Carden, Stephen - Virtue Ethics.dewey and Macintyre

7/29/2019 Carden, Stephen - Virtue Ethics.dewey and Macintyre

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VIRTUE ETHICS:DEWEY AND MAGINTYRE


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Co ntinuu m Studies in Am erican Philosophy:Dorothy G. Rogers, America's First Women PhilosophersThorn Brooks and F abian Freyen hagen, eds, The Legacy ofJohnRawlsJames Mar cum, Thomas Kuhn's RevolutionJoshua R us t, John Searle andThe Construction of Social RealityEve Ga udet , Quine on Meaning


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VIRTUE ETHICS:DEWEY AND MAG INTYRE

STEPHEN D. GARDEN

continuum1 1 1 L O N D O N N E W Y O R K


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Continuum International Publishing GroupThe Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX15 East 26th Street, New York, NY 10010 Stephen D. Carden 2006All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted inany form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing fromthe publishers.Stephen D. Carden has asserted his right under the C opyright, Designs and P atents Act, 1988, to beidentified as Author of this work.British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.ISBN: 0-8264-8900-1 (hardback)

Typeset by Aarontype Limited, Easton, BristolP rinted and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall


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For Nellie De ntonwalk with m e


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Contents

Acknowledgements ixIntroduct ion 11 Rediscovery of the virtues 62 Re con struction of ethics 283 Orig ins of the virtues 564 Humanflourishing 805 T he eth ica l life 103Conclusion 133Bibliography 143Index 146


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Acknowledgements

This book originated from my study at Vanderbilt University. I wish toexpress my deep grati tu de to Jo h n Lachs, who helped m e to un derstandDewey's philosophy; to Henry Teloh, who introduced me to Maclntyre'swork; to Rob Talisse, who initiated my interest in pragmatism; and toM ichael Hodges, who encouraged me from the beginning.

Special thanks go to my friend Carl Runyon, who was generous enoughto engage in extended conversation about the issues dealt with herein. I amalso sincerely grateful for the supp ort of Ja ck ie A ddin gton , G reg La by ak,Julia Ledford, and all my colleagues at Owensboro Community and Tech-nical College.

I owe the most to my family who ha ve given generously of their trem endo uslove, strength, and understanding: my wife, Sandy; my children, Polly, Clay-ton, and Laura; and my mother, Mary, who continues to inspire my love ofwords and ideas.


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Introduction

Alasdair Maclntyre is a central figure in the resurgence of interest in the vir-tues as fund am ental concepts in mora l philosophy; m any of his ideas, how ever,were anticipa ted by Jo h n D ewey, who also rega rded the virtues and the devel-opm ent of ch ara cte r as prim ary m oral ideas. All the following ideas are foundin the work of both philosophers: the significance of goods internal to humanpractices, the teleological nature of human conduct, the notion of virtues ashabits constituting an integrated cha racter , the imp ortanc e of inquiry andpractical intelligence, the social nature of morality, and a conception of thegood focused on relations with others.

On the other hand, while Maclntyre demonstrates a deep appreciation forhistory and tradit ion, Dewey advocates forward-thinking and innovation;while Maclntyre attacks l iberalism, Dewey praises the l iberation of humanenergies in a democracy ; and while M ac lnty re's app roac h is intellectualist icand dialectical, Dewey's method is naturalistic and empirical. Many of theirapparent differences are reconcilable, but it is my contention that Deweyholds a more comprehensive view. His explanation of human conduct interms of habit, impulse, and intelligence makes clear the biological origins ofthe virtues; his conce ption of gro w th offers a com pelling vision of hu m an flour-ishing; his conc eption of inquiry as problem-solving in response to pa rticu larhuman needs is flexible and grounded in scientific method; and his ability tomove beyond metaphysical dualisms and intellectual abstractions by stressingthe continuity of such concepts as means and ends can make virtue theoryfresh, exciting, and even more relevant for conte m pora ry times.

Both philosophers hav e a gre at dea l to say abo ut the virtues in a mo ral life,although this aspect of Dewey's work is too often overlooked. This is regretta-ble, since Dewey has a profound view of the virtues and of ethics generally,although it is scattered through several of his works, especially Democracy anEducation ( 1 9 1 6 ) , Reconstruction in Philosophy ( 1 9 2 0 ) , Human Nature and Conduct(1922), Experience and Mature (1925), "T hre e Inde pende nt Factors in Mora l(1930), and Ethics (1932). Dewey's ethics is radical in many ways, and diffi-cult, but once his moral philosophy is laid out somewhat systematically it isclear that he holds the virtues in human conduct to be a key element in thedevelop m ent of ch ara cte r and the progress of m oral inqu iry.

While Dewey's remarks on ethics are rather scattered, Maclntyre's posi-tion continues to grow and develop through a series of major works: his


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2 Introductionseminal book, After Virtue (1981); the two books that develop this line ofthought , Whose Jus t ice? W hich Rat ional ity? (1988) and Three R ival Vers ioMoral Inquiry (1990); and his latest book, Dependent Rational Animals (1999).His admission in the latter that an understanding of the virtues must includethe biological dimensions of hu m an life provides even m ore points of com par-ison with Dewey, and will be important in the overall evaluation of eachof their views.

This study is a comparison of Maclntyre and Dewey that allows these twophilosophers to converse abou t the n atu re and origins of the virtues and theirim po rtan ce for living a good life. Along the w ay, several other p oints of com-parison become evident, especially with regard to their views on human prac-tices, the nature of the self, a conception of human flourishing, moral inquiry,and the value of liberalism in the modern world. This comparison focuses onthe validity of an approach to ethics through the virtues and their impacton social relations in our culture . Dew ey's mora l philosophy m ay no t be fullyreconcilable with con tem por ary v irtue ethics, bu t his bro ad , consistent theo rycan serve to critiqu e pa rtic ul ar theories of virt ue ethics tha t m ay suffer from alimited perspective. This , in fact, is how I present Dew ey in comp arison withMaclntyre, for despite Maclntyre's abil i ty to draw upon a tremendous scopeof historical thought, I intend to show that Dewey has a more comprehensiveview on the virtues and that a close comparison of their ideas will reveal sev-eral significant weaknesses in Ma cl nt yr e's position.

Both philosophers ground their ethics in human practices, althoughDewey has a wider and more general understanding of them than is presentin Maclntyre's singular conception. Dewey also has a greater appreciationfor individual innovation than does Maclntyre with his more conservativestance; furthermore, Dewey's account of the virtues is greatly influenced byevolutionary biology while only in his latest book does Maclntyre attemptto investigate our anim al natures .

Both philosophers locate the virtues within a conc eption of hu m an flourish-ing, but Dew ey's idea of growth captures m uch of wh at M ac lnt yre intendswhile incorporating it into a broader and more compelling vision. Theirnotions of the self as a social construction differ as well. For Maclntyre, theself is cons tituted by the na rrativ e accou nts of hu m an activity th at w e give toeach other; Dewey agrees that human activity is purposive and historical inthe sense that it reveals a means-end structure in reflectivity, but his moreem pirical acco unt is less dep end ent on lang uag e and m ore connected to othermo re rudim enta ry processes in natu re. Also, while M ac ln ty re calls for h um anactivity to be ordered within a dialectical quest for the good, Dewey insists ona plur ality of goods, each of which isuniqu e to a particu lar si tuation; he arguesthat human activity is naturally ordered by growth, which is a process ratherthan an end state.


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Introduction 3Still, nowhere do their views clash more fully than over the nature of moral

inquiry, the conservative stance of Maclntyre contrasting with the l iberalapproach of Dewey. Although both recognize moral inquiry to be a primaryhuman activity, Maclntyre argues that i t must take place within a tradit ionwhile Dewey calls for a method of experimentation and innovation. Thetheory of truth that lies at the heart of Maclntyre's conception of tradition-constituted inqu iry, how ever, is weak; Dew ey's conception of inqu iry, on theother hand, is not only part of a more consistent position, but can reengagecontemporary moral philosophy. This leads naturally to their disagreementover the value of liberalism in American society. Both philosophers presentstrong critiques of m ode rn A m erican cultu re, but w hile Dew ey's offered solu-tion is framed within existing conditions, Maclntyre's calls for a return to aconservative past.

In the first chapter of this study, then, I examine Maclntyre's critiqueof modern moral philosophy and his proposal to revitalize the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. I make explicit the theory he has laid out for the virtuesin a moral life including the quest for a human telos, and I explain his view ofinquiry w ithin a traditio n a nd his criticism of liberalism. T he second ch ap terexam ines D ew ey's views on the virtues as they a rise in experie nce , on values asthe consummation of experience in growth, and on modern ethical theories.In subsequen t cha pters I com pare and c ontras t their views and offer a defenseof Dewey on the virtues, hum an flourishing, and m oral inq uiry. In the conclu-sion I gather togethe r some of the more significant weaknesses in M ac ln ty re 'sposition identified during the study.

In many ways, the two philosophers are not that far apart. Dewey wouldcertainly agree with Maclntyre's concept of a practice and the narrativeform of a single human life as background ideas for the virtues. Moreover,Dewey's use of Da rwin ian evolutionary theory in und erstanding mo rali tycan help M ac ln ty re h ere, especially his description of hu m an c ondu ct asinvolving hab it, im pulse, and intelligence . Dewey c an also offer a va luab le cri-tique of M ac ln ty re 's conce pt of a practice thro ugh his emp hasis on the con tin-ual need for intelligent transform ation of hab its and prac tices. M ac ln ty re 'sconception of a narrative form of a single human life is also enhanced byDewey's view of nature as constituted by processes or histories. Both thinkersrecognize the importance of internal goods in living the good life. Further-more, Maclntyre's emphasis on human vulnerabil i ty and disabil i ty would beaccepted by Dewey, who admits such realities about the human condition.M ac ln tyr e is correct that they deserve greater em phasis tha n they have beengiven in the past, and th at the relation of m utu al dep ende ncy am ong peo ple iskey to the content of the virtues.

In all these ways the ir views are sim ilar, bu t th ere a re serious differences aswell. Maclntyre insists that there must be an overall end or goal for human


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4 Introductionbeings as such, not jus t a n individ ual good an d not just a social good, but ah u m a n telos a con cep tion of hu m an flourishing; in fact, th e quest for thisgood is wh at drives the m oral trad ition he describes. Dewey, how ever, refusesto accept th at a ny one good can be final: Since hu m an experience is in constantflux, all goods pass awa y an d are followed upo n by new en gag em ents. Peopledo wish for the goods of life to stay; the ir te m po rar y and fragile na tu re is part lywh at makes them valua ble, but none is perm ane nt. T he idea of a hu m an telos,acc ording to Dewey, is an illusion. Nevertheless, I will argue tha t his conce p-tion of growth serves the purposes of a human telos without being a final ortranscendent state external to the natural world. There is a clear sense inDewey of what it means for human beings to flourish; it is for people to con-tinually increase and expand their construction of goods in the natural andsocial environment. This requires the development and exercise of scientificinquiry in a participatory democracy, and it requires a social platform of lib-eralism that allows for experimentation, increased communication, and tol-eratio n of a variety of individ ual perspectives.

Maclntyre does have a strong criticism to make of liberalism: In its rejec-tion of all trad ition s it claims to be the most tole ran t social and political ord er,but it is true that in some ways those who claim to be the most open-mindedcan b e, in the end, quite close-minded, if tolerance is prom oted at the expenseof all other goods. But Dewey does not agree with Maclntyre's charge thatliberalism fails to provide the resources to atta in a comm on conce ption of thegood; M ac lnt yr e seems una wa re of the man y ways in which people do reachagreement in practices and institutions, which Dewey calls "social intelli-gence." Dewey's version of liberalism calls for increased social interactionthrough free inquiry and open communication.

The most serious difference between Maclntyre and Dewey concerns theirviews on the na tur e of inqu iry. M ac ln ty re argues tha t it is constituted in andby a tradition. The main challenge for Maclntyre is to show that criticism ispossible both within a tradition and external to it, but his attempt to do soinvolves a certain conception of truth which is rather weak. When describingthe dialectical process within a tradition of inquiry, he says that progress ismade when problems that have been raised regarding the beliefs of the pastare resolved by solutions that are able to with stand all other objections. T hu sthe tradition itself is held together by a type of coherence theory of truth, inth at the test of tru th of any o ne belief consists in its inclusion w ithin a tra dit ionof inquiry; but the point at which objections cease depends on the vitality ofthe individual participants. Furthermore, he uses a type of correspondencetheory of truth when describing how, after such progress, participants withina tradition can realize that beliefs previously held are now known to be false,gen erating a kind of second -order claim to truth . In explaining this, he saysthat the mind is not a Cartesian substance but actively involved in the world,


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Introduction 5yet when the mind is "adequate" to its object, it is informed by images andconcepts which "re -pr es en t" objects and forms. Thu s he chara cterizes the cor-respondence of the mind and i ts objects as "adequacy" of "re-presentation";but still, the point of ade qua cy d epend s on the jud gm en t of the pa rticip an ts,and to the degree that the authority of tradition obstructs the creativity andinnov ation of individua ls, it limits the progress of ration ality itself. So Macln-tyre's con cep tion of tru th is weak at cru cial p oints , lim iting its force especiallyfor inter-traditional criticism.

Dewey, however, is able to avoid the pitfalls of desc ribing th e c orres pon den ceof mind and its objects, since both are correlative concepts that exist only inreflection upon the intera ction of the organism w ith its env ironm ent. For him ,the object of knowledge is not antecedent to the knowing; it is constructedwithin the process of inqu iry. Dew ey rejects the tenden cy in tra ditio na l ph ilo-sophy to emp hasize knowing as the universal hu m an relationsh ip to the world:Man is not a spectator of nature, he says, but part of its processes. AlthoughM ac ln ty re tries to say this, he falls back into the tra ditio na l way philosophershave thou ght a bou t subject and object. H ere , Dewey can help him ou t.

Dew ey's m oral ph ilosophy is a kind of situationalism , as is M ac ln ty re 's andAristotle's: The right action can only be determined within the particular cir-cumstances in question. This is why development of the virtues is central tomorality; they attune insight into situations as they arise so that the rightaction may be realized. For Dewey, moral principles are hypotheses. None isuniversal, but they are not a rbi trar y either; they can be verified in experience.To hold on to principles without testing them in the world is the worst kind ofdogmatism, and to subject them to criticism does not require a radical per-spective outside the natural world. Being generalizations from past experi-ence, principles are naturally carried forward into new situations, butexperience cannot be forced into fitting prior conceptions; it is the principleswhich should be adjusted as a result of their con tact w ith nat ur e. T he c harge ofrelativism that since w hat is right is relative to the partic ula r situation , w hatis right for one person may not be right for anothercreates a problem for amoral philosophy based on universal principles and holding that what is rightmust carry across all situations for all people, but it does not create a problemfor Dewe y. A cco rding to him , principles serve as guides to co nd uc t, bu t wh at isright in the situation is the particular process that results in the satisfaction ofneed. Moral goods are creations of our interaction with the environment; assuch, they cannot be known in advance. Indeed, they do not even exist inadvance of their construction within the situation, but this does not makethem any less good. Experience, then, not the principle, is the arbiter forwhat is right; this view allows for continued growth in habits of thought andaction and for the testing and refinement of principles for conduct. This is thebetter approach for making future growth possible.


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1Red iscovery of the virtues

In this ch ap ter I lay out the basics of M ac ln ty re 's m ora l philosophy. His workover the last two decades forms an expanding yet consistent and influentialproject to address funda m ental issues in ethical theory and A m erican cultu re.I begin by examining his analysis of the problem of incommensurability ofmodern ethical theories and his proposal for resolving it. Maclntyre's entireproject can be seen as a response to this problem which appears not only toform an impasse to progress in mo ral philosophy b ut to foment irreconcilab ledivisions within our cu lture . I then p resent his deve lopm ent of a virtue theorybeg inning w ith his seminal w ork, After Virtue, and con tinued in his latest book,Dependent Rational Animals. This development reveals a remarkable shift froMaclntyre's first attempt to avoid biology to his more recent embracing of itand of a conception of human flourishing that rejects some of the elitist flavorof Aristotelian ethics, incorpo rating a statement of hu m an vulnerabil i ty andinterd epe nde ncy . Fina lly, I discuss the close relationship ofjustice and pra cti-cal wisdom in the development of individual ch aracte r , in a m oral tradit ion,and in M ac lnty re's cr i tique of l iberalism. T he tremendou s scope and d epth ofhis wo rk m ake any e nca psu latio n of it difficult an d, in a sense, unfair; his ideasdevelop organically, rather than analytically, and seethe with context in his-tory. In bringing atte ntio n to the im po rtan ce of the relation betw een freedomand truth for contemporary philosophy and its impact on cultural realities,M ac ln ty re has set the tone for the study of ethics toda y, a nd his work in revi-talizing the virtues as an essential feature of the moral life has made virtueethics possible as a viable the ory for stud y.

Return to traditionIn After Virtue, Maclntyre lays out the problem of the incommensurabil i tyof modern ethical theories: that in determining which theory to take up, thereis no neutral perspective from which to evaluate them one against another.As a consequence, argumentation about any number of contemporary issuestends to be interm ina ble since the positions tha t are tak en derive from reason-ing based on certain incommensurable backgrounds. These backgroundsare , of course, presupp osed in justifying the par tic ul ar p osition or view being


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Rediscovery of the virtuesespoused, and lend rational support or cognitive evidence to the claimsbeing mad e. How ever, the proponents of the various ideological backg roundscannot reach agreement or resolve their differences because the differentbackgrounds share no universal principles, beliefs, or values. It was Aristotlewho noted tha t unless argu m en tatio n is rooted in shared values it will be inef-fective, which entails that no terminus will be possible among the various linesof discussion.

This incommensurability results from their foundational approach: Eachtheory, Maclntyre argues, begins with certain first principles that have nofurther justification, so the choice among them seems arbitrary. Modernethica l theories are powerful systems of tho ug ht w hich collectively tend to ca p-ture the m ajority of ideological views that o ccur in one form or ano the r. T hetheories are based on certain deep and profound philosophical principlesthat ultimately function as incontrovertible starting points, but since eachbegins from a unique fundamental position they generate distinct views onm oral problem s, thus giving rise to distinct lines of arg um en tatio n. M ac ln ty resays: "F ro m our rival conclusions we can a rgue b ack to our rival premises; butwhen we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation ofone premise against an othe r becomes a m at ter of pure assertion and cou nter-assertio n." Th e choice, then, becomes which ethical theory one shouldchoose, and here they can function much like political parties: For whateverreason, one commits oneself to one ethical theory over the rest and, if consis-tent, follows the ramifications of that theory wherever they lead, regardless ofthe resulting position on any particular issue. However, sometimes, as withpolitical parties, one switches theories depen ding on which pa rticu lar positionseems best. Th at is, rather than take the position that results logically from theethical the ory one is com m itted to, one chooses the ethical theory w hich willjustify the pa rticu lar position one wa nts to take concern ing the issue at ha nd .

Nietzsche claimed that because of this the theories themselves are masks forthe exertion of the will to power; Maclntyre explains: "Nietzsche understoodthe academic mode of utterance as an expression of merely reactive attitudesand feelings, their negative, repressed, and repressive character disguisedbehind a mask of fixity and ob jectivity." On ce a person realizes that chan gingethical theories will allow the defense of either side of the issue one wishesto support, it begins to appear that the theories themselves are nothing moreth an systems of tho ug ht th at exist to justify pa rtic ul ar ide ological beliefs.Since when one reaches the level of theoretical discussion there are no com-mon standards by which to adjudicate among theories, one may pick thetheory tha t seems most com fortable given one's pre-existing views on variouscontroversial issues. There is no impetus to change one's views simply becausean ethical theory results in an un wa nted position; one merely chooses the ethi-cal theory appropriate to one's views in that context. Then one has the entire

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hreasoning power provided by these particular systems of thought to justifywhatever position one wishes to take at the time. Rather than choosing theethical theory which is most internally consistent or coherent, one choosesthe theory based on one's opinions about the particular moral, social, or poli-tical controversy. Ethical theories then do become masks, or pretenses towisdom, not only concealing the basic emotional disposition or close-mindedbias one alre ad y h as, but, se em ingly, justifying it as well.

M ac ln ty re suggests tha t Nietzsche's critique can be found to day in the formof emotivismthe view that moral judgments are "nothing but expressions ofpreference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral orevaluat ive in character ." 3 If the major ethical theories of modern times areincom m ensurable, then no one theory can claim to be better , or mo re correct ,th an any oth er. Th ey b ecom e, not so m uch systems of cognitive principles, b utschemes of ration aliza tion to justify one's pre-existing p osition on a pa rtic ula rissue; they becom e ways to defend on e's preference; ra the r th an be ing n orm a-tive, they a re me rely effective. T his leads to a m ora lity in which a ny on e's viewis as good or correct as any other's, regardless of experience or expertise, theonly real difference being effectiveness in the expression of one's preference.The more voices that align with any particular attitude, the more effectivethe expression and the more power is exerted by the collective will. In thisview, power becomes the arbiter of mo ral judg m en ts.

According to Ma cln ty re, the incom me nsurabil i ty of ethical theories is ult i-m ately due to the failure of the quest for an inde pen den t ra tion al justificationof m orality , an effort taken up by the Enligh tenm ent in its atte m pt to discoveruniversal first principles of ethics by assuming an unbiased neutral perspec-tive. T he atte m pt to find a grou nd of m orality in som ething other th an religionhas occupied modern philosophy since Hobbes first took up the question.H e, of course, argued that since reason cannot replace religion, people mustagree upon a secular sovereign to adjudicate all matters of disagreement.The notion of a social contract has long been acknowledged as one possibleground of morality, but its premise of individuals' choosing to leave a stateof na tur e in orde r to form a society is co ntra ry to w hat we know ab out the evo-lution of humans; people are social creatures, and the individual is more thecrea tion of society tha n the other way aroun d. K an t argu ed th at reason isthe only possible grou nd of m ora lity since it possesses a universa l stru ctu re, bu this emphasis on absolute laws to determine conduct proves too inflexible aguide to the pa rticu lar affairs of ordin ary e xperience . W hen absolutes areapplied to concrete situations, they either prove incommensurable or fail toprov ide the co nten t necessary to engage in the co ncrete situations of life. Ben-tham proposed the fulfillment of desire as the ground of morality, but wasunable to provide the motivation necessary to move from the psychologicalhedon ism of individua ls to the ethical hedo nism he proposed for the collective.

V i r tue E th i c s : D ew ey a nd M ac l n tyre


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Rediscovery of the virtuesT he e nligh tene d self-interest necessary to realize tha t my good is best ac hievedby m ean s of the good of all is evide ntly ra re and difficult for people to ac qu ire.

Thus all these attempts failed to provide the necessary ground of moralitytha t was sought, even thoug h some justification inde pen de nt of religion wasstill considered fund am entally essential for the establishmen t of a m oral p hilo-sophy that would be acceptable in modern t imes. Maclntyre says that "thebrea kdo wn of this project provided the historical bac kgro und against w hichthe pred icam ents of our own cultu re can become intelligible." As a conse-quence our moral tradit ion has become broken and fragmented: We have aset of moral rules, but we disagree over what makes them normative. Eachtheory is internally consistent, given its initial approach, and each provides acognitive structure for moral decision-making that is sufficient in most cases;yet in taking different approaches in their beginnings, these ethical theoriesremain incommensurable. Each possesses its own inherent value, but theycannot be evaluated against each other, as they share no common value orstand ard by which to mak e a com parison.

What this failure shows is that no unbiased neutral perspective is possible,and so, according to Maclntyre, either Nietzsche is correct or moral philoso-phy must work from within a tradition wherein certain first principles areassumed. In its belief that, once the ignorance and superstition of the pasthad been removed, a pure perspective would be possible from which a freshlook at things would reveal their true nature and provide for moral certainty,the Enlightenment looked to the future with confidence that human reasoncould solve problems in the areas where the institution and practice of theChurch had failed. Human reason was sufficient to the task, it was believed,and once the obstacles to its natural functioning were removed, it would beable to see the world aright. It is true that many fresh perspectives were pre-sented in intricate , systematic d etail, each possessed of an intrig uing original-ity, but no perspective was unbiased and neutral. Each perspective seemeduniq ue, bu t this was because it was premised on an individu al m ind abs tractedfrom its environmentself-conscious, and situated somehow behind experi-ence peering out u pon it. It is clear now th at such an ab stractio n is purely arti-ficial, since any individual mind is also a human mind, and it will necessarilybring with it the experiences that formed it and the events, conditions, andpersonalities that shaped it.

To this degree, Maclntyre says, Nietzsche is correct that there is no escap-ing personal bias. To claim, however, that all attempts at moral philosophyare nothing but the exertions of a blind impulsive will to power is unwar-ranted, because the personal bias one brings is not purely an individual crea-tion but also a product of the patterns of human culture that spawned it.This opens, then, the possibility for an individual mind to turn to engage thetraditions that set the conditions for its field of activity. In this case it is

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10 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and Maclntyreinevitable that within a tradition certain first principles are assumed, for, asM ac ln ty re states, it is a cond ition for the existence of a trad ition at all:

[Rjeason can only move towards being genuinely universal and impersonalinsofar as it is neither neutral nor disinterested ... [and] membership in apa rtic ula r type of m oral com m unity , one from w hich funda m ental dissenthas to be excluded, is a condition for genuinely rational enquiry and moreespecially for moral and theological enquiry.In arguing for tradit ion-consti tuted inquiry, Maclntyre claims that cr i t i-

cism can take place within a living tradition, and that, despite the challengesof relativism to which such tradition-o riente d inqu iry would seem pron e, eval-ua tion am ong traditions is possible as well. It is crucial to un ders tand tha t, forM ac lnt yre , tradit ion is more th an just repeti t ion of the pastconservation ofthe old ju st for the sake of its pre serv atio n is the worst form of dog m a an d willinevitably crumble and decay from stagnation. Living traditions are engagedin inquiry that involves criticism and creativity in order to move forward.Maclntyre contends that any tradition must begin with certain beliefs orshared values, but the changing nature of experience adds fuel to the objec-tions th at are raised to these beliefs.

Engaged in a shared dialectical inquiry, participants in a tradition offerideas for collective evaluation, some of which at times prove capable ofmeeting and answering all objections, and become incorporated into thebody of shared beliefs. Some of the antecedent beliefs must then give way tonew ones, Maclntyre explains, even though something from the past willalwa ys be bro ug ht forw ard into the future, since this is w ha t gives a t rad itio nits iden tity:

Th eor etica l enq uiry is cons tituted by a sequence of questions, ordered bothso that questions are generated in accordance with the direction of enquiryand so that, at each stage, what needs to be presupposed or otherwiseappealed to in answering the questions of that stage has already been pro-vided. In the posing of each detailed set of questions, the principal answersmade available by the various and conflicting traditions which have con-tributed to the making of this enquiry are set out and evaluated. At everystage what emerges is the outcome of some particular learner 's debate withall those distinct pasts.6

Thus criticism is possible within a tradition, since each participant brings aunique perspective to the collective inquiry. No two participants have identi-cal life histories, and although they share common values, how these valuesare applied to the changing life situations of each individual will vary, thus


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Rediscovery of the virtues 11sparking creative imagination of alternativesif the tradition is healthy andprovides the necessary conditions for such inquiry to take place. Not all do.

Maclntyre does recognize that tradit ions may fall into what he terms an"epistem ological crisis" and cease to m ake progress:

Conflicts over rival answers to key questions can no long er be settled rat ion -ally. Mo reover, it may indeed ha pp en tha t the use of the metho ds of enqu iryand of the forms of argu m ent, by me ans of which ratio na l progress had beenachieved so far, begins to have the effect of increasingly disclosing newinadequacies, hitherto unrecognized incoherences, and new problems forthe solution of which there seem to be insufficient or no resources withinthe established fabric of belief.

Maclntyre is famous for arguing that liberalism is, in fact, a tradition that isnow in such a state of crisis, and he says th at the only way to escape from such astate is for some adherent of that tradition to bring to it ideas from anothertradition that are capable of removing the impasse. Thus criticism of tradi-tions from outside is possible, according to Maclntyre, although it is rare:He limits it to the specific instance when an individual, his own tradition incrisis, has managed to immerse himself sufficiently in a tradition other thanhis own. If his original tradition has opened up conflicts that prove insoluble,Maclntyre argues that such an individual may be able to bring ideas from asecond trad itio n t ha t are cap ab le of resolving the conflict: " F or one view tohave emerged from its encounter with another with its claim to superiorityvindica ted it must first have rend ered itself m axim ally vu lnera ble to the stron-gest arguments which that other and rival view can bring to bear against it."

In tha t case, he says, the other adh eren ts of his original tra ditio n would haveto recognize the second tradition as superior since it proves able to resolve theproblems that caused the crisis in the first place. The best example he gives ofthis is Aq uina s, who was able to merge the two traditions of Aristotelian phi-losophy and Ch rist ianity. Gra ha m explains that "ra tion al superiority is to befound in the circumstances in which one tradition explains the persistent diffi-culties encountered by another better than the other can itself, and in waysth at the ad he ren ts of the less successful tra di tio n can rec og niz e." Progresscan, perhaps, be resumed, although the future of the revised tradition mustinclude its admission of debt. This seems to be the only time, however, whensuch criticism is possible: wh en the tr ad itio n itself is in crisis; ord ina rily , p ra c-tical reasoning is strictly lim ited to the traditio n within w hich one is working.Thus Maclntyre is deeply protective of traditions and draws a sharp limit toexternal criticism.

Maclntyre claims that the best resources for moral inquiry are offered bythe Aristo telian -Th om istic trad ition , of which one of the key ideas is the roleof the virtues in lead ing a good life:


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12 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MaclntyreMy own conclusion is very clear. It is that on the one hand we still, in spiteof the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology,lack any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualistpoint of view; and tha t, on the othe r han d, th e Aristotelian trad ition ca n berestated in a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moraland social at t i tudes and com mitm ents.110

It is this tradition, Maclntyre argues, that has become fragmented in them od ern w orld, so tha t m ode rn ethical theories generally prescribe very similarmoral rules, such as those that value truthfulness, courage, temperance, andjustice, but all for different reasons. It is the meta-ethical systems that areincommensurable because of their failure to establish universal principles ofethics. Each ethical theory presents a mainstream view of right conduct, yetwh en differences arise over questions of jus tice , for insta nc e, the co ntr arylines of reasoning which follow from each perspective prove irresolvable.M ac ln ty re 's profound app recia tion of history allows him to see tha t beforethe advent of modern philosophy, a powerful tradition of moral philosophyexisted that had its roots in ancient Greece yet had been incorporated intothe Christ ian m oral tradit ion by Aq uinas. A major p art of M ac lnt yre 's argu-m en t is that one of the defining features of m od ern ity is its rejection of Scho las-ticism with its basis in Aristotle's philosophy, and with it the rejection ofteleology. Descartes, for one, was clear in his rejection of it when he statedthat purpose was useless in regard to physics. Maclntyre explains that thereason moral rules seem to have been imposed from some external authorityis that we have lost the concept of a telos for mankind; obviously, if the moralrules were to direct us tow ard hu m an na tur e as it should becom e, they will beat variance w ith hum an natu re as i t is now.So the Enlightenment marked the break up of the Aristotelian-Thomistictradition in moral philosophy, even though it has come down to us today infragm ents. It has only been in the last few years th at the conce pt of the virtue shas even been accepted as a viable conception for modern times; part of thereason for its resurgence lies perhaps in the fact that still, for many people,the quest for living the good life draws the attention and excites wonder.In spite of recognizing the multiplicity of responses that are possible, one stillconte m plates the possibility of unc overing an answ er to this question for one-selfwhat sort of person should I be? This question has not gone away.

Fo und a t ion s o f t he v i r tuesFor Aristotle, the moral and intellectual virtues are acquired dispositions ofcharacter that can be determined for all rational animals since they, as do allspecies, hav e certain conditions und er wh ich they flourish. Such a natu ralistic


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Rediscovery of the virtuesT 13approach to ethics has much to commend it in modern t imes. By groundingmorality in a biological conception of human nature, Aristotle bypasses thereligious and idealist objections that can engage one in endless controversy.All human beings presumably share certain natural conditions in ordersimply to survive, and just as the observation of more rudimentary forms oflife reveals shared conditions under which they prosper, similar conclusionsmust follow about more complex species such as humankind. Aristotle's con-cep tion of hu m an flourishing is ma nifested in his des cription of the several vir-tues tha t serve as m ean s to and as con stitutive of the good life.

Aristotle's me taphy sical biology has been replace d, of course, by D arw inia nevolutionary theory, which leaves the problem today one of agreement onwhat constitutes human flourishing. But it is not clear that the problem hereis the chan ge from one theory of hu m an biological natu re to anoth er, for surelythe same disagreement over the conditions for human flourishing could beraised regarding Aristotle's view alone. It is one thing to say that the good lifeis one tha t is lived acc ording to the virtues, and a no the r to sayjust wh at thosevirtues are. Now few would disagree, perhaps, with the virtues of honesty,courage, tem peran ce, and justice, yet what we mea n when we speak todayof courag e or tem pera nce m ay have change d som ewh at from A ristotle's day.No dou bt a grea ter nu m be r of people toda y would object to certa in oth er Aris-totelian virtues such as magnificence and high-mindedness. The more thatdetails are added to spell out the conception of the good life, the more par-t icular th at conception bec om es particular , we migh t say, to a certain A the-nian ideal of the fourth centu ry BC. T he prob lem , th en, is tha t w hat beginswith a sound basis in the universal conditions for biological life becomesgradua lly m ore relative to a particular perspective.

In his seminal work, After Virtue, Maclntyre tr ied to avoid biology alto-gether by grounding the virtues in the three ideas of a practice, the narrativeorder of a single life, and a moral tradition, with the virtues deriving fromthis prior account of our social and moral life. Intended as a continuation ofthe philosophical tradit ion of Aristotle and Aqu inas, M ac lnty re's theory pre-supposes neither biology nor Christianity. Rather, he grounds the virtuesin community life, the activities we engage in with others; even the personal,reflective views we hav e of ou r own in div idu al lives he shows to be ord ered inour relations w ith others. These th ree ideas which he offers as ba ckg rou nd tothe conc ept of the virtues are n ot inten ded to be discrete elements of the con-ception, but cumulative; all three are necessary in his view, and it is a mistaketo focus on a ny one to th e exclusion of the othe rs.

T h e no tion of a pra ctic e is itself com plex . H e defines it as follows:By "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex formof socially established cooperative human activity through which goods


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14 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and Maclntyrein ternal to that activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve thosestan da rds of excellence which are approp r iate to , and partially definitive of,that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excel-lence, and hum an concept ions of the ends and goods involved, are system-atically extended.

To engage in a practice is to realize what Maclntyre calls "internal goods,"which are such that they can only be specified in term s of the pra ctic e of wh ichthey are goods and "can only b e identified and recognized by the experience ofpar t icipat ing in the practice in quest ion." As opposed to external goods,which "are always some individual's property and possession," internalgoods are "good for the whole community who participate in the practice";furthermore, to be truly involved in a practice may sometimes require thesacrifice of external goods. The concept of internal goods echoes Aristotle'sconcept of activity, in which the ends of the action are included within theactivity itself; as such, an activity is complete at any t ime, as opposed to amotion, which takes time for completion. Goods internal to a practice canonly be defined within the particular practice wherein they exist, and so par t i -cipation in the practice is required in order to even experience them, such asthe ple asu re of striking out the side in a World Series game.

According to Macln tyre , ano ther key feature of a practice involves thes tandards of excellence established by the masters of the practice throughoutits history and which serve to define success in the activity, such that a funda-mental relationship within a practice is that between the master and thenovice. The novice must submit to the autho rity of the ma ster , who has inter-nalized the stan da rds of excellence, in order to learn how to perform well andso begin to enjoy the inte rna l rew ards of excellence in purposeful activity. Theprocess of learning, therefore, is crucial because it is here that the rules of thepractice become a guide for future activity and the s tandards of excellencebegin serving to distinguish correct from incorrect actions. It is impor tan t tonote that the s tandards of excellence are not chosen by the practi t ioner;rather , they are inherited from the masters who developed them in the past.As such, the initiate begins a kind of search, or quest, for them. In fact, ratherthan choosing them the initiate mu st study, subm it to, and em ulate them; evenin criticizing them, or in open rebellion against them, they serve to definenegatively the direction the critic or rebel takes.

In addition to this looking backward, the pract i t ioner is also involved in aforward extension of his own powers as they develop along the lines delimitedby the practice in which he is engage d. His own progress in stretching his abil-ities to reach the s tandards of excellence wh ich define the practice constitutesprogress for the practice itself; this can be seen most clearly, if perhaps rarely,when a genius appea rs every sooften to set new stan dard s of excellence for the


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Rediscovery of the virtues 15practice. Interestingly, this forward direction provides a needed distance toallow for criticism of the practice from inside; that is, given the aims of thepractice, failure can be distinguished from success in certain areas. Forinstance, health-care workers may determine the need for increased attentionto pain management .

Now we can see how the concept of the virtues fits into this background ofs o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . A s M a c l n t y r e s a y s : "A virtue is an acquired human quality thepossession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internto practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us ro m achieving any such goods";the virtues, then, which he lists as "justice, coura ge, an d ho nes ty" are ch ara c-teristics of human behavior the exercise of which furthers the activities ofwhatever practice in which we engage. They are human quali t ies necessaryto achieve the intern al goods: justice in giving to each w ha t he is due (whichcan only be known by those engaged in the practice); courage in taking risksnecessary to promote the common goals of the practice; and honesty inlistening to criticism from others engaged in the activity and speaking truth-fully in return . These virtues of ch ara cte r cross bou nda ries an d are not lim itedto one practice; also, they can be important in criticizing the practice itselffrom within, for the possibility does exist for practices to be counter to thegood life. In fact, the necessity for criticism leads Maclntyre to place themwithin a larger social and moral context, the narrative order of a singlehuman life.

I t is an imp orta nt step in his overall argum ent when M ac ln ty re introducesthe "c on ce pt of a self whose un ity resides in the unity of a nar ra tiv e w hich linksbirth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end." 1 5 In orderto understand someone's behavior, it is essential to understand his inten-tions, for without that his behavior can be interpreted in any number ofways. Take for instance, someone at work outside in the yard: is he digging,gardening, exercising, winterizing, or pleasing his wife? Any of these could beboth a true and appropriate response. Understanding the person's intentionsinvolves placing his activity in a setting. As M ac ln ty re says: "W e can not . . .characterize beh avior independ ently of intentions, and we cann ot cha racter-ize intentions ind epe nde ntly of the settings which m ake those intentions intel-ligible both to agents themselves and to oth er s."

1 6So from a person's beh aviorwe are led to his intentio ns, which place the activity within a setting, M ac ln -

tyre con tend s, unifying the perso n's activities w ithin a na rra tiv e of his life'sstory from birth to death. Each individual person finds her- or himself in themidd le of thingsas someon e's child an d someone else's pare nt, as someone'sniece or nephew and someone else's au nt or uncle looking back wa rd tow ardthat from which they have come and forward toward that to which they aregoing. T he po int here is tha t in orde r to un de rstan d anyo ne's behav ior it mustbe placed within some socially recognized form of activity. This also places it


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16 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and Maclntyrewithin a history and gives it a na rrati ve form; furtherm ore, as I am the subjectof a narra tive tha t runs from my birth to my de ath , I am ac cou ntab le for ques-tions about the purpose of my behavior, and, likewise, I can ask others for anacc oun t of their actions.In exp laining the final idea involved in comp osing the com plex b ack grou ndfor the virtues, the notion of a moral tradition, Maclntyre introduces his con-ception of m an's telos the elem ent he argues is missing from m ode rn ethicaltheories an d a bo ut w hich th ere is seemingly so little agre em en t. He identifies itas the search itself: " [T ]h e good life for m an is the life spen t in seeking for th egood life for m an , an d th e virtues necessary for the seeking are those which willenable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is."Again, the notion of history plays a key role in grounding the purpose ofhuman activity and giving meaning to life. Thus to live an authentic life forMaclntyre requires at least some engagement in the tradit ion of searchingfor the good lifea centuries-old conversation, or argument, about whatmakes life worth living.

In saying that the good life is to search for the good life, Maclntyre meansthat the product is the process; that is, the good life is not an end state but theactive pursuit of reflective inquiry about how one should live. His point is thatone should engage others dialectically within a moral tradition to carry outthis life's work because, otherwise, progress cannot be achieved; this is, atleast in part , what people who study moral philosophy are doingthat is ,searching for the good life. Now some might resent Maclntyre's insistence onsuch a life of reflection since few peop le hav e the m ean s to su pp ort such a lei-surely pu rsuit. Som e may see no value in such a search; there m ay be those whoare living a very good life without reflecting on it at all. Maclntyre's responsewould be to point again to the lack of any coherent worldview in contempor-ary times an d the inhe ren t difficulty in ach ieving consensus on social problem swithout a shared conception of a universal human good. In his eyes, such asearch is therefore necessary, a nd , in fact, co nstitutes the good life for m an .

Most recently, Maclntyre admits that a biological conception of humannature is essential to moral theory, and he further asserts the importance ofattention to human vulnerabil i ty and disabil i ty to reveal our dependency onothers. In his latest work, Dependent Rational Animals, he makes a concerteeffort to establish clearly the basis of our rational nature in our animalna tur e; he claims tha t the identification of w ha t makes an organism vulner-able assumes some conception of its flourishing. In trying to break down thehard l ine between human and nonhuman animals , Maclntyre presentsrecent investigations concerning the complex social behavior of dolphins.What he finds is that the behavior of higher animal forms does not present asharp contrast to prelinguistic human behavior, and he offers a rebuttal ofthe claims made about radical differences between human and nonhuman


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Rediscovery of the virtues 17animals th at are based on languag e. Ju st as language need not be presupposedin attributing beliefs to humans, he says it need not be presupposed in under-standing nonhuman animals: "It is therefore in itself no obstacle to ascribingreasons for their actions to the me mb ers of no nh um an intelligent species, suchas dolphins, that they do not possess the linguistic resources for articulatingand utter ing those reasons." 1 8 People often act "without thinking," butprove able later to state the reasons which led them to act in that way. Thefact th at they do not formulate a statem ent of inten tion before they act doesnot make their action unintelligible. It is one thing to act for a reason, andanother to formulate that reason as a proposition. He refers to Malcolm'sexample of the dog that has chased the cat up a tree and waits below: It isprop er to say that the dog believes the cat is up the tree, but n ot th at the dogbelieves the proposition, " T h e ca t is up the tre e. " Ju st as hum ans com e to"read" each other 's actions af ter interacting for a t ime, Maclntyre arguesthat humans who spend much time with nonhuman animals can do the same,and this is not to speak metaphorically about beliefs or reasons for action, butto speak naturally:

[I] t is becau se we do hav e reasons for actio n prio r to any reflection, th e kindsof reason that we share with dolphins and chimpanzees, that we have aninitial m att er for reflection, a starting po int for that transition to ratio nalitywhich a mastery of some of the complexities of language use can provide.M ac ln ty re argues for a biological basis for the virtues in a universal concep-

tion of flourishing that is identical for all species, despite the divergent parti-culars nee ded to flesh ou t the co nce pt for indiv idu al species:

W hat it is to flourish is no t of cou rse the sam e for dolp hin s as it is for gorillasor for humans but it is one and the same concept of flourishing that findsapp licatio n to me m bers of different ani m al and plant species. And cor-respondingly it is one an d the same con cept of needs tha t finds similar b roadapp licatio n. W ha t a plant or an an im al needs is w ha t it needs to flourish quamember of its particular species. And what it needs to flourish is to developthe distinctive pow ers th at it possesses qua me m ber of that species.20

Maclntyre says that humans f lourish as independent practical reasoners:"H u m an beings need to learn to und erstand themselves as practical reasonersabout goods, about what on particular occasions it is best for them to do andab ou t how it is best for them to live out their lives ." H ow eve r, such abilityalso requires the acknowledgem ent of our dependenc y on others. M ac lnt yreinsists that because our relations with others provide the resources for ourgrowth and well-being, these relations of giving and receiving also reveal ourmutual dependency on others:


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18 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MaclntyreInde pen den t prac tical reasoners con tr ibute to the formation an d sustainingof their social relatio nsh ips, as infants do not, a nd to lea rn how to beco m e anindependent practical reasoner is to learn how to cooperate with others informing and sustaining those same relationships that make possible theachievement of common goods by independent practical reasoners.

This is a deliberate dep arture from Aristotle 's view of "th e high-m inded m a n "and a move closer to Aquinas, for the good life is not one of self-sufficiencyindependent of others. We are all vulnerable, Maclntyre says, and sub-ject to disease, injury, disability, and harm; at such times we turn to othersfor assistance :

[T]he acquisition of the necessary virtues, skills, and self-knowledge issomething that we in key part owe to those particular others on whom wehave ha d to depend . Wh en we f inally have become inde pend ent reasoners,generally early in our adu lt lives, m an y of these relationships of dep ende nceare of course over. Yet this is not true of all of them. For we continue to theend of our lives to need others to sustain us in our practical reasoning.

This is a prim ary fact of hu m an na tu re, a nd because we receive such goods, weare ob ligated to give such goods in retu rn, even tho ugh m an y times we do notrepay the particular ones from whom we received, but give to others fromwho m we have received nothin g.

Du nne points out that M ac lnty re's conception of hu m an f lourishing"resides most fully in the exercise of independent practical reasoning; butpart of his inten tion is to show jus t how deeply be holden to others we are forthis very exercisefor its character both as independent and as rational." 2 4Dunne is most impressed by the importance of our relationships with othersfor our own well-being, noting the differences here from so many other moralphilosophies that assume mo ral au tono m y as fully present from the beginn ing;"[ r ja th er ," he says, "exercise of the vir tues of an indep ende nt practical rea-soner is in itself shot through with otherness."

M ac lnty re's conception of the vir tues has then expande d to em brace thosetraits of character that promote human flourishing in the growth of ourrationa l na ture from our anim al na ture an d in our dependency on the acts ofgiving and receiving that constitute our relations with others:

If I am to flourish to the full extent that is possible for a human being, thenmy whole life has to be of a certain kind, one in which I not only engage inand achieve some measure of success in the activities of an independentpractical reasoner, but also receive and have a reasonable expectationof receiving the attentive care needed when I am very young, old and ill,or injured.26


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Rediscovery of the virtues 19M ac lnt yr e lays out two interdep end ent sets of vir tues: those of an indepe nden tration al age nt and those of a dep end ent ration al an im al, both of which a rem eans to and con stitutive of hu m an flourishing. Becoming an inde pen den tpractical reasoner is one essential cha racteristic of hu m an flourishing. M ac ln -tyre says that one must learn to evaluate reasons as good or bad (a startingpoint shared with prelinguistic beings), stand back from one's desires, andimagine alternative futures:

[T]he practical learning needed, if one is to become a practical reasoner isthe same learning needed, if one is to find one's place within a network ofgivers and receivers in which the achievement of one's individual good isunderstood to be inseparable from the achievement of the common good.We become independent practical reasoners through the acquisit ion and

exercise of the intellectual and moral virtues, which we owe to those thatedu cate d us ab ou t how to function well in society. Rec ogn ition of our depe n-dency is im po rta nt because after we becom e ind epe nd ent p ractic al reasonerswe owe to others what they need to become such as well. The virtuesof independent practical reasoning, then, are interrelated with the virtues ofacknow ledged depe nden ce realized in our relationships of giving and receiv-ing. Th e central vir tue of this acknowledged depe ndence is wh at M ac lnt yr ecalls "just gen erosity " a com bina tion of justice an d generosity so that we"give more th an justice requires " in acting from "atte ntiv e an d affectionateregard" for the other .2 8 In other words, one does more for others than followstrict proportional allotment of what is owed; one practices the virtues ofcharity and misericordiam in the sense of genuine concern and compassiofor others. Furthermore, Maclntyre argues that while our relationships withthose in our community engage our affections, these virtues extend furtherbeyon d, even to strangers who confront us with genu ine need. Th us the virtuesof giving "industriousne ss in getting, thrift in saving, and d iscrim ination ingiving" arise, as well as the vir tues of rece iving "gra ti tude ," "co urtes y,""forbearance," and "truthful acknowledgement of dependence."

In this latest work, then, Maclntyre goes more deeply into our biologicaland p hysical existence in relations with others tha n he had ea rlier, gro und ingthe vir tues in our anim al na ture and our dependence on others. These condi-tions present us with basic hu m an needs which, of course, determ ine the courseof our w ell-being. And he also says more a bo ut the n atu re of hu m an flourish-ing in this elem ental contex t: that an und ersta nd ing of our vulnerab ilitiesassumes a structure for human excellence. Human flourishing requires ourfunctioning as independent practical reasoners who, in being accountable toothers, engage with others in pursu it of an und ersta nd ing of the comm on good;such functioning is made possible in virtue of the characteristics learnedfrom others in evaluating our reasons for action, standing back from our


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20 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and M aclntyredesires, and imagining alternative futures. But this flourishing also involvesthe acknowledgment of our dependency on others expressed by the virtuesof ust generosityjustice initiated from a sense of charity, beneficence, miser-icordiama willingness to give more than is demanded by what is propor-tiona l. Both of these interd ep end en t sets of virtues are ac quired from andexercised in our relations with others of giving and receiving, a networkof relations formed in and forming in turn a local community. Nations,M ac ln ty re says, are too large an a ren a for such relations to form, and familiesare too small . A local community is needed, Maclntyre says, wherein eachperson can engage in and contr ibute to the pursuit of a common conceptionof the good"some form of local community within which the activities offamilies, w orkplaces, schools, clinics, clubs dedicate d to de ba te a nd clubs dedi-cated to gam es and sports, and religious cong regations m ay all find a pl ac e. " 3 0The ideal of human flourishing, then, is a life in pursuit of the good in accor-dance with the virtues of acknowledged dependencea life lived in commu-nity formed an d m aintaine d by the combined pursuit of a com mon conceptionof the good life.

The crisis of modernityA key idea for M ac ln ty re that runs through out his work is the im porta nce ofthe relationship between the moral and the intellectual virtues, especially jus-tice and practical wisdom. It is not clear how sharp a distinction should bedrawn between these two classes of virtues, for there is ample evidence thatthey are closely related to each other. Plato's Republic, for example, beginswith a remark about the virtue of listening which would seem to be a moralvirtue, but clearly it serves as an important prerequisite for such intellectualvirtues as ope n-m inde dne ss. T h e basis for the distin ction is, of course , in Aris-totle, who posited two sorts of objectsthe changing and the unchangingwhich are reflected in our desires and in our thoughts. To the degree that wedistinguish between behavior and thought, the distinction is preserved, but asC. S. Peirce dem onstra tes in his essay, " T h e F ixation of Belief," our moral dis-positions affect how we settle our intellectu al do ubts . And some in the cu rren tfield of vir tue epistem ology conflate the distinc tion as well, focusing as they d oon the ch ar ac te r of the know er for the justification of a belief.

Maclntyre's claim echoes Aristotle 's , in that understanding what justicedem and s in a situation requires possession of the virtue itself; in other words,a person m ust be just in order to exercise prac tical w isdom. T he source ofm uch of our disag reem ent over co nte m po rary issues is due to our tende ncy toapply a rule or principle to every situation where there is a conflict. Howwe apply the rule, however, and even which rule we use, depend on what


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Rediscovery of the virtues 21pa rtic ula r bias we hav e, such as a pa rticu lar religious or political po int of view.Before one can determine what justice requires, one must examine the parti-culars of the situation, that is, exercise a finely tuned sensitivity to the contextof the situation . T his, of course, is to practice the intellectual virtue otphronesis,and it requires training from an early age involving the imitation of rolemodels. Practical wisdom develops along with moral goodness; one cannotevaluate actions correctly unless one has acquired the correct disposition.The idea that a person may live any way he wishes to live and still be able tojudge what is right and wrong in any situation is mistaken. A person cannotcheat others on a regular basis and yet know what justice demands. This isthe view encouraged, however, by a principles app roac h to m oral evaluation,which draw s a sharp line betwe en belief and p ractic e; all that is needed is thecorrect set of rules and a willing obedience to their au tho rity.

On the contrary, Maclntyre argues that the capacity for practical reason-ing is inseparable from an education in the exercise of the moral virtuesbecause practical wisdom and moral excellence develop in a symbiotic rela-tions hip. Th e virtues them selves derive from a con cep tion of the good , p roject-ing what a person could be if he realized his telos. They are characterist ics aperson develops over a lifetime of making the right choices in pursuit of thegood, qualities which en able an ind ividua l to do w hat his role requires and topreserve or restore a jus t orde r. Rules are im po rta nt for training a pe rson,wh ethe r it is a child or an ap pren tice new to a practice. Bypassing the need toexplain each decision individually, rules cover many instances and therebyfacilitate learning and acclimation to the proper activity; but in describingthis process of moral and intellectual development it becomes clear thatmoral rules are not primary, but rather derive from the virtues.

It is easy to see that just having rules is not enough. In Plato's RepublicSocrates dem ons trated the limitation of such a view with the exam ple of some-one who had lent his weapons to another for safe-keeping only to return as amadman in a deranged state asking for them back. Keeping the rule in such acase would be the unjust thing to do. The point is that there will always beexceptions, and that it takes something other than obedience to authority todecide when to follow the rule or not. It requires sensitivity to the circum-stances and the context of the situationin other words, it requires practicalwisdom, which is developed over a lifetime with others in pursuit of moralexcellence.

As Aristotle said, all creatu res lea rn by im itating ; the novice learns the pra c-tice by imitating the master, just as the child learns to be a good person byimitating the r ight role model. Graham explains that "practical reason willbe a ma tter of relying upon the jud gm en ts of those well versed in the m oraltrad ition s of specific times and places, and by em ula tion c om ing to be able tomake judgments in our turn."v This can lead to a charge of circularity, such


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22 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and Maclntyreth at the righ t choice is w ha t thephronimos would do, but aphronimos is identifiedas the one who m akes the rig ht cho ice. Ne vertheles s, the circle is bro ke n by theexperience t ha t comes from living with others in com m on p ursuit of the good,although Maclntyre says that i t is only apparent to one who shares thatgood. In the end, one is simply left w ith the dog m atic assertion th at there arecases and there are cases. A mo ther, for exam ple, who abuses her children is apoor mother; on the other hand, the mother who sacrifices personal pleasuresor ga in by carin g for an infirm child is a virtu ou s mo the r, a nd it require s only aminimum of acquaintance with the role of a mother to distinguish the two.

Rules are needed for m oral edu catio n. W e become just by performing justacts, but we cannot know which acts to perform until we become justthusthe need for good role models; but rules can help here, too. First comes learn-ing to apply the rule and acquiring the disposition to do what the rule pre-scribes. Ne xt comes lea rnin g how to justify the perform anc e of good ac ts.T he n you a pply tha t justification to new cases. But in the adv anc ed stages ofmoral education, when the movement is from the less to the more complexcasesthere is no longer any rule-governed behavior, but the developmentof moral excellence alongside practical wisdom. They undergo a mutualdevelopment, interrelated in growth and maturity through experience.No rule governs this. Ifphronesis were rule-governed, then there would be aninfinite regress of rules to govern the application of rules (as Wittgensteinhinted in his Philosophical Investigations). So there m ust be justification this not rule-governed, such that an increase in the ability to make more com-plex jud gm en ts is valid ated by an increase in the adeq uac y of the c oncep tionof the good. Ag ain, the re is no circularity here. In developing the conc eption ofthe good an d the virtues of ch ara cte r, each corrects the othe r; there is a dialec-tic between them. In this development, justification can only be made withhindsightbeing able to explain why a mistake was made, and being able todefend a position against all possible objections. Looking forward, the phroni-mos may have nothing external to his own judgment to which to appeal inmaking a decision. The difference here is that this is no mere appeal to per-sonal bias or a mask for the will to power; rather, Maclntyre argues thatthe decision emanates from a practical wisdom that has been attuned to thepartic ularitie s of life by the pu rsuit of the good in concert with o ther m em bersof the c om m unity.

I t is true th at one chooses to becom e jus t, bu t it requires time to develop th atdisposition, an d longer still to acqu ire the virtue. O ne m ust purposely subjectoneself to situations d em and ing a jus t ac tion and consciously choose to do theright thing and do this repeatedly until it becomes natural, a habit. Of courseone does not know w hat the right th ing is unless one has been train ed, and thistraining is not an intellectual exercise so much as an organized activity. Thereason for the action should be explained as the action is being taken by a role


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Rediscovery of the virtues 23mod el providing the guidan ce. O ne becomes able to recognize a role m odel bycoming to trust the others around one, those who have helped and cared forone in the past. The virtues begin with fulfilling social roles and expand withmaturity to the living of a good life. So it is clear that moral rules can only begene ral descriptions of w hat a good a nd wise person would do; the rules are notprimary. First comes the virtuous person who is able to see what the rightaction is in the particular circumstances; then comes the rule which gener-alizes this right action for future reference and training purposes. Moral rulesare needed by the individual and by the com mu nity, but they canno t providejustification for the Tightness of an action.

This is another reason why moral inquiry must be constituted in and by atradition: The conception of the good is not an individual insight but a com-munal affair. Just as the virtues we acquire from others are formed out of ourrelations with them, our exercise of these virtues contributes to the well-beingof all in the community. These virtues are inculcated in the young so thatthey will do well and the community prosper. A conception of the good ispresupposed in the process of acculturation, one that is held up perhaps in dif-ferent forms, but one that reflects generally the values of the community. Ourrelations with others and the goods we hold both individua lly an d in com m onare ordered by a striving for the human goodwhat provides for and con-sists in human flourishing. The quest for the human telos unifies the commu-nity, including individuals who challenge any conception of the good whichis expressed.

According to Maclntyre, we are all engaged in this quest; some may bemore absorbed in it than others, but it forms the relations we value the most.To engage directly in the quest is to participate in the ongoing tradition ofmoral philosophy in the search for the good. It is a dialectical quest in whichbeliefs are proclaimed, objections raised, and objections made to the objec-tions; points of criticism that have withstood all objections become part of thebody of know ledge to be proclaim ed as subject for dialogu e, an d so the tr adi -tion moves forward. Maclntyre contends that even this dialectical processrequires the exercise of the virtues of honesty, courage, temperance, and jus-tice, and we could list more virtues of criticism, crea tivity, open -mind edness,as well as respect and even reverence for the tradition itself:

What emerged from Socrates' confrontation with Gallicles in the Gorgiawas that it is a precondition of engaging in rational enquiry through them ethod of dialectic th at one should alre ady possess and recognize certainmoral virtues without which the cooperative progress of dialectic will beimpossible, something further acknowledged by Plato in the Republic inhis identification of those virtues the practice of which must precede initia-tion into philosophical community and by Aristotle in his account of the


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24 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and Maclntyreinsepa rability of the mo ral and the intellectual virtues in both p olitical a ndphilosophical community.3 2

"A living trad it ion ," according to M ac ln ty re, "is an historically extended,socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about thegoods which constitute that tradition." Maclntyre discusses three majormoral traditions, or traditions of inquiry: the Aristotelian, the Augustinian,and the Hu m ea n. Such a trad ition of inqu iry is at least partia lly den ned byits adherents becoming aware of the existence and direction of the traditionand by their confronting the curre nt problem s in an effort to further the tra di-tion in its progress. Of course within a tradition there is conflict: As a partici-pant engages in the inquiry he can only do so by assuming certain beliefs asgiven, from which the tradition has generated a set of problems to confront.So the traditio n looks both b ack w ard and forwa rd: bac kw ard to the discussionof the gre at q uestions of the pas t an d the intelle ctu al efforts to define a nd posi-tion the inqu iry, an d forward to the resolution of cur ren t problem s of thoug ht.It is the process begun by the Melisians centuries ago: Thales first proposed atheory, and Anaximander studied it, criticized it, and proposed a revision tothe theory to meet the cri ticism; then A naximene s did the same with A naxi-mander's revised theorystudy, criticism, and further revision. Thus the tra-dition of inqu iry was born a nd continues today in several different areasof hu m an interest, not the least of which is m oral philosophy. M ac ln ty reargues that the method of doing moral philosophy is bound within tradi-tions: W e sub m it to th e given beliefs of one of the gr ea t thinke rs of the p ast inan effort to und ers tan d h im . Pa rt of th at effort is alway s to que stion or criticizethese ideas while offering a prop osa l or revision to m eet the criticism . In doin gso , M ac lnt yr e explains, the tradit ion of enquiry is carr ied forward:

T he sta nd ards of achiev em ent w ithin any craft are justified historically.They have emerged from the criticism of their predecessors and they arejustified because and insofar as they have remedied the defects and trans-cended the limitations of those predecessors as guides to excellent achieve-ment within that particular crM ac ln ty re argues tha t liberalism (tha t loose collection of social, political,economic, and ethical views that generally value the promotion of individual

freedom, toleration of individu al preferences, an d the rule of constitutiona llaw) now constitutes a tradition. In defining itself in its rejection of all tradi-tions as stultifying to free th ou gh t, it prom otes the valu e of tole ran ce, yet it hasproven to be intolerant of con trary views. As the Enligh tenm ent rejected w hatit saw as the igno ran ce a nd s upe rstition of the pas t, the philosop her felt himselfto be emancipated, standing alone in a new era of thought, where principlesuniversal to man could be entertained for the first time and be accepted or


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Rediscovery of the virtues 25rejected on the basis of their intrinsic value. The philosopher could standalone, outside all obscurantist traditions, and see clearly and distinctly tojud ge the true relations of things. No hin dran ce to thou ght was to be to lerated ;rather, the value was freedom of speech and discussion. Now because itbecame wedded to the political ideals of liberty and equality, it stood readyto solve all major impediments to human happiness. However, one by onethe universal principles once proposed have fallen to criticism until none hassurvived; attempts have been made, especially by Kant and Mill, to secure agrou nd for the establishme nt of a theory of m orality w ith which to adjudica teamong rival views, but they have all failed. Maclntyre says that "graduallyless and less importance has been attached to arriving at substantive conclu-sions and more and more to continuing the debate for its own sake"; and ourlegal system has evolved as an arena "in which conflict resolution takes placewithout invoking any overall theory of human good."

Maclntyre concludes that no unbiased neutral perspective is possible, andthe effort of modern philosophers to assume one in their search for universalfirst principles is what has led to the emergence of liberalism itself as a tradi-tion. The effort of the northern European Enlightenment to throw off theignorance and superstition of the past and proclaim the liberty, rationalityand self-interest of the individual set the conditions for what was believed tobe a fresh, unbiased perspective upon the real without the blinders of theheavy tradition s of the paste specially Scholasticism, w hich the new sciencewas not only proving to be wro ng, bu t to be dan gero us. T he principles discov-ered by H obb es in a social co ntra ct to escape the state of na tur e a nd establisha society, by Kant in the most universal structures of reason, and by Mill inthe psychological motivators of pain and pleasureare signs of the variedthou ght tha t ruled the day. T he social, political, and econom ic forces p rovidedthe backg roun d conditions for the emergen ce of liberty and equa lity as funda-mental ideals in moral philosophy as well. Liberalism grew from this asser-tion of individualism and intellectual freedom to pursue universal principleswhich would rule by consent of all. However, as is evident, no universal prin-ciples have been able to draw a consensus; each, in fact, begins with a dog-matic assumption. So the forces of liberalism have emerged as conditions tosustain the search for such principles, although they cannot be agreed on,gu ara nte ein g freedom of choice amo ng the possibilities to all, and prev entin gthe imposition of any on e. M ac ln ty re 's point is tha t such forces in fact not onlypromote this individualistic liberalism as a conception of the good butimpose it over any other, and so liberalism constitutes a tradition unto itself:"[L jib era l theory is best und erstood , not at all as an at tem pt to find a ration -ality independent of tradition, but as itself the articulation of an historicallydeveloped and developing set of social institutions and forms of activity, thatis, as the voice of a tra di tio n. " 3 6


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26 Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MaclntyreThe several ethical theories which exist today are incommensurable

because of the failure to establish a purely objective stance from which tojudge them, yet the political reality has continued to push for independenceof thought, holding up the virtue of tolerance expressed in the maxim that noone's conception of the good is to be forced on anyone else. Maclntyre laysbare the inconsistency in the idea of free thinking as an absolute value. Eachperson is free to pursue his own conception of happiness unless that conceptionincludes imposing his conception upon someone elsethat is not allowed.So, in fact, it becomes clear that no conception of the good life contrary to thatof liberalism itself is to be tolerated; to the degree that one proposes a particu-lar conception of the good life, it can be entertained in thought, but is never tobe implemented among others. Thus liberalism, despite its claim to be the onlyopen-minded venue of thought, is, in fact, close-minded after all. It can now beseen that liberalism does in fact constitute a tradition because it is aware ofitself and its direction, and because there are those who engage in confrontingthe current problems with a view to resolving them in the future; however, ithas reached the stage where no resolution is possible, predicated as it is on anillusionthe illusion of the detached eye looking from a purely objective posi-tion. As Maclntyre says: "[I]t is an illusion to suppose that there is some neu-tral standing ground, some locus for rationality as such, which can affordrational resources sufficient for enquiry independent of all traditions."Thus liberalism is a tradition in crisis.

Notes

1. Maclntyre, A., After Virtue [hereinafter AF], 8.2. Maclntyre, A., Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry [hereinafter 77?3. Maclntyre, AV, 12.4. Ibid., 39.5. Maclntyre, 772F, 59-60.6. Ibid., 79.7. Maclntyre, A., Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [hereinafter WJWR], 362.8. Maclntyre, TRV, 181.9. Graham, G., "Maclntyre on history and philosophy," 35.

10. Maclntyre, AV, 259.11. Ibid.,187.12. Ibid., 188-9.13. Ibid., 190-1 .14. Ibid., 191.15. Ibid., 205.16. Ibid., 206.17. Ibid., 219.


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Rediscovery of the virtues 2 718 . M acln tyre , A ., Dependent Rational Animals [hereinafter DRA], 2 4 - 5 .19. Ibid., 56.20. Ibid. , 64.21. Ibid. , 67.22. Ibid., 74.23 . Ibid. , 96.24. Du nn e, J., "E thics revised: flourishing as vuln erab le and d epe nd ent: a critical

notice of Alasdair M acln tyre 's Dependent Rational Animals," 348.25. Ibid. , 349.26. M acl n t y re , DRA, 108.27. Ibid. , 113.28. Ibid. , 121-2.29. Ibid. , 126-7.30. Ibid., 135.31. Gra ham , "M ac lnt yr e on history and phi losophy," 30.32. M acl n t y re , TRV, 60.33 . M acl n t y re , AV, 222.34. M acl n t y re , TRV, 64.35. Maclntyre, WJW R, 344.36. Ibid. , 345.37. Ibid. , 367.


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2Reconstruction of ethics

In this cha pter I attem pt to cons truct a limited bu t consistent picture of w ha t Itake to be Dewey's moral philosophy. Certainly other interpretations alongthese lines are possible, but I do not believe that many would disagree withthe essential elements tha t I lay out. I begin by draw ing u pon D ewey 's analysisof human conduct in terms of habits to develop a conception of the virtues inmoral experience as he describes it. I do not intend to place Dewey in thevirtue ethics camp (if one actually exists), but he does have much to sayabo ut the vir tues and the developm ent of cha racte r . I then examine Dewey'snotion of consummatory experience as growth in order to determine how itm ight function in the distinction of virtues and vices. Ag ain, Dew ey does notaccept traditional views of eudaimonia, but he does offer clarification about thegood in human experience. Finally, I discuss Dewey's critique of modernmoral philosophy and attempt to characterize his own view in contrast to it.

De we y's work is difficult to confine b ecause it is eno rm ou s, c om preh ens ive,and radical; nevertheless, it can provide valuable insight into a rich andpowerful ap pro ach to m orality using the virtues tha t is distinct from the dom i-nant deontological and consequentialist approaches. Dewey requires sensitiv-ity to the context of pa rtic ula r situations whe rein m oral problem s arise, andcalls for intelligent action in their resolution; in the consummation of theseactive forces he envisions the construction of good as a result. His way isdem anding bu t extraordinar i ly promising.

T he virtues in experienceDewey begins by accepting Darwinian evolutionary theory as the biologicalbackground for morality. This places him in sharp contrast to Aristotle, whoalso based his claims about the virtues and human flourishing on his biologicalund erstand ing of m an, b ut since species, according to him, were unch angin g,they provided an absolute foundation for his claims about morality. Darwin'stheory of evolution, how ever, challenges the im m utab ility of species, argu ingth at they evolve over time and so are constantly cha ngin g. In fact, D arw inia nevolu tionary th eory takes a m ore nom inalistic ap pro ac h to the whole questionof what a species is: It is a name for a general group of individuals. As timepasses and n atu ral con ditions chang e, new groups of individuals a da pt and


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Reconstruction of ethics 29emerge, leading to new classifications of species. Thus Dewey works from abackground of biological flux wherein species classification is imposed uponindividual life forms for ordering purposes. This view impacts all areas of hismoral philosophy.Nature, according to Dewey, includes the organism interacting with itsenvironment, which means that each affects and is affected by the other . Thisallows him to in terpret nature as constituted by events, or "his

Carden, Stephen - Virtue Ethics.dewey and Macintyre

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