BA-RA 7941 VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 177271May 4, 2007

FACTS:Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of those groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.

HELD:The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (Note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941, which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

QUINTOS-DELES VS. COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONG.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform and charge her duties as House of Representatives member representing Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:W/N the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the CoA.

RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that Deles appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC: G.R. NO. 120265, SEPTEMBER 18, 1995 (248 SCRA 400Agapito A. Aquino, PetitionerCommission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, RespondentsPonente: KAPUNAN, J.:The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.FACTS:Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and MateoBedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.HELD:In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does notengender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts.To successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be deemed to continue.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC 262 SCRA 256G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992,Congress enacted RA. 7227(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created theSubic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA toimplement the declared national policy of converting the Subicmilitary reservation into alternative productive uses.On November 24, 1992,the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to thePhilippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of itstask, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by theAmerican navy.On April 1993, theSangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office ofthe President.On May 24, 1993,respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.The petition prayed for the following: a)to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.On July 6, 1993,COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereofwas merely a resolution and not an ordinance.On February 1, 1995,the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval basewithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956,respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certioraricontesting the validity of Resolution No.2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposesan amendment of a national lawISSUE:1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 102. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within thepowersof the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."HELD:1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started byprivate respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but"initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted toa "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power ofthe people to propose billsand laws, and to enact or reject themat the polls independent of thelegislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the rightreserved to the people to adopt or reject anyact or measure which has been passedby a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, theComelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct ofelections.These law-making powers belong to the people, hencethe respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance orthe content oflegislation.2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage andnot yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, thenthere would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights andobligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, itis merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide onlyactual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it isquite clear that the Court hasauthority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission ofgrave abuse ofdiscretion. However, it does not have the sameauthority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not beenpromulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch orinstrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made noreviewable pronouncements about the issues brought bythe pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made bya branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of andacquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE 262 SCRA 292: G.R. NO. 125416, SEPT. 26, 1996Facts:Petitioners in the special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the INUDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marco; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information on June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, We are now considering ourselves free to so whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desires objectives in pursuance of public interest.ISSUE:W/N Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD:Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not that the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. it cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. The transactions used here presumably is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people. The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.