Case 1:10 Cv 01178 SHS
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Transcript of Case 1:10 Cv 01178 SHS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________________X BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as Trustee for the Registered Holders of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C30, acting by and through its Special Servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, BANK OF AMERICA,N.A., 10 Civ. 1178 (SHS) as Trustee for the Registered Holders of COBALT CMBS ECF Case Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2 and Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C31, acting by and through CWCapital Asset Management LLC pursuant to the authority granted under that certain Amended and Restated Co-Lender Agreement dated March 12, 2007 and U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5 and ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-6, acting by and through CW Capital Asset Management LLC pursuant to the authority granted under that certain Amended and Restated Co-Lender Agreement dated March 12, 2007, Plaintiffs, -against- PCV ST OWNER LP, ST OWNER LP, TRI-LINE CONTRACTING CORP., ATLAS FIRE PROTECTION, INC., POMALEE ELECTRIC CO, INC., REFUSE SYTEMS CORP., PRO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., TRITON STONE AND MARBLE LLC, S.T.S. TRADING INC. d/b/a S.T. LUMBER & HOME CENTER, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING, S.D. INT’L d/b/a S.D. STONE DEPOT, ELBEX AMERICA OF NEW YORK, INC., NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD and FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants, -against- APPALOOSA INVESTMENT L.P. , I, PALOMINO FUND LTD., THOROUGHBREDFUND L.P., and THOROUGHBRED MASTER LTD. Intervenor-Defendants. _____________________________________________________X
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF APPALOOSA INTERVENORS’
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS A PARTY-DEFENDANT
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 1 of 22
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TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appaloosa
Investment L.P. I, Palomino Fund Ltd., Thoroughbred Fund L.P., and Thoroughbred
Master Ltd. (the Appaloosa Intervenors) have filed a motion seeking leave to intervene as
a matter of right in this Action as a party-defendant. Intervention is required because
Plaintiff CW Capital has pursued foreclosure in breach of its fiduciary obligations to the
Appaloosa Intervenors. Plaintiff CW Capital is also deeply conflicted, and does not
adequately represent the interests of the Appaloosa Intervenors, who have more than
three quarters of a billion dollars at stake in the trusts secured by the property at issue in
the foreclosure Action; namely, the mortgage on Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant
Town (the “Property”).
Plaintiff CW Capital Management’s actions in pursuing foreclosure on Peter
Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town (“Stuyvesant Town”) violate its obligations as
Special Servicer to act as a prudent commercial mortgage servicer seeking to maximize
value for the benefit of all Certificateholders. By rushing to foreclose, when other less
hazardous avenues were available, Plaintiff CW Capital has recklessly and imprudently
exposed the Appaloosa Intervenors—and other Certificateholders—to wholly avoidable
losses, risks, and injuries, including:
• Double and Unnecessary Transfer Taxes: A foreclosure judgment will require a double payment of New York City’s $100 million transfer tax on the Property: once when title is transferred by foreclosure, and a second time when the Property is sold in the inevitably necessary workout of this loan. No prudent commercial mortgage lender would willingly assume these tax liabilities, particularly when they could be limited by other means, or avoided entirely in bankruptcy.
• Environmental Liabilities: The documents governing the trusts state clearly that Plaintiff CW Capital may not pursue foreclosure unless, within
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 2 of 22
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six months prior to initiating the Action, it has obtained an environmental assessment certifying that the relevant mortgaged property is in compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. The Appaloosa Intervenors do not believe any such assessment has been obtained.
• Excess Rent Claims: The tenants at the Property are the beneficiaries of an un-liquidated, potentially massive excess rent claim that may, in the future, be converted into a damage judgment worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The status of this liability is uncertain, as is its effect on the rights of the Certificateholders and the value of the underlying mortgaged property. Proceeding precipitously to take title by foreclosure, in the face of this uncertainty, is again imprudent and not in the best interest of the Certificateholders.
• Creation of Unnecessary Losses for Certificateholders: By subjecting the property to transfer tax liability on foreclosure, Plaintiff CW Capital may obtain a priming lien at the top of the capital structure to secure repayment of that advance. This priming lien would create additional losses that would not otherwise be suffered by holders of subordinated tranches, including tranches of Certificates owned by Appaloosa.
• Voting Rights: Tranches whose recovery is wiped out by CW’s priming lien will also be deprived of voting rights they otherwise would enjoy under the trusts.
The Appaloosa Intervenors stand to suffer unique and irreparable injuries as a
result of Plaintiff CW Capital’s actions. The Appaloosa Intervenors own over
$750,000,000 of Certificates in the Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage C-30 Trust
(the “C-30 Trust”). Although much of this is senior debt, Appaloosa also holds over 30%
of three subordinated tranches of C-30 Trust Certificates. At a reported valuation range
of $1.8 - $2.2 billion, Appaloosa's particular series of subordinated Certificates are likely
to be the next loss-absorbing layers in the C-30 debt stack, and would thus become
impaired by the incurrence of $200 million of priming liens and back-end transfer taxes.
Moreover, the thickness of these debt layers is so narrow ($50-$100 million), that the
additional costs would likely be the difference between a recovery of zero and par on
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 3 of 22
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Appaloosa's particular tranches. These securities are likely to be the fulcrum securities in
any restructuring of the property. Appaloosa holds significant interests in other
subordinated tranches, as well. These losses could be avoided if Plaintiff CW Capital
were acting prudently and with due regard for its fiduciary obligations.
No other party to the Action can or will adequately represent the interests of the
Appaloosa Intervenors. When Appaloosa attempted to open substantive discussions of
the profound problems associated with pursuing foreclosure, Plaintiff CW Capital’s
counsel responded by offering to “write a letter for the Hall of Fame.” Plaintiff CW
Capital is not only acting imprudently, it is subject to a profound conflict of interest. In
addition, Plaintiff CW Capital’s actions will benefit the governmental entity Defendants,
at the expense of Appaloosa and the other Certificateholders, by subjecting the property
to $200 million of wholly unnecessary transfer tax liability. This tax liability does not
benefit the Certificateholders; instead, every dollar goes solely to benefit the
governmental entities. Absent an intervention, no party in the lawsuit will adequately
hold Plaintiff CW Capital accountable to perform its obligations as Special Servicer to
act in the best interests of the Certificateholders, and to pursue remedies that are
reasonably expected to maximize their recovery.
The Appaloosa Intervenors should not be made to wait for a damages remedy to
redress Plaintiff CW Capital’s breach of its fiduciary obligations, particularly when
intervention as of right is warranted, and could avoid these damages entirely.
I. INTRODUCTION
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The Appaloosa Intervenors hold over three quarters of a billion dollars of
Certificates1 whose repayment is secured by the mortgage on the Property. On February
16, 2010, without consulting with Appaloosa or—to Appaloosa’s knowledge—any other
un-conflicted noteholder, Plaintiff CW Capital Asset Management LLC (“CW Capital”),
in its capacity as Special Servicer and on behalf of the Trustees of various trusts, filed a
Complaint (“Action”) seeking to foreclose on the Property.
CW Capital’s foreclosure Action was instituted in violation of CW Capital’s pre-
and post-default, fiduciary obligations. As Special Servicer, CW Capital is obligated to
service and administer the loans with “the same care, skill, prudence and diligence” that
would be the “customary and usual standards of practice of prudent institutional
commercial mortgage lenders servicing their own loans.” It must do so “with a view to
the maximization of the recovery on such Mortgage Loans on a net present value basis
and the best interest of the Certificateholders,” and “without regard to … any relationship
… the Special Servicer may have with the related Mortgagor, the Depositor, any
Mortgage Loan Seller or any other party to the Transaction… and the ownership of any
Certificate or Companion Loan.”2 Despite these clear obligations, CW Capital has
pursued foreclosure even though a successful judgment will inflict the wholly
unnecessary, avoidable, and imprudent harms on Appaloosa and the other
Certificateholders described above.
1 As noted, certain of the Certificates are held in the C-30 Trust. The other Certificates are held in the COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2, Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C31, the ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5, and the ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-6 (“Other Trusts” and with the C-30 Trust, collectively, the “Trusts”). 2 See Pooling and Servicing Agreement $7,903,498,737 Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-C30 at pg. 78 “Servicing Standard.”
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 5 of 22
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Appaloosa is entitled to intervene as of right to protect its own interests from the
reckless behavior of an entity that is supposed to—but is not—acting in the best interests
of Appaloosa and the other Certificateholders. CW Capital’s recklessness is evident: It
has willfully created a risk of assuming double tax liability, a liability that would result in
a gratuitous and wholly unnecessary priming lien. Its negligent disregard for the interests
of the Certificateholders is evident, as well: It has moved precipitously to foreclose, even
though it exposes the Trusts (and perhaps the Certificateholders) to litigation risks and
other liabilities that could be avoided or limited if CW Capital were acting prudently.
Why, then, has CW Capital pursued this foreclosure? The answer is simple: CW
Capital is burdened by an irreconcilable conflict between its role as Special Servicer and
its status as a holder of junior notes and their rights as “Controlling Class Representative”
of the C-30 Trust. As Special Servicer, CW Capital has clear fiduciary obligations to act
in the best interests of all of the Certificateholders “without regard to the ownership of
any Certificates,” i.e. without regard to its own holdings of the notes. As Controlling
Class Representative, however, CW Capital has the power to direct the Special
Servicer—here, itself—to take actions solely in its own interests.3 That instruction right,
however, cannot be permitted to overcome CW Capital’s clear fiduciary obligations as
Special Servicer to act in the interests of all holders.
This conflict precludes any finding that CW Capital can “adequately represent,”
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2), the interests of all Certificateholders, much less the interests of
3 See PSA at § 6.11(b) (noting that the Controlling Class Representative “may take actions that favor the interests of one or more Classes of the Certificates over other Classes if the Certificates, … may have special relationships and interests that conflict with those of Holders of some Classes of Certificates, … [and] may act solely in the interests of the Holders of the Controlling Class ….”) and (a) (providing that “the Special Servicer will disregard any direction or objection … of the Controlling Class Representative … if such direction or objection causes … the Special Servicer to violate the Servicing Standard ….”).
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the Appaloosa Certificateholders. The conflict between CW Capital and Appaloosa is
particularly profound: in the absence of CW Capital’s reckless assumption of priming
liens and other liabilities, Appaloosa holds Certificates that are the de facto controlling
class of the Trusts. The Appaloosa Intervenors, who hold more than $750 million of
Certificates, including tranches that stand to be wiped out and stripped of their rights as
fulcrum securities if CW Capital forecloses, have a clear, direct, and legally protectable
interest in the Property at issue in this Action. That interest is being significantly
impeded or impaired by the disposition of this Action, and by the conflicted actions of
CW Capital. Appaloosa by this intervention seeks to protect its interests and rights and,
as detailed below, should be afforded the opportunity to intervene as a party-defendant as
of right.
In reality, no current party to the case adequately represents the interests of the
Certificateholders, including Appaloosa, who stand to be injured irreparably by CW
Capital’s imprudent actions. CW Capital is profoundly conflicted. The Appaloosa
Intervenors have tried repeatedly to speak with CW Capital to resolve these concerns but,
since the Action was filed, CW Capital’s counsel has responded flippantly and
inappropriately to Appaloosa’s efforts to open a dialogue. CW Capital’s silence, in these
circumstances, ignores the gravity of the issues it faces, and is wholly inconsistent with
CW Capital’s fiduciary obligations as Special Servicer. The governmental entities that
are defendants will benefit—directly and indirectly—from the reckless and unnecessary
double tax payment that will be caused if CW Capital proceeds with its foreclosure.
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Each of these reasons establishes that Appaloosa is entitled to intervene as of right
in this Action. For these reasons, and those explained in greater detail below,
Appaloosa’s motion should be granted.
II. APPALOOSA SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE AS A PARTY-
DEFENDANT
A. Standard of Review
Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants an applicant the ability
to intervene in a pending lawsuit as a matter of right when, upon timely application, it
demonstrates that:
… the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added). To satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2),
a party must therefore (1) make a timely application; (2) demonstrate an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) show that disposition
of the action threatens to impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) show
that existing parties inadequately represent its interest. Brennan v. New York City Bd. of
Educ., 260 F.3d 123, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2001).
The test for intervention by right is flexible and discretionary; courts generally
look at all four factors and do not focus narrowly on any one of the criteria. See United
States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The various
components of the Rule are not bright lines, but ranges—not all ‘interests’ are of equal
rank, not all impairments are of the same degree, representation by existing parties may
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be more or less adequate, and there is no litmus paper test for timeliness. Application of
the Rule requires that its components be read not discretely, but together.”).
The applicant’s well-pleaded allegations must also be accepted as true for
purposes of considering the motion to intervene, with no determination made as to the
merits of issues in dispute. See Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 213 F.R.D. 131,
136 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
B. The Appaloosa Intervenors Have Met the Requirements for
Intervention as of Right
1. Appaloosa’s Motion to Intervene Is Timely
Appaloosa’s motion to intervene is indisputably timely. The Second Circuit
considers the following four factors to determine whether a motion under Rule 24(a)(2) is
timely: (1) the length of time the would-be intervenor knew or reasonably should have
known that its interest was imperiled before it moved to intervene; (2) the foreseeable
prejudice to the existing parties if intervention is granted; (3) the prejudice to the would-
be intervenor if intervention is denied; and (4) exceptional circumstances which may
militate against or in favor of allowing late intervention. United States v. Pitney Bowes,
Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1994).
This case began just over a week ago. Appaloosa is seeking to intervene at the
earliest possible opportunity. The Court has yet to set a scheduling order and many
parties have not yet been served. Appaloosa’s motion for leave has also been filed before
any defendant filed an Answer, so none of the existing parties has (or will) suffered any
prejudice as a result of the intervention. Finally, the Court has not been asked to make
any substantive rulings in this Action. By every applicable measure, Appaloosa’s Motion
is timely.
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2. Appaloosa Has a Protectable Interest in the Action
Appaloosa has an interest in the property that is the subject of the Action. The
Second Circuit has held that the applicant must have a “direct, substantial, and legally
protectable” interest in the proceeding. United States v. Peoples Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
271 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Washington Elec. Corp., Inc. v. Massachusetts
Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Appaloosa’s interest in the Property and the foreclosure Action is enormous and
obvious. It holds over $750 million of Certificates secured by the Property. Although
much of this is senior debt, Appaloosa owns 30% of three subordinated tranches that are
fulcrum tranches with significant rights to control the restructuring of the property.
Appaloosa has significant holdings in other subordinated tranches, as well. Appaloosa, in
short, is one of the largest holders of Certificates. It stands to be uniquely injured by the
destruction of its voting and fulcrum security rights and the loss of principal on these
Certificates if CW Capital proceeds with the foreclosure and imposes a reckless,
unnecessary, priming lien at the top of the structure.
3. Appaloosa’s Interests May Be Impaired or Impeded if Intervention Is
Denied
The sale of the Property has the potential to inflict the following injuries on
Appaloosa: a) Plaintiff CW Capital, which has filed suit as Special Servicer, is also a
holder of notes and the Controlling Certificateholder, and thus suffers an irreconcilable
conflict of interest that has injured Appaloosa and the other Certificateholders; b) losses
due to excess tax liability and extinguishment of note recoveries for junior tranches that
result from that excess, but wholly avoidable, tax; c) the risk of environmental liabilities;
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and, d) additional losses due to a potential excess rent judgment in favor of the tenants.
We address each of these, in turn, below.
a. CW Capital Is a Conflicted Fiduciary and Cannot Proceed
The Special Servicer has roles and responsibilities that are fiduciary in character.
It is required, as noted earlier, to act in the best interests of all Certificateholders and
without regard to its own holdings of the notes. The foreclosure should not proceed,
given CW Capital’s profound conflict, until it carries its burden to demonstrate that
foreclosure is fair to the Certificateholders and calculated to maximize their recovery—
rather than maximizing their losses, as currently seems likely.
There are many means and methods that could be employed by the Special
Servicer to resolve the default on the Certificates. Foreclosure is one, but it is wholly
imprudent because of the tax and excess rent liabilities. Other alternatives were
available, and would have been used by a prudent—and disinterested—mortgage lender.
These include reorganization outside of bankruptcy, a sale of the property (which would
avoid the problem of double taxation), or a reorganization in bankruptcy, which could
avoid the tax entirely. 11 U.S.C. §1146(a) (a properly structured transaction in Chapter
11 bankruptcy made pursuant to a plan would avoid the imposition of a transfer stamp or
similar tax). Each of these alternatives, and others, has differing impacts on differing
classes of noteholders.
CW Capital (acting as Special Servicer) was permitted to decide—consistent with
the Servicing Standard—which of these alternatives would be employed. Given the
distressed nature of the Securitization, and the near-certainty that noteholders will suffer
significant losses no matter how the defaults at issue are resolved, the decisions by CW
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Capital, acting as Special Servicer, should have been undertaken so as to maximize the
Certificateholders’ recovery in all of their best interests, and all avenues that could lead to
a more favorable outcome should be pursued to exhaustion. Importantly, CW Capital
was required to make these judgments without regard to either its own note holdings in
the S tranche of the C-30 Trust or the collateralized debt obligation pools sponsored by
CW Capital.4
As Controlling Class Representative, however, CW Capital is permitted to
instruct the Special Servicer—here, itself—to take actions solely in CW Capital’s
individual interests, and in derogation of and direct conflict with the interests of other
Certificateholders.5 Obviously, CW Capital’s decisions can—and will—affect its own
note holdings, which may fare better or worse depending on which decisions it takes.
This, however, is precisely what the PSA prohibits: under its plain terms, CW Capital
cannot obey its own instructions, to itself, if to do so would cause it to violate the
Servicing Standard.6
Stated plainly, CW Capital has a direct interest in and will be directly impacted
by, the decisions that it is supposed to make as a disinterested fiduciary. Because CW
4 In addition to the holdings described above, the Appaloosa Intervenors believe CW Capital purchased Certificates and placed them in Collateralized Debt Obligation pools sponsored by CW Capital. This is yet another, profoundly conflicting interest that burdens CW Capital. 5 See PSA at § 6.11(b) (noting that the Controlling Class Representative “may take actions that favor the interests of one or more Classes of the Certificates over other Classes of the Certificates, … may have special relationships and interests that conflict with those of Holders of some Classes of the Certificates, … [and] may act solely in the interests of the Holders of the Controlling Class ….”). 6 See PSA at § 6.11 (b). Controlling Class Representative “may take actions that favor the interests of one
or more Classes of the Certificates over other Classes of the Certificates, … may have special relationships and interests that conflict with those of Holders of some Classes of the Certificates, … [and] may act solely in the interests of the Holders of the Controlling Class ….”) and (a) (providing that “the Special Servicer will disregard any direction or objection … of the Controlling Class Representative … if such direction or objection causes … the Special Servicer to violate the Servicing Standard ….”).
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Capital is a self-dealing fiduciary with respect to the foreclosure Action, it does not—and
cannot—adequately represent the interests of other, un-conflicted Certificateholders like
Appaloosa. No foreclosure should be finalized or concluded without assuring that there
is a real party in interest to demand CW Capital’s faithful performance of its fiduciary
obligations. The Appaloosa Intervenors are not only willing to do so, they have
established their right to intervene to protect their own rights, which are at imminent risk
of being destroyed by CW Capital’s heedless, conflicted conduct.
Courts have granted intervention when presented with far more tenuous interests
in property. See, e.g., In re Oceana Int'l, 49 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (allowing the
current property owner to intervene in a suit brought by a former mortgage holder against
a bank for fraud committed in the previous foreclosure because, even though the current
property owner was not subject to losing the property, its title “could be made vulnerable
by the force and effect of the principles of stare decisis.”). Here, the profound conflict
afflicting CW Capital, and the billions of dollars of unrepresented Certificateholders
whose interests are at stake, warrant granting the Appaloosa Intervenors intervention as
of right.
b. Foreclosure Subjects the Securitization to Unnecessary and
Imprudent Double Taxation and Appraisal Risks, and So May Wipe
Out Appaloosa’s Junior Certificates and Their Voting Rights
Because Appaloosa’s interest is inexorably tied to the Property securing the
Certificates it owns, the disposition of the foreclosure and sale of the Property may also,
as a practical matter, impair or impede Appaloosa’s ability to protect its interest. As
pleaded in Appaloosa’s Complaint in Intervention, the C-30 Trust Certificates and the
certificates issued by the Other Trusts could face significant exposure to a double transfer
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tax associated with any foreclosure or sale of the Property. CW Capital’s payment of a
transfer tax entitles it to a priming lien under the terms of the PSA. This priming lien has
potential to impair or even wipe out certain of Appaloosa’s junior tranches of securitized
notes. Where a non-party’s rights could be impaired by any judgments or rulings in an
action, such as when one class of corporate shareholders might be favored over another,
this has been deemed a sufficient basis to allow intervention. See Consolidated Edison,
Inc. v. Northeast Utilities, 2004 WL 35445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing a
shareholder of the target corporation in a merger-gone-bad to intervene in a breach of
contract suit between the acquirer and target, noting “[t]he intervenor’s rights could be
impaired by any obligations or judgments reached in this litigation, as, for example, by
rulings that found that Con Ed owed damages to the Judgment Class rather than the
March 5 Class.”).
Foreclosure will also necessarily involve the appraisal and valuation of the
Property which, likewise, could potentially impact or impair Appaloosa’s position and its
holdings. When purchased, the Property was originally valued at approximately $5.4
billion. CW Capital is obligated, and likely is already proceeding to obtain, an appraisal
of the value of the Property. That valuation may very well establish that, while a quick
path to foreclosure would place CW Capital in control of the property post-foreclosure,
the notes it holds are actually far “out of the money.” Indeed, it has recently been
estimated that the Property will now be appraised in a range of $1.8 - $2.2 billion.
Taking that into account, three subordinate tranches (of which Appaloosa holds over
30%) are the de facto controlling class of the C-30 Trust. CW Capital has no financial
interest in those tranches. The PSA, recognizing this created perverse incentives,
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authorized CW Capital to go to the Certificateholders (or to the Certificateholders in the
de facto controlling class) to confirm that they wished it to proceed with foreclosure. See
PSA at §6.10.
Amazingly, CW Capital chose not to do so. Instead, it rebuffed Appaloosa’s
efforts to open a dialogue concerning the most prudent path to take. These events
undercut any claim that CW Capital adequately represents the interests of the
Certificateholders, much less those of Appaloosa—whose holdings could be profoundly
impaired, or injured irreparably, if the foreclosure proceeds.
c. Foreclosure in the Face of Significant Uncertainty Concerning
Potential Excess Rent Liability Is Imprudent; Any Excess Rent
Judgment Has the Potential to Further Subordinate or Extinguish the
Value of Appaloosa’s Certificates and the Certificates of Other Junior
Holders
Another potentially significant impact on Appaloosa’s holdings may result from
the liability for an un-liquidated, but potentially massive claim for excess rent arising
from an earlier declaratory judgment action filed by the tenants of Stuyvesant Town. In
that action, as is set forth in Appaloosa’s Complaint in Intervention, the tenants of
Stuyvesant Town sued the current and former owners of the Property, claiming that they
were not entitled to take advantage of the luxury decontrol provisions of the Rent
Stabilization Law while at the same time receiving tax incentive benefits (“Excess Rent
Claim”). The Court agreed. As a result of this lawsuit, someone is potentially liable for
hundreds of millions of dollars of presently un-liquidated liability for this Excess Rent
Claim. It is by no means clear, however, who will ultimately bear that liability, how it
may be affected by the foreclosure, or whether it could be limited or avoided if the
property were restructured in some other way.
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Equally uncertain, and laden with enormous risk, is the issue of environmental
liabilities. As described in the motion, the Property is World War II-era construction.
The PSA states plainly that CW Capital cannot foreclose unless, prior to instituting
foreclosure, it has obtained the environmental assessments necessary to ensure that it is
not succeeding—recklessly and inadvertently—to environmental liabilities. See PSA at
§3.09. CW Capital does not plead that it has obtained these required assessments. No
foreclosure can—or should—proceed until a real party in interest is able to demand, and
document, that they have done so.
Foreclosure in the face of these uncertainties, and CW Capital’s decision to
expose all of the Certificateholders to the possibility of hundreds of millions of additional
dollars of losses over and above the losses they have already sustained, could have a
significant impact on Appaloosa’s holdings secured by the Property and its rights under
the Trust Agreements.
4. Appaloosa’s Interest May Not Be Adequately Represented by the Parties
The final element needed to establish Appaloosa’s right to intervene is a showing
that its interests may not adequately be represented by the parties to the original action.
An intervenor need only show that the representation may be inadequate, not that it is
inadequate. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court has held that “[this] requirement . . . is satisfied if the
applicant shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of
making that showing should be treated as minimal.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (emphasis added); see also Sackman v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
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Appaloosa has more than met its burden to demonstrate that its interests are not
adequately represented in this foreclosure Action. This is not the typical case in which a
neutral Indenture Trustee may be counted on to faithfully protect the interests of all
bondholders. Here, foreclosure is being pursued by CW Capital, which is burdened by a
profound conflict of interest. CW Capital is a self-dealing fiduciary. Its personal
financial interests, and its role as Controlling Certificateholder, are directly in conflict
with Appaloosa’s rights as the holder of over 30% of the Certificates in the tranches that
are the de facto controlling classes of the C-30 Trust. Appaloosa therefore cannot rely on
CW Capital in its capacity as Special Servicer to adequately protect the interests of
Appaloosa, or any other Certificateholder, given both CW Capital’s conflict and its
reckless behavior to this point.
CW Capital emphatically does not “share the same ultimate objective,” Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Town of East Hampton, 178 F.R.D. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(providing that adequate representation is presumed only when the would-be intervenor
shares the same ultimate objective as a party to the lawsuit), as do the other
Certificateholders and Appaloosa. In a similar context, courts have permitted
bondholders to intervene when a trustee is not likely to advocate the position of a
bondholder. See, e.g., Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 2005 WL
751914 (S.D.N.Y March 31, 2005) (holding that the bondholders were permitted to
intervene as a matter of right because the trustee, while similarly situated, would not
likely advocate one of the bondholders’ defenses based on a potential conflict that the
trustee had). The same should be true here, precisely because CW Capital is so
profoundly conflicted that it cannot be counted on to protect the rights of all
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 17 of 22
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Certificateholders. See Aristocrat Leisure Ltd., 2005 WL 751914 at *6 (finding
inadequate representation of bondholders by trustee due to “risks of ‘collusion’ and
‘adversity of interest’ between Bondholders and the Trustee given the Trustee’s
association with a main underwriter of the offering”); Con-Ed., 2004 WL 35445 at *6
(finding adversity of interest and granting intervention because “[w]hile NU claims that it
and Rimkoski have the same ultimate objective in proving that Con Ed breached the
Merger Agreement, NU and Rimkoski have conflicting objectives in determining who
should receive any damages”); Miller v. Silbermann, 832 F. Supp. 663, 672
(S.D.N.Y.,1993) (noting that “[e]vidence of inadequate representation includes such
factors as (1) collusion; (2) adversity of interest; (3) possible nonfeasance; or (4)
incompetence.”).
Nor can Appaloosa rely on any of the Defendants to undertake to protect
Appaloosa’s interests. None of those Defendants is situated similarly to Appaloosa. The
Defendants include the defaulting borrowers. They certainly have no incentive to protect
the rights of those to whom they are likely to owe more than the $3 billion. The equity
owners of the Property made relatively insignificant capital investments to buy the
Property. Their investments are deeply out of the money. They are also exposed to
hundreds of millions of dollars of excess rent liability—since they, and not the
Certificateholders—pocketed the excess rents. Yet the equity owners have, inexplicably,
failed to put the Property in bankruptcy. The governmental entities similarly have an
obligation to protect only the public interest, and have no obligation to protect the
interests of Appaloosa and the other Certificateholders.
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III. CONCLUSION
Intervention as of right is plainly warranted on these facts. Appaloosa, the holder
of $750 million of C-30 Certificates, including 30% of the de facto controlling
Certificates in the subordinate tranches, plainly has an interest in the Property. This
interest may be impaired or impeded by CW Capital’s reckless assumption of avoidable,
double transfer tax liability, or other litigation and environmental risks that it may assume
if it successfully forecloses on the Property without first discharging its fiduciary
obligations to explore, and pursue to exhaustion, other paths to restructuring that would
maximize the Certificateholders’ recovery, rather than maximizing their loss.
Appaloosa’s interests are not adequately represented by any party in the proceeding;
indeed, its interests are directly in conflict with CW Capital which is purporting to—but
is not—acting in the interests of Appaloosa and the other Certificateholders.
For these reasons, and those stated in its Motion for Leave to Intervene,
Appaloosa should be granted intervention as of right, and should be permitted to pursue
its claims for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
Dated: New York, New York February 23, 2010
Respectfully submitted,
WARNER PARTNERS, P.C.
By: ___s/___________________
Kenneth E. Warner KW 5524 [email protected] 950 3rd Avenue New York, NY 10022-2705 (212) 593-8000
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 19 of 22
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ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS APPALOOSA INVESTMENT L.P. I, PALOMINO FUND LTD., THOROUGHBRED FUND L.P., AND THOROUGHBRED MASTER LTD.
OF COUNSEL: GIBBS & BRUNS LLP Kathy D. Patrick Texas Bar No. 15581400 Robert M. Madden Texas Bar No. 00784511 Sydney Ballesteros State Bar No. 24036180 Anthony N. Kaim State Bar No. 24065532 1100 Louisiana, Ste. 5300 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 650-8805 Fax: (713) 750-0903
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 20 of 22
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________________X BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as Trustee for the Registered Holders of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C30, acting by and through its Special Servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, BANK OF AMERICA,N.A., 10 Civ. 1178 (SHS) as Trustee for the Registered Holders of COBALT CMBS ECF Case Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2 and Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C31, acting by and through CWCapital Asset Management LLC pursuant to the authority granted under that certain Amended and Restated Co-Lender Agreement dated March 12, 2007 and U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5 and ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-6, acting by and through CW Capital Asset Management LLC pursuant to the authority granted under that certain Amended and Restated Co-Lender Agreement dated March 12, 2007, Plaintiffs, -against- PCV ST OWNER LP, ST OWNER LP, TRI-LINE CONTRACTING CORP., ATLAS FIRE PROTECTION, INC., POMALEE ELECTRIC CO, INC., REFUSE SYTEMS CORP., PRO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., TRITON STONE AND MARBLE LLC, S.T.S. TRADING INC. d/b/a S.T. LUMBER & HOME CENTER, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING, S.D. INT’L d/b/a S.D. STONE DEPOT, ELBEX AMERICA OF NEW YORK, INC., NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD and FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants, -against- APPALOOSA INVESTMENT L.P. , I, PALOMINO FUND LTD., THOROUGHBREDFUND L.P., and THOROUGHBRED MASTER LTD. Intervenor-Defendants. _____________________________________________________X
ORDER
Case 1:10-cv-01178-SHS Document 17 Filed 02/23/2010 Page 21 of 22
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Upon consideration of the motion in intervention filed by Appaloosa Intervenors
L.P. (“Applicant”), Applicant’s Complaint, and any opposition thereto, the Court finds
that the Applicant meets the requirements for intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Applicant’s Motion to Intervene is
GRANTED, and Applicant is given leave to participate as a party to this Action as
Intervenor-Defendant. It is further
ORDERED that Applicant’s Complaint which was attached as Exhibit “A” to its
Motion to Intervene be deemed filed as of the date of this Order and Applicant shall
proceed to serve said Complaint on the parties pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED this ___ day of March, 2010.
______________________________
Judge Sidney H. Stein
United States District Judge
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