Case 1:21-cv-00134 Document 1-1 Filed 01/15/21 Page 1 of 2 ...

JS 44 (Rev. 10/20) CIVIL COVER SHEETThe JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as

provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the

purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff County of Residence of First Listed Defendant

(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

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and One Box for Defendant) (For Diversity Cases Only)

1 U.S. Government 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF

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of Business In This State

2 U.S. Government 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State 2 2 Incorporated and Principal Place 5 5

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Citizen or Subject of a 3 3 Foreign Nation 6 6

Foreign Country

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110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 625 Drug Related Seizure 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 375 False Claims Act

120 Marine 310 Airplane 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 423 Withdrawal 376 Qui Tam (31 USC

130 Miller Act 315 Airplane Product Product Liability 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))

140 Negotiable Instrument Liability 367 Health Care/ 400 State Reapportionment

150 Recovery of Overpayment 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS 410 Antitrust

& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury 820 Copyrights 430 Banks and Banking

151 Medicare Act 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability 830 Patent 450 Commerce

152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability 368 Asbestos Personal 835 Patent - Abbreviated 460 Deportation

Student Loans 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application 470 Racketeer Influenced and

(Excludes Veterans) 345 Marine Product Liability 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations

153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY LABOR 880 Defend Trade Secrets 480 Consumer Credit

of Veteran’s Benefits 350 Motor Vehicle 370 Other Fraud 710 Fair Labor Standards Act of 2016 (15 USC 1681 or 1692)

160 Stockholders’ Suits 355 Motor Vehicle 371 Truth in Lending Act 485 Telephone Consumer

190 Other Contract Product Liability 380 Other Personal 720 Labor/Management SOCIAL SECURITY Protection Act

195 Contract Product Liability 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations 861 HIA (1395ff) 490 Cable/Sat TV

196 Franchise Injury 385 Property Damage 740 Railway Labor Act 862 Black Lung (923) 850 Securities/Commodities/

362 Personal Injury - Product Liability 751 Family and Medical 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ExchangeMedical Malpractice Leave Act 864 SSID Title XVI 890 Other Statutory Actions

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240 Torts to Land 443 Housing/ Sentence or Defendant) 896 Arbitration

245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations 530 General 871 IRS—Third Party 899 Administrative Procedure

290 All Other Real Property 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION Act/Review or Appeal of

Employment Other: 462 Naturalization Application Agency Decision446 Amer. w/Disabilities - 540 Mandamus & Other 465 Other Immigration 950 Constitutionality of

Other 550 Civil Rights Actions State Statutes

448 Education 555 Prison Condition

560 Civil Detainee -

Conditions of

Confinement

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1 Original

Proceeding

2 Removed from

State Court

3 Remanded from

Appellate Court

4 Reinstated or

Reopened

5 Transferred from

Another District(specify)

6 Multidistrict

Litigation - Transfer

8 Multidistrict

Litigation -Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):

Brief description of cause:

VII. REQUESTED IN

COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S)

IF ANY (See instructions):JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

26 USC 7609

Center for Democracy and Technology

David M. GossettDavis Wright Tremaine LLP - 1301 K Street, NW #500East, Washington, DC 20005

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs andBorder Protection; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552

USCB, USCIS & DHS improperly withholding agency records responsive to FOIA requests made by CDT.

1/15/2021 /s/ David M. Gossett

Case 1:21-cv-00134 Document 1-1 Filed 01/15/21 of 2

JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 10/20)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as

required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is

required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of

Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use

only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then

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(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the

time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land

condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)

(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".

II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X"

in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below. United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.

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to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes

precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked. Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the

citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity

cases.)

III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this

section for each principal party.

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that is most applicable. Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.

V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.

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PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to

changes in statue.

VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional

statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service.

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Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.

Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.

VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket

numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

Case 1:21-cv-00134 Document 1-1 Filed 01/15/21 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY ) AND TECHNOLOGY ) (a District of Columbia non-profit organization) ) 1401 K Street NW, Suite 200 ) Washington, D.C. 20005 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. ___________________ ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ) HOMELAND SECURITY ) 245 Murray Lane SW ) Washington, D.C. 20528 ) ) U.S. CUSTOMS AND ) BORDER PROTECTION ) 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW ) Washington, D.C. 20229 ) ) U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND ) IMMIGRATION SERVICES ) 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW ) Washington, D.C. 20008 ) ) Defendants. ) )

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

Plaintiff Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), a nonprofit organization

incorporated in the District of Columbia, by its undersigned attorneys, alleges as follows:

Introduction

1. CDT is an organization dedicated to promoting and protecting free expression on

the Internet. It brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552,

et seq., to enjoin the United States Customs and Border Protection (CB”) and the United States

Case 1:21-cv-00134 Document 1 Filed 01/15/21 Page 1 of 8

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Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), components of the United States Department of

Homeland Security (DHS), from continuing to improperly withhold agency records responsive to

FOIA requests made by CDT. The underlying FOIA requests sought records regarding

Defendants’ policies and practices regarding the monitoring of social media for immigration and

naturalization purposes.

2. Based on the limited information about these practices that is publicly available,

CDT is concerned that these practices are of dubious constitutionality, and may have the effect of

chilling of Americans’ speech on social media platforms. In particular, social media surveillance

like the practices at issue introduces significant civil liberties concerns. Communication on social

media is highly susceptible to misinterpretation because it is, like most human interaction,

idiosyncratic. Deciphering the meaning of statements is difficult without an intimate

understanding of the context in which they are made. In the context of immigrants in particular,

social media content commonly contains foreign languages, further increasing the complexity of

analyzing this information. Government monitoring of social media opens the door to

discriminatory pretextual denials of benefits—in fact, DHS has acknowledged these risks, noting

that “data may be taken out of context,” and that social media surveillance may lead to “an

erroneous adverse effect on an individual, such as denial of an immigration benefit.”1

3. CDT made the FOIA requests to investigate and better understand these practices.

But the government has stonewalled CDT’s FOIA requests. According, CDT brings this action

to enforce its and the public’s right to receive information about the practices.

1 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf.


https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016%E2%80%8C_0.%E2%80%8Cpdf

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016%E2%80%8C_0.%E2%80%8Cpdf

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Jurisdiction and Venue

4. This Court has both subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal juris-

diction over the parties pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B). This Court also has jurisdiction

over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201(a), and 2202. Venue lies in this district

under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).

Parties

5. Plaintiff CDT is a nonprofit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia

and recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as a tax exempt 501(c)(3) corporation. For more

than 25 years, CDT has represented the public’s interest in an open, decentralized Internet and

has worked to ensure that the constitutional and democratic values of free expression and privacy

are protected in the digital age. In support of this mission, CDT uses FOIA to obtain, analyze,

and disseminate information concerning the activities of federal agencies.

6. Defendant DHS is a federal department that oversees the two component agencies

from which Plaintiff seeks records, and is an “agency” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).

7. Defendant CBP is a component within Defendant DHS charged with enforcing

regulations regarding trade, customs, and immigration, and is an “agency” within the meaning of

5 U.S.C. § 552(f).

8. Defendant USCIS is the component within Defendant DHS that oversees immi-

gration to the United States, and is an “agency” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).

Statutory and Regulatory Background

9. FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, requires agencies of the federal government to release

requested records to the public unless one or more specific statutory exemptions apply.

10. An agency generally must respond to a party making a FOIA request within 20

working days, at minimum notifying that party of the agency’s determination of which of the


4

requested records it will release; which it will withhold and why; and the requester’s right to

appeal the determination to the agency head. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). The 20-day period may

in limited circumstances be extended, but only after written notice. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B).

Factual Background

11. On or about February 1, 2011, DHS announced a plan to implement “Publicly

Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiatives” designed to collect,

analyze, and disseminate “relevant and appropriate de-identified information to federal, state,

local, and foreign governments and private sector partners.” 76 Fed. Reg. 5603 (2011).

12. Since that time, DHS has significantly expanded its collection and monitoring of

social media information, and now uses social media to inform its decisions about who may

travel to the United States; who may enter the country; who may stay here; and ultimately who

may become a U.S. citizen.

13. Publicly available information demonstrates that DHS has apparently documented

its expansion of what social media information it collects and monitors through a series of

directives, privacy impact assessments, and privacy compliance reviews, which date from 2011

through the present and have been issued across DHS’s various component agencies, including

CBP and USCIS.

14. On August 14, 2019, CDT filed a FOIA request with CBP seeking records in its

possession or control relating to CBP’s monitoring of social media information. Specifically,

CDT requested CBP Directive 5410-003 – Operational Use of Social Media (Jan. 2, 2015), a

document referenced repeatedly in a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) that examines CBP’s


5

implementation of operational social media monitoring.2 A copy of CDT’s FOIA request to the

CBP is attached as Exhibit A. CBP acknowledged this request as CBP-2019-076482.

15. On September 10, 2019, CDT filed a second FOIA request with CBP, seeking

records in its possession or control relating to the training CBP personnel receive in connection

with monitoring social media information. The second CBP FOIA request had two parts:

• First, CDT sought “[a]ny guidance documents or training materials provided to CBP personnel on the treatment of First Amendment protected activity on social media as referred to on page 4 of the March 25, 2019 DHS/CBP/PIA-058;” and

• Second, CDT requested “[t]he social media training provided CBP personnel from the Office of Chief Counsel and the CBP Privacy and Diversity Office as referred to on page 4 of the March 25, 2019 DHS/CBP/PIA-058.”

A copy of CDT’s second FOIA request to the CBP is attached as Exhibit B. CBP acknowledged

this request as CBP-2019-083584.

16. Meanwhile, on August 27, 2019, CDT filed a FOIA request with USCIS seeking

records in its possession or control relating to USCIS’s use of social media data in adjudicating

immigration benefits, which were referred to in other USCIS documents. The request to USCIS

sought four sets of documents:

• The “USCIS procedures and training focused on understanding data quality limitations associated with social media” referenced in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 18[3];

• The USCIS policy on the Operational Use of Social Media referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-014 on page 5 in this text: “USCIS is finalizing its policy

2 See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative, DHS/CBP/PIA-058 (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf.

3 See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting, DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 (July 21, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.pdf.

4 See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01 (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/


https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.%E2%80%8Cpdf

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.%E2%80%8Cpdf

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf

6

for use of Social Media in compliance with the DHS Directive 110- 01, Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media and Instruction 110-01-001”;

• USCIS training materials on the “USCIS Privacy Requirements for the Oper-ational Use of Social Media training” referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 17 in footnote 38; and

• USCIS “Rules of Behavior” for social media monitoring referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 17 in footnote 38.

A copy of CDT’s FOIA request to the USCIS is attached as Exhibit C. USCIS acknowledged

receipt of this request on September 12, 2019 (COW2019501245).

17. As of the filing date of this Complaint, neither CBP nor USCIS has responded

substantively to CDT’s FOIA requests. CBP has not so much as estimated a date for fulfilling

CDT’s FOIA requests; and although USCIS initially estimated a completion date of December

20, 2019 (a date well beyond the statutory deadline of 20 working days), it has not—since

submission of the FOIA request, or in the 13 months after its own estimated completion date—

provided CDT with any of the agency records it requested.

18. In short, CDT has not received any records in response to its FOIA requests to

CBP or USCIS, even though the statutory deadlines specified in 5 U.S.C. § 552 all have long

passed.

19. CDT has exhausted applicable administrative remedies with respect to production

of records in response to its FOIA requests to the Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR RELIEF

COUNT I (Failure to Produce Documents)

20. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 19.

privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf.


https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf

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21. CDT properly asked DHS, CBP, and USCIS to produce specific records

maintained by the agencies, to which the agencies’ own publicly available documents refer, that

contain details about the agencies’ monitoring of social media.

22. Defendants DHS, CBP, and USCIS either explicitly or constructively denied

CDT’s requests in full and failed to produce any responsive documents or data.

23. CDT has a statutory right to the agency records requested under FOIA, and there

is no legal basis for Defendants to withhold the records.

24. As a result of the actions complained of herein, CDT was denied access to records

that it was entitled to receive in violation of the FOIA.

25. CDT therefore is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the

immediate processing and disclosure of the requested records.

Requested Relief

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

(1) Order that Defendants DHS, CBP, and USCIS immediately and fully process

CDT’s FOIA requests and disclose all non-exempt documents immediately to CDT;

(2) Issue a declaration that CDT is entitled to immediate processing and disclosure

of the requested records in the formats specified by the FOIA requests;

(3) Retain jurisdiction of this action to ensure no agency records are wrongfully

withheld;

(4) Award Plaintiff its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees in this action; and

(5) Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.


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Dated: January 15, 2021 Respectfully submitted, /s/ David M. Gossett David M. Gossett (D.C. Bar #468390) [email protected] Ronald G. London (D.C. Bar #456284) [email protected] Shannon L. McNeal (D.C. Bar #1047259) [email protected] DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 1301 K Street NW, Suite 500 East Washington, D.C. 20005 202-973-4200

Counsel for Plaintiff CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY


EXHIBIT A

Case 1:21-cv-00134 Document 1-2 Filed 01/15/21 Page 1 of 7

August 14, 2019 Via Electronic Mail

FOIA Officer U.S. Customs and Border Protection 90 K Street, NE FOIA Division Washington, DC 20229

RE: Request Under the Freedom of Information Act U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operational Use of Social Media Data To whom it may concern: This letter constitutes a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and is submitted on behalf of the Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) to United States Customs and

1

Border Protection (“CBP”). CDT respectfully requests records pertaining to CBP’s monitoring of social media information.

I. Requested Documents

1) CBP Directive 5410-003 – Operational Use of Social Media (Jan. 2, 2015).

II. Background

On March 25, 2019, CBP issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), “Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative DHS/CBP/PIA-058,” examining CBP’s implementation of operational social media monitoring. The PIA states that CBP searches public 2

social media posts to further the agency’s “situational awareness” including identifying “natural 3

disasters, threats of violence, and other harmful events and activities” that may threaten the safety 4

1 The Center for Democracy & Technology is a 501(c)(3) organization that advocates for global online civil liberties and human rights. CDT drives policy outcomes that keep the internet open, innovative, and free. The organization supports laws, corporate policies, and technology tools that protect privacy, and advocates for stronger legal controls on government surveillance. https://cdt.org/about/. 2 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs and Border Protection, DHS/CBP/PIA-058, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative, 1 (March 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf. 3 Id. 4 Id.

1401 K Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20005


of CBP personnel or facilities, including ports of entry. CBP makes use of Internet-based platforms as well as government and commercially developed tools that facilitate the monitoring of social media sites. Many of these tools use keywords to search for and pull content. CBP 5

employees then review the content captured by these tools for their relevance to “situational awareness and threat monitoring.” The PIA refers to “appropriate uses of social media”; 6

additionally, the PIA makes note of “rules of behavior” that employees must follow when handling social media data. Each reference to these procedures cites CBP Directive 5410-003, 7

“Operational Use of Social Media,” as the document implementing previous directives and dictating operational social media policy for the agency. CBP personnel also receive training to 8

conform their conduct to this document. This Directive, which appears to play a significant role 9

in CBP’s efforts to safeguard rights, is not publicly available. We respectfully request its release. The guidance CBP personnel receive for monitoring and using social media information is of great public interest. Government surveillance of social media raises considerable constitutional and privacy concerns. Indeed, CBP has recently faced scrutiny for targeting activists, journalists and lawyers for surveillance and enhanced scrutiny at ports of entry because they were associated with asylum seekers. Leaked documents from a joint U.S.-Mexico task force suggested that 10

CBP helped compile a “secret database” of journalists and activists, which included social media information. 11

Rather than quell public concern, this PIA—published only a couple of weeks after that story broke—describes an initiative that appears to invite CBP to regard much online social media activity as relevant for review and retention. For example, situational awareness, defined as “information gathered from a variety of sources that, when communicated to emergency managers and decision makers, can form the basis for incident management decision making” 12

could permit CBP to monitor and retain a broad swath of innocent expressive conduct and First Amendment protected activity. Furthermore, CBP’s keyword lists “may be developed for high interest events (e.g., trials or conferences where there may be an increased threat risk).” While 13

5 Id. at 2. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 8. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 12. 10 See, e.g., Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC 7 San Diego (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-US-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html; Mari Payton, Paul Krueger & Tom Jones, Critics Blast Secret US Government Surveillance of Journalists, Attorneys, and Border Activists, NBC 7 San Diego (March 8, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Critics-Blast-Secret-US-Government-Surveillance-of-Journalists-Attorneys-and-Border-Activists-506860971.html. 11 Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC 7 San Diego (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-US-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html. 12 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs and Border Protection, DHS/CBP/PIA-058, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative, 1 (March 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf. 13 Id. at 3.

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the PIA does state that CBP makes efforts “to minimize collecting information related to First Amendment activities,” disclosure of the Directive on the Operational Use of Social Media 14

could provide information about the scope and effectiveness of such efforts. For example, does the Directive permit monitoring of the use of a hashtag associated with a planned protest, or efforts to provide humanitarian aid? Such monitoring would chill the exercise of constitutional rights including the rights to free speech and association. The PIA describes other behavioral restrictions placed on CBP personnel. The PIA states that the majority of CBP personnel will not collect, store or disseminate personally identifying information (PII), however such activity may occur if, among other justifications, the data will “allow CBP to protect [] facilities as well as to ensure the efficient functioning of CBP field locations.” This provides CBP broad discretion to retain much PII, which may result in chilling 15

public expression on social media platforms for fear that CBP could collect an individual’s PII due to their discussion of an issue of interest to CBP. The requested Directive may assuage the public of this concern, or show it to be well-placed. Additionally, the PIA states that CBP personnel are permitted to conceal their identity when viewing social media, “consistent with CBP policy and procedures.” Here, the PIA cites the requested Directive for the policy guiding 16

this CBP conduct. Reading the PIA though, it is not clear what this policy is, and why CBP needs to use masked identities online. Indeed, the PIA states that CBP policy prohibits CBP from posting information on social media sites; connecting or engaging with other social media platform users; and accepting invitations to connect or interact on social media sites. Without 17

access to the relevant CBP directive, the general public has no way of assessing the circumstances in which CBP agents will use masked identities, and no way of assessing what CBP social media monitoring policies permit and whether they are sufficiently rights protecting. In the wake of notable reports of social media surveillance by CBP, the public has a right to be concerned about CBP’s Situational Awareness Initiative, and an interest in reviewing the requested Directive.

III. Application for Waiver of Fees

CDT requests a waiver of document search, review, and duplication fees on the grounds that disclosure of the requested records is in the public interest and because disclosure is "likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). CDT also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that the CDT qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).

1. Disclosure of the requested records is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of CDT.

14 Id. at 11. 15 Id. at 2. 16 Id. at 6. 17 Id. at 2.

3


There is significant interest in CBP surveillance and enforcement conduct at and between Ports of Entry, and numerous news accounts reflect the considerable public interest in the collection of social media information by government agencies. The Trump administration’s plans to expand 18

collection of social media information as part of President Trump’s “extreme vetting” proposal has also received extensive news coverage. While CBP has been unclear about how and when it is 19

utilizing social media monitoring, leaked documents from a joint U.S.-Mexico task force showed that CBP had helped compile slides and dossiers on journalists, activists, and lawyers that included social media information. Finally, with recent security breaches from a CBP contractor releasing 20

sensitive biometric data on the Internet, there is substantial interest in the methods CBP is using to 21

collect and store social media information and other personal data. CDT is not filing this FOIA to fulfill a commercial interest. This request is made in furtherance of the work CDT does for the public interest.

2. CDT qualifies as “a representative of the news media” and the records requested are not sought for commercial use.

18 See, e.g., Matt Novak, US Homeland Security Says Tracking Social Media of Immigrants is Nothing New, Gizmodo (Sept. 28, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/us-homeland-security-says-tracking-social-media-of-immi-1818875395; Shirin Jaafari, The new DHS plan to gather social media information has privacy advocates up in arms, PRI (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-10-12/new-dhs-plan-gather-social-media-information-has-privacy-advocates-arms; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, How ICE and Other DHS Agencies Mine Social Media in the Name of National Security, Common Dreams (June 5, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/06/05/how-ice-and-other-dhs-agencies-mine-social-media-name-national-security. 19 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, US to require would-be immigrants to turn over social media handles, CNN (March 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/29/politics/immigrants-social-media-information/index.html; Saagar Enjeti, Trump administration to ask most US visa applicants for social media information, The Hill (May 31, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/446336-trump-admin-to-ask-most-us-visa-applicants-for-social-media-information; Faiza Patel, Snooping on Foreigners’ Facebook Feeds Is Ineffective and Creepy, The Atlantic (June 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/if-us-takes-visa-applicants-social-media-handles/591544/. 20 See, e.g., Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC 7 San Diego (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-US-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html; Salvador Hernandez, The US Compiled A Secret List Of Journalists, Attorneys, And Activists To Question At The Border, BuzzFeed News (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/government-list-journalists-border-immigration-question; Elliot Spagat, Border agency watchdog looking into caravan database, Associated Press (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/b990c949e7ad4884a2a7dac389885e9a; Ryan Devereaux, The U.S. Targeted Journalists On The Border. Two Senators Want to Know Why., The Intercept (Mar. 11, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/11/southern-us-border-mexico-journalists/. 21 See, e.g., Drew Harwell, U.S. Customs and Border Protection says photos of travelers were taken in a data breach, The Washington Post (June 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/10/us-customs-border-protection-says-photos-travelers-into-out-country-were-recently-taken-data-breach/; Sidney Fussell, This Is Exactly What Privacy Experts Said Would Happen, The Atlantic (June 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/travelers-images-stolen-attack-cbp/591403/; Maggie Miller, Lawmakers demand answers on Border Patrol data breach, The Hill (June 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/448015-lawmakers-demand-answers-on-border-patrol-breach; Russell Brandom, US border agency cuts ties with breached surveillance contractor, The Verge (July 4, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/4/20682143/perceptics-us-customs-border-breach-surveillance-suspended.

4


CDT also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that CDT qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). CDT meets the statutory and regulatory definitions of a "representative of the news media" because it is an "entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III). CDT maintains an active website and social media presence that helps it distribute its commentary and reporting on topical issues related to its mandate. CDT also maintains a bi-weekly newsletter through which it disseminates new material 22

like blog posts and insights to subscribers. CDT will release the requested documents to the public without charge. For these reasons CDT requests that fees for this FOIA request be waived.

Please furnish materials associated with this request to:

Mana Azarmi Center for Democracy & Technology 1401 K Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20005 [email protected] (202) 407-8828 Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Respectfully,

Mana Azarmi Policy Counsel Center for Democracy & Technology

Evan Ringel Legal Intern Center for Democracy & Technology

22 See, e.g., Natasha Duarte, 5 Takeaways from the New DHS Privacy Guidance, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (May 17, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/5-takeaways-from-the-new-dhs-privacy-guidance/; Mana Azarmi, Location Data: The More They Know, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/location-data-the-more-they- know/; Greg Nojeim & Mana Azarmi, Court Steps in to Protect Constitutional Rights at the Border, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (May 11, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/courts-step-in-to-protect-constitutional-rights-at-the-border; Mana Azarmi, CBP’s Border Searches Struggle to Comply with Constitution and Agency Policy, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/cbps-border-searches-struggle-to-comply-with-constitution-and-agency-policy/.

5


Mana Azarmi <[email protected]>

FOIA Request CBP-2019-076482 Submitted1 message

[email protected] <[email protected]> Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 4:46 PMTo: [email protected]

This message is to confirm your request submission to the FOIAonline application: View Request. Request information is as follows:

Tracking Number: CBP-2019-076482Requester Name: Mana AzarmiDate Submitted: 08/14/2019Request Status: SubmittedDescription: On March 25, 2019, CBP issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), “Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and SituationalAwareness Initiative DHS/CBP/PIA-058,” examining CBP’s implementation of operational social media monitoring. The PIA states that CBP searchespublic social media posts to further the agency’s “situational awareness” including identifying “natural disasters, threats of violence, and other harmfulevents and activities” that may threaten the safety of CBP personnel or facilities, including ports of entry. CBP makes use of Internet-based platformsas well as government and commercially developed tools that facilitate the monitoring of social media sites. Many of these tools use keywords tosearch for and pull content. CBP employees then review the content captured by these tools for their relevance to “situational awareness and threatmonitoring.” The PIA refers to “appropriate uses of social media”; additionally, the PIA makes note of “rules of behavior” that employees must followwhen handling social media data. Each reference to these procedures cites CBP Directive 5410-003, “Operational Use of Social Media,” as thedocument implementing previous directives and dictating operational social media policy for the agency. CBP personnel also receive training toconform their conduct to this document. This Directive, which appears to play a significant role in CBP’s efforts to safeguard rights, is not publiclyavailable. We respectfully request its release.


https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/submissionDetails?trackingNumber=CBP-2019-076482&type=request

EXHIBIT B



September 10, 2019 Via Electronic Mail

FOIA Officer U.S. Customs and Border Protection 90 K Street, NE FOIA Division Washington, DC 20229

RE: Request Under the Freedom of Information Act U.S. Customs and Border Protection Use of Social Media Data Training Materials To whom it may concern: This letter constitutes a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and is submitted on behalf of the Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”)1to United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). CDT respectfully requests records pertaining to the training CBP personnel receive relating to the monitoring of social media information.


1) Any guidance documents or training materials provided to CBP personnel on the treatment of First Amendment protected activity on social media as referred to on page 4 of the March 25, 2019 DHS/CBP/PIA-058;2 and

2) The social media training provided CBP personnel from the Office of Chief Counsel and the CBP Privacy and Diversity Office as referred to on page 4 of the March 25, 2019 DHS/CBP/PIA-058.3

II. Background

On March 25, 2019, CBP issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), “Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative DHS/CBP/PIA-058,” examining CBP’s 1 The Center for Democracy & Technology is a 501(c)(3) organization that advocates for global online civil liberties and human rights. CDT drives policy outcomes that keep the internet open, innovative, and free. The organization supports laws, corporate policies, and technology tools that protect privacy, and advocates for stronger legal controls on government surveillance. https://cdt.org/about/. 2 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs and Border Protection, DHS/CBP/PIA-058, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative, 4 (March 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf. 3 Id.


2

implementation of operational social media monitoring.4 The PIA states that CBP searches public social media posts to further the agency’s “situational awareness”5 including identifying “natural disasters, threats of violence, and other harmful events and activities”6 that may threaten the safety of CBP personnel or facilities, including ports of entry. CBP makes use of Internet-based platforms as well as government and commercially developed tools that facilitate the monitoring of social media sites. Many of these tools use keywords to search for and pull content.7 CBP employees then review the content captured by these tools for relevance to “situational awareness and threat monitoring.”8 The PIA observes that “[p]rior to collecting information from social media, CBP employees will determine whether a posting is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and whether the collection of information is permissible under the Privacy Act.”9 To aid these determinations, CBP personnel receive “training to distinguish between First Amendment protected activities and credible threats” which requires the “use of a balancing test when assessing whether or not speech is deemed a threat.”10 Furthermore, “CBP personnel receive social media training from the Office of Chief Counsel and the CBP Privacy and Diversity office on how to identity First Amendment activity and determine if social media posts discuss protected activities, such as protests, or if they are credible threats for which CBP personnel should take action.”11 The guidance and training CBP personnel receive for monitoring and using social media information is of great public interest. Government surveillance of social media raises considerable constitutional and privacy concerns. Indeed, CBP has recently faced scrutiny for targeting activists, journalists and lawyers for surveillance and enhanced scrutiny at ports of entry because they were associated with asylum seekers.12 Leaked documents from a joint U.S.-Mexico task force suggested that CBP helped compile a “secret database” of journalists and activists, which included social media information.13 Rather than quell public concern, this PIA—published only a couple of weeks after that story broke—describes an initiative that appears to invite CBP to regard much online social media activity as relevant for review and retention. For example, situational awareness, defined as “information gathered from a variety of sources that, when communicated to emergency

4 Id. at 1. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 2. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 4. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 See, e.g., Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC 7 San Diego (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-US-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html; Mari Payton, Paul Krueger & Tom Jones, Critics Blast Secret US Government Surveillance of Journalists, Attorneys, and Border Activists, NBC 7 San Diego (March 8, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Critics-Blast-Secret-US-Government-Surveillance-of-Journalists-Attorneys-and-Border-Activists-506860971.html. 13 Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC 7 San Diego (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-US-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html.


3

managers and decision makers, can form the basis for incident management decision making”14 could permit CBP to monitor and retain a broad swath of innocent expressive conduct and First Amendment protected activity. Furthermore, CBP’s keyword lists “may be developed for high interest events (e.g., trials or conferences where there may be an increased threat risk).”15 While the PIA does state that CBP makes efforts “to minimize collecting information related to First Amendment activities,”16 disclosure of the training materials provided CBP personnel on the First Amendment and social media could offer information about the scope and effectiveness of such efforts. For example, does the Directive permit monitoring of the use of a hashtag associated with a planned protest, or efforts to provide humanitarian aid? Such monitoring would chill the exercise of constitutional rights including the rights to free speech and association. Without access to the guidance and training materials provided CBP personnel who engage in social media monitoring, the general public has no way of assessing whether their First Amendment rights are sufficiently safeguarded. In the wake of notable reports of social media surveillance by CBP, the public has a right to be concerned about CBP’s Situational Awareness Initiative, and an interest in reviewing the requested materials.

III. Application for Waiver of Fees

CDT requests a waiver of document search, review, and duplication fees on the grounds that disclosure of the requested records is in the public interest and because disclosure is "likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). CDT also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that CDT qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).


There is significant interest in CBP surveillance and enforcement conduct at and between Ports of Entry, and numerous news accounts reflect the considerable public interest in the collection of social media information by government agencies. CBP monitoring and collection of social media information is a topic of substantial public attention, and the continued use of social media data collection and screening has received coverage from the news media.17 The Trump administration’s

14 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs and Border Protection, DHS/CBP/PIA-058, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative, 1 (March 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp58-socialmedia-march2019.pdf. 15 Id. at 3. 16 Id. at 11. 17 See, e.g., Matt Novak, US Homeland Security Says Tracking Social Media of Immigrants is Nothing New, Gizmodo (Sept. 28, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/us-homeland-security-says-tracking-social-media-of-immi-1818875395; Shirin Jaafari, The new DHS plan to gather social media information has privacy advocates up in arms, PRI (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-10-12/new-dhs-plan-gather-social-media-information-has-privacy-advocates-arms; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, How ICE and Other DHS Agencies Mine Social Media in the Name of National Security, Common Dreams (June 5, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/06/05/how-ice-and-other-dhs-agencies-mine-social-media-name-national-security; Shera S. Avi-Yonah and Delano R. Franklin, Incoming Harvard Freshman Deported After Visa Revoked, The Harvard Crimson (Aug. 27, 2019),


4

plans to expand collection of social media information as part of President Trump’s “extreme vetting” proposal has also received extensive news coverage.18 While CBP has been unclear about how and when it is utilizing social media monitoring, leaked documents from a joint U.S.-Mexico task force showed that CBP had helped compile slides and dossiers on journalists, activists, and lawyers that included social media information.19 Finally, with recent security breaches from a CBP contractor releasing sensitive biometric data on the Internet,20 there is substantial interest in the methods CBP is using to collect and store social media information and other personal data. CDT is not filing this FOIA to fulfill a commercial interest. This request is made in furtherance of the work CDT does for the public interest.

2. CDT qualifies as “a representative of the news media” and the records requested are not sought for commercial use.

CDT also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that CDT qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). CDT meets the statutory and regulatory definitions of a "representative of the news media" because it is an "entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III). CDT maintains an active website and social media presence that helps it distribute its commentary and reporting on topical issues related to its mandate.21 CDT also maintains a bi-weekly newsletter through which it disseminates new material https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/8/27/incoming-freshman-deported/. 18 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, US to require would-be immigrants to turn over social media handles, CNN (March 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/29/politics/immigrants-social-media-information/index.html; Saagar Enjeti, Trump administration to ask most US visa applicants for social media information, The Hill (May 31, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/446336-trump-admin-to-ask-most-us-visa-applicants-for-social-media-information; Faiza Patel, Snooping on Foreigners’ Facebook Feeds Is Ineffective and Creepy, The Atlantic (June 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/if-us-takes-visa-applicants-social-media-handles/591544/. 19 See, e.g., Tom Jones, Mari Payton & Bill Feather, Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates Through a Secret Database, NBC 7 San Diego (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/investigations/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-US-Government-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.html; Salvador Hernandez, The US Compiled A Secret List Of Journalists, Attorneys, And Activists To Question At The Border, BuzzFeed News (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/government-list-journalists-border-immigration-question; Elliot Spagat, Border agency watchdog looking into caravan database, Associated Press (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/b990c949e7ad4884a2a7dac389885e9a; Ryan Devereaux, The U.S. Targeted Journalists On The Border. Two Senators Want to Know Why., The Intercept (Mar. 11, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/11/southern-us-border-mexico-journalists/. 20 See, e.g., Drew Harwell, U.S. Customs and Border Protection says photos of travelers were taken in a data breach, The Washington Post (June 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/10/us-customs-border-protection-says-photos-travelers-into-out-country-were-recently-taken-data-breach/; Sidney Fussell, This Is Exactly What Privacy Experts Said Would Happen, The Atlantic (June 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/travelers-images-stolen-attack-cbp/591403/; Maggie Miller, Lawmakers demand answers on Border Patrol data breach, The Hill (June 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/448015-lawmakers-demand-answers-on-border-patrol-breach; Russell Brandom, US border agency cuts ties with breached surveillance contractor, The Verge (July 4, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/4/20682143/perceptics-us-customs-border-breach-surveillance-suspended. 21 See, e.g., Natasha Duarte, 5 Takeaways from the New DHS Privacy Guidance, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (May 17, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/5-takeaways-from-the-new-dhs-privacy-guidance/; Mana Azarmi, Location Data: The More They Know, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/location-data-the-more-they- know/; Greg Nojeim & Mana Azarmi, Court Steps in to Protect Constitutional Rights at the Border, Ctr. For


5

like blog posts and insights to subscribers. CDT will release the requested documents to the public without charge. For these reasons CDT requests that fees for this FOIA request be waived.

Please furnish materials associated with this request to:

Mana Azarmi Center for Democracy & Technology 1401 K Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20005 [email protected] (202) 407-8828 Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Respectfully,

Mana Azarmi Policy Counsel Center for Democracy & Technology

Evan Ringel Legal Intern Center for Democracy & Technology

Democracy & Tech. (May 11, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/courts-step-in-to-protect-constitutional-rights-at-the-border; Mana Azarmi, CBP’s Border Searches Struggle to Comply with Constitution and Agency Policy, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/cbps-border-searches-struggle-to-comply-with-constitution-and-agency-policy/.


Mana Azarmi <[email protected]>

FOIA Request CBP-2019-083584 Submitted1 message

[email protected] <[email protected]> Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 12:10 PMTo: [email protected]

This message is to confirm your request submission to the FOIAonline application: View Request. Request information is as follows:

Tracking Number: CBP-2019-083584Requester Name: Mana AzarmiDate Submitted: 09/10/2019Request Status: SubmittedDescription: 1) Any guidance documents or training materials provided to CBP personnel on the treatment of First Amendment protected activity onsocial media as referred to on page 4 of the March 25, 2019 DHS/CBP/PIA-058; and2) The social media training provided CBP personnel from the Office of Chief Counsel and the CBP Privacy and Diversity Office as referred to onpage 4 of the March 25, 2019 DHS/CBP/PIA-058.

On March 25, 2019, CBP issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), “Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness InitiativeDHS/CBP/PIA-058,” examining CBP’s implementation of operational social media monitoring. The PIA observes that “[p]rior to collecting informationfrom social media, CBP employees will determine whether a posting is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and whether thecollection of information is permissible under the Privacy Act.” To aid these determinations, CBP personnel receive “training to distinguish betweenFirst Amendment protected activities and credible threats” which requires the “use of a balancing test when assessing whether or not speech isdeemed a threat.” Furthermore, “CBP personnel receive social media training from the Office of Chief Counsel and the CBP Privacy and Diversityoffice on how to identity First Amendment activity and determine if social media posts discuss protected activities, such as protests, or if they arecredible threats for which CBP personnel should take action.” The guidance and training CBP personnel receive for monitoring and using socialmedia information is of great public interest. Without access to the guidance and training materials provided CBP personnel who engage in socialmedia monitoring, the general public has no way of assessing whether their First Amendment rights are sufficiently safeguarded.


https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/submissionDetails?trackingNumber=CBP-2019-083584&type=request

EXHIBIT C



August 27, 2019

Via Electronic Mail FOIA Public Liaison U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services National Records Center, FOIA/PA Office P.O. Box 648010 Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010 [email protected]

RE: Request Under the Freedom of Information Act U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Use of Social Media Data To whom it may concern:

This letter constitutes a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and is submitted on behalf of the Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”)1 to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). CDT respectfully requests records pertaining to USCIS’s use of social media data in adjudicating immigration benefits.


1) The “USCIS procedures and training focused on understanding data quality

limitations associated with social media” referenced in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 18;2

2) The USCIS policy on the Operational Use of Social Media referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01 on page 5 in this text: “USCIS is finalizing its policy for use of Social Media in compliance with the DHS Directive 110- 01, Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media and Instruction 110-01-001”;3

3) USCIS training materials on the “USCIS Privacy Requirements for the Operational 1 The Center for Democracy & Technology is a 501(c)(3) organization that advocates for global online civil liberties and human rights. CDT drives policy outcomes that keep the internet open, innovative, and free. The organization supports laws, corporate policies, and technology tools that protect privacy, and advocates for stronger legal controls on government surveillance. https://cdt.org/about/. 2 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-068, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting, 18 (July 21, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.pdf. 3 U.S. Dept’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, 5 (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf.


2

Use of Social Media training” referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 17 in footnote 38;4 and

4) USCIS “Rules of Behavior” for social media monitoring referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 17 in footnote 38.5

II. Background

On December 16, 2014, USCIS issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), for “The Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate”,6 which provided a number of updates on how the FDNS directorate collects, uses, and maintains personally identifiable information. As a part of its work to “to verify the historical, biographical, financial, and personal information presented by applicants to detect the possibility of immigration benefit fraud and public safety and national security concerns,” FDNS personnel may review publicly available social media data.7 The PIA noted that, “USCIS is finalizing its policy for use of Social Media in compliance with the DHS Directive 110-01, Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media and Instruction 110-01-001.”8 It also noted that FDNS personnel would have to sign “Rules of Behavior” and receive an annual training on the use of social media data.9

On July 21, 2017, USCIS issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), “Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting DHS/USCIS/PIA-068,”10 examining a variety of issues regarding the implementation of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). This report included a section on “Social Media Reviews” indicating that the agency’s FDNS directorate may use multiple methods to review the social media presence of “select applicant populations” in order to identify “publicly available information . . . that may impact eligibility for [refugees’] immigration filing.”11 The social media information collected is handled in a manner “consistent with existing USCIS policies and rules of behavior regarding the use of social media information in adjudicative decision making.”12 Furthermore, it is noted that “[a]ll FDNS personnel receive the USCIS Privacy Requirements for the Operational Use of Social Media training and sign Rules of Behavior before initial use is granted and annually thereafter.”13 This PIA also stated that there are policies and trainings provided to USCIS personnel regarding the data quality limitations in publicly available social media information.14

How USCIS personnel retrieve and assess social media information in the course of adjudicating 4 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-068, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting, 17 (July 21, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.pdf. 5 Id. 6 U.S. Dept’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf. 7 Id. at 13. 8 Id. at 5. 9 Id. 10 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-068, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting, 7 (July 21, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.pdf. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 17. 13 Id. 14 Id. at 18.


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immigration benefits is an issue of great public interest. USCIS’s determinations on who may or may not receive an immigration benefit are highly consequential for the applicant and their loved ones. The U.S. government’s decision to review public social media data to aid these consequential decisions has raised numerous concerns about the preservation of immigrants’ rights to free speech and association. Further there is significant concern that inaccurate information and inferences will be derived from a review of an individual’s social media presence. Social media data can be an unreliable reflection of an applicant, a fact that both of the above referenced PIAs acknowledge.15 And the inclusion of social media data in these decision-making processes can leave applicants vulnerable to pretextual denials.

Agency documents acknowledge a need for standardized procedures when assessing social media data. Internal USCIS assessments of pilots involving social media use have noted a need for “clear guidance” on the evaluation of what social media records are derogatory and “worth future investigation,” the use of any allegedly derogatory information, and the sharing of “potential concerns” with law enforcement officers.16 Similarly, agency privacy evaluations recognize the need for a standardized procedure for the handling of social media data given the sensitive nature of the data, calling for the implementation of “Rules of Behavior for the Operational Use of Social Media” to ensure proper training and use by agency employees.17

The collection and use of social media data by agencies such as USCIS may have a substantial chilling effect on those seeking an immigration benefit, particularly absent clarity as to the treatment of their expressive activity. Proper training of USCIS personnel on the data quality limitations of social media could be a significant safeguard to prevent harm to applicants. However without access to this training or other policy guidance on how USCIS adjudicators should evaluate social media data, the public cannot be confident that the agency has adopted sufficient measures. The PIAs reveal that USCIS has endeavored to guide personnel on how to use social media data in the adjudication of immigration benefits. The release of the requested documents will either shore up confidence in the agency’s training and guidance materials, or reveal gaps in protection that must be addressed. In order to ensure that immigrants’ rights are appropriately safeguarded, we respectfully request the above listed documents be made publicly available.

III. Application for Waiver of Fees CDT requests a waiver of document search, review, and duplication fees on the grounds that disclosure of the requested records is in the public interest and because disclosure is "likely to

15 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-068, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Refugee Case Processing and Security Vetting, 18 (July 21, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-refugee-july2017.pdf; U.S. Dept’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, 14 (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf. 16 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Review of [redacted] Adjustment of Status Social Media Pilots, 33 (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/obama-team-did-some-extreme-vetting-of-muslims-before-trump-new-documents-show. 17 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013(a), Fraud Detection and National Security Data System, 14 (May 18, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-uscis-pia-013-01-fraud-detection-and-national-security-directorate; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013(a), Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, 5 (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsuscispia-013-01-fraud-detection-and-national-security-directorate.


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contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). CDT also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that the CDT qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).


USCIS monitoring and collection of social media information is a topic of substantial public attention, and the government’s collection of social media data in screening immigration visa and benefit applicants has received coverage from the news media.18 The expansion of persons from whom the government is collecting social media information has received media attention.19 The Trump administration’s plans to expand collection of social media information as part of President Trump’s “extreme vetting” proposal has also received extensive news coverage.20 Civil society organizations are concerned about the expansion of social media monitoring and collection by government agencies and have specifically addressed the lack of publicly available guidelines explaining how federal agencies monitor, collect, and use social media information.21 CDT is not filing this FOIA to fulfill a commercial interest. This request is made in furtherance of the work CDT does for the public interest.

18 See, e.g., Matt Novak, US Homeland Security Says Tracking Social Media of Immigrants is Nothing New, Gizmodo (Sept. 28, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/us-homeland-security-says-tracking-social-media-of-immi-1818875395; Shirin Jaafari, The new DHS plan to gather social media information has privacy advocates up in arms, PRI (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-10-12/new-dhs-plan-gather-social-media-information-has-privacy-advocates-arms; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, How ICE and Other DHS Agencies Mine Social Media in the Name of National Security, Common Dreams (June 5, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/06/05/how-ice-and-other-dhs-agencies-mine-social-media-name-national-security. 19 See, e.g., Sandra E. Garcia, U.S. Requiring Social Media Information From Visa Applicants, New York Times (June 2, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/us/us-visa-application-social-media.html; Jackie Bischof, The US just added one more requirement for visa applicants to stress about, Quartz (June 2, 2019), https://qz.com/1633061/us-visa-applications-will-now-include-social-media-screening/; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Government surveillance of social media related to immigration more extensive than you realize, The Hill (May 29, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/445766-government-surveillance-of-social-media-related-to-immigration-extensive. 20 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, US to require would-be immigrants to turn over social media handles, CNN (March 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/29/politics/immigrants-social-media-information/index.html; Saagar Enjeti, Trump administration to ask most US visa applicants for social media information, The Hill (May 31, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/446336-trump-admin-to-ask-most-us-visa-applicants-for-social-media-information; Faiza Patel, Snooping on Foreigners’ Facebook Feeds Is Ineffective and Creepy, The Atlantic (June 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/if-us-takes-visa-applicants-social-media-handles/591544/. 21 See, e.g., Hugh Handeyside, The FBI ‘Can Neither Confirm nor Deny’ That It Monitors Your Social Media Posts, American Civil Liberties Union (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/internet-speech/fbi-can-neither-confirm-nor-deny-it-monitors-your-social-media; Sophia Cope, DHS Should Stop the Social Media Surveillance of Immigrants, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/dhs-should-stop-social-media-surveillance-immigrants; Coalition Letter Opposing DHS Social Media Retention, Ctr. For Democracy and Tech. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://cdt.org/insight/coalition-letter-opposing-dhs-social-media-retention/; Kimberly McCullough, Why Government Use of Social Media Monitoring Software Is a Direct Threat to Our Liberty and Privacy, American Civil Liberties Union (May 6, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/why-government-use-social-media-monitoring; Faiza Patel, Social Media Monitoring, Brennan Ctr. For Justice (May 22, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/social-media-monitoring.


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2. CDT qualifies as “a representative of the news media” and the records requested are

not sought for commercial use. CDT also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that CDT qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). CDT meets the statutory and regulatory definitions of a "representative of the news media" because it is an "entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III). CDT maintains an active website and social media presence that helps it distribute its commentary and reporting on topical issues related to its mandate.22 CDT also maintains a bi-weekly newsletter through which it disseminates new material like blog posts and insights to subscribers. CDT will release the requested documents to the public without charge. For these reasons CDT requests that fees for this FOIA request be waived. Please furnish materials associated with this request to: Mana Azarmi Center for Democracy & Technology 1401 K Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20005 [email protected] (202) 407-8828 Thank you for your attention to this matter. Respectfully, Mana Azarmi Policy Counsel Center for Democracy & Technology Evan Ringel Legal Intern Center for Democracy & Technology

22 See, e.g., Natasha Duarte, 5 Takeaways from the New DHS Privacy Guidance, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (May 17, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/5-takeaways-from-the-new-dhs-privacy-guidance/; Mana Azarmi, Location Data: The More They Know, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/location-data-the-more-they- know/; Greg Nojeim & Mana Azarmi, Court Steps in to Protect Constitutional Rights at the Border, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (May 11, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/courts-step-in-to-protect-constitutional-rights-at-the-border; Mana Azarmi, CBP’s Border Searches Struggle to Comply with Constitution and Agency Policy, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/cbps-border-searches-struggle-to-comply-with-constitution-and-agency-policy/.


U.S. Citizenship and Immigration ServicesNational Records CenterP.O. Box 648010Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010

www.uscis.gov

September 17, 2019

Mana Azarmi1401 K Street NWSte 200Washington, DC 20005

COW2019501245

Dear Mana Azarmi:

We received your request for information relating to number of documents relating to USCIS's use ofsocial media data to aid immigration adjudications.

You specifically requested:

1. The "USCIS procedures and training focused on understanding data quality limitations associated withsocial media" referenced in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 18

2. The USCIS policy on the Operational Use of Social Media referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01 onpage 5 in this text: "USCIS is finalzing its policy for use of Social Media in compliance with the DHSdirective 110-01, Privacy Policy for Operational use of Social Media and Instruction 110-01-001

3. USCIS training materials on the "USCIS Privacy Requirements for the Operational Use of SocialMedia training" referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page 17 in footnote 38, and

4. USCIS "Rules of Behavior" for social media monitoring referred to in DHS/USCIS/PIA-068 on page17 in footnote 38.

This office received your request on September 12, 2019.

We may need to contact you at a later date about the nature of your request.

Your request is being handled under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). Ithas been assigned the following control number: COW2019501245. Please cite this number in all futurecorrespondence about your request.

We respond to requests on a first-in, first-out basis and on a multi-track system. Your request has beenplaced in the complex track (Track 2).

Your request for a fee waiver has been granted.

Consistent with 6 C.F.R. § 5.5(a) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) FOIA regulations,USCIS processes FOIA requests according to their order of receipt. Although USCIS’ goal is to respondwithin 20 business days of receipt of your request, FOIA does permit a 10-day extension of this timeperiod in certain circumstances. Due to the increasing number of FOIA requests received by this office,we may encounter some delay in processing your request. Additionally, due to the scope and nature ofyour request, USCIS will need to locate, compile, and review responsive records from multiple offices,both at headquarters and in the field. USCIS may also need to consult with another agency or othercomponent of the Department of Homeland Security that have a substantial interest in the responsiveinformation. Due to these unusual circumstances, USCIS will invoke a 10-day extension for your requestpursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B). Please contact our office if you would like to limit the scope of yourrequest or to agree on a different timetable for the processing of your request. We will make every effort


COW2019501245Page 2

to comply with your request in a timely manner.

This office now offers an online delivery option. If you would like to receive the requested records online,you will need to register this request at first.uscis.gov. If you do not already have a MyUSCIS accountyou will be prompted to create one. Once logged on, click the "Register Request" link where you will beasked to enter your control number COW2019501245 and the following six digit PIN: 446050. If you donot wish to take advantage of this option, we will be providing your records on a Compact Disc (CD) foruse on your personal computer. To request your responsive records on paper, please include your controlnumber and write to the above address Attention: FOIA/PA Officer, or fax them to (802) 860-6908.

The National Records Center (NRC) has the responsibility to ensure that personally identifiableinformation (PII) pertaining to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) clients is protected. Inour efforts to safeguard this information, we may request that additional information be provided tofacilitate and correctly identify records responsive to your request. Though submission of this informationis voluntary, without this information, your request may be delayed while additional steps are taken toensure the correct responsive records are located and processed. Further, if we are unable to positivelyidentify the subject of the record we may be unable to provide records responsive to your FOIA request.

You may check the status of your FOIA request online at www.uscis.gov/FOIA. Click the “Check Statusof Request” button in the middle of the web page or “FOIA Request Status Check & Average ProcessingTimes” on the left side under “Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIA).” Then click “FOIACheck Status of Request” at the bottom of the page and follow the instructions given. If you have anyquestions concerning your pending FOIA/PA request, or to check the status of a pending application orpetition, please call The National Customer Service Center at (800) 375-5283. Please be aware that theNational Records Center no longer accepts FOIA/PA related questions directly by phone.

All FOIA/PA related requests, including address changes, must be submitted in writing and be signed bythe requester. Please include the Control Number listed above on all correspondence with this office.Requests may be mailed to the FOIA/PA Officer at the PO Box listed at the top of the letterhead, emailedto [email protected], or sent by fax to (802) 860-6908. You may also submit FOIA/PArelated questions to our email address at [email protected].

Sincerely,

Jill A. EgglestonDirector, FOIA Operations


FOIA Summons

1/13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.

)

)

Defendant )

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant’s name and address)

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 30 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) you must

serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and

address are:

If you fail to respond, judgment by default may be entered against you for the relief demanded in the

complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

ANGELA D. CAESAR, CLERK OF COURT

Date:Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk


U.S. Customs and Border Protection1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NWWashington, D.C. 20229

David M. GossettDavis Wright Tremaine LLP1301 K Street NW, Suite 500 EastWashington, D.C. 20005

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs andBorder Protections; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration


FOIA Summons (1/13) (Page 2)

Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date) .

’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or

’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)

, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,

on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or

’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)

on (date) ; or

’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or

’ Other (specify):

.

My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date:Server’s signature

Printed name and title

Server’s address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

0.00


FOIA Summons

1/13



)

Plaintiff )

)


)

)

Defendant )







address are:






U.S. Department of Homeland Secuirty245 Murray Lane SWWashington, D.C. 20528


U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration



Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE





on (date) ; or






on (date) ; or



.





Server’s address


0.00


FOIA Summons

1/13



)

Plaintiff )

)


)

)

Defendant )







address are:






U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services20 Massachusetts Avenue, NWWashington, D.C. 20008





Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE





on (date) ; or






on (date) ; or



.





Server’s address


0.00


FOIA Summons

1/13



)

Plaintiff )

)


)

)

Defendant )







address are:






Jeffrey A. Rosen, Acting Attorney GeneralU.S. Department of Justice950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NWWashington, D.C. 20530





Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE





on (date) ; or






on (date) ; or



.





Server’s address


0.00


FOIA Summons

1/13



)

Plaintiff )

)


)

)

Defendant )







address are:






Michael R. Sherwin, Acting United States Attorney for D.C.U.S.Attorney's Office555 Fourth Street, NW 20530


U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration



Civil Action No.

PROOF OF SERVICE





on (date) ; or






on (date) ; or



.





Server’s address


0.00


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