86 Philcomsat v. Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December 1989] En Banc, Regalado (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications," the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, it is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which two global commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the United Nationss General Assembly. Since 1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT, and Capitol Wireless or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by PHILCOMSAT enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. It was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196 issued on 17 June 1987, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On 16 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT was granted a provisional authority to continue operating Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for 6 months from the date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on 17 March 1988, it was extended for another 6 months, or up to 16 September 1988. Thereafter, the NTC further extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT for another 6 months, counted from 16 September 1988, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed said order. Issue: Whether the NTC is not required to provide notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination of PHILCOMSATs application. Held: The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC. The order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other. Reduction of rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its questioned order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such ratefixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion. 87 Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957] En Banc, Padilla (J) : 9 concur Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the University of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntays counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari. Issue: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may be cancelled. Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntays suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice. 88 De Bisschop v. Galang [GR 18365, 31 May 1963] En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part Facts: George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for 3 years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of the Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa, to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration (Emilio L. Galang), in a communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board. Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of said denial as per letter dated 10 September 1959. No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila (with Judge Antonio Canizares presiding, Civil Case 41477) on the same day ordering the Commissioner of Immigration to desist from arresting and detaining de Bisschop. During the hearing, only documentary evidence were presented. On 27 March 1961, the lower court granted the petition for prohibition and ordered the Commissioner of Immigration to desist and refrain from arresting and expelling de Bisschop from the Philippines unless and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigrations in connection with the application for extension of stay filed by de Bisschop with said Board. The Commissioner of Immigration appealed. Issue: Whether the right to notice and hearing is essential to due process in administrative proceedings, and whether the Board of Commissioners are required to render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Held: The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines Immigration Act of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, the Courts are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause as, in the case at bar, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. Further, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the Immigration Act merely refers to the number of votes necessary to constitute the decision of said Board. 89 Var-Orient Shipping v. Achacoso [GR L-81805, 31 May 1988] First division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur Facts: Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos Bros. filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanio-an, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with them, which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on 4 March 1987 with both parties required to submit memoranda. Only the seamen submitted memoranda. On 10 June 1987, the seamen filed a motion to resolve, which the companies' counsel did not oppose. Thus, on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda, Achacoso rendered a decision on 9 September 1987 ordering (1) the dismissal of the case with a reprimand and against Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cagon, Manela and Genesis, against the commission of the same or similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more severe penalty; (2) exclusion of Llanes from the case; (3) reprimanding Var-Orient Shipping Co. for failure to comply with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and regulations and warning against committing the same or a similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more severely; (4) archiving the case of Arsolon, A. dela Cruz, Montero and D. de la Cruz with their names included in the POEA watchlist until they shall have voluntarily submitted themselves to WAAOs jurisdiction; (5) payment by the companies jointly and severally, unto Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cason, Manela and Genesis the amount of P1,550.59 each, representing deductions from allotments, plus P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and (6) payment by the companies jointly and severally unto Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing his salaries for the unserved portion of his employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; to be tendered thru Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) WAAO, 10 days from receipt of the decision. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the companies' counsel, then Attorney Francisco B. Figura through the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino on 21 September 1987. Atty. Figura alleged he did not receive the envelope containing the decision. The companies allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them on 20 November 1987 by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong. Previously, on 19 October 1987, the seamen filed "Motion for Execution of Decision," the companies' counsel did not oppose. On 23 November 1987, the companies, through new counsel, Atty. Quintin Aseron, Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" on the ground that the decision had not been received by them, hence, it was not yet final and executory. On 19 January 1988, the POEA Administrator (Tomas D. Achacoso). In due time, the companies filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the decision of the POEA administrator has been received, rendering said decision final and unappealable. Held: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the parties agreed that they would file their respective memoranda at the 4 March 1987 hearing and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. Atty. Figura's affidavit involving that he has not received the decision is self-serving. The companies failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly served on companies' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained. The issuance of the writ of execution is therefore not premature.