Case Digest Compilation From Research

8/11/2019 Case Digest Compilation From Research

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Basic Ignorance

Can a spouse marry the second time merely because of a well founded belief that theabsent spouse was already dead? No. If a marriage is solemnized by a Judge outside thearea of his jurisdiction, is the marriage invalid? No. These are the two questions raised in anadministrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MTCC) Judge HD whose jurisdiction

covers the Municipality of Sta. Monica and Burgos, Surigao del Norte.

On September 27, 1994, Judge HD solemnized the wedding of Bert and Lyn. Bert listed his

status in the marriage contract as separated but Judge HD still proceeded to solemnizetheir wedding on the basis of an affidavit acknowledged before the MTC Judge of Basey,Samar by two witnesses who attested: that they knew Bert to have been civilly married toIna in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five

children, Ina left the conjugal dwelling; and that she has not returned nor been heard of foralmost seven years thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

Then on October 27, 1994, Judge HD also performed the marriage ceremony between Dan

and Emmy. Upon the written request of Emmy, the wedding was solemnized not in his officebut in his residence which is located in another Municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte that

does not fall within his jurisdictional area.

Based on these two specific acts, an administrative complaint was filed against Judge HD for

gross misconduct, inefficiency and ignorance of the law. Was Judge HD guilty?

Yes. Under Article 41 of the Family Code (FC), even if the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the

declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.This is a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the FC to

discourage subsequent marriage where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been

dissolved or that a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead in accordance withpertinent provisions of law.

In the case of Bert, he did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first

wife Inas presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains marriage to Ina.It was therefore manifest error for Judge HD to accept and rely only on the joint affidavit

submitted by Bert. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and

thus void marriage between Bert and Lyn.

In the second wedding between Dan and Emmy, Article 3 of the FC requires as a formal

requisite the authority of the solemnizing officer. Judges, who are appointed to specificjurisdictions, may officiate weddings only within said areas and not beyond (Article 7 FC).They perform wedding beyond their jurisdiction only at the point of death, in remote places

or upon request of both parties in a written sworn statement to this effect (Article 8, FC).

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside of his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant

irregularity in the formal requisite laid down by Article 3, FC. This irregularity does not affectthe validity of the marriage but subjects the solemnizing official to administratively liability.

Here Judge HBs territory covers only Sta. Monica and Burgos. He was not clothed withauthority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa where he resides. He cannot cite the exceptions

in Article 8 because the request was only made by Emma and was not even a sworn

statement. By citing Article 8 as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, JudgeHB again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.


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While magistrates may at times commit mistakes in judgment, for which they are notpenalized, Judge HB exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law in an area which

has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. So he should be suspended for sixmonths and given a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealtwith more severely (Navarro vs. Domagtoy, A.M. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1998).

Simulated

This is a case explaining the meaning of in pari delicto which came into play betweenhusband and wife, Gerry and Rica.

Gerry and Rica were married on April 30, 1961 according to Chinese rites. On April 17, 1968

Rica purchased a parcel of land using her own separate personal funds so the title to theproperty was issued and registered in her name.

Later on, sometime in 1992, after more than 30 years of marriage and with three children,

Gerry was able to convince Rica, through repeated importunings, to execute a Deed of Saleof her property in his favor. Gerry promised Rica that he would construct a commercialbuilding on the property for the benefit of their children. He suggested that the property

should be in his name alone so that Rica would not be involved in the loan with the bank.The consideration of the transfer of the property in his name consisted of his promise to

construct a commercial building for the benefit of their children to whom he will in turn,execute a Deed of Absolute Sale, and to pay the loan he had obtained from the bank.

Because of Gerrys glib assurances, Rica signed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor withthe ostensible consideration of P200,000 which Gerry did not actually pay. So a new title

was issued in the name of Gerry alone. But to insure that Gerry would comply with his

promise, Rica did not deliver the owners copy of the TCT to Gerry.

From then on, marital trouble worsened as Gerry would insist on delivering to him theowners copy of the title which Rica would ask Gerry to comply with his promise. The maritalspat was aggravated by Gerrys promiscuity, volcanic temper and other vicious vices untilhe finally abandoned Rica and their children.

Gerry then fraudulently tried to obtain a new owners title by filing a petition in courtalleging that the original title was lost. When Rica learned about this scheme, she filed an

adverse claim and asked the Court to declare the Deed of Sale she signed null and void and

Gerrys title be cancelled. Gerry however contended that Rica should not be granted therelief she was praying for because she was equally at fault (in pari delicto) in the executionof the said Deed of Sale. Was Gerry correct?

No. The rule of in pari delicto applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of

the consideration or the purpose of the contract. In this case, the nullity of the deed arisesnot because of the illegality of the consideration but because the stated consideration had in

fact not been paid and therefore the said deed is fictitious, simulated, inexistent andproduces no effect whatsoever for lack of consideration. In pari delicto does not apply toinexistent contract due to lack of consideration or other essential requisites. It applies only

to existing contracts with illegal consideration (Yu Bun Guan vs. Ong G.R. No. 144735

October 18, 2001.)


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Splitting hair

This is a suit and countersuit between husband and wife explaining the meaning of litispendencia.

Romy and Candy had been married for five years, although during most of those years

Candy was abroad working as a nurse in the United Sates. Eventually, Candy learned thatprior to their marriage Romy was already married to another woman. She also discoveredthat their marriage license was not validly issued.

So Candy filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against Romy for thedeclaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it is bigamous and for having beensolemnized without a valid marriage license. Candy also sought to recover from Romy the

sum of $32,000 she allegedly sent him while working in the States to buy properties asinvestment for their future life together. She further asked for moral and exemplary

damages and attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

Two days later, Romy himself filed a complaint against Candy in the RTC of Davao seekinglikewise the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry her

at gunpoint and that they had no valid license. He also prayed for moral and exemplarydamages and attorneys fees.

Then in his answer to Candys complaint in Iloilo, Romy reiterated the allegations in his owncomplaint in Davao by way of counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages and prayed

that their marriage be declared void from the beginning for having been performed illegallyand under force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy.

For her part, in response to Romys complaint filed in Davao, Candy filed a motion to dismisssaid case invoking litis pendencia citing the civil case she earlier filed in Iloilo. According to

Candy, Romys complaint should be dismissed because it involves (1) the same parties or atleast such as representing the same interest; (2) the rights asserted and relief prayed for

are the same and the (3) identity in the two cases is such that the judgment that may berendered in her pending complaint would, regardless of which party is successful, bar any

other judgment in Romys complaint.

Romy on the other hand contended that the possible judgment in Iloilo denying the

annulment of the marriage because of failure to prove that there was no valid marriagelicense and that he deceitfully failed to disclose a prior marriage would not constitute a

ruling on whether he himself had been forced into the marriage. Was he correct?

No. Romy has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issuebesetting the two actions which is simply the nullification of marriage contracted by the

parties. Interestingly in his answer with counterclaim filed in Iloilo, Romy has also raised the

issue of force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy, the very same issue in his

complaint in Davao. Hence, he cannot now deny that the issues as well as the argumentsraised before the two trial courts are identical. Any decision or ruling promulgated by the

RTC of Iloilo will necessarily be a bar to another judgment by the RTC of Davao and viceversa.

Moreover, in his answer in Iloilo, he also presented a counterclaim for moral and exemplary

damages and attorneys fees by reason of the complaint filed by Candy. A counterclaimpartakes of the nature of a complaint and or a cause of action against a plaintiff in the case.

To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a subsequent


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complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action notsanctioned by the Rules (Mariscal vs. Court of Appeals et. al. G.R. No. 123926 July 22,

1999).

Romys complaint in Davao was thus dismissed. Eventually, Candy won the case In Iloilowhere her marriage to Romy was nullified on the ground that it was bigamous. Candy was

likewise awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees totaling toP200,000.00.

Concurrent, not exclusive

This case of Pete and Carmen explains the exclusive original jurisdiction of Family Court tohear and decide petitions for habeas corpus in relation to Custody of Children under

Republic Act 8369.

Pete and Carmen got married on July 7, 1993. Typical of marital unions, they started living

happily and harmoniously in a conjugal house near Petes parents. Their union was blessedwith three sons: Ron, Jun, Rico and a daughter, Carla.

But like most marriages, their relationship also had some rough sailing due to the usual

marital spats. One of those quarrels turned so bitter that after almost nine years ofmarriage or on May 18, 2002, Pete left the conjugal abode with his three sons in tow,

transferring from one province to another apparently to avoid being traced by Carmen.

Carmen sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between herand Pete but to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa in their

Barangay which proved to be futile. Finally she had to file a petition for habeas corpus of

Ron, Jun and Rico who were then ages 8, 6, and 4 years respectively. Carmen alleged thatPetes act of leaving conjugal dwelling and going to different places disrupted the education

of their children and deprived them of their mother. She prayed that Pete be ordered toproduce their sons before the court and explain why they should not be returned to her

custody.

While initially Pete agreed to return custody of their sons to Carmen, he later changed his

mind and fought it out. Pete and Carmen hurled accusations against each other, blamed oneanother for their breakup and pointed to each other as the one who left the conjugal

dwelling. Pete claimed that Carmen was unfit to take care of their children because of her

habitual drunkenness and frequent late night outs which are the same defects that Carmenattributed to Pete whom she claimed to be an alcoholic, a drug addict and prone to violence.

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision granting custody of Jun

and Rico who were then six and four years old respectively, to Carmen subject to visitation

rights of Pete. With respect to Ron who was then eight years old, the CA ruled that hiscustody should be determined by the Family Court in a special proceeding on custody of

minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Pete questioned this ruling. He contended that the CA had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of

habeas corpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under R.A. 8369.

Was Pete correct?


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No. RA 8396 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeascorpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8396 reveal no manifest

intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should beread in harmony with the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) andBP 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization ACT OF 1980) that Family Courts have concurrent

jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of

minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, datedApril 22, 2004.

In this case, after Pete moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred

his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. By giving the family courtsexclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leavingindividuals like Carmen without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children.

Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would behelpless since they cannot seek redress from Family Courts whose writs are enforceable

only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack of recourse could not have been theintention of RA 8396.

Moreover, under RA 8396, the family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in

custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issuedexclusively by the Family Courts under said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may beavailed of in conjunction with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules

of Court (Madrinan vs. Madrinan, G.R. 159374, July 12, 2007).

Immaterial error

In a contract of sale, when the seller allegedly makes a legal mistake in consummating the

sale, can she invoke that mistake to undo what she has done and claim back the propertyshe sold on the ground that the sale is null and void? This is the question answered in this

case of Nita.

Nita is a married woman. But unlike other married women, Nita is not too dependent on her

husband. In fact, she generates more income than her husband and has accumulatedsubstantial paraphernal properties through her own hard work and separate earnings.

Somehow, this kind of setup eventually led to other independent ventures of Nita. Shealso indulges in affairs with other men, which, under ordinary Filipino setting, is more of ahardworking husbands exclusive privilege or practice.

After about 15 years of marriage, she declared her independence from her own husband,

abandoned him, and decided to live in with Romy, whom she met in one of her business

deals. While Nitas attraction to Romy was physical, Romys attraction to Nita was material,considering Nitas substantial assets. The shrewd and worldly-wise Nita was aware of thiskind of relationship so she did not divulge nor even advise Romy of her transactions withher own property while they were already living together as husband and wife.

During her cohabitation with Romy, Romy became mentally ill, necessitating hospitalization.

Because Nita loved Romy, she was forced to sell a parcel of land she acquired from agovernment housing corporation to defray the hospitalization expenses of Romy. She alone

executed and signed the papers selling the said property to the couple, Nilo and Mila. Later


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on, she realized that it was a mistake to have sold the property for the price persistentlyoffered by Nilo. Thinking it was not yet too late to get back the land she sold, she sued Nilo

and Mila to have the sale annulled on the ground that she had not obtained the consent ofher husband Romy. She invoked the law prevailing at that time (Art. 144 Civil Code) whichsays that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but are not married,the property acquired by either or both of them, through their work or industry or their

wages and salaries, shall be co-owned by them. Since Romy, the co-owner did not consentto the sale, the sale is null and void Nita contended. Is Nita correct?

No. At the time Nita acquired the property which she sold to Nilo and Mila, Nita and Romy

were not yet living together as husband and wife. So the law invoked by Nita is immaterialand inapplicable. Furthermore, if the sale was defective by reason of lack of Romys consent,it was Romy or his heirs, not Nita, who had a right to ask for annulment. Nita could not

invoke her own fault or shortcoming (of not having obtained Romys consent to the sale) toinvalidate a sale she had consummated (Noveno vs. Court of Appeals, 8 SCRA 279).

Art. 144 of the Civil Code has been replaced by Arts. 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Art

144 regulates only the property relations of a man and a woman living together as husbandand wife who are not incapacitated or who are without impediment to marry each other or

the case of parties whose marriage is void from the beginning (except a bigamousmarriage). Aside from the foregoing situations, the Family Code has also expresslyregulated the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery and concubinage.

Overtaken by events

This is the unfortunate story of a couple who placed their lifetime savings in a bank and lostall of it despite what they thought was a timely legal move on their part.

Between 1982 and 1984, the Santos couple opened and maintained both time and savings

deposits with a development bank located in Metro Manila. Their deposits totaled aboutP950,000. When some of the time deposit certificates matured, the couple was not able to

withdraw them in cash. Instead, the bank issued a managers check which was dishonoredupon presentation for payment.

So the Santoses demanded payment and withdrawal of all their deposits. But the bank

likewise failed to comply with their demands. This prompted the couple to file a complaint incourt with a writ of preliminary attachment. The court ordered the issuance of a writ ofattachment and pursuant thereto one of the properties of the bank was attached.

While the case was pending, the Central Bank decided to place the bank under receivership

after finding that its condition was one of insolvency and its continuance in business wouldresult in probable loss to its depositors and creditors.

Thereafter, the couple obtained a judgment against the bank and filed a motion forimmediate execution so that their attachment will become permanent. The court however,

stayed the execution of the judgment because the bank was already placed under

receivership. Was the court correct?

Yes. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of the respondent bank to


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the obvious prejudice of the other depositors and creditors because after the MonetaryBoard declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the board

becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors.

One depositor or creditor cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by anattachment of properties of the bank. After a declaration of insolvency, the remedy of the

depositors is to intervene in the liquidation proceedings. This is the ruling in the case ofLipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal 154 SCRA 257.

Of course, if this case happens now, the couple can recover part of the deposit insured by

the PDIC.

Substantial Correction

The validity of marriages as well as the legitimacy and filiation of children can be questioned

only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party and not through a collateralattack. This is the ruling in this case of Maricris.

Maricris married Lito on January 4, 1978. Their union bore three children: Paul, born on May8, 1978, Carlo, born on June 4, 1980 and Janet born on June 7, 1983. After 25 years of

marriage, during which Lito worked and traveled abroad, Lito died in a vehicular accident inIndonesia.

Following the repatriation of Litos remains to the Philippines, one of those who went to hiswake was Lucy with a boy named Nino in tow whom she began introducing as her and Litosson.

This prompted Maricris to make inquiries and later on found out that in Ninos birthcertificate he was born on January 1, 1996 with Lucy listed as the mother and Lito as thefather, and that the boy was acknowledged by Lito as his son on January 13, 1996 and thenlegitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of the parents (Lucy and Lito) on April 22,

1998. So Maricris also obtained a marriage contract showing that Lito and Lucy were indeed

married on April 22, 1998.

Hence on December 23, 2005, Maricris together with her children Paul and Janet filed before

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition against Lucy and the guardians of Nino, to correctthe entries in Ninos birth record with the local civil registrar under Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt. Maricris contended that Nino could not have been legitimated by the supposed

marriage between Lito and Lucy because the same is bigamous since Lito was still married

to her. She thus prayed for: (1) the correction of entries in Ninos birth record with respect

to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and use of the fatherssurname; (2) a directive to Lucy and the guardians of Nino to submit the latter to DNA

testing to determine his paternity and filiation; (3) the declaration of nullity of thelegitimation of Nino, and for this purpose, for a declaration of the nullity of Lucy and Litosmarriage on the ground that it is bigamous.

In an order dated September 6, 2007, the RTC however dismissed the petition holding thatin a special proceeding for the correction of entry, it is not acting as a Family Court under

the Family Code and therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition to annul the marriage of


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15,000 square meters property had been disposed of to Bernie, they asked forreconveyance of the same. The heirs of Cindy and Bernie opposed the same, contending

that reconveyance was no longer possible because of prescription through the long lapse oftime and that the property had already been sold in good faith and for value. Were theycorrect?

No. Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, prescription generally does not run in favor of a co-heiror co-owner as long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership likeCindy in this case who showed during her lifetime that she never repudiated the other co-

heirs as co-owners of the property by giving them their shares of the fruits. With respect to

the claim of good faith, the record shows that when Cindy first sold the property, the landwas not yet registered under the torrens system but was only covered by a tax declarationso the claim of good faith cannot be availed of because the issue of good or bad faith of the

buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land and the purchaser isbuying the same from a registered owner whose title is clean (David vs. Bardin 149 SCRA

140).

Vital social institution

In all cases of annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage the court shall order the

prosecution attorney or the fiscal assigned to it to appear in behalf of the State to takesteps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not

fabricated or suppressed (Article 48, Family Code (FC). This is the rule involved in this casebetween Ricky and Vicky.

Ricky and Vicky who both belong to the elites in our society got married on June 3, 1972 ata lavish wedding rites and reception. The first ten years of their marriage appeared to be

normal. They lived together in their conjugal abode and begot two children. But after sevenmore years of living together or in 1989, the marriage apparently hit the rocks when Vicky

filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriageto Ricky after first obtaining a church annulment in 1986.

In her complaint, Vicky alleged that at the time of the marriage, Ricky was alreadypsychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became

manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights, one of which caused physical injuries to

her and impelled her to file a criminal complaint against Ricky; that Ricky also usedprohibited drugs, was apprehended and sentenced to a one year suspended penalty; thatRicky is a womanizer and in 1984 left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in

succession; that after leaving the conjugal dwelling, he gave minimal support to the family

and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of the children compelling her to accept

donations and dole outs from family and friends; that Ricky mismanaged their conjugalproperties and spent extravagantly incurring large obligations from banks and financial

institutions. Finally, Vicky asserted that attempts at reconciliation were made but they allfailed because of Rickys refusal to reform.

Ricky answered denying the imputations against him. He blamed Vicky for the breakdown of

their marriage after ten years. He alleged that Vicky did not accord him the respect anddignity due him as a husband but treated him as a persona non-grata; that due to extreme

animosities he left the conjugal home for a cooling off period; that it was Vicky who took


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drugs and had affairs with another man; that he was not a womanizer but his work in mediaexposed him to gossip linking him to various women; and that he was forced to dispose of

some conjugal properties due to financial reverses in his business. Thus he petitioned thecourt to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue administration of theconjugal properties.

At the trial which commenced on March 20, 1990, Vicky presented four witnesses includingherself, their marriage counselor, a close friend and her own counsel to prove herallegations. She also presented documents including news articles about her husbandsrelationship with other women, his apprehension by authorities for illegal possession of

drugs and the copies of the church annulment.

Upon resting her case the court scheduled the reception of Rickys evidence. The first dateset on May 11, 1990 was postponed upon his motion because his counsel was abroad. Onthe second date set by the court on June 8, 1990, he failed to appear thus prompting Vicky

to move that he be declared to have waived his right to present evidence and that the casebe deemed submitted for decision. On June 29, 1990, the RTC rendered judgment declaring

the nullity of Vickys marriage to Ricky and awarding custody of the children to Vicky.

Counsel for Ricky received a copy of the decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was takenfrom the decision so it became final and executory. When Vicky was trying to execute thedecision on October 17, 1990, Ricky opposed it and filed a petition for relief from judgment

before the RTC, but the RTC denied it. Ricky appealed the order of denial to the Court ofAppeals (CA), but the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the RTC.

Ricky questioned this CA ruling before the Supreme Court contending among others that

when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered theprosecuting officer to intervene for the State and inquire as to the reason for his non-

appearance to prevent collusion between the parties pursuant to Article 48 of the FC. Was

Ricky correct?

No. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the application of Article 48 of the FC. Forone, Ricky was not declared in default for failure to answer. Ricky filed his answer to the

complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by Vicky. He actively participated in theproceedings and cross-examined Vickys witnesses. It is crystal clear that every stage of thelitigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. Under the

circumstances, the non-intervention by a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusionbetween the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial

court.

Collusion should be prevented in the grant of annulment or legal separation because ourConstitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social

institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a

social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger

anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weaken our socialand moral fabric and hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family

members (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA, 158).


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Wrong remedy

Can the heirs ask for a declaration of nullity of the marriage of their deceased parent? Thisis the issue raised in this case of the heirs of the spouses Ely and Nida. NO.

Ely and Nida were married on June 14, 1962 and begot seven children. But after more than

20 years, or in 1983, Ely separated and co-habited with another woman, Lita. On May 1,2004, Nida died. Three months later, or on August 26, 2004, when Ely was already seriouslyill, he married Lita with whom he had been cohabiting. They got married before the

Municipal Mayor without the requisite marriage license by virtue of Article 34 of the Family

Code which exempts a man and a woman who had been living together for at least fiveyears without any legal impediment to marry each other. Six more months later or onFebruary 1, 2005, Ely already died.

On March 17, 2005, Elys children with his first wife Nida (the heirs) filed a declaration ofnullity of their fathers marriage to Lita. They argued that Article 34 of the FC allowingmarriage without license for those living together as husband and wife for at least five years

without legal impediment, was not applicable to the marriage of their father and Lita. They

posited that the marriage of Ely to their mother Nida was dissolved only upon the lattersdeath on May 1, 2004 which was barely three months from the date of the marriage of theirfather Ely to Lita. Therefore, they said their father Ely and Lita could not have been livingtogether as husband and wife for at least five years without any legal impediment. They

also raised as additional ground the lack of marriage ceremony due to Elys serious illnesswhich make its performance impossible.

In her answer Lita maintained that she and Ely lived together as husband and wife under

one roof for 21 years openly and publicly and even bore two children; hence they wereexempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She further claimed that the

marriage ceremony was performed in the municipal hall by the Mayor. As an affirmative

defense, Lita sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that pursuant to Section 2 (a)of A.M. 02-11-10-SC issued by the Supreme Court on March 7, 2003, petitions for

declaration of nullity of marriages under the FC may be filed solely by the husband or thewife.

Initially the RTC dismissed the heirs petition but later on reversed itself and reinstated it. Itheld that A.M. 02-11-20-SC, Section 2 applies only when both parties to a void marriage are

still living. Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file thepetition to declare the marriage void. It reasoned out that during the lifetime of their father

Ely, the heirs have only an inchoate right over his property so that only he can file a petition

to declare as void, his marriage to Lita. However upon his death his heirs already have avested right over whatever property he left behind, so they could already file a petitiondeclare his marriage to Lita void to protect their rights. Such vested right should not be

frustrated by any rule of procedure such as the A.M. in question, the RTC said. Was the RTC

correct?

No. A.M. 02-11-10-SC explicitly governs petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages

and annulment of voidable marriages under the FC which took effect on August 3, 1988.The allegedly void marriage of Ely and Lita subject of the heirs petition for declaration ofnullity was celebrated on August 26, 2004. Hence said marriage falls squarely within the

ambit of the A.M.

Section 2 of said A.M. provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a voidmarriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. There is no ambiguity in this Rule.


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The heirs here therefore clearly have no cause of action before the RTC.

But it does not mean they are already without recourse under the law. They can still protecttheir successional rights, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules, such petition cannotbe filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State because theyhave only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor and hence can only

question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in aproceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regularcourts. So the heirs here can still question the validity of the marriage of their father Ely to

Lita in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Ely filed in the regular courts (Suazo

vs. Heirs of Catli-Medinaceli etc. G.R. 173614, September 28, 2007)

Personal liability

One of the practices used in obtaining a loan from a bank is for the borrower to appointanother person as his or her attorney-in-fact or agent in negotiating for and getting theloan. This is what Mila did. And this is what got her into trouble.

Mila was a married woman who had her own separate paraphernal property consisting of

two parcels of land duly titled. She signed a special power of attorney designating Ben, a

family friend, as her agent to secure a loan from any bank of financial ins titution for anyamount or otherwise mortgage the abovementioned properties and in that connection to

sign or execute any deed mortgage or other documents necessary in securing said loan.Thereupon she gave the special power of attorney and her owners copy of the TransferCertificate of Title to Ben.

Subsequently Ben executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the said properties in favorof a bank. He signed said deed plainly as mortgagor with the marital consent yet of his wife.

The three promissory notes secured by said mortgage was also signed by Ben on top of a

line beneath which is written signature of mortgagor, and by his wife on top of a lineunder which is written signature of spouse. In all these loan documents there was nomention that he signed them for and in behalf of Mila as mortgagor. Thus it is clearly borneout by these documents that Ben was the intended user and beneficiary of the loans for his

bangus and sugpo fishpond.

When Mila discovered the transaction and after learning that Ben had left his residence andtransferred to an unknown place, she and her husband filed a suit against Ben and the bank

for the annulment of the mortgage since it was executed to secure the personal loans of

Ben and not in her behalf and therefore not enforceable against her. The bank contended

that the mortgage is valid because Ben was expressly authorized by Mila to mortgage herproperty under the special power of attorney she signed in favor of Ben. Was the bank

correct?

No. Bens act of signing the deed of real estate mortgage in his name alone as a mortgagor,without any indication that he was signing for and in behalf of the property owner Mila,

bound himself alone in his personal capacity as debtor of the bank and not as the agent orattorney-in-fact of Mila. Under the law on agency, in order to bind the principal (Mila) to a

mortgage on real property executed by the agent, it must upon its face purport to be made,


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signed and sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise it will bind the agent only. It is notenough merely that the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not

acted in the name of the principal. Neither is it sufficient that in the mortgage deed itself theagent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact he acted, signedand sealed the mortgage in his own name (Rural Bank of Bombon vs. Court of Appeals, 212SCRA 25).

Conditional (builder in good faith, contract to sell)

This is a tale of two marriages entered into by a man. Both marriages, however, are valid

and legal because they were contracted in succession, after the first one had been dissolvedby the death of the first wife.

During his first marriage, Carling and his first wife purchased a property in a Quezon City

subdivision. The contract he signed was a lease and conditional sale agreement under whichCarling as lessee-vendee would pay a monthly rental of P290 for 20 years. In the lease

agreement, the lessor-seller transferred only the temporary use and enjoyment of the houseand lot for residential purposes. It was provided further in the agreement that if at theexpiration of the lease period, the lessee-vendee (Carling) should have fully and faithfully

complied with all the obligations stipulated, the lessor-vendor would immediately sell,transfer and convey to him the property subject of the agreement. Four years later, his first

wife by whom he had three children, died. The widower Carling continued to pay for thehouse and lot. Eight years later, he remarried Bessie. Thereafter, payment of the house and

lot was made out of the conjugal funds of the second marriage. Four years later, Nimfa, one

of Carlings daughters by his first marriage, built a house at the back portion of thepremises at the behest of Carling. Nimfa thus offered to continue paying the monthly rental

until the full lease amounts had been fully paid. Upon such full payment the lessor-sellerexecuted in favor of Carling the Deed of Absolute Sale over the premises and the next day,

he donated all his rights, title and interest over the lot and bungalow thereon to Nimfa. Acontroversy arose when Carling died. However his wife Bessie, with whom he begot two

children, claimed that the property was acquired during the second marriage when the finaldeed of sale was executed. Therefore it should be their conjugal property. Nimfa, on the

other hand, contended that the property was acquired during the marriage of her mother

and father when the lease and conditional sale agreement was signed by Carling. Is Nimfacorrect?

No. The agreement entered into by Carling during his first marriage to Nimfas mother is inthe nature of a contract to sell as contradistinguished from the contract of sale. In acontract to sell or conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the

property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Compliance with the stipulated

payments is a suspensive condition, the failure of which prevents the obligation of the

vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. So what was vested in the conjugalpartnership of the first marriage was merely the beneficial title. It was only upon full

payment of the amortizations (lease rentals) that Carling acquired ownership. And this wasduring his second marriage. So the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of thesecond marriage. Bessie would get 1/2 of the property and the other half to be divided

between her and her two children at 1/6 each. But she must reimburse the amount

advanced by the first conjugal partnership and by Nimfa. Furthermore, Nimfa was theexclusive owner of the house she erected on the lot over which she had all the rights of a

builder in good faith. This was the ruling in Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 126.


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Substantial compliance

If the property subject of a case is conjugal, can any of the spouses alone file or defend thesuit? This is the question raised in this case of the spouses Tito and Tita.

The ownership of the foreshore land involved here was claimed by the couple because theyhave occupied it since time immemorial. But they were sued by Benny who said that theywere only his lessees of the property. Eventually the court ruled in favor of Benny which

ordered Tito and Tita to vacate the property except that portion which the couple reclaimed

from the sea and formed part of the shore. When the decision became final and a writ ofdemolition was issued against Tito and Tita, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionbefore the Court of Appeals against the lower court and the sheriff alleging grave abuse of

discretion in ordering demolition. In the petition, only Tito signed the certificate of non-forum shopping (that there is no other action or proceeding involving the same issues

before any other court) which is necessary before their petition can be given due course.

Benny thus questioned the petition and asked the Court of Appeals not to give due course toit. He contended that since the property they are claiming is allegedly conjugal, the

certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by both Tito and Tita. And since it wassigned only by Tito, the petition is defective. Was Benny correct?

No. The petition signed only by Tito constitute substantial compliance with the rules on non-forum shopping. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife.

Their residence is the subject property alleged to be conjugal. Whether it is conjugal underthe New Civil Code or the Family Code, the certificate signed by the husband Tito constitute

sufficient compliance.

Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In

fact he is the sole administrator and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join himin this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action

without being joined by the wife. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugalproperty could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone without the

concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filedby the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping

to be attached to the petition.

Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband

and wife jointly. However unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where consent of both

spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husbandand wife always act together. Each Spouse may validly exercise full power of managementalone subject to the intervention of the Court in case of disagreement by the wife over the

prevailing decision of the husband. Under the Family Code therefore, the husband alone

could have also filed the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition without being joined by the

wife.

Besides, the husband is reasonably presumed to know personally whether his wife has filedany action or claim similar to the petition he filed concerning the conjugal property. So hiscertification alone is substantial (Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658).


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Preferred relationship

Article II Section 12 of the Constitution provides that the State shall protect and strengthenthe family as a basic autonomous social institution. When the State so intervenes it is

exercising its prerogative of parens patriae which literally means father of the countrywhere the State, as sovereign, exercises powers of guardianship over persons under

disabilities.

This Constitutional provision strengthening the family under the doctrine of parens patriae

or father of the country is illustrated in this case of Pete and Betty.

Pete and Betty are husband and wife with only one child, Nina. Being the only daughter Nina

is the nia bonita of Pete. He dotes on Nina and loves her dearly. Apparently, Pete loveshis daughter more than his wife Betty. Petes love for his daughter somehow drove a wedgebetween him and Betty. Their relationship became a bit shaky. Every incident, no matter

how small, became reason enough for the spouses to harbor suspicions on each other. Sowhen Pete insured himself, he instituted his daughter Nina as the beneficiary, with his

brother Tom, uncle of Nina, and not his wife Betty as trustee during the minority of Nina.When Nina was about 12 years old, Pete died. And so pursuant to the terms of the

insurance policy, the proceeds of the life insurance was given to Tom, Ninas uncle and notto Betty her mother. Thus, Betty filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the said proceeds

to her. Will Bettys suit prosper?

Yes. The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary (Nina). Nina a minor is under the

custody and parental authority of Betty, her mother. The said minor lives with her mother,and she acquired proceeds by lucrative title. Said proceeds therefore belong to the minor

child in ownership and in usufruct to the mother. Under our law, the usufructuary (themother) is entitled to possession (Art. 321 Civil Code), Betty is entitled to the delivery of

the insurance proceeds. The trust in favor of Tom is null and void as it conflicts with said

law. Furthermore, it would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of thingsbut the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It could have been different if

the conflict were between father and mother and not between uncle and mother. Here it isthe mother asserting priority over the uncle. Certainly, the judiciary as the instrumentality

of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.The family as a unit will be strengthened if the mother is given priority over that of an uncle

(Cabana vs. Pilapil 58 SCRA 94).

Impliedly accepted

This case of Benny is about a donation made in consideration of marriage, or a donation

made before its celebration and in favor of one or both of the future spouses, known in law

as donation propter nuptias.

Benny was the oldest of the six children of the spouses Gil and Minda. He was engaged tobe married to Myra on June 4, 1944. A few weeks before their marriage or on May 22,1944, his parents Gil and Minda executed a donation written in the Ilocano dialect and

denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut wherein he and his prospective bride Myra were giftedwith four parcels of land, as well as a male cow and one-third portion of his parents ownconjugal house covered by OCT No. 18259. After their marriage, the fact of their marriage

were inscribed at the back of the land Titles donated.


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Gil and Minda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968 respectively, leaving as

heirs, Benny and his two brothers and three sisters. With Benny and Myras permission, theyoungest sister Marta took possession and cultivated one of the lands donated to Benny andMyra with an area of 4,876 square meters and covered by OCT No. 18383 wherein the factof their marriage was annotated.

Meanwhile on May 15, 1970 Benny and Myra already registered the Deed of Donation so thetitles of the donated land including OCT 18383 were already cancelled and in lieu thereof,

new titles were issued in Benny and Myras name. OCT 18383 was thus replaced by TCT84897. Marta however remained in possession and cultivation of the land.

On March 18, 1973, Benny and his siblings executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of

Rights wherein the remaining properties of their parents consisting of 12 parcels of landwere distributed among the three sisters because Benny and his two other brothers have

already received their shares in the estates of their parents by virtue of previous donationsand conveyances. Subsequently on June 12, 1976, the heirs executed another Deed of

Compromise Agreement concerning the distribution of two more parcels of land that werenot included in the Deed of Partition. All the other stipulations and provisions in the Deed of

Partition were confirmed by the heirs.

Sometime in 1977, when Martas husband got sick, her daughter Vilma took over possessionof the land with an area of 4,876 sq. meters formerly covered by OCT 18383 and laterreplaced by TCT 84897 already in the name of Benny and Myra which was one of the lands

donated to them by their parents.

Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was disturbed. Vilma filedan action for annulment of title against Benny and Myra before the RTC which was however

dismissed. This move prompted Benny and Myra to file an action for ejectment of Vilma

before the Municipal Trial Court which rendered a decision on November 25, 1985 orderingVilma to vacate the land.

To counter this ruling, Vilma and her mother Marta filed another complaint before the RTC

for the annulment of Benny and Myras TCT No. 84897 They alleged that the donationpropter nuptias or Inventario Ti Sagut was spurious because it did not observe the form

required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate

public instrument. Were they correct?

No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias are not governed by the same

rules especially as regards the formal requisites. Under the Old Civil Code (Article 1330),acceptance is not necessary to the validity of said gifts. The execution of a public instrumentin which the property is specifically described and the celebration of the marriage between

the beneficiary couple are enough to effectuate the donation.

Under the new Civil Code, the donation must be in writing to be enforceable and acceptanceis necessary although it need not be expressed for the donation to be valid (Article 129).

Implied acceptance is sufficient.

The law applicable here is the law existing at the time of the execution of the contract. Since

the donation was executed in 1944, it is the old Civil Code which applies because the New

Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. So applying Article 1330 of the Old CivilCode, it does not matter whether or not the donees accepted the donation for its validity.


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Indeed even if the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of Marta and Vilma wouldcollapse just the same because implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices

under said Code. So Vilma has to turn over possession of the property to Benny and Myra(Valencia and Valencia vs. Locquiao et. al., G.R. 122134, October 3, 2003).

Lasting affection

This is another case involving custody of children where the court used the childrens bestinterest as the basis for deciding who between the mother and father has the right to theircustody. This is the case of Ali, a Muslim and Sally a Catholic.

Before Ali and Sally were married, Sally became a Muslim so they can marry according to

the Islamic rites. Thus on February 3, 1988 Ali and Sally were married at a hotel in Manila ina Muslim ceremony. Ali was then 31 years old and a businessman whose work required

frequent travels abroad and be in different places most of the time, while Sally was only 20years old, scion of a well to do family. At the time of their marriage Ali was still married to a

Saudi woman whom he divorced after marrying Sally.

Initially, the couple stayed with Sallys family in Makati as Ali attended to his business. Lateron the couple migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they begot two children,Abdul, born on June 13, 1989 and Farah, born on September 29, 1990. They stayed in

Jeddah for two years, but by 1995, Sally and the two children went back to Manila. The

children lived in the house of Sallys mother in Ayala, Alabang where Ali used to visit them.In December 1996, Sally was re-converted to Catholicism and had their children baptized asCatholics.

Even before that or on March 11, 1996, Ali filed with the Sharia District Court an action toobtain custody of his two children. He alleged that Sally was not fit to be entrusted with the

custody of their children because she was continually going out and leaving their childrenhungry. She was seen with different men at odd hours wearing clothes detestable under

Islamic laws.

After filing her answer, an order was issued by Sharia court granting a writ of preliminaryinjunction enjoining Sally to desist from preventing Ali to exercise parental authority overtheir children. Then on March 2, 1999 Sally filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack

of jurisdiction over the subject matter since she and her children are no longer Muslims. Ali

opposed the motion contending that at the inception of the case on March 11, 1996 bothparties were Muslims, himself by birth and Sally by conversion. Sally reconverted toCatholicism only in December 1996, Ali said.

The Sharia court denied Sallys motion and proceeded to hear the case on the merits. Ali

submitted his evidence ex-parte in view of the non-appearance of Sally and on the basis ofsaid evidence it rendered a decision on November 16, 1999 granting custody of the children

and ordering Ali to support them and provide for their physical, mental and moraldevelopment.

The court found Sally unworthy to care for her children applying the Muslim law which says

that when a woman engages in zina (illicit sexual relations) and continually goes out,leaving her children, she is not worthy to be trusted with the custody of her children. On the

other hand, the court also found that Ali was capable both personally and financially to look


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after the best interest of his minor children. Was the court correct?

No. The Muslim moral laws are no longer binding on Sally. The standard in determining theproof on whether a woman is competent to care for her children, should not be restricted to

Muslim laws. What determines Sallys capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code(FC), now that she is no longer a Muslim. Although there is a need for the children to have

both father and mother, either party may lose parental authority over the children becauseof their voluntary separation, taking into consideration the circumstances that would showwhich parent can better take care of their children.

In this case, Sally has more capacity and time to see to the childrens needs. She is equallyfinancially capable of providing for all the needs of her children paying their tuition fees inan exclusive school. Ali on the other hand has work that requires him to go abroad and be in

different places most of the time. Besides under PD 603, the custody of minor children,absent any compelling reason, is given to the mother.

However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental

authority. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other lost, theattachment and feeling for their offspring invariably remain unchanged. Thus Ali should also

be granted visitorial rights at least once a week and may take them out with the writtenconsent of Sally (Artadi-Bondagan vs. Bondagan et. al. G.R. 140817, December 7, 2001).

Contradictory

May a spouse recover moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees as a consequenceof a marriage that has been declared null and void because of the psychological incapacity?

This is one of the issues raised and answered in this case of Leo and Lucy.

Leo and Lucy got married on July 4, 1979 and begot a son. From the start of their marriageLeo appeared to give his career as a banker and businessman the first priority and was

unable to relate not only to Lucy as a husband but also to their son as a father. He appearedto have no inclination to make their marriage work. Eventually when troubles came Lucy

and Leo separated. While Lucy tried to save the marriage, Leo was reluctant and refused to

reconcile.

In fact it was even Leo who filed with the RTC a petition on July 12, 1992 for the declaration

of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of Lucy.After Lucy filed her answer, Leo amended his petition by stating that both he and Lucy werepsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. But in her

amended answer Lucy denied the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated and

specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P7 million

because Leo deceived her into marrying her when he was psychologically incapacitated.

After trial, the RTC found from the testimonies not only of the parties, particularly Lucy, butlikewise those of the two psychologists, that the acts of Leo after the marriage weresufficient proof of his psychological incapacity and therefore the product of his incapacity to

comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Thus on July 31, 1995, the RTC rendered

judgment declaring the marriage between them null and void ab initio; awarding custody oftheir son to Lucy; ordering the liquidation of their conjugal assets; and ordering Leo to pay

Lucy, moral damages in the amount of P2.5 million, exemplary damages of P1 million and


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Specifically, Dina alleged in her petition that Dinos psychological incapacity is manifested byhis lack of financial support; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his

working wife; his consistent jealousy and distrust of his wife; his alternating moods ofdefiance and contrition; his refusal to assist in the maintenance of the family like the footing

of the household needs and other family needs; his arrogance and insensitivity to his wifesfeeling whom he liked to humiliate and embarrass even in the presence of their children. In

her petition Dina also cited the evaluation of a psychologist who found Dino to be sufferingfrom passive, aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature andirresponsible.

On the other hand, Dina likewise alleged in her petition that she is effusive and displays herfeelings openly and freely which change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despairdepending on her day to day experiences. She also alleged that her tolerance for boredom

was very low; she was emotionally immature and cannot stand frustration ordisappointment; she cannot delay to gratify her needs, gets upset when she cannot get

what she wants while her self-indulgence lifts her spirit immensely. Dina also alleged thataccording to the psychologist who evaluated her, she manifested psychological aversion to

cohabit with her husband and she suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder withNarcissistic features.

In the same petition Dina also mentioned the psychological report of the psychologist whofound that their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship and their incapacity

to accept and fulfill the essential marital obligations led to the breakdown of their marriage.The report also declared that based on their psychological make-up, the psychological

incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their essential marital obligations is grave,incorrigible and incurable.

On November 8, 2002, Dino filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the

allegations therein are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on

psychological incapacity. He claimed that the petition did not allege: the root cause of thepsychological incapacity; the gravity of the illness as to bring about the disability of the

party to assume the essential marital obligations and the marital obligations that were notcomplied. Was Dino correct?

No. Contrary to Dinos contention, the petition contains allegations sufficient to support adeclaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity as required by Article 36

of the FC and the guidelines set by this Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals 335 Phil. 664.The petition alleged that the family backgrounds of both Dino and Dina which were clinically

identified by the competent and expert psychologist are the root causes of the psychological

incapacity. Also alleged in the petition is the report of the psychologist that Dina suffersfrom Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features while Dino suffers fromPassive, Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorders which are grave, incorrigible and

incurable illnesses as to bring about their disability to comply with the essential obligations

of marriage. From the totality of the petition, it can also be gleaned that both of them failed

to live together as husband and wife, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and rendermutual help and support.

Besides the guidelines requires that proofs must be presented by the parties first during thetrial to determine whether or not the allegations are meritorious. Each case involving the

application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of prior

assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Theprovision should be interpreted on a case to case basis, guided by experience, the findings

of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.


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This cannot be complied with by dismissing the petition without trying the case on themerits (Aurelio vs. Aurelio, G.R. 175367, June 6, 2011)

Possession and ownershipA LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated

August 03, 2011 12:00 AM Comments (0) View comments

An action to quiet title to property by the person in possession does not prescribe. This isthe ruling applied in this case of Ben who had been in peaceful and continuous possession in

adverse manner of lot 452 since 1940.

Bens case arose when the adjacent lot 450 containing an area of 4,960 sq. m. wassurveyed on October 1, 1965 by a Cadastral Land Surveyor pursuant to the application for a

free patent filed by Tony. Subsequently on September 25, 1968, a Free Patent and OriginalCertificate Title (OCT) covering lot 450 were finally issued in the name of the heirs of Tony

who had in the meantime died. The OCT was registered with the Register of Deeds onAugust 29, 1974.

In 1991, when the heirs of Tony subdivided lot 450 covered by the OCT, they learned for thefirst time that it included a 790 sq. m. portion of the adjacent lot 452 occupied and in

possession of Ben since 1940. Hence when Tonys heirs took possession of said portion, Benfiled a protest with the DENR on December 26, 1991 against the Free Patent and the OCT

issued to Tonys heirs. Ben alleged that the 790 sq. m. portion of his lot 452 adjacent to lot450 was erroneously included in the OCT.

After proper investigation, the DENR special investigator and the geodetic engineer whoassisted him and conducted a survey of the adjoining lots 450 and 452 found that the

disputed portion with an area of 790 sq. m. is really part of Bens property. The sketch planprepared by the surveyor clearly shows that said portion is within Bens property and part oflot 452 taking into consideration the 57 year old coconut trees planted in a straight linewhich form a common natural boundary between the lots of the parties as admitted by the

parties themselves.

The Director of Lands however failed to act on the recommendation of the DENR to file an

action for the annulment of the Free Patent and the OCT by segregating from it the 790

sq.m. So on October 9, 1998, Ben himself filed a complaint for annulment of the OCT,ejectment and damages.

Tonys heirs however contended that Bens action is already barred by prescription. Theymaintained that their OCT which was issued in 1968 and registered with the Register of

Deeds in 1974 is already indefeasible when Ben filed his complaint. Were they correct?

No. Bens action primarily seeks the re-conveyance of the disputed 790 sq. m. portion ofland through the amendment of the OCT. An action for re-conveyance of property respectsthe decree of registration as incontrovertible and merely seeks the transfer of the property

wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name to the rightful owner or to one whoclaims to have a better right.

The prescriptive period for the re-conveyance of registered property is ten years reckoned


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from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. However the ten-year prescriptiveperiod is not applicable where the complainant is in possession of the disputed property. In

such a case an action for re-conveyance would be in the nature of an action to quiet titlewhich does not prescribe.

In this case, Ben who has been in possession of the disputed portion since 1940 by himself

and through his predecessors-in-interest is not barred from bringing this action againstTonys heirs whose claim to the property is merely based on the OCT which mistakenlyincluded the 790 sq. m. portion over which Ben has a better right since he and his

predecessors-in-interest had long been in possession of the same in concept of owner. Re-

conveyance is just and proper to end the intolerable anomaly that patentees should have aTorrens Title for the land which has never been in their possession and which has beenpossessed by another person in the concept of owner. A person, whose certificate of title

included by mistake or oversight the land owned by another does not become the owner ofsuch land by virtue of the certificate alone. The Torrens system is intended to guarantee the

integrity and conclusiveness of registration but it is not intended to perpetrate fraud againstthe real owner of the registered land (Heirs of Waga etc. vs. Sacabin, G.R. 159131, July 27,

2009).

Forced resignationA LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated

August 18, 2011 12:00 AM Comments (1) View comments

In illegal dismissal cases, the employer who interposes the defense of resignation has theburden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. This is the principle applied

in this case of Lynn.

Lynn was a licensed civil engineer for ten years already when she was hired by a

construction and development company (SMPI) as construction management specialist in1991. Because of satisfactory performance on the job, she was promoted as technical

services manager in 1994 and then as project development manager in 1995. As projectdevelopment manager she also sat as a member of the companys management committee(MC).

But on January 27, 1998, the Company CEO informed Lynn that the company was planning

to reorganize its manpower in order to cut on costs and that she had to file for resignation

otherwise face termination. Initially Lynn refused to sign the blank resignation form handedto her by the companys human resources department. Since then she had been excludedfrom the MC meetings and treated sourly that caused her humiliation and alienation.

Considering the alternative of being terminated from the service or resigning with an

attractive financial package offered her by the company, she opted for resignation instead of

suffer termination. So on February 18, 1998, she submitted the signed resignation letter.

Lynn however learned that there was no reorganization plan in place when she resigned orimmediately thereafter but only the hiring of new employees and some promotions of highranking personnel. So on June 26, 1998, Lynn filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging

that her separation from the service was practically forced upon her by management who

tricked her into signing the resignation letter due to an impending reorganization whenthere was none after all. She thus alleged that she had been dismissed without cause and

prayed for reinstatement and damages.


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But on March 26, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Lynns complaint for lack of merit.The LA found no proven force, coercion, intimidation or any other circumstance which couldotherwise invalidate Lynns resignation. Being a well-educated person, Lynn could not justbe inveigled into resigning against her will. He said that being excluded from themanagement committee meetings would not be so humiliating and alienating as to compel

her to resign and that the company indeed made some promotions and new appointmentswhich were measures implementing the reorganization. Was the LA correct?

No. Resignation is the formal pronouncement and voluntary act of relinquishment of a

position or office. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment.Hence the act of the employee before and after the resignation must be considered indetermining whether he/she in fact intended to terminate his/her employment. In illegal

dismissal cases, the employer who asserts that there is voluntary resignation and notdismissal has the burden of proving that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. SMPI

was unable to discharge this burden.

In this case the question of whether or not there was such a reorganization plan in place at

the time of Lynns separation is material to the determination of whether her resignationwas voluntary as claimed by SMPI because she could not have filed her resignation had shenot been informed that there was such reorganization. And, it is quite clear that there wasactually no genuine corporate restructuring plan in place yet at the time the CEO presented

to Lynn the seemingly last available alternative options of voluntary resignation andtermination by abolition of office. Certainly, inasmuch as the necessity of corporate

reorganization generally lies within the exclusive prerogative of management, Lynn at thatpoint had no facility to ascertain the truth behind it, and neither was she in a position to

question it right then and there. Indeed she could not have chosen to file for resignationhad SMI not broached to her the possibility of her being terminated from the service on

account of the supposed reorganization. So it is understandable for Lynn to opt for

resignation considering the attractive financial package which SMPI offered to her, instead ofsuffer termination that management made her believe will happen.

Thus Lynns separation from the company was the confluence of fraudulent representationto her that her office would be declared redundant coupled with the subsequent alienationwhich she suffered from the company by reason of her initial refusal to tender her

resignation. The element of voluntariness in her resignation is therefore missing. She has

been constructively, and hence illegally dismissed as indeed her continued employment isrendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely under the circumstances.

But considering that it has been more than a decade since she involuntarily resigned, andwith the changes in the corporate structure of SMPI, Lynns former position or its equivalentmay no longer be existing or is currently occupied. Furthermore there is a possibility that

Lynns rejoining SMPIs workforce would only create tension and strained relations andwould thus compromise her efficiency and productivity especially because she was holding a

key position founded on trust and confidence. Hence in lieu of reinstatement, she should begiven separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service plus full

backwages and P50,000 moral damages, P25,000 exemplary damages and 10% of the totalamount due as Attorneys fees (San Miguel Properties Inc. vs. Gucaban, G.R. 153982, July18, 2011).


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Insufficient proof

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption toapply there must be proof that it was acquired during the marriage. This is the ruling in thiscase of Elvie, married to Manny.

Elvie was one of the sureties of a loan obtained from a bank (MBTC) by a businesscorporation (CPDTI), amounting to a total of P160,000. When CPDTI defaulted in thepayment of the loan, MBTC filed a collection suit against it and its sureties including Elvie

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of MBTC ordering CPDTI and allits sureties to pay the total outstanding loan already amounting to P260,000. When this

decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued against CDTI and its co-defendants-sureties including Elvie. To implement the writ of execution, the Sheriff levied on

a property covered by TCT No. T-27967 registered in the name of Elvie married to Manny.

Elvie questioned the said levy, claiming that said property belongs to the conjugalpartnership. As such she asserts that it cannot be made to answer for her personal

obligation with the MBTC. To support her assertion, she submitted the Affidavit of Cris, theSeller of said property, attesting that Elvie and her husband Manny were the buyers of thesubject property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Manny as payment

for said property. In fact she said that the title to the land shows that it was registered inthe name of Elvie married to Manny. Was Elvie correct?

No. Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, the party

who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy wasacquired during the marriage. Thus the time when the property was acquired is material.

Unfortunately for Elvie, the affidavit she presented can hardly be considered sufficientevidence to prove her claim. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiant is placed on

the witness stand to testify on his affidavit, such affidavit must be rejected for beinghearsay. In this case, Cris was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his

affidavit.

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. A

photocopy of a document has no probative value and is inadmissible as evidence.

Similarly the certificate of title could not support Elvies assertion. The fact that the land wasregistered in the name of Elvie, married to Manny is no proof that the property wasacquired during their marriage. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two differentacts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.

Indubitably, Elvie utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the

conjugal partnership (Imani vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. 187023,November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA, 357).

* * *

All Ateneo Law School alumni are invited to the 75th year Grand Alumni Homecoming on

Oct. 21, 2011, Friday at the Isla Ballroom of the Edsa Shangri-la Hotel, Mandaluyong Citystarting at 5 p.m. with a mass at Boracay room. Host of the affair is Ateneo Law School

Class of 1987 which has prepared programs and activities for classmates, colleagues and


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Case Digest Compilation From Research

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