Case Digests IV

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    Sema vs. COMELECFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Bai Sandra S. A. Sema vs. COMELEC

    and Didagen P. Dilangalen & Perfecto F.Marquez vs. COMELEC

    Decided 16 July 2008

    PonenteAntonio Carpio

    G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628

    Majority: 7

    C.J. Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

    Carpio Morales, Nachura and J. Reyes

    Dissent: 6

    Ynares-Santiago, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,

    Leonardo-De Castro and Brion

    V

    T

    E

    Sema v.COMELEC(G.R. No. 177597, 2008) is a court case that was heard before theSupreme Court of the

    Philippines. It was consolidated with Marquez v. Comelec (G.R. No. 178628, 2008). It held that the Regional

    Assembly of theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanaodoes not have the power to create provinces and

    cities. Thus, the creation of the province ofShariff Kabunsuanwas unconstitutional and that province no longer

    exists as a political entity in the Philippines.[1]

    Contents

    [hide]

    1 The cases

    2 The facts

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    3 Issues

    4 Conclusion

    o 4.1 Summary

    5 Aftermath

    6 See also

    7 References

    8 External links

    The cases[edit]

    These consolidatedcertiorari,prohibition,mandamusanddeclaratory reliefpetitions sought the annulment

    ofCommission on Elections"Resolution No. 7902" (10 May 2007), treatingCotabato Cityas part of the

    legislative district ofShariff Kabunsuan.

    In G.R. No. 177597, Bai Sandra S. A. Sema (Sema), asked the COMELEC "to exclude from the canvassing the

    votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the legislative district in question in thePhilippine general

    election, 2007." In G.R. No. 178628, Perfecto Marquez, asked the Court "to order the COMELEC to conduct a

    special election for representative of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City.

    The facts[edit]

    Shariff Kabunsuan.

    The Ordinance appended to the 1987Constitution of the Philippinesapportioned

    2 legislative districts forMaguindanao. The first consists ofCotabato Cityand

    8municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of theAutonomous Region in Muslim

    Mindanao(ARMM), created under itsOrganic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Issueshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Issueshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Conclusionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Conclusionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Summaryhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Summaryhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Aftermathhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Aftermathhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#See_alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#See_alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Referenceshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Referenceshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#External_linkshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#External_linkshttp://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=1http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=1http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorarihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorarihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorarihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibitionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibitionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibitionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandamushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandamushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandamushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaratory_reliefhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaratory_reliefhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaratory_reliefhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Electionshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Electionshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Electionshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=2http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=2http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipalitieshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipalitieshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_Acthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_Acthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_Acthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ShariffKab.jpghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ShariffKab.jpghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ShariffKab.jpghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ShariffKab.jpghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_Acthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipalitieshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotabato_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Electionshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaratory_reliefhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandamushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibitionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorarihttp://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#External_linkshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Referenceshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#See_alsohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Aftermathhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Summaryhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Conclusionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#Issues
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    6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). Cotabato City, as part

    of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region

    XII (having voted against its inclusion in November 1989plebiscite).

    On 28 August 2006, theARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,

    enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the

    Province ofShariff Kabunsuancomposed of the 8 municipalities in the first

    district of Maguindanao.

    Later, 2 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff

    Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao.

    Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in 29 October 2006

    plebiscite.

    On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999,

    requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato Ci ty in view of the

    conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under

    MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007

    "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in

    the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted

    the COMELECs Law Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated

    27 February 2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No.

    7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of

    Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.

    On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these

    cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in

    question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First

    District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).

    Meanwhile, theShariff Kabunsuancreationplebiscitewas supervised andofficiated by theCOMELECpursuant toResolution No. 7727.

    Option Votes

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    In favor for creation 285,372

    Against the creation 8,802

    The following municipalities seceded fromMaguindanaoand formed the new

    province. All of them were from the firstlegislative district of Maguindanao.

    Barira

    Buldon

    Datu Blah T. Sinsuat

    Datu Odin Sinsuat

    Kabuntalan

    Matanog

    Northern Kabuntalan

    Parang

    Sultan Kudarat

    Sultan Mastura

    Upi

    Kabuntalanwas chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was the

    first to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law.

    Sandra Sema questionedCOMELECResolution 7902 which combined Shariff

    Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district during

    thePhilippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress

    representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, DidagenDilangalen.

    [2]

    Issues[edit]

    The Court was asked to rule on "whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,

    delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,

    cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and if in the affirmative,

    whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act

    201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representativein the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a

    legislative district for such province."

    Further, the High Tribunal had to render judgment on "whether COMELEC

    Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative

    district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_districts_of_Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_districts_of_Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_districts_of_Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barira,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barira,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buldon,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buldon,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datu_Blah_T._Sinsuat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datu_Blah_T._Sinsuat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datu_Odin_Sinsuat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datu_Odin_Sinsuat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matanog,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matanog,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parang,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parang,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Mastura,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Mastura,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upi,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upi,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Elections_(Philippines)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Elections_(Philippines)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Elections_(Philippines)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-2http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=3http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=3http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=3http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Elections_(Philippines)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upi,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Mastura,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parang,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matanog,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabuntalan,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datu_Odin_Sinsuat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datu_Blah_T._Sinsuat,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buldon,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barira,_Shariff_Kabunsuanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_districts_of_Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanao
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    [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation

    of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato

    City)."

    Conclusion[edit]On July 16, 2008 theSupreme Court of the Philippines's 33-pagejudgment(8-6)

    penned byAntonio Carpioannulled "Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201",

    which created Shariff Kabunsuan (carved out ofMaguindanao,Autonomous

    Region in Muslim Mindanao). JusticeAntonio Carpioopined: "We rule that (1)

    Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the

    ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act

    201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC

    Resolution No. 7902 is valid."

    Carpio stressed that only Congress can create provinces and cities because the

    creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative

    districts. Creation of province or a city inherently involves the power to create a

    legislative district. The Constitution mandates that a province or a city with at

    least 250,000 inhabitants is entitled to at least one representative."

    The Court also declared unconstitutional the RLAs power to create provinces

    and cities in the region but it did not pass upon the constitutionality of thecreation of new municipalities and barangays. Under Republic Act No. 9140 or

    the Expanded ARMM Law, the RLA has the power to create new LGUs and to

    set its own criteria in creating, dividing, merging, or abolishing LGUs.[3]

    Carpio further ruled that "in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 district

    representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives.

    Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the

    House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in

    case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seatsfor district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district

    representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the

    allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new

    provinces."

    http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=4http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=4http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpiohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=4
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    Summary[edit]

    Carpio tersely put thejudgmentin this manner: "In summary, we rule that Section

    19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly

    the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 ofArticle VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of

    the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create

    provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily

    includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise

    under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance

    appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a

    province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that

    every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional

    Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district

    representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM

    Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in

    Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201,

    enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff

    Kabunsuan, is void.

    Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the

    geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao withCotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and

    Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance

    appended to the Constitution."

    Aftermath[edit]

    The landmark ruling resulted in the Philippines' reverting back to 80 provinces.

    The ruling also nullified the elections of the governor, vice governor and

    provincial board of Shariff Kabunsuan and the entire provincial bureaucracy isdeemed scrapped as Shariff Kabunsuan reverts back as integral part

    ofMaguindanao.[4]

    Uncertainty loomed about the legal fate of local elected provincial officials in

    Shariff Kabunsuan. Among the proclaimed winners in the 2007 local election are

    2 board members and the vice governor. FormerSultan Kudaratmayor and 2007

    http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=5http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=5http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=6http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=6http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarathttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarathttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarathttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Kudarathttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sema_vs._COMELEC#cite_note-4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maguindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_(law)http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sema_vs._COMELEC&action=edit&section=5
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    Shariff Kabunsuan gubernatorial candidate Tucao Mastura said: "What will

    happen to the elected governor, vice governor, and board members? We cannot

    afford to be under a governor not elected by the people of Shariff Kabunsuan."

    Rep. Didagen Dilangalen of Shariff Kabunsuan, meanwhile, said "there is a need

    to declare vacant the position of governor, vice-governor, and board members in

    new Maguindanao province. There is no election held for the purpose of electing

    officials in the undivided Maguindanao. The election held there (Maguindanao) is

    an exercise in futility."

    Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) leaders on July 16, 2008

    warned that the Court ruling would cause leadership problem and unemployment

    in the province, for it will cause some of the elected officials and government

    employees in Shariff Kabunsuan to lose their jobs. Sema v. Comelec reduced the

    number of provinces in ARMM to 5. ARMM is composed of Maguindanao, Tawi-

    Tawi, Sulu, Lanao del Sur, Basilan (excluding Isabela City) and the city of

    Marawi.

    Maguindanao Gov. Andal Ampatuan, however, would welcome the judgment, for

    it reverted to the old province 2 crucial sources of income covered by Shariff

    Kabunsuan: the Parang seaport andAwang Airportin Datu Odin Sinsuat.

    Shariff Kabunsuan Vice Governor Ibrahim Ibay said that "among those severely

    affected by the decision are the more than 400 government employees in his

    province, half of which used to work in the old Maguindanao provincial

    government. What will happen to them? We dreamed for a separate province

    and now it is voided."

    The ruling may also affect the conduct of August automated election in the

    region, since Shariff Kabunsuan and Maguindanao are expected to use different

    kinds of machine for the elections. Maguindanao will use a direct recording

    electronic technology that uses a touch-screen technology for voting, while

    Shariff Kabunsuan, along with other ARMM provinces, will use optical mark

    reader technology, which will require voters to use a paper-based ballot to be fed

    to a machine

    n June 23, 2011

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awang_Airporthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awang_Airporthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awang_Airporthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awang_Airporthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_Mindanao
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    Municipal CorporationCreation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM)

    Population Requirement

    The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the

    province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted

    against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative

    districts. The 1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other

    municipalities.

    A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with

    power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this

    law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao

    Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of

    Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

    For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the

    1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later

    amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the

    purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan

    with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from

    Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).

    Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan

    with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City

    should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be

    excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and

    D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution,

    upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains

    legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in

    effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.

    COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless

    of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its

    representation.

    ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can

    create validly LGUs.

    HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is

    governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

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    Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

    merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance

    with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to

    approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units

    directly affected.

    Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,

    municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of

    a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government

    Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the

    Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

    There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

    Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the

    power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative

    powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create

    local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict

    arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to

    provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays

    within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the

    Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article Xof the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan

    province.

    Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least

    250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative

    in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at

    least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the

    population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand,

    ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a

    legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of

    legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create

    are barangays not cities and provinces.

    Tan v. COMELEC

    http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/04/tan-v-comelec.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/04/tan-v-comelec.html
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    G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986

    NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak."

    The issue in this case, however, is a bit on the technical side.

    - when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarilymore than one unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that wascreated as a result of the alteration

    FACTS:

    This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An ActCreating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of

    Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and SanCarlosand the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,

    Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.

    Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled aplebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a casefor Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not incomplete accord with the Local Government Code because:

    (1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those

    living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were notincluded in the plebiscite(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte wouldonly be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum areaprescribed by the governing statute

    The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timelyconsidered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January

    4, 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day,January 3.

    ISSUE:

    W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisitesunder Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that --

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    "Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordancewith the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to theapproval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

    HELD:

    In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever aprovince is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of theboundaries, "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit orunits affected" must first be obtained.

    The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarilyresult in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of

    Negros Occidental.

    "Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would beaffected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because itsboundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would becomposed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitutethe proposed province of Negros del Norte."

    The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredesversus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No.

    55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to supporttheir case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, itheld that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in theaforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:

    "...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of thepeople of the municipality if themunicipality is to be divided such as in the caseat bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I seeno ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."

    It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creationof the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recitedtherein that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within aperiod of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." However,when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained change from"areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected."The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new

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    province constitutes the area affected.

    "Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading,erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is asmuch an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parentprovince, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquentlyargue the points raised by the petitioners."

    Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

    "WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional.The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as theappointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.

    SO ORDERED."

    Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying

    that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political

    Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14,

    2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that

    the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed , and that the latter's nominees

    not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for

    Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.

    On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file

    Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but

    subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion

    merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

    Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a

    Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed

    COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed

    respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.

    On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No.

    147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,

    the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the

    second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the

    parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the COMELEC may proceed with the

    counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections,but barred the proclamation of any

    winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

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    This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No

    pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

    In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with

    grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of

    2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before

    this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

    Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en

    banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section

    1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

    The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for

    Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The COMELEC,

    however, did not act on that Petition.

    In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for

    there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of

    petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it.

    But a resolution may just be a formality because the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor

    General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

    In view of the participation of political partiesIn its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in

    the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For its part,

    Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of"major political parties."

    For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional

    and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party"

    is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law

    defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles

    and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing

    their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for

    public office."

    In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any

    political party or any organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character of

    these parties or organizations must beconsistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid

    down in the Constitution and RA 7941.

    "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because

    the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or

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    oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as

    exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban

    poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,

    handicapped, women, youth,veterans, overseasworkers, and professionals."

    However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized andunderrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or

    party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned

    in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be

    "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

    Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral

    group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to

    those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

    In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and

    underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

    While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates

    the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a

    fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in

    connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which

    they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or

    specialized by those in immediate association.

    In view of OSG contentionNotwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any

    party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence,

    it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park

    or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections.

    Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be

    appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly

    disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense.

    It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow

    in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give them

    not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the

    specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the

    larger affairs of the State.

    In view of COMELECs grave abuse of discretionWhen a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores

    the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of

    discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they

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    find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.

    In view of the Courts assistanceThe Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine,

    after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate inthe party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate

    to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in

    its work.

    In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of

    proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House

    of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a

    nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.")

    Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the

    number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a

    candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.

    Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats

    in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a

    losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented.

    What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for

    "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural

    communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, 5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of

    the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth

    placers" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win

    seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the

    House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited

    to them. There would have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the

    party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical.

    In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all"

    one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of

    underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or

    proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system.

    Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is

    designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youthsectors.

    For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the

    law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable

    those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not

    necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous

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    cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and

    professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors.

    BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 200907/16/2010

    0 Comments

    Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-ListRepresentatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently beenquoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implementthe Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

    BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

    On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, toreconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 becausethe Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the

    same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

    Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, wedefined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

    1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of theConstitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

    2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat

    constitutional?4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections?

    If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

    Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of theCOMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 inNBC No. 07-60. We declareunconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additionalparty-list seats.

    Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocationof party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continuedexistence of a provision in the law which willsystematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that

    a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any partyfrom dominating the party-list elections.

    We rule that, in computing the allocation ofadditional seats, the continued operation of the twopercent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes itmathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when thenumber of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold inthe distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.

    http://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.htmlhttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.htmlhttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html
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    In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional

    seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived atby dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast forparty-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage ismultiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats

    reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The wholeinteger of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partysshare in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next inrank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in thesecond round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seatseach qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

    Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating inthe party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major politicalparties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of theConstitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative thereservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-listelections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major

    political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-listelections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion ofmajor political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

    In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the

    computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. Ivote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that myinterpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the majorpolitical parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

    There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political partiesin the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political partieswere initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by somecommissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in thedisproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major politicalparties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total numberof votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including thosewhose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of theseseven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the totalnumber of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-listrepresentatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, oronly 8 out ofthe 155 parties garnered more than 2%.

    In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framingof the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitutionsought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how theinterests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political partieswho have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major politicalparties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of themarginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution . Thatopinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

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    IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the

    party-list system.

    In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

    However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold voterequired for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act(R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number ofvotes cast for the party list system presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation ofSection 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declaredconstitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow thepeoples broadest representation in Congress,the raison detre for the adoption of the party-list system.

    Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see thatin the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. Butthat figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it

    mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for theparty-list system can never exceed 100%.

    Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement.The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by ChiefJustice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that aminimum vote requirement is needed --

    1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;

    2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low,from participating in the elections;

    3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

    4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;

    5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives inthe legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to anoutright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;

    6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have notreally been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, theywill be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

    7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented .9

    However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment asit keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-listgroups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to theinevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because itprevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179271_2009.html#fnt9nhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179271_2009.html#fnt9nhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179271_2009.html#fnt9nhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179271_2009.html#fnt9n
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    It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VIof the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merelyprovides a ceiling for the number of party-list seatsin Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose ofimplementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceilingcompletely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offendingcondition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of thelegislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remaineffective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment thatrenders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

    Atong Paglaum v. Commission on ElectionsApril 9, 2013by1inareformina

    The Decision courtesy of the Supreme Court website

    Background of the case

    52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the

    Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission

    on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The

    Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of

    2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to

    represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not

    come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the

    organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to

    represent in Congress.

    Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in

    denying some of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the

    existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to

    accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.

    The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio

    was tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.

    Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the

    status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52

    http://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/2013/04/09/atong-paglaum-v-commission-on-elections/http://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/2013/04/09/atong-paglaum-v-commission-on-elections/http://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/author/1inareformina/http://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/author/1inareformina/http://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/author/1inareformina/http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/203766.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/203766.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/203766.pdfhttp://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/author/1inareformina/http://inareforminablog.wordpress.com/2013/04/09/atong-paglaum-v-commission-on-elections/
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    petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction,

    directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.

    THE RULING

    In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpios

    ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and remanded these petitions to the

    Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that

    obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to

    make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to

    determine whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system

    and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new

    parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were

    remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may

    be granted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the

    May 2013 elections.

    The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting

    on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court

    regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on whomay participate in the party-list system.

    New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May

    2013 party-list race and subsequent party-list elections

    The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the party-list system:

    (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)

    sectoral parties or organizations.

    On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or

    organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines

    state that these parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not

    need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.

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    As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering

    under the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates. These

    parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred from

    participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register theirsectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be

    considered an independent sectoral party linked to a political party through a

    coalition.

    The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented

    sectors come in?

    The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the

    party-list system.

    The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either

    represent marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking

    well-defined political constituencies. The high court went on to enumerate

    marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk,

    urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseasworkers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include

    professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

    The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to

    represent also applies only to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court

    ruled that it is enough that [a] majority of the members of the sectoral parties or

    organizations must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they

    represent. The same istrue for those who lack well-defined political

    constituencies.

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    As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines

    provide that they must either be members of the sector or have a track record of

    advocacy for their sector.

    Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or

    organizations be disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be

    disqualified provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

    The party-list system, according to the Decision

    Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high

    court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.

    The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to

    leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to

    sectoral groups.

    The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety,

    of the party-list system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to

    reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.

    There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution

    expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for

    sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include

    both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.

    To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987

    Constitution, which states:

    Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

    two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected

    from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the

    Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective

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    inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as

    provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,

    regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

    The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,also known as the Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of

    Terms):

    (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of

    parties

    (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an

    ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of

    government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,

    regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates

    for public office

    (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the

    sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the

    special interest and concerns of their sector

    Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the

    others, could only mean that they are not one and the same.

    Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum

    As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of

    Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

    (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and

    BANAT v. Comelec

    (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm).

    In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states

    that while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the

    Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the

    declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized

    and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm
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    However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that

    there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since

    the requirement that the major political parties should represent the marginalized

    and underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified these majorparties from the party-list system.

    As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the

    guidelines in this ruling merely formalized the prevailing practice when it

    prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list elections even

    if through their allied sectoral organizations.

    My 2-cents

    Flip-flopped as it may have in the case of Atong Paglaum, I agree with the

    Supreme Court in this Decision. No less than the Constitution provides in Sec.

    5(1), Art. VI that national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations may

    participate in the party-list systema fact that may not be denied in spite of

    where public discourse and sentiment tend to sway in as far as the party-list system

    is concerned.

    If we want the party-list system to truly represent marginalized and

    underrepresented sectors and party-list groups to come from the non-traditional

    political parties, then what needs to be done is amend the law. The Supreme Court

    cannot go beyond its duty of interpreting the law and may not perform a

    constitutional function and mandate which is solely that of the legislative branch.

    Doing so would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

    I totally agree that allowing national and major political parties to participate in the

    party-list elections does not make any sense if there were no distinction or

    requirement that the marginalized and underrepresented should be the

    constituency. Why then create a separate system if it is, in fact, free for all?

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    But this is an issue best left to Congress to resolve, heart-wrenching as this may

    sound to those whose desire is to provide a platform for a truly non-traditional

    mode of politics. For now, let us accept that we cannot go beyond what the law

    provides.