING AMERICANS' RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION, Hofstra Law Review, Winter 2012, SM)

As discussed above, the fear of Muslims or those perceived as Muslim has resulted in the government's failure to protect Americans' First Amendment right to receive information. n332 The strict scrutiny test [*499] that courts normally employ when assessing the content-neutrality of a regulation on speech has not been effective in light of the increased development of Islamophobia. n333 Following the 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia has impacted the free speech rights of Muslims and the mobility of foreign scholars, as well as the right

to receive information for all Americans. n334 "In an age of official insecurity and anxiety, the most difficult constitutional problem may not be controlling arbitrariness in permitting, but compensating for a chronic tendency to overestimate the likelihood of any damage to public security from public exercises of freedom of speech." n335 Given the current state of events and the vulnerability of the right to receive information, a new standard to deal with the right to receive information in times of political controversy is required. In order to resolve this issue of

dealing with national security and the right to receive information, courts should adopt a specific test under First Amendment speech analysis where : (1) there is a political conflict and (2) there is a clear group that society and the government targets because of the conflict . As discussed earlier, the government may restrict the content of speech in certain situations; however, it cannot favor one viewpoint over another. n336 The test will essentially focus on the effects of a regulation on speech when a specific group is targeted by the government

action. n337 Once the court determines there is a disparate impact on a certain group, the court will then resolve the issue as to whether the government has curtailed the right to receive information through this disproportionate treatment of the specified group . By first looking at the effects of a government action, courts will

provide a framework for which they can work through their First Amendment analysis. n338 When dealing with political conflicts, such as [*500] the war on terror, there are often certain groups that are discriminated against through practices that seem constitutional. Such discrimination is not only overlooked, but it has a subsequent effect on all Americans who are willing to explore different ideas other than those the government makes readily available. n339 The government's actions discussed above, such as dealing with speech at a protest, n340 forcing a woman to remove her hijab in prison, n341 and revoking the visas of foreign scholars n342 serve as examples. These actions appear to be neutral; however, the effects of the actions

unevenly target one particular group: Muslims and those perceived as Muslim . n343 It is important that the courts look beyond the language of the laws or government actions in order to gauge whether the government is in fact practicing viewpoint discrimination and violating the First Amendment right to receive information for Americans . n344 When looking at the effects of government actions: A law [may] not discriminate against a particular viewpoint on its face, and there [may be] no evidence of an improper legislative purpose in enacting the law. Within that framework of facial neutrality, however, we must examine restrictions on speech with particular care when their effects fall unevenly on different viewpoints and groups in society. n345 Looking at the effects of regulation on speech is something that the Supreme Court itself has taken into consideration when looking at the right to receive information. n346 As determined in Martin v. Struthers, n347 the Court explained that, "in considering legislation which thus limits the dissemination of knowledge, we must "be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must "weigh the circumstances and appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.'" n348 Courts have taken a similar stance in other cases. n349 The [*501]

bottom line is: courts must look at the effects of government regulations because laws that have a

disparate impact on one viewpoint run the risk of being viewpoint-based . n350 As in the case of

Islamophobia, it is easy to target a specific group because some Americans automatically associated

the 9/11 hijackers with all Muslims and those perceived as Muslim . n351 Similarly, in the interest of

national security, the government at times partook in practices that people may view as discriminatory. The government failed to protect the free speech rights of Muslims as a targeted group, and these actions subsequently harmed the right to receive information for Americans. Although the government's purpose in enforcing the laws discussed in this Note was not to close off Muslim ideas, the effects may show otherwise . n352 Justice Antonin Scalia stated, "the vice of content-based legislation - what renders it deserving of the high standard of strict scrutiny - is not that it is always used for invidious, thought- control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes ." n353 "Unavoidable targeting" stemming

from a government regulation is included within this "vice of content-based legislation." This phenomenon may shine

light on what has occurred following the 9/11 attacks. By employing an effects test in the First Amendment analysis, courts will more efficiently investigate whether there is viewpoint discrimination affecting the right to receive information since the courts must first establish if a government action falls disproportionately on a specific group. n354 [*502] VI. Conclusion Surely, the government has a highly supported interest in protecting the United States at

all times. However, protection should not ensue at the expense of severely limiting civil liberties and substantially restricting the marketplace of ideas. In times of political strife , such as facing terrorism today, the courts' current approach to dealing with First Amendment violations of the right to receive information fails to protect civil liberties . By looking at the discriminatory effects of regulations on speech, the court can protect a thriving marketplace of ideas.

Lack of specificity makes it harder for social justice—turns solvency

Bunker et al. 11 [MD Bunker, Clay Calvert, William C. Nevin, “Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and The Protection of Speech”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10811680.2011.603624#.VZV-0-1Vikp] JMOV

Professor Gerald Gunther famously declared strict scrutiny to be “‘ strict’ in theory and fatal in fact ” in 1972. Although Professor

Gunther's pithy and influential slogan may have been a reasonably accurate characterization at that time, strict scrutiny in the realm of the First Amendment is now much less fatal to government regulation of expression . This article

explores the beginnings of the strict scrutiny test and the underpinnings of its subsequent dilution. The article examines the multiple ways

courts can avoid applying strict scrutiny and argues that compelling state interests are proliferating in a manner that is harmful to robust speech protection . It also critiques the lack of precision in narrow tailoring analysis. The article concludes that First Amendment strict scrutiny has serious weaknesses that threaten to undermine vigorous protection for expression and offers suggestions for increasing the rigor and precision of the doctrine.

Profiling is distinct from description reliance—they conflate the two—its constitutional and logical to investigate suspects based on descriptionMcMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, “Eye on Islam: Judicial Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance Spectrum”, [http://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=ustlj] VIGNESH

"Religious profiling," in this Article, will be understood as the situation in which law-enforcement authorities act on the inference that a particular adherent of a certain religion is more likely to engage

in criminal or terrorist behavior than any particular adherent of another religion.14 Put an-other way, acts of religious profiling stem from an unfair prejudice towards members of a religious group, a prejudice that attributes criminal or terroristic propensities to all members of the group. But discriminatory bias will not account for all counterterrorist action based on the trait of Muslim identity. Muslim identity can simply be a part of a suspect description, and be as legitimate a trait for the police to rely upon in targeting potential suspects as height. weight. gender, or skin color. This Article's next section will discuss the difference between religious profiling and suspect description

reliance , a difference that becomes crucial when determining the degree of judicial scrutiny to give police action that targets Muslims. A. Suspect Description Reliance, Religious Profiling, and the Question of Discrimination Profiling-understood as presuming a person's criminal propensity from their membership in a particular group-is located at the unconstitutional end of the investigative-technique gamut. The other end of this spectrum is maintained by the permissible and wholly logical law-enforcement technique of relying on suspect descriptions. Whether a court will consider law-enforcement targeting of Muslims to be unconstitutional will largely tum on which end of the suspect description reliance/religious profiling spectrum that the court locates the targeting, as religious profiling will trigger the nearly insurmountable strict scrutiny, while suspect description reliance triggers the deferential rational basis scrutiny. Suspect description reliance is the rather simple concept that police officers, in choosing whom to investigate, may take into account certain characteristics-e.g., race, gender, physical markings, visible religious manifestations-because those characteristics match the physical description of the suspect provided by a victim or witness. 15 Such a technique is neither invidious nor unconstitutional; it is, simply put, "police work." For example, if a white robbery suspect is seen running into a bar where only three of the bar's patrons are white, the sole fact that the three men are white undoubtedly provides the police with the reasonable suspicion needed to justify detaining those men (or even probable cause justifying their arrest).16 While this police action involves targeting persons based on race, it is not "profiling" -presuming criminality from group membership; it is seeking and arresting individuals who match the suspect's description, which in this case happens to be based on race.

Difference between strict scrutiny and rational basis—and explanation by Justice KennedyMcMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, “Eye on Islam: Judicial Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance Spectrum”, [http://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=ustlj] VIGNESH

For the issue of religious-group targeting, of course, one must address an issue that Oneonta did not. While Oneonta's issue of racial profiling is a Fourteenth Amendment question exclusively, the issue of religious-group targeting-involving a potentially discriminatory infringement of religious exercise-represents a point of convergence for the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25 When these two constitutional claims are collapsed, a court's analysis of them collapses as well, such that a court will use the Fourteenth Amendment's analytical framework to evaluate the state's imposition on First Amendment free exercise rights. Put another way, in reviewing a potentially unconstitutional state infringement on free exercise, a court will evaluate the infringement with one of two levels of scrutiny26: it will determine whether the infringement is either (1) rationally related to a legitimate government purpose ("rational basis scrutiny"),27 or (2) whether it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose ("strict scrutiny ") .28 The question of which level of scrutiny

will be applied is, of course, the crux of the matter, as rational basis scrutiny is enormously deferential, while strict scrutiny has generally proven to be, to quote Professor Gunther, " strict in theory and fatal

in fact ."29 1. Level of Scrutiny In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,30 the Court employed the converged First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment analysis and established that its critical question of scrutiny turns on whether government officials, in imposing upon religious exercise, have done so with intent to suppress the targeted religion-discriminatory intent. At issue in Lukumi was the constitutionality of the City of Hialeah's animal sacrifice prohibition, a prohibition contained in a series of ordinances that the city's Santeria practitioners challenged as being a thinly veiled effort to curtail their religious activities.3l Justice Kennedy, writing for the Lukumi majority, began describing the mechanics of the Court's merged First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment analysis by discussing Employment Division v. Smith,32 the case in which the Court gave a rational basis review to an Oregon peyote prohibition that frustrated Native American religious practice.33 According to Kennedy, Smith establishes the first direction that a court can take in the merged analysis: when it finds that conditions similar to those in Smith are present-Le., when the state's action is neutrally postured towards religion-a court should review that action with light scrutiny. To this effect, Kennedy wrote, "A law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."34Kennedy then continued, moving on to describe the second direction of the merged analysis, which he deemed to be the proper direction to take in Lukumi: when a court finds that the conditions of Smith are not met, such that discriminatory intent is the state action's raison d'etre, the

state's action will be subjected to strict scrutiny . Kennedy worded the second direction this way: "If the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest."3s Ultimately, the Court determined that discriminatory intent lay behind Lukumi's animal sacrifice prohibition-that it "had as [its] object the suppression of religion"-and struck it down as unconstitutional.

Strict scrutiny is not applied on prisons and prisoners religious practicesNelson 09 [James D. Nelson, graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Law Review and received the Roger and Madeleine Traynor Prize and the Robert E. Goldsten Award for distinction in the classroom. After graduating, he clerked for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Nelson then served as a trial attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, before joining Columbia Law School as an Associate in Law and Lecturer in 2012. He is also the Editor-at-Large of Columbia Law School’s Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets,

December 11, 2009, “INCARCERATION, ACCOMMODATION, AND STRICT SCRUTINY”, http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/2053.pdf]

VIGNESH

More specifically, federal courts have divided over the question of how to apply strict scrutiny under RLUIPA. According to the statute, government policies imposing a substantial burden on a prisoner’s religious exercise must be justified as the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state

interest. But courts have not agreed on how this standard of review should be applied in the prison context. Some courts apply a deferential model of review, finding most religious burdens to be insubstantial and relying on the judgment of prison administrators regarding the weight of state interests. Other courts, however, are applying a “hard look” model of review that takes more seriously claims that prison policies burden religion and requires prison officials to demonstrate the need for such policies. The rise of a hard look model under RLUIPA is surprising. First, in reviewing claims for religious accommodation outside the prison context, courts have often applied strict

scrutiny with far less stringency than the standard traditionally requires . Courts have held that burdens on religious practice had to be unbearable in order to count as “substantial,” while accepting “less than compelling” government interests to satisfy the standard.6 Second, commentators predicted that courts would be even more deferential in the prison context. Of those who might bring claims for religious exemptions, incarcerated persons would be among the least likely to benefit from judicial review of governmental action.7 There are a number of reasons for such skepticism. First, courts may doubt that prisoners are sincere in the religious beliefs they claim and hold suspicion that such beliefs are feigned in an effort to obtain special treatment.8 Second, courts may generally lack sympathy for those convicted of criminal offenses.9 Finally, courts may doubt their own institutional competence to review decisions regarding the administration of a prison.10 In light of these considerations, few expected to see a change in the level of deference accorded to prison officials.

No Solvency/ Squo Solves

Some Profiled Surveillance has to be justified- the Aff is incredibly bias and the method is problematic--We cite 4 examples that their aff tries to spin as offenseSpencer 14 [Robert Spencer, July 13, 2014, “4 Muslims Who Deserve to Be Under Surveillance”, http://pjmedia.com/blog/4-muslims-who-deserve-to-be-under-surveillance/5/] JMOV

Leftists and Islamic supremacists are enraged this week over the revelation that the FBI and NSA, despite their officially politically correct See-

No-Islam Hear-No-Islam Speak No-Islam stance, have had four prominent Muslim leaders in the U.S. under surveillance. They have

appealed to Barack Obama to stop this surveillance and all related monitoring of Muslims immediately ,

which he almost certainly will, and have mounted a Twitter campaign based around the bitterly ironic hashtag #IAmATarget, which applies

more to infidels in the line of jihad attacks than it ever will to Muslim leaders in the United States.¶ The only problem with all the

righteous indignation that Leftists and Islamic supremacist leaders have summoned about this

surveillance is that it is entirely justified . The uproar began with an exposé titled “Under Surveillance:

Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On,” written by none other than Glenn

Greenwald, along with another far-Left journalist, Murtaza Hussain . Greenwald and Hussain purport to demonstrate

that five Muslim leaders whom the NSA and FBI have been watching are undeserving of such scrutiny, as

they’re honest, patriotic Americans whose only misdeed is to oppose administration policies. ¶ This is, of

course, absurd . Opposing U.S. government policies from the Left won’t get you placed under surveillance; it’ll get you media adulation,

foundation grants, and awards from philanthropic groups. Obama’s IRS persecutes conservative groups, not Leftists, and several military

presentations in recent years have claimed that “right-wing extremists” are a terror threat, with nary a word about genuinely violent Left-wing

extremist groups such as the Occupy movement and others.¶ Bizarrely, and perhaps because they couldn’t find enough

Muslims to fit their victim paradigm, Greenwald and Hussain include in their list of persecuted Muslims

Hooshang Amirahmadi , an Iranian-American professor at Rutgers, who is a professing atheist ; for the

actual Muslims on their list, they gloss over the genuine reasons why the FBI and NSA have placed these

men under surveillance: ¶ 4. Faisal Gill ¶ Faisal Gill is “a longtime Republican Party operative and one-time candidate for public

office who held a top-secret security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland Security under President George W. Bush.”

Greenwald and Hussain note that he “worked as a consultant for the American Muslim Council, which

was founded by the political activist Abdul Rahman al-Amoudi to encourage participation by American

Muslims in the political process.” Later he joined the Department of Homeland Security.¶ Gill’s problems

began, according to Greenwald and Hussain, in 2003, when “al-Amoudi was arrested for participating in

a Libyan plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and for illegal financial transactions with the

Libyan government, crimes for which he eventually pleaded guilty.” Gill was investigated, disclaimed any close

relationship with Alamoudi, and returned to work at the DHS. But he was, we now learn, kept under surveillance.¶ They’re outraged

over this surveillance, but Greenwald and Hussain don’t mention that, according to Discover the

Networks, the plot to assassinate Abdullah involved “two U.K.-based al Qaeda operatives,” and that he

“ultimately pled guilty to, and was convicted of, being a senior al Qaeda financier who had funneled at

least $1 million into the coffers of that terrorist organization.Ӧ Faisal Gill worked as a consultant for

Alamoudi’s group – that is, a group founded and headed by a confessed senior al Qaeda financier. Would

Greenwald and Hussain be this outraged that he was under surveillance if he had worked as a consultant for a group headed by a senior Ku Klux

Klan financier? Somehow I doubt it. 3. Asim Ghafoo r ¶ Asim Ghafoor is “a prominent attorney who has represented

clients in terrorism-related cases.” He had some controversial clients, including the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, which has

been linked to Osama bin Laden, and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law. But everyone is entitled to

representation, and representation does not require that an attorney endorse his client’s actions.¶

However, here again Greenwald and Hussain leave out salient details. Discover the Networks reports that,¶ Asim

Ghafoor was a political consultant, spokesman , and public relations director for the Global Relief

Foundation (GRF), which the U.S. government shut down in December 2001 because of the

organization’s ties to terrorism ….GRF is not the only organization with ties to terrorism with which

Ghafoor has been involved. While he was with GRF, Ghafoor was also the spokesman for Care International .

The December 6, 2002 Wall Street Journal reports: ‘Records indicate close ties between [Care

International] and the Boston branch of Al Kifah Refugee Center, the Brooklyn branch of which was

named by prosecutors as the locus of the 1993 conspiracy to bomb the World Trade Center.¶ Reason

enough to put Ghafoor under surveillance? How could it not be?¶ 2. Agha Saeed¶ Agha Saeed is “a former

political science professor at California State University who champions Muslim civil liberties and

Palestinian rights” – including, say Greenwald and Hu ssain, “the right of Palestinians to armed resistance against

occupation if peaceful means fail—a right affirmed in a series of resolutions by the United Nations

General Assembly .” ¶ The fact that the corrupt and morally compromised UN endorsed the “Palestinian”

jihad is hardly a ringing affirmation of its moral rectitude, and in any case, the groups that pursue

“armed resistance against occupation” are jihad terror groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic

Jihad. Saeed supports this “armed resistance,” so he may be in contact with some of the leaders or

members of such groups, and surveillance could reveal something that could be used to stop their jihad

terror attacks against civilians . So here again, surveillance is warranted. ¶ 1. Nihad Awad¶ Nihad Awad is “the

executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations ( CAIR) , the largest Muslim civil rights

organization in the country.” (Greenwald, the article fastidiously notes, “has given paid speeches before CAIR’s regional affiliates.”)¶

“Despite its political moderation and relationship to federal law enforcement agencies,” say Greenwald and Hussain, “CAIR became a primary

target of hardline neoconservatives after 9/11.” This apparently resulted in the fact that “in 2007, the Justice Department named the group as

one of more than 300 ‘unindicted co-conspirators’ in its controversial prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation,

then the largest Muslim charity in the U.S., which was eventually convicted of providing material

support to Hamas. ” ¶ Greenwald and Hussain notes that “i n 1994, Awad voiced public support for Hamas —before

the group’s campaign of suicide attacks against civilians and subsequent placement on the State

Department’s terrorist list in 1997.” But it adds:¶ “I do not support Hamas,” Awad says today, pointing out that the group was not

involved in terrorist activities at the time he made the statement. “It was not on the list of organizations that sponsor or conduct terrorism by

the State Department. And when the organization took those acts, CAIR has condemned it, repeatedly.”…¶ So we are to understand

that Awad supported Hamas in 1994, but in 1997, when it was placed on the State Department’s

terrorist list, he stopped supporting it. Here is part of the old Hamas website’s “Glory Record” of attacks

against Israelis – the terrorist organization’s own record of its murderous actions. On a page that

remained on its website well after 9/11, it celebrated the pre-1994 murders of Israeli civilian Ya’coub

Berey; civilians on a bus to Tel Aviv attacked by Hamas jihadi Ahmed Hussein Shukry; civilians in a crowd

in Jaffa who were murdered by another Hamas jihadi in 1992; and a civilian at Beit Lahya who was

murdered by a member of Hamas’s al Qassam Brigades. The site also celebrated the stabbings by Hamas

members of an Israeli bus driver, a group of Israelis at a bus station in Keryat Youval, a group of Israeli

citrus packers, and a group of Israelis who were run down by jihadist cab driver Jameel Ismail al-Baz.¶ All

these acts were committed and publicly celebrated before 1994, when Awad professed his support for

Hamas. That they give Awad a platform for his dissembling is typical of the dishonesty of the entire

Greenwald/Hussain piece. But it will accomplish its purpose: the ending of surveillance of these and

other Muslim leaders and the further weakening of counter-terror operations in general. And

Americans will be in even greater danger than they were before.

Indiscriminate Surveillance inevitable and harms are only felt after surveillance activity is reportedSerwer 14 [Adam Serwer, Reporter at MSNBC, Feb 20, 2014, “Judge throws out lawsuit challenging NYPD’s spying on Muslims”, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/nypd-allowed-spy-muslim-americans] JMOV

Religious profiling is okay, as long as you have a really good reason.¶ That’s the logic behind a decision reached by

federal judge William Martini Thursday, in dismissing a lawsuit against New York Police Department over the NYPD’s surveillance of Muslim

American communities in the region.¶ “ The police could not have monitored New Jersey for Muslim terrorist

activities without monitoring the Muslim community itself, ” Martini wrote. “The motive for the program

was not solely to discriminate against Muslims, but rather to find Muslim terrorists hiding among ordinary, law-

abiding Muslims.Ӧ Any harm suffered by Muslims who were spied on, Martini wrote, was not the fault of the

NYPD , but of the Associated Press reporters who first revealed the existence of the surveillance

effort . ¶ MELISSA HARRIS-PERRY, 1/19/14, 1:09 PM ET¶ The downside to living in an electronic age¶ “Nowhere in the Complaint do

Plaintiffs allege that they suffered harm prior to the unauthorized release of the documents by the Associated Press. This confirms that

Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries flow from the Associated Press’s unauthorized disclosure of the documents,” Martini wrote. “The harms are

not ‘fairly traceable’ to any act of surveillance.” The Associated Press declined to comment on the ruling.

National Data collection and Local Police reform are uniquely key to preventing oppression toward minoritiesNatarajan 14 Ranjana Natarajan (“Racial profiling has destroyed public trust in police. Cops are exploiting our weak laws against it”, December

15,http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyed-public-trust-in-police-cops-are-exploiting-our-weak-laws-against-it/,Accessed 6/21/15)

The #BlackLivesMatter movement has sparked nationwide protests and has raised awareness worldwide about the unequal treatment of black people by police in the United States. Listening to the

voices from the movement — and learning from the death of Eric Garner and the series of other deaths of unarmed black men — it’s clear that two issues need to be addressed: racial profiling and police use of excessive force. Both run afoul of the

U.S. Constitution, but remain common practices in law enforcement, too often with tragic results. In Garner’s case , for example , police targeted him for the petty crime of selling loose cigarettes — the types of crimes black people are targeted for at higher rates — and then attempted to arrest him with a chokehold, banned by the department. Whatever else we have learned from the recent tragedies of police violence, it is clear that we need comprehensive federal,

state and local policies that outlaw racial profiling and rein in police excessive force. Racial profiling — as well as profiling based on

religion, ethnicity and national origin — continues to plague our nation despite the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment under the law. In a 2011 report, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights found evidence of widespread racial profiling, showing that African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately likely to be stopped and

searched by police, even though they’re less likely to be found possessing contraband or committing a criminal act. In Illinois, for example, black and Hispanic drivers were twice as likely to be searched after a traffic stop compared to white

drivers, but white drivers were twice as likely to have contraband. The NYPD’s controversial stop-and-frisk program shows similar evidence of racial profiling , with police targeting blacks and Latinos about 85 percent of the time. In nearly nine out of 10 searches, police find nothing. Likewise, excessive force by police persists despite the Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. In lawsuits and investigations, the

U.S. Department of Justice has concluded that a number of major police departments have engaged in a pattern or practice of excessive force. The Cleveland Police Department was most recently found to be an offender, but it follows a long line of

other wayward law enforcement agencies: Seattle, New Orleans, Portland, Newark and Albuquerque among them. Clearly, cases like Eric Garner’s are not isolated — police use of excessive force is a systemic, national problem . The DOJ has recommended revising and clarifying local policies regarding appropriate uses of force, improving officer training and supervision, and

implementing rigorous internal accountability systems, among other things. But recommendations are not enough. Conquering this systemic issue demands a national mandate. Profiling undermines public safety and strains police-community trust. When law enforcement officers target residents based on race, religion or national origin rather than behavior, crime-fighting is less effective and community distrust of police grows. A study of the Los Angeles

Police Department showed that minority communities that had been unfairly targeted in the past continue to experience greater mistrust and fear of police officers. To root out this ineffective tactic that undermines public confidence, we need stronger policies against racial profiling at all levels — from local to federal — as well as more effective training and

oversight of police officers, and systems of accountability. Twenty states have no laws prohibiting racial profiling by law enforcement, according to an NAACP report released in September. Among states that do, the policies vary widely in

implementation and effectiveness. Only 17 of those states require data collection on all police stops and searches, and only 15 require analysis and publication of other racial profiling data . Limited and inconsistent

data collection makes it impossible to devise effective remedies for racial profiling. Last week, the U.S. Department of Justice unveiled a newly revised guide on use of profiling by law enforcement, distinguishing between legitimate uses (such

as using race and other characteristics in a suspect description) and illegitimate uses (such as criminal stereotypes). Among other things, the guide explains that uses of race and other characteristics should be based on particularized and trustworthy information relevant to the specific investigation , rather than generalized stereotypes . The policy also provides general provisions on training, data collection and accountability, and it was expanded to include national origin, religion,

gender, sexual orientation and gender identity. Civil rights groups have been calling for this updated guide for years. However, the Department of Justice did not address all concerns. Civil rights advocates had also called for the elimination of loopholes for

national security and border enforcement, which the DOJ did not adopt. The document states: This Guidance does not apply to

Federal non-law enforcement personnel, including U.S. military, intelligence, or diplomatic personnel, and their activities. In addition, this Guidance does not apply to interdiction activities in the vicinity of the border, or to protective, inspection, or screening activities. The DOJ policy, however, is far clearer and stronger than

policies held by many states and localities. As the NAACP found, some states and localities ban the use of pretextual traffic stops, others explicitly prohibit racial profiling, and still others require mandatory data collection — but few contain all of the elements of an effective racial profiling ban, and many states lack profiling laws altogether. Since Americans encounter local police in far greater numbers than any federal law enforcement officers, the adoption of state and local laws and policies banning profiling is critical . Excessive force and racial profiling

are two destructive modes of police misconduct that require concerted, vigilant action to reduce and eliminate. While racial profiling can end in tragic police killings of unarmed individuals, such as with Eric Garner or Michael Brown, it also results in many unnecessary stops and searches, harassment and intimidation, and even confiscation of property without due process. The steps to curb this are clear: At all levels of government, we need definitive anti-profiling laws and policies, training of officers on the elimination of explicit and implicit bias, data collection on traffic stops and other police-community contacts, and development of internal and external accountability systems. With these efforts, police departments across the country can rebuild public trust and ensure that policing methods reinforce rather than undermine our democratic values.

Squo solves, Federal gov’t already expanding rules, but local law enforcement is not Apuzzo 14, Matt Apuzzo(”U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by Federal Agents”,January 16, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/us/politics/us-to-expand-rules-limiting-use-of-profiling-by-federal-agents.html?_r=0, Accessed 6/21/15)

The Justice Department will significantly expand its definition of racial profiling to prohibit federal agents from considering religion , national origin, gender and sexual orientation in their investigations, a

government official said Wednesday. The move addresses a decade of criticism from civil rights groups that say federal authorities have in particular singled out Muslims in counterterrorism investigations and Latinos for immigration investigations. The Bush administration banned profiling in 2003, but with two caveats: It did not apply to national security cases , and it covered only race, not religion, ancestry or other factors. Since taking office, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. has been under pressure from Democrats in Congress to eliminate

those provisions. “These exceptions are a license to profile American Muslims and Hispanic-Americans,” Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, said in 2012. President George W. Bush said in 2001 that racial profiling was wrong and promised “to end it in America.” But that was before the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. After those attacks, federal agents arrested and detained dozens of Muslim men who had no ties to terrorism. The government also began a program known as special registration, which required tens of thousands of Arab and Muslim men to register with the authorities because of their nationalities. “Putting an end to this practice not only comports with the Constitution, it would put real teeth to the F.B.I.’s claims that it wants better relationships with religious minorities,” said Hina Shamsi, a national security lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union. It is not clear whether Mr. Holder also intends to make the rules apply to national security investigations, which would further respond to complaints from Muslim groups. “Adding religion and national origin is huge,” said Linda Sarsour, advocacy director for the National Network for Arab American Communities. “But if they don’t close the national security loophole, then it’s really irrelevant.” Ms. Sarsour said she also hoped that Mr. Holder would declare that surveillance, not just traffic stops and arrests, was prohibited based on religion. The Justice Department has been reviewing the rules for several years and has not publicly

signaled how it might change them. Mr. Holder disclosed his plans in a meeting on Wednesday with Mayor Bill de Blasio of New York , according to an official briefed on the meeting who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the conversation was private. Mr. de Blasio was elected in November after running a campaign in which he heavily criticized the Police Department’s stop-and-frisk tactic , which overwhelmingly targets minorities and which a federal judge declared unconstitutional. The mayor and

attorney general did not discuss when the rule change would be announced, the official said. A senior

Democratic congressional aide, however, said the Obama administration had indicated an announcement was “imminent.” The Justice Department would not confirm the new rules on Wednesday night but released a short statement saying that the mayor and the attorney general discussed “preventing crime while protecting civil rights and civil liberties.” In the past, Mr. Holder has spoken out forcefully against profiling. “Racial profiling is wrong,” he said in a 2010 speech. “It can leave a lasting scar on communities and individuals. And it is, quite simply, bad policing — whatever city, whatever state.” Officials in the Bush administration made similar statements, however, which is why civil rights groups have eagerly waited to hear not

just Mr. Holder’s opinion, but also the rules he plans to enact. As written, the Justice Department ’s rules prohibit federal agents from using race as a factor in their investigations unless there is specific, credible information that makes race relevant to a case. For example, narcotics investigators may not increase traffic stops in minority neighborhoods

on the belief that some minorities are more likely to sell drugs. They can, however, rely on information from witnesses who use race in their descriptions of suspects. The rules cover federal law enforcement agencies such as the F.B.I. They do not cover local or state police departments. That is significant because Muslim groups have sued the N ew Y ork P olice D epartment over surveillance programs that mapped Muslim neighborhoods , photographed their businesses and built files on where they eat, shop and pray. Mr. Holder’s comments about the new racial profiling rules came up in a conversation about that topic, the official said. William J. Bratton, the city’s

new police commissioner, has said he will review those practices. While the rules directly control only federal law enforcement activities, their indirect effect is much broade r, said Fahd Ahmed, the legal director of the Queens-based South Asian immigrant advocacy group Desis Rising Up and Moving. For instance, he said, immigration bills in Congress have copied the Justice Department profiling language. And civil rights groups can use the rules to pressure state and local agencies to change their policies. “Federal guidelines definitely have an impact,” Mr.

Ahmed said. “Local organizers can say, ‘These policies are not in line with what’s coming from the federal level.’ ”

Status quo solves – Sensitive Operations Review Committee checks discrimination practicesBullard ’13 (Ben Bullard; June 14, 2013; Personal Liberty; “The FBI Can Pull Back Your Curtain, But Mosques Are Off-Limits”; http://personalliberty.com/the-fbi-can-pull-back-your-curtain-but-mosques-are-off-limits/)//CC

Ever since Islamic groups cried out against the FBI’s semi-successful surveillance into terrorist plots that emanated from mosques , the agency has been forced to turn its attention elsewhere in the ongoing campaign to uncover domestic terrorism. In February 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU ) joined the Council for American-Islamic Relations of Greater Los Angeles in filing a Federal class-action lawsuit against the FBI for infiltrating mosques in Southern California and allegedly gathering general information without probable cause. Regardless of the merits of that suit, the backlash over the Southern California case had a subversive effect on Federal domestic surveillance policy. Later that same year, the Administration of President Barack Obama established a review panel within the D epartment o f J ustice called the Sensitive Operations Review Committee , e ffectively carving out special treatment for the religious , political, journalistic and academic spheres : A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) is defined as an investigative matter involving the activities of a domestic public official or domestic political candidate (involving corruption or a threat to the national security), a religious or domestic political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, or the news media; an investigative matter having an academic nexus; or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing the investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) and other DOJ officials. (Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-I Dom), Part

VILN.) As a matter of FBI policy, “judgment” means that the decision of the authorizing official is discretionary . Whether the FBI should be indiscriminately watching any individual or affiliated group is a matter for a separate article (indeed, we’ve written several of them), and recent scandals showing that the Nation’s vast enforcement empire is doing just that are both loathsome and alarming. But if Obama is going to watch most of us, it’s only fair (and makes a fair amount of sense) that he watch all of us.

The aff doesn’t solve racist local police tactics like stop and frisk, fusion centers, biometric scanning—comparatively more invasiveCyril 15 [Malkia Amala, founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities, March 30, 2015, “Black America's State of Surveillance”, http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance] alla

This model is deceptive, however, because it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They aren’t. In a racially discriminatory criminal justice

system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the “New Jim Crow”—a de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. In New York City, the predictive policing approach in use is “Broken

Windows.” This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes—like selling

loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death . Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling—

indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices . As local law enforcement

agencies increasingly adopt surveillance technologies, they use them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and offline; to observe daily movements of individuals and groups; and to observe data trends. Police departments like Bratton’s aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all three. They will use

technologies like license plate readers , which the Electronic Frontier Foundation found to be disproportionately

used in communities of color and communities in the process of being gentrified . They will use facial

recognition, biometric scanning software, which the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be adopted by

local police departments for any criminal justice purpose. They intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have

been touted as an effective step toward accountability based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many other issues, remain unclear. They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an invasive cellphone surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect’s cellphone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby. The same is true of domestic drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct routine aerial surveillance. While drones are currently unarmed, drone manufacturers are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons

like rubber bullets, tasers, and tear gas. They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to increase interagency collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence community. According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the clearinghouse for increasingly used “suspicious activity reports”—described as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.” These reports and other collected data are often stored in

massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody who’s ever dealt with gang databases knows, it’s almost impossible to get off a federal or

state database, even when the data collected is incorrect or no longer true. Predictive policing doesn’t just lead to racial and religious profiling—it relies on it. Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted contact between police and people of color, almost 90 percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious activities reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities of color. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of color.

Fusions centers are the only way that Federal and Local law enforcement data is shared—those fail—means federal changes don’t affect local communitiesPSI 12 [PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, the oldest subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS”, October 3, 2012,https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hsgac.senate.gov%2Fdownload%2Freport_federal-support-for-and-involvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-centers&ei=jqeFVa_FE8Te-QHf2oLIDg&usg=AFQjCNEY5sKmzFYKts_5F0R5KDR-3QwwZg&sig2=VTn5HU2_sLH1AfWAJEsjBg&bvm=bv.96339352,d.cWw] alla

Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United States. 1 Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, however, that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers

forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes

endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-

published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism . The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials’ public claims about fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers’ “success stories.” At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS’s own operations.

Modeling args are wrong—no correlation between grants and modeling—only our studies include the broader law enforcement environment—other things are more important than federal influence Burruss et al 12 [George W. Burruss has a Ph.D. in Criminology & Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Joseph A. Schafer has a Ph.D from Michigan State in Social Science (Criminal Justice), Matthew J. Giblin, an associate professor and undergraduate program director in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Melissa R.

Haynes, Member of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, “Homeland Security in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to Big-City Peers”, September 2012, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf] alla

Second, much of the literature implicitly or explicitly assumes that homeland security preparedness can be improved through funding allocations (e.g., grants), particularly from state and local governments (Davis et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2005). Alternatively, other writings have assumed that preparedness is simply a byproduct of, or rational response to, the potential for a terrorist attack in a jurisdiction (Davis, 2004; Henry, 2002). What these studies tend to ignore is the larger environment . The efficacy of efforts to enhance homeland security may not be just a function of perceived/actual risk or funding, but both of those forces and others. For example, enhanced preparedness and innovative practices may also flow from written products such as books and journals, as well as conferences, training, and other professional networks and channels. These sources, as shown in a study of Illinois law enforcement agencies, play a significant role in determining preparedness levels, independent of risk and resource allocation (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). To date, however, researchers have largely ignored these sources (termed institutional pressures) as determinants of

homeland security practices. Moreover, if these channels are salient, the proximity of small agencies

to big-city peers might be irrelevant as learning and modeling is indirect rather than direct. This

omission is glaring considering that research verifying the significance of these factors could be used to shape the diffusion of a range of innovations across the law enforcement industry.

No federal modeling internal link—local law enforcement models regional agencies—our ev is comparative Burruss et al 12 [George W. Burruss has a Ph.D. in Criminology & Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Joseph A. Schafer has a Ph.D from Michigan State in Social Science (Criminal Justice), Matthew J. Giblin, an associate professor and undergraduate program director in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Melissa R. Haynes, Member of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, “Homeland Security in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to Big-City Peers”, September 2012, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf] alla

Respondents were asked a range of questions designed to assess the extent to which institutional pressures influenced their approaches to homeland security. The measures address factors that are

independent of any one person in the organization; that is, they focus on the influence of other

agencies, professional associations, and publications without addressing who within the organization

was specifically affected by these factors .10 Table 8 reports the results of a number of questions measuring whether agency practices were influenced by the actions of their peers. In evaluating their own homeland security performance, 25.8 percent of respondents indicated they paid significant

attention to other agencies like their own . An additional 59.8 percent of agencies paid some attention to similar agencies.

Less than one percent of responding agencies reported that they paid no attention to similar agencies in evaluating their homeland security performance. Participating agencies were asked to what extent their agency modeled homeland security policies and practices after other agencies that they viewed as successful. The majority of agencies indicated they did engage in such modeling often (35.3 percent) or

occasionally (54.9 percent). Other sources of institutional pressure are professional associations and relevant publications. In defining homeland security practices and approaches agencies might be influenced by the resources offered by these other entities. Respondents were asked to rate the influence of four sources of influence on a three-point scale from not at all influential (0.0) to very influential (2.0). Peer agencies were reported

to be the most influential . Strong influence was also indicated for professional associations and government publications. Journal

articles and books were the least influential, with an average rating between somewhat influential and not at all influential. Grant programs and other funding opportunities were generally less influential. In relative terms, federal and state grant funding for equipment and training were most influential. Private or community funding sources were least influential in formulating homeland security approaches and practices.

Massive alt cause—local police bigotry and racism disproportionally impacts black people—(exposure to local police is more common and direct than exposure to federal law enforcement--so the alt cause outweighs the aff’s internal link)Lee 14 [Jaeah, Jaeah reports, writes, codes, and charts at Mother Jones. Her writings have appeared in The Atlantic, the Guardian, Wired, Christian Science Monitor, Global Post, Huffington Post, Talking Points Memo, and Grist, “Exactly How Often Do Police Shoot Unarmed Black Men?”, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/police-shootings-michael-brown-ferguson-black-men] alla

The killing of Michael Brown by police in Ferguson, Missouri, was no anomaly: As we reported yesterday,

Brown is one of at least four unarmed black men who died at the hands of police in the last month alone. There are many more cases from years past. As Jeffrey Mittman, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Missouri

chapter put it in a statement of condolence to Brown's family, "Unarmed African-American men are shot and killed by police at an alarming rate. This pattern must stop." But quantifying that pattern is difficult. Federal databases that track police use of force or arrest-related deaths paint only a partial picture. Police department data is scattered and fragmented. No agency appears to track the number of police shootings or killings of unarmed victims in a systematic, comprehensive way. Here's some of what we do know: Previous attempts to analyze racial bias in police shootings have arrived at similar conclusions. In 2007, ColorLines and the Chicago Reporter investigated fatal police shootings in 10 major cities, and found that there were a

disproportionately high number of African Americans among police shooting victims in every one ,

particularly in New York, San Diego, and Las Vegas. "We need not look for individual racists to say that we have a culture of policing that is really rubbing salt into longstanding racial wounds," NAACP president Cornell Williams Brooks told Mother Jones. It's a culture in which people

suspected of minor crimes are met with "overwhelmingly major, often lethal, use of force," he says. In Oakland, California, the NAACP reported that out of 45 officer-involved shootings in the city between 2004 and 2008, 37 of those

shot were black. None were white . One-third of the shootings resulted in fatalities. Although weapons were not found in 40

percent of cases, the NAACP found, no officers were charged. (These numbers don't include 22-year-old Oscar Grant, who was shot and killed

by a transit authority officer at the Fruitvale BART station on New Year's Day of 2009.) The New York City Police Department has reported similar trends in its firearms discharge report, which shows that more black people have been shot by NYPD officers between 2000 and 2011 than have Hispanics or whites. When you look at the racial breakdown of New Yorkers, black people are disproportionately represented among those targeted as criminal shooting suspects, firearms arrestees, and those fired upon or struck by police gunfire. Often, the police officers do not get convicted or sentenced. Delores Jones-Brown, a law professor and director of the Center on Race, Crime, and Statistics at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, has identified dozens of black men and women who have died at the hands of police going back as far as 1994. She notes that while these incidents happen regularly, it often takes a high-profile case, such as Brown's, to bring

other recent incidents to national attention. "Unfortunately, the patterns that we've been seeing recently are consistent: The police don't show as much care when they are handling incidents that involve young

black men and women, and so they do shoot and kill," says Jones-Brown, a former assistant prosecutor in Monmouth

County, New Jersey. "And then for whatever reason, juries and prosecutor's offices are much less likely to indict or convict." Between 2003 and 2009, the DOJ reported that 4,813 people died while in the process of arrest or in the custody of law enforcement. These include people who died before an officer physically placed him or her under custody or arrest. This data, known as arrest-related deaths, doesn't reveal a significant discrepancy between whites, blacks, or hispanics. It also doesn't specify how many victims were unarmed. According to the FBI, which has tracked justifiable homicides up to 2012, 410 felons died at the hands of a law enforcement officer in

the line of duty.* But black people are more likely than whites or Hispanics to experience a police officer's threat or use of force, according to the Department of Justice's Police Public Contact Survey in 2008, the latest year for which data is available. Of those who felt that police had used or threatened them with force that year, about 74 percent felt those actions were excessive. In another DOJ survey of police behavior during traffic and street stops in 2011, blacks and Hispanics were less likely than whites to believe that the reason for the stop was legitimate. The Justice Department has investigated possible

systemic abuse of power by police in at least 16 cities. Police shootings of unarmed black people aren't limited to poor or predominantly black communities. Jones-Brown points to examples where police officers have shot unarmed black men and women in Hollywood, Riverside (California), and Prince Georges County—a Maryland suburb known as the most affluent US county with an African-American majority.

"Part of the problem is that black people realize that you don't have to be poor, you don't have to be in your

own community...and this can happen to you ," she says. These killings occur against black people of varying socioeconomic backgrounds: "Actors, professional football players, college students, high school grads. They happen to black cops, too." Yet, the lack of comprehensive data means that we can't know if there's been an upsurge in such cases, says Samuel Walker, a criminal justice scholar at the University of Nebraska in Omaha and author of The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America. "It's impossible to make any definitive statement on whether there were more incidents in the last 5 to 10 years than in the past," he says. "We just don't have that kind of data." But what is certain, Walker says, is that the fatal shooting in Ferguson "was just the tip of the iceberg."

Local-federal police data distribution fails—it’s too unorganized—local law enforcement cellphone data collection is another alt causeAckerman 13 [Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US and won the 2012 National Magazine Award for Digital Reporting, “Data-sharing among US law agencies amounts to 'organised chaos' – report”, December 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/data-sharing-law-enforcement-organised-chaos] alla

The sharing of crucial intelligence about counter-terrorism between the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and local police departments takes place through a patchwork process that amounts to “organized chaos”, according to a new report. The report, released Tuesday by the Brennan Center for Justice, a public-

policy institute at New York University law school that has a track record of being skeptical of government surveillance, found inconsistent rules, inadequate oversight, apparent wastefulness and insufficient regard for civil liberties nationwide. “This poorly organized system not only wastes time and resources; it also risks masking reliable intelligence that could be crucial to an investigation,” the report says, warning that a “din of data” is overwhelming law enforcement. “There’s a lot of irrelevant information being collected,” said

Michael Price, a counsel with the Brennan Center and the author of the report. “As a result of that, it seems pretty easy for information to slip through the cracks.” A Department of Homeland Security spokesman took vigorous exception to the report’s factual presentation and its conclusions, saying that much of the responsibility for the patchwork rules should properly be attributed to discrepancies in laws across the 50 states and arguing that the fusion centers contribute strongly to national security while protecting civil

liberties. Scrutiny of the wide-reaching intelligence apparatus in federal, state and local law enforcement since 9/11 has largely taken a backseat during the past six months’ worth of revelations from whistleblower Edward Snowden about the National Security Agency’s surveillance activities . But this

week, several reports pointed to an enormous amount of data collected by police departments –

particularly from cellular towers . The Brennan Center report examined 16 major police departments across the US, along with 19 affiliated “fusion centers” – controversial data-sharing pools between federal, state and local agencies – and 14 of the FBI’s joint terrorism task force partnerships with police. It found, among other problems, inconsistent quality control, which permitted a flood of local tips – some as innocuous as “ordering food at a restaurant and leav[ing] before the food arrives ” (an example from

California, according to a Fusion Center training document obtained by the report's authors) – into fusion centers. Data like that does not meet the legal standard for "reasonable suspicion" normally required to pursue surveillance, let alone the requirements of probable cause. Yet it can be stored within fusion centers and accessed by

a variety of law enforcement and homeland security agencies for up to a year , the report said. Despite efforts by the Department of Homeland Security, most of the fusion centers operate with “minimal oversight, or no oversight whatsoever”, the report found. Out of 19 centers reviewed, only five require independent audits of retained data. “We’re calling for clear, consistent processes and stronger standards for collecting and sharing information to reduce some of the noise coming from this din of data,” Price said. A Department of Homeland Security spokesman contended Tuesday that the report misrepresented the complexities of data-sharing across local, state and federal agencies, and strongly defended the relevance and performance of fusion centers. “This report fundamentally misunderstands the role of fusion centers within our national security structure and their value to state and local law enforcement,” said DHS press secretary Peter Boogaard. “As pointed out by congressional leaders and major law enforcement organizations across the country, fusion centers greatly improve information sharing and co-ordination between federal, state and local law enforcement. By receiving classified and unclassified information from the federal government and assessing its local implications, fusion centers help law enforcement on the front lines better protect their communities from all threats, whether it is terrorism or other criminal activities.” The FBI did not respond to a request for comment made after a media embargo

on the Brennan Center report lifted. Fusion centers have been the subject of criticism from both civil libertarians and powerful elected officials. A 2012 investigation by the bipartisan Senate permanent subcommittee on investigations of more than 80,000 fusion center documents could not find any contribution the centers had made to “disrupt[ing] an active terrorist plot”. DHS disputes the results of that investigation, as do several legislators on committees overseeing the department. Senator Tom Coburn, an Oklahoman who serves as the top Republican on the Senate government reform and homeland security committee, has emerged as a leading legislative critic of fusion centers and joint terrorism task forces, for many of the same reasons detailed in the Brennan Center report. After a government inquiry indicated many federal data-sharing efforts were duplicative, Coburn issued a statement in April calling them “a vital component of national security”, but

adding, “that is not an excuse to waste taxpayer funds”. The Brennan Center’s report comes as police departments’ widespread

use of cellphone data is attracting new scrutiny. On Monday, the Washington Post revealed that police departments around the country relied 9,000 times last year on so-called “tower dumps”, or data collected from cellphone signals that went to a given cellphone tower during a certain period of time. That data necessarily includes call information from cellphone subscribers who are never suspected of any crime. “There are serious questions about how law enforcement handles the information of

innocent people swept up in these digital dragnets,” congressman Ed Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat who plans to

introduce legislation limiting tower dumps, told the Post. Also on Monday, USA Today reported that approximately a quarter of police departments in the US have employed tower dumps, and at least 25 departments around the country employ a portable piece of spoofing hardware, called a Stingray, that tricks cellphones into thinking it is a cell tower, allowing it siphon data and send it directly to police. And all that information is on top of the fruits of the NSA’s vast data collection efforts, which are not entirely off limits to federal law enforcement. The controversial bulk collection of Americans’ phone data has been repeatedly described by the NSA as a tool to aid the FBI in detecting domestic terrorism activity. NSA deputy director John C Inglis recently stated that the FBI cannot search directly through the NSA’s data troves, but the agency shares telephone metadata with the bureau following searches through its databases based on “reasonable articulable suspicion” of connections to specific terrorist organizations. The Brennan Center report did not specifically analyze law enforcement tower dumps, but Price called the reports of them alarming. “This is another indication of the vast trove of information that state and local police are collecting about law abiding Americans,” Price said. “To date, that information does not appear to be particularly useful in preventing terror attacks.”

Fusion centers fail—local law enforcement doesn’t have oversightPrice 13 [Michael, serves as counsel for the Brennan Center’s Liberty and National Security Program, “NATIONAL SECURITY AND LOCAL POLICE, December 10, 2013, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf] alla

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, many state and local law enforcement agencies have assumed a critical but unfamiliar role at the front lines of the domestic fight against terrorism. The federal government has encouraged their participation, viewing them as a tremendous “force multiplier”2 with approximately 800,000 officers nationwide.3 Indeed, by collecting and sharing information about the communities they serve, police departments have been able to significantly increase the data

accessible to members of the federal intelligence community.4 At the same time, however, the headlong rush into

counterterrorism intelligence has created risks for state and local agencies, with too little attention

paid to how to manage them. Although prevention of terrorist attacks is often described as a new, post-9/11 paradigm for law enforcement, the prevention of all crime has been a central tenet of modern policing since its debut nearly 200 years ago.5 Intelligence activities, including the use of surveillance, undercover officers, and informants, have helped fulfill this mandate. But due to the potential for abuse that came to light during the 1960s and 70s, many courts and legislatures placed checks on police intelligence operations. Most importantly, they required officers engaged in intelligence activities to have reasonable suspicion that a person or group is involved in criminal activity before collecting, maintaining, or sharing information about them. Of course, this rule does not apply to most other police activities. Officers responding to an emergency, for example, may record a victim’s statement or document an eyewitness account without suspecting either individual of wrongdoing. But for many police departments, reasonable suspicion

became a prerequisite for creating intelligence files.6 Since 9/11, some police departments have established counterterrorism programs to collect and share intelligence information about the everyday activities of law-abiding Americans, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion.7 This information is fed into an array of federal information sharing networks, creating mountains of data.8 Whether these practices have made us safer is debatable.9 What is clear is that they raise issues of accountability and oversight in ways that have not been given sufficient attention. The centerpiece of this new counterterrorism architecture is a national information sharing network connecting police departments

and federal agencies, known as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). But there is little consistency regarding the types of information that local law enforcement agencies collect and share with their federal counterparts. The policies and procedures governing such activities are often opaque or unavailable to the public, while a deliberately decentralized system produces rules that vary considerably across the country. Inconsistent rules jeopardize the quality of shared intelligence and raise serious civil liberties concerns. In some jurisdictions, for example, police have used aggressive information gathering tactics to target American Muslim communities without any suspicion of wrongdoing. Such practices have not generated investigative leads or proven especially useful in preventing potential terrorist attacks.10 But they have strained community relations with law enforcement, thereby

jeopardizing the very terrorism prevention mission they are intended to accomplish.11 Many state and local intelligence programs lack adequate oversight. While federal agencies operate under the watch of independent inspectors general, there is often no equivalent for state and local information sharing ventures. Very few local governments have built the kind of oversight structures that should accompany such a significant expansion of police functions.

Multitude of barriers to data-sharing—localized law enforcement cannot effectively model/cooperate with federal agenciesAFCEA International 7 [The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) established in 1946, is a non-profit membership association serving the military, government, industry, and academia as an ethical forum for advancing professional knowledge and relationships in the fields of communications, information technology, intelligence, and security, “The Need to Share: The U.S.

Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement”, April 2007, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.afcea.org%2Fmission%2Fintel%2Fdocuments%2FSpringIntel07whitepaper_000.pdf&ei=5LSEVarfJeq1sATX0YGQAQ&usg=AFQjCNFXOVotodHFFBsKU6WKdjvU_u5slw&sig2= KthG2NXEpzngYQ_75f9lLQ&bvm=bv.96339352,d.cWc] alla

The committee believes certain steps can help the intelligence and law enforcement communities move forward in their ability to share

information and intelligence better. Communicate and Reinforce the Need for Sharing: People have a natural tendency to resist change. For this reason, leaders throughout the intelligence and law enforcement communities must consistently and repeatedly deliver the message of change and ensure that everyone understands the importance of sharing information. Analysts who have been told for years that releasing certain types

of information violates the law must now be strongly encouraged to exchange the information with

others . The new Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, has made a strong statement to all intelligence professionals with his

direction that it is not enough to share intelligence: There is a responsibility to provide it. Earn Public Trust: Abuses of the past have made the public skeptical about the government’s role in personal lives. Yet, the public wants and deserves a collaborative intelligence and law enforcement community effectively working together to prevent another terrorist attack. A Markle Foundation task force7 noted, “For information sharing to succeed, there must be trust.… Building trust requires strong leadership, clear laws and guidelines, and advanced technologies to ensure that information sharing serves important purposes and operates consistently with American values.” The communities must ensure compliance with the law and make the commitment visible to the public. Manage Risk: The intelligence and law enforcement communities have been risk

averse in the past regarding sharing information—often for good reasons. Today’s environment calls for a different approach. The risk of sharing information must be balanced against the risk of not “connecting the dots.” What is the true value of having important information—even if it comes from a tenuous source in some cases—if the information is never shared with others who may need it and who may add value to the information? As a first step, local law enforcement should have a formal role and presence within the NCTC. This would give law enforcement officials early warning about terrorist tactics used overseas before the terrorists try to apply them in the United States, and it would help law enforcement plan and train better. Create Clear, Understandable, and Consistent Guidelines: Many current guidelines and policies are complex, confusing, inconsistent, and make sharing information difficult to achieve. This complexity causes delays in sharing data and undermines its utility. People are more apt

to give up if the rules are too hard to follow. Eliminate the Construct of “Data Ownership:” The “owners” do not always appreciate why information they control could be significant to others. For sharing to be effective, those who have a broader picture may be the best advocates regarding what needs to be shared. For example, local and state law enforcement, fire, and public health organizations can make a critical contribution in terms of detection, prevention, and response. The federal intelligence or law enforcement communities may not be taking full advantage of these capabilities and skills because they do not have a clear understanding of what they can contribute. These individuals on the “front lines” may hold key pieces of the puzzle. The fact that some of their information comes from an unclassified source does not automatically mean it is not useful or important. Use Technology in a

Meaningful Way: Most of the obstacles to meaningful change in this arena are cultural, but technology still can play an important role. Most, if not all, of the technological impediments to protecting sources and methods while enabling effective information sharing have been solved. Technology should be embraced as a key in easing the administrative burdens of sharing information. Emphasize Training: Effective and focused training can improve the confidence of community members and the public’s perception that information is being handled appropriately. The right training, coupled with intelligence policies, will better enable sharing and ultimately will help change the cultures. Share Good Ideas and Lessons Learned: The District of Columbia, among others, has taken first and useful steps. It has initiated discussions in the law enforcement

and intelligence communities to broaden understanding of what types of information are needed and why. Once state or local law

enforcement organizations articulate and justify specific needs, and it becomes clear the contribution they can make to mission success, the willingness to share information will improve significantly. Other steps are possible. In the early 1980s the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) partnered with local law enforcement to educate U.S. police officers on the trends, tactics, and patterns of the South American drug cartels. As a result, local law enforcement officers knew what behavior, precursor chemicals, and modes of transportation were associated with major trafficking and violent crimes of the international cartels. Such partnerships work. Leaders in both communities should look to the partnership model within the Joint Terrorism Task Force as an approach to enabling information sharing. The Director of National Intelligence has recently created an Information Sharing Steering Committee (ISSC) and declared the ISSC will “move the Intelligence Community beyond the ‘need to share’ philosophy and more to a ‘responsibility to provide.’”8 This commitment can steer the federal, state, and local communities closer to the goal of a shared information environment. Conclusion Since September 11, 2001, the intelligence and law enforcement communities have struggled to adapt to

new challenges and to refocus and reorder priorities. Nonetheless, the seam between federal, state, and local

communities has inhibited the United States’ ability to fight terrorism. Although Congress has

removed many of the existing barriers to cooperation, and limited examples of progress exist,

implementation is lagging. The key to change is strong leadership in both communities. Leaders must

understand and nurture cultural change that emphasizes a responsibility for providing information—

not just for sharing it. They must also communicate to their subordinates a willingness to accept risk in sharing data and must

deemphasize data ownership. These steps, along with clear guidelines, inter-community training, the exchange of lessons learned, and the effective use of technology, can open doors of cooperation that have been closed for too long.

Alt Causes

Local Police Departments are oppressive – federal data and Maple Heights provesDewan 14, Shaila Dewan, Reporter for the New York Times, 2014 (Mostly White Forces in Mostly Black Towns: Police Struggle for Racial Diversity, New York Times, September 9, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/us/for-small-police-departments-increasing-diversity-is-a-struggle.html, Accessed on 6/20/15)

Maple Heights police officers with a driver stopped for a traffic violation. The department has only two black officers out of 35. Credit Michael F. McElroy for The New York Times MAPLE HEIGHTS, Ohio — The population of this working-class Cleveland suburb has gone from nearly all white to two-thirds black since its mayor declared more than 35 years ago that he did not know “what a minority is.” But its police and fire departments have not kept pace: The Maple Heights police force today still has only two black officers out of 35; the fire department is 100

percent white. Maple Heights is far from unique. Across the country, police departments still struggle to hire and retain minority candidates — in some cases despite great efforts, in others because of a lack of initiative. But now, the problem has taken on new relevance since the fatal shooting of a young black man last month in Ferguson, Mo., where just four of the 53 police officers are black, according to the police chief. Nationwide, the total number of minority police officers has risen, but they remain heavily concentrated in larger cities, with the numbers falling off sharply in smaller ones, like Ferguson and Maple Heights. In 1977, Maple Heights agreed to increase minorities in its police and fire

departments. But officials did not follow through. Credit Michael F. McElroy for The New York Times Data from a federal survey of police departments in 2007, analyzed for The New York Times by Andrew A. Beveridge, a sociologist at Queens College, found that nearly 400 departments, most with fewer than a hundred officers, were substantially whiter than the populations they served. In these departments, the share of white officers was greater than the share of white residents by more than 50 percentage points. Ferguson and Maple Heights are about the same size, just over 20,000 people, and in both, the black population has surged in recent decades. Both cities have white mayors and largely white political leaderships. And both police departments have fallen far short of reflecting the communities they serve — even as some of Maple Heights’s neighboring

police departments have achieved much higher levels of diversity. Critics point to the lack of racial balance in police departments as evidence of systemic racism. But experts say the experiences of the two towns illustrate the obstacles to achieving diversity in law enforcement, even for departments that have made it a priority. “I see all these pundits come on the Sunday talk shows and say: ‘Of course you can hire more black people. Of course they’re not trying,’ ” said Nelson Lim, a senior sociologist at the RAND Corporation’s Center on Quality Policing who has consulted with departments in Los Angeles and San Diego. “But it’s very, very, very difficult.” There is little hard evidence that diversity correlates with better performance, in part because it is difficult to control for complex variables and to know which outcomes, from crime rates to brutality cases, to measure. In fact, one study of a Florida police department found that black officers were more likely than white to use force against black suspects. A review of court cases going back to the early 1990s revealed only a handful of civil rights or excessive-force cases against the Maple Heights police, two of which involved a white officer who is no longer with the

department, and none that involved a fatality like the shooting in Ferguson. Still, it is an accepted tenet of community policing that when departments reflect the communities they serve, they have an easier time building trust and defusing , rather than escalating, tense situations . In Maple Heights, some residents said they would like to see more black officers, while others said that it was the attitude, experience and training of the officer, not race, that mattered. Chris Turney, a home renovator who lives with his wife and two daughters, said it was more important for officers to live in the city. All but one do not. “The police come here, they do their jobs, they don’t try to get to know anybody,” said Mr. Turney, who is black. “The police don’t wave.”

Hundreds of police departments across the nation have forces with a white percentage that is m ore than 30 percentage points higher than the communities they serve. Other residents drew a contrast between police attitudes in Maple Heights and neighboring Bedford Heights, where three-quarters of the residents, and nine of 28 police officers, are black. “Bedford’s not going to do you like Maple,” said Carlos Walker, 41, who is black. “You have to do something real stupid for Bedford. Maple, soon as they get behind you, you sweating.” In her 11 years as an officer in Bedford Heights, Detective Ericka Payne, who is black, has often

provided backup on calls in Maple Heights. “There are definitely differences in the ways the departments interact with the outside community,” Detective Payne said. “We try to be a little bit more community oriented. Because we are a little bit more diverse, we understand those dynamics and maybe have a little bit more ease dealing with that.” Several Maple Heights officials said the diversity of the police and fire departments had never been a major issue. It is hard to find qualified candidates of any race, said John C. Popielarczyk, who has been with the Maple Heights Police Department since 1990 and the acting police chief since May. Maple Heights,

devastated by the foreclosure crisis, has fallen on hard times, and the police force has shrunk. And with most officers staying on the job for 25 years, Chief Popielarczyk said, the opportunity to hire is scarce. Of eight recent hires, two were black. One, the chief said, was fired for cause before his probationary period ended. The department has advertised in minority newspapers and changed the private company that administers its Civil Service exam in hopes that more minority candidates would pass, he said. But he added: “The real goal of the department is to provide qualified officers who are competent and can provide quality service regardless of race. I don’t think people really care about the color of the officer that responds; they care that the officer responds quickly, is effective, treats them well and is respectful.” The acting fire chief, James Castelucci, said much the same, adding that one promising black candidate withdrew when his current employer offered him more money. The obstacles to diversity are many, Dr. Lim, the sociologist, said. Candidates usually must pass written tests, physical agility tests, psychological tests, polygraphs and background checks, some of which can have a disparate impact on minority candidates. Qualified black candidates are sought after not just by competing police departments, but also by employers in other industries. And some police chiefs have cited a negative attitude toward law enforcement among blacks that hinders recruiting. Police departments have tried all kinds of remedies, from personal trainers to help with physical fitness tests to tailored recruiting. (A RAND survey found that women were attracted to the good salaries in policing, blacks to the profession’s prestige and Asians to the excitement of the job.) But many small departments lack the resources, or the will, to conduct an exhaustive review of their hiring practices. In Maple Heights, job candidates are ranked by how well they score on the written exam, earning bonus points for factors like previous training, military experience and city residency. For each opening, the candidates are considered one by one, in order of their score. Frank Ross said he did not accept the city’s explanations for having few minority police officers. Credit Michael F. McElroy for The New York Times Some nearby suburbs like Bedford Heights and Cleveland Heights — where about 40 percent of the residents and 22 of 102 officers are black — do things differently. The chiefs of both departments said officials were allowed to consider the top 10 candidates on the list, which helps them hire more minority candidates. Both chiefs said their cities took an aggressive approach to diversity as early as the 1970s. Cleveland Heights has two types of officer positions, one that requires a Civil Service exam and a college degree, and a lower tier, called basic patrol, that does not. Once a basic patrol officer is hired, the city will reimburse tuition costs, and many eventually earn a degree and work their way to the upper tier. The diversity of neighboring police departments poses a challenge to cities like Maple Heights, Dr. Lim said: “If the leadership, if the police chief, is dedicated to getting more diversity in the work force, how hard is it to figure out how the other department is doing such a good job?” Asked why Maple Heights considered only one candidate at a time, Chief Popielarczyk said: “We’ve always done it that way. My understanding is that that’s how we’re supposed to do it.” Some Maple Heights residents have tried to persuade the city to hire more blacks, forming a committee called the Maple Heights Citizens for Change. In 2012, Elaine Stone, a committee member who runs a blog called the Maple Heights African American Gazette, was digging around and discovered a long-forgotten affirmative action agreement, signed by the mayor, a citizens’ committee and a representative from the federal Justice Department in

1977. In that deal, Maple Height s , at the time about 96 percent white, agreed that within three years minorities would make up at least 4 percent of its police and fire departments. But it soon became clear that the city was less than fully committed to this goal. “I figure we’re all minorities,” the mayor at the time, Emil J. Lisy Jr., told reporters when he was criticized for failing to live up to the agreement. “The first thing is to find out what a minority is, and I haven’t figured that out.” Federal officials threatened to withhold $500,000 in funds, but backed down after the mayor submitted a 65-page response. When

Ms. Stone learned about the agreement, she contacted Frank Ross, the only surviving signer of the document . Mr. Ross was a teacher in his 20s when he came to Maple Heights, at a time when real estate brokers steered black customers to a part of town called

Presidential Row. He now lives 12 miles away, but agreed to go to meetings of the committee, where he suggested that the group call the Community Relations Service of the Justice Department, the same office that helped

broker the earlier deal. Though new discussions were opened between the city and the service, which provides mediation and training to governments, residents feel the talks have stalled. Neither the mayor nor the Maple Heights legal director returned calls for comment for this article, and the service does not publicly discuss its work. Participation by local governments is strictly voluntary. Ms. Stone said economics, not overt racism, had kept the police and fire departments largely white.

“There was white flight, but people were trying to hold on to their jobs,” she said. “I can understand you don’t want to give up that job.” Mr. Ross said apathy among black voters was partly to blame for the situation. But he does not accept the city’s excuses . “They’re telling me in 40 years they can’t find any African-American policemen?” he said. “ Forty years later — it’s very emotional for me. Forty years later, I’m still dealing with the same thing . ”

Alt cause – Local police is the problem—community oriented policing is failingJrank Law Library, No Date, (,No Date,http://law.jrank.org/pages/2228/Urban-Police-Policing-minority-citizens.html, Accessed 6/19/2015)

Historically, cooperation and communication between police and minorities has been troubled . Williams and Murphy described a history of policing shaped by the enforcement of laws that have discriminated against minority groups, particularly African Americans. Slavery, segregation, and discrimination are historical realities that shaped the current distrustful, strained, and often hostile relationship between police and minority citizens. This poor relationship reached its pinnacle during the police-citizen crisis of the 1960s. The civil rights movement had gained momentum and become more militant. Protesters gathered to demonstrate against race discrimination and

injustice within the criminal justice system. Police officers responded to protesters with physical brutality, which increased the tension between minorities and the police. This tension exploded in the form of riots and civil

disobedience, often sparked by incidents involving the police (Walker, 1999). As a result of several crime commission reports and research findings questioning the effectiveness of "professional" police organizations, police organizational strategies evolved to focus on strengthening relationships and creating partnerships between the police and citizens. Police departments attempted to improve community relations through the creation of police-community relations units, race relations training for officers, and the hiring of more minorities and women. Some of these techniques were relatively successful. As reported by Walker (1999), African American officers represented a majority of the force in departments such as Detroit, Washington, and Atlanta in 1993. In addition, African Americans were selected as police chiefs in several large departments, including New York City, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, and others.

Furthermore, by the mid-1990s, women represented 13 percent of all officers in large police departments. Despite these advances, police still struggle with minority community relations. In 1993, the acquittal of four officers accused of beating Rodney King, an African American motorist in Los Angeles, sparked race riots across the country. Other major cases of police abuse of force in the 1990s (e.g.,

the Louima and Diallo cases in New York City) further increased tension between the police and minorities. In 1996, 26 percent of African American citizens surveyed reported they had very little or no confidence in the police , compared to only 9 percent of white respondents (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996). Furthermore, when asked about

attitudes toward use of force, 60 percent of whites had favorable attitudes compared to 33 percent of African Americans and 42 percent of Hispanics (Huang and Vaughn). Serious questions regarding police discrimination remain. Studies

routinely show that minorities are overrepresented as suspects who have force used against them, and who are shot and killed by officers. Worden's analysis of 1977 data showed that police were more likely to use both reasonable and

unreasonable force against black male suspects. This is also true of the use of deadly force. However, changes in police departments' administrative policies led to decreases in the use of deadly force by officers. In a study of

the New York City Police Department, Fyfe found that changes in the department's formal policies governing police shootings in 1972 reduced the average numbers of shots fired by officers by 30 percent. The total number of uses of deadly force decreased by nearly 50 percent from 1970 to 1984. In that same time period, the ratio of African Americans to whites who had deadly force used against them decreased from six-to-one to three-to-one (Walker, 1999). Reductions in police use of deadly force toward minorities were also noted after the fleeing-felon standard guiding police use of deadly force was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court

in Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). African Americans are also disproportionately arrested more often than whites. It is unclear whether these disparities in arrest statistics represent actual discrimination (i.e., disparity based on extra legal factors, such as race). When other factors are taken into consideration (e.g., seriousness of the offense, the evidence available, demeanor of the suspect, etc.), it appears that arrest decisions are influenced more by situational and legal factors than strictly race (Riksheim and Chermak).

However, police are more likely to police inner-city neighborhoods, which are predominantly minority areas. In this sense, police may be showing a form of contextual discrimination by heavily policing particular neighborhoods or particular types of crimes. A concern is that police officers are profiling citizens based on race and ethnicity. The term DWB or driving while black is a vivid descriptor of this phenomenon. Minority groups claim that police are more likely to pull over motorists simply because of their race. In fact, studies of New Jersey State Police have shown that minorities are pulled over disproportionately. This same argument is made in urban areas, where minorities believe they have become the targets of police harassment through tactics of aggressive enforcement of minor crimes. Studies of police have

shown that African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately stopped, questioned, and frisked by police (Browning et al.). Surveys of citizens also ind icated that African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped and interrogated by police. One survey of African American high school students revealed that 80 percent had been stopped by police and 62 percent of those stopped said the police treated them disrespectfully (Walker, Spohn, and

DeLone). At the same time, however, minority citizens complain that police are not responding to their needs in these areas. Citizens

allege that police are not providing adequate protection or attention in their neighborhoods. According to Walker, this apparent contradiction can be explained by "the diversity within racial and ethnic minority communities . . . . Complaints about

police harassment generally come from young males who have a high level of contact with the police. Most members of racial minority communities, however, are law-abiding adults with jobs and families. Like their white counterparts,

they want more not less police protection" (1999, p. 222). In the 1980s, new strategies of community oriented policing have encouraged the partnership between citizens and the police . Research has shown, however, that strategies of community policing tend to have the strongest impact on neighborhoods where they are least needed. Satisfaction with community policing techniques is highest in homogeneous, higher socioeconomic status communities, and lowest in heterogeneous, lower socioeconomic status communities (Bayley, 1988). It is clear that new approaches to improve police-minority relations are needed.

Alt Cause—Underrepresentation of local minorities in the police force is a larger problemBadger, Keating, and Elliot 14 Emily Badger, Dan Keating, and Kennedy Elliot, (“Where minority communities still have overwhelmingly white police”, August 14, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/14/where-minority-communities-still-have-overwhelmingly-white-police/, Accessed on 6/21/15)

There is something unsettling about the scenes this week out of Ferguson , Mo., that goes beyond the rare sight of military equipment on city streets or the disproportionate deployment of it. In so many of these images, the unarmed residents are black. But almost all of the officers facing them are white . The fatal police shooting Saturday of an unarmed black teen that set off these confrontations in a St. Louis suburb has raised questions not just

about the conduct of one officer, but the makeup of an entire police force. How could a community that's two-thirds black have a police force that's almost entirely white ? How could such divisions ubiquitous in the 1960s persist in 2014? Across the country, this racial imbalance is not rare . Fifty years after the Civil Rights movement called attention to the under-

representation of minorities in police departments, the pattern is still widespread. More than three quarters of cities on which the Census Bureau has collected data have a police presence that's disproportionately white relative to the local population. Meanwhile, in more than 40 percent of cities, blacks are under-represented among police officers, a Washington Post analysis of Census data revealed . While the pattern is widespread, broad

variations exist. The charts below show which cities have the greatest and smallest disparities between population and police. These numbers are more encompassing than a mere count of officers in a municipal police department. From

the point of view of residents in each community, they reflect the larger police presence one might encounter. The center line in each chart represents equality — or how we might expect a police force to look if it perfectly reflected the demographics of the city it serves. Non-Hispanic white representation in most cities is above this line; in other words, the share of white police officers in Memphis

or Charlotte is higher than the share of whites living in those cities. If we count cities within five percentage points of that line as having relative equality , just one in 10 cities and towns in America meets that standard. If we look at the data from the perspective of black officers, ab out 45 percent of cities and towns meet this definition of equality . That number, though, is largely driven by cities with few or no black officers but also very small black

populations. Remove cities where less than 5 percent of the population is black, and 72 percent of all such places — 446 in total — have police forces where blacks are under-represented. In the 609 communities where Hispanics make up at least 5 percent of the population, they are under-represented among police as well in 66 percent of places. Even the best intentions by police departments won't automatically create perfect equality because city demographics shift over time — in some places more rapidly than others. The Department of Justice, which has filed hundreds of lawsuits against

discriminatory local agencies since the 1970s, has historically looked at demographic data like this, along with hiring and recruiting practices. It is striking on the above charts, however, that many of America's biggest cities are hovering more closely around equality than others . These are the same cities where fierce battles were fought and federal lawsuits waged over unequal hiring practices after 1972, when amendments to the Civil Rights Act extended

protection from discrimination to state and local government employers. "Politicians realized that they couldn’t have an all-white police force in a city with a substantial minority population," says Richard Ugelow, who worked on such lawsuits in the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ for 29 years. "That changed the culture of the police departments and the willingness of law enforcement, police and fire departments to become

more diverse. You see that in Chicago, New York, Atlanta, in these large cities. They want to have a diverse workforce. You don’t have those same pressures in these smaller communities." The public outcry and federal pressure that made such inequality so visible in Chicago — prompting dramatic change there — hasn't historically extended to places like Ferguson, a suburb of 21,000 with 53 commissioned police officers. "It's hard for the government to bring a lawsuit," Ugelow says, "against a police force of 100 people." The above charts show many places with either all-white or no-black police forces. Many of them are smaller cities, such as Niagara Falls, N.Y., where 20 percent of the population is black but all 250 police are white,

according to the data. In Florissant, Mo., a quarter of the population is black, but none of the 25 police are. Some seemingly unequal communities have also experienced demographic shifts that have exacerbated the imbalance between the police presence and the population. Ferguson is an example of such a place: In 1990, the city was almost

three-quarters white. By 2010, it was two-thirds black. Its police force today may in some ways be a legacy of the makeup and policies of an earlier moment of time. Ugelow doubts that the picture above is the result of intentional

discrimination today — "blacks need not apply." But some of the same historic practices and applicant tests that effectively excluded minorities may still exist in departments that never updated their policies. During the recession, small-town police agencies that have had to cut resources may have trimmed the HR staffs and recruitment programs that address

this issue. Ugelow also worries that, since the Bush Administration, the DOJ has eased up on its civil rights litigation. Historically, the issue of inequality in police departments has focused on the relationship between blacks and whites. But as the country's Hispanic population continues to grow, communities have to take into account demographic patterns that encompass more than white and black. In San Antonio, for instance, blacks and whites only account for one-third of the local population, and a slightly higher proportion of the police; Hispanics make up 63 percent of the

population, and 58 percent of the police. As a note, the data above draws from a special 2010 Census count of workers in 755 cities and towns, including every place with a population of at least 50,000 at that time. Once a decade, the Census creates this employment file for federal agencies that monitor employment practices and enforce civil rights

laws. The data include the number and demographics of police officers — counting police and sheriff's patrol officers, and transit and railroad police — working in each city. The data do not include detectives, security guards or parking enforcement officers.

MASSIVE alt cause—they can’t solve racial profiling by local law enforcement agencies—comparatively more exposure to them than federal law enforcementHarris 99 [David A., Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law at University of Pittsburgh, “DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS”, June 1999, https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways] alla

On a hot summer afternoon in August 1998, 37-year-old U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Rossano V. Gerald and his young son Gregory drove across the Oklahoma border into a nightmare. A career soldier and a highly decorated veteran of Desert Storm and Operation United Shield in Somalia, SFC Gerald, a black man of Panamanian descent, found that he could not travel more than 30 minutes through the state without being stopped twice: first by the Roland City Police Department, and then by the

Oklahoma Highway Patrol. During the second stop, which lasted two-and-half hours, the troopers terrorized SFC Gerald's 12-year-old son with a police dog, placed both father and son in a closed car with the air conditioning off and fans blowing hot air, and warned that the dog would attack if they attempted to escape. Halfway through the episode – perhaps realizing the extent of their lawlessness – the troopers shut off the patrol car's video evidence camera. Perhaps, too, the officers understood the power of an

image to stir people to action. SFC Gerald was only an infant in 1963 when a stunned nation watched on television as Birmingham Police Commissioner "Bull" Connor used powerful fire hoses and vicious police attack dogs against nonviolent black civil rights protesters. That incident, and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s stirring I Have a Dream speech at the historic march on Washington in August of that year, were the low

and high points, respectively, of the great era of civil rights legislation: the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. How did it come to be, then, that 35 years later SFC Gerald found himself standing on the side of a dusty road next to a barking police dog, listening to his son weep while officers rummaged through his belongings simply because he was black? I feel like I'm a guy who's pretty much walked the straight line and that's respecting people and everything. We just constantly get harassed. So we just feel like we can't go anywhere without being bothered... I'm not trying to bother anybody. But yet a cop pulls me over and says I'm weaving in the road. And I just came from a friend's house, no alcohol, nothing. It just makes you wonder – was it just because I'm black?" – James, 28, advertising account executive Rossano and Gregory Gerald were

victims of discriminatory racial profiling by police. There is nothing new about this problem. Police abuse against people of color is a legacy of African American enslavement, repression, and legal inequality. Indeed, during hearings of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("The Kerner Commission") in the fall of 1967 where more than 130 witnesses testified about the events leading up to the urban riots that had taken place in 150 cities the previous summer, one of the complaints that came up repeatedly was "the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious basis." Significant blame for this rampant abuse of power also can be laid at the feet of the government's "war on drugs," a fundamentally misguided crusade enthusiastically embraced

by lawmakers and administrations of both parties at every level of government. From the outset, the war on drugs has in fact been a war on people and their constitutional rights, with African Americans, Latinos and other minorities bearing the brunt of the damage. It is a war that has, among other depredations, spawned racist profiles of supposed drug couriers. On our nation's highways today, police ostensibly looking for drug criminals routinely stop drivers based on the color of their skin. This p ractice is so common that

the minority community has given it the derisive term, "driving while black or brown" – a play on the real

offense of "driving while intoxicated." One of the core principles of the Fourth Amendment is that the police cannot stop and detain an individual without some reason – probable cause, or at least reasonable suspicion – to believe that he or she is involved in criminal activity. But recent Supreme Court decisions allow the police to use traffic stops as a pretext in order to "fish" for evidence. Both anecdotal and quantitative data show that nationwide, the police exercise this discretionary power primarily against African Americans and Latinos. No person of color is safe from this treatment anywhere, regardless of their obedience to the law, their age, the type of car they drive, or their station in life. In short, skin color has become evidence of the propensity to commit crime, and police use this "evidence" against minority drivers on the road all the time.

NYPD is an example of local, racist policies that the plan can’t reformAP 12 — Samantha Henry, Matt Appuzzo, Wayne Perry, reporters for the Associated Press, American multinational nonprofit news agency, 2012 (“New Jersey Muslims Angry Over NYPD Surveillance Findings,” The Huffington Post, May 25, Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/25/new-jersey-muslims-cangry-nypd-surveillance_n_1545319.html, Accessed on 6/15/15)

Muslim leaders said they were told that every instance of NYPD activity in New Jersey had been justified by a lead, but that the attorney general would not provide any details on the nature of any of those leads, saying the fact-finding was ongoing.

Imam Mustafa El-Amin of the Newark-based Masjid Ibrahim said he was concerned that Chiesa refused to explain what

leads had been received. With the NYPD compiling a map of every mosque in Newark – including his – he said he wanted to know about any problems or potential dangers in his mosque he might be unaware of. "We understand the need for surveillance and security," said El-Amin, "We just don't appreciate how this was done. We as Muslims feel we were violated, simply because we are Muslims." Several Muslim leaders at

Thursday's meeting said that they did not find the assertion that the NYPD had leads for all their operations in New Jersey credible, adding that efforts to maintain communication between the community and law enforcement would be hurt by the findings that the NYPD had done nothing wrong – and could keep doing what they have been doing. "It was basically an, `FYI, good Thursday afternoon, let it die in the media before the Memorial Day weekend,'" said Mohamed El-Filali, executive director of the Islamic Center

of Passaic County, across the Hudson River from New York. If the surveillance of every mosque, burger joint and barbershop targeted was justified, he asked, why were no arrests made? Aref Assaf of the American Arab Forum

said the attorney general made them feel like second-class citizens. "I said to him it's not only insulting, it's

offensive to our sense of justice , that you bring us to Trenton to tell us that you accept as legal and valid the actions of the NYPD,

and I will not be surprised if you're issuing an order informing your law enforcement officials that they too can spy on American Muslisms because if it's legal for NYPD, than it must be legal for NJ to do the same." The Muslim leaders said they would consider all legal options, including renewed appeals for action by the U.S. Justice Department. A federal civil rights lawsuit has also been considered.

Local police surveillance targeted at Muslims is unchangeable Friedersdorf 13 — Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs, has a Masters degree in Journalism from New York University and a BA in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from Pomona college, 2013 (“The Horrifying Effects of NYPD Ethnic Profiling on Innocent Muslim Americans,” The Atlantic, March 28, Available online at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/the-horrifying-effects-of-nypd-ethnic-profiling-on-innocent-muslim-americans/274434/, Accessed on 6/16/15)

The Associated Press brought the NYPD's clandestine spying on Muslims to the public's attention in a series of vital stories.

Starting shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, officers infiltrated Muslim communities and spied on hundreds or perhaps thousands of totally innocent Americans at mosques, colleges, and elsewhere. These officers "put American citizens under surveillance and scrutinized where they ate, prayed and worked, not because of charges of wrongdoing but because of their ethnicity ," the news

agency reported, citing NYPD documents. Informants were paid to bait Muslims into making inflammatory statements. The NYPD even conducted surveillance on Muslim Americans outside its jurisdiction, drawing a rebuke from an FBI field office, where a top official charged that "the department's surveillance of Muslims in the state has hindered investigations and created 'additional risks' in counterterrorism." NYPD brass and Mayor Michael Bloomberg defend these policies as counterterrorism efforts that are necessary to keep New Yorkers safe. As you ponder the specific costs of these policies, as evocatively described below, keep in mind one thing about the

ostensible benefits: "In more than six years of spying on Muslim neighborhoods, eavesdropping on conversations and cataloguing mosques," the Associated Press reported, "the New York Police

Department's secret Demographics Unit never generated a lead or triggered a terrorism

investigation ." They acknowledged, in court testimony, having generated zero leads.

Offense

DA Links

Terror Links

Muslim surveillance is key to stop terrorism – France provesKamisar 1/7 (Ben; January 7, 2015; The Hill; “GOP rep: French attack shows need for more Muslim surveillance”; http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/228756-gop-rep-french-attack-shows-need-for-muslim-surveillance)//CC

Rep . Pete King (R-N.Y.) said Wednesday that the terrorist attack on a French satirical newspaper underscores the need for increased surveillance in Muslim communities . “ We should put political correctness aside and realize that it is important to have police in the communities, using sources, using informants,” he said on Fox News’s “America’s Newsroom.” “Let’s face it: The threat is coming for the most part out of the Muslim community . It’s a small percentage, but that’s where it’s coming from,” King said. King added that that it’s not clear that increased surveillance “would have stopped the attack” but said the French attack “shows the absolute necessity of having” those programs. He’s called for these policies after previous terrorist attacks and defended of the now-defunct New York Police Department program that assigned undercover officers to Muslim communities. King noted that police similarly targeted the Italian community while working to stamp out mob organizations, among other examples. The New York Republican also said Wednesday’s attack in France should serve as a “wake-up call” for Congress to iron out differences on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding. King warned that Congress’s fight over immigration and DHS funding shouldn’t also jeopardize the nation’s counterterrorism programs. “We have not funded the Department of Homeland Security, and that’s because of this [fight] over immigration,” he said. “Whatever we do on that as far as immigration cannot in any way be allowed to interfere with our counterterrorism methods.” As retribution for President Obama’s recent executive order that granted work permits and deferred deportation for millions of immigrants living in the U.S. illegally, Republicans led a charge to only authorize DHS funding until the end of February. That way, GOP leaders will be able to negotiate the agency’s funding with more leverage, since the party now controls both houses of Congress. But King said that negotiators should not put U.S. security at risk and also keep optics in mind. “The juxtaposition would be terrible: a terrorist slaughter in Paris and the U.S. cuts back on Homeland Security funding,” he said. “ We cannot in any way allow the funding or the programs that stop terrorism in this country to be impeded in any way whatsoever .”

The US is experiencing a spike in Islamic terrorist strikes – surveillance is necessary to prevent attacksInserra 6/25 (David - a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy; June 25, 2015; The Heritage Foundation; “Terrorist Plot No. 71: Rise in Terrorism Calls for Increased Vigilance”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/terrorist-plot-no-71-rise-in-terrorism-calls-for-increased-vigilance)//CC

On Monday, the FBI charged Justin Sullivan with attempting to provide material support to a terrorist group as well as two weapons charges. Sullivan was planning to attack a public venue, such as a bar or a concert,

with a rifle in support of the Islamic State ( ISIS ). This is the 71st Islamist terrorist plot or attack against the U.S. homeland since 9/11 according to publicly available information. It is the third plot foiled this month alone and part of an ongoing spike in terrorist activity within the U.S . The U.S. must recognize that

terrorists have not stopped trying to strike us and , indeed, have only grown bolder in the past few months. While the U.S. should not give in to fearmongering, it cannot naively ignore the threat that confronts it. The U.S. must use all the tools of its national power to prevent terrorists from striking . In April 2015, Sullivan’s father called 9-1-1 after Sullivan began to destroy various household items, particularly religious items, seemingly in support of ISIS. Sullivan’s father said that they were “scared to leave the house.” Following this incident, the FBI assigned an undercover agent (UC) to communicate with Sullivan. Sullivan praised ISIS and swore his allegiance to it, describing himself as a “mujahid,” a guerilla fighter engaging in violent jihad. Sullivan told the UC that the two of them should remain in the U.S. to support ISIS since they would likely be captured if they tried to travel. Instead, Sullivan had settled on attacking a U.S. target with a gun, saying that “[yo]u only need 600 dollars… for the gun and bullets.”[1] Sullivan said that he would be purchasing an AR-15 rifle “in about two weeks” at a nearby gun show, promising that “I’ll kill people this month.” Sullivan estimated that he and the UC could kill 1,000 people with AR-15s.[2] Sullivan then began to talk about firearm silencers and poisons that could be used on the bullets or in a bomb. He asked if the UC could make the silencers for use in June or possibly July. In addition to seeking out a silencer and poisons, Sullivan also sought 100-round drum magazines for the AR-15 as well.[3] After gaining as much information as possible from Sullivan, the FBI then provided him with a silencer that Sullivan believed was homemade on June 19. The FBI then raided the Sullivans’ house, finding the silencer and arresting Sullivan. Sullivan admitted that he was planning to use the silencer during an attack on a bar or a concert between June 21 and June 23. He intended to buy a rifle from a gun show on June 20.[4] This 71st plot is the ninth Islamist terrorist plot in this calendar year and the third in June alone. As was the case with all the other plots this year, Sullivan was inspired by ISIS. Sullivan’s was also the 60th plot or attack involving a homegrown terrorist, meaning one who was radicalized here in the U.S. In targeting a bar or a concert, Sullivan was also going after the third most common terrorist target: different types of mass gatherings (plots against the U.S. military and New York City are the most and second most common targets, respectively). Together with the recent release of State Department research showing a spike in global terrorism in 2014, the U.S. must come to grips with the true nature of the terrorist threat, both at home and abroad.[5] To combat the real and growing threat of terrorism, Congress should: Ensure that the FBI shares information more readily and regularly with state and local law enforcement and treats state and local partners as critical actors in the fight against terrorism. In this case, a local 9-1-1 call seems to have triggered FBI involvement. While using state and local partners as important sources of information is half the battle, local partners must also receive timely information from the FBI. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should play a role in supporting these partners’ efforts by acting as a source or conduit for information and coordinating information sharing between the FBI and its partners. Designate an office in DHS to coordinate countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. CVE efforts are spread across all levels of government and society. DHS is uniquely situated to lead the federal government’s efforts to empower local partners. Currently, DHS’s CVE working group coordinates efforts across DHS components, but a more substantial office will be necessary to manage this broader task. Support state, local, and civil society partners. Congress and the Administration should not lose sight of the fact that all of the federal government’s efforts must be focused on empowering local partners. The federal government is not the tip of the spear for CVE efforts; it exists to support local partners who are in the best position to recognize and counter radicalization in their own communities. Maintain essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important

investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and should be allowed to continue . The need for effective counterterrorism operations, however, does not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law

and respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well. As the U.S. experiences the highest level of terrorist activity since 9/11, Congress must remember that this is not a short-term skirmish but a long war. Failure to recognize the nature of this conflict , our enemy, or the reality of the threat will leave the U.S. unprepare d. Instead, the U.S. must remain vigilant and provide U.S. counterterrorism officials with additional legal tools to confront the growing threat .

Targeted surveillance is necessary – Boston bombing provesCareccia ‘13 (John; June 17, 2013; Western Journalism; “Islamic Mosques: Excluded From Surveillance By Feds”; http://www.westernjournalism.com/islamic-mosques-excluded-from-surveillance-by-feds/)//CC

Homeland Insecurity: The White House assures us that tracking our every phone call and keystroke is necessary to stop terrorists, and yet it won’t snoop in mosques, where the terrorists emanate from. Fact – Many of the terrorists have been radicalized in Mosques and Muslim agencies right here in America.

According to the NSA the government’s sweeping surveillance of our most private communications excludes Mosques and Muslim affiliated facilities. Supposedly this is done to protect the sensibilities of innocent Muslims who worship in Mosques. Since October 2011, mosques have been off-limits to FBI agents. Surveillance or undercover sting operations are not allowed without high-level approval from a special oversight body at the Justice Department dubbed the Sensitive Operations Review Committee (SORC). Who makes up this body, and under what methodology do they review requests – nobody knows. The names of the chairman, members and staff are kept secret. Why is it necessary to keep the names and titles of the people who decide whether or not to protect the rest of the country from radical Muslims, secret? We do know the panel was set up under pressure from Islamist groups who complained about FBI stings at mosques. Just months before the panel’s formation, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) teamed up with the ACLU to sue the FBI for allegedly violating the civil rights of Muslims in Los Angeles by hiring an undercover agent to infiltrate and monitor mosques in America’s second largest city. Another defeat for the politically correct imbeciles in our government. Before mosques were excluded from the otherwise wide domestic spy net the administration has cast, the FBI launched dozens of successful sting operations against homegrown radicals inside mosques, and disrupted dozens of plots against innocent American citizens across the U nited S tates. If only they were allowed to continue , perhaps the many innocent victims of the Boston Marathon bombings would not have lost their lives and limbs . The FBI never canvassed Boston mosques until four days after the April 15 attacks, and it did not check out the radical Boston mosque where the Muslim bombers worshiped even though they were supposedly on the government’s watch list. The bureau didn’t even contact mosque leaders for help in identifying their images after those images were captured on closed-circuit TV cameras and cellphones. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the Politically Correct attitude of the Obama administration is dangerous to the well being of the average hard working American citizen . There are many religious communities in the United States. How can the government attack one of the oldest and most established religions in the United States and choose to defend the actions of another belief system that espouses violence and murder of Westerners who they classify as infidels. Even though the FBI was tipped by Russia more than a year before about the leanings of the two Boston bombers, they apparently chose to ignore it. Now after the fact we learn that one of the Muslim bombers made extremist outbursts during worship , yet because the mosque wasn’t monitored , red flags didn’t go off inside the FBI about his increasing radicalization before the attacks .

Arab Americans won’t give up their radicals – surveillance is keyCareccia ‘13 (John; June 17, 2013; Western Journalism; “Islamic Mosques: Excluded From Surveillance By Feds”; http://www.westernjournalism.com/islamic-mosques-excluded-from-surveillance-by-feds/)//CC

Why didn’t the Imam contact the FBI? Why don’t these people of peace speak up when they hear people in their congregation espousing hate of the country they have adopted . Maybe it’s because they see us as an opportunity to expand their Caliphate and don’t really care what happens to the infidels in their way who don’t deserve to live. This is particularly disturbing in light of recent independent surveys of American mosques, which reveal some 80% of them preach violent jihad and distribute violent literature to worshipers. Even though Islam is not a religion in the strict sense (it is more of a socio-economic way of life), if Church doors are open to anyone or anything then Mosques

should be too. If Muslims have nothing to hide then they should not object to being treated the same or equal to other religious organizations. If our Federal agencies are going to protect us from attack, they have to adopt strong measures to root out these radicals and a plan to counter those who would commit atrocities against citizens of the the United States.

Muslim Surveillance is essential to stop terrorismMoore and Lemire ’12 (Tina and Jonathon; March 3, 2012; Daily News; “Ray Kelly defends spying on students, calling it an essential safety strategy for city”; http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/raymond-kelly-defends-spying-calling-essential-safety-strategy-city-article-1.1032607)//CC

Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly gave an impassioned defense of the NYPD’s controversial Muslim surveillance program Saturday — declaring it essential for the city’s safety . The tactics, which allegedly include spying on mosques, cafes and shops, have come under fire from Muslim and civil rights groups, but Kelly said the Police Department’s strategy has been “misrepresented .” “For some, the very act of intelligence gathering seems illegitimate when applied to the crime of terrorism,” Kelly said in his most wide-ranging remarks to date on the hot-button topic. “In fact, the Police Department uses many of the same methods to find and stop terrorists that we use to arrest drug dealers, human traffickers and gang leaders,” the commissioner told a Fordham Law School alumni group. Even as more than 100 protesters demonstrated outside his speech, Kelly did not back down, declaring that the su rveillance program was not just legal, but a vital part of the successful takedowns of more than a dozen terror plots since Sept. 11, 2001. “A broad base of knowledge is critically important to our ability to investigate terrorism ,” said Kelly, who suggested that the NYPD did not do enough after the first World Trade Center attack. “ It was precisely our failure to understand the context in 1993 that left us vulnerable in 2001,” he said. “We won’t make that mistake again — on Mayor Bloomberg’s watch or mine.” Claiming reconnaissance was necessary to gather intelligence needed to penetrate dangerous groups, Kelly defended the NYPD’s focus on Muslim neighborhoods and student groups. “We know that while the vast majority of Muslim student associations and their members are law-abiding,” Kelly said, “we have seen too many cases in which such groups were exploited.”

Terror Rollback

French Attacks prove rollback—Numerous foreign governments strengthen surveillance too—that’s devastating for the affBusiness Insider 1/11/15 [Business Insider, January 11, 2015, “The Paris Attacks Could Be Used As

Justification For Tighter Borders And More Internet Surveillance ”, http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-internet-and-border-monitoring-needed-to-thwart-further-attacks-2015-1#ixzz3dv0f31I4] JMOV

Paris (AFP) - Increased Internet surveillance and tighter border checks are "urgently" needed to foil jihadist attacks of the sort that rocked Paris this week, European, US and Canadian security ministers agreed Sunday.¶ The gathering of interior and justice ministers at the French interior ministry was held before a massive anti-terror march in Paris that included dozens of foreign leaders.¶ A joint statement by the

ministers -- representing 11 EU nations including France, Britain, Germany, Sweden and Poland, as well as the European commissioner for

migration and home affairs, and US Attorney General Eric Holder -- emphasized their "determination to fight together against terrorism".¶ They said it was "essential" that major Internet providers cooperate with governments in closely monitoring and, if necessary, removing online content "that aims to incite hatred and terror ". ¶ They also want to "step up the detection and screening of travel movements of European nationals" leaving or entering the EU's external borders, and modify Europe's internal Schengen freedom-of-movement rules to widen

information sharing and subject suspect passengers to greater checks. ¶ They saw a "crucial and urgent need" to establish an EU-wide database

of passenger information for travel inside Europe and for flights leaving or entering the 28-nation bloc.¶ The proposed measures are to be

discussed further at a February 12 EU summit focused on reinforcing security.¶ Holder announced a broader February 18 summit in Washington

to be hosted by US President Barack Obama.¶ The steps were unveiled after three days of carnage in Paris by three gunmen who claimed

allegiance to Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the rival Islamic State group.¶ The violence began with a bloody attack on the satirical newspaper Charlie

Hebdo on Wednesday, when two of the gunmen killed 12 people.¶ Twin assaults by French commandos on the gunmen holed up in two

separate locations -- in a town outside Paris and in a Jewish supermarket in the capital -- ended with the Islamists' deaths on Friday.¶ Civil liberty concerns REUTERS¶ Holder said Sunday that the announced US summit would "discuss ways in which we can counteract this violent extremism that exists around the world".¶ " Only if we work together, through sharing of information, by pooling our resources, will we ultimately be able to defeat those who are in a struggle with us about our fundamental values ," he told reporters.¶ The interior and justice

ministers stressed in their joint statement that the enhanced monitoring of the Internet should be done with respect to it remaining "a forum

for free expression".¶ But there are fears by some civil liberty groups that such state pressure on private Internet companies could erode citizens' rights and freedom of expression online, especially in the wake of the scandal over electronic snooping by the United States' NSA.¶ The increased checks on travel by Europeans was

also of concern. ¶ The European parliament and others want to ensure limits are imposed on the sharing of passenger data with the US to

prevent Europeans being exposed to unwarranted prying.¶ Undermining Schengen freedoms that have opened up most of the EU's internal

borders are also seen as a slapdown of one of the bloc's most cherished principles.¶ European-born jihadists ¶Interior Minister Bernard

Cazeneuve speaks to the press at the offices of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015 in Paris, France.¶ In the wake

of the Paris attacks, though, voices demanding reinforced domestic security against jihadists were louder than those championing personal

freedoms.¶ The EU commissioner for migration and home affairs, Dimitris Avramopoulos, said authorities are "determined to move ahead in

coordinating our efforts within Europe and with our international friends in order to give an end to this drama and this phenomenon".¶ French

Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve emphasised the problem of "foreign jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq" many of whom come from EU

countries -- particularly those with sizeable Muslim populations such as France, Britain and Germany.¶ Information on them and on "terrorist

networks" must be shared between the allied countries, he said.¶ "We are resolved to fight against terrorism," Cazeneuve told a

news conference.¶

Politics

Plan links to politics the house and the senate don’t like Islamic sensitivity billsCAIR ’13 ( Council on American Islamic Relations Chicago; March 19, 2013; “THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS”; http://www.cairchicago.org/blog/2013/03/the-influence-of-islamophobic-propagandists-in-congressional-politics/) //CC

A select group of expert propagandists wield considerable influence in congressional politics. These so-called scholars and activists compile misinformation that is widely discredited and peddle it to sympathetic right-leaning politicians who regurgitate its resulting hateful rhetoric on the national stage. The most odious of these “misinformation experts” include Brigette Gabriel, Frank Gaffney, Daniel Pipes, Walid Phares, Zuhdi Jasser and David Yerushalmi, just to name a few. Their rhetoric is bigoted and incorrect, yet insidiously shapes our national discourse through their political allies who hold influential positions in House Committees. The most influential political allies include: Rep. Peter King, Rep. Allen West, Rep. Sue Myrick, Rep. Michele Bauchman, and Rep. Paul Broun among others. Through their various think tanks and advocacy organizations, misinformation experts fear-monger and propagate baseless and inflammatory rhetoric that shapes state and national discourse and policy.

Detention CP

Detention CPText: The Unites States federal government should end Islamophobic indefinite detention policies.Counterplan solves Islamophobic detention policies shape the War on TerrorRalph 6 (Diana Ralph, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate Professor of Social Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE ‘‘WAR ON TERROR’’: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of 9-11-2001 Research in Political Economy, Volume 23, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.261-298, 911blogger.com/node/16381)

Standing with Muslims against the “War on Terror ” In this chapter, I have demonstrated that: The overriding motive for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is to secure control over the Middle East and Central Asia for U.S. oil, military, and corporate interests. Bush’s handlers have been planning imperial conquest of the world since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989. From the evidence here and elsewhere, it is difficult to draw another conclusion than that Bush’s associates organized the 9-

11 attacks to kick start popular support for this war. They have continued to justify the ‘‘war on terror’’ by claiming that Muslim terrorists pose an immanent danger to Americans. In fact, however, terrorism actually poses minimal risk to Americans. The ‘‘war on terror’’ is a concept modeled on Israel’s assaults on Palestinians to provide a cover for campaigns of territorial conquest. Far from being ‘‘under attack,’’ America has pre-emptively attacked and conquered two sovereign states, and

is threatening military domination of the entire world. In other words, Bush’s ‘‘war on terror’’ is a massive con job , perpetrated by a few oil and military elites, at the expense of Muslims particularly, but threatening the security and well-being of virtually everyone on the planet . An immensely wealthy and powerful republic has

been hijacked by a small cabal of individuals...The American people have...been deliberately lied to, their interests cynically misrepresented and misreported, the real aims and intentons of this private war of Bush the son and his junta concealed with complete arrogance." (Said, 2003) Thomas Donnelly, author of the RAD blueprint for Bush’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ recently reaffirmed the neo-conservative commitment, not to protect Americans from ‘‘terrorism,’’ but to conquer the world. This war, properly understood, is a struggle to build a [new] ... order throughout the ‘‘greater Middle East,’’ that giant swath of the planet that extends from West Africa to Southeast Asia. ...Operation Iraqi Freedom represented the first step in a generational commitment to Iraq, but also the commitment of many generations to transforming the greater Middle East....The vision of the Bush Doctrine is hugely ambitious; in embracing this great vision, the United States must obligate the resources and create the institutions necessary to realize it." (Donnelly, 2004, pp. ix, 111) 4.1. ‘‘Either you are with us, or you

are with the Terrorists’’ Fear and hatred of a scapegoated ‘‘enemy’’ are powerful tools by which despots confuse people into believing that their oppressors are their salvation. Just as anti-Semitism served to divide and silence progressive German movements in the early Nazi era, Islamophobia is dividing and

silencing us now. No one wants to associate with “terrorists ”, much less be labelled and persecuted as one.

Many progressive Western people fear and despise “fundmentalist” Muslims, and thereby fall into the trap of allying themselves with , or at least not opposing, Islamophobic laws and practices in the name of opposing “terrorism”. They thereby collude in undercutting the fabric of rights, due process, and equality on which they too depend. The Bush Doctrine rhetoric has succeeded in convincing most white Americans that “terrorists” pose a serious threat to their personal safety, and that the “war on terror” is necessary to protect them. Islamophobic language and values have seeped into the fiber of our daily lives .

Bookstores now have “terrorism” sections, displaying some of the 5,036 mostly new books on the topic.15 Several U.S. colleges and universities now offer degrees in “homeland security.” Media images of “Arab extremists” have become routine. Most Americans now believe that “terrorism” is such a big problem, that they should pay with their taxes, their freedoms, their decimated public services, and their children’s lives. In the summer of 2005, polls found that 79 percent of Americans believed that “the threat of terrorism against the U.S.” has increased or stayed about the same (Polling Report.com, 2005). Seventy-six percent thought “Osama bin Laden himself is currently planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States,” and 64 percent supported the Patriot Act. Sixty-four percent would be “willing to give up some of [their] personal freedom in order to reduce the threat of terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005). Almost half of all Americans “believe the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim-Americans” (Dean, 2005). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and shocking revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison, however, popular support for the “war on terror” plummetted. In November, 2005, 55 percent of Americans

disapproved of the way Bush is “dealing with the war on terrorism” (PollingReport.com, 2005). 4.2. Which Side are you on? Before 9-11, the anti-globalization movement had been rapidly gaining influence and unity worldwide. Opposition to U.S.-dominated institutions like the

World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the G-8, NATO and APEC, had succeeded in disrupting and exposing several of their gatherings. And in their place, the World Social Forum and other progressive people’s movements were demonstrating that indeed there are excellent

alternatives to globalization and corporate rule. The 9-11 “attacks” and the “war on terror” derailed these hopeful movements and imposed crippling constraints on dissent , democracy, and national sovereignty .

Under cover of Islamophobic targeting of Muslims, the U.S. is waging war on all movements for

social justice both domestically and internationally, using its new post 9-11 legislative powers and bloated military

and policing budgets. Domestically, the Bush administration is attacking democracy, abortion rights, the judiciary, environmental protections, social security, public education, women’s rights, union rights, and civil rights (Dorhrn, 2003). Internationally, it pressures other nations to enact similar “anti-terror” laws and policies, as well as demanding that they open their economies to full U.S. corporate rule. As

Bernadette Dorhn points out: “The result is a chilling effect. That is to say, people around the targets back away, get silent, don’t stand up when they see the cost of simply expressing your opinion or even making a joke, let alone publicly objecting to what’s going on” (2003). Many progressive groups oppose Islamophobia and support Muslim victims of U.S. and Israeli assaults. These include civil liberties associations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, anti-Zionist Jewish and Christian groups, unions, peace groups, and student organizations like the Canadian Federation of Students. Secular, Jewish, and Christian groups have formed alliances with Palestinians and Iraqis

in oppostion to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. In the U.S. the C enter for C onstitutional R ights works to

end arbitrary detention of Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere . In Canada, the Campaign to

Stop Secret Trials in Canada has mobilized broad support for Muslim detainees and their rights. However , even these groups have not dared to challenge the Islamophobic base of the “anti-terror” legislation, for fear of being called pro-terrorist. They are thereby left arguing that the particular individuals for whom they advocate

aren’t terrorists, while implicitly condoning the myth that “real” terrorists are lurking in the shadows. But under the Bush Doctrine, all Muslims are presumed to be either current or potential terrorists, and their civil liberties have been sacrificed in the name of

“national security”. To defeat the Bush plot for world control, we will need to challenge Islamophobic fear of

“terrorists”, to assert clearly that there is little substantive terrorist threat . What terrorism there is could better be

addressed through criminal justice systems and international law. More importantly we need to insist that the U.S. desist from both overt

preemptive wars and covert state-financed terrorism. The actual security of both Americans and all other people will be best served by ending the occupations of the West Bank, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and recognizing the right of all nations to self-determination (including oil policies). We need to stand in solidarity with all Muslims, regardless

of their religious beliefs. At this juncture, Islamophobia is the key barrier to effective mobilization against the Bush regime.

2NCNo aff can “solve” islamophobia but the counterplans challenge to indefinite detention policies is sufficient to challenge islamophobia. Butler 06 (Judith Butler, Professor at UC Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” Ch. 3: Indefinite Detention, p. 50, 2006)

If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of deciding whether criminal acts occurred. Indeed, "deeming" someone dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to

preempt determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is potentially enormous . We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of thousands of Arab residents or Arab -American citizens , sometimes on the basis of last names alone ; the harassment of any number of US and non-US citizens at the immigration borders because some official "perceives" � a potential difficulty; the attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern descent on US streets , and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses . When Rumsfeld has sent the US into periodic panics or "alerts," � he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened

awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark-skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well versed in making visual distinctions , say, between Sikhs and Muslims or , indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani-Americans. Although "deeming" � someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these

discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, has become targeted by this government mandate to be on

heightened alert , with the effect that the Arab population in the US becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain "indefinite containment" � takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag in the months following September Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless ruled public culture-and business interests_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be proven to

establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the

jurisdiction of the law , depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and

international law are entitled . These are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects , humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo released by the Department of Defense. The DOD did not hide these photos, but published them openly. My speculation is that they published these photographs to make known that a certain vanquishing had taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication. These were not photographs leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international response was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European human rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge, cruelty, and a nationalist and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several

countries asked that their citizens be returned home for trial. But there is something more in this degradation that calls to be read. There is a reduction of these human beings to animal status , where the animal is figured as

out of control, in need of total restraint . It is important to remember that the bestialization of the human in this way has little , if anything, to do with actual animals , since it is a figure of the animal against which the

human is defined. Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these people have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent

acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with murderers under both criminal and international law. The language with which they are described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are exceptional , that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings

such as these . The treatment of these prisoners is considered as an extension of war itself , not as a postwar question of appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their detention stops the killing. If they were not detained , and forcibly so when any movement is required, they would appar- ently start killing on the spot; they are beings who are in a permanent and perpetual war. It may be that al-Qaeda representatives

speak this way-some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those detained are centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative team in Guantanamo, suggest that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention the prison uprisings in Afghanistan in

which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison. In this sense, the war is not, and cannot be, over; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and there is a warrant for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the continuing site of war . It would seem that the rules that govern combat are in place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners separated from the war itself. When General Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the street, even if you don't charge them?" he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my emphasis). | 1 If the war is against

terrorism, and the definition of terrorism expands to include every questionable instance of global difficulty, how can the war end? Is it, by definition, a war without end, given the lability of the terms "terrorism" � and "war" �? Although the pictures were published as a sign of US triumph, and so apparently indicating a conclusion to the war effort, it was clear at the time that bombing and armed confiict were continuing

in Afghanistan, the war was not over, and even the photographs, the degradation, and the indefinite detention were continuing acts of war. Indeed, war seems to have established a more or less permanent

condition of national emergency , and the sovereign right to self-protection outfianks any and all

recourse to law.

Chow K

1NCThe aff is engaged in a war of words when in reality they do nothing for the Muslims being surveilled by the NSA- the starting point for advocacy should be to confront our own privilege Chow ‘93. Rey Chow, Professor of English and Comp Lit, Writing Diaspora: tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, pg. 17

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons – especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek privilege – I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, the forms of power that transform them into its objects and instrument in the sphere of knowledge, truth, consciousness and discourse . Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci‘s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational space? Because borders have so clearly meandered into so many intellectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation between borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought as the creation of new fields. Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders – of borders, that is, as para-sites that never take over a field in its entirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau is a helpful for the formulation of this parasitical

intervention.De Certeau distinguished between strategy and another practice – tactic – in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces. . Strategy therefore belongs to an economy of the proper place and to those who are committed to the building, growth,, and fortification of a field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy ?a cultural weapon, a private hunting preserve,? or ?a means of social stratification? in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus (de Certeau, p. 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old rules of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case ben concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture (de Certeau. P. xi). Why are tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism, interdisiplinarity, the third world intellectual, and other companion issue develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and

difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness ensuring from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness – all these forces creates new solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense. We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan space alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate fro m their oppositional viewpoint,and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words . (When Foucault saidintellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of

big business,. . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.28 Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising?How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics – that which is without any base where it could stockpile its winnings? (deCerteau, p.37)–from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

The aff’s victimization of Arab Americans projects more surveillance onto these communitiesSpivak and Barlow ’04. GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, Tani E. Barlow, T.T. and W.F. Chao Professor of History and director of the Chao Center for Asian Studies at Rice University,“Not Really a Properly Intellectual Response: An Interview with GayatriSpivak,” positions: east asia cultures critique, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2004, pg. 140

GayatriChakravortySpivak: My problem is that I am unable to give a general response. It is a pity in all of this postnational talk that this cruel nationalism —taking pleasure in the death of others— begins with the shock of the death of one’s own. It is a cause for great sorrow that this event brings out the worst kind of “herd mentality”—to quote Nietzsche—in human beings, and it falls under nationalism. Bush’s spin doctors have told him to say that Islam is a wonderful religion and the hijackers hijacked it. There- fore one must now endlessly be nice to Arab Americans even as there is relentless racial profiling and undercover incarceration . Feminism is show- ing its problems too . Why are members of the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan suddenly taken to be prophets ? We don’t know much about their values. They are a good group. They haven’t appeared all of a sudden, but they have only now been picked up because the Taliban hate their women . But people know little about their specific problems. They also cannot give them real informed sympathy because they are taken as a kind of fetish that will justify support for the war, although they themselves oppose it . On the other side, you have the picture that CNN showed of U.S. women on aircraft carriers who are actually chief programmers, wielding sextants and so on. And the guy even said that there can be no more sexist jokes about women drivers. There is this wonderful blond girl. Midwestern-looking, freckled cheeks, saying, “If I can drive an aircraft carrier, I can drive a truck.” These are issues I wrote about in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” twenty years ago. Who could question that these are terrible things? You would be foolish to say there was any justification for burning widows or stoning adulter- esses. On the other hand, this sudden exposure of visible violence by people, justifying war, killing Afghans, does nothing to guarantee that the subaltern women’s epistemic production will be one iota altered . I am interested not only in the fact that men do harm to women, but the fact that when it comes to the subaltern woman , nobody is interested in the patience that is required, in order to make her not acquiesce when they arrive at the point of visible violence .

The aff acts as the maoist – criticizing civil society while also benefiting from their own privilege Chow ‘93. Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Brown Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, pg. 10-11

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist . ArifDirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of

China,the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism —a cultural critic , in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking . The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/ does not have . Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing— the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric . In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the Maoist’s most important ancestors is Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre. Like Jane, the Maoist’s means to moral power is a specific representational position— the position of powerlessness . In their reading of Jane Eyre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as

powerless: Until the very end of the novel,Janeis always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on

renouncing what power might come to her as a teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary’s wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone.This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism’s ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Bronte’s depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England’s empire building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted GayatriSpivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Bronte’s treatment of the “madwoman,” Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the “native subject” is not created as an animal but as the object of what might be termed the

terrorism of the categorical imperative.This kind of creation is imperialism’s use/ travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to “make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end himself .” In the twentieth century, as Europe’s former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis-à-vis established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the

opposition known as leftist…There is a vis-à-vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left, which since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. The Maoist retains many of Jane’s awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into “truth” and an idealist

intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living “third world” natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their “backwardness,” a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.

Their project amounts to a politics of self-subalternization, where the judge is encouraged to find solidarity with the other of the 1ac - their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first placeSpivak ’88.GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Carl Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, pg. 24-25

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this ' subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo—political determinations. ’The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject . . . . This S/ subject , curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. 5 It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind ' of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read , critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other ,supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could ‘ occupy (invest?) its itinerary - not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intellectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic ' factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased , however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of "knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ (Foucault 1980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were ’

or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is , rather, to offer a n account of how an explanation and narrative of reality ' - was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and tegimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question : On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak ? . . .

Close your eyes to the 1ac—any knowledge or political productivity they can generate will be redeployed to destroy the very subjects they hope to help.Spanos ’00.William V. Spanos, distinguished professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York; he is a founder and editor of the critical journal boundary 2, PhD, 1964, University of Wisconsin, Madison: Literary theory, literature and philosophy, “America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire” 2000. p. 48-50

To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the modern West ; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and its "natural" role as an appendage to Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title "contribution to modern learning" when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pre-texts for a text whose usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history, time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new

disciplines; to divide, deploy , schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature , temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one's powers: these are the features of

Orien- talist projection entirely realized in the Description de l'£gypte, itself enabled and reinforced by Napoleon's wholly Orientalist

en- gulfment of Egypt by the instruments of Western knowledge and power.89 Nor, finally, is it an accident that the emergent Linnaean system of classification — of identifying, naming, and classifying the flora and fauna of nature — inaugurated the global taxonomic projects, most no- tably that of his student Anders Sparrman,90 that became the essential European means of producing a modern

orneoimperialist discourse, a discourse that,in the name of the truth of empirical science, invents or constructs the Other in the image of the First World . I am referring to what Mary Louise Pratt, in her Foucauldian study of

the relation- ship between scientific travel writing and colonialism in South Africa and Latin America, has calledthe " anti-conquest narrative ." This is the narrative "in which the naturalist naturalizes the bourgeois European'sown global presence and authority" to differentiate its "benign" truth- producing motive from an earlier, overtly violent imperial narrative. In a way that recalls Foucault's and Said's differentiation of the visible and "inefficient" deployment of power in the ancien regime from the more invisible and materially and politically economical version of the Enlightenment, Pratt

observes: Natural history asserted an urban, lettered, male authority over the whole of the planet;it elaborated a rationalizing,

extractive, dissociative understanding which overlaid functional, experiential relations among people, plants, and animals. In

these respects,it figures a certain kind of global hegemony, notably one based on possession of land and resources rather than control over routes. At the same time, in and of itself, the system of nature as a descriptive paradigm was an utterly benign and abstract appropriation of the planet. Claiming no transformative potential whatsoever, it differed sharply from overly

imperial articulations of conquest, conversion, territorial appropriation, and enslavement. The system created... a Utopian, innocent vision of European global authority, which I refer to as an anti-conquest. The term is intended to emphasize the relational meaning of natural history, the extent to which it became meaningful specifically in contrast with an earlier imperial,

and prebourgeois, European expansionist presence.91The difference between an earlier, pre-Enlightenment, and a later, post-Enlightenment, configuration of the internal space of the imperial circle is, of course, crucial to any understanding of the essence of imperial practice. But my purpose in thus invoking Foucault's analysis of

the complicity of the classificatory table of the Enlightenment with the domination of the Other in the disciplinary society, and Said's and Pratt's extension of Foucault's genealogical insight to includethe modern European imperial project , is not to bring a story about the development of the technology of European colonialism to its fulfillment and narrative closure, one that renders prior technologies of power anachronistic. It is , rather, to retrieve a fundamental dimension of this story that has been obliterated from memory even as it resonates unthought in the very contemporary language these postcolonial critics use to indict the truth discourse of the West as "imperial ." I want to suggest that the classificatory table, as microcosm of a larger spatial totality and as the model for wider "imperial" practices (the mass production process, the pan- optic penal system, the medical and psychiatric hospital, the family, the classroom, the nation-state, the colonial administration, and so on), is grounded in and enabled by the metaphysical principle of principles or, as Enrique Dussel puts it, "the ideology of ideologies":92 that Identity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the other way around.Unlike its predecessor in the ancien regime, metaphysical inquiry at this advanced Enlightenment stage does not obliterate the contradictory, amorphous, unimproved, and "ahistorical" Other from the vantage

point of a visible "center elsewhere."It "acknowledges" this Other's claims as contributive to(the knowledge of)the larger self-identical Whole. In other words, it "classifies" the amorphous Others from the vantage point of an invisible "center

elsewhere." It differentiates these Others into discrete phenomena — attributes distinguishing identities to them— within and in behalf of a prior encompassing self-present total Identity. This individuation of the amorphous Other conveys a sense of the sovereign integrity of the differentiated entities, but it obscures the fact that their uniqueness is entirely dependent on a dominant synchronic Totality, the always present and

determining center of which is always out of sight.To acquire validity the differentiated entity must accommodate its differential partiality to the prior Totality, must, that is, objectify and subordinate itself to — take its proper place within — the gridded structure of the dominant Identity. To become a subject it must heed the call — the hailing — of the Subject. As his invocation of the ontological metaphorics of the center and the circle should suggest, what the Lacanian Marxist Louis Althusser says about "the interpel- lation of the individual as subject" — the (subjected) subject invented by the bourgeois capitalist Enlightenment — applies by extension to the spatial economy of the (neo)imperial project as such:

Islam LinkThe 1AC victims of discrimination based on their “Islamic” nature and defining the West based on its Islamophobia recreates the violent categorical differences –only the alternative can solve the case by charting a course between America and IslamSpivak and Barlow ’04. GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, Tani E. Barlow, T.T. and W.F. Chao Professor of History and director of the Chao Center for Asian Studies at Rice University, “Not Really a Properly Intellectual Response: An Interview with GayatriSpivak,” positions: east asia cultures critique, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2004, pg 160

GCS: Yes, we do not tend to notice that Euro-U.S. globality, which is tac- itly offered as the unmarked global as such, with endless invocations of the transnational subject and satellite dishes in Nepalese villages, is the one that conjures with nation-state alliances. It is in that other globality called “ Is- lamic ” that archaic and residual , moving, globalizing frontiers are in conflict with the idea of the nation-states. As in the case of the Gulf War, it is the case of people one way, the state another. We must complicate the global in order to get a grip upon this fast-evolving situation. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Amir Abd-ur-Rahman of Afghanistan tried to think through such explanations between the provisional globality of something called “Islam” and the urgent need for the emergence of a practical nation- state. I do not have access to his autobiography in Farsi, but I have carefully studied its English translation, attempting to read as much as possible be- tween its lines. Not all of it is by his hand of course; one is not gullible about the evidentiary strength of autobiography, just as one is aware of the linea- ments of the autobiographical in the most “objective organization of facts.” This characteristic of devising and charting a course between the existing solidarity of “Islam ” and the consolidation of the frontiers and boundaries of the nation-states , loosely established as Afghanistan by Ahmad Shah Durani in 1747, i s so pervasive in this text that it is hard to isolate a quotation. In 1876 he drew up agreements to create peace between all of the various groups in that area: Hindus, Muslims, tribals, gypsies, you name it. There were over two hundred Firmans of this sort in existence in Farsi. It could have consol- idated a nation-state negotiating between “Islam” and the commonality of religions and ways of life, interchangeable at this time, accessing the larger dimensions of this other word, haq, which is translated into English rather misleadingly as “right,” and so on. So again, an unmarked centrality was not allowed to emerge in Afghanistan, and no one knows anything about this now as they are talking and talking about what’s going on.

Alt Solves

Alternative solves—results in individual methods of revolt against violence such as Islamophobia like self-immolation—creates a better method of resolving problemsSpivak ’11 GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Frontier Vol. 43, No. 25, May 22-28, 2011, http://www.frontierweekly.com/pdf-files/vol-43-45/subaltern-43-45.pdf

The subaltern is a position without identity . If you think you can claim to be specifically a subaltern , the only thing to do with it is to lead in the name of the subaltern , a grounding error in the same category as tracing Bach, only reversed, from above, not from below.7 Jonathan Chauveau, a French journalist (like many politically correct folk in that part of the world, anxious to have me endorse a speaking subaltern), e-mailed me as follows : the popular revolts in Africa and their political consequences were neither anticipated nor envisaged by the countries concerned and even less by international diplomacy. Can one explain this blindness by the fact that leadership came from young people and women not belonging to recognized circles of the "official opposition." It would thus be their subaltern position —a population not recognized as a "classically" constituted political force— which would explain that no one anticipated these events definitively, because no one had, at their disposal, the means for hearing them, listening to them, or yet understanding them. Do you agree with this analysis? Is it not a case of the subaltern grabbing the right to speak? ...Given that these popular uprisings seem identical. Can one envisage a regional political alliance in future? I replied :I am of course tremendously impressed by what's happening in North Africa, but it's not necessarily "the subaltern speaking." It is rather the awe-inspiring spectacle of citizens claiming citizenship. It is possible that the urban subproletariat mingled with the largely metropolitan, class-mixed, gender-mixed crowd we saw in Tahrir Square. There was also a phenomenon of "prendre la parole" by the private sector, by civil society, by the citizen. Unfortunately, if the term "subaltern" has to remain useful, it cannot be identified with varieties of national liberation movements. It must , however, be said, that the young man who burnt himself to death in despair in Tunisia might be thought of as a subaltern bringing himself to crisis, " speaking," and there being an infrastructure of political will, created, paradoxically, by the predatory state, able to "hear" him and complete his speech act .8

AT: FrameworkRather than attempting to know the Truth of Islamophobia, we should refuse attempts to locate our politics in the reality of the present and FIRST AND FOREMOST seek to interrogate our subject positions in academia to allow others to speak for themselves.Owen ‘97. David Owen, professor of social sciences at Southampton University, 1997, “Maturity and Modernity: Nietszche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason,” Routledge publishers, published July 22, 1997

In our reflections on Foucault’s methodology, it was noted that, like Nietszche and Weber, he commits himself to a stance of value-freedom as an engaged refusal to legislate for others. Foucault’s critical activity is oriented to human autonomy yet his formal account of the idea of autonomy as the activity of self-transformation entails that the content of this activity is specific to the struggles of particular groups and individuals. Thus , while the struggle against humanist forms of power/knowledge relations denotes the formal archiectonic interest of genealogy as critique, the determination of the ‘main danger’ which denotes the ‘filling in’ of this interest is contingent upon the dominant systems of constraint confronted by specific groups and individuals . For example, the constitution of women as ‘hysterical,’ of blacks as ‘criminal,’ of homosexuals as ‘perverted’ all operate through humanist forms of power/knowledge relations, yet the specificity of the social practices and discourses engaged in producing these ‘identities’ entails that while these struggles share a general formal interest in resisting the biopolitics of humanism, their substantive interests are distinct. It is against this context that Foucault’s stance of value-freedom can be read as embodying a respect for alterity. The implications of this stance for intellectual practice became apparent in Foucault’s distinction between the figures of the ‘universal’ and ‘specific’ intellectual . Consider the following comments: In a general way, I think that intellectuals-if this category exists, which is not certain or perhaps even desirable- are abandoning their old prophetic function. And by that I don’t mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for: ‘See what must be done, see what is good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is where I am.’ The greek wise man, the jewish prophet, the roman legislators are still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. The universal intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth; of our being (e.g. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ inellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities , the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. The historicity of thought , the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary i n what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses , not global but local criticism . We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to

acknowledge that Foucault’s position does not entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘ we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought and practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154). This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s point is unintelligible if we recognize his concern to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism ( and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation . (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for a reposing of the question, “who are we ?” the role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

Our framework accesses the best internal link to intellectual activism—star this argument because it’s the only thing that makes this debate matter outside of the ballotConstable ’95 (Elizabeth L. Constable, professor of philosophy at the University of California, Irvine, Review of: Rey Chow, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, South Central Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pg. 74, jstor)

Rey Chow's collection of eight essays provides a vigorous, insightful analysis of the political, pedagogic, and institutional challenges facing intellectuals in a world where, for Chow,diasporic consciousness defines "the reality of being intellectual"(15). Atatime when cultural studies has

become increasingly accepted in educational institutions , the field has also inevitably become , not only critical, but in its turn, constitutive of our institutions . Chow's sharp observations and energetic inquiries intend to restore the critical, self-questioning edge to intellectuals' work in cultural studies. As the title iindicates, her interest lies in "tactics of in to triggering intervention," finding ways to rresist the "turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses ” (17).

AT: PermThe perm is a standard imperialist strategy that marginalizes and interprets criticism rather than listening to it.Briggs and Sharp ’04 John Briggs and Joanne Sharp, professors at the Department of Geography and Geomatics University of Glasgow, “Indigenous knowledges and development: a postcolonial caution,” Third World Quarterly, 25 (4). pg. 661-676

Yet to receive much critical attention in development theory and practice is the nature of the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in development thinking. A central tenet of postcolonial theory is its concern with the ontological and epistemological status of the voices of subaltern peoples in Western knowledge systems, and a postcolonial interrogation of the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in development suggests caution. Indeed, Spivak(1988)has questioned whether “the subaltern” can ever speak ; even when apparently expressing her own views, the subaltern is not able to express her true self.Writing about attempts to recover the voices and experiences of the subaltern in South Asian historiography, Spivak has argued that the subaltern cannot speak, so imbued must she be with the words, phrases and cadences of Western thought in order for her to be heard. In order to be taken seriously – to be seen as offering knowledge and not opinion or folklore – the lifeworld of the subaltern has to be translated into the language of science, development or philosophy, dominated by Western concepts and Western languages. For Spivak (1988), the implications of this “ epistemic violence” mean that the ways of knowing the world and knowing the self in non-Western culture are trivialised and invalidated by Western scientists and experts . Hence, the subaltern must always be caught in translation , never truly expressing herself, but always already interpreted . Furthermore , postcolonial theorists (for example, Spivak 1988; hooks 1990; Goss 1996)have questioned the degree to which academics and experts in the West really want to engage with people elsewhere , an engagement which requires a de-centring of themselves as experts . Some postcolonial theorists have already bemoaned the lack of true engagement with the knowledges and voices of the West’s “others”, and, despite claims to be interested in others, suggest that the West is only interested in hearing its own voice (hooks 1990; Spivak 1988; Mohanty 1988). Hooks’ (1990) autobiographical approach tells a similar tale to Spivak in her attempt to be heard from the margins. For her,the margins are a site of “radical possibility” which reject the politics of inside and outside, because “to be on the margins is to be part of the whole but outside the main body”(hooks 1990:341). It is a hybridised indigenous knowledge which she believes offers a unique and important perspective which is not distorted by the power and prejudices of the centre. However, hooks has felt silenced by those who seek the experience, but not the wisdom, of the other . She argues that“ I was made ‘other’ there in that space...they did not meet me there in that space. They met me at the center ” (hooks 1990:342). The experiences of the marginalised are used in the West, but without opening up the process to their knowledges, theories and explanations. When there is a meeting, it is at the metropolitan centre, in the(predominantly)Western institutions of power/knowledge(aid agencies, universities, the pages of journals)and in the languages of the west(science, philosophy, social science and so on, expressed in English, French, Spanish and so on).So by approaching the institutions of knowledge, she has been forced to the centre, a location both metaphorical in its control of authority and geographical in its physical presence. For local knowledge and narratives to be heard at all, they have to move to this central terrain, where they may be “accepted” and subsequently appropriated . She claims to have met a reluctance to abandon the mark of authority, experiencing instead only a desire for material from which explanations can be made.Western researchers want to know about her experiences, but not her own explanations .

T

1NC

1. “Curtail” means to restrictWebster’s 15 – Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Ed., “curtail”, http://www.yourdictionary.com/curtail

verb

To curtail is defined as to restrict something , stop something or deprive of something.

An example of curtail is when a town wants to stop drunk driving.

2. Violation - “Restrictions” are direct governmental limitations – Viterbo 12 (Annamaria, Assistant Professor in International Law – University of Torino, PhD in International Economic Law – Bocconi University and Jean Monnet Fellow – European University Institute, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute, p. 166)

In order to distinguish a n exchange restriction from a trade measure, the Fund chose not to give relevance to the

purposes or the effects of the measure and to adopt , instead, a technical criterion that focuses on the

method followed to design said measure.

An interpretation that considered the economic effects and purposes of the measures (taking into account the fact that the measure was introduced for balance of payments reasons or to preserve foreign currency reserves) would have inevitably extended the Fund's jurisdiction to trade restrictions, blurring the boundaries between the IMF and the GATT. The result of such a choice would have been that a quantitative restriction on imports imposed for balance of payments reasons would have fallen within the competence of the Fund.

After lengthy discussions, in 1960 the IMF Executive Board adopted Decision No. 1034-(60/27).46 This Decision clarified that the distinctive feature of a restriction on payments and transfers for current

international transactions is "whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such*.47 This is a limitation imposed directly on the use of currency in itself, for all purposes.

3. The plan does not curtail - enacting Strict Scrutiny Standards may have an effect of possibly curtailing surveillance in the distant future, but it does not have a direct effect as of the 1ac plantext of curtailing surveillance much less restricting it.

Assess whether the means themselves are a limit---allowing actions that effect a reduction ruins precisionRandall 7 (Judge – Court of Appeals of the State of Minnesota, “Dee Marie Duckwall, Petitioner, Respondent, vs. Adam Andrew Duckwall, Appellant”, 3-13, http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/court-of-appeals/2007/opa0606 95-0313.html#_ftnref2)

[2] When referring to parenting time, the term "restriction[,]" is a term of art that is not the equivalent

of "reduction" of parenting time. "A modification of visitation that results in a reduction of total visitation time, is not necessarily a restriction' of visitation.' Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. App. 1986). When determining whether a reduction constitutes a restriction , the court should

consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction." Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993).

4. Voting issue---a. Limits---allowing effectual reductions explodes the topic. Any action can potentially result in less surveillance. Limits are key to depth of preparation and clash. They get more ground to weigh as offense against counterplans or to link turn DAs like politics, at the expense of negative preparation, because it’s impossible to research every single non-topical trick the aff could deploy. That crushes competitive equity which comes first because debate is a game. It’s very unlikely that a direct effect of the plan is a curtailment of surveillance, hold them to a very high standard. b. Ground---our interpretation is key to establish a stable mechanism of legal prohibition that guarantees core ground based on topic direction. They allow the Aff to defend completely different processes like “oversight” that dodge core DAs and rob the best counterplan ground. The aff must be a decrease in surveillance, not an increase in policies that might lead to a decrease in surveillance – we lose ground on generics like the terror disad or any surveillance bad argument or link – the aff can potentially spike out of any 1nc offense, creating an extreme amount of aff ground.