Blas vs. Galapon

Facts: Pursuant to the National Housing Authority (NHA) Circular No. 13, the NHA conducted in 1987 the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) census and tagging of structures as pre-qualifying requisites for determining the potential lot beneficiaries in the Peñafrancia ZIP zone in Paco, Manila. In the census, the petitioner was determined to be an absentee structure owner of the dwelling unit tagged as Structure No. 86-313,while respondent Eduardo Galapon and three others were censused to be the renters of the petitioner in the structure. The petitioner, then a 78-year old widow living in her son's dwelling unit had been renting Structure No. 86-313 out as a source of income.

NHA Circular No. 13 disqualified any absentee or uncensused structure owner from owning a lot within a ZIP zone. Alarmed that she might be disqualified to own the 50-square meter, the petitioner filed a petition for change of status from absentee structure owner to residing structure owner with the Awards and Arbitration Committee (AAC) of NHA.

The AAC recommended the approval of the petitioner's petition for change of status but the NHA denied such petition. The petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President. On October 13, 1997, the OP found the petitioner and the respondents to be the long-standing bona fide qualified applicants and awarded the disputed lot and the structure to both of them in equal shares. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents were disqualified to be awardees of Lot 12, Block 2, Peñafrancia ZIP Project.

Held: No. The respondents were the censused renters or occupants of Structure No. 86-313. Such status could not automatically be changed by their judicial ejectment at the petitioner’s instance, considering that their right to become lot beneficiaries of the ZIP was consistently recognized by the AAC, the NHA, the OP and the CA. The respondents, being qualified homelot beneficiaries of Lot 12, Block 2, enjoyed the right of pre-emption vis-à-vis Structure No. 86-313, which was a right granted to them as the censused renters of the structure to have the first option to acquire or to purchase the structure.

Petiton Denied.

NIEVES A. SAGUIGUIT vs. People

G.R. No. 144054 June 30, 2006

Petitioner was charged with eight counts of violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The instant case calls for a reexamination and modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties …. Petitioner respectfully submits that it was not the intention of the lawmaking body, … to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto a criminal offense already; there must be an

intent to commit the prohibited act, and subject check should be issued to apply on account or for value.

Issue: Whether or not the Court can delve into the policy behind or wisdom of B.P. 22.

Held: No. Under the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court cannot delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, matters of legislative wisdom being within the domain of Congress.5 Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga, 2004) 1

Facts: On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM). Four provinces voted

for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The

same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH. On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWH

Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur.

On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada.

On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law.

Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM.

Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm.

Held and Ratio:

On RA 8999 RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a RA 9054. By

creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to amend RA 6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a plebiscite.

1 Angelica Paglicawan

Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory law needs to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the functions of the DPWH to ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur.

On DO 119- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer control and supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA

G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 

FACTS:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue: Whether or not the question of who was the rightful Senate President is a political or justiciable question.

Held: The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al

“Equal Protection” – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmaster’s conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

Comelec vs. Cruz

Facts:

The then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the provision : Sec. 2. Term of Office. – The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

Issue:

Whether or not the application of Sec. 2 is a political question.

Held:

Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v Republic600 S 102

“Separation of Powers”

Facts:

Congress enacted, in 1971, Republic Act No. (RA) 6260, otherwise known as the Coconut Investment Act, creating the Coconut Investment Corporation (CIC) for the declared national policy of accelerating the development of the coconut industry through the provision of adequate medium-and long-term financing for capital investment in the industry. To finance the CIC, RA 6260 also created the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF) that was to be funded with collections from a levy on the sale of copra. A portion of the funds would be placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers with the largest membership as recognized by the Philippine Coconut Administration, "for the maintenance and operation of its principal office which shall be responsible for continuing liaison with the different sectors of the industries, the government and its own mass base."

Issue:

WON the series of acts and omissions of respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0033 culminating in the Order of 15 June 1990 are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Held:

The instant petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Sandiganbayan grievously erred and clearly abused its judicial discretion when it repeatedly and continuously denied COCOFED, et al. the opportunity to present their evidence to disprove the baseless allegations of the Ill-Gotten Wealth Cases that the sequestered assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and of former President Marcos, an error that undeniably and illegally deprived COCOFED, et al of their constitutional right to be heard.

The Court to be sure agrees with the thesis that, under present state of things, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General have no power, by themselves, to convert the sequestered shares of stock. That portion, however, about the reference to the separation of powers being gratuitous does not commend itself for concurrence. As may be noted, the reference to the separation of powers concept was made in the context that the ownership of the subject sequestered shares is the subject of a case before this Court; hence, the need of the Court’s approval for the desired conversion is effected.

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCORJAWORSKI vs. PAGCORG.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004

FACTS:The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.

On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,” which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.

Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space.

ISSUE:Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity such as SAGE.

RULING:No. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.

Bengzon v. DrilonG.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:

                On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

Issue:

                whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act

Held:

                The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power.  But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise.  The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts.  It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.  What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.

Endencia vs. David

G.R. No. L-6355-56

August 31, 1953

FACTS

Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which states that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to Solicitor General Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, “our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. The Solicitor General also reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE

Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.

HELD

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

LASCO vs. UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUNDFOR NATURAL RESOURCESEXPLORATIONG.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995 FACTS: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the UnitedNationsRevolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fundand subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent allegedthat respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomaticimmunity. ISSUE: Whether special agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity. RULING: The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of theDepartment of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE inaccordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations wherethe Philippine Government was a party. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over privaterespondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench. 

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summary

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summaryG.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: (1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?(2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces subject to judicial review?(3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate constitutional provisions on

civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP?

RULING: In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the case at bar in that it has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in any way. It’s contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague. As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General that the president’s act is a political question beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of power is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question of legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third issue, the Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of such patrols and in no way places the over-all authority in the Marines.

Petition is dismissed.

Gudani vs. Senga G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006Facts of the case:

Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) including General Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo emerged.  Upon the discretion of the President, AFP Chief of Staff Senga issued a memorandum prohibiting General Gudani and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidental approval.  However, General Gudani and Col. Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance with Senator Biazon. 

Issue:

Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry. 

Ruling:

The President has a constitutional authority to prohibit members of the AFP from attending a Senate hearing by virtue of her power as a commander-in-chief.  This is under her prerogative as the highest official of the AFP.  Note that it is not an invocation of her

executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power to control the actions and speech of the members of the AFP.  Non compliance of the military subordinates would violate the principle that "the civilian authority is supreme over the military authority". 

RELI GERMAN, et. al.,petitioners,vs. GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MAJOR ISABELOLARIOSA,respondents.G.R. No. 68828. March 27, 1985. FACTS: At about 5:00 p.m. of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of businessmen, studentsand office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila,to hear mass at the St. JudeChapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists 1 and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent Major IsabeloLariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, fromproceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañangsecurity area. When petitioners' protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the churchproved unavailing, they decided to leave. However, because of the alleged warning given themby respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in thefuture would likewise be prevented, petitioners now invokes their right of freedom of religion.Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass atSt. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Courtthat they have never restricted any person or persons from entering and worshipping at saidchurch They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the veryresidence and offices of the President of the Republic.ISSUE:Whether or not the right to freedom of religion of the petitioners was violated.

HELD:While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right toreligious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must bedone in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in theexercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties . . . observe honesty and good faith."Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, stillrespondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violativeof the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed throughthe Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J P. Laurel Streetand the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affectedthoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected tocourteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readilyperceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of thePresident and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign gueststransacting business with Malacañang. In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained

of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by whichthey had attempted to translate the same into action.

Austria vs NLRC (August 16, 1999)

Facts:

Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time.

Thereafter, petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and asked for a convention to settle the dispute between petitioner and Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner left the office. However, while on his way out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough)” which prompted him to go back and overturn Pastor Buhat’s table, scatter books in the office, bang Buhat’s attaché case and throw the phone.

Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.

(Nakakainis ‘tong part na ‘to dahil appeal nang appeal! Hahaha)

1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of petitioner

2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent

3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter

4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent (grabe ang kulit!)

Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.

Issues:

WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state;Held: NO.

Ratio Decidendi:

The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good-neighbors." The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions.

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affaits are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.