Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill (1933)Court of Appeals of Alabama

Facts: Alleged assault on Hill’s wife by Sapp, employee of Western Union. Sapp was charged with repairing clock at plaintiff’s business. Wife called at 8:13 that phone needed repair. Arrived at Western Union around 8:30. Sapp had a few drinks previously. When wife asked for him to fix clock, Sapp allegedly made suggestive remarks and reached for wife.Procedural: Question of whether assault had happened sent to jury by lower court.Issue: Whether the issue should have been taken to jury.Holding: Reversed. Sapp had not acted within the scope of his employment.Rationale: Defendant’s defense that Sapp could not have succeeded in touching wife not relevant because the tort of battery is not required to succeed to be charged. As long as the wife was close enough to fear contact, battery is possible.

Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newman (1970)Court of Civil Appeals of Texas

Facts: Newman is retired, has Parkinson’s, arthritis, heart trouble, among other issues. Newman had been arrested for alcohol related offenses previously. Newman’s nephew paid for care, did not inform Newman. Was not advised that he would be kept against his will. He was prevented Procedural: Lower court found in favor of Newman.Issue: Was Newman falsely imprisoned?Holding: Affirmed. Reward reduced.Rationale: False imprisonment is the direct restraint of one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification.

Parvi v. City of Kingston (1977).Court of Appeals of New York

Facts: Police found two brothers arguing in alley. Parvi was attempting to calm them. All three intoxicated. Plaintiff either went willingly or was taken to golf course outside city limits. Parvi wandered into throughway and was struck by car. Defendant had no recollection of confinement.Procedural: Trial court dismissed case, due to Parvi’s lack of memory, appellate court affirmed.Issue: Did lower courts err in dismissing case?Holding: Reversed

Rationale: Broughton v. State of New York holds that false imprisonment only holds if victim is aware of the confinement or harmed by it. Parvi may have known of his imprisonment at the time but later lacked recollection. It may have been that Parvi lacked recollection because of alcohol or his injuries. Dissent: Plaintiff failed to show that he was conscious of his confinement or that he failed to consent to it. Parvi admitted lacking recollection and only knew what he did based on hearsay.

Hardy v. LaBelle’s Distributing Co. (1953).Supreme Court of Montana

Facts: Hardy had been hired by LaBelle as a temporary worker. Another employee reported Hardy for suspected theft. Hardy was brought to manager’s office, where managers and a police officer were present. A lie detector test supported Hardy’s statement of innocence.Procedural: Ruled in favor of defendants by lower court.Issue: Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and whether the lower court erred in instructions.Holding: AffirmedRationale: Hardy admitted wanting to stay in office after testing and clarify situation. Did not asked to leave nor was compelled to stay.

Enright v. Groves (1977).Colorado Court of Appeals

Facts: Undercover officer saw dog running free, in violation of lease law. Dog returned to Enright home and spoke to minor child. Groves approached Enright’s car and asked for her license twice, Enright declined. Enright taken to police station and charged with violating lease law. Procedural: Lower court ruled for plaintiff and awarded damages.Issue: Was Enright falsely arrested?Holding: AffirmedRationale: False arrest arises when one is taken into custody by a person who claims but does not have proper legal authority. Claim will not stand if officer has valid warrant. Evidence clear that Groves arrested Enright for refusing to produce driver’s license. Groves did not explain why he wanted her license and no statute supported Groves’ request. Groves therefore was not entitled to use force or arrest.

Whittaker v. Sandford (1912)Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Facts: Whittaker, her husband and defendant all members of a religious sect in Jaffa. Plaintiff attempted to leave sect and return to America. Defendant offered passage back to America on his yacht, informing her that she was not being detained onboard. Once at port, defendant refused to give a boat so defendant could leave. Whittaker remained onboard for a month.Procedural: Lower court found for plaintiff. Defendant appealed an order denying new trial.Issue: Was plaintiff falsely imprisoned?Holding: AffirmedRationale: Lower court instructed that restraint must have been physical. Refusal to provide a board counts as physical restraint.

State Rubbish Collection Association v. Siliznoff (1952)Supreme Court of California.

Facts: Defendant collected trash from section. Ordered to pay money to section holder. Defendant signed notes.Procedural: Plaintiff sued Defendant to collect on notes. Defendant sought cancellation because of duress and lack of consideration. Punitive damages sought against plaintiff for distress. Lower court found for Defendant. Plaintiff argued that threats were not for immediate physical harm but future action.Issue: Plaintiff’s primary contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support judgment.Holding: AffirmedRationale: In absence of any privilege, intentionally subjecting another to mental suffering incident to serious threats, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances as to constitute a technical assault.

Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida (1958)Supreme Court of Florida

Facts: Alleged insulting language used by Defendant’s employee while plaintiff was customer.Procedural: Complaint dismissed for failure to state cause of action. Plaintiff sought damages for mental suffering, such led to health problems.Issue: Was the alleged conduct the cause of the health problems?Holding: AffirmedRationale: The defendant’s employee merely insulting the plaintiff is not enough to collect for damages. Court draws the line between “emotional distress” and “severe emotional distress.” Was the action “calculated to case ‘severe emotional distress’ to a person of ordinary sensibilities?”

Harris v. Jones (1977)Court of Appeals of Maryland

Facts: Plaintiff 8 year employee of GM. Harris suffers from speech impediment. Contention that Jones, knowing of the impediment and Harris’s sensitivity towards it, maliciously ridiculed him and caused emotional distress. Also contends that this occurred while both were employed by GM and that company knew of Jones’ conduct. Incidents occurred over 30 times, refused transfer to another department.Procedural: Plaintiff suing GM and Jones for distress. Trial court found for plaintiff, appeals court reversed.Issue: Was the lower court correct in its decision to reverse?Holding: AffirmedRationale: The severity of the emotional distress must be proven by the Plaintiff and must also be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. A link must exist between the conduct and the distress. If the plaintiff cannot prove the link, then the appeals court’s decision is correct.

Dougherty v. Stepp (1835)Supreme Court of North Carolina

Substantive Facts: Defendant entered land of plaintiff, attempted to survey and claimed it as his own. Procedural Facts: Action of Trespass quare clasum fregit (remedy sought after person trespassed on another’s land)Procedural History: Because the defendant did not mark land while surveying, the judge instructed the lower court that the actions were not trespass.Substantive Issue: Is entering another’s land, for whatever reason, even without leaving mark still trespass?Procedural Issue: Were the judge’s instructions in error?Holding: Reversed and remanded.Rationale: Amount of damages would depend on the acts done to the land but it is an elementary principle that an unauthorized entry is trespass.

Herin v. Sutherland (1925)Supreme Court of Montana

Substantive Facts: The defendant was hunting and, while standing another person’s land, discharged his weapon and injured the plaintiff’s

property.Procedural Facts: The defendant filed a demurer, which was overruled. The defendant defaulted and damages for $1 were entered against him. The defendant appealed.Substantive Issue: Were the defendant’s actions trespassing given that he was not in the plaintiff’s land?Holding: AffirmedRationale: When the defendant fired his gun and disrupted the quiet, he committed trespass. By purposefully causing the bullet to fly over the plaintiff’s land, the defendant did trespass. The court rejects the notion that a person can only object to shots fired if injuries can be claimed.

Rogers v. Board of Road Com’rs for Kent County (1947).Supreme Court of Michigan

Substantive Facts: Defendant had license to place snow fence parallel to roadway near plaintiff’s farm. Plaintiff understood fence would be removed by defendant at the end of each winter. Agents failed to remove steel anchor post and it was subsequently hidden by grass. When plaintiff’s husband attempted to mow grass, he hit the post and was thrown and killed.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff filed suit to recover, claiming husband was killed by trespass and negligence of defendant.Procedural History: Defendant filed motion to dismiss based on government immunity. Lower court granted dismissal. Plaintiff appeals.Substantive Issue: Were the actions of defendant trespass or negligent.Holding: Reversed and remanded. Sovereign immunity did not apply.Rationale: A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure which the actor has placed with (a) the consent of the owner or (b) pursuant to a privilege conferred upon the actor.

Glidden v. Szybiak (1949)Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff bitten by dog as a child, needed medical care. Father paid. Plaintiff had climbed on back of defendant’s dog, pulled its ears. Plaintiff treated but has scars that are discernable upon close view.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit to recover for harm and expenses. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was committing trespass to

chattel and therefore defendant not liableProcedural History: Trial court found for plaintiff, found she was too young to understand actions and commit such a tort.Substantive Issue: Is plaintiff guilty of trespass to chattel?Holding: AffirmedRationale: Trespass to chattel requires that the chattel is “impaired as to its condition, quality or value, possessor deprived of chattel or bodily harm is done to someone or thing owner had interest. Since dog was not harmed, plaintiff not liable.

CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. (1997).United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff operates computer communication service, allows access to content and provides resources to subscribers. Defendants sent spam to plaintiff’s subscribers, among others, using plaintiff’s servers. Plaintiffs attempted to stop spam, defendant circumvented measures. Plaintiff received complaints about spam.Procedural History: Plaintiff filed restraining order which they are attempting to extend. Contends that spam places burden on equipment. Plaintiff argued trespass to chattel. Defendant argues that servers not dispossessed. Substantive Issue: Does trespass to chattels occur when chattels are not dispossessed?Procedural Issue: Should the extension be granted.Holding: GrantedRationale: Defendant’s cited Glidden, trespass requires damage. However, since trespass can also occur with devaluation and value of servers is “wholly derived from extent to which that equipment can serve subscriber base.” Affidavit from worker at plaintiff states that burden has been placed upon servers, which would diminish value.Subscribers have also terminated accounts due to spam. Defendant’s actions harm plaintiff reputation and bottom line.

Pearson v. Dodd (1969)United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff is senator. Former employees of plaintiff entered office and made copies of documents, which were given to defendant.

Procedural Facts: Senator filed suit for conversion and invasion of privacy.Procedural History: Partial summary judgment to plaintiff on theory of conversion, rejects partial summary judgment to plaintiff on theory of invasion of privacy. Appealed.Substantive Issue: Did the defendant commit conversion by paying for copies?Procedural Issue: Are the lower court’s judgments valid.Holding: Affirmed for invasion of privacy and reversed on conversion.Rationale: The defendant’s wrongful interference with property was not conversion. Conversion requires treating plaintiff’s goods as if they were defendant’s own. No deprivation occurred. Less serious interferences fall under trespass to chattels. Where information is gathered and sold as a commodity, it is property. Question is not whether defendant had right to keep files from prying eyes but whether information taken from those files fall under property of law of property. None of the files were literary property, scientific inventions, secret plans.

Scott v. Edinburg (2003)United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit

Substantive Facts: Defendant is police officer. While eating, learning man was attempting to steal car. Car pulled out, missing defendant, who dodged. Car drove off, defendant fired several times. Car crashed.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit, claiming excessive use of force during arrest of Scott. Lower court found for EdinburgProcedural History: Lower court ruled that since Scott attempted to run down Defendant, deadly force was justified. Defendant claims that Scott was attempting to run him over and that force was also necessary to protect bystanders.Substantive Issue: Was deadly force necessary in this instance?Procedural Issue: What is the standard to argue with regards to deadly force?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: When a person threatens a police officer with a deadly weapon, deadly force is justified, (Tennessee v. Garner). A car can be a deadly weapon, (Smith v. Freland). However, a justification to shoot is not one to shoot with impunity. Threat to officer had ceased when Scott drove away. Given that Scott was attempting to flee at a high-speed, threat to bystanders may have existed.

Lubitz v. Wells (1955)Superior Court of Connecticut

Substantive Facts: Wells owner of golf clubs. Left it outside, where son picked it up. Son swung club at rock and struck plaintiff.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence against Wells.Procedural History: Plaintiff argues that father was negligent for leaving club outside where child would see it and also failed to warn son about dangers. Demurrer argued no cause of action and inability to support judgment against father.Holding: Demurrer sustained.Rationale: Golf club not intrinsically dangerous enough to argue negligence to leave outside.

Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1865)Court of Exchequer

Substantive Facts: Defendant installed water mains in street near plaintiff’s house. Main sprung a leak. Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence.Procedural History: Jury returned verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.Substantive Issue: Did the defendant’s actions constitute negligence?Holding: Verdict entered for defendantRationale: Defendants might have been liable if they omitted to do what a reasonable person would have done. Just because the defendant’s precautions were insufficient does not mean that the actions were negligent.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (1947)United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Substantive Facts: Sinking of barge owned by one party, chartered to another which was loaded with flour belonged to the United States. Carroll was owner of a tug whose employees negligently shifted the barge’s mooring lines. Barge broke free, drifted against another ship, careened and sank.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sought compensation for flour and barge owners sought compensation for barge. Procedural History: Barge owners and Carroll both found partially

liable. Barge owners’ failure to have attendant onboard was considered negligence.Substantive Issue: Which party should pay for the damages?Procedural Issue: Was the defendant liable for damages.Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: Impossible to know when a barge will break free. Attendant should have been onboard at the time.

Vaughn v. Menlove (1837)Court of Common Pleas

Substantive Facts: Defendant built hay rick near property line, near plaintiff’s cottages. Advised that rick could catch on fire. Reality ensued.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued for negligence. Defendant denied charge.Procedural History: The trial court instructed the jury that the issue was whether the fire was due to gross negligence. The jury found for Plaintiff, but Defendant appealed on the ground that the jury should have been instructed to find negligence only if it found Defendant had not acted to the best of his own judgment.Substantive Issue: Did the defendant act negligently?Procedural Issue: Were the lower court’s instructions correct?Holding: Found for defendantRationale: Rule for gross negligence too uncertain. Must have standards.

Delair v. McAdoo (1936)Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Substantive Facts: Automobile collision between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant tried to pass plaintiff, his tire blew out and he swerved into plaintiff’s car.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought an action in trespass to recover.Procedural History: Lower court found for plaintiff. New trial ordered due to excessive reward. Appealed on judgment.Substantive Issue: Was the defendant guilty of negligence.Procedural Issue: Was the lower court correct in denying the motion for a new trial?Holding: Affirmed

Rationale: Drivers are required to take precautions for car safety. Any individual should know when his tire is worn and should be replaced.

Trimarco v. Klein (1982)Court of Appeals of New York

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff suffered injuries when glass in bathtub shattered. Defendant was owner of building.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence, arguing defendant deliberately used glass that was not shatterproof.Procedural History: Trial court found for plaintiff. Appellate Division reversed.Substantive Issue: Was the failure to use shatterproof glass a sign of negligence?Holding: Reversed and remanded for new trial. Plaintiff’s argument about non-applicable statute to be excluded.Rationale: If defendant knew of better way to substitute glass and the issue was the plaintiff’s actions, then no duty falls on defendant to use shatterproof glass. When proof of an accepted practice is accompanied by evidence that the defendant conformed to practice, due care is shown. Plaintiff’s arguments about thickness of shower door and New York statute not applicable. Fact that others may have used a better or safer practice not a standard.

Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co. (1941).City Court of New York

Substantive Facts: A driver working for the Defendant’s taxi company, jumped from a running taxi when a highwayman entered the taxi and demanded to be driven away while being chased by a recent victim. The driver left the cab while it was still running and it subsequently ran up onto a sidewalk and injured the Plaintiff.Procedural History: Plaintiff brought suit for damages and negligence.Substantive Issue: Whether abandoning his car was reasonable given the circumstances.Holding: Taxi driver was not negligent.Rationale: Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise that care and caution which a reasonable and prudent person ordinarily would exercise under like conditions or circumstances. In an emergency situation, the law does not hold a person to the same standards as if he had

opportunity for deliberate action. The circumstances dictate what is or is not prudent action.

Roberts v. State of Louisiana (1981)Court of Appeals of Lousiana

Substantive Facts: Roberts fell and broke his hip after being bumped into by the blind operator of the concession stand at the United States Post Office Building. The concession operator failed to use his cane while walking from his stand to the bathroom when the accident occurred.Procedural Facts: Roberts brought suit, claiming the operator was negligent.Procedural History: The trial court ordered the suit dismissed.Substantive Issue: Was it reasonable for a blind man to walk from his place of employment to the restroom without the use of his cane?Procedural Issue: Was the lower court correct in dismissing the suit?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: The blind have a right to live in society and have allowances made for the handicap. Conduct of the blind must be reasonable in light of the handicap. The operator not using his cane was considered negligent in this situation because the operator was moving in a familiar environment.

Robinson v. Lindsay (1979)Supreme Court of Washington

Substantive Facts: The plaintiff lost the use of her thumb as a result of a snowmobile accident. The driver of the snowmobile was a thirteen-year-old boy. The owner of the snowmobile is the defendant.Procedural Facts: Suit was brought against Lindsay and the minor driver.Procedural History: The trial court instructed the jury to give the driver a child’s standard of care. The trial court ordered for a new trial.Substantive Issue: Whether to apply an adult standard of care to acts of children who engage in adult behavior.Procedural Issue: Was the lower court correct in its instructions of the standard of care?Holding: Order for new trial affirmed.Rationale: A child is held only to the exercise of such degree of care and discretion as is reasonably to be expected from children of that age. However, courts in other jurisdictions have created an exception to the special child standard to prevent injustice if the child cause injury while

engaged in dangerous activities.

Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co. (1970)Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Substantive Facts: Erma Veith, an insured of the Defendant, was involved in an automobile accident with the Plaintiff when she was suddenly seized with a mental delusion.Procedural Facts: Judgment for the plaintiffProcedural History: The case was tried on the theory that some forms of insanity are a defense to negligence. The jury found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.Substantive Issue: Was the plaintiff aware of her condition, which would make her liable for liability?Procedural Issue: Holding: AffirmedRationale: Not all types of insanity are a defense. To avoid liability under this statute, there must be an absence of forewarning to the defendant that he or she would be subject to a debilitating mental illness. This court also held that persons who suffer from sudden mental incapacity due to sudden heart attack, epileptic seizure, stroke, or fainting should not be judged under the same objective test as those who are insane.

* The general policy for holding an insane person liable for his torts is stated as follows:i. When one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should be borne by the one who occasioned it;ii. To induce those interested in the estate of the insane person to restrain and control him; and,iii. To stop false claims of insanity to avoid liability* However, not all types of insanity vitiate responsibility for a negligent tort. The effect of the mental illness or mental disorder must be such as to affect the person’s ability to understand and appreciate the duty, which rests upon him to drive his car with ordinary care. In addition, there must be an absence of notice or forewarning to the insane person that he may suddenly be unable to drive his car.

Heath v. Swift Wings Inc. (1979) Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Substantive Facts: Pilot error caused an airplane crash, killing the pilot and the passengers. The pilot spent a long time loading and reloading the small aircraft prior to take off. There was evidence that the plane was not properly balanced.

Procedural Facts: Procedural History: The jury found there was no pilot error after receiving a jury instruction containing a definition of negligence that focused on the defendant’s own experience and training.Substantive Issue: Whether professionals should be held to an industry standard of care or one that is predicated on their individual experiences and training.Holding: The proper standard of care for professional negligence is an objective standard, using minimum industry standards and not looking into the individual’s actual training or experience. The jury instruction instead created a subjective standard by focusing on the defendant’s personal training.Rationale: The jury instructions in this case imposed a subjective standard by asking the jury to decide if the pilot acted in a reasonably prudent manner given the pilot’s own particular experience and training. Instead, the pilot’s actions are to be measured by an industry standard that is applicable to all pilots. By using an objective standard the court avoids imposing a different standard of care for each case.

Hodges v. Carter (1954)Supreme Court of North Carolina

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff lost his drug store in a fire in filed four separate insurance claims. Claims were denied. Plaintiff sought relief in court. The insurance companies claimed improper service of process and the trial courts concluded that service was proper. However, that decision was appealed and reversed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff then filed this suit against the Defendants alleging they were negligent in prosecuting his actions. Procedural History: Trial court found for the defendant.Substantive Issue: Whether Plaintiff’s attorneys were negligent in failing to properly serve the Plaintiff’s complaints against his insurance companies.Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: An attorney is not liable for an error of judgement or for a mistake made on a point of law, when that point of law has not been settled by the highest court in the jurisdiction. An attorney is liable for loss to the client that results from a lack of knowledge or skill that would ordinarily be possessed by others in the profession, failure to use reasonable care and diligence and failure to exercise good faith.

Scott v. Bradford (1979)Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Substantive Facts: The plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy. Before the procedure, a consent form was signed. Plaintiff suffered from complications from surgery. A different doctor corrected the issues.Procedural Facts: Scott brought suit, arguing defendant failed to inform her of the risks.Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Whether the Plaintiff must establish that a reasonable person would not have elected treatment if informed of the risks, or if they must merely show that they would not have elected treatment.Procedural Issue: Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: To sustain a cause of action in a theory of informed consent, a patient must show that:* the physician failed to inform the patient of a material risk* the patient, if informed, would not have elected the treatment* the risks that were not disclosed resulted in injury to the patient.

Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co. (1934)Supreme Court of the United States

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was driving truck, approached railroad crossing. View was partially obscured by boxcars. Attempted to cross slowly but was hit by train.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff’s estate brought suit for wrongful death.Procedural History: Trial court directed a verdict for defendant on the grounds of contributory negligence. Circuit court of appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted by Supreme Court.Substantive Issue: Does the Court’s decision in Goodman set the precautionary standard too high?Procedural Issue: Were the plaintiff’s actions contributory to his injuries?Holding: Reverse and remand consistent with opinion. Rationale: Circuit Court relied on Goodman, which established the need to stop and look before crossing railroads. Some courts have Pennsylvania rule, unyielding duty to stop. Majority rule has duty to stop but depends on circumstances. Court rules that duty to stop is not

absolute. If view was obscured by boxcars, duty is to stop once cleared if safe. Getting out of car uncommon. Pokora had no room to do so. Goodman case explicitly limited by court to reduce confusion.Legal Principle: Even if a duty to stop exists, duty is not absolute; reasonable care but be observed. Only stop when safe to do so.

Osborne v. McMasters (1889)Supreme Court of Minnesota

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff’s intestate killed as a result of poison sold without a label by defendant’s clerk.Procedural Facts: Action for damages by plaintiff.Procedural History: Lower court found for plaintiff.Substantive Issue: Was the defendant negligent for failing to label the poison?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: When a statute imparts a specific duty for the specific protection of others and a person neglects to perform that duty, it is evidence of negligence per se. This is also true when there is a clear duty imposed by common law that requires the exercise of due care.Legal Principle: If a person neglects to perform a duty imposed by either statute or common law and that law is designed for the protection of others, then the evidence of the act or omission constitutes negligence per se.

Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp. (1971)Supreme Court of Oregon

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was patron of bar and was injured in brawl.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff filed suit to recover damages.Procedural History: Lower court found for defendantSubstantive Issue: Did the defendant’s violations of Oregon law constitute negligence as a matter of law?Holding: Reversed and remandedRationale: Oregon law prohibits bartenders from giving alcohol to the intoxicated and should escort the intoxicated off the premises. ) was to prevent violence. Since plaintiff was part of group meant to be protected by statutes, failure to do so is negligence.

Perry v. S.N. and S.N. (1998)Texas Supreme Court

Substantive Facts: Plaintiffs’ children abused by caregivers.Procedural Facts: Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants, claiming defendants had knowledge of previous abuse and failed to disclose it, in violation of the Family Code.Procedural History: Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action.Substantive Issue: Whether the defendants’ actions were a breach of duty.Procedural Issue: Whether plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for negligence per se.Holding: There cannot be negligence per se without an underlying common law duty.Rationale: To sustain a cause of action for negligence per se, the defendant must owe the plaintiff a pre-existing duty of care in common law of which the violation of legislation is evidence of the negligence. In this case, the duty extends solely from the Family Code and there is no preexisting duty at common law between these defendants and the plaintiffs. To hold a person liable for a duty that is only imposed by legislation would create a new type of tort liability.

Martin v. Herzog (1920) Court of Appeals of New York

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff and husband struck by car while driving. No evidence that defendant was moving at excessive speed or of any defect in equipment. Plaintiff was driving without lights.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff filed suit to recover damages for injuries resulting in death.Procedural History: Trial court found defendant liable, Appellate Court reversed. Issue of statute was left to jury’s discretion at Appellate level.Substantive Issue: Was the defendant negligent?Procedural Issue: Does the jury have the ability to lower a party’s duty?Holding: Appellate court affirmed.Rationale: Unexcused omission of the statute is negligent itself. Jury does not have ability to lower a party’s duty.Legal Principle: Jurors have no dispensing power by which they may relax the duty that one party owes under the statute to another.

Zeni v. Anderson (1976)Supreme Court of Michigan

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff hit by defendant’s car on snowy day. Plaintiff was not using sidewalk due to snow. Statute required pedestrians to use sidewalkProcedural Facts: Suit brought for damagesProcedural History: Jury verdict for plaintiff. Court of Appeals reversed.Substantive Issue: Was the defendant’s failure to use the sidewalk contributory negligence? Holding: Court of Appeals reversed.Rationale: A rebuttable presumption of negligence exists when a party fails to follow statutory language. Presumption rebutted by the fact that it would have been safer to use cleared snow road do to possible risk of falling.

Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. (1911)Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff, slipped and fell on a banana peel left on the Defendant’s train platform. Peel was black and looked as if it had been trampled on.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Was the defendant negligent?Holding: YesRationale: Because the appearance of the banana peel suggested that it had been on the ground for some time, it could be inferred that the peel had been seen and could have been removed by one of the employees of the railway.

Joye v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (1968)United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell on a banana peel in the Defendant’s store. The banana peel was brown and sticky with bits of dirt and sand on it. The floor around the peel was also dirty.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.

Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Whether the Defendant had sufficient notice of the hazard to be found negligent.Holding: Evidence inconclusive.

Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001)Supreme Court of California

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff slipped in puddle of milk and suffered damages.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Was the store negligent in keeping store clean and safe?Holding: YesRationale: Defendant has duty to keep store clean and must use reasonable care. Plaintiff only has burden to show that defendant had notice of issue and had time to correct it.

Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co. (1972)Supreme Court of Colorado

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff slipped and fell.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suitProcedural History: Substantive Issue: Whether the Plaintiff must show that the store had notice of a dangerous condition.Holding: NoRationale: Notice does not need to be shown if the business creates the issue.

H.E. Butt Groc. Co. v. Resendez (1999)Supreme Court of Texas

Substantive Facts: Procedural Facts: Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Procedural Issue:

Holding: Rationale:

Byrne v. Boadle (1863)Court of the Exchequer

Substantive Facts: Procedural Facts: Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Procedural Issue: Holding: Rationale:

McDougald v. Perry (1998)Supreme Court of Florida

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff was injured when the spare tire flew off of the Defendant’s trailer and hit the Plaintiff’s windshield.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: At trial, the jury was instructed on Res Ipsa Loquitur, but on appeal the court found error in this instruction and held that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the doctrine.Substantive Issue: Whether the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies to the accident.Holding: Trial court ruling affirmed.Rationale: The mere fact that the accident occurred does not always warrant the application of the doctrine. But in rare instances the fact that the accident occurred, along with a showing of an immediate precipitating cause, permits the inference of negligence. In this case, the spare tire would not have come loose had the Defendant exercised reasonable care when inspecting his vehicleLegal Principle: Res Ipsa Loquitur applies to occurrences where the occurence itself is evidence upon which to base an inference of negligence.

Larson v. St. Francis Hotel (1948) District Court of Appeals of California

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was injured when an armchair thrown from a window of the St. Francis Hotel struck her.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages, arguing Res IpsaProcedural History: Trial court found that Res Ipsa could not be used.Substantive Issue: Whether Res Ipsa was applicable under the circumstances.Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: For the doctrine to apply, California law requires that: (1) there was an accident; (2) the object that caused the accident was under the exclusive control and management of the defendant and (3) had the defendant been using ordinary care, in the course of ordinary events, the accident would not have happened.* The doctrine can have no application when there is evidence of divided responsibility and the accident can have several causes, some of which the Defendant is not responsible for.Legal Principle: Res Ipsa Loquitur does not apply unless the object that caused the accident is under the exclusive control of the defendant and under ordinary circumstances using ordinary care, the accident would not have happened.

Ybarra v. Spangard (1944)Supreme Court of Florida

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was diagnosed with appendicitis and was scheduled for surgery. After surgery, Plaintiff complained of neck and back pain. His condition worsened, eventually resulting in paralysis.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Superior Court of Los Angeles entered judgments of nonsuitSubstantive Issue: Was Res Ipsa appropriate in this case?Holding: Yes; Reversed.Rationale: “where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.”Legal Principle: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies with equal force in cases wherein medical and nursing staffs take the place of machinery and may, through carelessness or lack of skill, inflict, or permit the infliction of, injury upon a patient who is thereafter in no position to say how he received his injuries.

Sullivan v. Crabtree (1953)Court of Appeals of Tennessee

Substantive Facts: The passenger in a truck was killed when the truck swerved and went off the road and down a steep embankment. The driver of the truck was unable to determine the exact cause of the accident.Procedural Facts: Family of deceased brought suit.Procedural History: Substantive Issue: Was the defendant negligent?Procedural Issue: Is Res Ipsa applicable in this case?Holding: Res Ipsa does apply. Negligence up to the jury.Rationale: The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur does not generally apply to motor vehicle accidents, but in cases such as this, where the cause of the accident is within the driver’s control and the accident is not one that would normally occur without negligence, the doctrine may be applied.

Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans R. Co. (1962)Supreme Court of Louisiana

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff husband killed in collision between automobile and railroad. Railroad track ran parallel to warehouse, was obscured by it. Neither conductor nor driver could see the other. Crewman later saw car, engineer applied breaks. Car struck. Speed of car unknown. Train travelling above speed limit.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence, arguing driver would “conceivably” have had time to take measures.Procedural History: Lower court found for plaintiff.Substantive Issue: Whether the excessive speed of the train was a cause in fact of the fatal collision.Holding: Reversed with costs to plaintiff.Rationale: Speed was a substantial factor if the collision would not have occurred otherwise. Testimony that even at 25 mph speed limit, train would not have been able to stop in time. Plaintiff does not make any other contention or support claim. Evidence deficient on the count. Plaintiff has failed to meet burden of proof.Legal Principle: Negligence is not actionable unless it is a cause in fact of the harm for which recovery is sought. Negligence is a cause in fact of the harm to another if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm.

Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. (1885)Court of Appeals of Louisiana

Substantive Facts: Defendant train was running late, passengers told to hurry up. Plaintiff emerged from room and hurried down unlight stairs. Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sought damages for injuries.Procedural History: Lower court gave damages to plaintiff.Substantive Issue: Were the defendant’s actions the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.Holding: AffirmedRationale: Defendant could have slipped anyway. Defendant’s failure to light stairs exacerbated the possibility of slipping.Legal Principle: Where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiples the chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it may have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury.

Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc. (1998)Supreme Court of Minnesota

Substantive Facts: Defendant was hunting deer while plaintiff’s wife was painting inside of ranch house. Defendant stumbled and fired, the bullet hit wife, killing her.Procedural Facts: Gentry brought suit, claiming negligent handing of weapon and handling of stairs.Procedural History: Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. Substantive Issue: Procedural Issue: Did the district court err in granting summary judgment?Holding: AffirmedRationale: To prove cause, there must be both causation in fact and proximate cause.

Kramer Service Inc. v. Wilkins (1939)Supreme Court of Mississippi

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff received cut on forehead at defendant hotel. Glass from broken transom, which had been in disrepair from some time. Cut did not heal and became cancerous.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Substantive Issue: Was the cut received the proximate cause of the cancer?Procedural Issue: Was the defendant negligent in repairing transom?Holding: Affirmed for liability. Reversed and remanded on damages.Rationale: Expert testimony inconclusive, cut may have provided opening for cancer. Exact cause of cancer unknown.

Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (1983)Supreme Court of Washington

Substantive Facts: Procedural Facts: Procedural History: Summary judgment granted to defendant. Plaintiff appeals.Substantive Issue: Whether an estate can maintain an action for professional negligence as a result of failure to timely diagnose lung cancer; where the easte can show probable Holding: Reverse and reinstate the cause of action.Rationale: Both counsel advised that doctor negligently failed to diagnose cancer and proximately caused a 14 percent reduction in survival chances. Look at Hamil v. Bashline 1978. Doctor failed in duty to protect against harm from another source. Fact finder must look at what did occur but what might have occurred. Therefore, limited degree of certainty. Defendant did reduce chances but reduction does not necessity total recovery. Damages should be based on premature death

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1995)United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiffs suffered limb reduction birth defects. Mothers ingested drugs manufactured by the Defendant while they were pregnant. Drug approved by FDA.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Plaintiff expert testimony was not admitted in district court. Affirmed at Court of Appeals, Supreme Court reversed and remanded due to Federal Rules of Evidence.Substantive Issue: What test should be used to admit scientific evidence?Procedural Issue: Was the defendant’s evidence improperly excluded at district court.Holding: Witness testimony not applicable.Rationale: Courts used Frye test to see if testimony comports to scientific evidence. Now must determine whether testimony reflects scientific knowledge, the scientific method and is relevant.

If expert testimony is shown to be the result of research conducted for the purpose of litigation, the expert must show precisely how they reached their conclusions and point to an objective source to show they followed the scientific method as it is practiced by at least a recognized minority in their field. Because the Plaintiffs’ experts cannot do this, the testimony is not admissible. The Plaintiffs’ experts did not conduct their research independent of the litigation and the theories have not been published in scientific journals or reviewed by peers, thought there has been ample time to do so because the theories and litigation has been around for a decade.

Hill v. Edmonds (1966)Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Divison

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff injured when car he was in struck a tractor with no lights on. Driver of the car saw the tractor.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damagesProcedural History: Complaint against driver dismissed.Substantive Issue: If both parties were negligent, who is liable?Holding: Complaint against driver reinstated. New trialRationale: The accident would not have happened had the tractor’s owner not left the tractor in the road without its lights on. Because the harm could not have resulted without the negligence of both the driver of the car and the tractor’s owner, they both may be responsible for the injury.Legal Principle: When two separate acts of negligence produce a single harm, each tortfeasor is wholly responsible for the harm even though his act alone may not have caused it.

Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P & S. St. M. Ry. Co. (1920)Supreme Court of Minnesota

Substantive Facts: Forest fire in bog caused by defendant. Merged with another fire, not caused by defendant. Combined fire destroyed plaintiff property.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damagesProcedural History: Verdict for the plaintiff. Appealed on the grounds of improper instruction.Substantive Issue: Did the court err in providing jury instructions?Holding: Dismissed. Judgment affirmed.Rationale: If two or more causes concur to bring about an event, then the cause-in-fact of an injury is established by the “substantial factor” test. The court applied the “substantial factor” test imported from the rule in the Cook case, 98 Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561, 40 L.R.A. 457, 68 Am.

St. Rep. 830, which exempted Defendant from liability since there were other fires sweeping east towards Plaintiff’s property, and any one of those fires could have been the actual cause of Plaintiff’s loss. The narrow rule in this case states that if a fire combines with another of no responsible origin, and after the union of the two fires, they destroy the property, and either fire independently of the other would have destroyed it, then, irrespective of whether the first fire was or was not a material factor in the destruction of the property, there is no liability.

Summers v. Tice Supreme Court of California

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff and Defendants went on a hunting trip. Plaintiff provided each Defendant with directions on how to safely fire their weapons. While attempting to shoot their target, both Defendants fired in Plaintiff’s direction. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his right eye and face.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damagesProcedural History: Trial court found plaintiff. Appeals court affirmed.Substantive Issue: Can both men be liable for the actions of one of them?Procedural Issue: Did the trial court err in affirming judgment?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: The plaintiff should not be deprived of his recovery from negligent defendants just because he cannot know which defendant actually shot him. Because both of the defendants were negligent and both were wrongdoers, then it is their burden to absolve themselves if they can.Legal Principle: When there is negligence by multiple parties, and one party can only have caused the plaintiff’s injury, then it is up to the negligent parties to absolve themselves if they can.

Sindell v. Abbot LaboratoriesSupreme Court of California

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff’s mother took estrogen while pregnant. The plaintiff developed cancer as an adult. Unknown which of defendants produced the specific drug taken.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damagesProcedural History: Substantive Issue: In cases where the plaintiff cannot determine which of the defendants was negligent, who should be liable?Holding: Rationale: Strong policy reasons for fashioning liability to the

Defendants. First, the Plaintiff was innocent of any wrongdoing and has no way of knowing which of the drug manufactures caused her injury. Second, the manufacturers of such drugs should be culpable for producing a drug that has harmful effects to future generations. Third, the manufactures are in a better position to bear the cost of such harm and they are in the best position to discover and guard against future harm.

1. All defendants named in the suit are potential tortfeasors (that is, they did produce the harmful product at issue at some point in time)

2. The product involved is fungible3. The plaintiff cannot identify which defendant produced the fungible

product which harmed her in particular, through no fault of her own

4. A substantial share of the manufacturers who produced the product during the relevant time period are named as defendants in the action

If these requirements are met, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the plaintiff; if she can prove actual damages, then a court may order each defendant to pay a percentage of such damages equal to its share of the market for the product at the time the product was used. A manufacturer may rebut the presumption and reduce its market share damages to zero by showing that its product could not have possibly injured the plaintiff (for example, by demonstrating that it did not manufacture the product during the time period relevant for that particular plaintiff).

Ryan v. New York Central R.RCourt of Appeals of New York

Substantive Facts: New York Central R.R.’s woodshed was set on fire either by carelessness or by a defect in one of its engines. Plaintiff’s house was 130 feet from the shed. It was consumed in the fire despite diligent efforts to save it.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Defendant suit for nonsuit granted. Plaintiff appeals.Substantive Issue: Is defendant liable for damages from a fire started in defendant’s building.Procedural Issue: Was the lower court correct in granting a nonsuit?Holding: Judgment affirmed.Rationale: The destruction of Plaintiff’s house was not a natural and

expected result of Defendant’s fire. The damages incurred by Plaintiff are not the immediate, but the remote result of Defendant’s negligence. The immediate result was the destruction of Defendant’s own woodshed. Beyond that, it was remote.Legal Principle: Every person is liable for the consequences of his own acts. He is liable for damages for the proximate results of his own acts, but not for remote damages.

Bartolone v. Jeckovich (1984)Supreme Court of New York

Substantive Facts: The plaintiff suffered whiplash and other injuries as a result of a car crash caused by defendant. His injuries aggravated a pre-existing schizophrenic condition.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Substantive Issue: Whether the defendant is liable for the schizophrenic condition of the plaintiff.Holding: YesRationale: The evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff lead a normal active life before suffering minor physical injuries in the car accident. Expert medical testimony explained how the injuries lead the plaintiff to exhibit schizophrenic behaviors.Legal Principle: The defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him and maybe liable fore aggravating pre-existing illnesses.

In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd (1921)California Court of Appeals

Substantive Facts: Petitioner charted boat to respondent. While discharging cargo from a ship, a wooden plank fell causing a spark to ignite the petrol the ship carried. The resulting fire destroyed the ship.Procedural Facts: Petitioner brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Lower court ruled for petitioner.Substantive Issue: Whether the charterer’s negligence was a proximate cause of the fire.Holding: YesRationale: The fire was a direct result of the negligent act and therefore the charterers are liable for the fire. That damage that might result when a wooden plank falls while discharging cargo is a foreseeable consequence of the negligence.

Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (1961)Privy Council

Substantive Facts: Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. operated a dock in Sydney. The Wagon Mound was moored 600 feet from the Plaintiff’s wharf when, due the Defendant’s negligence, she discharged furnace oil into the bay causing minor injury to the Plaintiff’s property. Oil ignited when molten metal dropped from the wharf and came into contact with cotton waste floating on the water’s surface. The fire seriously damaged the wharf and two ships docked there.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages, under nuisance liability.Substantive Issue: Whether the fire that destroyed the Plaintiff’s wharf was a foreseeable consequence of the Defendant’s negligence.Holding: The injury to Plaintiff’s property, though a direct result of the defendant’s negligence, was an unforeseeable consequence. Rationale: The natural consequences rule leads to instances where a negligent party is liable for both the direct trivial foreseeable damage and all unforeseeable and grave consequences too. This takes the law beyond the principle that a man should be liable for the probable consequences of his actions. The prior rule has led to much confusion and inconsistent results in the law. The Defendant is liable for the fire if the injury by fire is a foreseeable consequence of their negligence.

Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (1961)Privy Council

Procedural History: Plaintiff filed suit on the grounds of nuisance and negligence.Substantive Issue: Whether the fire was reasonably forseeable.Holding: YesRationale: Wagon Mound’s operators would have foreseen that oil spilling into the harbor had a possibility of causing a fire, but would have only a very low probability. A fire could only result under exceptional circumstances. However, because the risk of fire was foreseeable, the defendants bore a duty to prevent the risk, even if the risk was a remote possibility.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co (1928)Court of Appeals of New York

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff was standing on a railroad platform purchasing a ticket, when a train stopped and two men ran forward to catch it. One of the men nearly fell, and two railroad employees attempted to help him. In the process, a package containing fireworks fell and the contents exploded. As a result of the explosion some scales at

the other end of the platform fell and struck the Plaintiff.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Trial court found for plaintiff. Appellate division affirmed. Court Substantive Issue: Were the actions of the Defendant’s employees negligent?Holding: Reversed and dismissed.Rationale: While the actions of the employees may have been negligent in dropping the package, but since plaintiff was far away, plaintiff was not caught in blast but rather injured by unforeseeable remote outcome. Damage was remote.

Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp (1980)New York Court of Appeals

Substantive Facts: Dickens was driving near defendant’s work site. Dickens suffered a seizure and crashed into Plaintiff. Plaintiff sent flying and was covered by boiling enamel. No barrier to stop oncoming traffic.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for injuries, claiming negligence.Procedural History: Trial court entered a judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant argued lack of proximate cause, appellate affirmed.Substantive Issue: Is the intervening act a normal or foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence?Procedural Issue: Does the intervening act break the chain of causation?Holding: No, judgment affirmed.Rationale: When a third party intervenes, causal connection not severed. Issue of foreseeability up to the jury. That Dickens was negligent does not insulate defendant. It is unknown if the crash was the result of Dickens’s failure to take his medication or a driving error. Injury to workers at construction site should have been foreseeable. That defendant could not anticipate the precise manner of the accident does not preclude liability.Legal Principle: Foreseeability is the reasonable anticipation of the possible results of an action. Proximate cause is determined by whether an intervening act is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. If it is not foreseeable, then it is a superseding act which would sever the causal connection.

Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co (1910)Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Substantive Facts: A tank car full of gas derailed and gas ran into the street. Duerr struck a match, causing an explosion. Uncertain as to Duerr’s motive for striking the match.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damagesProcedural History: Trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.Substantive Issue: Was the lighting of the match a contributing or proximate cause to the explosion?Holding: Reversed and remanded.Rationale: If the match was lit maliciously, then defendant not liable because it is not foreseeable that someone would try to cause an explosion. If match was lit without malice, then defendant is liable because defendant should have foreseen someone would try to light a match.

McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. (1998)Supreme Court of Washington

Substantive Facts: McCoy injured when he was attempting to help at an accident sight and was hit by a car.Procedural Facts: McCoy brought suit against Suzuki for negligent manufacture.Procedural History: Defendant moved for summary judgment. Trial court granted dismissal. Appeals court reversed. Procedural Issue: Must plaintiff show proximate cause under rescue doctrine?Substantive Issue: Was proximate cause established by the plaintiff?Holding: Remand for further consideration.Rationale: Rescuer must show proximate cause. Question of foreseeability a matter of fact.

Daley v. LaCroix (1970)Supreme Court of Michigan

Substantive Facts: LaCroix sheared off a utility pole and caused an explosion at the Plaintiffs’ house.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damage and for emotional distress suffered.Procedural History: Trial court granted directed verdict for the defendant. Court of Appeals affirmed.Substantive Issue: Is a physical impact necessary to show negligent emotional distress?Holding: No, reversed and remanded consistent with opinion.Rationale: when defendant’s negligence creates a definite and objective

physical injury as a result of emotional distress, the plaintiff may recover damages without any physical contact upon the plaintiff at the time of the mental shock.

Defendant’s standard of conduct is measured by reactions to be expected of normal persons. Plaintiff has the burden of proof that the physical harm complained of is a natural consequence of the alleged emotional disturbance, proximately caused by defendant’s conduct.

Thing v. La Chusa (1989)Supreme Court of California

Substantive Facts: Thing’s son was injured by a car. Plaintiff did not witness the accident, but arrived after. Procedural Facts: Thing sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress.Procedural History: Trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Appeals court reversed.Substantive Issue: Is it necessary to witness an accident to suffer distress?Holding: Reversed.Rationale: Plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person only if: (1) the plaintiff is closely related to the victim; (2) the plaintiff is present at the scene at the time the injury occurs and is then aware of the injury being caused to the victim; (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress beyond which would be expected of a disinterested witness.

Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co. (1896)United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff was trespassing upon the Defendant’s (railway, when Plaintiff’s foot became stuck. Defendant’s train crew did not see Plaintiff until it was too late to stop the train and Plaintiff was injured.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued for damages.Procedural History: Trial court entered directed verdict for the defendant.Substantive Issue: Is there a duty to anticipate trespassers, which would introduce liability?Holding: Judgment affirmed.Rationale: Railroad companies are held to a duty of constant and strict care in relation to individuals at street crossings or other places where the railroad is on notice that individuals cross. However, at all other

points along a railroad track the railroad company has a right to a free track and is not bound to anticipate trespassers. Trespassers at these points assume all risks of condition that may be found there. The obligation of the railroad company to a trespasser arises at the moment of the trespasser’s discovery and is a duty to make all reasonable efforts to avert injury. The Defendant’s train crew made sufficient efforts to avert injury in the present case.

Barmore v. Elmore (1980)Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff visited the home of the Defendants. During the visit, Plaintiff was attacked and stabbed by Thomas Elmore Jr.

Procedural Facts: Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants, claiming they were negligent in failing to protect him from a dangerous condition on their premises.Procedural History: Trial court entered a directed verdict for the defendant.Procedural Issue: Was the plaintiff an invitee or licensee?Substantive Issue: Does a host have a duty to protect a licensee on the premises?Holding: Judgment affirmed.Rationale: The primary benefit of Plaintiff’s visit was to the fraternal organization of which both were members, rather than to the Defendants. Therefore the Plaintiff is best categorized as a licensee. Defendants’ only duty was to warn him of hidden dangers unknown to Plaintiff of which Defendants had knowledge.

Campbell v. Weathers (1941)Supreme Court of Kansas

Substantive Facts: The Plaintiff entered the business of the Defendant and without purchasing any items, used the restroom. Plaintiff was injured when he stepped into an open trap door on the way to the restroom. Plaintiff sues for negligence.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued for negligence.Procedural History: The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the evidence. Procedural Issue: Was the plaintiff an invitee?Substantive Issue: What is the duty a hose has to an invitee?Holding: Reversed.Rationale: Plaintiff had been a customer of the Defendant for a number of years. He had used the hallway and toilet on numerous occasions and

had never been told that it was not for public use. Court refuses to advance the theory that a regular customer is not an invitee simply because the customer has not made a purchase on the particular occasion on which he is injured. Based on the facts of this case Plaintiff is an invitee.

Rowland v. Christian (1968)Supreme Court of California

Substantive Facts: Rowland asked to use the bathroom and was injured when a cracked handle of the faucet broke and severed tendons and nerves on his right hand. Christian had known for two weeks that the handle was cracked and had complained to the manager. However, she did not warn Plaintiff of the condition.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued for damages.Procedural History: Summary judgment to the defendant.Substantive Issue: Can ordinary principles of negligence be used to determine the liability of a landowner to a person coming onto the property?Holding: Reversed.Rationale: Defendant was aware that the faucet handle was defective and dangerous, that the defect was not obvious, and that Plaintiff was about to come into contact with the defective condition. Defendant did not warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition. From these facts the trier of fact can reasonably conclude that a failure to warn or to repair the condition constitutes negligence.

Bussard v. Minimed, Inc. (2003) California Court of Appeal

Substantive Facts: Defendant hired a pest control company to spray overnight. An employee, Irma Hernandez, arrived early the next morning and fell ill. One her way home, she rear-ended Plaintiff who was stopped at a red light. Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued Hernandez for negligent driving and sued Defendant in vicarious liability under the respondeat superior doctrine, claiming that Hernandez was acting within the scope of her employment while driving home.Procedural History: Trial court ruled against plaintiff, arguing respondeat superior not applicable.Substantive Issue: When an employee falls ill due to conditions at the workplace, is the employer liable for the results of her illness after she leaves work?

Holding: Judgment reversed.Rationale: Because the consequences of the exposure in this case can foreseeably lead to an accident, and because the employee’s job contributed to the accident, such losses can be fairly attributable to employer’s business.

O’Shea v. Welch (2003) United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

Substantive Facts: Defendant Welch was a manager of an Osco store. While driving to the district office of Osco to deliver football tickets obtained from a vendor for distribution to Osco managers, Defendant stopped at a service station to get a cost estimate, and while turning into the station, Defendant hit Plaintiff O’Shea. Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued Osco for vicarious liability and Defendant for negligence.Procedural History: The District Court held that no jury could conclude that Defendant was acting within the scope of his employment when he stopped at the service station.Substantive Issue: Whether a jury could determine that the employee’s conduct was within the scope of his employment.Holding: Yes. Judgment reversed.Rationale: An employee is acting within the scope of his employment when he is performing services for which he has been employed, or when he is doing anything which is reasonably incidental to his employment. The test is not necessarily whether this specific conduct was expressly authorized or forbidden by the employer, but whether such conduct should have been fairly foreseen from the nature of the employment and the duties relating to it.Legal Principle: When determining whether an employee has embarked on a slight or substantial deviation, courts must examine various factors including: 1) the employee’s intent; 2) the nature, time, and place of the deviation; 3) the time consumed in the deviation; 4) the work for which the employee was hired; 5) the incidental acts reasonably expected by the employer; and 6) the freedom allowed to the employee in performing his job responsibilities.

Murrell v. Goertz (1979)Court of Appeals of Oaklahoma

Substantive Facts: Murrell Goertz had an altercation that resulted in Goertz striking Murrel. Procedural Facts: Murrell sued Goertz and his employer Oklahoma

Publishing Company, claiming that Goertz was liable under respondeat superior. Oklahoma Publishing and Goertz claim that Goertz was an independent contractor.Procedural History: Trial court ruled for Goertz.Substantive Issue: Was Goertz an independent contractor rather than a servant?Holding: Judgment affirmed.Rationale: Goertz had no contact with Oklahoma Publishing. The policies of Ohlahoma do not rise to the level of supervision to make Goertz an employee.

Rylands v. Fletcher (1865) House of Lords

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff owned and operated a mine adjacent to which Defendant constructed an artificial pond. The latter caused a mineshaft collapse, which resulted in a flood, and damaged Plaintiff’s operation.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff sued for damages.Procedural History: Trial court found for plaintiff.Substantive Issue: Was the use of Defendant’s land unreasonable and thus was he to be held liable for damages incurred by Plaintiff?Holding: Rationale:

Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. (1932)Supreme Court of Washington

Substantive Facts: Baxter purchased a car from St. John Motors, a Ford dealer, who had purchased the automobile from the Respondent. Baxter led to believe that windshield was made with shatterproof glass. It wasn’t. Baxter sustained injuries.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for injuries.Procedural History: Trial court took issue from jury and entered judgment for defendants.Substantive Issue: Did the trial court err by refusing to admit catalogues as testimony.Holding: Reversed and remanded.Rationale: Appellant had catalogues created by Respondent that claimed the windshield was made of shatter-proof glass. To permit a manufacturer to create demand for its product by representing they possess qualities that they in fact do not, while barring recovery due to a

lack of privity is unjust.Legal Principle: Representations set forth by a manufacturer whose falsehood cannot be readily detected by a buyer may be relied on by the buyer regardless of an absence of privity of contract.

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960)Supreme Court of New Jersey

Substantive Facts: Husband purchased car for wife. Wife injured. Plaintiff did not read fine print which limited liability to replace defective parts to 90 days after delivery or 4,000 miles.Procedural Facts: Plaintiffs brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Trial court found for plaintiffs. Defendants appealed, cert to Supreme CourtProcedural Issue: Whether an implied warranty of usability exists between the third-party seller and the purchaser?Substantive Issue: Whether an express warranty which limits the manufacturer’s liability to replace defective parts and which disclaims other express or implied warranties is valid.Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: The conflicting interests of the buyer and seller must be considered giving weight to the social policy, the decisions of the courts, mass production methods of manufacture and distribution, and the bargaining position of the ordinary customer. The purpose of warranties is to safeguard the buyer and not to limit the seller. The motive of the warranty here was to avoid warranty obligations

The warranty here is a standardized and imposed on the automobile customer on a take it or leave it basis. Thus, the discrepancy in the bargaining powers of the parties is clear. The courts do not have a holding condemning the imposition on the buyer of a standardized warranty as a means of limiting the responsibility of the manufacturer.Legal Principle: An express warranty, which limits the manufacturer’s liability to replace defective parts is against public policy.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963)Supreme Court of California

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff injured when his power tool threw a piece of wood, striking him in the head. Plaintiff gave notice over 10 months later. Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages. Defendant disclaimed liability due to lack of timely notice.

Procedural History: Trial court found no evidence of negligence by manufacturer, only submitted cause of action for breach of warranty against manufacturer and retailer. Jury verdict for retailer against plaintiff and for plaintiff against manufacturer. Manufacturer appealed.Substantive Issue: Is the plaintiff’s cause of action no longer valid due to lack of timely notice?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: Civil Code has a notice requirement, which must be fulfilled with reasonable time. Notice requirement inappropriate for injured consumers.Legal Principle: Individuals injured by products with design or manufacturing defects may bring suit under strict liability regardless of a failure to give timely notice to the manufacturer for a breach of warranty.

Rix v. General Motors Corp. (1986)Supreme Court of Montana

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff injured when his car rear-ended by GMC vehicle. Issues with water tank installed after sale.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought liability suit due to defects.Procedural History: Trial court found for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.Substantive Issue: Was the trial court properly instructed on strict liability.Holding: Reverse and remanded.Rationale: Under a manufacturing defect theory, the essential question is whether the product was flawed because it was not constructed correctly. Legal Principle: A manufacturer cannot be held strictly liable for the danger caused by one of its products, if it does not cause the defect in the product.

Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co. (1984)Supreme Court of Michigan

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was operating a forklift manufactured by the Defendant. The forklift was equipped with a “dead-man” switch, intended to prevent it from moving if the operator let go of the controls. Plaintiff testified that he was aware that the battery was running low on the forklift when the accident occurred. Plaintiff attempted to start the machine on an incline and when the machine experienced a power surge it caused Defendant to fall to the ground.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for design defect.Procedural History: Trial court only instructed on negligent design. Found for defendant. Appeals court reversed.

Substantive Issue: Did the trial court err by not instructing the jury on a breach of warranty theory in addition to a negligent design theory?Holding: Reversed, trial court reinstated.Rationale: Regardless of whether a plaintiff is suing on a theory of negligence or implied warranty, the plaintiff must prove that something is wrong with the product itself that makes it dangerous. Actions claiming defects in product design do not provide for a simple test.

Four approaches have been popularized in determining a defect in product design cases. Negligent risk-utility analysis focuses on if the manufacturer would be judged negligent if it had known of the dangerous condition when the product was marketed. A second analysis compares the risk and utility of the product at the time of trial. A third analysis focuses on the consumer expectations for a product. The final analysis combines the risk-utility and the consumer expectation analyses.

The risk-utility balancing test is essentially a negligence standard, analyzing if the manufacturer exposed the consumer to a greater risk than he should have in choosing a particular design. This approach is supported by the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA), published by the Department of Commerce in 1979. This approach has much support for design defects. First, design defects, unlike manufacturing defects, result from documentable decisions by manufacturers that plaintiffs should be able to learn of through discovery. Second, a negligence standard in these cases encourages the design of safer products. Third, a verdict for the plaintiff in a design defect case is essentially a ruling that the entire product line is defective, depriving the public of the product. Finally, the court believes that such a fault system provides for greater intrinsic fairness.

O’Brien v. Muskin Corp, (1983)Supreme Court of New Jersey

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff injured in pool designed by defendant. The water in the pool was filled to a depth of approximately three and one-half feet and a warning decal saying Do Not Dive appeared beneath the manufacturer’s logo in letters approximately one-half inch high.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for strict liability.Procedural History: Trial court ruled for defendant, appellate court reversed. Court only considered adequacy of the warning.Substantive Issue: Should the court have considered risks of injury.Holding: Reversed and remanded.Rationale: In contrast to manufacturing defects, the standard measure for design defects is a comparison of the utility of the product with the

risk of injury that it poses to the public. Factors relevant to this decision include: (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product; (2) The safety aspects of the product; (3) The availability of a safer substitute product; (4) The ability of the manufacturer to eliminate the unsafe character of the product; (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger; (6) The anticipated awareness of the user of the inherent dangers of the product and their avoidability and (7) The feasibility of the manufacturer spreading the loss.

These factors also include the “state-of-the-art”, or the scientific knowledge available in the industry at the time the product was designed. However, complying with the state-of-the-art does not provide an absolute defense, as the burden is on the Defendant to prove that compliance with this justifies placing a product on the market. Other considerations, such as the relative need for the product, or if the product was an essential or a luxury, might lead to the determination that the risk involved with the product still outweighed its utility.Legal Principle: Based on risk utility analysis, a defendant may be liable for a design defect even if his product complied with the existing level of technological advances at the time of design.

Butterfield v. Forrester (1809)King’s Bench

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was riding, with low light. A witness testified that if Plaintiff had not been riding very hard he might have observed the pole. The defendant had put the pole across the road for repairing his home.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence.Procedural History: Trial court directed verdict for the defendant, plaintiff appealed.Substantive Issue: If the plaintiff was negligent, can the plaintiff recover for the defendant’s negligence?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: For Plaintiff to recover two things must occur: (1) an obstruction in the road by the fault of Defendant; and (2) no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of Plaintiff.Legal Principle: Plaintiff cannot recover for negligence if Plaintiff was also negligent.

Davies v. Mann (1842)Exchequer

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff let donkey graze near public highway. A

carriage approached and reality ensued.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Trial jury instructed to determine whether the proximate cause was the defendant’s conduct. Jury ruled for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.Substantive Issue: Who is responsible for injuries caused by the defendant’s negligence if the plaintiff was also negligent?Holding: AffirmedRationale: Even if the animal was unlawfully in the road, if the Defendant could have avoided injuring the animal through proper care, but failed to do so, he is liable for the consequences of his negligence.Legal Principle: If the defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident after the plaintiff no longer had such an opportunity, and the defendant improperly did not avoid the accident, he is liable. This initiated the last clear chance doctrine.

McIntyre v. Balentine (1992)Supreme Court of Tennessee

Substantive Facts: Parties involved in collision, with both parties responsible. Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit.Procedural History: Trial court found for defendant. Plaintiff appeals and requests that court adopt comparative negligence.Substantive Issue: Should Tennessee adopt comparative negligence?Holding: Affirmed, reversed and remanded.Rationale: The contributory negligence bar to recovery may have developed as on outgrowth of issue pleading, where questions posed had to be answered yes or no, leaving common law courts to award all or nothing. Two basic forms of comparative fault are used throughout the nation, pure and modified comparative fault. Under the pure form, damages are reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. The modified form is the same as pure, except plaintiffs recover only if plaintiff’s negligence either does not exceed does not exceed 50%, or is less than 49% of defendant’s negligence.

Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc. (2000)Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff joined defendant club to lose weight, was injured during initial evaluation. As part of the signup process, Plaintiff had to sign a Participation Agreement which contained an exculpatory release for all claims, demands, injuries, and damages from all acts of passive or active negligence on the part of Defendant.

Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence. Defendant countered with release.Procedural History: Trial court granted summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiff appeals.Substantive Issue: Whether the clause was valid?Holding: Affirmed.Rationale: Although it was a contract of adhesion, such fact alone does not demonstrate grossly disparate bargaining power. Furthermore, because health club services are not deemed of great public important or a practical necessity, no special legal relationship or overriding public interest exists which would render the provision void against public policy.

Plaintiff was not required to assent to the terms and did not give up a valuable legal right to do so (cf. a condition of obtaining employment or making use of public carrier or utility services). Instead, she was free to choose any club which would provide the same services, but voluntarily applied for a membership to Defendant’s private club and agreed to the terms upon which the membership was bestowed.

There are three exceptions that arise where an exculpatory clause will be unenforceable: 1) when the party protected by the clause intentionally causes harm or engages in acts of reckless, wanton, or gross negligence; 2) when the bargaining power of one party to the contract is so grossly unequal as to put that party at the mercy of the other’s negligence; and 3) when the transaction involves the public interest.Legal Principle: The ultimate determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the circumstances against the backdrop of current societal expectations, including transactions that are so important to the public good that an exculpatory clause would be “patently offensive” such that “the common sense of the entire community would pronounce it” invalid.

Rush v. Commercial Realty Co. (1929) Supreme Court of New Jersey

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was tenant at defendant property. When to use detached bathroom, fell and was injured.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence.Procedural History: Trial court ruled for the plaintiff.Substantive Issue: Did the trial court err by not directing a verdict in favor of the Defendant based on Plaintiff’s contributory negligence or assumption of the risk?Holding: Affirmed.

Rationale: The building was under the control of the Defendant and it had a duty of care for maintenance. The jury could reasonably find that the accident was the result of Defendant’s negligence. Therefore, the only applicable questions are if Plaintiff assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent. Plaintiff had no choice, but to use the bathroom and had no duty to go elsewhere to do so.Legal Principle: Implied assumption of the risk is applicable only when a plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known risk.

Blackburn v. Dorta (1977)Supreme Court of Florida

Substantive Facts: Three cases where consolidated by the Supreme Court of Florida to determine if the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk was viable as an absolute bar to recovery subsequent to adoption of comparative negligence.Substantive Issue: Is the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk still viable as an absolute bar to recovery subsequent to adoption of comparative negligence?Holding: Rationale: Court held that contributory negligence would no longer be a complete bar to negligence, but rather would be considered in apportioning damages. However, in that case the court left the viability of assumption of the risk for a future day. The court notes that assumption of the risk is not a favored defense and that it generally serves no purpose not covered by the doctrine of contributory negligence or common law duty.

Several categories of assumption of the risk have developed, including (i) distinctions between express and implied; (ii) between primary and secondary and (iii) between strict and implied. This Court’s determination deals with implied assumption of the risk.

Primary assumption of the risk occurs when the defendant is not negligent, either because he owed no duty to the defendant or because he did not breach a duty owed. The concept grew out of the master-servant relationship. This terminology is subsumed in the principle of negligence itself. Thus there is no useful purpose in retaining it.

Secondary assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense to an established breach of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. This defense can be further divided into strict and qualified assumption of the risk. Strict secondary assumption of the risk involves conduct, which is reasonable, but nonetheless bars recovery. The court found nothing in

either case law or justice to validate this rule under the modern comparative negligence scheme.

Qualified secondary assumption of the risk is conduct that is unreasonable and bars recovery. Such conduct can just as easily be characterized as contributory negligence. This Court holds that the principles of comparative negligence will be applied in any case where the defense of implied assumption of the risk is asserted.Legal Principle: The concept of comparative negligence eliminates the need for the affirmative defense of implied assumption of the risk.

Teeters v. Currey (1974)Supreme Court of Tennessee

Substantive Facts: Currey, negligently performed a surgery on Teeters that was intended to prevent future pregnancy. Plaintiff did not discover the negligence until three years later when she gave birth. Plaintiff sued and Defendant answered claiming the statute of limitations as a bar to recovery.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for negligence. Defendant countered with statute of limitations.Procedural History: Trial court ruled for defendant. Statute of limitations begins at injury.Substantive Issue: Was the trial court correct in holding that the cause of action accrues when the injury occurs, so as to begin the running of the statute of limitations?Holding: Reversed and remanded.Rationale: A majority of American states have adopted the discovery doctrine. Under this doctrine, the statute does not begin to run until the negligent injury is, or should have been discovered. The court adopts the discovery rule for cases involving the negligent performance of surgical procedures, so that the statute of limitations commences to run when the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury.Legal Principle: The statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered the negligent injury.

Clark v. Oregon Health Sciences University (2007)Supreme Court of Oregon

Substantive Facts: Clark’s son had surgery at Defendant hospital. Negligence led to brain damage.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit against employees and hospital

for damages. Employees countered with Oregon statute, limiting action to the state. Plaintiff brought suit to determine constitutionality of the statute.Procedural History: Trial court found for plaintiff. Appeals court ruled for plaintiff against University but reversed against employees.Substantive Issue: Whether the statute was against state law?Holding: Reversed and remandedRationale: Legal Principle:

Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1974)United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff’s home destroyed in fire. Plaintiff severely burned. Fire started by heater manufactured by defendant.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Trial court awarded $2,000,000 in compensatory damages. Defendants moved for new trial or remittitur.Substantive Issue: Was the trial court correct in determining that the verdict of the jury did not exceed the maximum amount which the jury could reasonably find based on the maximum recovery rule?Holding: Defendant motion denied.Rationale: In the present case, five elements of damages are applicable: (i) past physical and mental pain; (ii) future physical and mental pain; (iii) future medical expenses; (iv) loss of earning capacity and permanent disability and (v) disfigurement. This Court examines each of these elements individually, determining the maximum amount of damages available under each based on the evidence available. Considering each of these elements in unison, this Court determines that the maximum jury award supported by the evidence is $2,980,000. Therefore, the jury’s damage award is valid.

The Defendants also argue that the introduction of photographs of the Plaintiff was inflammatory and that the presence of the child in the courtroom inflamed or prejudiced the jury. The photographs were allowable because part of Plaintiff’s claim for damages was for disfigurement and humiliation. Also, the presence of Plaintiff was not inappropriate because Plaintiff was well behaved and quiet during all courtroom proceedings.Legal Principle: Under the maximum recovery rule, a court will overrule a jury’s determination of damages only if the damages exceed the maximum amount the jury could reasonably find based upon all of the evidence. Court will look at past pain, future pain, future medical expenses, loss of earning capacity and disfigurement.

Richardson v. Chapman (1997) Supreme Court of Illinois

Substantive Facts: Plaintiff was driving car. McGregor was passenger. When the car was stopped, struck from behind by a semi driven by defendant. Plaintiff paralyzed.Procedural Facts: Plaintiff brought suit for damages.Procedural History: Trial judge directed in favor of plaintiff on the question of liability. Jury returned verdict of $22,358,814. Defendant appealed amount of damages. Appeals court rejected challenges. Defendant appealed.Substantive Issue: Whether the award of damages was excessive?Holding: Affirmed, reversed and vacated.Rationale: Expert testimony estimated upper and lower bounds of future medical expenses. Expert attempted to avoid having to predict exact rates through use of bounds. Courts had no issue with expert. Trial court awarded nearly $1.5 million more in future medical costs than expert testified would be necessary. Future medical reduced by $1 million. Other determinations okay. Damages to McGregor were $100,000 in pain and suffering. Reduced by $50,000.Dissent: Expert based care on minimum requirements, Jury should have been allowed to reach a higher sum.

Cheatham v. Pohle (2003)Supreme Court of Indiana

Substantive Facts: Parties divorced in 1994. Pohle kept incriminating photos and distributed them. Statute required 75% of punitive damages must go to state.Procedural Facts: Cheatham brought suit for intentional infliction of emotion distress.Procedural History: Cheatham brought suit to determine constitutionality of the statute.Substantive Issue: Whether the statute constituted a taking.Holding: No.Rationale: Punitive damages are not a right.Legal Principle: Plaintiff has no right to punitive damages because punitive damages are common law and states can alter the law.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (2008)United States Supreme Court

Substantive Facts: Plaintiffs lived in area affected by Exxon-Valdez spillProcedural Facts: Plaintiffs brought suit for damages

Procedural History: Compensatory damages of $507 million and punitive damages of $2.5 billion.Substantive Issue: Whether punitive damages were excessive.Holding: Yes.Rationale: Legal Principle: Punitive damage awards in maritime cases shall be capped at a 1:1 ratio measured against compensatory damage awards.