Dear Student,

Thank you for attending an Academic Excellence workshop before classes begin at GW Law!

Academic Excellence is the office at GW Law that assists all students in their pursuit of strong academic

performance and potential. It is located within the Dean of Students Office (E Building, First Floor). In

addition to workshops, Academic Excellence also offers 1-on-1 academic performance counselling and

tutoring services. Here is the schedule for the 2019-2020 academic year workshops. Room locations will

be announced well in advance. All workshops will be recorded and be accessible for later viewing.

Time Topic Coverage

August 12

10a – 12p

The Law School Student Experience and Preparing for Class &

Fundamentals of U.S. Legal Structure

August 13

10a – 12p

Introduction to Legal Analysis

Study Aids and Practice Resources

August 14

10a – 12p

Strategies For Succeeding Inside the Classroom

Upperclassmen Student Panel

September 11

12p – 1p Outlining

September 25

12p – 1p Exam Preparation

November 6

12p – 1p Midterm Debrief & Final Exam Simulated Practice

January 8

12p – 1p Back to Basics: Academic Excellence Top Strategies

February 12

12p – 1p Evaluating Your Fall Exam Performance & Seeking Professor Feedback

The Academic Excellence webpage itself is an excellent source for resources. Check it out:

https://www.law.gwu.edu/academic-services. I also invite you to set up an appointment for an Academic

Strategy Session if you are interested in a 1-on-1 consultation about your approach to your studies. You can

do that here: https://calendly.com/arealon.

Everyone in the Dean of Students office is rooting for your success! Congratulations on your admittance to

GW Law!

Regards,

Andrew

Andrew D. Realon, Esq.

Program Administrator for Academic Excellence

202-994-1806 Direct

202-994-8320 Main

Email: arealon@law.gwu.edu

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llNSERT COURSE NAME]

CASE BRIEF: [INSERT CASE NAME]

Chapter I: [INSERT CHAPTER HEADING] Page: [Page#] Section A: [INSERT SECTION HEADING]

I. [INSERT SUB-SECTION HEADING[a. [INSERT SUB-POINT HEADING]

NAME: INSERT CASE NAME ISSUING COURT

FACTS: • LIST FACTS THAT ARE MATERIAL TO THE COURT'S HOLDING

PROCEDURE: INSERT PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE. (e.g., P sued D. Trial court granted D's motion to dismiss. P appealed.)

DATE

ISSUE: WHAT QUESTION OF LAW COURT IS ASKED TO DECIDE 1HAT!S Rf:L\JLD TO ROOK RO, \!)MAP ABO VD (e.g. Whether the trial cou1t gave the c01Tect jury charge for negligence?)

HOLDING: WHAT IS THE COURT'S ANSWER TO THE QUESTION ABOVE? (e.g., No, the trial court did not err when it gave the jury charge for negligence.)

REASONING: • LIST REASONS WHY THE COURT HELD AS IT DID. (e.g., RULES, STATUTES,RESTATEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY REASONS, ETC.)

DISPOSITION: INSERT HOW THIS COURT DISPOSED OF THE CASE. (e.g., AFFIRMED, REVERSED, OR REMANDED)

DISSENT: INSERT BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ANY DISSENTING OR CONCURRING OPINION.

CLASS NOTES

HYPOS: INSERT HYPOTHETICALS POSED BY YOUR PROFESSOR

RULES & INSERT THE ELEMENTS OF ANY RULES GIVEN BY YOUR PROFESSOR

ELEMENTS:

RATIONALES: INSERT THE RATIONALE OR PUBLIC POLICY REASON GIVEN BY THE PROFESSOR

"NUGGETS": INSERT PERSONAL INSIGHTS GIVEN BY THE PROFESSOR

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Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation

Supreme Court of California, 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737

September 30, 1970

Burke, J.-Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation appeals from a summary judgment granting to plaintiff the recovery of agreed compensation under a written contract for her services as an actress in a motion picture. As will appear, we have concluded that the trial court correctly ruled in plaintiff's favor and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Plaintiff is well known as an actress, and in the contract between plaintiff and defendant is sometimes referred to as the "Artist." Under the contract dated August 6, 1965, plaintiff was to play the female lead in defendant's contemplated production of a motion picture entitled "Bloomer Girl." The contract provided that defendant would pay plaintiff a minimum "guaranteed compensation" of $53,571.42 per week for 14 weeks commencing May 23, 1966, for a total of $750,000. Prior to May 1966 defendant decided not to produce the picture and by a letter dated April 4, 1966, it notified plaintiff of that decision and that it would not "comply with our obligations to you under" the written contract.

By the same letter and with the professed purpose "to avoid any damage to you," defendant instead offered to employ plaintiff as the leading actress in another film tentatively entitled "Big Country, Big Man" (hereinafter, "Big Country"). The compensation offered was identical, as were 31 of the 34 numbered provisions or articles of the original contract.1

Unlike "Bloomer Girl:' however, which was to have been a musical production, "Big Country" was a dramatic "western type" movie. "Bloomer Girl" was to have been filmed in California; "Big Country" was to be produced in Australia. Also, certain terms in the proffered contract varied from those of the original.2 Plaintiff was given one week within which to accept; she did not and the offer lapsed. Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking recovery of the agreed guaranteed compensation.

The complaint sets forth two causes of action. The first is for money due under the contract; the second, based upon the same allegations as the first, is for damages resulting from defendant's breach of contract. Defendant in its answer admits the existence and validity of the contract, that plaintiff complied with all the conditions, covenants and promises and stood ready to complete the performance, and that defendant breached and "anticipatorily repudiated" the contract.

1 Among the identical provisions was the following found in the last paragraph of Article 2 of the original contract:

"We [defendant] shall not be obligated to utilize your [plaintiff's] services in or in connection with the Photoplay

hereunder, our sole obligation, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, being to pay you the

guaranteed compensation herein provided for."

2 Article 29 of the original contract specified that plaintiff approved the director already chosen for "Bloomer Girl"

and that in case he failed to act as director plaintiff was to have approval rights of any substitute director. Article 31

provided that plaintiff was to have the right of approval of the "Bloomer Girl" dance director, and Article 32 gave

her the right of approval of the screenplay.

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Defendant's letter of April 4 to plaintiff, which contained both defendant's notice of breach of the "Bloomer Girl" contract and offer of the lead in "Big Country," eliminated or impaired each of those rights…

It denies, however, that money is due to plaintiff either under contract or as a result of its breach, and pleads as an affirmative defense to both causes of action plaintiff's allegedly deliberate failure to mitigate damages, asserting that she unreasonably refused to accept its offer of the leading role in "Big Country."

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, the motion was granted, and summary judgment for $750,000 plus interest was entered in plaintiff's favor. This appeal by defendant followed.

As stated, defendant's sole defense to this action, which resulted from its deliberate breach of contract, is that in rejecting defendant's substitute offer of employment plaintiff unreasonably refused to mitigate damages.

The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or, with reasonable effort, might have earned from other employment. (Citations omitted). However, before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee's rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages. (Citations omitted).

Applying the foregoing rules to the record in the present case ..., it is clear that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff's failure to accept defendant's tendered substitute employment could not be applied in mitigation of damages because the offer of the "Big Country" lead was of employment both different and inferior, and that no factual dispute was presented on that issue. The mere circumstance that ''Bloomer Girl" was to be a musical review calling upon plaintiff's talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be produced in the City of Los Angeles, whereas "Big Country" was a straight dramatic role in a "Western Type" story taking place in an opal mine in Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind between the two employments; the female lead as a dramatic actress in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered the equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.

Additionally, the substitute "Big Country" offer proposed to eliminate or impair the director and screenplay approvals accorded to plaintiff under the original "Bloomer Girl" contract, and thus constituted an offer of inferior employment. No expertise or judicial notice is required in order to hold that the deprivation or infringement of an employee's rights held under an original employment contract converts the available "other employment'' relied upon by the employer to mitigate damages, into inferior employment which the employee need not seek or accept ... The judgment is affirmed.

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Contracts Breach of Contract

Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY The trial court granted P summary judgment on her breach of contract claim against D. D appealed to this court.

FACTS

P, a well-known actress, entered into a contract with D film producer under which P wasto play the lead role in a musical song & dance film, “Bloomer Girl.”

P’s guaranteed compensation under the contract was $750,000.

~6 weeks before filming was to begin, D notified P that they were cancelling the film andnot honoring the contract.

In the same notice, D offered P a substitute role, with the same monetarycompensation, to play the female lead in a dramatic Western to be filmed in Australia,“Big Country.”

The new contract provided no rights of approval as to directors or screenplay. (P hadthose rights in Bloomer Girl)

The D gave P one week to accept this substitute contract, which P refused to do.

ISSUE Did P fail to mitigate her damages by refusing to accept the “Big Country” contract, which offered equivalent compensation but differed in other significant ways from the “Bloomer Girl” contract?

HOLDING No, the duty of mitigation did not require Plaintiff to accept an offer of substitute employment that was both dissimilar and inferior to the original employment.

RATIONALE The court evaluated the employment offered to P in each film and concluded that the “Big Country” employment was both different and inferior to “Bloomer Girl”.

Rule: The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or, with reasonable effort, might have earned from other employment.

Rule: Before an employer cites other employment opportunities as an opportunity to mitigate, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived.

DISPOSITION This court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff.

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206 N.C.App. 308 Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dorothy HARRIS, Plaintiff, v.

Clarence BAREFOOT, Lucia Castaldo, and Richard Clyde, jointly and severally,

Defendants.

No. COA09–1313. |

Aug. 3, 2010.

Opinion

ELMORE, Judge.

On 5 July 2005, Dorothy Harris (plaintiff) was delivering mail for the United States Postal Service at 3362 Meadowlark Road in Harnett County when she was attacked by two dogs.

Per her deposition, plaintiff relates the events of the incident as follows: plaintiff had delivered a package to 3362 Meadowlark Road, which was located directly across the street from the home of Clarence Barefoot (defendant Barefoot). She then walked back up the driveway toward the road and saw two dogs barking at her from across the street near the Barefoot home. Within a matter of seconds, she was surrounded by the two dogs, knocked to the ground, and bitten repeatedly. Plaintiff later described the dogs as a Rottweiler named Riley, belonging to defendant Barefoot, and an Australian Heeler/Border Collie mix dog named Dusty, belonging to Lucia Castaldo (defendant Castaldo). Defendant Castaldo and Dusty were visiting defendant Barefoot, defendant Castaldo’s grandfather, when the attack allegedly occurred. As a result of the attack,

plaintiff sustained numerous injuries, including more than twenty injuries, including bite marks, lacerations, and skin tears.

In her deposition, defendant Castaldo stated that she was on the back patio of the Barefoot home with Riley and Dusty when she heard barking and screaming from across the street, at which point she and the two dogs jumped up and ran toward the sound. Defendant Castaldo stated that she ran behind the dogs toward the street and that the dogs were out of her sight for a few seconds as they rounded to corner of the Barefoot home. When she arrived across the street near 3362 Meadowlark Road, she found plaintiff, who seemed to have suffered dog bites. Defendant Castaldo then performed first aid and took plaintiff to the hospital.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants, alleging negligence.1 Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted those motions on 23 June 2009 and 30 June 2009. Plaintiff now appeals.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants knew or should have known of the vicious propensities of their dogs. Summary judgment is proper “when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 56(c) (2009). “Where the pleadings and proof disclose that no cause of action exists, summary judgment is properly granted.” Joslyn v. Blanchard, 149 N.C.App. 625, 628, 561 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2002)(citation omitted). In evaluating a trial court’sgrant of summary judgment, “[e]vidence

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presented by the parties is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003) (citation omitted).

[1] [2] [3] For a plaintiff’s negligence action tosurvive a defendant’s motion for summaryjudgment,

a plaintiff must set forth a prima facie case (1) that defendant failed to exercise proper care in the performance of a duty owed plaintiff; (2) the negligent breach of that duty was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (3) a person of ordinary prudence should have foreseen that plaintiff’s injury was probable under the circumstances.

Strickland v. Doe, 156 N.C.App. 292, 294, 577 S.E.2d 124, 128 (2003) (quotations and citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff must set forth that the dogs possessed a vicious propensity and that defendants knew or should have known of this propensity. Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51, 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967). “If the plaintiff establishes that an animal is in fact vicious, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s dangerous propensities.” Ray v. Young, 154 N.C.App. 492, 494, 572 S.E.2d 216, 219 (2002).The test of liability of the owner does notcontemplate the intentions of the animal butwhether the owner should know from pastconduct that the animal is likely, if notrestrained, to do an act in which the owner couldforesee injury to person or property. Id. at 494–95, 572 S.E.2d at 219.

[4] Plaintiff argues that defendant Barefoot knew

or should have known that his dog could have posed a danger to others because Rottweilers are aggressive and dangerous by nature, and that defendant Barefoot’s treatment of the dog—keeping the dog tethered in his yard most of the time—not only shows that he knew the dog could be violent, but also contributed to the dog’s vicious nature. The facts, however, do not support any of these contentions. While our courts have found that Rottweilers are aggressive by nature and that it might be negligent not to keep them restrained, Hill v. Williams, 144 N.C.App. 45, 55, 547 S.E.2d 472, 478 (2001), plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing that Riley was indeed a Rottweiler. Plaintiff consistently refers to the dog as a “ninety-pound Rottweiler,” but failed to forecast any evidence as to the dog’s actual weight or breed. Defendant Barefoot stated that the dog weighed forty-five pounds and was a mixed breed dog, including some Rottweiler ancestry. Even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must, we find no basis to infer the breed of the dog as a Rottweiler. As such, plaintiff’s argument related to the dog’s breed must fail.

Regarding defendant Barefoot’s treatment of Riley, evidence showed that he tethered Riley for 18–20 hours a day to prevent him from running into the street and injuring himself. Plaintiff claims that this shows knowledge that Riley was dangerous and contributed to his vicious nature. In support of this contention, plaintiff relies on an expert and Humane Society literature to show that tethering a dog for this long of a period creates a dangerous environment and does not allow the dog to be properly “socialized,” resulting in a dog’s being more aggressive than it otherwise would have been. However, this expert never examined Riley, nor did she speak to anyone who had firsthand knowledge of how Riley behaved; her testimony instead was based on general

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behavior information from other dogs that are tethered for long periods of time. Thus this evidence does not tend to show that Riley possessed a vicious propensity or that defendant Barefoot’s treatment contributed to a vicious propensity.

Again, even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the facts seem to support strongly the conclusions that Riley lacked a vicious nature and that defendant Barefoot had no reason to know of a vicious propensity. One of defendant Barefoot’s neighbors stated, in her deposition, that she had never seen Riley at the Barefoot home; the other, her husband, only saw Riley on one occasion. They both stated that they had never heard any barking from Riley and that they had not heard of any situations in which Riley had attacked a person or property. Plaintiff, who delivered mail to the area daily, also stated that she had never seen Riley, had not seen Riley display any vicious behavior toward others, and had not heard of Riley displaying vicious behavior. Defendant Barefoot stated that Riley had not exhibited any vicious propensities toward any other animals or person nor had he been involved in any altercations with any other animals or persons. This evidence suggests not only that Riley did not have a vicious nature, but also that defendant Barefoot did not have reason to suspect such conduct. Thus, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence showing Riley’s vicious propensity or that defendant Barefoot knew or should have known of such a vicious propensity.

[5] Similarly, plaintiff argues that defendantCastaldo knew or should have known that herdog Dusty possessed a vicious propensitybecause, again, the Australian Heeler/BorderCollie mix is an aggressive breed, and her meansof restraining the dog shows her knowledge thatthe dog was dangerous. However, the only

evidence presented by plaintiff that the Australian Heeler/Border Collie mix is generally known to have propensities for aggression comes from an article on Wikipedia.com, an online source that can be changed at any time by any user.2 In contrast to plaintiff’s Wikipedia article, Defendant Barefoot presented admissible evidence that Dusty did not have aggressive tendencies. Defendant Barefoot testified that he had not observed Dusty getting into fights with other dogs or any other aggressive tendencies. Defendant Castaldo also testified that Dusty did not show any prior aggressive behavior and had not behaved viciously toward any person or animal. The Hill standard that a defendant may have a duty to restrain a dog based upon the general propensities of a particular breed of dog again does not apply, as plaintiff failed to forecast competent evidence that the Australian Heeler/Border Collie mix is a breed generally known to have a vicious propensity. See Hill, 144 N.C.App. at 55, 547 S.E.2d at 478.

Plaintiff’s argument that defendant Castaldo’s means of restraining Dusty shows knowledge of a violent propensity is also without factual support. The evidence on which this claim is based is the testimony of an expert who never personally observed the dog; her testimony was, again, that excessive tethering and poor socialization leads to a dangerous environment for a dog and can make it more dangerous. This does nothing to show a vicious propensity or defendant Castaldo’s knowledge of a vicious propensity. Defendant Castaldo testified that she only brought Dusty with her on three visits to her grandparents’ home. Plaintiff did not show evidence on how Dusty was kept at defendant Castaldo’s primary residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Plaintiff points only to the three occasions in which Dusty was brought to the grandparents’ house to substantiate her argument of “excessive tethering.”

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Plaintiff also claims that defendant Castaldo should have known from Dusty’s habit of chasing horses and trucks that she was aggressive and needed to be restrained. While Dusty may have run behind horses and trucks, there is no evidence that she ever harmed persons or property or was vicious in nature when so doing. Plaintiff presented no evidence that Dusty had vicious propensity or that defendant Castaldo knew or should have known of a vicious propensity. As such, this argument is without merit.

Affirmed.

Judges JACKSON and STROUD concur.

[Footnotes Omitted]

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Question: is the case below more similar or dissimilar to the Parker v 20th Century case?

Jack Nickels was a famous dramatic actor who lived in San Francisco. In 2000, Nickels entered

into a contract with GMG to star in a new, one-hour comedy television series set in a hospital.

The shows were to be filmed in a Los Angeles studio. Nickels was set to play the role of an

emergency room doctor. Under the terms of Nickels’ contract with GMG, Nickels was to be paid

$2,000,000 for the first season of the show, and GMG had the right to renew the show for each

of the next two years at $3,000,000 and $4,000,000 per season respectively. The contract also

gave Nickels the right to direct two episodes per season and write one episode in each of the

second and third seasons. Two months after making the contract and months before filming of

the series had started, GMG informed Nickels that it had decided to cancel the series.

However, in its letter informing Nickels of its decision, GMG offered Nickels the lead role in an

already-existing, successful series, also set in a hospital. The role involved him playing an

emergency room doctor, and the show was a drama that regularly had comedic scenes and

episodes. The person who had previously played the lead had already decided to leave the

show. Under the terms of GMG’s offer of this alternative role, Nickels’ compensation was set at

the same figures as in his original contract. Because the show already had an established team

of writers, Nickels was not given the right to write any of the episodes, but he was given the

right to direct three episodes per season. The show was to be filmed in New York City. Nickels

rejected this alternative offer and sued GMG for breach of contract.

Discuss whether plaintiff Nickels’ rejection of the alternative position could be used to reduce

his recovery of damages. Assume that Parker v. 20th Century Fox is binding precedent.

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