Carl Schmitt, the Concept of the Political and the International Political Environment

Reducing the human experience to its most essential duality is nothing new. To Jeremy Bentham,

this consisted of pleasure and pain, while in Chinese philosophy Ying and Yang are at the core of the

natural world. In a similar manner, Carl Schmitt’s binary logic also reduces society to its most basic

elements: the friend and the enemy. Here, Schmitt differs from other reductionist theories in that his

dyad is the source of the political, and it is from this distinction that our societies are formed,

maintained, progressed and destroyed. Taken to its most extreme conclusion, the friend or the

enemy is the difference between life and death.

The pessimistic nature of Schmitt’s philosophy draws from political realism and the ideas of Hobbes,

who believed that there exists a Bellum omnium contra omnes or ‘The war of all against all.’1 This

view holds that man is inherently dangerous in his natural state. Where Schmitt differs from other

realists is that he does not simply expand on the Hobbesian tradition, but instead creates a radical

new view of how this natural man transforms into the political man. This framework insists that our

current definitions of politics and the state are flawed and that liberal institutions have devalued and

diluted the core political message embedded within them.

Schmitt’s work must be viewed in its historical context, and his ideas are formulated from several

perspectives, including philosopher, theoretician, legal scholar, theologian and political scientist.

Most importantly, he wrote his most influential work in a climate of growing fascism and discontent

during 1930s Germany. His strong support for the German Enabling Act of 1933 which empowered

Hitler as absolute dictator2 resulted in him being cast as the philosophical justifier of the Nazi

ideology. Despite this, simply concentrating on Schmitt’s personal politics rather than his theoretical

framework negates the value of his theory as an analytical tool in the modern political world.

Indeed, the post Cold War environment has resulted in a re-emergence of Schmittian philosophy as

1 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 17.2 Joseph Bendersky, “The Expendable Kronjurist: Carl Schmitt and National Socialism, 1933-36,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 2 (April 1979): 311.

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it provides an alternative understanding of an international structure and the threat that terrorism

poses to it.

This essay provides an overview of Schmitt’s Concept of the Political; the historical context from

which it emerged; and its usefulness in analysing the international political system. As such, the first

third is dedicated to a prologue that frames the fermentation of Schmitt’s ideas within the Weimar

Republic and his earlier essays addressing dictatorship and theology. The middle third summarises

the key claims Schmitt presents in the Concept of the Political, providing commentary and

challenging the theological source of the friend-enemy distinction. The final third then applies this

logic to current international political system, and in particular examines how international terrorism

fits his political philosophy. I conclude by contesting Schmitt’s view of liberalism as a concept which

robs societies of their values and morals, while at the same time supporting his general political

framework. It provides an excellent analytical framework to explore modern political interaction,

tarnished only by his rejection of liberalism and pacifism on what amounts to theological grounds.

At its core, Schmitt’s Concept of the Political is a criticism of liberalism. While liberal ideas are now

extolled as desirable under a global political system driven by American primacy, the early 20th

century differed as numerous intellectual experiments clashed through grand sweeping ideologies

such as Marxism, fascism and liberalism. Schmitt’s youth was crowded with such events; in Russia to

the North Marxism had taken hold; in Italy to the South, fascism was growing; while in Germany

liberalism was to be implemented. Liberalism was being advocated strongly by the US, under

Woodrow Wilson and his push for liberal internationalism. Liberal ideas such as free trade,

democracy and transparency were designed to overcome the problems of misperception spiralling

into warfare as occurred in the lead up to the First World War.3 In response to these concerns, the

Weimar Constitution of 1919 stipulated that Germany would be a democratic republic.4

3 G. John Ikenberry, “Why Export Democracy?,” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 23, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 58.4 P. M. R Stirk, “Hugo Preuss, German political thought and the Weimar constitution.,” Article, October 2002, 497-504, http://dro.dur.ac.uk/773/ (accessed April 28, 2010).

2

A key feature of the new Republic was the use of a parliamentary democracy to govern. This was

immediately problematic for Germany, whose far right and left political wings were fractured after

the German revolution of 1918-19.5 Unlike the systems of Britain or the US with their broad left/right

political cleavages, German political parties had splintered into many smaller self-interest groups.

This combined with a proportional representation voting system that resulted in many radical groups

obtaining seats in the parliament, with no party holding a clear majority. While the Social democrats

held the most with 153 seats out of 4916, the numerous left and right wing fringe parties were able

to cause instability and parliamentary deadlocks.

Schmitt’s thought evolved out of this period of ineffective governance. To Schmitt, the parliamentary

system was a prime example of the failure of liberalism which weakened the state through the

intrusion of individualism and self-interest into the system. Furthermore, the indecisive nature of

this system threatened both the state’s moral core and the broader security of the state from

enemies. His first key work - On Dictatorship (1921) - concentrated on this potential weakness of the

state in the hands of a parliamentary system during times of emergency. While the Weimar Republic

did possess a set of emergency laws under Article 48 of the constitution, which President Friedrich

Ebert used to address rebellions and the economic crisis7, Schmitt opposed the concept of

‘commissarial dictatorship’ which meant that parliamentary norms could be returned by a vote in

parliament.8 He instead preferred the concept of a ‘sovereign dictator’ who would be able to take

decisive actions to create a new juridical order to meet the threats of the state.9 In short, if the

political system is challenged so much that it needs to enter a state of emergency, then the state

5 Ralph H. Lutz, The German Revolution, 1918-1919 (CUP Archive, 1968), 183.6 “WHKMLA : History of Germany : Weimar Republic, 1924-1928,” http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/germany/wr19241928.html (accessed April 15, 2010).7 Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter, Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 198.8 David Dyzenhaus, “Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?,” The American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (March 1997): 130.9 M. Kohn, “Bare Life and the Limits of the Law,” Theory & Event 9, no. 2 (2006).

3

requires a single decisive figure that can embody the will of the people, without any constitutional

restraints.10

Schmitt’s next essay added a moral perspective and theological message to these ideas. Entitled

Political Theology (1922), it explored at what point it is right to take on the role of sovereign dictator

and explores where the source of their decision should come from. Here he compares politics and

theology, believing that Catholicism is a ‘normative standpoint for politics.’11 Under Schmitt’s logic,

Catholicism has clear definitions of the good and bad, but at the same time has an inherent

subjective morality from which decisive action can be taken.12 His conclusion is that politics is

fundamentally a secularized form of theology.13

This leads us to The Concept of the Political (1927), whose most important contribution to political

philosophy is the friend-enemy distinction. The friend-enemy dyad is the most basic element of the

political and is what drives all of our social actions. Importantly, Schmitt differentiates this idea of

the political as being different from party politics or politics as we might refer to within the state.

Instead, Schmitt’s political is the most essential element; it is the most ‘irreducible duality’14 and the

basis of how and why we organise ourselves into political entities. This emphasis on the political as a

fundamental force is immediately apparent in the opening sentence of the Concept of the Political.

Here, he states that ‘the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political.’15 This

statement disputes the traditional Hobbesian idea that sovereignty is established by political groups

after man acknowledges his state of nature is vulnerable. Instead, Schmitt reverses this and claims

the state and therefore the political is inherent in nature.16 Most importantly, it is from this political

10 Baehr and Richter, Dictatorship in History and Theory, 202.11 John P. McCormick, “Review: Political Theory and Political Theology: The Second Wave of Carl Schmitt in English,” Political Theory 26, no. 6 (December 1998): 831.12 Ibid., 833.13 R. Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, political existentialism, and the total state,” Theory and Society 19, no. 4 (1990): 400.14 A. Wolfe, “A fascist philosopher helps us understand contemporary politics,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 2 (2004): 3.15 C. Schmitt and G. Schwab, The concept of the political (University of Chicago Press, 2007), 19.16 R. Van Munster, “The war on terrorism: When the exception becomes the rule,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17, no. 2 (2004): 143.

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pre-existing political tension that people create political entities. Consequently, most frameworks –

and in particular liberalism – have a flawed view of the source of the political. The liberal view holds

that sovereignty evolves when a specific group of people commit to a social contract to escape their

anarchistic fate. But under Schmitt’s framework, this view misunderstands the core issue. He instead

asserts that groups of people gain their identity and form groups of people from an existing political

motive. This motive stems from the collective and instinctual idea of who is friend and who is

enemy.

After this provocative opening line, the Concept of the Political begins its attack on liberalism. To

Schmitt, liberalism confuses and dilutes the political by first isolating it, then mixing it with other

areas of civil life. Schmitt uses ‘politics and morality’, ‘politics and law’ and ‘politics and economy’ as

examples of liberalism’s attempt to detach civil ‘domains.’ For example, using the political and moral

in an independent domain devalues sovereign power. Instead of the power flowing from the

sovereign, the detachment of domains makes the political a pejorative force. Thus state intervention

in matters of the Church or family life becomes undesirable. Since these domains are dominated by

self-interested groups, they ultimately become further isolated and rationalised under a liberal

system. The end result is a dilution of power throughout the infrastructure of the state which affects

the source of a state’s sovereignty. One of Schmitt’s key concerns is this devaluation of the moral

realm will result in a greedy and selfish society. To him it will lead to nihilism as citizens inhabit a

moral vacuum that creates a pointless existence.

Similarly, Schmitt emphasises the detachment of the legal domain, whose attempt to remove itself

from the political, is an action to ‘reduce the state to a set of legal relationships’17 - something he

terms legal normativism. To him, state sovereignty is diminished when based on valueless legal

relationships between parties only interested in selfish ends. Instead, Schmitt views the sovereign

state as something that has been built from historical precedents and previous clashes of the friend

and enemy, which have created an inherent value system. Here, he wishes to reverse legal 17 Jean-Claude Paye and James H. Membrez, Global war on liberty (Telos Press Publishing, 2007), 234.

5

normativism and place the roots of sovereignty in decisiveness and action, rather than in vapid and

valueless laws. Once the sovereign authority is free of the legal, popular or ethical restrictions

created by self-interested people and groups, political decisions will be pure.18

The second part of Schmitt’s Concept of the Political introduces the friend-enemy distinction as the

point from where true authority and sovereignty evolve. The friend-enemy distinction is the most

basic antithesis that groups people into likeminded entities. In the most ‘extreme case conflict’19

violence and death are the outcomes. To clarify this, he explains that other areas of human action

are dictated by simple binary distinctions using ‘good and bad’ and ‘beautiful and ugly’ as examples.

But in the end, the friend-enemy distinction is the source of all other antithesis, as ‘from this most

extreme possibility human life derives its specific political tension.’20

This is the most problematic part of Schmitt’s thesis. While he claims the enemy is ‘concrete and

existential’21, his explanation is ambiguous. To him, ‘the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognised as

the enemy’22 – in other words, the enemy becomes apparent with no action required. Importantly,

the enemy is not the personal enemy, nor is it an economic adversary. The enemy is a public enemy,

and one that rallies together a group of people who also clearly recognise the enemy. This is

hazardous conclusion as it allows the formulation of an enemy based on a simple moral judgement.

As a method of describing the enemy it may have validity, but is troublesome when used as

prescription, as crude characterisations and racist stereotypes can be used to justify aggression.

In contrast, the ‘friend’ is not automatically known, but simply the person who possesses the same

enemy. Indeed, under Schmitt’s framework, the enemy is essential in allowing us to form groups

that add value to our human existence. The threat of death from an enemy forces us to be human,

forces us to excel in our lives, and forces us to uphold moral and social beliefs. This again is a direct

18 C. E. Frye, “Carl Schmitt's concept of the political,” The Journal of Politics 28, no. 04 (2009): 824.19 Schmitt and Schwab, The concept of the political, 27.20 Ibid., 35.21 Ibid., 27.22 Ibid., 67.

6

challenge to liberalism’s pursuit of pacifism. Under Schmitt’s framework, a pacifist world is one void

of the political. To Schmitt, this pacifist world would be nihilistic and have concern for only the

individual and for entertainment. There would be no way to reference good or bad, and no way to

order or progress the human experience. Thus, in the end liberalism would dehumanize us and rob

humanity of its moral core. In Schmitt’s words, liberalism attempts to ‘deprive [the] state and politics

of their specific meaning.’23

Since the September 11th attacks on the USA, a revival of interest in Schmitt’s writing has occurred.

To Tracy Strong, the revival is driven by liberalism’s inability to properly analyse the new

international environment where terrorism is the dominant theme.24 The traditional liberal

perspective would seek to use common cultural, economic and political institutions and values to

create universal norms as a way to overcome conflict between the West and radical Islam. Yet in the

decade since the 9/11 attacks, this perspective has failed to adequately explain the dynamics

occurring in the international political system. In reality, Political Islam, as advocated by groups such

as the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, is absolutist and universalist25 and thus immune to the

traditional methods of statecraft under liberalism. It is here that Schmitt’s work provides a fresh way

of analysing the political interaction between the US and radical Islam.

Firstly, the reaction of the Bush administration after 9/11 fits Schmittian logic. A single terrorist act

resulted in radical Islam cast as the enemy in ‘concrete clarity.’ Furthermore, if we apply the

Schmitt’s theoretical framework, it reveals the problem of liberal intrusion of self-interest into the

state infrastructure. In this sense, the US lacked a clear enemy after the fall of communism and had

lapsed into a period of liberal devaluation. Bill Clinton’s impeachment was the most visible affect of

this disrespect for the political and the lack of purity in this core domain. Having the head of state

testify about menial issues such as oral sex was a consequence of the legal domain being detached

23 Ibid., 29.24 Ibid., XXV.25 Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe (Routledge, 2008), 117.

7

from the political and pursuing its own self-interested agenda. The lack of an enemy had reduced US

society to petty indecisiveness that ultimately put the state at risk.

Similarly, the September 11th attacks demonstrated the vulnerability of a liberal system to defend

itself. Liberalism had no answers for an attack on ‘values’ rather than an attack in traditional military

terms. 26 This difficulty was demonstrated when Donald Rumsfeld identified the enemy as those ‘who

work in the shadows’ and are ‘trying to attack directly at the way of life of free people of the United

States.’27 Congress countered this legal conundrum by passing the Patriot Act, which suspends legal

rights for certain people labelled as terrorists28 as these traditional legal institutions viewed terror in

purely criminal terms. In other words, the Patriot Act was an attempt by the state to legally clarify

the enemy.

This weakness of the legal domain led to further radical actions from the Bush administration, such

as Bybee memo, which authorised the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.’29 Furthermore,

this document let the President enjoy ‘complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-

Chief authority and in conducting operations against hostile forces.’30 John Yoo was the architect of

this ‘unitary executive theory’, which argued that the current laws were ineffective against an enemy

that did not fit within the liberal system.31 In effect, Yoo was invoking Schmitt’s argument for the use

of emergency laws to permit decisive action. Additionally, Yoo labelled terrorists ‘enemy

combatants’, which allowed the US use wartime executive laws where the President as Commander

in Chief is not restricted in his actions,32 in an act reminiscent of the ‘commissarial dictatorship’ of

the Weimar Republic.

26 Georg Meggle, Ethics of terrorism & counter-terrorism (ontos verlag, 2005), 231.27 Ibid.28 Paye and Membrez, Global war on liberty, 249.29 W. Sandholtz, “Closing off the Torture Option,” S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ 18 (2008): 589.30 William E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib,” Constellations 13, no. 1 (2006): 118.31 “Sidney Blumenthal: George Bush's rough justice | World news | The Guardian,” January 12, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/12/usa.comment (accessed April 27, 2010).32 “What Bush Wants to Hear - The New York Review of Books,” http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18431 (accessed March 25, 2010).

8

If we use Schmitt’s analytical framework, the actions of the US post 9/11 are that of a state that has

been weakened by liberal devaluation of the political system. In this light, the US system reacted as

expected. That is, when threatened by an attack from a new, but distinct enemy, the US took

decisive action in both military and legal terms to protect itself. As a consequence, the US attacked

its ‘enemy’ in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though these actions faced fierce criticism from numerous

commentators, under Schmitt’s framework this was the only real option that could be taken; playing

by the rules of liberalism would be a pointless against an enemy who paid no attention to the liberal

framework.

Schmitt’s framework also provides warnings on the temptation to creep towards totalitarianism in

order to defeat the enemy. In this sense, we can use the Concept of the Political as a preventative

theory to analyse the potential dangers of the US approach. Here, US actions have parallels with the

growth of Germany nationalism in the 1930s. In particular, the 9/11 attack and US response

resembles the attack on the Reichstag in 1933, which resulted in the removal of the democratic

process in order to defend against the ‘enemy.’ Additionally, the Bush administration’s legal

arguments and the introduction of the Patriot Act possess a similar narrative to Schmitt’s view of

liberalism as inadequate in protecting the state from communism.33 More importantly, the enemy

becomes a stereotype which political entrepreneurs can use to justify the removal of civil liberties.

Here, the label of terrorist is used to criminalise a specific type of political objective34 which preys on

fear in order to consolidate who is ‘friend.’ Such leaps of faith led to the demonization of the Jewish

people in Europe under Hitler. Consequently, Schmitt’s philosophy has immense real world use for

both description and warning.

Interestingly, Schmitt’s ideas work just as well when applied to radical Islam. To Jihadists, the enemy

is equally clear, but unlike their liberal counterparts, they are not hampered by the isolation of

domains through self-interest. Most of the Al-Qaeda associated terrorists are members of the

33 Scott Horton, “The Return of Carl Schmitt,” Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/11/return-of-carl-schmitt.html (accessed March 25, 2010).34 Paye and Membrez, Global war on liberty, 108.

9

Wahhabist sect which advocates Political Islam. Within this system, the Quran is the ultimate

sovereign authority, and consequently libertarian ideas have little weight. Here, Schmitt might argue

that Wahhabists are at an advantage, because a single mufti can issue a fatwa based on a pure

decision; they are not at the whim of any of the devalued institutions of liberalism, and make their

judgements from a single source. Further still, the Wahhabist idea of Jahiliyyah, or the ‘state of

ignorance’ mirrors Schmitt’s criticism of liberalism and its pacifist end goal. Under the interpretation

by the Muslim Brotherhood founder, Sayyid Qutb, Jahilyyah is a consequence of Western liberalism

infiltrating Islamic society. To him, the West’s emphasis on individualism would ultimately destroy

civilisation as humans were consumed by their own selfish desires.35 Consequently, any society

without a pure Sharia legal system – the laws of god - is the enemy of Islam.36 Hence, when a Jihadi

vanguard deploy their attacks on the Western ‘enemy’ they have no regard for international law, but

only ‘pure’ law. Consequently liberal ideas of ethics and human rights as a means to counter the

enemy have no effect in this value system.

The examples of the US and radical Islam demonstrate the descriptive value of Schmitt’s work, but

they also underline the potential dangers of its ‘social Darwinism.’37 Schmitt himself said that ‘only a

weak people will disappear’38 and this type of thinking has the potential to spiral into violence as the

use of his philosophy in Nazi Germany demonstrated. As such, the identity of the enemy is the

critical flaw in Schmitt’s work, which ultimately remains undefined. For such a clearly described

theory which prides itself on its empirical foundations, its core definition of the enemy is particularly

vague. In the end Schmitt’s tries to put forward a nomological argument that has fundamental

‘normative flaws.’39

Schmitt’s enemy is clearly drawn from a theological basis, but in this context it is worth considering

some of Schmitt’s more radical remarks to frame his motives. This was a man who pronounced ‘in

35 Adam Curtis, “The Power of Nightmares,” Baby its cold outside (BBC, October 20, 2004).36 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Kazi Publications, 1993), 9.37 Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, political existentialism, and the total state,” 405.38 Schmitt and Schwab, The concept of the political, 53.39 Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib,” 108.

10

that I defend myself against the Jews, I struggle to do the work of the Lord.’40 Even more antagonistic

was his claim that the Jewish people ‘eat the flesh of the slaughtered peoples, and are sustained by

it.’41 Hence, we could argue the identity of the enemy stems not from an internal moral compass or

revelation, but from a blatant racist stereotype. Consequently, using Schmitt as a prescriptive tool

risks beginning a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this sense, Schmitt’s reductionist logic makes conflict

inevitable, because real enemies have nothing to discuss, only ‘manoeuvres to consider.’42

Furthermore, if no enemy exists, one will be created simply because it is required in order to remain

‘political’.

Nonetheless, if we can disregard the personal character of Schmitt and instead concentrate on his

works for their descriptive value, the picture is much different. Schmitt’s concept of the political

does provide a rigid framework for analysing the source of sovereignty of the state and the actions

of nations to protect their interests. We have applied it here to both the US and Jihadists for its

descriptive value, but it could be equally applicable to analysing conflicts in Rwanda, Cambodia or

the Former Yugoslavia.

In conclusion, the Schmitt’s Concept of the Political deserves a place alongside the other key political

philosophies of the 20th century. The resurrection of his ideas by a wide range of scholars despite

their controversial context is testament to this. In fact, the context in which he wrote provides the

Concept of the Political with its powerful warning about the danger of a total reductionist approach

to politics. If Schmitt’s work were to be used as a handbook for governance, war and violence would

be endemic. It is hard to see how this outcome could be worse than his fear of the morally void

liberal society.

40 Gopal Balakrishnan and Carl Schmitt, The enemy (Verso, 2000), 206.41 Ibid., 211.42 Arthur Aughey, “A state of exception: The concept of the political in Northern Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 12, no. 1 (1997): 8.

11

Yet on the other hand, it provides an excellent way of understanding why conflict occurs and the

motives of states and their actions. Schmitt claims liberals can never be truly political43 and the

inability of the current international system to deal with the role of Jihadi terrorism goes some way

to supporting this. Liberalism as a philosophical perspective has no answers to the absolute

theocratic approach of radical Islam. In contrast, the Concept of the Political provides a clear way of

analysing the motives and actions of the state when they decide on who is friend and who enemy.

43 Wolfe, “A fascist philosopher helps us understand contemporary politics,” 4.

12

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