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CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE INTRODUCTION

IEAGHG Summer School University of Texas at Austin

July 6 - 11 2014

Max Prins

Technology Manager – Shell Upstream International - Operated

2013 Field Trip – Tim Dixon in Action!

2013 - IEAGHG NOT SPARED FROM BUDGET CUTS...

On a more serious note:

With proper risk management

this could have been prevented.

DISCLAIMER STATEMENT

The companies in which Royal Dutch Shell plc directly or indirectly owns investments are separate entities. In this presentation the expressions “Shell”, “Group” and “Shell Group” are sometimes used for convenience where references are made to Group companies in general. Likewise the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Group companies in general or those who work for them. The expressions are also used where there is no purpose in identifying specific companies.

The information contained in this presentation contains forward-looking statements, that are subject to risk factors which may affect the outcome of the matters covered. None of Shell International B.V., any other Shell company and their respective officers, employees and agents represents the accuracy or completeness of the information set forth in this presentation and none of the foregoing shall be liable for any loss, cost, expense or damage (whether arising from negligence or otherwise) relating to the use of such information.

All copyright and other (intellectual property) rights in all text, images and other information contained in this presentation are the property of Shell International B.V. or other Shell companies. Permission should be sought from Shell International B.V. before any part of this presentation is reproduced, stored or transmitted by any means.

Max & Shell

Netherlands MSc Petroleum Engineering, final thesis at Shell R&D

UK Well Site Petroleum Engineer

Malaysia Petrophysicist

Business planning

Syria Head of Petrophysics

Malaysia Chief Petrophysicist Asia

Technology Coordinator

Qatar Subsurface Manager – LNG project

Technical Manager, VP Upstream

Netherlands GM CCS & Contaminated Gas

Technology Manager – Upstream International Operated

Why an IOC & International for me?

Cultural Exposure

Wealth of opportunities

Responsibility and challenge from day 1

Personal Development

Teamwork

Oh yes, and… nice weather, lots of travelling, Scuba diving, jungle trekking,

mountain walking, skiing, desert exploring, camping, moto-cross, watersports,

4WD jungle trips…….

You this week!

Living & Working Overseas

Not for recruitment purposes!

Living Overseas - Scotland

Living Overseas – Malaysia x2

Living Overseas - Syria

Living Overseas - Qatar

WHY IS SHELL PURSUING CCS?

ANY THOUGHTS?

SHELL’S ROLE

12

7/10/201

4

MEET OUR CUSTOMERS’ GROWING NEED FOR RELIABLE,

AFFORDABLE ENERGY

SHELL’S RESPONSE TO THE CO2 CHALLENGE

1. Natural Gas 2. Biofuels 3. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 4. Energy efficiency

Perdido, USA Biofuels, Brazil (Sugar cane for proposed Cosan joint venture)

SEPC, Singapore (part of the global energy efficiency programme)

Carbon Capture Research, Mongstad, Norway

THE CCS OPPORTUNITY

CCS could account for 19% of the CO2 reductions needed by 2050 Without CCS the cost of meeting CO2 emissions targets could be 70% higher Several applications:

GasPower & CCS Contaminated fields CCUS – EGR/EOR

“The next decade is a key “make or break” period for CCS; governments, industry and public stakeholders must act rapidly to demonstrate CCS at scale around the world in a variety of settings.” International Energy Agency

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CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE CCS & TECHNOLOGY

IEAGHG Summer School University of Texas at Austin

July 6 - 11 2014

Max Prins

Technology Manager – Shell Upstream International Operated

Aerial Surveillance & CCS

Industrial scale projects in construction

Planned industrial scale project (FEED)

TCM

Gorgon

Peterhead

Shell involvement in CCS Projects;

Boundary Dam

Industrial scale projects in operation

Quest

Involvement through Shell Cansolv Technology

MY PREVIOUS JOB: SUPPORT LARGE SCALE DEMO PROJECTS

Discontinued projects; - Barendrecht - Draugen - Zerogen - Longannet

2012

2015

2018

2014

2016

MY CURRENT JOB: MANAGE TECHNOLOGY From

Decomplexing

To

Deferment reduction

Technologies

Accommodation Solutions

3D mapping Advanced Seismic

Low Cost Drilling technologies

Drilling depleted zones

Aerial Inspection

Robotics Inspection CCS

Enhanced Recovery

MA

LA

YS

IA P

HIL

IPP

INE

S

NIGERIA GABON IRAQ

UN

ITE

D K

ING

DO

M IR

EL

AN

D NETHERLANDS NORWAY GERMANY

PETERHEAD CCS PROJECT – BUSSINESS CHALLENGE

Front End Engineering Design phase started:

To allow bidders to understand the existing plant layout & surroundings to develop their understanding of the scope.

Site is owned by Scottish Southern Energy so limited access.

Technology Solution:

A low cost, high quality Aerial Survey of the Peterhead Power Station & an Offshore Pipeline Route Survey out to the Goldeneye Platform

Footer

ACQUIRING QUALITY DATA TO ENABLE PETERHEAD CCS PROJECT DELIVERY

Integrated Planning Map

360 Panoramic Views

Drone Panoramas 360 Google street view

Integrated 3D Visualisation

UAV Survey5 cm resolution OrthoPhoto survey

TECHNOLOGY IMPACT

• Reduced HSE exposure with Unmanned Aerial Survey

• Less travel - Canadian contractors could “virtually” visit the site as opposed to flying to UK. Instant access to analyse the site remotely.

• Cost savings

• Speed – Aerial Data acquired in 5 days versus 5 weeks

• Use of 3D Visualization & Panoramas for External Stakeholder & Partner engagement:

• Proactively managing Non Technical Risk & Societal Performance.

• Allows Public to understand future developments.

Footer

THIS MORNING FROM UKCCSRC

Footer

Announcing Peterhead - SSE Secondment Opportunity

SSE is currently undertaking FEED (Front end engineering design) development of a Carbon Capture and Storage

project at Peterhead power station and is looking for a Placement Engineer to support the design development

activities during FEED.

SSE are working with Shell to develop the project with SSE’s scope being the supply of key utilities and services

to support the carbon capture plant (Flue gas, steam and cooling water etc).

The PhD Placement Engineer has the responsibility of supporting the Design Development Engineer and

Project Design Lead in managing the design development process, including project engineering activities

relating to review / selection of optimal design solutions, technology choices and interface requirements.

Further details, including eligibility criteria and an application form, are available here and

the closing date is close of business (5pm, UK time) on 1 August 2014.

If you have any queries, please don't hesitate to get in touch with us at network@ukccsrc.ac.uk.

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CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION

IEAGHG Summer School University of Texas at Austin

July 6 - 11 2014

Max Prins

Technology Manager – Shell Upstream International Operated

DEFINITIONS

23

Risk The probability that an event will occur. It encompasses a variety of measures of the probability of a generally unfavourable outcome. Risk = Function of the likelihood of occurrence and consequence

Uncertainty The condition in which reasonable knowledge regarding risk, benefits, or the future is not available.

Probability The relative possibility that an event will occur as expressed by the ratio of the number of actual occurrences to the total number of possible outcomes.

CCS PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Look at the Integrated System Capture volumes

Integrated Engineering Design – Capture, pipeline, storage

Capacity

Injectivity

Well count

Cost

Verify Storage Performance Validate, calibrate, update performance predictions

Adapt injection & monitoring to optimise performance

Ensure timely transfer of long-term liability

CO2 inventory reporting

Ensure Containment Detect early warning signs for any loss of containment

Activate safeguards to reduce containment risks to ALARP

Demonstrate effectiveness of any control measures deployed

Purpose of upfront thorough risk management Co-create and provide solid plan to management, partners and government/legislator

Deepen project understanding

Drive awareness and integrated approach across the CCS chain

RISK ANALYSIS - INTEGRATED, ITERATIVE PROCESS

Identify Risks

Implement Safeguards

Risk Evaluation

Decisions

Project

Design

Containment

Capacity

Injectivity

Conformance

Site Characterisation

Site Selection

MMV

Engineering Design

Economic evaluation

Infrastructure

Volumetrics

Storage Life

MMV Program

Stakeholder

Financial

Contracts & Procurement

HSSE

Legislation & Regulations

Quantitative

Qualitative

Semi-Quantitative

Uncertainty Analysis

RISK ANALYSIS: MUST CROSS THE FULL PROJECT LIFECYCLE

Pre-Injection

Injection Closure Post-Closure

Site Selection

Characterisation

& Baseline data

collection

Monitor to Verify

Site Performance

Monitor to Inform

Site Closure

Process

Minor Project

Monitoring

May Be

Needed

Illustration; Benson 2007 WRI Presentation

CCS SEQUESTRATION WORKFLOW (QUEST)

27

Evaluate Storage Feasibility

Select Storage Site

Evaluate Site-Specific Storage Risks

Characterise Geological Safeguards

Select Engineered Safeguards

Evaluate these Initial Safeguards

Storage Risks Suitable?

Evaluate Monitoring Performance

Monitoring Performance Acceptable?

Adapt Monitoring Plans

Evaluate Storage Performance

Storage Performance Acceptable?

Implement Control Measures

Performance Review

& Site Closure Site Characterisation

Establish Monitoring Requirements

Select Monitoring Plans

Establish Performance Targets

Identify Contingency Monitoring

Identify Control Measures

Evaluate these Additional Safeguards

Storage Risks Acceptable?

MMV Plan

yes no

Communication and Consultation

Company, Government, Regulator, Landowners ….

no yes

no yes

Site Closure

continue

continue

final yes

final yes

yes no

Risk Management

EASYRISK

ALARP Risks Uncertainty Management

TESLA Bowtie Analysis

STORAGE RISK & UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

Evidence

For

Uncertainty Evidence

Against

• Data Collection • Analysis • Understanding

• Workflow • Modelling • Engineering

• Prevention & Recovery • Barriers – Passive & Active • Hardware or Processes

HIERARCHY FOR RISK REDUCTION – BARRIER OPTIMISATION

29

Eliminate – Eliminate the hazard

Substitute - Use processes or methods with lower risk impact

Isolation / Separation – Segregate hazards and/or targets

Engineered Safeguards – PREVENTION Design to prevent an unwanted event

RECOVERY Design to mitigate harmful consequences

Organisational Controls – Training, Competency, Communication

Procedural Controls - Operating procedures, Work instructions, Permits

Maintenance regimes

Emergency Response procedures

Personal Protective Equipment Protect the person

PPE

Isolate

Engineer

Admin

Isolate/Separate

PPE

Engineer

Organisation

Procedures

MOST

EFFECTIVE

LEAST

EFFECTIVE

Eliminate Substitute

–

PPE

Isolate

Engineer

Admin

Isolate/Separate

PPE

Engineer

Organisation

Procedures

Eliminate Substitute

STORAGE SITE SELECTION – RISK ANALYSIS & MITIGATION

Site Specific

Risk Profile

Uncertainty Profile

Capacity, Injectivity, Containment, MMV

30

Evaluate Storage Feasibility

Select Storage Site

Evaluate Site-Specific Storage Risks

Characterise Geological Safeguards

Select Engineered Safeguards

Evaluate these Initial Safeguards

Storage Risks Suitable?

Site Characterisation

CO2 Storage Advantages Issues Field Examples

Increases HC recovery & economic gain Timing Weyburn

HC Seal Proven Recycled CO2 injection profile Salt Creek

Data & knowledge rich area Well count/integrity K12B

Common Practise in O&G industry CO2 remains mobile Denver unit

Production license period ended Timing In Saleh

HC Seal Proven Well count/integrity Peterhead/Goldeneye

Data & knowledge rich area Repressurisation pore collapse Miller

Monitoring wells use leagacy wells Storage Capacity LaBarge

Timing Data & knowledge availability Sleipner

Large Potential Storage Capacity Sustained Injectivity Snovit

Few wells acting as potential leak paths Plume development & Monitoring Frio

Enhanced Residual & Dissolution trapping Seal extent/integrity Otway

Saline Aquifers

EGR & EOR

Depleted Fields

SITE SELECTION: SCREENING CRITERIA

CO2 Storage Property or Attribute Criterion

Level No. Criterion Eliminate or Unfavourable Preferred or favourable

Cri

tica

l 1

Reservoir Seal Pairs, extensive and competent barrier to vertical flow

Poor discontinuous, faulted and/or breached

Intermediate and excellent, many pairs

(multi-layered system)

2

pressure regime Overpressure, pressure gradients greater than

14kPa/m

Pressure gradients less that 12 kPa/m

3

Monitoring potential Absent Present

4

Affetcing protected groundwater quality

Yes No

Esse

nti

al

5 Seismicity High Moderate or less

6 Faulting & fracturing Extensive Limited to moderate

7

Hydrogeology

Short flow systems or compaction flow. Saline

aquifers in communication with protected groundwater

acquifers

Intermediate and regional scale flow

De

sira

ble

8 Depth <750-800m > 800m

9 Located within fold belts yes No

10 Adverse diagenesis Significant Low to moderate

11

Geothermal regime Gradients >35 degC/km

and/or high surface temperature

Gradients <35 degC/km and low surface

temperature

12 Temperature <35 deg C >35 deg C

13 Pressure < 7.5 Mpa > 7.5 Mpa

14 Thickness < 20m > 20m 15 Porosity < 10% > 10% 16 Permeability < 20mD > 20mD 17 Caprock thickness < 10m > 10m 18 Well Density High Low to moderate

Ref: Dr S. Bachu et al

PPE

Isolate

Engineer

Admin

Isolate/Separate

PPE

Engineer

Organisation

Procedures

MOST

EFFECTIVE

LEAST

EFFECTIVE

EliminateSubstitute

Eliminate –Eliminate sources of f lammable gas release

Substitute –Substitute Compressor House for open arrangement

Separation –Separa te c ompressors from each o ther

Separa te c ompressors from rest of p lant

Separa te gas cloud from igni tion sources

Engineered Safeguards –PREVENTION Design f or proc ess con tainment integri ty

MITIGATION Gas detec tion, shutdown, blowdown

Isolation of igni tion sources

Forced ventilation

Organisational Controls –Operator training f or Compressor upset condi tions

Communication for emergency response

Procedural Controls -Operating procedures

Emergency response procedures

Personal Protective Equipment –N/ A – there is no PPE effec tive against explosion

Not

assessed in

quantitative

termsPPE

Isolate

Engineer

Admin

Isolate/Separate

PPE

Engineer

Organisation

Procedures

MOST

EFFECTIVE

LEAST

EFFECTIVE

EliminateSubstitute

Eliminate –Eliminate sources of f lammable gas release

Substitute –Substitute Compressor House for open arrangement

Separation –Separa te c ompressors from each o ther

Separa te c ompressors from rest of p lant

Separa te gas cloud from igni tion sources

Engineered Safeguards –PREVENTION Design f or proc ess con tainment integri ty

MITIGATION Gas detec tion, shutdown, blowdown

Isolation of igni tion sources

Forced ventilation

Organisational Controls –Operator training f or Compressor upset condi tions

Communication for emergency response

Procedural Controls -Operating procedures

Emergency response procedures

Personal Protective Equipment –N/ A – there is no PPE effec tive against explosion

Not

assessed in

quantitative

terms

Eliminate –Eliminate the hazard

Substitute -Use processes or methods with lower risk impact

Isolation / Separation –Segregate hazards and/or targets

Engineered Safeguards –PREVENTION Design to prevent an unwanted event

RECOVERY Design to mitigate harmful consequences

Organisational Controls –Training, Competency, Communication

Procedural Controls -Operating procedures, Work instructions, Permits

Maintenance regimes

Emergency Response procedures

Personal Protective EquipmentProtect the person

Selection criteria, scores and rational -> targets risk reduction

Eliminate or Isolation from key risks

Favourable ranking of site “A” (lowering risk) choice over “B” or “C”, even at

higher cost

Better ability to engineer and control safeguards (MMV and site operations)

Selection

Criteria

Selection Rationale Option

A B C

Containment Thickening seals updip ++ + -

Legacy wells ++ + -

Capacity BCS thickening E-NE +

Injectivity BCS reservoir quality ++ + -

MMV Better access and less

interference ++ + -

Pore Space

Access

Freehold –vs-crown ++ - - - -

Cost Most proximal site + +

Growth ++ -

SITE SELECTION: RISK ELIMINATION/ISOLATION

SUBSURFACE RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Subsurface Risks & Uncertainties can be condensed in 5 ranked risk groups

Risk Group Risk

Description

Key Uncertainty Addressed

Wells Loss of Containment

Through Wells

Ability to drill & cement gauge hole

DTS (for leak detection)

Integrity of Legacy Wells

3rd Well

3rd Well

Study in Progress

Containment LoC through the

Subsurface

Structural interpretation

Regional correlation of seals

Geomechanics

HRAM, 2D,3D, VSP

2D, logs

Core, logs

Injectivity Non-commercial

rates of injection

Permeability height (Kh)

Skin

Non-Darcy skin, relative permeability

Connected volume

CO2 injectivity

H2O inj. test

H2O inj. test

No, SCAL (core)

HRAM, 2D, 3D

CO2 inj. test

Capacity Low connected pore

volume

Compartmentalisation

Reservoir properties (h, N/G, phi &

cr)

HRAM, 3D, ext.H2O inj. test

3rd well, core

MMV Conformance risk Unexpected plume migration

Differentiation CO2 contamination

Detectability

HRAM, 2D, 3D, 3rd well

Water sampling .......

MDT, sampling, INSAR

ITERATIVE DESIGN PROCESS REDUCES RISKS

34

Risk-Based

Identify risks

Address uncertainty

Data collection & Analysis

Modelling

Verify geological safeguards

Design passive engineering safeguards

Understand remaining uncertainty

Identify Risks

Implement Safeguards

Risk Evaluation

Site Characterisation

Risks

reduced to

ALARP

Source: Adapted from CO2Qualstore Report (DNV, 2009)

SITE CHARACTERISATION: SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION OF PASSIVE SAFEGUARDS

Evidence based using collective expert judgement (Univ’s; DNV)

Informed by appraisal data and site characterization studies

Subject to independent expert review

May steer further studies/data gathering to reduce white space

Threat Safeguard Evidence For Evidence Against EF EA

T6 Induced stress re-

activates a fault

B6.1 Select site with no

natural seismicity

1. No recorded seismicity within AOR

2. Central Alberta is tectonically stable

3. No faults seen in overburden

4. Faults not critically stressed before injection

1. Past may not indicate future seismicity

0.6 0.2

B6.2 Select site away from

known faults

1. No faults through seals on 2D/3D seismic 1. Not all faults (offsets<20m) identified

2. Widespread basement faults; offsets<20m

3. Reactivated fault may grow upwards

0.3 0.3

B6.3 Select max injection

pressure using

geomechanics

1. Inject at >14MPa below BCS fracture pressure

2. Fault-normal stresses remain compressive

3. Compressor & pipeline rated to 14.5MPa

1. Injection induces shear stress on faults

0.6 0.2

B6.4 Lower Lotsberg -

Reseals fault

1. Salt creep re-seals fault after slippage

2. Expected salt thickness is 2-36 m

1. Pinches out beyond the SW edge of AOI

2. Salt creep may take years to re-seal fault0.2 0.4

B6.5 Upper Lotsberg -

Reseals fault

1. Salt creep re-seals fault after slippage

2. Expected salt thickness is 53-91 m

1. Salt creep may take years to re-seal fault0.3 0.3

SITE CHARACTERISATION - RISK ANALYSIS

1 in 104 per year

1 in 106 per year

Based on collective expert judgement

Informed by appraisal data and feasibility studies

Unacceptable

Tolerable

Broadly

Acceptable

1 in 104 per year

1 in 106 per year

Ris

k M

etr

ic

Number of Safeguards

Passive safeguards

Active safeguards

MMV – RISK ANALYSIS & MITIGATION

37

Establish Monitoring Requirements

Select Monitoring Plans

Establish Performance Targets

Identify Contingency Monitoring

Identify Control Measures

Evaluate these Additional Safeguards

Storage Risks Acceptable?

MMV Plan

yes no

Identify Risks

Implement Safeguards

Risk Evaluation

MMV Design

Risks

reduced to

ALARP

Risk-Based Verify geological & engineered

safeguards

Reduce containment risk to

ALARP

Site-Specific Tailor-made monitoring

Informed by appraisal data

Adaptive Respond to observed

performance

Contingency plans in place

Likelihood Consequence

MANAGING RISK – THE BOWTIE CONCEPT

THREATS

What barriers and controls are there to prevent the event happening, or

escalating?

UNWANTED EVENT

No escalation giving

least potential impact

BA

RR

IER

C

O

N

S

E

Q

U

E

N

C

E

BA

RR

IER

S

BA

RR

IER

S

BA

RR

IER

S

Full escalation giving

largest potential impact

Prevention (proactive) Control and Recovery (reactive)

reduce likelihood of harmful event limit and mitigate consequence, re-instate BowTie approach: Consider both threats and consequences as well as the control

measures taken to prevent the unwanted top event as well as ways to minimise the

consequences in the form of recovery measures

BOW-TIE - CCS STORAGE CONTAINMENT RISK EXAMPLE

Legend Passive safeguards; these are always present

Active safeguards, these are only present when a decision to

intervene is made triggered by monitoring information

Legend Passive safeguards; these are always present

Active safeguards, these are only present when a decision to

intervene is made triggered by monitoring information

Threat:

CO2 migration

along injector

Passive safeguards:

* Cement

* Completion design

Active safeguards:

* Monitoring

* Well repair/abandonment

Unwanted Event:

Loss of Containment

CO2 migrates out of

primary store

Passive safeguards:

Seals above store

chem reactions

Active safeguards:

* Monitoring

* Barriers to protect

groundwater

BOW-TIE - CCS STORAGE CONTAINMENT RISK EXAMPLE

Consequence

Ground water

impacted

MONITORING - HOW TO BUILD AN ACTIVE SAFEGUARD

Detector Decision

Logic Control

Response

A sensor capable of

detecting changes with

sufficient sensitivity and

reliability to provide an

early warning

Decision logic to

interpret the sensor data

and select the most

appropriate form of

intervention

A control response to

ensure continuing

containment or to control

any potential loss of

containment

Is it fast enough, precise enough and big enough?

Can we react to the changes detected?

MANY INDEPENDENT CONTROL RESPONSE OPTIONS EXIST

Preventative Controls Corrective Controls

Injection Controls Well Interventions

IC1 Re-distribute injection across existing wells RM1 Repair leaking well by re-plugging with cement

IC2 Drill new vertical or horizontal injectors RM2 Repair leaking injector by replacing completion

IC3 Extract reservoir fluids to reduce pressure RM3 Plug and abandon leaking wells that cannot be repaired

IC4 Stop injection Exposure Controls

Well Interventions RM4 Inject fluids to increase pressure above leak

WI1 Repair leaking well by re-plugging with cement RM5 Inject chemical sealant to block leak

W!2 Repair leaking injector by replacing completion RM6 Contain contaminated groundwater with hydraulic barriers

WI3 Plug and abandon leaking wells that cannot be repaired RM7 Replacement of potable water supplies

Remediation Measures

RM8 Pump and Treat

RM9 Air Sparging or Vapour Extraction

RM10 Multi-phase Extraction

RM11 Chemical Oxidation

RM12 Bioremediation

RM13 Electrokinetic Remediation

RM14 Phytoremediation

RM15 Monitored Natural Attenuation

RM16 Permeable Reactive Barriers

RM17 Treat acidified soils with alkaline supplements

SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION OF MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES

Technology Indicator Evidence For Evidence Against EF EA

6 Detect fault reactivationDHPT Down-hole pressure-

temperature gauge in a WPGS

observation well

Sustained Winnipegosis

pressure increase detected

by down hole pressure

gauge

1. Industry standard technology

2. Continuous monitoring

3. Early warning before brine or CO2 arrives

4. Sensitive to low flux rates (1 ppm)

5. Detection within 1-6 months

1. Gauge drift may mask indicator

2. Natural changes may mask indicator

3. WPGS pressure barriers may mask indicator

4. WPGS permeability may be insufficient

0.8 0.1

DHMS Down-hole microseismic

monitoring

A sustained cluster of

microseismic events

located above the

primary seal that

migrates upwards with

time

1. Industry standard technology

2. Continuous monitoring

3. Detect magnitude -3 events up to 600m away

4. Event location error c. 10-20 m

1. Not all fault slip creates microseismic events

2. Not all microseismic events are detectable

0.7 0.2

INSAR InSAR - Interferometric

Synthetic Aperture Radar

Short spatial wavelength

surface uplift anomaly

around a potential fault

1. Detects dilation of any shallow formation

2. Sensitive to uplifts >1mm/year

3. Monthly monitoring over entire AOR

1. Natural monitoring targets maybe limited

2. Cannot monitor through snow cover 0.6 0.2

SEIS3D Time-lapse surface 3D seismic Appearance of an

amplitude anomaly

above the primary seal

around a potential fault

1. Areal coverage over entire CO2 plume

2. Expect to image the CO2 plume

3. Lateral resolution c. 25 m

4. Vertical resolution c. 10 m

1. No sensitivity expected to brine migration

2. Acquisition noise may mask indicator

3. Only monitor every few years

4. Leak may go undetected for years

5. Unable to detect CO2 leaks <10-60 ktonnes

0.3 0.3

Task

Evidence-based using collective expert judgement

Informed by appraisal data and site characterization studies

Subject to independent expert review

May steer further studies/data gathering to reduce white space

CONCEPTUAL MMV PLAN

MMV CONTRIBUTES TO RISK ACCEPTANCE

Unacceptable

Tolerable

Broadly

Acceptable

1 in 104 per year

1 in 106 per year Ris

k M

etr

ic

Number of Safeguards

Passive safeguards

Active safeguards

Based on collective expert judgement

Informed by appraisal data and feasibility studies

PERFORMANCE & CLOSURE

46

Evaluate Monitoring Performance

Monitoring Performance Acceptable?

Adapt Monitoring Plans

Evaluate Storage Performance

Storage Performance Acceptable?

Implement Control Measures

Performance Review

& Site Closure

no yes

no yes

Site Closure

continue

continue

final yes

final yes

Closure Plan Outline

Intro

Project Overview

Storage Performance Tasks for Site

Closure

- CCS Targets from the Regulator

Storage Performance Data -Well inventory

-CO2 inventory

- Containment Performance

- Conformance Performance

Operating Plan Updates -SDP changes

-MMV changes

Proposed Closure Activities -Storage site reclamation

-Well decommissioning

Site Closure Certification -Post-closure monitoring

-Transfer of infrastructure

Reporting & Documentation

The Government or Regulators View Of

Remaining Risk

SUMMARY

Risk & Uncertainty needs to be addressed at every phase of the project

Different stakeholders will focus on different risk elements

Landowners – HSSE, Containment

Government, Regulator – HSSE, Containment, Capacity and long term liability

Proponent - HSSE, Containment, Capacity, Injectivity, Financial, Long Term liability

An Industrial Scale Integrated project needs to address them all

Site Selection – Reduction/elimination/isolation from risk

Site Characterisation – Reduction in uncertainty and remaining risk

MMV – Risk monitoring and mitigation

Site Closure – Risk Transfer

A FINAL THOUGHT

“Probability is not really about numbers; it

is about the structure of reasoning”

– Pearl, Shafer; 1983

“Perhaps the most important aspect is

not the probability number, but the

evidence and reasoning it

summarizes”

– North; 1995

“Bowties are excellent tools to manage

and communicate risks,

also for bus trips”

– Prins; 2014

48