BARREDO V GARCIABOCOBO; July 8, 1942NATUREPetition for review on certiorariFACTS- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garciacaused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision betweentaxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causingoverturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one ofthe passengers- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicabas employer of Fontanilla- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he wasdriving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo iscareless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caughtseveral times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime becthis is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissionspunishable by law- Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary andbec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsibleISSUEWON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making himprimarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of FontanillaHELDYes. There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under theA100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arisingfrom the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The otheraction is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligentemployer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that heexercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took theaction under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from theemployer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve hissentence.ObiterDifference bet Crime and Quasi-delict1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means ofindemnification merely repairs the damage3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is apenal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenesNOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibilitye.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of trafficwhen nobody is hurt4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence- Presumptions:1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption ofnegligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by provingexercise of diligence of a good father of the family- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of paterfamilias- motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of ownersof motor vehicles

MENDOZA V ARRIETAMELENCIO-HERRERA; June 29, 1979NATUREPetition for review on Certiorari of the Orders of CFI Manila dismissing petitioner’sComplaint for Damages based on quasi-delictFACTS- Three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,Bulacan involving (1) Mercedes Benz, owned and driven by petitioner MENDOZA; (2)private jeep owned and driven by respondent SALAZAR; (3) gravel and sand truckowned by respondent TIBOL and driven by MONTOYA.

- Mendoza’s and Montoya’s version: After jeep driver overtook the truck, it swervedto the left going towards Marilao, and hit car which was bound for Manila. Beforeimpact, Salazar jumped from the jeep, Mendoza unaware that jeep was bumpedfrom behind by truck- Salazar’s version: After overtaking truck, he flashed a signal indicating hisintention to turn left towards Marilao but was stopped at intersection by apoliceman directing traffic. While at stop position, his jeep was bumped at rear bytruck causing him to be thrown out of jeep. Jeep then swerved to left and hit thecar.- Oct. 22, 1969. In CFI Bulacan, two separate informations for Reckless ImprudenceCausing Damage to Proprety were filed against SALAZAR (damage to Mendoza) andMONTOYA (damage to Salazar)- Salazar was acquitted; Motoya found guilty beyond reasonable doubt- Aug. 22, 1970. In CFI Manila, Mendoza filed a civil case against Salazar and Timboleither in alternative or in solidum.- Timbol filed Motion to Dismiss on grounds that complaint is barred by priorjudgement; CFI Manila dismissed Complaint against Timbol- Salazar filed Motion to Dismiss; CFI Mla also dismissed Complaint against him ongrounds that New Rules of Court rewuires an express reservation of civil action tobe made in the criminal actionISSUES1. WON Mendoza can file an independent civil case against Timbola) Is the civil suit barred by prior judgment in the criminal case?b) Is the civil suit barred by failure to make a reservation in the criminal action ofright to file an independent civil action (as required in Sec.2 of Rule 111)?

2. WON Mendoza can file an independent civil case against SalazarHELD1. Yes.a) No, not all requisites of Res Judicata are present.Ratio There is no identity of cause of action between the dismissed criminal caseand the new civil case.Reasoning In the criminal case, cause of action was enforcement of civil liabilityarising from criminal negligence. In the civil case, it was quasi-delict. The twofactors a cause of action must consist of are: (1) plaintiff’s primary right – Mendozaas owner of the car; (2) defendant’s delict or wrongful act or omission whichviolated the primary right – negligence or lack of skill, either of Salazar or ofMontoya.b) No, right to file an independent civil action need not be reserved.Ratio Sec. 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court is inoperative because it is anunauthorized amendment of substantive law, and it cannot stand because of itsinconsistency with Art.2177.Reasoning Art.2176 and 2177 of Civil Code create a civil liability distinct anddifferent from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the RPC.2. No.Ratio Civil action had extinguished because “the fact from which civil liabilitymight arise did not exist.” (Sec 3c, Rule 111, Rules of Court) Under the facts of thecase, Salazar cannot be held liable.Reasoning The offended party has an option between action for enforcement ofcivil liability based on culpa CRIMINAL (RPC, Art.100) or action for recovery ofdamages based on culpa AQUILIANA (CC, Art.2177). First option was deemedsimultaneously instituted with the criminal action unless expressly waived orreserved of separate application. It can be concluded that Mendoza opted to basehis cause of action on culpa criminal, as evidenced by his active participation in theprosecution of criminal suit against Salazar.DispositionOrder dismissing Civil Case against Timbol is set aside and trial court to proceedwith hearing on merits; orders dismissing complaint in Civil Case against Salazar areupheld.

EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIAG.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTCFERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.

Gutierrez vs Gutierrez (1931)

Facts:

On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. The diver of the car is an 18 y/o boy, son of the car’s owners. It was found by the trial court that both the boy and the driver of the autobus were negligent by which neither of them were willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other. Plaintiff is the passenger of the bus who as a result of the incident fractured his right leg to his damage and prejudice. Thus, plaintiff sued the boy, his parents as owners of the car, the bus driver and its owner for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

How should civil liability be imposed upon parties in the case at bar?

Held:

The case is dealing with the civil liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence.

For the boy, it is his father who is liable (based on culpa aquiliana) to the plaintiff because of the following conditions; first, the car was of general use of the family, second, the boy was authorized or designated by his father to run the car, third, at the time of the collision the car is used for the purpose not of the child’s pleasure but that of the other members of the car owner’s family members. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner’s business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.

For the chauffer and the bus owner (based on culpa contractual), their liability rests upon the contract (the safety that is assured by the operator upon the passenger) whereas that degree of care expected from the chauffer is lacking.

Araneta v. De Joya

Facts:

Respondent De Joya, general manager, proposed to the board of Ace Advsertising Corp., to send Ricardo Taylor to the US to take up special studies in television. The Board did not act upon the proposal. Nevertheless, sent Taylor to the US. Respondent assured Antonio Araneta, a compny director, that expenses will be handled by other parties which later was confirmed through a memorandum.

While abroad, Taylor continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon orders of, and approved by, the respondent. Petitioner Luis Araneta, signed three of the vouchers, others signed by either respondent or Vicente Araneta, the company treasurer. All told, Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20 on account of Taylor’s travel and studies.

Then a year after, Ace Advertising filed a complaint before the CFI against respondent for the recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge, authority or ratification.

The respondent in his answer denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company’s board and at any event he had the discretion as general manager to authorize the trip which was for the company’s benefit.

A third party complaint was file by respondent against, Vicente and Luis and Taylor. Respondent proved that some of the checks to cover the expenses of Taylor were signed by Vicente and Luis.

In their defense, Luis and Vicente claimed that they signed the checks in good faith as they were

approved by respondent.

The CFI rendered judgement ordering the respondent to pay Ace for the amount disbursed with interest at a legal rate until full payment and dismissed the third party complaint.

Respondent appealed to CA. CA affirmed the decision of trial court with regard to its decision in favor of Ace but reversed the dismissal of the 3rd party complaint. CA found as a factthat Taylor’s trip had neither been authorized nor ratified by Ace. It held that Luis and Vicente were also privy to the authorized disbursement of corporate monies with the respondent. That when they approved signed the checks, they have given their stamp of approval. As it is established that corporate funds were disbursed unauthorized, the case is of a simple quasi-delict committed by them against the corporation.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict, notwithstanding that he was occupying a contractual position at Ace? Otherwise stated, whether or not quasi-delict (tort) may be committed a party in a contract?

Held:

Yes. The existence of a contract between the parties constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. His guilt is manifest on account of, in spite of his being a vice-president and director of Ace, petitioner remained passive, through out the period of Taylor’s trip and to the payment of the latter’s salary. As such he neglected to perform his duties properly to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario 1942

Facts:

A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, a employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.

It was found that Fontanilla has been found to have been previously violating traffic rules.

Barredo set up his defense claiming that being only subsidiarily liable under the RPC and the accused not being imputed nor adjudged to pay damages in a civil action, then it is a bar for an action against him.

The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff awarding them P2,000.00 against the Barredo.

Issues:

Whether or not an employer (Barredo) should be held principally and directly liable for the negligent act of his employee (or for the criminal act or omission of the employee)?

Apropos the employee is acquitted in the criminal case and the employer is exonerated as subsidiary

liable, will it bar the civil action based on quasi-delict a.k.a culpa extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana?

Whether or not the law is restrictive on the liability of the employer as subsidiary to that of the accused (confining itself within the provision of the penal code)?

Held:

(1)Yes. An employer (Barredo) is principally liable for the negligent acts (or even criminal acts) of his employee in the performance of his duties) because it is presumed by law that the employer (as well as the father, guardian , etc.) committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by law.

(2)No. The reason for this is that the civil liability of the employer (in the criminal case) is grounded upon the crime committed by its employee, while the liability of the employer (in quasi-delict) is completely attributable to itself independent of the criminal act of the employee that is by not carefully selecting and supervising its employees. Thus:

Cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which “any king of fault or negligence intervenes” which means even if such act or omission has nothing to do with the actual resulting damage, like, for example, then the owner of a taxi company hires a driver who is known to him (or should have been known to him) that the latter is guilty of violating traffic rules. In case the driver causes damage as a result of his performance as a driver, then the owner is liable for the damage, not for the act of omission of the driver (because it is covered by the penal code which makes the criminal or felon primarily liable for his injury cause) but for its negligence in employing the driver.

(3)Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distributing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: “The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.” (N.B. cause of liability is the bond or tie between the one who caused the injury and his employer, father, guardian, etc.) Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by

reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.

Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others.

We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. N.B. It is that Bond ( in the performance of the subordinate of the act) which will determine whether or not the superior (employer, parents may be held liable

El Cano vs Hill

Facts:

Defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, killed Agapito. He was apprehended and charged appropriately before CFI. He acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”

Thereupon, the parents of Agapito, filed a complaint for recovery of damages against the defendant and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: first, the civil action is barred by the acquittal of Reginald, and; second, the father cannot be held liable for the act of his son because the latter is already married at the time of the commission, thus, is already emancipated.

Issues:

Whether or not quasi-delict is restricted to negligence and cannot apply to voluntary acts or omissions

producing injury ( or felony)?

Whether or not a father may be held liable for the act of his emancipated child constituting quasi-delict?

Held:

No. To repeat the Barredo case, under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ although it mentions the word “negligence” but according to Justice Bocobo it must be construed according to “the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the

intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same.” Criminal prosecution and civil action are two different things.

On the second issue (obsolete), Yes, the father may be held liable. While it is true that marriage of a child emancipates him from the parental authority of his parents, what matters really is whether or not such minor is completely emancipated as defined by law. In the case at bar, his emancipation is only partial for as provided by law he can sue and be sued in court with the assistance of his parents, he cannot manage his own properties without the approval of his parents, and third as in the facts, he relies for subsistence from his parents.

Occena vs Icamina 1990 (Antique)

Facts:

On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: “Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas,” which, freely translated, mean: “You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas” and other words and statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.

Accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and judgment was rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for slight oral deflation sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00 and subsidiary in case of insolvency but no damages were awarded to petitioner as held by the trial court.

Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief with the RTC which affirmed the decision of the MTC.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the instant appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the decision rendered by the RTC has become final?

Whether or not damages are warranted to petitioner?

Held:

No. While the criminal aspect of the case has become final, the civil aspect did not due to the timely

appeal filed by petitioner with regard to the civil aspect of the case (Peeple vs Coloma).

Yes. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100, RPC). Likewise, article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation.

In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

Banal vs Tadeo 1987

Facts:

Petitioner herein is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed against Rosario Claudio. Claudio is charged with 15 separate information for violation of BP 22. Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued. Petitioner moved to intervene through private prosecutor but it was rejected by respondent judge on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, “it is not a crime against property but public order.” Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution for violation of BP 22 (a special

penal law) which does not provide for civil liability?

Note:

Intervention of a private prosecutor is for the purpose of protecting the private interest of the complainant to recover damages.

Held:

Yes! Under Art. 100 of the RPC, ‘every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.’ Thus a person committing a felony offends namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of

whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

“Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,

shall indemnify the latter for the same.”

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.

Barzaga vs CA 1998 (DELAY)

Facts:

Petitioner’s wife died and her wish is to be buried before Christmas.

After her death on Dec 21, 1990, in fulfillment of her wishes, petitioner went to respondent’s store to inquire the availability of materials to be used in building his wife’s niche. Respondent’s employee advised petitioner that to come back the following morning. That following morning, petitioner made a payment of P2,100 to secure the delivery of the materials. However, the materials were not delivered on time. Several times petitioner went to respondent’s store to ask for the delivery. Later that day, the petitioner was forced to dismiss his laborer since there is nothing to work with for the materials did not arrive.

Petitioner however purchased the materials from other stores.

After his wife was buried, he sued respondent for damages because of delay

For his part, respondent offered a lame excuse of fortuitous event that the reason for delay is because the trucks tires were flat.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of delay that will entitle petitioner for damages, although it was not specified in the invoice the exact time of delivery?

Held:

Yes! The law expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (Art 1170 of the Civil Code).

The appellate court appears to have belittled petitioner’s submission that under the prevailing circumstances time was of the essence in the delivery of the materials to the grave site. However, we find petitioner’s assertion to be anchored on solid ground. The niche had to be constructed at the very least on the twenty-second of December considering that it would take about two (2) days to finish the job if the interment was to take place on the twenty-fourth of the month. Respondent’s delay in the delivery of the construction materials wasted so much time that construction of the tomb could start only on the twenty- third. It could not be ready for the scheduled burial of petitioner’s wife. This undoubtedly prolonged the wake, in addition to the fact that work at the cemetery had to be put off on Christmas day.

This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation.7 In their contract of purchase and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what was required of him as purchaser, i.e., the payment of the purchase price of P2,110.00. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach.

Telefast vs Castro (1988)

Facts:

In 1956, Sofia Castro-Crouch (plaintiff-respondent) was vacationing in Pangasinan in her parent’s house. That same year in November, her mother, Consolacion died. On the day of her mother’s death she addressed a telegram to her father Ignacio who was then in the US announcing Consolacion’s death. The telegram was accepted by Telefast (defendant-petitioner) in its Dagupan office after payment of required fees or charges.

The telegram never reached the addressee. Consolacion was interred without her husband and children besides Sofia.

Sofia went back to the US and learned that the telegram never reached her father. Thus, she and her siblings and their father sued Telefast for damages arising from the breach of contract by the defendant. Petitioner-defendant Telefast interposed that the reason why the telegram never reached the addressee is because of “technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control.” It appears though that no attempt made by defendant to inform Sofia for that matter or any reason at all that explains why the telegram reached the addressee.

The CFI ruled in favor of Sofia and her co-plaintiffs awarding her damages she prayed for. Telefast

appealed before the IAC which affirmed the decision of the CFI.

Hence this appeal.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages arising from the breach of contract even though that there

was a technical and atmospheric factors that lead to its failure to comply with terms of the contract?

Held:

Yes. Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides, “Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, delay, negligence, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Art. 2176 also provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent’s message overseas by telegram. This, petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondent and is thus liable for damages.

Also, it is evident that petitioner did not do anything to advise the plaintiff of the circumstances which lead to its failure to comply with its obligation. It is apparent that such tantamount to gross negligence. Hence bad faith.

PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL .

In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano Necesito, carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then proceeded on its regular run from Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan truck No. 199 entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the left femur. Subsequently, actions for damages were brought directly against the operator of the bus. The latter pleaded that the accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver Bandonell.

After joint trial, the Court of First Instance found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular thirty-day inspections were made of the steering knuckle, since the steel exterior was smooth and shiny to the depth of 3/16 of an inch all around; that the knuckles are designed and manufactured for heavy duty and may last up to ten years; that the knuckle of bus No. 199 that broke on January 28, 1954, was last inspected on January 5, 1954, and was due to be inspected again on February 5th. Hence, the trial

court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous event, dismissed both actions. Hence this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the carrier is liable for the injuries and damages sustained by the passengers.

2. Whether or not the cause of the accident is that of fortuitous event.

Held:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability" (10 Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; and cases cited therein). The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable.

2.As to the second issue, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden flaws would impair that strength. This periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's agents did not measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" - "as far as human care and foresight can provide", and therefore that the knuckle's failure can not be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility (Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657; Son vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 94 Phil., 892.).

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of

First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR

G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

Facts:

Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.

On October 22 a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. Two separate Information for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya. The cause of action was due to how truck-driver Montoya was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment finding the accused Freddie Montoya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liabilityin view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for identification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum. Truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.

In an order respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.Upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule.

Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition to review the last two mentioned Orders, that required jeep-

owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.

Issue:

Is the action against respondents barred because of a prior judgment?

Held:

Petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

The court held- it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between the criminal case and the civil case. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in the criminal case. And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil case is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code

Petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint . The court declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, the civil case is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

PEOPLE’S CAR INC., vs Commando Security L-36840 May 22, 1973

Facts:

Plaintiff, a car dealer, entered into a contract with defendant, a security agency, its duty is to guard the former’s premises from theft, robbery, vandalism and other unlawful acts. On a certain night, the security guard deployed by the defendant, without authority neither from the plaintiff nor from defendant, drove a car, which was entrusted to the plaintiff by a customer for service and maintenance, outside of the plaintiff’s compound and around the city which after the security guard lost control of, fell into a ditch, causing it severe damage. Plaintiff complained against the security guard for qualified theft. While the car is undergoing repair, plaintiff rented a car for its customer for 47 days until the car is fixed, and took pain to repair the damaged car.

Then plaintiff instituted a claim against the defendant for recovery of the actual damages it incurred due to the unlawful act of the latter’s personnel, citing inter alia the Par. 5 of the contract that defendant accepts “sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours”. Defendant on the

other hand, interposed, that it may be liable but its liability is limited under Par. 4 of said contract providing: “that its liability “shall not exceed one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per guard post”. To quote the contract:

‘Par. 4. — Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the negligence of its guards, after an investigation has been conducted by the Party of the First Part (plaintiff) wherein the Party of the Second Part has been duly represented shall assume full responsibilities for any loss or damages that may occur to any property of the Party of the First Part for which it is accountable, during the watch hours of the Party of the Second Part, provided the same is reported to the Party of the Second Part within twenty-four (24) hours of the occurrence, except where such loss or damage is due to force majeure, provided however that after the proper investigation to be made thereof that the guard on post is found negligent and that the amount of the loss shall not exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS per guard post.’

‘Par. 5 — The party of the Second Part assumes the responsibility for the proper performance by the guards employed, of their duties and (shall) be solely responsible for the acts done during their watch hours, the Party of the First Part being specifically released from any and all liabilities to the former’s employee or to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guard during their tour of duty.’ ...8

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant limiting its liability to P1,000.00 under par. 4 and said that under paragraph 5, it is the customer who should bring the suit before the court.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover its expenses from the defendant on account of the latter’s employee’s unlawful act, despite the provision under paragraph 5 it is the 3rd party who should institute the claim which held the plaintiff harmless from any and all liabilities of the defendant’s employees?

Held:

Yes. 3rd parties, the customer in the case at bar, are not bound by the contract between the defendant and plaintiff. But the plaintiff is in law liable for the damages caused the customer’s car, which had been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant’s security guard in breach of their contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, “obligations arising from

contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.”

Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court’s view, that “under the Guard Service Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant” — since the customer could not hold defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant. Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among others, could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff’s business, in the same way that defendant’s baseless attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot b expected to have brought it more business.