Case Digest

LEGAL ETHICS 2nd Sem 2005-2006

ANGEROUS DRUG ACT

42. FRANCISCO IMSON y ADRIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 19300313 July 2011CARPIO, J .:Facts:PO1 Gerry Pajares, PO1 Noli Pineda, the confidential informant, and other policemen arrived at around 10:30 p.m. to theplace where a buy bust operation was about to be conducted by reason of a report that accused Francisco Imson was sellingshabu. Said buy bust operation was not undertaken because they saw Imson talking with Dayao. Thereafter, they sawImson giving Rolando S. Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Pajares approached thetwo men and introduced himself. He immediately apprehended Imson while Pineda ran after Dayao who tried to escape.The policemen confiscated two plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu.Imson and Dayao were brought to the Police Station where they executed their joint sworn statements and where the twoplastic sachets were marked with “RDS” and “FIA” ,the initials of the two. The two plastic sachets were examined and bothtested positive for shabu.Two informations for illegal possession of dangerous drugs against Imson and Dayao were filed.In its Decision, the RTC found Imson and Dayao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.When appealed, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC.Imson and Dayao filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied said motion. Hence, the present petition.Issue:Whether or not the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible in evidence because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired.Resolution:The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the two plastic sachets containing shabu donot render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. Likewise, the failure of the policemen to mark the two plasticsachets containing shabu at the place of arrest does not render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court held that the failure of the policemen to immediately mark the confiscated items does notautomatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The Court held:Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody.The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accused‘s arrest illegal or theitems seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and theevidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. ―Immediate Confiscation‖ has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen,testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient inshowing

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, GanaLopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C


compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking atthe nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.The presumption is that the policemen performed their official duties regularly. In order to overcome this presumption,Imson must show that there was bad faith or improper motive on the part of the policemen, or that the confiscated itemswere tampered. Imson failed to do so.

50. People vs Narvasa

GR. No. 128618 November 16, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

FELICISIMO NARVASA, JIMMY ORANIA and MATEO NARVASA, accused, FELICISIMO

NARVASA and JIMMY ORANIA, appellants.

FACTS: Three informations were filed against accused-appellants, two for aggravated illegal

possession of firearm and one for homicide.

The trial court in convicting the accused guilty of aggravated illegal possession of firearm

accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial could not

overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered firearms to

shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo Camba.

Further supporting said testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on

appellants and the recovery of various cartridges and shells matching the firearms

purportedly used in the crime. Though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as

evidence, the trial court, citing People v. Ferrera, ruled that appellants may still be convicted

of illegal possession of firearms.

Appellants question the credibility of Witnesses Laderas and Nagal because of an alleged

inconsistency in their testimonies. Laderas testified that there was an exchange of fire

between appellants and PO2 Simeon Navora, while Nagal declared that only the appellants

fired. Appellants point out that “conflicting testimonies on a material and relevant point casts

doubt [on] the truthfulness or veracity” 17 of such testimonies.

ISSUE1: W/N the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies affected their credibility

HELD1: Appellants’ contention is untenable. The circumstances of the instant case explain

the seeming inconsistency in the testimonies of the two witnesses. At the time, they were

under fire and in fear of losing their lives. Moreover, they did not take cover in the same place

that Navora did.

Nonetheless, their uncertainty on whether Navora had fired back is immaterial to the crime

charged and too insignificant to impair their credibility. In any event, the Court has ruled that a


https://allthingslegalandfun.wordpress.com/2014/08/12/people-vs-narvasa/


witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minute

details.

ISSUE2: W/N the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction

HELD2: Appellants cite People v. Lualhati, wherein this Court ruled “that in crimes involving

illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,

viz: the existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or

possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the

same.” Appellants contend that the existence of the firearms was not sufficiently proven

because the prosecution had not presented the firearms as evidence. It is necessary, they

argue, that said “firearms allegedly possessed by the accused-appellants and allegedly used

in the killing of Policeman Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms

constitute the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are sentenced.” 20

Appellants’ argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that

the existence of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be

presented as evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela, the Court held that the existence of

the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said

firearm. In the said case, Appellant Orehuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession of

a firearm despite the fact that the firearm used was not presented as evidence. The existence

of the weapon was deemed amply established by the testimony of an eyewitness that

Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it to kill the victim.

98. ARTURO MEJORADA VS.SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Mejorada was a right of way agent employed in the Office of the Highway District Engineer in Pasig, Metro Manila. His work was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions/improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages that they may incur. Mejorada required the claimants de Leon et.al to sign blank copies of Sworn Statement on the Correct Assessment and Fair Market Value of Real Properties as well as an Agreement to demolish, remove and reconstruct improvements. Claimants did sign without bothering what those documents were about as they were more concerned with just compensation supposedly due them. In the signed documents, Mejorada made it appear that the value of the properties of the claimants were much higher than actual value claimed by the de leon et. Al. What was reflected in the Agreement was the value of improvements that was P2,000 lower than the value declared by the owner/claimants. Also, declarations of property were attached to the documents, which declarations were actually falsified as they were registered under different names other than the claimants. Claimants were later accompanied by Mejorada to receive the proceeds of their checks. But Mejorada took part of the proceeds. Claimants could not complain as they were afraid of Mejorada’s armed companions. Claimants de leon et.al later filed complaints against Mejorada (assisted by their



counsel) with the Provincial Fiscal Office in Pasig. Consequently, 8 informations were filed against Mejorada.

Mejorada’s contentions 1. He cannot be guilty of violating S3 of RA 3019 as he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits as mentioned in the provision. 2. His act was not done while in the performance of his official functions 3. Claimants were not injured party 4. The most that can be charged against him is Robbery not liable under RA 3019

ISSUES: WON Mejorada’s act constitute the offense in S3 of RA 3019 (i.e. causing undue injury to any party…giving party unwarranted benefits... thru manifest partiality, evident bad faith / gross inexcusable negligence….) and have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution?

Other Issues (Crimpro related):

WON offense proved during trial should prevail over offense charged in the info WON Sandiganbayan is the competent court with jurisdiction over the case

RULING: YES. Mejorada is guilty under RA3019 for violating S3 of the law. He is a public officer who took advantage of his position by making claimants sign agreements which contained falsified declarations of the value of improvements and lots. There was manifest evident bad faith on his part when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. The claimants are not the only injured party but also the State because the latter was disadvantaged with Mejorada’s act of inflating said values of property. The law is not limited to those public officials who committed the prohibited act while discharging their duty of granting licenses, permits but also those who committed prohibited acts while being public officers. Offense charged in the info should prevail over offense proved during trial. Since this is the case, the appropriate penalty that should be imposed upon Mejorada is 56 years and 8 days and this did not violate the 3 Fold rule of the RPC. Art. 70 speaks of service of sentence, duration of penalty and penalty to be inflicted and not on the imposition of penalty. It merely provides that the prisoner cannot serve more than 3x the most severe of the penalties of 40 years. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Mejorada’s case as he is deemed to have committed the prohibited act while being a public officer.

90. Merencillo v People (521 scra 31)

Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct bribery. Petitioner demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar P20,000.00 in exchange for the approval of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR). Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner and delaying the release of CAR, private complainant seek the help of the authorities. As a result, petitioner was caught in the entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.



Petitioner appealed the decision to the Sandiganbayan which was denied affirming the RTC decision. Hence, this petition for review of certiorari, contending that he was twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.

Holding: No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: Sec.3 In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following acts shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: XXX XXX One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously of successively for violation of the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or os necessarily included in the other, as provided in Sec.7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in an offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses although the two charges against the petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offense.



JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME82. PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINANG.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012Perez, J:FACTS:On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafaand violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaintalleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of NineMillion Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored uponpresentment for payment.Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan inthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an“Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liabilityhas been extinguished by reason of prescription.In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs theprescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326(An Act ToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts)where theright to file an action to a “proper court” and not to merely to prosecution office forB.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputedviolation occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case wasformally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action alreadyprescribes. RTC granted the motion.On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of cityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to the prescription.ISSUE:Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a “judicial proceeding” thatcan interrupt prescription of crime under B.P. 22?HELD: YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinctionbetween cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by speciallaws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that theinstitution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutoragainst accused interrupts the period of prescription.Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filingof complaint on September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore the action against therespondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, March 10, 2000Crim Pro - Rule 110



Facts:Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks

with the aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.

On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".

On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos, then, raised the matter before the DOJ.

On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City.

On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The motion was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review but it was referred to the CA "for appropriate action".

On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.

Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, “[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:… after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years.” Under Section 2 of the same Act, “[t]he prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.



Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial question”. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

122. DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYANFACTS:Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), inconnection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the DoromalInternational Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth ofelectronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department ofEducation, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (orNMYC). An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and apreliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) isclearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminalcases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the DoromalInternational Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participatedin the biddings



conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower &Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since therehad been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation isunnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.(2) Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the samesubject matter.(3) Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminaryinvestigation.HELD: Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the SupremeCourt.RATIO:(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the applicationto bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act isabsolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remaineda family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, themembers of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly orindirectly ... participate in any business.(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over hisopposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shallalso be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case.Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there wereno preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention ofthe court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that thepreliminary investigation may be conducted. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shallimmediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminaryinvestigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.

130. G.R. Nos. 147706-07 | February 16, 2005 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and EFREN L. ALAS, respondents | J. Corona

FACTS: Two separate informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.



On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.

- Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private persons are charged with them in the commission of the offenses.

- The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by a special law.

- said entity is formed was primarily for business

The People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or controlled corporation as the term was defined under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987.RA 8249 (act defining jurisdiction of sandiganbayan) did not make a distinction as to the manner of creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers to fall under its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

HELD: Petition granted. More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, “to encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public, especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside xxx” and to facilitate postal service by “receiving collections and making payments, including postal money orders.

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish

Constitution: The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

58. People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)Facts:Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, wasapproached by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brandnew Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip



to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, sayingthat the van was unavailable. Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio,who had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed tolease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabeand Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 aday inclusive of the P500.00 driver’s fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upontheir return from Bicol. Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacio’sTamaraw FX at his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same backto Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe.Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from FerdinandIgnacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It waslater found out that the two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbedand dumped Elis him along the highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacanwhen Elis refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of specialcomplex crime of carnapping with homicide. Hence, this appeal.Issue:Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?Decision:Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing andPenalizing Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain,of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by meansof violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. That there is anactual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that thetaking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all theelements of carnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot bedenied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of the Tamaraw FX wasinitially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purposeof taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession intoan unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to theMoncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, thetwo separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle.Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellantconstituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of thevehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the personunlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actualpossession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as thereis apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's willthrough violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of aproperty belonging to another is imputable to the offender.

BASA, Michelle Yvonne L. Case Digests



and entered another judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of carnapping underRepublic Act No. 6539.(2) PEOPLE vs. GARCIAFacts:On December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, wasapproached by Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brandnew Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the vanwas unavailable. Instead, Cortez got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased abrand new Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days. Fourdays passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about the vehiclehe had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao,Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis’ wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and asked where her husband was.The Tamaraw FX, as well as Garcia and Bernabe were seen in Nueva Ecija. When they failed toproduce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the MoncadaPolice Station for investigation.Issue:Whether the elements of the crime of Carnapping as defined in R.A. 6539 are present to warrantthe conviction of the accused.Held:The Court held that all the elements of the crime of carnapping are present in this case. Itexpounded that Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and PenalizingCarnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehiclebelonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidationof persons, or by using force upon things." More specifically, the elements of the crime are asfollows: 1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gainfrom the taking of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offenderhimself; and 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the takingwas committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force uponthings. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for thepurpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into anunlawful one. The Court was convinced that while there may be no direct evidence of thecommission of the crime, the foregoing constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrantGarcia’s and Bernabe’s conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustaina conviction were met, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from whichthe inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is suchas to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances indeed form anunbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia werethe perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and circumstances consistent with guiltand inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, maysurpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. The Court affirmed the decision of thetrial court and modified the award for damages.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)178. People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)



Facts: Respondent herein, Arturo F. Pacificador was then the Chairman of theBoard of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NSSC) , a GOCC andtherefore making respondent a public officer.On Oct. 27, 1988 Pacificador and a certain Jose Marcelo were chargedbefore the Sandiganbayan for violation of R.A. NO. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleges that on or aboutDec. 6, 1975 to Jan. 6, 1976 Pacificador together with Mr. Marcelo who was thenchairman of a private corporation Philippine Smelters Corporation , conspired tocause the transfer and conveyance of parcels of land owned by the NSSClocated in Camarines Norte to the private corporation Philippine SmeltersCorporation by virtue of a contract of sale. That in relation to that sale theGovernment was in a serious disadvantage for the contract price of such landwas only P 85, 144.50 compared to the fairmarket value of P862,150.The Deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of said provinceon May Dec. 29, 1975Pacificador main defense was that the crime charged had beenextinguished by prescription.Petitioner argument on the other hand was that the crime was notextinguished first on the ground that R.A. 3019 provides for its own prescriptionof 15 years. 2ndon the ground that the case should have been deemeddiscovered only on May 13, 1987, when a complaint was filed with the PCGG,hence the filing to the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988 was well within theprescriptive period.Lastly, it is the petitioners contention that respondenteffectively prevented the discovery of the offense in such way the ordinaryprinciples of prescription do not apply in this case.Issue:Whether or not the crime has been extinguished by prescription?

Decision:Yes. The SC answered herein petitioners argument in the negative. Firstthe Sc held that Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescriptionof offenses defined and penalized by special laws. Wherein it provides that“Prescription should begin from the day of the commission of the violation of thelaw, and if the same be not known at the time from the discovery thereof andinstitution of judicial proceedings. In other words if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was discovered, and the running of the prescriptive period is tolled by the institution of judicial proceeding.In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of 1975 to Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019 inwhich crimes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this casebecause it seems to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P.195 which was approved on March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only10 years, wherefore it could not be applied on the ground that such amendmentis not favourable to the accused. The SC also held that while petitioners herein allegation of having no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that the registration of deeds in the public real registry is anotice thereof to the whole world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Hence, even If the period



of prescription is reckoned from Feb.18, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case wasfiled with the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.

138. AÑONUEVO, JR.V. COURT OF APPEALS411 SCRA 621FACTS:Pending the resolution of the administrative disciplinary case against Anonuevo, Jr., et. al.,the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for Indirect Bribery against them before theMTC based on the same set of charges. The Office of the City Prosecutor conducted areinvestigation of the case and recommended the withdrawal of the Information for insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause.ISSUE:Does the dismissal of the criminal case for warrants the dismissal of the administrativedisciplinary case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence?HELD:NO. The quantum of evidence required in the latter is only substantial evidence, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required in criminal cases. Thus,considering thedifference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and thesanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings andconclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

146.PNB v. Gancayco, 15 SCRA 91 (1965); FACTS:-Ernesto Jimenez was the former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration (ACCA).-He was investigated for unexplained wealth.-The special prosecutors of DOJ Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor required Philippine National Bank to produceat a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Jimenez.-PNB declined to reveal its records invoking RA 1405.-On the other hand, the special prosecutors demanded anew that Eduardo Romualdez, as bank president, producethe records or he would be prosecuted for contempt citing the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (3019).- Because of the threat of prosecution, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment-. After trial, during which Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, author of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act testified,the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez. The court said that, by enacting section 8 of, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without suchprovision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of thosecharged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.

-PNB appealed the decision.ISSUE:-Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclosed the records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.HELD:- While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential ... and [therefore] may not beexamined, inquired or looked into," except in those cases enumerated



therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs inmandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-GraftLaw is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule againstthe disclosure of bank deposits.- With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it isenough to point out that while section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential,"it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) Incases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of publicofficials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealthare similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot beexcepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policyas to the other. This policy express the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters uponits discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.


Case Digest

Documents

Transcript of Case Digest