Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 1 … · 2019. 12. 21. · Case...

Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 of 68C06541713 _____ .J I.....,.,..._,...._.,...;.,,... ........

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(b) (3) NatS�cAct "

Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

fflftNF) DEA TH OF A DETAINEE IN (2003·7402-IG)

(b) (1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

John L. Helgerson Inspector General

27 April 2005 (b)(3) CIAAct , (b )(6) .

I Acti Ai • I . I ng � ssistant nspector Gen�ral for Investigations

(b)(3) CIAAct ..

(b )(6) I \supervisory

(b)(3) NatSecAct

speer.at Agent .

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

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NATIONAL SEtURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

NOFORN·

PROPIN·

ORCON-

REL ... •

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

Not Releasable to Foreign Natlo.nals

Caution-Proprietary Information Involved

Dissemination and Extraction of Information

Controlled by Originator

This Information has been Authorized for Release to ...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

INTRODUCTION ........•........................... � ................•.................. 1

SUMMARY ..... � ..........................•.•.........•.......... � .. .... 1!•················••o• 1

BACKGROUND .........•.•...•............•..............•.........••..••.••.......••.... 5 . .

PROCEOURES AND R'ESOURCES •............... � .....•..........•........ 6

FINDINGS·····································.················································ 7

(SffN'P) GUL RAHMAN1S CAP'.rURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION ..... � .... 7 (b )( 1 )

. J I ·

(b )(3) NatSecAct (.s/fNf) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS A.t\ t .......... ..... ...... 9 . . .

(-st/NF) POUCY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AT-THE TIME OF ............................................................... ., .................... . .

·�""··· . (StfNr) RESPO'�SIBILiTY FOR RAHMAN's INTERROGATION ............ ...... 1B . "

(SlfNF) RAHMAN's 'TREATMENT DURING DETENTION A.Nb . . . . INTERROGATION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• �· •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , ••••••• 21

�'lm') RAHMAN's LAsT 'DIREE DAYS � ................................................... 41 (W/f'OUO) 1iIE INVESTIGATION BYIHE DO INVESTIGATIVE 'I'EAM .... 50

(b)( 1 ) . ( b )(3) C I AA ct . (€f OTHER ncHNIQUES EMPLOYED OR APPROVED

. �� NatSecAct 8� f ................................................... .' .................... '. ... ; .................. 54 (b)(7)(c) · LNl�IT'\ N DAYT11 rA•T' D C · 55 �cn1nr1· OTIFICATIONS OF .1vuuv.1.t1.1v S EATIITQ ONGRESS ............ . . .

(U) APPLICABLE LA ws, REGULATIONS AND Poucu:s ............... ; •. .,; ... ;.SB .

CONCLUSIONS ....•.......•.•.......•..•..•.•...... ; ..•..... ,, ... � ....... � .•.....•..•... 61

RECOMMENDATIONS .••... .••. .....•.................•.•• ., ...•.• ; ...... � .•...•... 64 (b)(3) NatSecAct

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APPENDIX Chronology of Significant Events EXHIBIT . . (b)(3) NatSecAct

I �ubject: '�--��Gui Rahman: Chronology of Events (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(StfNF) DEA TH OF A DETAINEE I (2003-7402-IG)

(b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

27 April 2005 . (b )( 1) (b )(3) NatSecAct INTRODUCTION

. . (b)(1) . 1. "(S//NF) OngN ovember 2002, an individual detained by (b)(3) NatSecAct the CIA in\ GulRahman, died. On[=:November, the

I

· Deputy Direct or.for Operations (DDO) informed the Deputy .

Inspector General that the DDO had dispatched a team to investigate the death. In January 2003, the Office.of Inspector Ge'ne.ral (QIG) :filitiated an investigation: This report reviews the events.leading to. Rahman's death.

·

. (b)(1) . SUMMARY (b)(3) Na:tSecAct

., 2. (S/ /NF) Rahman, a suspected Afghan extremist associated

with the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin (RIG) o�ganization, who was a roximatel 34 ears' old was ca tured in Pakistatj

� ��g� NatSecAct Oc�t�ob_e_r-20_0_2-.1� ·

On �--�--�-------.��-----------�-------' ov�rnber 2002, aircraft. rendered Rahman from

(b)(1) (b)(1) (b )(3) Na�tS_e_: cA:::: c::::t =:::::=:::::::::::::::::::::===:::= (b_)(_3_) N _a _ts_:_e _cA_c _t __________ _


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.atSecA�t detention rrogation facility,! J

in security �ards reportedly found Rahman ead in ce e morning ·of0November 200?

(b)(1) . (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 3. {S//NP). Between[}md0November 2002, R��3) Nat?e�Act

underwent at least six interrogatioJ.'.l sessions b. � Agency personnel.

1 The interrogation team included th� !Site Manager,. , ( b) ( 1 ) J _

� independent contractor (IC). ___ --�

(b)(3) CIAAct nsychologist/interrogator, (C) Bruce Jessen; the Station'� (b)(3) NatSecAct and an IC '--.-•�t--� (b)(6) ' (� )(7)( c)

had no rteITOg:lioI\ I experience. or relevant training before his arrival in in July 2002. However, he acquired some .on-th7b�)(T) training an experience during the four mfb)(1? he had been[(b)(3) NatSecA�t'fior to Rah.man's death. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecA�t 4. �I I Rahm:m·was subjected to sleep deprivation sessions of up to 48 hours, at least one cold shower, and a "hard

I takedown" termed "rough treatment" as reported in pre"."death cables · addressing the progress of the interrogation. In addition, Rahman ��g� NatSecActepor.tedly w�s without clothing �or m�ch of.his.time a�i J I Despite these measures, Rahµtan remamed uncooperative and

· provided no intelligence. His only concession w�. to acknowledge (b)(1) . 1:tls identity on�November 2002 and, subsequently, to explain what (b )(3) NatSecAct.m h th · · Rahman. t : d his · tan I v ll.lage e came ?m; o erwISe, re a.me resIS ce

(b )( 1) postw:e, and demeanor. The cab:e fron:i II onONo;.ember 2002 (b)(3) NatSecActeporting that Rahman had admitted .his laenflty �tated, Rahman

spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold conditions with minimal food an<;! sleep." A psychological

(b)(1) assess�ent of Rahman, prepared by Jess�n and reported in a cab�e on (b)(3) NatS�cA�November �002, no ted �ahman's r�markable physical and

psychological resilience and recommended; in part, "continued . environ.mental deprivations."

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

2 (U / /�ot all members of the Interrogation team were.lnvolv� In every interrogation session.

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� _ _,,,5_._,. (S//NF)' On the afternoon of0November 2002, wheCJ I �ards delivered food to Rahman, he reportedly threw his food, water bottle, and defecation bucket at the guards. In addition,

(b)( 1 ) he reportedly threatened the guards and told theceen their (b)(3) C IAAct faces and would kill them upon his release. Whe as (b)(3) NatSecAct informed of this incident, he approved or directed e guards to

��(�)· . ·shackle Rabman's hands and feet and connect the shackle.s with a short chain. This position forced Rahman, who was �ed below the waist, to sit on.a cold concrete floor and prevented· him from standing up.

(b)( 1 ) 6. \S//NB The following morning, the guards'.reported that (b)(3) NatSecActRahman was slumped over in his cell. The ambient te�perature w:as

recorded at a low o0degrees Fahrenheit. Rahman was still in the (b)( 1 ) "short chain position," wearing only a sweatshirt. (b)(3) NatSecAct '

·" 7. -�> c--1station reported Rah.man's death that day in (b)(3) NatSecJ:'c!ml �cable to.the DDO. The 'QDO.dispatched an .

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. investigative team (the Directorate of Operations (DO) Investigative Teaml consistine: of a senior security officer assigned to the · "" · .. .. .. . .

(b)(3) C IAAct an Office of General Counsel ��g� NatSecAc,__t(_OG_C_,.) (b)(3)_C IAAct ttomey, and an Agency pathologist to

· The DO Investigative Team conducted . interviews, an the pa o ogist performed an autopsy of Rahman.

The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that the death · was caused by hypothermia.3 ·

8. ts//l'if) On 22 January 2003, the General Counsel informed the Inspector General (IG) that. Rahman. died as a result of the · �onditions at a facility substantially controlled by Agency officers. O�G initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident and reported the death to the Department of Justice

3 (U} Hypothermia is subnormal temperature within the central body. The term hypothe� is used when an individual's body temperature is below 95 degrees Fahrenheit. This will occur

/when the loss of body heat exceeds heat production. ·

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(DoJ) by letter on 13 February 2003.4 On 29 December'2003, the Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, DoJ reported by memorandw;n that

(b )( 1) DoJ would not.pursue a federal prosecution of c�al charges (b)(3) NatSecActregarding Rahman's death. The matter is Wlder review by the U.S.

I Attorney's Office for the Eastern Dishict of Virginia. 1· (b)(3) CIAAct · ·

��(c) 9 .. (S;tzE'E'1, At the time of his assignment itj IC was 1 · I

a first-toml__J:>perations officer who had no training or . experience to prepare him to manage a detention facility or conduct

(b)(1) interrogations. At the time of Rahman's deathJlhad not · ·

(b )(3) C IAAct received interrogation training and was ri;.erar facility with a (b)(3) NatSecAct di f H d · 'd ..1

5' · dir (b)(6) . mo �o ea quarters gw anc ean'(b)(1) talion ect

(b)(7)(c) supervision. (b)(3) NatSecAct

10. (S//�Wt This OIG investigation concl:Udes tha� I treate� Rahman harshly because of his alleged-stature, lack of cooperation, p�es�ure to break Rahman, and I �experience

(b)(1) with a committed interrogation resi.Ster. I �proved O! ordel;'ed

(b )(3) CIAAct- pladngi.Wunan in the short chain position while naked beio ....... wr-<th....,....e------r(b )(3) NatSecActiVaist in near freezU::tg c onfinemerit c:onditions 'and this directly.led to (b)(6) Rahman's dea� by hypothermia. I �xhibited ·reckless (b)(7)(c) indifference to the possibility that his actions might cause injuries or

result in Rahman's death. (b)(1) . . (b )(3) NatSecAct

lL (S//NF) OIG foun� that Rahman did not receive a · physical examinatiqn during his detention at l . land concludes

(b)(1) that the Station's Physician's Assistant (PA) did

(b)(3) CIAAct �ot attend to Ra.hn4m in the same manner and with the same (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b )(7)( c)

4 (S/ /NF) This referral is a requirement of Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C,), § 403q(b)(5) that mandates .OIG to report ix:tformation .conce�g possible violations of federal criminal law to DoJ. The General Counsel had orally advised the Chief of the Ctjminal Division, DoJ, of the cirCUID$tances of Rahman's death on 24 January 2003. ·

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stand�d of ·care as the other detainees.5 �urthe� \as a medical care provider, was aware of the increasingly �old conditions inJ \during the period of time he and Rahman were both in

(b)( 1 ) I . ]Novem�b)(��02) and did not advocate more humane

(b) (3) NatSecActtreatment for Rahman.(b)(3) NatSecAct . 12. OIG also concludes that I I

(b ) ( 1 ) • d not provide adequate supervisioi:d orj \ · (b)(3) CIAAct . . . M r Jb dir t 'bili'ty (b)(3) NatSecAct1ctiv1ties at _ ?reover�

. . 7ar�.

ec .respons1

(b ) (6) · .for failing to include pertinent facts m hts official wntten account of (b)(7)(c) Rahman's death that led to material omissions and inaccuracies being

provided to the Congressional oversight committees. ' (b)( 1 )

. (b)(3) NatSecAct · ·

(b)( 1 ) BACKGROUND (b )(3) NatS�cAct .

. " .. 13. (SI/N'.FY Soon after the establishment of0Station in early '2002, the Station took the initiative to begin conductin interrogations of detamees using Staffon guists. (b)( 1 )------!

(b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

�---(b )(3) NatSecAct __ (b )(3) NatSecAct ______ --.-.1

(b ) ( 1 ) 14. f:S / Jn A ril 2002, _]station p['osed thj (b)(3) NatSecAc�onstruction of etention facility to meet

the Station's requirement or "secure, safe, and separated handling of (b )(1) terrorist detainees." In June 2002, Head uarters' Cotinterterrorist (b)(3) CIAAct Center (CTC) pproved the (b)(3) NatSecA�!mds to establish the etention facility The . ' (b)( 1 )

(b ) ( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

______ (b)(3) NatSecAct. _ __..___�

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facili was an_�gency o� (b)(1)

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSe'cAct (b)(3) NatSecAct � l I . . . . · (b)(1) · 15. \vt 1.1.�r) received 1ts first·detam.ee on(b)(3) Na

.tSecAct

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Oeptember 2002. After the first month of operation� th.e l population had grown to its mct?dmum capacity of 20 detam,___ee_s _. � 1 I·

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��g� NatSecAct 17· (S//NF)[ \ Iha� overall responsibility for the facility, and Agency staff

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(b )( 1 )

officers and contractors trayeled on tem or to conducHnterrogatiens·at the: facili i---�-��-'-L___ __ _J \ ..

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(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES· (b)(3) N·atSecAct

� __ 1_8_.�(S//!'qf) Two OIG officers traveled to\ lmspected ·

�--�and conducted interviews· there as a part of the . investigation. OIG reviewed the material collected during the Sp17cial Review1.Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003- j 7123-IG), that is relevant to this investigation. Iricluded within that· material are policy doctiments, cables, and infernal and external communications. OIG also drew material for this R,eport fromilof . ! the interview reports prepared during the Special ReView. Oi� reviewed all m:aterials assembled for the DO Investigative Team and that team's final report, including a final autopsy report. · (b)(3) CIAAct

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FINDINGS

fSllNf) GUL RAHMAN'S CAPTURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION (b)(3) NatSecAct

19. -tS/ � J Rahman was a suspected Afghan extremist from Lowgar Province, who was associated with the I:IIG organization.7 CTC identified him as a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abu Abd Af.;.Rahman Al-Najdi, an alleged member of Al-Qa'ida.8 Rahman was an ethnic Pashtun who spoke Pashtu, Dari, and Farsi

. l · and was approximately.34 years old. ·


(b)(1) - (b)(3) NatSecAct _______________ ___,

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··:.� �·i21. (8/ Riliman was apprehended in Islamabad, · · 'faidsfan on October 2002, during an early morning raid,�--�

... 1 (b)(1) I (b)(3) NatSecAct · (b )(3)_ NatSecAct.=�==;;;;'--:------

7 f.TI r-1 During �interrogation sessioi;' after he admitte� his true identity, �said he was trffin:Krllangar Village; Pol-E-Alam Region, Lowgar Provmce. Lmygar Provmce 18

. immediately southwest.of Kabul.



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(b_)(_3) __ N_a_ts_e _cA_c_t _____ ,

22. October 2002 ..

Station sent a (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ___ --,,, ____ _j_---,.--.---l-a_d_VIS_· --,ed that\ I during a

· t�rrogation sessio had identified one of '-c=---=�-�--' '-,-------.>

(b )( 1 ) his fellow detainees as Gul Rahman. (b)(3) NatSecAct of the L___··----·-------------- -------�

apprehension. In a reflection of how important a detainee Rahman (b)(1) · was believed to be,-Headquarters subs�quen�y advisedL I (b)(3) NatSecActm� �tati.ons that Secretarr of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had

· . requested an �pdate on tr(b)(1) Jcase. (b )(3) NatSecAct

'23. (S

(b)(1) (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(3) NatSecAct . . b On

' November 2002. Rahman was rendere to (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) . w·

. (b)(3) NatSecAct 24. -(5'/ Following Rah.man's rendition t� I \ =1generate stx cables regarding Rahman, including two cables

following his death. Only one of these cables, which reported the chronology of Rahman's death, provided a ch�acterizatio� of . · �an, describing� as an: "enemy comb.atant.1112

12 (U / /FeBe} The Department of Def� defines an "enemy combatant" as an individual who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of the conflict. (Letter from William J. Haynes II to Senator Grl Levin, 26 November 2002.) .

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25. (-S

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e was targete ecause o s ro em a i a. an was considered an Al- ·

Qa'ida operative because·he assisted the group. Beirig both a HIG member and an Al-Qa'ida operative is not inconsistent. '-----�

there is no fo:pnal definition of the term 0oper".1tive." !rt Rahµtan(b)(6) case, it would be similar to the term "facilitator.''L]v:iewed a (b)(?)(c) facilitator as somewhat less involved than an operative.

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(8f/Nf) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS ATL (b)(3) Na�SecAct


(b)(1) �---,'---�-'--.----,-----�-----'(b )(3) NatSecAct.------'

27. (S/ INF) The detention facility6=,=======f--�--. consisted of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells.


. Four of the cells had �--�·---------------'-�

a metal bar above eye level that ran between. two walls to which detainees could be secured by their hand.s in a standing sleep-. deprivation position. The facility's windows were covered tO

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13 'ESffNF) · �ent facility fo�.__-�fvas completed Q2Q04 and detainees ';ere removed fromL_____J

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suppress outside light. Stereo speal<ers in the cellblock constantly played loud music to thwart any· attempt to communicate between detainees.


( b )( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) 29. (S//NP) I ]was not insulated and .had no central air (b)(3) NatSecAct di. · . h tin A -i.. d t' d (:On tiorung or ea gi an gency-pur\,:J.Lase . genera or supporte

its power requirements. Whenl received its first detainee in

b 1 September 2002, by many accounts the �emperature was hot and � b ��3 � c I Met . remained gen�rally h�t or warm until N o:v.emb�r 2002.15 Individual (b)(3) NatSecAct:ells were des1gn�d with a recess for electrical space heaters; (b)(6) however, electrical heaters were not placed in the cells. (b )(7)( c)

· · · 30.- �/./t.&) Cestimated there were between six and l2 gaS heaters in the cellblock at the time ·of.Rahman's death .. '-I ---�

I f offker who participated in the DO Investigation Team, reported there were five gas 'heater.s in the detainee area of the (b)(1) f"",..;litybefore Rahman's death. (b)(3) NatSecAct

___ 3_1_. �/INF} According t�e customary practice at (b)(1) [ �as to shave 'each detainee's head .and beard and conduct a (b)(3) CIAAct 't'\ledical examination upon arrivcil. Detainees were then given

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(b)(3) NatSecAct . · .

(b)(6). . iiniforms and moved to. a cell. Photographs were taken of each (b)(7)(c) detainee foridentification purposes. While in the cells,.detainees· ·

. were shackled �o the wall . .The guards fed the 'detainees· on an . alternating schedule of ohe meal on one �day' anl two meals the nei<t d In ti. . ti' f th.

Id th dir t. d\ (b)(6)l . (b)(i) ay. � crpa on o e co wea. er . ec e (b)(?)(c) (b)(3) CIAAct .

. .

(b )(3) NatSecAct (S//twt According tQ the door had to be opened to deliver water bottles and acc.ess (b )(6) · the excrement bucket. . ( b )(7) ( c) · 15 (U) .In November 2002, the temperature(Qanged from a high ofOo a low .oO

degrees F�eit. . . .(b)(3) NatSecAct · .

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(b )( 1) assistant, I \to acq, ;air unlfomts, heaters, (b)(3) CIAAct · · h fu1 · (b)(3) NatSecAct propane, and blankets. According t e was success m

(b)(6) purchasing the uniforms, blankets an some hea�ers. It was difficult (b)(7)(c) · to purchase heaters because they were in high dem.and. U a detainee

was cooper�tive, he was afforded improvements in his environment to include a mat, blankets, a Koran, a lamp, and additional food · choices. Detainees who were not cooperative were subjected to austere conditions and aeeressive interrogations until they became

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32. (S//NF) for the U.S. Bur�au of Prisons (b)(1) �OP). to s�nd a aining team toCJfrom Oo (b)(3) NatSecAcL_JNovember.16 team worked ·with the mtenor guard force

· · concentrating on teclutlqu�s such as entry and escort procedures, ( b )( 1 ) application of restraints, security checks, pat 'down and cell searches, (b)(3) CIAAct · and.,.docunienting prescribed checks of detainees·. ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct ·

(b)(6) . . ' • .

(b)(?)(c) . 33. (S//NF) J J . \ \characterizedL_=:JlS "so many accidents

'." · · . .. · '"· ,.,, ... 'waiting to"happen." For example; there could be an attack from the'" · · oulsi.i'le; the detainees could hurt thtimselve."J 1 · (b)(1).. ,· .. , •. -.. 1 . COSL . ]":' (b)(3) NatSecAca 'b d

''hi h . k hi . . lli .

(b )( 1) escn e as a ns , run mte · ence facili!Y_�

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) : (b )(7)( c)

.....__ _______ ,_ In an electronic message

(e-rt�ail) to· the J?DO two days after Rahm�'s d.eathi JWrote, in

pa ' ·. . .

.

On an employee impact ·note, I have made it clear to all hands involved that the responsibility is mine alo�e, �othing more need·


��--�-�---�--�------·---·--------(b )( 1) 17 (� erved J(b )( 1) . om August 2002 until July 2003. (b)(3) ClAAct .________, (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

d (b)(6) ·SEeRET· NOPORM/IMR (b )(7)( c) (b )(3) NatSecAct

Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C0654 1 7 1 3

. . ... f • • : .. '


C06541713 Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C0654 1 7 1 3 ·

SECRE'T/J Jl'.'iOPORN//"MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

be said on that, and I am and have been coordinating with appropriate senior hqs levels since the inception of this -p�ogram.

(b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) (b)(7)(c)

��g� CIAAct . 35. (S/(NF)I " �� 'dnot knowwhathis'duties (b)(3) NatSecActwould be when he arnved m He believed the primary factors (b )(6) . in his assignment as Site Mana er were the vacan in the (b)(7)(c) detention progi;am and that ·

[ _J !i had no formal instruction ,atine:, (b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) CIAAct

· int errogations untifA.Pril 200310months into his our.21 . �_(b)(1)

36 .. (S//tifi) rnl �ssign e� �b)(3) NatSecAct· res onsibili · for all detention-related functio

(b)(3) NatSecAct as also responsible f<-?r ��(c) renditions to

.and from other CC?untries and detaine� transfers. j�------.

(b)(1)

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIMct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b )(7)( c)

(S//�lP) as not designated as a Certified Interrogator until he completed the two- ·

week interrocti.on cowse and 40 hours of s:upervised interrogations with an experienced interrogator

-·-�ertification was awarded on[}pril 2003.

(b)(3) CIMct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6)

. ' �/dhl()PADJJ//lv� (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct


I . · l,..

I . !


C06541713 Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541 7 1 3

Sf!CMT � VMOPOft:M//MR (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

. (b)(3) CIAAct -----(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) (b)(7)(c)

. 37. (�//NF) [=1�xplained that he �elected ·--�b_as_e_d_o_n__, ��g� CIAAct. ·. -several factors including the fact] (b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(6) (b )(7)( c) '.----�-------------� added th�t he watched �-�

disc ar e his duties and was ve satisfied with the job he perform�d. said that he and ed a lot about issues. ad free access to th tation front office,

recalled consulting with t least once· a day; (b)(1) . . ' ' ��g� ��Act·

· 38. (S//NFj[ !stated that he andj j briefed\I (b)(6) . on CIA policies, anj!\ �earned from on-the-jop .training. CJ (b)(7)(c) believed tha� lreceived whatever guidance·was available at·

Oefore he arrived, butll did not know what that was. · .. , said that the guidan�asseC;1.tol !included such issues··

C:: 's prohibition on torture; being vigilant\ Ito enstµ'e· (b)(1) there iS no torture; and the facfthat it iS·perm.issible to use certain · · . · (b)(3) NatSecA?t tactics 4i. debriefing that cannot-injure, threaten with death, or induce

(b)(1) lasting physical damage to the detainees. ·

(b)(3) CIAAct · .

39 (S.' ':f:\m)J L 'd h b · £ d 'cul . . (b).(3) NatSecAct.· · • < n u: J!:lat e w�.s ne1e on parti ar (b)(6). . mterrogations.on a case-bv-case basIS. 1f there was a new or (b)(7)(c) important detainee· a� Jhe was briefed every day as the

(b )( 1)

. t ti. 'ts ' (b)(1) m erroga on ran 1 course; (b)(3) NatSecAct. ·

40. (S//�I bdvised that he had discussio with Station mana ement-includin

when issues arose. management visited

. very other day, or l stated that someone from Station (b)(1 )�h011t once a month.

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b )(7)( c)

-SE-cRE..........,,I'dNOFeRN//� (b)(3) NatSecAct.




SOCRE� I� f'roroltM//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct · -

41. (S//P.JP-) The Director·of CTC--in written comments on the (b)(1) draft report endor�ed by the DDO, who served as the previous (b )(3) C IAAct Director of CTC-said thaf, by thj fall of 2002, the shortage of veteran (b)(3) NatSecAc!.Jperations officers had hit(b)(1) Station hard. To accomplish critical (b )(6) • . . (b)(?)(c) nuss1ons, . (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

CTC often relied on talented young officer�such as �----�

to take on responsibilities beyond their training and experience. In j lease, he was asked to take on enormous res onsibilities atj }rincipally l;>ecause of his

.i---��-�,,--' (b)(3) NatSecAct �--� and relative maturity, whi qualified him better than

most for this entirely new DO mission.

(SllNF) PouCY FOR CUSTODIAL 1NT£RROGATJONS AT THE TIME OF RAHMAN' s D.EAriI

. 42. (S//�JF) Prior to the time of Ralunari's death, CTC and OGC disseminated policy guidance, via cables,.e-mail, �r orally, o� a specific case-by-case basis to addr:ess r�quests to.µ.se specific

·

interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those involved in· interrogations to sign an acknowledgement thatthey'had read, un�erstood, or agreed to comply with the gui<;lanceprovided; nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals

(b)(1) . who had been briefed oil interrogation procedures.

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 43'. (S//NF)' According to in (b)(S)· ·I �002, a senior operations

�o�ffi� .c

-1(b

-)(_1

_,_) --'------------\

(b)(7)(c) ��-

interro ated a artic:ularly obstinate d\.bJ.@L�atSecAct The officer

te a ca e t propose ques a , timately, became the mqdel for I I Jrec�ed that the proposal included use of darkness, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and noise;

��jgj NatSecActhe use of.cold temperatures was not addressea.23 The response from Headq�ters was th�b fn) proposal. was acceptable, based on the fact

.--------·(b)(3) CIAAct----------�-� (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

�23--.-(S-7-'/?_.JP)_As- no-te-d-be-lo-w�l ( b) ( 7) (Cf tppears mistake n about the absence of a proposal to use cold as a technique. .

. 14· SECRET/l�-��Oitt'<f//MK

· . · · ··· . ...

. ·��-�-�-��-�� - - ·--- - - - ·---·-- - - ----- · · ------ - -. -(b)(3) NatSecAct--�----- ---- - --· - - ·--·-· · -- -- -- - · --·




SECR'.ET /j ��IDFOR:N//lvffi (b)(3) NatSecAct

that no permanent harm would re�ult from any of the proposed measures.24 Prior to the death of Rahman, that cable from · Headqu1:1rters served as the Station's guidance on what could be done in interrogations.

44. (S//NF)J ]explained that Station guidance was to (b )( 1) adhere to the four teclmiques approved by .Headquarters. Guidance (b)(3) CIAAct L • di" 'd al' t t · 'tiall " t h t h 11 It (b)(3) NatSecAct'o m VI :U m ei:r?ga ors� y �as ca c as ca c can. ��s (b )(6) l_ !responsibility to morutor things a� \ !stated (b)(7)(c) that the issue.of when the Station needed to s e ek Headqu�ters

approval was a erav area. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct -45. (-5/l I !2002,J !submitted to

(b)(1) . Headquarters a proposed interrogation plan for the detainee at the . ·

(b )(3� NatSecAc� I It r equested "specific Head,quarters concurrence and definitive CTC/Legal authority" to employ specifi�d

· intep:ogation techniques. With the·detainee. It proposed sound disori entation, time deprivation, light deprivation, physical con;tfort leveJ deprivation, loweritcg the quality of the detainee's food, and ·

,. · ·�·:�·" · ... ·--·unpx:e'dictable r01md-the-clock interrogation: that would lead fo sleep" · · · · · · deprivation. The cable offered a specific descripf;ion of each of the

· · · "::. �: .

. , ,,."proposed techniques. One specific proposal was, ·· :: '· · � . . ·: :·: · · .... :� .

fhyskal comfort level deprivation: With the use of a window air' conditioner and .a jq.dicious provision/ deprivation of WaI'll\ clc:ithing/blankets, believe we can increase [the det�ee's] .Physical discomfort level to the·point where we may lower his mental/trained r�sistance abilities.

(b)(1)· (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

·--------'----------� (b )(7)( c)

S!'eltETd:NoFoluU/MR . ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C0654171 3


C06541713 Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 713 I SECR&-T/j f�RU//MR ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

· . 48. (-Sr) A review of cables to�� from\ �etwee� (b)(1) nAugtiSt and1=}fuvember disclosed only one cable proposing (b)(3) NatSecAct

. . ·

(b)(1) l (b)(3) NatSecAct

J 16 SEC�� OltM//Mft

, . I

I / ...

---------(b)(3) NatSecAct _________

____ __ _



C06541713 A�c� for Release: 201 6/09/30 co6541 713

T� VNOFOIU�//MR(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct · . (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) additional interrogation methods forl �e��ees. This cable, (�)(3� Cl�ct

A tiVritten by Jessen for a different detainee, requested permission to · �b��)

Nat ec capply "the following [moderate value target] in,terrogatkm pressures

(b)(7)(c) ... as deemed appropriate by Uessen], ... isolation, sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation (sound masking), facial slap, body slap,·attention grasp, and stress positions."

(bl( 1 l 49. (5/ [> Acrdlng tc=Jhe initial m�rrogiitionS (b)(3) NatSecAct:onducted at in S eptember and October 2002 were more

custodial interviews, with the added psychological impact of being in that facility with total darkness and separation from other detainees. When Agency officers came to conduct interviews or interrogations, the only guidance he provided them was how to get m and out of tli.e

(b)(1) facility securely. I �tated that .the interrogators enjoyed the . (b)(3) CIAAct freedom to do what they wanted. He did not po$sess a list of "do's (b)(3) NatSecAct and don'ts" for interrogations · (b)(6) ' • '

(b)(7)(c)

( b )( 1 )

. 50. (S/ /NF) The :Qi.rector of CTC-in written comments on the draft report endorsed by the DDO said that, at the time of Rahman's

.. death, there was a lack of dear, applicable program guidance for operations to detain and interrogate terrorists captured on the · battlefield. He stated, · · , : · · .....

[T]he opening ofl � September 2002 came � a practical (b)(3) NatSecAct

' response to a clear-cut and urgent C?,perational need. ' Unfortunately,! . . · �egart 'operation while CU\ wa& still in

,. l

the process of establishlrig uniform and <;ietailed program guidance on detention and interrogations pradices, and prior to development of the structured, tightly controlled CTC !fetention and interrogation program managed by CTC ... today. While that program�which was launched in November 2002 from a low base of experience, personnel, and· overall expertise-also came together without well develo ed and detailed CIA olicie on detention and interrogation

(b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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C06541713

(b)( 1 ) Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 7 1 3

(b)(3) NatSecAct SECR&'.r I� iNOPORM//MR . (b).(3) NatSecAct

(b )( 1 ) 51. ) Accordingly, when�-��-(b )(3) CIAAct arrived in n ovember 2902, foQ' first TDY assignment (b)(3) NatSecAct1 · eportedly advised "You cannot harm or (�)(�) .. e etainees, u you can handle the e n�interrogations ( )( )(c) as you see fit." It was not apparent toOthaL_Jknew what �e

rules were.26 . _ · · ·

'Sf "N.F'\ RE D A .. 'rfl l A ... rl [ (b)( 1 ) I ( I / SPONS1BIUTYFOR A'\./UlJ.Yll1lV S NTERROGATION (b)(3) NatSecAct ( b) ( 1 ) 52. (5//NF) I I stated that it w \ · (b)(3) CIAAct t all diti ' aft fli hts (b)(3) N ts Aree ren qn aircr g ��-

(b)(6) 8 ec iieeded to be elsewhere. H�wever, e said he-di not have a specific

(b)(7)(c) recollection of the rendition of Rahmani !on[]November 2002.27 There was no logbook documenting the arrivals and departures of Agency personnel at the facility.

(b)( 1 ) ·

53. (S//NF) ontends that Rahman was the (b)(3) CIAAct _,.. . 'bility f J . t · · h th. J (b)(3) NatSecAct'spons1 � o essen.. as no certain w , e er essen wa�

(b )(6) · sent to I Wi,th Rahman or another case.2B JessP.n d t d al . ti . 'th Rahman. (b)( 1 ) (b)(7)(c) · Con uc e sever mterroga on s.ess1ons w1 · · · (b)(3) NatSecAct -

54. .(6/./NF-)'··A:ccording tq !Jessen met ·with Rahman eve�9 Tho�e sessions were documented in a series of cables that\___Jindicated were drafted by Jessen.I . �aid he ·

·participated in some· of the iriterrogatioris Jessen conducted but could. (b)(1 ) . . . . . (b)(3) CIAAct . not remember how many. Wh� infon:ned th.�t a pre-dea� (b)(3) NatSecAct�ported that Jessen cond1:J,cted srx ses�1ons with Rahman,� (b )(6) estimated he participated in, about three of th.ose. I f tated that (b)(7)(c) . (b)( 1 ) : . (b)(1 ) .

(b)(3) NatSecAct ' (b)(3) NatSecAct

26 (SttNF) eked iQ�ovemb.r 2002 untl[]Ianuarv 2003. I ! I .

( b) ( 1 )--------01-( b) ( 3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 28 � According to a October 2002 CTC/UBL cable, Jessen was �ing sent t �-� ['to� in-depth interrogations of several key Al-Qa'ida operatives recently detained in _]Rahman was not captured until 00ctober 2Q02. 29 (S//Pffl Jessen was ir((b )( 1 )�onflOctober until[}J'ovember 2002.

· . (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C0654 1 7 1 3


C06541713 Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 71 3 .

SEGRE! !I VNOflem:M//MR (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) . he ctif not recall which interpreter :icipatr in the interrogation (b)(3) CIAAct sessions with Rahman. According to fter Jess�n left I (b)(3) NatSecAc�ovember 2002, Rahman becam case by default,.._a�d�din-. -g� ��(c) ti:at all of the detainees who �ere not being interrogated were under

his general control. . . . 55. (S//NF) Jessen, who holds a Ph. D in clinical psychology,

( b )( 1 ) . was experienced from nearly two decades of work in the Department (b )(3) N atSecAcbf Defense SERE program and· had conducted interrogations of CIA's

. first high value detainee at a different'location,30 Jessen explained

/�lgl C IAAct that he was directed to ro tol � conduct an evaluation of (b)(3) NatSecActmother detainee, \ While there, he evaluated (b)(6) several other detainees! prepjed �terrogation plans, and forwarded (b)(7)(c) them to Headquarters. also asked Jessen to evaluate Rahman,

described as a "hard case:" Jessen said Rahman, got a lot of attention and he became the focus of[=:Jand the Station's High Value Target cell.

. . 56. �//NF) Jessen explained tha� �ked Jessen to look

. �·� �g� ·N�tS��A;tafRahnian in addi�ori to the other defainees Jessen, was evaluatiilg at '• I

· · I · · · I According to Jessen,! · . Jwas responsible for all of the

• r 1' , , � . ,

(b)(i.)

· · · : · . . · · '�·detainees that came tq fWhen det�ees arrived, it 'was · •" "' . . . .

. ... '

(b)(3) C IAAct I I responsibility to interr�gate them. When �ked if Rahman (b)(3) NatSecActwas his case, Jessen responded1 "Unequi�ocally, no." When informed (b)(6) . . thaoserted that Rahman wa's Jessen's case, Jessen averred (b)(?)(c) tha as wr�>ng. .

(b )(6) '(b)(?)(c)

30 '(€). Jessen became a CIA independent contractot ox\ 12002, following his retirement .from active duty with the U.S. Air Force. ·

· �� \

SECR£'r ��1tMOP�//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct




(b ) ( 1 ) SECRET(� �ltM//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct · (b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) C IAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct . 57� (S//NP) According tq la second independent ��(c) contractor

.psychologist/�terrogat?r, (C) James Mit�ell, came �olL---�

. to work with another detamee dunng November. Mitchell particrpated . in one of �e'Il.'s sessions with Rahman.31 Bo.th psychologists left I lonL___JN"ovember 2002. . . "

(b)( 1 ) 58 . . (S//NF) Mitchell stated that he observed! �terrogate (b) (3) C IAAct · . . (b)(3) NatSecActRahman on one occasion for about 10 nunutes; Rahman was (b)(6 ) ·uncooperative. Mitchell stated �an appeared healthy; however, (b)(? )(c) he had scratches on his face, bruises on his ankles, and his wrists

were black and blue. Mitchell requested that the PA examine Rahman' hands 32 (b) ( 1 ) '

s · (b) (3) NatSecAct ·

(b)( 1 ) 59. �5//NF�escribed Rahman as a significant figure at (b)(3) C IAAct I Dru " · · · · Rahman (b)(3) NatSecAct not ve an opportuni to interrogate (b)(6) and did not see him when he was alive. as·informed·that (b) (? )(c) Rahman was someone else's. case, possibly

�---

. 60. ts//NF) I · I I advised that she··was,.jnl fWhen . (b)( 1 ) Rahm . d · d th 33 Sh am· . t d ' his . 'tial (b)(3) C IAAct . an was eta.me er�. e p � m rm

(b)(3) NatSecAcfnterrogationj . �and.traveled toL_J�er·he·was rendered (b)(6) there.34.1 \said she participated in an un4etermined numbe� of · (b)(?)(c) interrogations of Rahman but estimates it was fewer than 10. She

·participated wi�d Jessen on two occasions. · She estimated . she participated in #ve interrogations of� after J�ssen left

(b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct · (b)( 1 ) .

(b)(3) NatSecAct 31 {S,4WF) <;:able records indicate Mitchell arrived l----==1>nDovem�r 2002. Mitchell had a background with the SERE program similar' to Jessen's. He became a CIA IC in Septen'l.ber 2001 following retirement from the U.S. Air Force. Like Jessen, Mitchell had been involved in the inteITogation of the Agency's first high value detainee. · · ·

(b) ( 1 ) 32 � According t� I the Stati.o� PA, no one ever requested that he (b)(3) C IAAct Pxamine Rahman, his hands, or an other detafuee. (b )(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) (b )(7)( c)

SECRET/I JH'OFORN,< /,MR . (b)(3) NatSecAct


. . I r

. I I I

I . '


C06541713 Ap�r()'{�or Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 7 1 3 � / j fNOPORW//'.b4:1?

(b)(1 ) '(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) N atSecAct

·

. I \November 2002. When asked who had the interrogation · · responsibility for� �ponded, "no one in

particular-so I guess d me."

(Bl/Nf) RAH.MAN'S TREATMENT DUIUNG DETENTION AND I · N . (b)(1 )

(b)( 1 ) NTERROGATIO . · (b)(3) NatSecAct ,

(b)(3) CIAAct · \ . . · . . , (b)(3) NatSecAct 61 . (S//NF) I ,Bald he dir not •r,ecifically recall Rahman 6 (b )(6) . treatment upon arrival a� l stated that Rahman's

. (b)(7)(c) clothes would. have been removed early in his detention, and most of the time Rahman was naked or would have been wearing only a diaper.

(b)( 1 ) · . 62. (SJ /NF(�said that Ralµnan was either in h,is ·cell or (b)(3) CIAAct in a sleep deprivation cell when he was not being interrogated.35 (b )(3) NatSec�lt �id not know exactly how much tim� Rahman spent in the · . �� l�*l( c) sleep ldep,tion cell but estimated it was about 50 perce.nt of the ·

time. contended that no sle� .. d:pri�ation was conducted on Rahman a ter Jessen �eparted [onl_J'Jovember] and added there

.. would have been no point in continuinl it the\ beca�e Rahman was . not being interrogated.36 According· to Rahman arrived at

(b)( 1 ) . . ... · · · [ \in a cliape;- and i� was·remo:v.ed at some point. He was · · ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct•robably put back in a diaper.when.he .was put in a sleep deprivation cell

,.37 Ho"Weve�said there wot.tld have been-no reason to use

a diaper when R�an1was no.t in a sleep deprivation cell.

. . . (b)( 1 ) ' (b)(3) CIAAct. 63. �//hP?) I \characterized Rahman as stoic and very (b)(3) N atSecAGJtubbom, uiilike the other· detainees. He was the most stubborn

· �� (c) · individuai th�y detained at the facility.SS Although most of tl:te other detainees were "compliant" almost imme.diately, Rahman wa.S h;lrri-

.' ' (b)( 1 )

. · (b)(3) NatSecAct

35 �) As mentioned earlier, four of the 20 cells at\ �ere constructed with an iron bar across 'the top of the cell and secured to two walls. These cells could be used to force the detainee to stand during sl�p deprivation sessions. · ,

·

. 36 � Despitc=Jontention, . ecall�· that Rahman ( b) ( 1 ) was in a sleep depriyati�n c�ll on []Novembe� '.2002 when she �eked on the detainees. (b )(3) NatSecActl7 � During the OIG visit tl_ �anC}4ay 2003, two detainees were

undergoing standing sleep deprivation in these ce�. Both were naked. 38 (� At the time of Rahman's death� (b )( 1 )een in operation for 69 days.

· · (b)(3) NatSecAct

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SHCRET/ 1 foPORN//1\1.Clt (b)(3) NatSecAct

core Pash tun. He ·had been a �ombatant all his Ille and had been ((bb))((1 )

) wounded many times. Rahman did not complain and simply said, . 3 C IAAct "Thanks t G d all ' 11 " Wh . d d that . his 'd t d (b)(3) NatSecAct o o , :rs we . en rerrun e m vi eor-a�p�e�-� (b) (6) 19 December 2002 intervie� with the DO Inlestiga�ve Team,�I ---�

(b)(?)(c) stated that Rahman complained incessantly, aid he just I .. recalled Rahinan being stoic. ·

·

(b)(3) NatSecAct '

64. W-1 J . J According to cables reporting Rahman' s interrogatioris, he didl complr about conditions. After the first two

(b )( 1 ) days of interrogation, eported that Rahman "co:µi.plained b )(3) NatSecAct>out poor treatment, coinplained about the violation of his human

tjghts, and claimed inability to thmkdue to conditions (cold)." The subsequent cable reporting Rahman' s .interrogation sessions described Jessen's impression that Rahman "continues to use 'health and welfare' behaviors and �omplaints as a major part of his resistance posture."

(b)( 1 ) 65. �S//NF) The DO Investigative Team inteniewedD (b)(3) NatSecfct I guard c�mmander four days after Rahman's. death .

. . . According to the ·guard cemmanderL Rahman wore p�ts for .. t • • •• ,, . \ .. . . ,-3, �:.

appr�ximitely .his first,�ee ?ays atl . (�)(1)i·then spent the · remamder-ofhis ·detentio� without pants. · (b)(3) NatSecAct

66. (S//NF) Jessen said that Rahman's diaper and clothes· would have been removed at the interrogators' directi�n: The guards

· would not have removed them wifl:l:out direction. According to . Jessen, Rahman was without his clothes more than he was· with them. The int�tro�ors gave Rahman .some· clothing after he admitted his . identity onl(b)( 1�ovember 2002. · (b)(3) NatSecAct · r------.

67. (Sr/P'il!) . The linguist,! �xplained that it was difficult · (b)( 1 ) � him' t b h ft h . t d . Rahman' . t . (b)(3) NatSecAc?r o remem �r oyv ? en e ass�

.e m . s m err?gation

I · at l lbut estimat�d it was appr�Xllil.ately fiv� to seven times.39 (b) ( 1 ) He assisted! Im the interrogation of two detainees, including (b)(3) C IAAct · ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct---'--------------------------�

(b)(6) 'T? ) (c)

.. .

.,.,

SHCRE-T 1 1 �OEOll.W//MR (b) (3) NatSecAct

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I I I ·


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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Rahman. f !stated that during the entire time he saw Rahm� at (b)(1) . I �Rahman was either wearing a diaper or was naked below (b)(3) Nat§.�c�9.ist. I �aid that he could not be precise about when

Rahman wore a diaper as opposed to being naked, but his condition seemed to alternate from one to the other. The\ fhirt that ·

Rahman wore was not sufficient to cover his genital area. Rahman . (b)(1) was particularly concerned with being naked in front of \ (b)(3) NatSecA�t . \the guards. Every ti.me Rahman crune to the��.

interrogation room·, he asked to be covered. · d not observe a supply of diapers at the · but it was evident t9 .

(b)(1) him that Rahman·had received a replacement di�per at som'(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct juncture. (b){3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) · . . 68�) Acco�ding toL:=Jprior to the first interr6 ation (b)(7)(c) sessiont�stated that Rahman was a "reall bad ." as '

present when Rahman was rendered t . d was .. . . present when Rahman was first interrogated a That was

(b )( 1) either the niSht Rahman was rendered to�r the succeeding (b)(3) NatSecActday. The first interrogation session included Jessen� and

· .. · ,. �· " "'." possibly\ I The· only other person remembered being · · "� , '" · ,,

(b)(1) present dur41g one of Rahman's i:nterrogatjons was Mitchell. The (b)(3) CIAAct, ·:··•-:mterrogation sessions with Rahman were normally brief bec·ame of ' "!' ''. 1-:::.-(b)(3) NatSecActl.. : . . illin' t t Th tl d 15 · · (b )(6) .. · . �ns unw. gness o coo�era e. ey were mos y aro� minutes (b)(7)(c) m duration; the longest was one or two hours.

69. (S//NF) Jessen estimated that he interrogated Rahman two to 'four times.40 He employed an 11insult slap" with Rahman once but determined it was only a minor irritant to Rahman and worthless as a continuing teclinique. Jessen occasionally observed! I '

(b)(1) · encounters with Ra):unan ahd said he was the hardest case in (b)(3) .CIAAct ... ti' •ty· th' t J· h d . b. . d· E h . R-'-·---(b)(3) NatSecAct'ap v1 a ess� a ever o serve . ven w · en wwU:Ui was

(b)(6) depleted psychologically, he would r9utinely respond .that he ·was (b )(7)(c)

40 � A cable reported that Jessen was invoived in six interrogation sessions with Rahman.

23

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"fine" when asked about his condition. The only concession Rahman. made was to admit his identity when it was clearly established and irrefutable.(b)(3) NatSecAct

.

(b)( 1 ) 70. (S"}i !Jessen prepared the futerrogation .plan for Rahman (b)(3) NatSecActefore departing I ?nd noted that there was no quick fix to get him

I to cooperate. It would take a long time and it W(l$ necessary to keep up the pressure on Rahman and to provide medical assessments. Jessen did not foresee that the interrogation plan on Rahman would be. implemented for some time, at least not until the S�tion was augmented by graduates of the interrogation classes.41 Jessen wrote in

(b) ( 1 ) a cable dated[]\fovember 2002 as a part of the Interrogation Plan (b )(3) NatSecAclleconiinendation:

· It will be important to manage !fl.e [proposed interrogation] deprivations so as to allow [Rahman] adequate rest and nourishment so he remains .coherent and capable of providing accurate informatiort: The station physician should collaborate with the interr.ogation team to achieve this optimum balahce.42 It is reasonable to expect two weeks or more of this regimen before

J · significant movement occurs. . . ."""' . . . ·: . . (b)( 1 ) . . ' . . (b)(3) C IAAct 71. �S//NF) I . !described Rahiruu\ as '!ineredlbly · (b)(3) NatSecAc�talwart " and said he would not talk. I · ldid not remember . · (b ) (6 ) . . I . .

• , . ' . '

(b)(?)(c) what clothes Rahman was weanng. I �dded that Rahman ·

: wotild hav� been riaked during the interrogation sessions. She said

I she is not certain, but believed that l(b)( 1 )� receive(l cfothes, a top and bottom, after Jesse11 departed[(b)(3) N�tSecAct .

. . . 72. (S/ /HF) tated that he is not certain how many

detainees at (b)( 1 ) ave been naked (t){1' the waist down. It . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3� NatSecAct

��-

. (b )(3) _N�Actording to a Headquarters ciible sent . ovember 2002, the first interrogation course was scheduled to run from ovember 2002, with 10 students ,

(b) ( 1 ) · scheduled 'to attend that session. �ponded on November 2002, with concurrence for a (b )(3) NatSecAcfDY interrogation team to travel tol__Jollowing completion of the course. Later, the senior

mterrogator in ere wrote an e-mail regarding the request and noted in part, " . . . At leas.t one of · . · the guys they have in mind iS Gui Rahman, who is an Afghan, and I do not think he is truly a

[High Value Target] or [a Medium Value Target.] How do yoti think we should proceed on this?" 42 (.S-//Nf!)' There was no Station physician, only Physicians' Assistants.

24 .sseR:!!T7 J tNOPORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct ·


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C0654171 3 Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 71 3 . SSCRET !\ �1'�0PORW//b4R

(b)(1 ), (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct depends upon how they. are acting; "It may be needed. to break them." �� (c) It was used in Rahman's case to break him down to be more

c

Jmpliantl He was defiant and strong and made �eats" according

· to (b)(3) NatSecAct . ·

(b ) ( 1 ) 73. ts/ Rahman's Medical Care ... Accor�i11g to the (b) (3) NatSecAc�ovember 2002 cable that reported the chronology of events

· connected with an's death, Rahman was brought tc{ · Ion (b ) ( 1 ) �ovember and given a physical' examination. However, despite this (b) (3) NatSecActofficial reporting, the PA who accompanied Rahman \ . \

· I I stated that neither he nor any other (b) ( 1 ) PA conducted physical examfuations atl \on Raluµan or other (b)(3) NatSecAct detainees who were rendered there during that period. The brief

check the PA performed on rendition detainees � lcould not (b ) ( 1 ) . be considered a physical examination because, in part, it did not (b) (3) NatSe�Actinvolve questioning the detainees· about their health.history and

curr�nt. cond(�)(3) N�tSecAct ·

.'74. "f.'i ! I on[] November 20()2, St . . d (b)( 1 ) ation re orte (b)(3) NatSecAct

· · · ... b cable tha[

"approXimately a fol;lI'th of the prisoners have one or more significant • tm· . di 1 bl (b)( 1 ) 1 II 0

pre-eXIS g me . ca pro ems upon (b)(3)"'N ts A t ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct a ec c ·

. ·

.

. · 75. (Si'� l The [\Novanber 2002 cahj'eported fuat during two m� assistance visits t� by the medics, all

(b)(1 ) detainees were taken from their cells to a room and given a private (b) (3) NatSecA�1e<;iical evaluation where they were interviewed by an Office of

Medical Services (OMS) officer 'and a urine specimen was tak�nto determine the specific nutrition and hydration levels. It reported that

(b)( 1 ) . the last routine visitQ w s November 2002 and the urine testing

(b )(3) Nat�ecActdetern:rined all of the etainees were receiving sufficient , , . noilrishment and hy ration. e c.able further reported that'all the .

43 � Whe{ ( b )( 1 )tation used the term "medic" it �eant Physiclans' Assistants. (b) (3) NatSecAct

�� &ECRETL_fNOflORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct


. ' .

.



SHCMT/ 1 �J()P�J//b4R · (b)(3) NatSecAct

detainees were cooperative with the medic� personnel regarding (b) (1 ) their health and welfare except for Rahman, who simply stated, (b)(3) C IAAct "Thanks to God, all is well."44

·

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(G) �-7_6�. (S//NF) PA\ !advised that he visited (b)(7 )(c) I !shortly after his[N'ovember 2002 arrivflll I The ·

f!lcility had opened since his prior assignment! I He (b )( 1 ) consulted with 0}15 by telephon� �ed guid�ce to treat the (b)(3) NatSecAc.!letainees atC =1if they are ill. L__Jthen.examined the

detainees, heard their health concerns, and tested their urine to . ��g� NatSecAcf1etermine if th�y had s�ficient n��hment. \ �aid he did not

perform any arnval medical exammation on Rahman or arty other (b ) ( 1 ) newly arrived detainee atl ?nd was unaware of detainee (b ) (3) NatSecActrivals and departures from the facility.!__ lwas confident he

-

would remember if he had examined Rahman.45

(b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6 ) (b ) (7 ) ( c)

. 78. (S//NF) According to� an interview ·with the OIG,.on a subsequent date, possi�ovember 2002, he checked

(b ) ( 1 ) . · .on the c:I:etainees and observed Rahman for the first time. \ \ (b)(3) C IAAct reported that Rahman was wearing a blue sweats� and blue (b) (3) NatSecAct (b) (6) (b ) (7 ) ( c) 44 (.e) I =:Jtated that he provided.D�th some of the information· that . .

appeared in this cable. . tated that 45 tS) As reported pre�iously, Rahman arrived there oJJNovember 2002.

he did not re are treatment notes or medical records while ( b) ( 1 )--�--� (b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b ) (7 )( c)

2,:;· SECRB'l'/j }cwo�J//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct


(

! /, I ' .... "-, • , ,., •

. ' · .. ty . . I ·!

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C0654 1713 Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 7 1 3 SECltfff � VNOfiOltlq//l\ltk

(b) (3) NatSecAct

sweatpants, and possibly socks, and was standing in his cell with ·his arm cha�ed to a pin on the wall. J �elieved Rahman had

(b ) ( 1 ) abrasions on his wrists, similar to the other detainees . I !stated (b)(3) C IMct j;h h d'd kn h l Rahm k b Rahm (b ) (3) NatSecAct at e 1 not ow w at angu�ge an spo e, ut

. an

( b ) (6) · . mdicated that he was okay and did not make any com,plamts. .

(b ) (7) ( c) Con8equently, according to\ \he did not examine Rahman nor test his urine and did not know if there were any abrasions beneath his clothes.47 1 \did .not know of any medical coptact with .Rahman by the other two medical care providers at the Station.48 ·

��g� C IAAct · . 79. �//�aryj �ecollection that Rarunan was wearing (b)(3) NatSecAcl:;weatpanj is �t odds with others who spent considerable time a� ( b ) (6) · during that period. No other interviewee mentioned that (b) (7) (c) Rahman was wearing pants after his first couple of days. The guard

commander said that Rah.man's pants were removed after approxim�tely $.ree days and he was without pants. The deputy

· · �commander said that Rahman was naked most of the time.

��g� NatSecA6t-.-Jthe interpr�ter, rec�ed �at �an .�as naked b�low the · waist or wore a diaper dunng his entire penod of detention.\ I

' •'',c ' ,.,, "• , .. ,.,. , •• " ' shld'that Rahman's clothe•s we:re removed early pn.-1 he was naked or ' • ' I '• ·

· . ,fb)l3' NatSecAct· · (b)( 1 ) · . . . wore a ruwp-:-"- .LU�L>· V.L .... "le time. . ( b) (3) NatSecAct • "' l • ; "l..( 1 .. '.'�1�!#'1i;:" '!'lf1! .. •" I t '"' , 1 ' •: • 1 ' 't • � 'I:• ' "-1';1f'+•�, J� " •

(b )( 1 ) . · so;-(57'0 Reports'o� Rahman's lnterrogati�n. \ I . (b ) (3) NatSecAct first ca�le rep�� ofr::l' · terrogation was issued �ee days

· . after his rendition t It reported thatL_=:?nd Jessen had

(b ) ( 1 ) interrogated Ralunaii. over ct; -hour period and noted that the (b) (3) C IMct psychological and physiological pressures available for us.e wer�· (b)(3) NatSecActLinlikely to make Rahman divulge significant information. The cable (b )(6) . (b ) (7) ( c)

! 'l

..--------�(b)( 1 )1�---------�(b)(3) C IAAct (b) (3) NatSecAct ( b ) (6) (b )(7)( c)

{SHNft) A TDY physician ·eported they did not have any interaction' with Rahman while he was alive'. '-------'

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(b)( 1 ) . . . (b)(3) NatSecAct•ted that, although the other detain�es who had been brought to

I jdropped their resistance within 48 hours, Rahman remained l'.elatively unchanged. It added,

Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload,· total darkness, isolation, a cq!P. shower, and rough treatment, Rahman. remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and demeanor. (b)(3) NatSecAct

.

��g� NatSecAct 81. ��.A se�ond, post�renditi6n cable w�s sent from · I =1 tct= �o{]November 2002. It reported that Rahman

appeared to be physically fatigued but defiant during interrogations. (b) ( 1 ) · Tt sought material to employ as psycholo 'cal ressure and re uested (b)(3) NatSec��t@! . lprep�e a videota · e of

(b)( 1 ) I (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) C IAAct !__ . _ . . (b)(3 ) NatSecAct . 82. �/ 0 I lsent a third P<?St-rendition cable on (b)(6) r-i...Tovember 2002 "Sub'ect· Gul Rahman Admits His Identity " It (b)(?) (C) l_J'4 I '

• . · reporte.d f:hat Jessen, andj �terrogated Rahman onc:JJovem ·er 2002, an that Rahman iiad; spent �e 'days· since � last mterrog�tiqn session in cold conditio� �th �al food and sleep.so It further reported that Rahman was confused for portions of the interviews due to fatigue and dehydration.st The cable reported that Rahman provided.his true identity and biographical information

(b ) ( 1 ) but provided fictitious and rehearsed resr)about his (b)(3) NatSecActelationship wittj I eported that

l{ahman was afforded improved conditions � would be reinterviewed onNovember 2002. .

(b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)( 1 ) .

(b)(3) NatSecAct

49 (SI!� There is no indication thaL __ Jet.t:hjs request. ·

50 <SA · I �timated that she participated in seven to 10 interrogation sessions with (b) ( 1 ) Rahman at[ I Hm..,PvPr. this was the only occasion when her presence is documented in (b)(3) NatSecActca,ble. (b)(3) NatSecAct ·

· 51 f.T/11 As.previously reported, thrlNovember 2002ncable reported the Station's medicalsupport to detainees. The cable dtecf that, during theLJo[}fovember 2002 medical ·

· assis.tance visit to[ ( b) ( 1 )\it was determined that all detainees were receiving sufficient · .

hydration. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b) ( 1 ) . (b )(3) NatSecAct

t'\O

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� I I

Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 of 68C06541713 · Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 71 3

(b) ( 1 ) SECRET/j rNOPOKN//MR . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct "' (b ) ( 1 )

(b)(3) NatSecAct

83; ('&"/ fL___J sent a fourth cable on LJ! ...,ovember 2002. (b)(3) NatSecAct 1-1 � 11..t

.

That cable was prepare y Jessen and reported a mental status examination and a recommended interrogation plan for Rahman.s2 It reported that Ralunan had demonstrated a rigid and intractable resistance posture and would not be affe.cted by continuing interrogatio�. The cable recorrunended continuing environmental deprivations and instituting a concentrated mterrogatlon regimen of 18 out of 24 hours. It also recommended that the Station ! ��( ) collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve the optimum c

balance and noted it was reasonable to expect' two or more weeks of the regimen before seeing any progress. Finally, it recommended using the n�wly trained interrogators from Headquarters' recent

(b) (1 ) training cla.ss' . . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3)

. NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatsecAct

��2=] · . .

84. '(S/ On the reported day of Rahman's death, · 0November 2002 sent a cable to the ODO, j �Gui Rahman: Chronology ot-Events." It -reported that Rahm:ari appeared · calm and controlled to his interroge\tors but had reportedly .

(b )( 1 ) threatenedi ]guards previously, vowing toidll._.th.....,e""'· m_,..allct+-;.o...-r------(b ) (3) NatSecAct . th, kill d f 11 · t..�� 1 53 This. · d Lt. · · ·· · · · " · · nave· em . e o owmg lLJ.D re ease. was cite as ,Ule reason that RaJ:tman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle

(b) ( 1 ) · · restraints in his cell.54 It alSo repdttetl that\ �a.st saw · ·

(b)(3) NatSecA�t�$mafl on the afte111oon of0November 2002, and that Rahman was found de�d on the morning of[]November 2002. The Station

·

conclucl,ed it was not possible to determine the cause of Rahman' s death without an autopsy. The cable did not include the infomiation

(b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct .

(b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b) (3) NatSecAct

52 � The mental status exam was req�ested by CTC/UBL oGovember 2002. CTC/UBL noted "[Headquarters] UBL is motivated tQ extract any and all operational infqrmation on ,AJ-Qa'lda and [HIG] from Rahman . . . [and) achieving Rah.man's cooperation [is) of great importance. We would like to work quickly to create circumstances in which he will cooperate."

. . 53 �) Jessen reportedly li.eard fromr-\ before0November 2002 that Rahman sensed the guards werel �d threatened t�em, but Jessen said he never witnessed the (b)(3) NatSecAct guards mistreat Rahman. · . r · ·

· 54 (Sr-! �pite the assertion that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle ( b )( 1 ) 11!Sti'a� cell, the same cable repoi'ted that Rahman's hand restl'aints were removed on (b) (3) NatSecA�ovember 2002; ·

(b) (3) NatSecAct



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(b)(3) NatSecAct

that Rahman was naked below the waist or that a series of chains and

(b ) ( 1 ) . restraints (the short ch� position). was used on Rahman that forced (b)(3) NatSecAct� to sit bare-bottomed on the concrete floor of his cell.SS

I 85. (S//NF) Cold Conditions. I (b) ( 1 ) stated that onONovember 2002��-.L.......-,-�-as-. -o-c�cu-p-ie_d_wi_'th_o_th_e_r ___,

(b)(3) C IAAct duties and asked her to check on each detainee because it was getting �� NatSecAc�old: I Fent from cell to cell and gave appl�s to detainees. (b ) (?)(c) Also, she gave a few of them blankets and, if they did not have socks,

! . she provided socks to them.

�6. (S/ l,NF)I jdio not provide a blanket, socks, or an apple to Rahman. She returned his apple to! land stated she did

(b) ( 1 ) not know whatCJdid with the apple but doubted he would have (b)(3) C IAAct given it to Rahman because he was noncompliant. J lnaid she (b )(3) NatSecAct · . . '--· -��p (b)(6) , saw all of the detamees, except Rahman. He was m one of the sleep (b (7) (c) deprivation cells when she provided apples to the detainees.56 The

other detainees she observed all wore sweatshirts and sweatpants and. most bad sockS;.none of the detainees was without clothes. Some wore wool knit sweat�rs on top of the sweatshirts; .

(b )( 1 ) · 87. (SI/NF) � . . . \stated (b )(3) C IAAct •hat it was very coli: (when he was there on a brief TOY (b)(3) NatSecAct d th . f h · th · d his · d · h Rahm · (b ) (G) an e ISsue o ypo ernua crosse nun as e saw an

(b)(? )(c) wearing only socks and a diaper.57 He commented on the cold and hypothermia to the other Headquarters officer travelin�-jth Wm, but not tol ] I explained that he w� a�

(b ) ( 1 ) only to

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b ) ( 1 ) . (b ) (3) NatSecAct ·

.

(b) (3) C IAAct · 55 (SI� This cable w� the basis for the information provided.in the 29 No:vember 2002 ( b) ( 3) N atS ecAct:ongressional NotificatioM_ n n_ .t �'s death. It was not until a second Con�essional ·

( b) ( 6) . NotifiC<1:tion was made orL JMaY 2003, tl,tree .months after the DO Investigative Team's report was ( b) ( 7) ( c) iss�ed, that 'CIA informed Congress that Rahman was naked below the waist and shackled in the

short chain position that prevented Rahman from standing upright. . . 56 1.,$1 n·m This accour placj Ralunan in a sleep deprivation cell on0November 2002, and appears to conflict with account that Rahman's sleep deprivation was discontinued on

( b) ( 1 ) !]November 2002, when Jessen departed · · · ·

(b ) (3) NatSecA�ti {S//ta1c=Jbelieved he visited[ la few days after Rah.man's. arrival there, · .,. ... ..,) roximatety[]NOvember 2002. c=_�1so witnessed the hard takedown of Rahman while at : (b) (1 --=--1 . (b)(3) C IAAct

. ·

· I I I I . I

I . ! ·

I • ' '' I ' ' • •'*•.I >- ,� • ' '

I ... ,

I . I

, , · I

(b) (3) NatSecAct 3� J� ��( c ) __ � __ s_:B_C_M_r_1.-L1 __ i)-N ..... _ .... o::J:l_U�KN""_,....._l.,...,/�MR:: ____ -'-. '--' -------(b )(3) NatSecAct



Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 7 1 3 ' - ' I I ' ' (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)( 1 ) observe and assumed that the officers there would realize it was cold (b)(3) C IAAct d ]d 1 , · I h d f . l · d (b)(3) NatSecAct an . w ou not ea\ e a pnson�r unc ot e or a ong �eno .

(b)(6) I . �ad observed blankets m other cell s and assumed Rahm.an ·

(b)(7)(c) would get a blanket soon. I !recognized that someone could not be left naked for long without unwanted complications.

88 . (S//"P'JF) J kecalled that both Ralunan and another detainee complained about being cold. I lctid not' approach�! -�

(b)( 1 ) about the cold conditions at\ land was not aware of anyone (b)(3) CIAAct else doing so. · (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) (b )(7)( c)

I

89. (S//NP) Jessen remembered it was cold inj \prior to his departure on[]November 2002. There were some electrical heaters in the cellblock area but none in the individual cells . Jessen remembered receiving a heater fromL(b)( 1 ) I because the room was cold.58 . (b)(3) C IAAct

: (b) ( 1 )-------�----------(b)(3) NatSecAct·-' --�

i . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) i (b)(?)(c) (b )( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

31 Si:ERET 1 �NOFOltM/ !MR

..._, _____________ (b)(3) NatSecAct ______________ _



C06541713 · �D) � · 1 )

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(b ) (3) NatSecAct 90. ES//NF]""Within thd �avs of arriving: ml I (b)(?)(c)

0November, a contract�l�in f ist,I jwas assigned byl lor his assistant to erform a daily check of the detainees in their cells at 9 It was during that period that

(b) ( 1 ) the temperature dropped precipitously; checks were normally b)(3) NatSecAct:onducted in the morning, and also in the evening if the weather was

co�ey had observed the detainees shivering around the period · ·

of · November. Some detainees with blankets were shivering. ��g� NatSecA6those w1 out blankets were tho�e who were not cooperating . .

91. (S//NF} c=]remembered that sometime arormd L�� ((�)) N 8 A�November 2002,�mentioned the temperature was

I at ec ca.ropping, it was getting cold, and they should try to keep the

(b)( 1 ) detainees warmer. It was a general statement made to a .group (b) (3) C IAAct indudingl land!) I fwas also present during a . (b)(3) Nat.SecActdiscussion betweec=:Jandl · !about supplying warmer ��( ) clothes. They were concerned that the provision of blankets to all of

I c the detainees at that time could send t:he wrong signal; they tried to

use desired items like blankets as something to earn by cooperation.

92. (S//NF) A ontract lin_Kl:!ist, (b) ( 1 ) stated that he askedC --� la few days before (b)(3) C IAAct a an die pro a y oo-- ovember) at what temperature (b)(3) NatSecAct . (b) (6) hypothemua occurred.60 reportedly responded that he (b (7 )(c) believed it 'occurred when the atmospheric temperature dropped to

58 degrees Fahrenheit.61 According to\ II ldid not ·

respond in a manner indicating he was going to do somejg about! it; he just said "okay." \ �as certain, however, that

had heard him. explained that he did not raise the issue df (b)( 1 ) the cold withl�because of anything he s.(b) ( 1 ),. ht>i:irr\ about (b)(3) NatSecAct ____j · (b)(3) C IAAct

(b)( 1 ) (b)(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b (7 )(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

�----------(.b)(?)(c)------� (b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(S/0�) Durin� an inrrview with the DO Investigative Team one=November 2002, �-�pted that did not know at what temperature one would reach hypothermia.

SECREc=J�NOFORN//MR (b )(3) NatSecAct


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(b)(3) NatS ecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct Rahman. Rather, it was based on what\ pbserved with two (b)(3) NatSecAct · .

h kin 'th 11 th · f th h ·

(b)(6) other detamees e was "'.'Or g w1 , as we as e · act at e was (b)(7)(c) cold even when wearing ·a jacket .

. 93. (f,//N¥) I �old OIG that, based on ¥s knowledge . of thermodynamics and conductivity, if a person's body temperature�

(b)(1) . drops t6 95 degrees Fahrenheit, the brain would be impacted. At 90 (b)(3) CIAAct �egrees Fahrenheit the person will die. However, if the room (b)(3) N�tSecActtemperature is 70 degrees Fahrenheit or above and a person is sitting ��(c) naked on the floor, the person will be all right. If the room · ·

te:r;nperature is 30 degrees Fahrenheit, a person could sit on fue 'floor . and be unaffected if he is clothed: ! . !explained that he was

aware fuat a.concrete fl,oor would suck the heat out of someone who· . . was sitting on the floor without pants . . From his knowledge of

thermodynamics� \opined that R�an had only a 30 · (b)(1) percent chance of surviving the night while sitting on the cold floor (b)(3) CIAAct of his cell without pants. (b)(3) NatSecAct . ·

(b )(6) (b)(?)(c) .

(b )( 1)

94:--(S//� Five days after Rahman's death, the DO. Investigative Team int17rviewed\ !The one and one-half page . report that resulted from that interview contained the following:

. . (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatS ecAct (b )(6)

. th 't aft his fir d . 't r---(b)(1 )� a er st or secon VISl toL(b)(3) NatSecAct he mentioned the tern erature at the facility toi j \ !told them that it was cold in the

Ly-.,...nT-.-.-e-=-p_,rlS-:-:--o-c-ne-::ccr=-=--s w__Je�r-e-:.shi.....-'v,..·e7ring� and it was not cold outside (b)(7)(c)

95. (.sfi'NF) During an OIG interview, less than four months . later, when asked if he had concerns regjding je temperature at

(b)(1) I lat the. time �f Rahman'� death, responded, "not . ·

(b)(3) NatSecActreally." When asked if he had a conversation with ·anyone about the tem'pera:ture a� . L lresponded .that he believed he told C jthat\ !had me�tioned t<;> someone that it was cold. \ iad<:!ed that he did not remember the identity

(b)(1) of the person with whom. he discussed the issue of the cold . (b)(3) CIAAct temperature; "it could have b.een anyone." When asked .what (b)(3) NatSecAc}>rompted his comment about the cold� !stated that lt was (b)(6) . .. (b)(?)(c) . - " 33 .

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b )( 1 ) startin�cold. "I walked by and must have said it was getting . . (b)(3) C IAAct rold. 'L___Jsaid he had forgotten the comment; it was not made in (b) (3) NatSecAct L al I L · d d him (b) (G) ' a 1orm context. However, renun e (b)(? ) (c) of his comment. When asked if this comment could have been made

t� I who had the resp<?nsibility for\ JI (bj ( 1 ) . ,. responded, "It could have been [made to] anyone."6i (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b) (1 ) ' 96.' �s;;�a:) To assist [ Im rememberhtg the identity of (b )(3) NatSecAc!he person with whom he spoke about the cold condition in .

· I I !read the interview report prepared by: the DO . Investigative Teaml Mter the death of Rahman. [ I .then

��g� C IAAct �bserved: "I �ess it could bel . !he wo�d �ve b,een the most (b) (3) NatSecAcftkely officer. When ask�d to quantify that likelihood as a (b)(6)

· percentage,\ �esponded it was 50 percent. ·\ Jdenied he (b)(?)(c) told the two members of the DO Investigative Team .that the ·

detainees were shivering. When asked if cold was used as a teclmique a� . 1: Jresponded, "Not that I know ." He

(b )( 1 ) explained that he was more fo�ed on the use of loud music there. (b,) (3) NatSecAct .

I · · .91. (S//NF) I �ecalled that, at the (b )( 1 ) f:ime of Rahman's death[ �lamented .. that Jle previously raised (bl) (3)

. NatSecActhe issue. of the cold with someone atl I I

s�ted tha� �pecifically said, "I told those eo le that they had to do something about the cold there." said it was

(b) ( 1 ) clear from the context thar!was not re erring to (b)(3) C IAAct I fOme low-level �ut \ ldid not ido--e-ntify--,-' -,----,-w--c-h-o�m . (b)(3) NatSecAche was describing (b) (6) . (b (?) (c) · 98. (S//l'W) stated that he has.no recollection of having

a conversation with egardiri.g the colc:I weather. However, . \ Id.id rec �entioning that he thought Rah.man's deatl;t. ·was indu<;ed by the cold. ·

·

(b) ( 1 ) .

(b)(3) C IAAct (b )(3) NatSecAct' (b)(6) · ________ _ ( b) ( 7 )( c) 62 (e'J Additioruilly, the notes prepared by the OGC attorney during �terview with the

op Investigative Team read, 'The first and �ond time\ jmE!Jl.tiOned temperature to them; meaninCJnd oth�r8 �o�.� . . .

' i9t!Cl�d�

I 1·

. . . .. 1

. . . ...... . .j. ..

I . I

•-------------(b) (3) NatSecAct · , ____________ _



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. (b )(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) C IAAct / ,.,,. m� · d' j \ b h · hi (b)(3) NatSecAct ·99. (Srrrw; Accor mg t'1 no one roug t to s (b)(6) attention or to the front office any concerns about tl)e cold. \ (b)(7 )(c) ·

said it was not apparent in talking with\ · \that there w�a_s_a_� problem with cold atl

(b)(3) NatSecAct-� 100. $1\ l:rn Decem�er 2002, less than one. month after

(b)( 1 ) Rah.man's hypothennia·mJiuced de�(b)(11 ) jreport�d the following (b)(3) NatSecAct regarding another! ]detaine(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b ) ( 1 )

[The detainee] was submitted [sic] to sensory deprivation, cold, and sleep deprivation within the parameters of [a referenced cable} . . . When moved to the interrogation room for interrogation sessions [the detainee] was stripped and had to earn his clothing with cooperation and information. When he demonstrated resistance, [the detainee] was left in a cold room, shackled i:md stripped, until he demonstrated cooperation.

(b)(3) NatSecAct · .

101 . (S//NF) Cold Showers. who was present a� . Im. November 2002, reported that she witnessed "the �hower from hell" used on Rahman during his first week in

.. . " . . aetention.63 \ !asked 1�aniria'n"fruHdentity; and whei:i'he 'did not . . ,. (b)(1 ) . respond with his tiue name, Rahman was placed back under the cold · (b)(3) C IAAcf· wat�r by the guards at\ ! 'direction. Ralunan was so cold that � · · · (b)(3) NatSecAc}le could barely utter his alias. According to\ j the enfue ��(c) process lasted no more than 20 minutes . It was intended to lower

Rahman's resistan<;e and was not for hygienic reasons. At the . conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the fo.ur sleep deprivation cells: where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his head.(b)(1 )

• f

( b )( 1 )

. . (b)(3) NatSecAct 102. · (S.//NF) J�ssen, wh:o wa,S ·present a� lat the same

. time, recalled the · guards admirµstering a cold shower to Rahman as a "deprivation technique." Jessen subsequently checked on Rahman after he had been rettimed to his cell� Jessen detected that Rahman .. was showing the early stages of hypothermia and ordered the guards to give the detainee a blanke(b)(1 ) fw1.w interpreted for Rahman,

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(b )(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) (b)(7)(c)

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(b)( 1 ) · also witnesse� prder a cold sho�er for Rahman� Rahman was · (b)(3) C IAAct b . . ti th tim ..11 I t t d 't 'd th (b)(3) NatSecAct e:mg uncoopera ve at e e, anCI! . s a 7 � was evt ent at

(b)(6) the cold shower was not being ordered for hygienic reasons. (b) 7) (c)

103. (S/(NF) A Bureau of Prisons officer, conducting training for thej Jguards ·a�I l'o/itne�sed a tall detainee wearing a blindfold and a diaper fastened hi duct tape arrive at an unheated

(b)( 1 ) and cold area �here the shower w:is located.64 The diaper w� (b) (3) NatSecActremoved and discarded . . The detamee was placed under the stream

of f:Pe shower for approximately five minutes and he was shivering. Because of the detainee's height, .a guard wearing rub��r gloves stood on a stool to ensure the detainee was covered head to foot with the

(b) ( 1 ) water spray. There was soap in a bucket, but it was not used. The (b )(3) NatSecA�PP officer was informed that a contractor was coming· tol.__ ___ �

that day to repair the water heater. There was no towel present; the detainee was· dried. with his shirt and then escorted back to the cell wearing a new diaper and his wet shirt. In the .cell, the' guards · restrained the detainee's hands to a bar at th� approximate height of

· his head. It occurred to the BOP officer that the cold sh<?wer might (b)(1 ) have been intended as a deprivation or interrogation teclmique.65 ( b)(3) NatSecAct

104. (S//�) Based on the length of time Rahman·was at· (b)( 1 ) . I � ]estimated that Rahman would have received (b)(3) C IAAct two showers . I !witnessed only one shower and it was a (b)(3) NatSecAct · , . · (b)(G) cold shower. Rahman did not like the show.er, but the guards

. , (b)(7 )(c) yvere able to get him clean. I �as nqt certain if .the BOP officers witnessed the showers.

105. (S//NF) Several of the officers interviewed about the · possible us� of cold showers as a technique cited that the water .

(b)( 1 ) · heater was· inoperable and there was �o other r�ourse .except for

(b)(3) C IAAct cold $howers. However,CJexplamed that µ a detamee were (b)(3) NatSecActooperative, he would be given a warm shower if possible. CJ (b)(6) . (b)(1 ) ; . (b)(7 )(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct

� P officer provided a similar account of the cold shower. He did not believe it was .emp oye<:t as an interrogation technique because the water heater was broken at the time.

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i . i

I I ·

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stated that when a detainee was l.lncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two goals by combining th�.hygienic re�son for a shower with the unpleasantness of ·a cold shower.

(b) ( 1 ) 106. (S//P.W) According toj I cold was not supposed (b) (3) C IAAct to play a role in the interrogation. Cold was1not a technique; it was a (b) (3) NatSecAct:hange of season. When asked in February 2003, if cold was used as (b) (G) · an interrogation technique, I �esponded, 11.not per se." He (b )(?)( c) explained that physic� and environmental discomfort was used to

encourage the detainees to improv� their environment. I ·. I pbserved that cold is hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "J:fow cold is cold? How cold is life threatehing?"C'=1stated that

( ) ( 1 ) Rahman was not given cold water. He stated that cpld w�ter (� ) (3) NatSe�Act:ontinues to be employed at! �owever, showers' were

administered in a heated room. He stated there was no specific ' guidance on it from Headquarters, ·andl �as left to its own ·

(b)( 1 ) diScretion in the use of cold.C]asserted that there was a cable (b) (3) NatSecA�t !documenting the use of "manipulation·of the · ·

• t' "l)(i �e�u�Vll'......-.onmen-��.�,��-.-. . . (b ) ( 1 ) " .. (b)(3) C IAAct 107. (S//Nf') Hard Takedown. During the course.of (b)(3) NatSecActRahman's autopsy, the :Agency pathologist noted several abrasions �� (c)

. o;n the body.67 Jessen, who was pres�nt durlng'the firs� 10 days�o_f_� �an's confinement� reported th.�

t, while in the co�pany of! � � Jessen witnessed a .team of four or five [ pfficers execute a "hard takedown'·' on Rahman.68

��g� C IAAct -.Ac�o:dirig �o Jess�n,. �e team �agged Rahman from his·cell, cut his . (b)(3) NatSecAct clothes off; secured his hands with I\1ylar tape and put a hood over

� head. They ran Rahman up and down the long corridor adjacent · to his cell. A couple of times he stumbled and was momentarily dragged along the ground until they were able to get Rahman back.

(b) ( 1 ) . . (b)(3) C IAAct / ((bb))((�))

NatSecACt67 �//NF) The Final Autopsy Findings noted "superficial excoriations of the right and left

L" shoulders, left lower· abdomen, and left knee, mechanism undeternUned." (b) (7) (c) . . .. (b) ( 1 )

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on his feet. Rahman was slapped and punched in the stomach during this episode, bitt Jessen could determine that the officers were pul.lillg their punches to limit the pain. Jessen said the takedown was rehearsed and professionally executed. The proces� took between three to five minutes, and Rahman was returned to his cell. Rahman

.. had crusty contusions on his face, leg, and hands that fooked bad, but nothing that required treatment. Jessen heard that other hard · .

(b) ( 1 ) takedowns were also execute.d atC p9 Three other officers (b)(3) NatSecAc!\'ho were present at the SaJlle time provided similar accounts of the

incident.

108. (S//NF) Jessen saw a value in the hard takedown in order to make Rahman uncomfortable and experience a lack of control. Jessen J;'ecognized, however, that the teclmique was not

(b) ( 1 ) approved and recommended tol !that he obtain written (b )(3) C IAAct . al 1: l . th t •t..-: (b)(3) NatSecA�tpprov ior emp oymg e euuuque; (b)(6) .

. � (b)(?) (c) . 109. �) Acc;:ording t the hard t�edown was

·

employed often in' interrogations at as "part of the · · · atmospherics/t. It was the standard pr.oce ure for mo�g a detaine¢

to the sleep deprivation cell. It was performed for.shock and i(b)( 1 ) · psychological·impact and signaled the transition to another phase of (b)(3) NatSecActthe interrog�tion. He said that th� act of putting a detainee into a. · · diaper als� could cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because ·

the floor of the facility is �oncrete.

110. {S//NF)[ �ontendecl that he ordered the hard ��g� C IAAct t�edown on Rahman to make him think he was being tak� to a (b)(3) NatSecAdlifferent cell� I This.was (b )(6) accomplished by runnfug him up and down the corrid9r. As . (b)(?) (c) · Rahman was being moved down the corridor, he fell and got a scrape

on his shoulder. c=].id not' remember where else· Rahman received injuries. L_Jexplained that the scraping �as not

(b) ( 1 ) . . . . b)(3) NatSecAct (S//HFf Accordfug to one BOP officer who travele<i'to[ �fore he departed from

Washington, D.C., al �upervisor, name Unknown, requested that the BOP team teach the hard tal<edown technique to the guards at\ I After the BOP team arrived[ [the request was not �epeated'. and BOP did not teach the technique. ( b) ( 1 )

(b)(1 ) . . . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct. sECRBT/I 3�0l!OF�Ji/MR

I J .. , ' . nl,,; \ .'.., t • . , • , '·�

.... , . . . . l .... , , . ' \ • .

I I I

· 1

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(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1 ) (b)(3) C IAAct expected to be part of the process, and he was displeas�d vyith the (b)(3) NatSecActresults because Rahman was injuxed. I !asserted that he had no (b )(6) · interest in hurting the detainees. He observed that abrasions c�use (b)(7)(c) · management problems because there i,s a need to summon th� ·

physician to the facility to tend to the detainees' woun�s to prevent " (b )( 1) infection.70 J �tated that neither he,! �tation management, (b)(3) NatSecActor anyone else involved with the.program ever authorized or

encouraged anyone to hit, slap, or intentionally inflict pain on a detainee . .

(b) ( 1 )

��g� ��Act 111 . (SHMF>I . �tated �t this hard takedown.was the (b )(6) only time Rahman could have received the abrasions on his body. ( b ) (7)( c) He recalled only one instance when the hard takedoWn was used on

Rahman. According t� I the reference to rough treatment in the

. . - .. .. 0November 20021 \cable refers to the hard takedown, as well as the insult slap given to Rahman by Jessen.71

��g� NatSecAct . 112. (�) !noted there was an alternative to the h�d takedown that he <;ailed the "gentle takedown." It was reserved for

. . . , detainees who had been cooperative and were being transferred from . (b)( 1 ) : \ I In those instances, the detainee is advised what to expect (b)(3) C IAAct-:"'' · in advance and instructed to lie on his stomach and nofr'esist.(b) ( 1 ) · • :" ( b)(3) NatSecAct . . ·

. (b)(3) NatSecAct

��(c) 113. �S//NF� !stated he did 1;10t discuss the l:tar<l; ·

taked9wn with Station managers; he thought they understood what . teclutlques were being used at�!- Jstated that,

after completing the interroga�e understood that if he was ( b)( 1 ) going to do a hard takedo�, he must report it tc;> Headqu�ers.72 (b)(3) NatSecAct

. · (b)(6) · . (b)(7)(c)- · . .

-70 (SffNF) · If [ �eated Rahman for those abrasions, it was not reported to OIG durin the contact w.ith the three medical care roviders resent durin Rahman' s detention.

�� g � C IAAct «'h'HP) According t who led. the DO Inves�gative TeamC]was not

( b )( 3) N atS ecActorthcoming about the hard takedown. puring two interviews with .the DO jvesti�tive Team,

(b)(B) c=Jreported that Rahman was pushed anq shoved· a bit. It was only after teIVi.ewed Jessen that he learned of the.hard takedown . . At that oint, after two interviews withe==]

(b )(7)( C) ' id not see an ose in recontactin a third · e to uestion him on this. e. .

��lt!T dWOPQffiq//MR . (b)(3) NatSecAct



C0 6541713 Approved for Release : 201 6/09/30 C0654 1 7 1 3 ·

5l!CMT I J tt*>FOR:N/ tr( b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) N ts A t (b)(3) NatSecAct 8 ec c

1 14. (&� I When the[}Jovembet 2002C-�able reporting the treatment of Rahman reached CTC, a senior CTC/Re�ditions Group officer forwarded this cable via an ·e-mail message to a CTC attorney. The officer highlighted part of the paragraph that reported, "Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a col4 shower, and rough treatment, Rahman remains steadfast in maintaining hjs high resistance posture and demeanor." The CTC officer commented,

. "Another example of field interrogation using coerci".e techniques without. authorization."

·(b)(3) C IAAct

�� (c) · 11s . . ��/NP� I � CTC atto�ey,. �t�ted that she was not familiar with the ''hard takedown" technique and was not aware that this technique h�d been used at ! I She explained that ifC]had sought approval to employ the hard t�edown,

(b)( 1 ) . intentionally cold conditions, and the short chain restraint, she would (b)(3) NatSecActave responde4 .that they were not available for approval since they

did not fit the legal parameters. Although a cold shower for Rahman was an available tecllrii ue� she woUld have recommended that it not

( b) ( 1 ) · be· approved if had provided� all the r.elevant details lb )(3) NatSecAct.cluding that .

was cold:� .h��".5 .�•Mully-clothed.

. . 116. (S//NB I ]stated that he was generally familiar (b)( 1 ) with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that it is (b)(3) C IAAct authorized and believed it had been used one or more times at (b)(3) NatSecAct ft order to intintldate � detainee.73 \ �tated that he (b )(6) uld-·�t aril kn' if 't had b d d did . 'd (b)(?)(c) -yvo no necess y. ow i . �n, use an not cons1 er

it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval. When asked about the p.ossibilitY that a detainee migl;lt

· have beei:i�dragger on the giound during the cour�e of a hard ' takedown . responded that he.was unaware of that and.did not

(b)( 1 ) ' d tand th . t f clr . . al th ' "d . ' (b)(3) NatSecA�tm ers .

e porn o . aggmg someone ong e c�m or m

I I I . (b)( 1 ) (b)(3) N.atSecAc _ _;,.t ______ _....__

73 (Bl!>� There is no evidence that hard takedowns or short crutln restraints are or were authorized. They are not listed in relevant Agency guidance as approved interrogation measures. ' •

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££CRET � j;-NeFom II MR . . (b)(3) NatSecAct

117. (S//NF) I !contended that he observed Ralunan's (b)( 1) dead.body and the abrasions did not appear to be fresh . I �tated (b)(3) C IAAct that he understood from l !that the abrasions on Rahman's (b)(3) NatSecAct d d h' f (b )(6) shoulders pre ate is trans er to'-----'-------� (b)(7)(c) However, after examining three postmortem

photographs taken during the autopsy,! !advised OIG that, in his professional judgment, the abrasion on Ralunan's shoulder was

(b)( 1) between two and five days old. He estimated the abrasion on (1:;>)(3) NatSecActRahman's hip as ranging from three. or four days to a .maximum of .seven days old .

1 18. (6//NF) Following his return to Headquarters subsequent to the autopsy, the pathologist learned th�t Rahman had been subjected to a technique that was used to disorient him and he

��g� CIAA t had fallen; ' that was presumably the hard takedown. It was the .

(b)(3) NatS�cActpathologist's medical opinion that the abrasions on the shoulders and (b)(6) hip occurred fairly simultaneously. He estilnated they occurred from (b)(7)(c) one to three days, at most, before Ra.hrftan's death and certainly did

not occur two weeks before his P,eath. The pathologist <#d not ask

(b )( 1)

I lwho assisted during the autopsy. wh"!ther he had seen the b . . · 1 - .,..., _ ,_ . . t , th (b)( 1 ) a ras10ns pnor (b)(3) NatSecActa ; (b)(3) N atSecAct

(b)(3) N atSecAct 119 . ('6/ CJ Despite the visible presence of ab.rasioJ;lS on

Rahman's body�CJtation reported in the []November 2002 cable that constituted the official report of Rahman's death to the DDO, "The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific cause of death." This same language was incorporated m the 29 November 2002 Congressional Notification of Rahman's death.

(Sl1Nf) RAHMAN'S LAST THREE DAYS ��g� NatSecAct (b)( 1 ) D (b)(3) NatSecAct 1 20. (S-//Nf) In the November 2002 cable sent to the DDO, I !Station reported a chronology of the events regarding Rahman,

with specific reference to the last days of his detention and his death. No other cables documented Rahman's activities or stahtS after

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121. (S//NF)I \ stated that he drafted this cable. 'c--1 -�

· (b)( 1 ) stated that he is familiar with this cable . He does riot remember

(b)(3) C IAAct much of the contents of the cable, but t;he necessary documentation of (b)(3) NatSecActLe circumstances of the death would be in the cable. It was drafted (b)(6) b� land released byl 1 1 �dited it for clarity, as was (b)(? )(c) his custom for a(b)( 1 )'les he released from[(b)( 1 )] He had no

recollection regi(b )(3) }JatSecAct.tance of the '(b )(3) . NatSecActo the cable.

(b)( 1 ) . d. 22. �5//lvr) 0November 2002. The0Nov�mber 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct chronology cable reported:

(b)( 1 ) (b),(3) NatSecAct

(b )( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct

The last time Rahman was seen b officer prior to his death

was on .the afternoon of Monda ovember 2002. At that time

Rahman was assessed to be in goo overall health. Station noted

that Rahman had small abrasions on his wrists and ankles as a

result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened and his

hand restraints were removed when Rahman was returned to his

celI.74

(b) ( 1 ) 123. (5//�.JF}\ [recalled that h� had one brief session with

(b)(3) NatSecActRahman onONovember 2002, four days after Jessen left �! --�

I I I stated that this was based on Jessen's recommendation that

Rahman be left alone and environmental deprivations continued.75 !

I The plpose of the session in an interrogation room, according to

(b )( 1 ) was just to. check on Rahman to determine if he was more (b)(3) C IAAct compliant. Rahman never went any further than admitting his (�) (�) NatSecActidentity. [ ___ �]did n.ot recall if Rahman was wear:ing a diaper at that

�b� �?�(c) time but noted there would have been no reason to use a diaper because Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.

( b )( 1 ) . 12 4. (S/ n@) I I contended he has li ttl� s p=rc

(b)(3) CIAAct recollection of the session ox(]November 2002.(b)( 1 ) also did not (b)(3) NatSecAct · . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b ) (7)( c )


This is the only passage In the cable that addressed the events of0November 2002. would have made this assessment of Rahman's health.

ent an e�mail messa e on ovember 2002, to her supervisors at She wrote, "l am the primary

.__��-�--�c-on-c-en�tr-a�tin-g_o_n-.-.-.'u Rahman and other ne'A'

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recall which inte reter was used in this session, but he would have used one to conduct an interrogation. stated the session was neutral in tone and not

(b )( 1 ) confrontational . . Accordingly, he would consider it a debriefing, not (b)(3) C IAAct . . · ·

(b)(3 ) NatSecAct' interrogation. (b)(6) .. .

. (b)(7)(c) 125. (S//NF' I !recalled that, during the last few days of his detention; Rahman did something that caused I Ito order the gu�rds to give Rahman a sweats�t and pos.sibly some socks and to loosen his restrain�. I �tated Rahman must have been

(b ) ( 1 ) . somewhat compliant because his hand restraints were removed. The (b)(3) CIAAct fact �at his wrists had pretty bad scabs on them was also a factor in (b)(3) NatSecA�t.taving the restraints removed . . According to l lthe sweatshirt �� (c) was not the result of Rahman complaining of being cold or l · \

surmising Rahman was cold becaus.e he saw Rahman shivering. They were in the interrogation :room, which was relatively warm with two 1000-watt lights and an electric heater. L ___ �tated that he might have given Rahman the sweatshirt because it was -getting

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . cooler;! jwas .trying· to.find .a .way. to .do something positive for . . . .. . ,.. . . . .. . . .. . · ' Rahman. I �tated. he did not recall having a convers"'·tion with . . . ··

anyqne about the cold conditions at the time. He could not, however, , 1 ·: • • • • .,, .... •• �,,-�. discmmt the possibility that concerns raised by others Iitlght" have · "' ·· ...

· · played a role in his decision to give Rahman the sweatshirt. I I explained that he did not prepare a cable as-a result of' the (b)( 1 )

. · · · · · on[

(b)(1 ) ....... i.,. .. i. ..... ,, use t ch ha. d (b){3) NatSecAct•n (b)(3) NatSecAct'a no mu ppene (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1 ) �26 . . (-S!LJ[}iovemb�r 2002. ThQovember

.2002 (b)(3) NatSecb chro�ology ca�le reported:

I I

At 1530 local .oQovember 2002, fuel ponunander told station that when Rahman had been given food at 1500 local, he had thrown it, his plate, his water bottle and defecation bucket at the guards who had deliv.ered the food. Station requested that

(b) ( 1 ) (b)(1 ) . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

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th� �ommander t� replace [sic] Ralu:Uan�s hand restraints to prevent this from reoccurring, or prevent him from undertaking any other viole�t actions.76 ·

'----------� The g u ard(s) reported that Rahman had been acting violently and had throWI'l: his food and defecation bucket at the guards . . Rahman had also threatened the guards, i:toting

(b)( 1 ) · that he had s e en their �aces �d would kill them wh en he got out of (b)(3) CIAAct the fpcility. I lcohfirmed.it is likely that �ahman had seen the (b)(3) NatSecAcguards' faces, bt=!cause they were sometimes lax about using their (b)(e) k hi £ th . f (b (?)(c) ere e s to cover e:tr aces .

___ 1_28�. (S//NF)! · lciid 110t i:ecall whether ! J \ jwere present a� I wh en Rahman threw his food. He did not specifically recall t�lling others about the inddent but acknowledged that he �ay have toldl ]

an� f .w:ho would have (b) ( 1 ) ·�h-a-d�an-m-. -te-r-es_t_in-�th_e_c_a-se-.�--�. · , ·

(b)(3) CIAAct �� atSecAct 129_ ·�//Nr) I . . . l�pproach�dDan� ·

. pn ·

b)(?)(c) · bJvember 2002, between 1500 and 1800 hours, accorc.ling to CJ was la ughing an d r eveal�d tha,t Rahman had been violent in .

his ce / threatened the guar�, an d had thrown his fopd. ·

· added that he would take car� of it. B. terpreted � as a ·

lighthearted colllln:ent and assumed · was laughing becaus� rto detainee had done this previously. LJfurther assumed that when

I lsaid he would take. care of it, he meant he woul<;l have the cell (b )( 1 ) cleaned and have Rahman chained. b��eved he depatted (b)(3) NatSecAft !with hortly following the

I . comment b . did not recall for certain whether�! --� (b)( 1 ) came back with him or remaine�)(11) �th (b)(3) C IAAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) -------

(b)(?)(c) 76 (� This is the only.passage in the cable that.addresses the even�ber 2002. It · has been established that the term "station'' in this paragraph means ' '

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( b ) ( 1 )-51!C:l.t'BT 11 rNOFOR:N'/ /Mlt

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAcL__ I ]did not remember hearin that Rahman had thrown ( b)(6) · · anything else besides his food. id not recall a ( b) (?)(c) discussion of the Rahman incid'-e-nt_o_n��-ov_e_m_b_e___,.r 2002 . .

· 130. (S//�) �ecalled that, app�oximately a day before Rahman's deatl:l,i==Jcasually rttentidned Rahman had

��g� C IAAct · thrown his food and defecation bucket at the guards. �o her, this

( b)(3) NatSecActappeared t9 be a normal update on Rahman. I �te:r;preted ( b)(6) I Jtone as indicative that the throwing of the items was "not a ( b)(7 )(c) big deal," but rather an indication of R.ahman's stature of being hard

core.I jstated that! ldid not mention that Rahman had tlµ-eatened the guards. She did not remembeCJbeing ptesent during this discussion.

� ��g� C IAAct . 131. ·(ShlNF)J lstated �e did not know what might have (b)(3) NatSecActprompted Rahman to act in this �anner. He was the only detainee · (b )(6) who had ever threatened the guards or thrown food at them. As a ( b)(7)(c) result of this conductJ !ordered the guards to shackle Rahman's

han�. l\was not certain who proposed the i<;lea to s�ort chai!r · · · · Rahm��li$p�cted tlie gu

Jd(s) re,ommended it and he ·

approved. Regardless of the origin acknowl�� a·t l:ie . . would have authorized'l�ahlriaii's short Chaining o1:1J . ,yovember . 2002. . . . . (b)( 1 )

, · . . · . (b)(3) NatSecAct 132. ·(Sii-WF)[ !explained th�t the short chain was ·

(b ) ( 1) . ·necess� to prevent Rahm� from throwing things.77 � . · (b)(3) C IAAct 1'.easoned if only Rahman's hands had been shackled t�he still (b )(3) NatSecAct · · . , .� (b)(6) would have been able to throw objects. That is, mana�ling one hand (b)(7)(c) to the other still pei:nutted the limited range of movement that wotild

(b )( 1 )

. .. .

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(b ) (6) (b)(7 )(c)

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(b,) ( 1 ) . all�w Ralunan the ability to throw something.78 In I lvi�w,

(b )(3) C IAAct . trying to harm others when they entered the cell crossed thj line; a' (b) (3) NatSecActletainee who acted in this mariner needed to be restrained.

(b )(6) . did not want Rahman throwing tlrings evei;t though the tray was (b)(?)(c) constrll(:ted·of cardboard and the bucket and water bottle were made

of plastic. \Id.id not know if the defecation buck.et was empty at the time it�own.79 . .

133. $//NF) According t9 ]the short chaining was not the result of the verbal threat to the guards. !llid not have any firsthand knowledge of the threat; the guards�alum about it.· They

(b) ( 1 ) . did not appear very worried or fri tened th · (b) (3) C IAAct found this s risin becaus (b) (3) NatSecAct · · � had reportedly (b ) (6) - L�-t��------� . .---.-.,-----.-di .... d not recall n -'L.� --(b ) (?) ( c) ea ene e guar s previous Y· '----�----. .l'.i:UWldlt

being punished for the previous threats �ought he· wot,.tl� �-�

recall if Rahman had been punished.

134. · (5//NF) I �tated it never occurred to him that short (b ) ( 1 ) chaining Rahman while wearing no pants would have consequences. (b )(3) C IAAct In retrospect�ai� he can see there.were.problems caused by (b ) (3) Nat�ecAc!J.,,a·t 'a:�tion.'· .kftnen'me, he viewed short chaining as just a · ·

(b)(5) ch · . t af I Rahman�d think h h d. (b) (?)(c) me arusm o s e y seCtll'.e . not . e a .

crossed the line in ordering the short auung. It was not done to induce pa.in or s�fjring. j only thought at the time ·':Vas to make Rahman ;rnmobile. stated they are not in the punishment [(b)( 1 )� J.1.. • th b . f ttin �-& • gam� .at (b)(3) NatSecA�tare m e usmess o ge

. g uuomiation . . . ( . . . . ·�-�

��g� C IAA t 135. �S//NF) According tol l �t was evident t� him (b) (3) NatS�cA�µring � .�vestigation thatC �ected how �:was to be (b) (6)

· treated and interrogated. The guards wot;lld not.have ch'11:tled b)(?)(c) · ·

78 "(8t7'NF) Despite this view, th�re·was no need for the guards to enter the cell to deliver food. The doors for each cell were constructed 'with a small slot nea.r the bottom of the doors. The purpose of the slot was for the safe delivery of Joo? to the detainee·without opening the doors. The' same slot was u� by the guarc:ls to inspect the cell and monitor detainees during securi!J . �

e�� Fo� �£ the officers who respon�ed to ��'s �ell pnnNovembe� 20�2 said they

.did not see or smell urine or excrement in or around the cell. · (b ) ( 1 ) · · · (b )(3) NatSecAct

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(b)( 1 ) Rahnian without being instructed to do so. [ ( b)(3) CIAAct I (b) (3) NatSecAct---------��--��-----=------=--� (b)(6) Anything that happened to �ahman would have come through (b) (7)(c) C 1 (b)(3) NatSecAct

��1_36�. (S//NF) I �e BOP officers explained that! I' I lta�ght the use of a sho� chain to the guards and mentioned it as an alternative method of securing a prisoner.so [ �OP

( b)(3) NatSecAct officer said "short chail\4lg" is used by BOP officers in cases where the inmate· has been violent or kicks at the guards and would never be used'for an inmate who threw food at a guard. The guards. . practiced the technique for approximately an h0ur and were told to practice all the techniques 'in the evening on each other. According to

(b ){1 ) the BOP officers, they did not offer any scen�os for 'the use of the (b)(3) C IAAct short chain, that is, under what circumstances it(1)fff� be used; th�y (b)(3) NatSecActdmply taught the teclmique. · (b)(3) NatSecAct · (b ) (6) (b)(7 )(c) . . 137. �//.N�)I �ho assiste� �tllfrom·l�te

September to early December 2002, and had coJ.1,Si�ntact · · With the guards·, stated iliat the I \guards used a fonn o� short .. shackling prior to the arrival of the BOP offic�rs. The original

(b)(1 r . ''\" . ' technique involve� chaining both'the ·hands and the feet,'to the: wan: . (b)(3) NatSecA�he wall hook was less than two feet from the floor. '.fhe detainee

would have to siton the.floor of the cell with his arm elevated 'and bent.81 CJ stated that he saw Rahman short ci_lained in his cell. He never saw anv other detainee pla.ced in that position.

(b)(3) NatSecAct . . . . ·

(b)( 1.) �!� (StCDovemb�r 2002: 'UmCJNovember 2002

(b)(3) NatSecA�o�<;>logy cabl� reported: · (b)(3) NatSecAct

Inte�ew�d se

.

parately oSI November 2002,.each of the tw� (b)( 1 ) lLJ (b )(3) NatSecAct guards reported that during normal' cell checl<s'at 2200, 2300, � ,

(b)( 1 ) . I ( b)(3) . NatSecAct

and 0800 on[(;0{fovember, they. saw � was alive in his .· (b )(3) NatSecAct ·

(b)(6) . \ ( b )(7 )( c) ..._,8l�(�S,�'/-��Th-e-diffe�. �ren-c�e b�e-tween the two techniques is that, with the original technique, the

detainee is chained to the wall, and there is no third cha;n connecting the hands to the feet

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cell. Rahman was visually inspected through the door cell slot but no guard entered his cell. Both of the two guards.on the 0900 cell check said independently that Rahman was definite�y alive, with his eyes open, seated in. his cell at 0800 hours orf!November 2002 . . . . Shortly after 1000 hours on0Nove�2002, Station personnel then present at the facili�_con�ct an interrogation of . another individual were notified byL__Jguards that GulRahman was sleeping in his ceµ but there was some problem.

(b)( 1 ) (b r3) NatSecAct • .

These officers were escorted to the cell by the guards. These (b )( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct officers realized. Rahman was deceased and' they subsequently

requested via secure radio that Station medic visit the facility. Officers reported that a small amount (palm-sized pool) of dried blood was present in and around the mouth and nose of subject .

(b)( 1 )

. Rahman was observed still shackled, and slumped over in the · seated position . • . .

At approximately 1030 ho\.trs, Station medic arrived at the location. The 'Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious c:onfusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific cause of death. He noted that the blood in evidence was dark, not in keeping with a wourid to the nose or mouth area. The medic's notes on Rahman's condition are filed at Station. His estimation was that Rahman had.been.dead less than a few hours.

(b)(3) NatSecAct 139. (S//}>W) According to the two TOY c;>fficers who were present at\ !when Rahman was reported dead, he was lyin;g on his side; his hands were shackled together as we;re his feet.. His hands were then secured to his feet and his feet . were chained to a grate on th� will with a six- to.�

.2-inch cha(b) ( 1 )

. . · (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)( 1 ) . .. 140. (-5//NF)lis�ted he was Una.ware thatStation . (b)(3) C IAAct officers tried to co:nt� on the morning oQovember 2002 ·

(b )(3) NatSec}\�t.hen Rahman' s death was discovered. He indicated the radio was ��(c) not always on. I lsaid he was not certain where h� was at �e

t:i:tne Rahman's bod was found.llthought perhaps he was' at the Station but h�owledged that had he been at the Station an (�(f) trio c ed, someone �o�d have located him..82 . . (b)( 1 )

(b)( 1 ) . . {b)(3/ NatSecAct . . (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) C IAAct 82 � None of the personnel, includin� lwhOwere presentC ( b) ( 3) N atSecActnd beca.ine aware of Rahman's death that date could account fo� lwhereaboui:s (b )(6) throughout the morning when �1s death was reported to the Station. (bl (?)( c

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,-WhenJhepfficers subsequently returned to the Station from (b)( i ) � �they info�ed s�lected Station personnel of Rah.man's (b ) (3) C IAAct death. One of them, 1dentttrw:u:ecalled, Jnforme9ev ha\ (b) (3) NatSecActf�und Rahman dead in his ce�.83 Whe�ent to see he (b) (6) was alreadx aware of Rahman's death,8� . · .

(b )(7)( c) · (b )(3) NatSecAct ; · ·

141 . (S?j bii, !acknowledged that the account of the guards checkiiig on l an at 2200 and 2300 and 0400 hours, as reported in the cable, was odd and·inconsistent with the policy of the rounds conducted e:v.ery four hours. He maintained, however, t?.at 'this was what the guards t9ld him\ �aid he thought it was unusual that the guard commander was not present' atl I .

( b)( i ) when Rahman's death was reported. Other officers also cited that (b)(3) NatSecAct:his absence appeared unusual.

(b )(3) NatSecAct · 142. �/JI From what he hearctCJsaid he �as ·

confident R�ed of hypotherillia. Bemg on the bare flo.or was likely a factor. I �tated he had no more experience than the

. , average person with hypothermia. From life expetiencei-1 �� g� C IAA t .. recognized .that if the. ground is colder than your body, itrspruclent (b )(3) NatS�cAc {o have somethin between· our bod and the ound. (b )(6) (b)(7) (c)' assumed

that other detainees · d not 'e because they were more warmly dressed. Rahman was the only prisoner short chained.in his cell at

· the tjme; he was different from the other E:J' ners. When asked ,if he " · thought Rahman would have been alive o November 2002 if he

(b )( 1) had cooperatedJ !responded that if an had been ·

(b)(3) CIAAct � ti · · h · uld · b bl till .b. all. ' . (b)(3) NatSecAct'oopera ve, e wo pro a y s e ve. · (b)( i ) (b )(6) · (b )(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c) ·

� Wheri interviewed by the D0 InvestiF!tive Team three days after Rahman's death, (b )( 1 ) L__Jstated he learned of the dea� f:rooj 1 lcorurrmed tp.is d�g his OIG (b)(3) CIAAct interview. · .

(b)(3) NatSecActl � No phetographs were taken of Rahman or the condition �fhis cell. The only ( b) ( 6) . �tographs of Rahman were the photographs taken in conjunction with the �utopsy on (b)(7) (c) L_}fovember 2002. ·

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��w � c·IAA 143. (S//NF)I lstated that he is hesitant to conc�ude that (b ) (� ) NatS��Acthypothermia was the cause of Rahman's death. He is not convinced. (b )(6) that there were not other unspecified medical conditions th�t existed (b)(7)(c) with Rahman that contributed to his death. llstated that H is

hard for him to sq�e with hypo�ermia as �use of death since I

· Rahman was alive through the night. : ,.

(b) ( 1 ) (W/F.Qll&) THEINVESTIG1'.TlO"�BY.mED0 INVESTIGATIVE TEAM (b)(3) NatSecAct

144. (S//NF)\ \statioMported Rahman's death in an (b)(3) NatSec�ct · Fable to the DDO on L_JNoveni.ber 2002, 'the day of

Rahrilan's death. Shortly thereafter the DDO dispatched �ee (b) ( 1 ) · A�ertc ·officers the "DO Investigative Team") t� �n a (b )(3) NatSecAct to investigate the circumstances of the death.85 The

(b) ( 1 ) D Investigative Team, cm;�sistin of ho was the senior securi officer assi ed to

(b)(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct conducted interviews, and the (b )(6) (b)(7)(c)

'----��--�-�----' pathologist perform.ed an autopsy -of Rahman.86· , • ·" ,'L. hf\\: � .. � • • .. .. , " ... ·,i . . . .. . !, '

145. (S//t-Wi �dvised theiDO. Investiga6ve Team that (b)( 1 ) · detainees were examiiled and photographed upon their arrival to (b )(3) c IAAct pro�ect the Agency in the event they were beaten or otherwise (b)(3) NatSecAct:Ustreatedl lprior to rendition.·. However, wh�c=l on (�)(6) 0Janµary 2003, two months after Rahman's arrival inj____S . ( )(?)(c) ·requested the identity of the medical officer, the results of Rahnlan's

medical examination, j'1 coptes of the rendition photographs[ � did not produce them reported that no medical documents

. were retained from the renditions, LJation did not retain (b)( 1 ) medical documentation of detainees aid he could not (b)(3) NatSecAct . · .

(b) ( 1 ) (b)(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

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identify the medic who reportedly exarilined Rahman and also said (b) ( 1 ) the digital photographs of Rahman had been overwritten. (b)(3) C IAAct (b) (3) C IAAct · . . (b)(3) NatSecAct. (b) (3) NatsecAct 146. WflliF}The oo Inves� Team lntervir:dl

I lcIA

(b) (6) employees and contractors and .th�ide guards. was (b) (?)\c) interviewed a second time when he returned to Headquar ers while on leave from c---imd by an �-mail message that was sent to I �later attejptffig�l�cate additional informatiiin. On · � DJai\.uary 2003, ompleted a 33-page rep?rt with 50

(b)( 1 ) ;lttachments, including the post-mortem photographs. (b )(3) NatSecAct · .

. 147. (S//NF}j �tate<;l he delivered tissue samples and

(b)( 1 ) histologies (microsco�ic examination o� structure of the tissues) to (b)(3) C IAAct government laboratones. From the toxicology and laboratory · .

(b)(3) NatSecAct sttidies, he learned there were no traces of cyanide, opiates, truth (b) (6) serums, or poisons. He said he was ''99.9 percent" certain that the ( b)(?) (c) cause of death was hypothermia and asserted that, µ Rahman's death

had occurred in the United States, it would have been listed as death. - · .. · · by hypothermia;·! lstated·that,· from· a 'Clinical perspective, ·he· is · · .. · . . . . · · · . . .. · · ·

· . .... skeptical of the accUracy· of' the reportirig of the time of. death. He · " · '

believes the account of th� guards that Rahman was shivering at 0800 : · : :-- · · " " "

.. (b) (3) N�atSecAdOOO hours "does not fit." · 1 (b) ( 1 )· · . . .

• (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b ),( 1 ) 148. (� L __ J 0nONoveinber 2002,I b�nt an e-mail (b)(3) C IAAct message to several OGC attomEtys assigned to the DO that was . ( b)(3) N�tSecAct intended to. be a preliminary report of })is findings.87 Included in the · (b ) (G) ail · · th f ·n · (b) (7)(c) e"".m message was e o owing:

(b) ( 1 ) . ( b)(3) C IAAct ( b)(3) NatSecAct ( b ) (6) (b)(7) (c)·

(b)(5)

�7 (U / /�)[ �aid h� did not prepare any ?ther report on this matter. , .

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(b)(3) C IMct . · (b)(3) NatSecAct 149. fB/J I are=:November 2002, prior

.to djpartin

J (b)(6) \ }ent an e-mail message to his supervisors which (b)(7 ) (c) was forwarded to the DDO and Associate PDO. The e-mail reported

' i(b)(1rt= I •

(b) (3) NatSecAct · ·

\ �hich is where our Subject was housed, is a newly constructeeoncrete facility that has no heating or cooling. Temperatures have recently dropped into the thirties at night. Having walked through the facility in the afternoon, it was still ·

very cold. Most prisoners are fully clothed, however this · prisoner was somewhat' difficult to handle and uncooperative. He had thrown food and threatened to kill the guards. As punishment his pants were takel,l. from him. He �d not worn pants (m�aning he.was naked from the waste [sic} down) for several days. There was 'no carpeting or matting on the floor, which means that when he was shackled, his naked body sat agamst the bare concrete. .

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151 . (SHMF) The ·autopsy indicated, by a· diagnosis of exclusion, that Ralunan' s death wa8 caused by hypothermia.SS The Final Autopsy Findings reported the cause of d�ath as

. "undetermined,'' the manner of death as "ll;Ildetermined," and the · clinical impression as. hypothermia.

152. (S71NF} The DO Investigative Team concluded:

+ There is no evidence to .suggest that Rahman's death was deliberate.

·

+ There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman was beaten, tortured, poi.Saned, stran�led, or.smothered.

·

• Hypothermia was the most likely cause of .death of Rahman.

+ R�an's death was not deliberate but resulted from . . "incarceration in.a .. cold. environment .while .nude.from.the . . . . . . . . . .

waist·down·an&being shackled in a position that prevente� him from moving around to keep warm. Additionally; this kept him in direct contact with'the colP, concrete floor leading to· a loss of body heat through ·conduction.

' '

Rahman's actions contributed to his own death. By . throwing his last meal, he was unable to provide his body with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his violent behavior res�ted in his· restraint, which ·

prevented him from. generating body heat by.moving

around and brought him in qirect contact with the concrete floor. leading to a loss of bo�.y heat through conduction.

88 (U) A diagnosis of exclusion in a death case is one where all other causes of death are excluded and the clinical environment � which the victim was found is examined along with the immediate history developed during the investigation. However, no definitive tests 0r findings establish that diagnosis. · · ·

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(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct . . (b ) (6)

. (b)(7) (c)--� . tc) OTHER TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED �RAPPROVED B�

�-----

153. (S//NF) A senior CTC operations office:i; stated that when he was a� !between 13 September and 3 October 2002� I .

I: offered to fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the operations officer was interviewing a �� who was thought to be

(b )( 1 ) · withholding informa'tion. ReportedlyL_____btaged. the incident, (b )(3) NatSecAc!vhich included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA

(b)( i ) officers andLJguards. When the guards moved the detainee from (b)(3) C IAAct the in'terrogation room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a (b)(3) NatSecActhooded detainee, lying motionless on the ground an� made to (b) (6) appear as if he.had been shot to ·qeath. The operations officer added · ( b) (7 ) ( c) tha,� lopenly discussed his p�an fo� the mock execution for

several days prior to and after the event withLJ.tation officers.

��g� NatSecAct 154. (S//NF) Station offic�ri:;;n · fecounted that

I aroun9 . :J20021 she heard t thlS ·Same semor ere . (b ) ( 1 ) · operations o!ffcer staged � mock execution .

. She was not pre��nt but

I . I

I.. .. . . . ..

I ( b )(3) c IAAct understoocht·went·badly; she was· told thaht was· transparently a · ·

(b)(3) NatSecActruse and no benefit was derived from it. . . • • • ...... .A,1 • .1, ... " .... , ... \ .. � • • ..

(b) (6) (b) (7 )(c)

I · .. :" · · 155�·�(8//NF) Four other office.rs and ICs who were interviewed admitted to either participating in such an incident or hearing about one of them.89 An IC who led a CTC review of procedµres at l �er Rahman's death stated tha� I described staging a mock execution of a detainee. R�portedly, a ·

(b ) ( 1 ) detainee who witnessed the·'body" in the aftermath of the ruse "sang (b)(3) C IAAct like a bird.". (b)(3) NatSecAct .

�� l��l( �) 1s6. (S(:NF?. I I

!admitted that he pa:rticipa� m a "mock execution" at when the first detainees arrived. He contended the etamees were ther� only one day, ·and he hoped to shake them up quick!y.c::::::Jexp� he discharged a firearm in a safe manner while anL, .... \ , � . fficer lay on the floor and

(b) ( 1 ) . (b)( 1 ) . . (b ) ( 1 ). (b) (3) NatSe.cAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) C IAAct i;iq li:l.J.Am} 1t· · diffi.cul· t t d t . ' h ck . ti 't ged d . this ( b)(3) NatSecAct '"'"".... JS o e emune ow many mo execu ons were s a unng

( b) ( 6) period. There appear to be at least two. c=Jadmits to panicipating in only one.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct · (b)(7 )(c) (b )(6) (b ) (7)( c) chicken blood was splattered On the wa,U. The t�chnique wa�L---�

idea and was based on thej J concept of showing something that looks real, but is not. According· toJ I irt that case it was not effective because it appeared to be staged. (b)(6)

. . . . · . . · ( b)(7) (c) ��g� NatSecAct 1S7. (S//Niar- !stated thatC_�----�--=-c--.

I •

�o em:�oyed �e mock executio� teclmi ue once; the offic�r (b)( 1 ) informed\_ labout it afterwards. The. re ortedly tried (b)(3) C IAAct the technique ecause the detainee knew it was facility (b)(3) NatSecActand the officer wanted to induce the belief tha ould do . � ��(c) anything.I . . ]contended that he did not kTI.ow when this incident

occurred ·or if it was successful.

158. (S//}'ij1� When asked about the possibility· that handguns (b)( 1 ) had been used as ro s or mock execi.ltions had been staged at (b)(3) NatSecAct responded, "We don't do that . . . there's none . I

of that." aid he Would be surprised if someone said that a (b)( 1 ) gun, was used; it was not part of an interrogation technique. He (b )(3) C IAAct . . . . eX:plained.that handguns .were. not allowe� .fu.the v�cinity of. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . (b)(3) NatSecAc� detainees, for fear that the weapons could be taken away·or turned (b)(6) ' . ' . . (b)(7)(c) on the mterrogators . .

. � . ; :�� ,·.;�� .. • , • • 1 ; .� i 1:·: , . r �' , , "·· · : · · .

· 1s9 . (S//NF� Upon fyrther discussion,! !revealed tJ:lat · I

appro�te!y four days before his interview with OIGc=Jto!d ( b )( 1 ) · of an instance wher{ [conducted a mock execution at ( b)(3) NatSecAct in approximat�l� �002.90 Reportedly,

the firearm was discharged Ol;ltside of the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threa� information.

(b)( 1 ) E5ated that he did not hear of a �imilar act o.ccurring at (b)(3) C IAAct ubsequently. · · · · (b)(3) NatSecAct .

��(�) (SitNf) NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN's DEA.m ro CONGRESS (b )(3) NatSecAct · ·


. 160. ·� As. discussed previoU:Sly� �e orted ·

· Rahman's death to Headquart�rs in a�ovemb�r 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct. (b)( 1 )

(b)( 1 ) �- .

· (b)(3) NatSecAct ( b )(3) C I AA ct 90 (€j jwas inte�ewed o��ebruary 2003. ( b)(3) NatSecAct · (b)(3) C IAA�t_J. ( b)(6) .

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b 1 �IA VMOflORN/IMR (b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct �b�b� NatSecA�)(3) NatSecAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct

. · cable to the DDO. (S�e Exhibit.) On[]November 2002� I · ( b )( 1 ) · · t"o'l"'lorted I �tation Medical Support to Detainees in (b)(3) NatSecAct- to the DDO. This addressed the medical e�e �-�--� provided to detainees in general along with a comment about the medical treatment orovided to Ralunan. · 1

(b) (3) NatS�cAct ,. 16l. tS/ I I On 29 November 2002, the Dire�tor of

Congressional Affairs (D /OCA) provided the ·chairman and ranking member of each Intelligence Committee and the Chairman and Ranking Memb�r of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense a background paper entitled ''Death of Detainee Gul Rahn;l.an." The paper identified Rahman as "an AlQa'ida operative and Hezbi-Islami Gulbuddin/Hekmatyar associate · who was also a close contact of senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Abdul Rafunan--,AI-Najdi." It reported CIA was sending a team of officers toL_Jto conduct an inquiry-into Rahman's·death1

((�))((1 )) N ts A;T\cluding an autopsy to determine the cause of death. The 3 a ec gkckground paper reported, "Rahman arrived at th�r--liete�tion .

- · · · · facility on[]November·(2002] ·and was· given a physi�amination ·

(b)( 1 ) mhich indicated no· medical iss'ues Of>··preexisting medical (b) ( 1 ) . (b)(3) NatSecAct diti .. 91 . . (b)(3) NatSecAct · con ons. (b)(3) NatSecAct · · · · ·�·62. wi=J · On 23 January ��o�, �e .. IG reported to the. DC! . by memorandum that the General Counsel had informed the IG on 22 January 2003 of the de�th of Gul Rahman: Further, ·the IG stated that the OIG·was ·investigating' the issue. On 30 January 20031 the D<;:I forwarded the IG1s memorandum to the Congressional oversight committees and reiterated the DCI had notified the committees of · this matter by formal notific�tion on 29 November 2002. J;he DCI'::> letter added that the DO Investigative Team's report was nearii)g

(b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecA�t . (b)(3) NatSecAct

91 (fr/ nThe first portion of thls statement appem to be drawn from the�ov�er 2002

\ . [cimieTeporting the death of Ralurian. As explained earlier, this information is inaccurate.

There JS no evidence that .Rahman rec�_!\ physical examination upon his arrival atr-1 or at any time following his arrival in[__j It cannot be determined where the Offi�� Congressional Affairs obtained i:he information ·that Rahman did

.not have any medical issues or a

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(b)( 1 ) �-xis ting medical condition because that conclusion was not reported in either the Dor ' L__JJovember 2002 cables. . "( b) ( 1 ) · ( b) ( 1 ) I

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completion and CIA would be sending the committ.ees a follow-up notifica tio(b ):(3 r'N�ts�"cA�titure.

163. �;J I On 2 May 2003, the D/OCA provided an update to the Intelligence Committees of Congress and Chairman' and Ranking. Member of the House and Senate Appropriatio!IB Subcommittee on Defense in the form of a background paper entitled "Death of Detainee Gui Rahman." The background paper, "Investigation by the Directorate of Operations," which included an autopsy and toxicology, disclosed that Rah.man's death was accidental and �ost likely resulted from hypothermia. "92 The background paper reported that Rahman was nude from the waist down and that "an autopsy' disclosed several surface abrasions which he obtained withlll the first few days of his incarceration."93 The

· ·

background paper reported, "During his incarceration, Rahman (b)( 1 ) threatened several times to killl =guards.94 . . . At1500 (b)(3) NatSecA��ours] onC}Jovember 2002 . . . Rahm� again' threatened to kill the

guards and threw his food, wate! bottle, and waste bucket at the .

guards/� . . . pinally;-the background paper· reported;· '!As. a result of.his · . .

·

tjolent behavior, an:d following procedures recommended by the U.S. BOP, Rahman was shackled to the wall in a short chain position which prevents prisoners from standing upright. "95

(b)(3) NatSecAct · · 92 �/ LJ As rep9rted above, in actuallty, Ute autops� reported tile cause of death as

"lll\determined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as ·

( b) ( 3) Nat S ecAct hypothermia. the investigative report concluded, "There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death was deliberate." .

93 '(Si Al The initial report to Congress on 29 Novembe� 2002 did not report fuat Rahman was nak�ow the waist and chained iil a position that forced him to sit on the coricrete floor. The autopsy did not address the age of the abrasions. As explained earlier, the pathologist . opined to OJG that the abrasions to the shoulders and hips occurred from one to three days, at most, before Rahman's death. .

· · ·

· ·

· 94 � Ac.cording t�R.alunan reportedly threatened the guards two times only, . (b)(3) Nat�ecActduring the week of[]November and on[]November. . "

. 95-<S"/llAs reported previously�d OIG that he did not recall :unishittg ((� �� ( ) ( b ) ( 1 ) Rahman Torffie first alleged verbal thre�OP.officers,] J c. (b )(3) C IAAct I � lwho taught the short chain position, inilicated that they adriever seen ( b )( 3) NatSecActhe short Chain position used in a cell situation. Additionally, they did not offer.scei:tarios for use "

( b) ( 6) of the short chain position and woUld not employ the technique on a detainee for throwing food. (b )(7) ( c) They simply taught the technique. ·

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(U)' APPUCABLE LA ws, 0R.EGiILATIONS AND POUCTES . .

164. (U) . Title 18 U.S.C. §112, Manslaughter, provides in pertinent part :

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds:

,Voluntary - Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passiOn. Involuntary - In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an 1:ffilawful manner, <?r without due eaution and circumspection, of a lawful act which .might produce death.

· '

165. (U) Title. 18. U.S.C. §2441, Torture, provides penalties for "who[m]ever outsid� the United Stat�s commits or attempts to commit torture." The statute defines the crime of torture, in pertinent part, as:

. . . . . . . an act committed. by a.person.acting. under. the .color. of iaw.

. . ,specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or

·� . .. . sufferlrlg (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upori another person within his custody or physical ' .

: ' . ·" . control. .

166. (U) Title' 18 U.S.C. §2441, War .Crimes, provides penalties for "whomever, whether inside or outside the United States, comntlts a war cri.ID.e" whe�ein "the person committing such war crime or the victim of such. war crime is a member of. the Aimed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States.". The statute defines a war crime as any cqnduct defined as a grave breach of t:tte .Geneva Conventions [or any protocol to su� convention: to which the United States is a party].96 The prosCribed conduct includ�s the following

96 · M The United States is not yet a party'to either of the two "Protoeol$ ·Additional t� the Geneva C:onventions.,"

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r�levant offenses: willful killing, torture or inhumcµl treatment, in�luding biologiciµ expe�ents, willfully' causing great suffering to body or health.97

·

167. (U) On 7 February 2002, President B:ush issued. a . . memorandum noting that the "provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban" [in Afghanistan] but would not · apply to-Al-Qa'ida.98 Neither the Taliban·nor Al-Qa'ida would be entitled to enemy Prisoners of Wa:r status, however. Nonetheless, the Presf dent ordered, "As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

168. �//NF). On 24 January 2003, the General Counsel orally informed the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ of Rahman's death. On 13 February 2003, OIG reported Rahman's death in detention to the U.S. DoJ by memorandum .

. : . . . . . . . . " . . " . . . . . . . . · . . . :: . . . " .. . . . " . . . " . . . . . . . . . " . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . ' . " . . . .

· · 169. "(S//NB)' on 29 December 2003, the Chief,.. ... .... . . · · · ·

Cohnterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, DoJ, reported by letter that it declined to pursue a federal prosecution of criminal ¢a:rges in this matter. As of April 2005, the matter is under revi�w by the U.S. Attorney's Offic� for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant·to the direction of the Attorney General.

·

97 (U) Grave breaches are de&ed in the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War are listed in Article 147. · (Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention

. Relative to the Treatment of'Prisoners of War lists tl)ese same offenses as "grave breaches.") 98 (U) Memorandum from the President to· the Vice President, Sec,retary of State, Secretary of Defense, Att,omey General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to"the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Humane Treabnent of al Q<1;�da and Taliban Detainees," dated and signed 7 February 2002.

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170. (U//FOUO) Agency Regulation 13-6, Appendix I; Standards for Employee Accountability provides�

,.,

a. Consequences will follow an employee's failure to comply with a statute, regwatiol), policy or other �dance that is applicable to the employee's professional conduct or performance.

b. The lack of knowledge of a statute, regulation, policy or guidance does not necessarily excuse the employee. However,

. lack of knowledge may affect the level of employee ·

responsibility and t:he extent to which cijsciplinary action is warranted. Therefore the following factors will be considered prior to holding an anployee acc;ountable for a particular act or omission:

(1) Agency efforts to make employee$ aware of the statute, �egulation, policy or guidance;

(2) The extent of employee awareness of the statute, regulation, policy or guidance;

. . . . . (3) ' The 'ini.portan:ce of the' conduct or 'performance af iSstie;

. ' (4) The position or grade of the employee.

c. Any finding of defid�nt performance must be specific and may include omissions and failure to act in accprdance with a reasonable level of pr�fessionalism, skill, and diligence.

d. Determinations under the above standard will be based in part on whether the facts objective�y indicate a c,ertain action should have been taken or not taken and whether the employee had an opportunity and the respons.ibllity to act or not act.

e. Managers may be held accountable in addition for th� action(s) or inaction of subor:dinates even if the manager lacks knowledge of the subordinate' s conduct. Such accountability depends on: '

(1) Whether th.e manager reasonably should have been aware of the matter and has taken reasonable i:p.easures to ensure such awareness.

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(2) Whether the manager has taken reasonable measures to ensure compliance with the law and ·Agency policies and regulations .

. CONCLUSIONS

171 . (S//�JF) CIA had not i;ssued any applicable custodial interrogation guidelines by the time of Rahrnan's detention. The

�� g� C IAAct prac��e at that time was for interrogators to propose in!errogation ( b)(3) NatSecAci:e�hniques to ere for pre-approval. I Jdid not take (b) (6) this step .prior to the interrogatio:t;). of Rahman. Further, a ere legal (b)(7) (c) advisor said Headquarters would no�have knowingly approved

sever.al of the techniques that\ I employed, including cold showers, cold conditions, hard takedowns, and the short chain restraint.

(b) ( 1 ) · .

. . 172. (Sll°NI71 \treated Rahman harshly because of ( b)(3) C IAAct Rahm ' all d t tur his . . . ti t th (b) (3 ) NatSecAct . an s ege · s a e, . . uncompronusmg reac on o e . . . . .. . . . ( b)(6) · interrogation andvlack of cooperation, the pressure onLJto (b) (7 )(c) "break him," 'an� l lack of experience with a committed

. t ' ti' • t (b ) ( 1 ) ' m erroga on rests er. ·(b)(3) NatSecAct 173. (S//NF) 0nONovember·2002� \ordered or

(b)( 1 ) approved the guards placing Rahman in ·the short chain position (b) (3 ) C IAAct whereby he was compelled to sit 011: the concrete floor of � cell. (b) (3 ) Na�SecActRahman was only clothed .in a sweatshirt . . This act directly led to (b)(6) Rahman's. de��othermia .. llwas fully cogni,zant that the (b)(? )(c) . temperature irL__Jhad fallen sfiarpIYin November. Two ·

.

individuals said that they raised the subject of the cold temperatures withj J 0n[)Novemberrldirected that actions be taken to . he�p other d�tainees ward off tKeco-la. Other officers an4 contractors

( b )( 1 ) present a� In. N�vember 2�02 .stated they reco�ed it was (b )(3) NatSecAct very cold-and some detainees were inadequately protected against

r-- the cold,. 'J'.hey stated they were personally aware of the possibility o� hypothe�a, but some s�d they ass�ed it was the responsibility of someone else to address.

SiERfIT dNOPOltW//MR _ . _ (b) (3) NatSecAct.



1 C 0 6 5 4 1 7 1 3 Approved for Release : 201 6/09/30 C0654 1 7 1 3 ( b)(3) C IAAct

(b )(3) NatSecAct (b )(6)

SECRE17' � �ORM//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(?)(c) 174. (S//NF)I !exhibited reckless indifference to the

possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's death. There is no· indic�tion that�tended that Rahman .

(b)(1 ) should be severely harmed or kill� . · . · (b)(3) NatSecAct .---· --_, ·

. .i7s. (5111'1P) The initial account of I lguards'that ·

Rahman .died in the mid-morning o0November 2002 is unreliable

I I ' ·

I · I (b )( 1 ) and self-serving. It is likely that Rahman died during the night and

(b)(3) NatSecActhe guards waited until Station officers were present ati Ito .

I report his death. Nonetheless, there is no evidenc� that th� \ (b) ( 1 ) ! (b)( 1 ) .guards assaulted or independently mistreated Rahman. . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

. 176. (S//NE) Rahman did hot receive a physical examination

��g� C IAAct followmg his ren�tion fr.on{ �r at any time while detained (b)(3) NatSecAC� ldeswte l Jreport to the contrary. Although (b )(6) I Jthe physician's assis�t at that time, reported that (b) (?)(c) he examined all the other detainees held atl I he did not

. . · examine Rahman. ( ]allowed Ralunin's statement that a 11 was · well to-supplanta·physical examination . . (b)( i ). · . . . .. · . . . . . . . (b)( 1 ) . . . · . . . · ·

· (b)(3) NatSecAct . (b) (3) NatSecAct . (b)( 1 ) . 1�. �//�W),___[ ��\who was�uring the firstD (b) (3) C IAAct ..J f Rahman' d t ti' did t tt d t Rahm . th (b )(3) NatSecActays o s e en on, no a en o an m e same (b)(6) . manner and with the same standard of care. as �e other detainees. (b) (7)(c� Bas aware of th� cold conditions; indeed the temper�ture in ·

d reached a Iow·of �1 degrees the day before he departed. . on0November. As amedicat care provider, he should have advocated more humane treatment for Rahm.an that would ensure

(b) ( 1 ) his health and safety. (b)( 1 ) (b)(3) NatSecAct . . . ·(b)(3) NatSecAct

178. {S.//WP) I • ls�tion's reporting of the details of Rah.man's detention and death in Station cables contained false .

(b)( 1 ) N 8 �tatements and material .omissions. Consequently, the Congressional ·

(b)(3) at ecAct tifi" . dr . ft th bl :-& · ti b · · · d no cation awn · om e ca e uuorma on ore inaccuracies an

material omissions. The inaccurate reporting.obscured or minimized the cireumstances of the death, the involvement �f Din the mistreatment of Rahman, and the absence of adequate supervision by

(b)( 1 ) I I A follow-up report to the Congression,al oversight (b)(3) C IAAct L . • .

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) (b)(?)(c) SECRET/!� -��K)FORU//MR

· · (b )(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 71 3

I I l'


Approved for Release: 201 6/09/30 C06541 7 1 3 �ET/ l rNOfiU:Ki�nMR , (b)(3) NatSecAct

committees was prepared on 2 May 2003. That . report, drawn from the DO Investigative Report, accurately reported'salient circumstances that contributed to Rahman's death that were initially

(b)(1) omitted. (b)(3) C IAAct (b )(3) NatSe.cAct 179. (S/ /�<Fl] � direct resporisil>ility for failing

�� ·�(c) to include pertinent facts in � ovember 2002 offic;ial written

. .account of Rahman' s death. The 1cable sftec,cally jithheld

information known tq land that directed the guards 'to place Rahman in the· short chain positiori'while he was naked below the waist, thereby forcing him to sit bare bottomed on

(b)( 1 ) . the bare concrete floor of his cell in what were known to be very cold · (b)(3) NatSecAct tur · · . tempera es.

. . 180. (-5/ /NP) I lbeai's responsibiliLo�r not · ·

providing adequate supervision ofl �ctivities at · (b) ( 1 ) ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)( 1 ) . (b)(3) C IAAct. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) . (b) (7) (c)

(b)(3) C IAAct (b)(6)

. d .sOCitlff NOFORN//MR. ( b)(3) NatSecAct . .



C0654 1713 , ...... , , . , (b)(3) C IAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

. (b )(7)( c)


-SECRB-T /j fMOPORM//Iv.m (b)(3) NatSecAct · .

RECOMMENDATIONS

1 . (S/ /NF) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency . should convene ari Accountability Board to review the ·performance � � regard to the events that contributed to the death of Gul Rahman.

CONCUR:

(b )(6)

h];l L. Hel� rson Inspect?r General

(b)(3) C IAAct (b)(5)

�11-�/QS- . Date

SEGRET LJNOEORN//Mlf. (b )(3) NatSecAct


I .

. :. . ' ,.. j . '

. , \ '

Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 1 … · 2019. 12. 21. · Case...

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Transcript of Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 1 … · 2019. 12. 21. · Case...