2. Malis 2 The Algerian Civil War (1991-2002) provides a good
case study of political reforms by begging the question when might
a government offer concessions? Sparked by a multifaceted Islamists
movement vying for political inclusion and a military regime
unwilling to relinquish power, the dynamism of this case lends
itself to a theoretical framework that focuses on negotiation and
transition away from conflict. This is because any fruitful
argument for such a process must account for divergent interests
within the regime and opposition. Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe
Schmitter present a worthwhile framework that examines when and why
a government will offer concessions to an opposition group by
accounting for diverging interests within the regime and
opposition. This paper will do the following things. First, it will
briefly define key concepts necessary to understanding the
theoretical framework by ODonnell and Schmitter. Second, it will
use these concepts in relation to the Algerian case. Particularly,
this paper will divide the conflict into three periodsthe years
prior to the conflict (1989-1992), the period of extended violence
that make up most of the civil war (1992-Rome Accords-1999), and
the reconciliatory years (1999-2000s). Does the framework provided
stand up when viewed across these periods? How can the Algerian
case improve on the framework discussed? The virtue of ODonnell and
Schmitters conclusions will depend on how we answer these two
questions. First, Schmitter and ODonnell define transition as the
interval between one political regime and another (6). The Algerian
Civil War is an interesting case of regime transition because it
encompasses both a move towards pluralism and a reversion to
authoritarianism. However, according to ODonnell and Schmitter,
both moves can mostly be explained by domestic, internal factors.
They assert there is no transition whose beginnings is not the
consequencedirect or indirectof important divisions within the
authoritarian regime itself,
3. Malis 3 principally along the fluctuating cleavages between
hard-liners and soft-liners (19). Hard-liners want to hold on to
power at all cost. As ODonnell and Schmitter state, they believe
the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable
(16). Hardliners are willing to deploy various methods to maintain
power. Sometimes, they might exercise their military capacity and
impose severe repression towards regime opposition. Other times,
they might tactfully erect a faade behind which they can maintain
their state power (16). Either way they are unwilling to relinquish
power. Alternatively, soft-liners within the regime will have an
increasing awareness that they might have to implement some degree
of compromise in the near future to remain in power; often achieved
by some form of electoral legitimation (16). The overarching
concept involved in determining the makeup of individual actors
within the regimeeither as a hard-liner or as soft- lineris
uncertainty. The hardliners fear that the transition and political
democracy will result in the destruction of the status-quo and are
prepared to force at any cost a return to the good-old- times of
order, social peace, and respect for authority (24). Alternatively,
the soft-liners might see cooperation as a means to keep alive the
hope that they will eventually be able to control the process and
protect their interest (25). The differing positions on transition
and reform as illustrated by the distinction between hard-liners
and soft-liners lead us to the next concept, liberalization.
Defined as the process of redefining and extending rights,
liberalization often includes the freedom from punishment for
expression of collective dissent from government policy, freedom
from punishment for expression of the means of communication, and
freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens (7).
Benefactors of liberalization programs typically are the opposition
groups seeking concessions and the soft-liners within the regime
who, as mentioned earlier, are more open to
4. Malis 4 retaining power through pluralist reform. Another
outcome stemming from liberalization is that the opposition can
become fragmented into factions that are extremist or moderate in
their opinion towards the regime. The extremists are similar to the
hardliners of the regime in that they refuse to participate in
negotiations because they view compromise as harmful to their
interests. They might interpret reform as a false-promise,
disillusioned by past actions of the regime, or they can be simply
too angry at the actions committed by the regime that, even if
negotiations would be beneficial to their interests, they would
rather continue to fight. Alternatively, the moderates while still
frustrated with the regimesee negotiation as beneficial to
transition and are willing to make concessions at the bargaining
table in order to secure a quicker resolution. So when do incumbent
authoritarian regimes decide to negotiate with the opposition?
According to ODonnell and Schmitter, this process takes place when
soft-liners and moderates are able to come together and cooperate
towards ending the conflict. This infers that there is already a
split within the regime and the soft-liners are willing to begin
negotiation with moderates rather than continuing to fight.
Moreover, it infers that these soft-liners are prepared to depart
from the hardliners in the regime and sacrifice their safety in
order to negotiate with the opposition. Lastly, soft-liners must
also have enough power to be able to speak on behalf of the whole
government. Similarly, the moderates of the opposition must be
willing to lay down their arms and come to the negotiation table.
This infers that they, too, are prepared to depart from the
extremist opposition and sacrifice their safety to be able to speak
with the regime. However, this also means the moderates must appear
to the regime as strong enough to speak on behalf of the
opposition. Without the perception of force, the soft-liners risk
being labeled a support of the state and become open to attacks
from the extremists. They also risk losing credibility with regime
as a legitimate force of contention. The same risk applies for the
soft-liners in the regime.
5. Malis 5 Lastly, there has to be enough trust between both
parties that negotiations will not fall apart and that whatever
deal determined would be upheld. The delicate balance between force
and trust on both sides (regime and opposition) creates pronounced
uncertainty during a transition, particularly during instances of
negotiation. According to ODonnell and Schmitter, the regime tends
to have, at least at the beginning of the transition, a strong hand
in relation to the opposition. If the opposition refuses to play
according to the regimes rules, they will simply cancel the game
and return to the authoritarian status quo ante (24). Therefore,
the framework argues that the moderatespreferring to avoid the
worse outcomewill agree to play the game and accept less-than-ideal
reform. Conversely, extremists are more willing to risk a showdown
with the regime than to accepting such a self- limited outcome
(24). The conceptual framework illustrates the frailty of regime
transition. During conflict, rifts within both the regime and the
opposition create uncertainty and complicate the process of
negotiation. Much like a game of poker, each side is trying to
appear both powerful and trustworthy so that they can maximize the
potential outcome. With this in mind, how does the conceptual
framework hold up when placed in conjunction with the Algerian
Civil War? As we will see, the strength of the argument varies
depending on the period being discussed. Economic Crisis, Social
Cleavages, and Liberalization Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many
saw Algeria as a promising Middle Eastern country bound for
modernization and development. Gaining independence from France
through a bloody war from 1954 to 1962, Algeria was praised for
assembling a seemingly successful socialist economy with
development potential. Proof of its potential during the 1960s and
1970s was its leadership in the Group of 77 (G77) (Takeyh 62). The
system adopted after independence
6. Malis 6 was a mixture of the party, the administration, and
the army. However, the militarycontent to remain behind the
sceneshas always been the real power in the Algerian political
system. Perhaps the first display of its military authority was
when the army brought Ahmed Ben Bella to power as the first
president in 1962. Three years later, in a military coup led by
Minister of Defense Houari Boumedienne, President Ben Bella was
ousted from office. In 1979, the military played power broker again
following a disagreement over Boumedienne's successor, eventually
selecting FLN candidate Chadli Bendjedid as the countrys third
president. Noticeably, the FLN was simply a smokescreen to the
militarys interests. For much of the 1970s, the party-regime
controlled all aspects of legal political activity. Formal
political opposition was banned and those who did not conform to
the law were punished (Bouandel 4). However, the political
landscape of Algeria began to show signs of distress as political,
social, and cultural cleavages within Algerian society emerged in
the mid-1980s. The countrys reliance on the broader petroleum
market to fund its socialist programs came under threat as oil
prices collapsed (Takeyh 63). The following brief overview of the
oil collapse shows just how drastic the situation stood. In
1973-74, the real price of crude oil more than tripled. After
declining slightly in 1975-78, it doubled again in 1979-80. But the
1979-80 price increase was eroded between 1981 and 1985, as price
declined by nearly 40 percent. Price then collapsed in the first
half of 1986, falling by more than 50 percent (Gately 238).
Moreover, the states failure to diversify its markets integrated
with a growing educated-youth base. As Takeyh states, In any
developing society, by far the most difficult challenge for the
state is not managing the poor but controlling the aggrieved
intelligentsia whose aspirations remain unfulfilled (Takeyh 63).
Faced with marginalization and underemployment, many Algerians
sought Islam as an escape.
7. Malis 7 Reeling from falling oil and gas prices in 1988 and
a middle-class who were beginning to take to the street and protest
under the banner of Islam, the party-regime pursued economic and
political solutions in the form of liberalization. Many
social-welfare services and subsidies that were eating up state
resources were cut. The effect of this liberalization, however, was
an increase in public dissent. Used to receiving these services
under the socialist regimes of prior, many citizens disagreed with
the abolishment of these safety nets, especially since the
liberalization disproportionately hurt the working-class and the
poor. By October 1988, a large portion of the population could no
longer buy basic essential goods and bread riots spread throughout
Algeria. This opposition was met by fierce suppression from the
military (Takeyh 66). Faced with the dilemma concerning its
willingness to repress, the party-regime implemented further
political liberalization in hopes of subduing the opposition. On
November 3, 1988, the Algerian Constitution was amended to allow
parties other than the ruling FLN. For the first times in its
history, Algeria witnessed a relatively free political atmosphere
with a flourishing press, competitive political parties, and
intense debate on the direction of the state (Takeyh 66). Joining
this political debate was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)founded
on February 18, 1989who was dedicated to displacing the existing
ruling system. Its main constituents included the bereaved
urban-middle classthe small merchants, the civil servants, the
first-generation graduateswho had taken to the streets during the
previous riots (Takeyh 66). From first glance, Algeria appeared to
be transitioning towards a pluralist society through the apparent
acceptance of political reform by both the party-regime and the
emerging opposition groups. However, a closer examination at the
actions of the regime and rhetoric of the opposition during this
period of political liberalization reveal how precarious this
impression actually was.
8. Malis 8 Algeria: 19891992 During the primary period of
political liberalizationbetween 1989 and 1992various strategies
were employed by the Islamist opposition in order to gain public
support. In Tragedy of Errors Mohammed M. Hafez delineates four
periods where the Islamists strategies were distinct. From 1989-91
there was a period of accommodation and limited militancy, in May
and June 1991 there was escalating militancy, from June 1990 to
December 1991 there was a moderation and retreat from
confrontation, and then from 1992 onwards, there was violent
insurgency. Turning our focus to the first three periods (the
fourth will be detailed later in the paper), the strategies
implemented during each phases were a direct product of how the
regime used repression and liberalization. These two
conceptsrepression and liberalizationcan be understood as opposing
forces and a regime must be careful in how it exercises each.
Inappropriate use of either could spell disaster for the regime.
Repression could further embolden your opposition by fostering
anti-regime sentiments. Liberalization could give the opposition
the false hope of taking power through democratic processes.
Alternatively, when used effectively, both can result in the
regimes conservation of state power. Beginning with the first phase
(1989-1991), we can begin to see two groups emerging within the
Islamist movement. The FIS presented the public with two faces, one
moderate and the other radical. Abbasi al-Madani, the principle
leader of the FIS, was the moderate face and sought to reassure the
public of FISs good intentions and moderate message, particularly
when it came to issues of democracy and individual liberties (Hafez
310). Despite preferring a government based on al-shura (Islamist
tradition for consultation) to democracy, Madani saw no conflict
between Islam and democratic procedures stating, Pluralism is a
guarantee of the cultural wealth and diversity needed for
development. Democracy as we understand it means
9. Malis 9 pluralism, choice, and freedom (Takeyh 67). The FIS
deputy leader, Ali Benhadj, another longstanding Islamists
advocate, had more radical opinions and on several occasions had
denounced democracy, the state, and opponents of Islam in public
speeches. Further evidence can be seen in his statement regarding
majority rule where he asserts, The truth is not decided by the
majority even if the latter were Muslims but is represented by
adopting the divine truth, even if we alone do so (Hafez 311).
Replicating the stances of its two leaders, the actions of the FIS
supporters fluctuated between militancy and moderation. Two moments
capture the balancing act characteristic of the first phase: a
march in April 1990 and a demonstration against the Gulf War in
1991. On April 20, 1990, the FIS held a landmark demonstration that
brought together between six hundred and eight hundred thousand
people to march in silence (Hafez 311). The march was both an act
of defiance and an act of discipline. Scheduled on the same day as
a FLN march against the political use of mosques by Islamists, the
FIS march was seen as a move to embarrass the regime due to the
inability of the state to match its level of participation.
However, the silent demonstration also intended to combat the
charges of Islamist violence espoused by the state. By remaining
silent, the FIS showed its commitment for political inclusion
(Hafez 311). On January 18, 1991, the FIS and some other parties
organized a mass demonstration against the US-led coalition
preparing to liberate Kuwait. With nearly four hundred thousand
people participating in the demonstration, the rhetoric was
destined to be multidimensional. Radicals, led by Benhadj, did
express their militancy calling for jihad and demanded the state to
open training camps for volunteers to fight the new crusaders in
Iraq (Hafez 311). Even still, much of the actions of the FIS during
the first phase were not revolutionary in nature and, in general,
the demonstrations were peaceful. Although militancy did play a
role in obtaining
10. Malis 10 public support, the FIS also tried to garner
support through the extension of social services (Hafez 312). In
short, the FIS relied on multiple sources of support and was
neither moderate nor radical in full. However, in the following
months (May-June 1991), the FIS began to demonstrate more fervently
in the streets. The voice had shifted towards greater militancy
than before with the FIS now using protests, rallies, and public
prayers, as an open expression of dissent with the FLN regime. In
May 1991, militant rhetoric by the FIS had reached its height. The
FLN had implemented several electoral laws that directly impacted
the substantive power of the FIS in politics (one of which being
the ban on electoral propaganda in mosques). Clearly enacted to
benefit the ruling FLN, the FIS responded by calling for a general
and unlimited strike (Hafez 314). Signs reading Down with Chadli
adorned the streets. The strike extended into June, diffusing into
a series of rallies and occupations of public squares. These were
met by a series of clashes with the military and mass arrests and
several deaths and injuries came as an additional consequence. Both
Madani and Benhadj were charged with fomenting, organizing, and
conspiring against the state and the state was put under the status
of siege, making political demonstrations momentarily illegal
(Hafez 314). Frustrated by the FLNs attempts to diminish
substantive power, the FIS sought to bypass the increasingly
hostile state by relying on its mobilization capacity (Hafez 315).
Additionally, in the years prior (first phase), the state showed no
sign of repressing public demonstrations that were largely peaceful
in nature. This gave the impression that as long as the FIS did not
engage or advocate violence it was given a free pass. This was
clear in the two large demonstrations in 1990. As Hafez puts it,
Advocates of escalation within the FIS thought they could get away
with non-violent, extra-institutional militancy (Hafez 316).
11. Malis 11 Taken aback by the crackdown but wanting to remain
a legitimate actor, the FIS implemented several moderation measures
in response to the events of June. First, in July 1991, prominent
members met in Batna, Algeria for a Loyalty conference. The
question of where to go from here was floated around and a loose
consensus was formed. The FIS wanted to continue the path towards
electoral legitimacy. Additional moderation measures included the
suspension of Said Mekhloufi and Qameredin Kharban, two radical
advocates, from the party. The freeze on their membership was meant
to show the regime that the FIS would not tolerate militancy and
violence. Abdelkader Hachani, the provisional leader of the FIS,
also moderated the voice of the party by waiting to organize
rallies until the state had made it legal to so (Hafez 316). Their
strategy appeared to have worked enough because in December 1991,
the first round of parliamentary elections began. After examining
the years prior to the 1991 elections, it becomes clear that the
degree of militancy in the FIS varied across time and can be partly
explained by the degree of system accessibility and the nature of
state repression. As ODonnell & Schmitter assert, movement
along these lines [liberalization], however, sporadic and uneven,
constitutes an important departure from the usual practice of
authoritarian regimes (7). The liberalization of the late 1980s and
the lack of repression by the state during the first phase, gave
the FIS the perception of political freedom. As Adam Przeworski
states, such movements have the effect of lowering the costsreal
and anticipatedof individual expression and collective action (7).
However, since the state allowed for the FIS to mobilize with very
little reprisalas seen by the April 1990 demonstration and the Gulf
War protestthere was no deterrent for the FIS to moderate the
radical tone. Had the state cracked down and selectively punished
militant rhetoric, the FIS would have been forced to take a stance
on where it stood on the spectrum of militancy.
12. Malis 12 Sticking with our poker metaphor from earlier, the
FIS had no reason to fold its hand because the regime was checking
every move. Testing the waters, the FIS slow-played and
accommodated the regime. Had the regime pressed the action earlier
on, it is likely the FIS would have settled and accepted a
less-than ideal outcome. But as time passed, the FIS decided to
increase the pot and place larger and larger bets; slowing
escalating its militancy. It felt confident doing so because it
perceived the state as either having a weak hand (willing to
compromise/liberalize) or unwilling to go all-in (full out
repression) and risk losing the game. However, seeing how large the
pot had become, the regime decided it needed to crack down on the
extra-institutional activities and militant rhetoric. Sticking with
the terminology, the crackdown was a late raise by the
regimecalling the FIS bet. Not only did they arrest thousands of
individuals, including Madani and Benhadj, the military shut down
the FISs newspapers. The message was sent loud and clear, the state
would only tolerate those who maintain their opposition off the
streets (318). The FISs desire for political inclusion and its
optimism concerning the upcoming elections links closely to our
theoretical framework. According to ODonnell & Schmitter,
regime opponents, provided they believe they have some chance of
gaining representation, have strong incentives to cooperate with
the regimes soft- liners, if only to guarantee that elections will
be held (58). Algeria: 1992Rome Accords This was indeed the
position the FIS took after the military cracked down. Fearful that
the regime would end the game but still hopeful that it could still
win the hand, the FIS moderated its voice and opted for
accommodation from July 1991 to January 1992; long enough for the
parliamentary elections to begin. Unfortunately, unbeknownst to the
FIS, this game of poker was on the verge of a sudden halt. On
December 21, 1991, the FIS participated in the
13. Malis 13 national parliamentary elections winning 188 out
of 430 national assembly seats in the first round. The military,
foreseeing another electoral defeat for the FLN, performed a coup
dtat throwing President Benjedid from office and declaring a state
of emergency. The FIS leadership initially sought a political
solution to the crisis and rallied the FLN and Socialists Forces
Front (FSS) to challenge the constitutionality of the coup (Hafez
318). Shortly after the coup, the military established the High
State Committee (HCE) and banned the FIS, sending its leaders
Madani and Benhadj to twelve years in prison. In addition, the
military opened up five internment camps in the middle of the
Sahara desert. There more than 10,000 known or suspected FIS
supporters were deported over the next half-year. Even after all of
this, there were still FIS leaders willing to seek a political
solution based on a return to elections (320). For others, the coup
signaled the end of the states legitimacy of power and over the
next few years insurgents organized into numerous armed groupsthe
most prominent being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic
Salvation Army (AIS) (Hafez 319). The GIA was constituted by the
most radical elements and included other extremist actors that had
opted to stay outside the FIS apparatus from 1989 to 1991 due to
their admonishment of democracy and the electoral process (Hafez
319). The AIS materialized a little later, officially formed in
July 1994, and represented the armed wing of the FIS. Despite them
both being radical Islamist groups, differences in ideology
developed. The AIS believed that violence be used as a last resort
and that violence would not resolve the Algerian crisis (Takeyh
70). Rather, its use of violence was directed at pressuring the
military regime to release the FIS leaders, rehabilitate the FIS as
a legitimate political party, and reinstitute the electoral
process. Moreover, the AISs willingness to negotiate stood in stark
contrast to that of the GIAs policy which declared no dialogue, no
cease-fire, no reconciliation, and no security and guarantee
with
14. Malis 14 the apostate regime (319). As fighting went on, a
popular saying amongst GIA insurgents was Power is within the range
of our Kalashnikovs (Takeyh 70). As ODonnell & Schmitter
projected, splits in both the regime and the opposition have
emerged. The military, no longer seeing the FLN party as a viable
cover-up for power, forces Bendjedid from office and establishes
its own institutions to govern. Thus, the distinction between
hard-liners and soft-liners becomes revealed. On the other side,
the diverging tones of the FIS during the years leading up to the
election break into distinctly separate groups. The FIS and other
moderate groups are contrasted by newly formed extremists groups,
such as the AIS and GIA. The Rome Accords Roughly two years into
the conflict, a potential opportunity to end the violence
materialized. In November 1994, the Sant'Egidio Community, a peace
group affiliated with the Vatican, arranged a meeting of
representatives from the FIS, the FLN, and the other opposition
parties to draft a plan to end the war. Known as the Rome Accords,
due to the location of the meeting, it had managed to bring over 80
percent of the vote in 1991 parliamentary election into discussion
about a possible peace solution. Imprisoned FIS leaders Madani and
Benhadj endorsed the meeting from their cells with Benhadj
declaring if the Rome Accords led to a dialogue with the
government, he would "go himself into the mountains" to get the
mujahedeen (GIA) to accept the terms (Viorst 96). To this point
there had not been any clear sign of the Islamic movements
readiness to compromise. In January 1995, all the parties at the
table signed the Rome Accords. Both secularists and Islamists made
significant compromises during the negotiation. Secular parties
joined the FIS in affirming the enlightened Islamic principles set
forth in the
15. Malis 15 1954 declaration that had launched Algerias war of
liberation (Viorst 96). On the other side, the FIS also made
significant concessions, agreeing to waive reinstatement of the
results of the 1991 election, along with its claim to be Algerias
legitimate government (Viorst 96). Moreover, all parties dismissed
dictatorship in any form and guaranteed fundamental individual and
collective liberties such as race, sex, and religion (Takeyh 70).
On paper, the Rome Accords represented an unprecedented openness of
dialogue between conflicting groups. Nevertheless, the dialogue
between political leadership did not translate into an agreement
between armed factions; the reason being both the GIA and the
military regime refused to attend the negotiations. The Rome
Accords reveal an important condition to negotiations, the
necessity of power. Without power, negotiations are merely symbolic
gestures that produce little in terms of actual conflict
resolution. As our framework asserts, negotiation and compromise is
possible when soft- liners of the regime can talk with moderates of
the opposition from a position of power. Unfortunately, the Rome
Accords could not produce a peaceful resolution to the crisis
because, despite representing over 80 percent of the voters in
1991, the groups that possessed substantive powerthe military and
the GIAwere not present. The collapse of preliminary negotiations,
according to our framework, seemed to mean that both sides were
subject to the veto of their hard-liners. Simply, the dialoguiste
on both sides could not persuade the radicateurs to put down their
arms. While our framework does acknowledge the fickleness of
negotiations through its emphasis on power and trust between
soft-liners and moderates, some scholars, such as Daniel Brumberg,
have argued that the bargaining in transitions literature cannot
really apply to cases where religious, rather than economic, actors
are involved. This is because the demands of
16. Malis 16 religious actors often cannot be fulfilled with
negotiated compromise. He begins by reiterating the complexity of
the political environment and how many factors contribute to the
stability of an autocratic regime. He states, In the Arab world, a
set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social,
and geostrategic factors has created an adaptable ecology of
repression, control, and partial openness (Brumberg The Trap of
Liberalized Autocracy 57). In other words, the regime can
manipulate a multitude of factors to remain in power and these
factors make negotiating with an autocratic regime difficult for
any opposition, not just an Islamist opposition. However, the
following assessment by Brumberg captures precisely the
difficulties moderate Islamist activists face during negotiation
and is the root of his argument. The problem with the Islamic
modernists' arguments is that their project hinges on a complex and
often opaque interpretive schema difficult for lay people to grasp.
More crucially, many find it difficult to avoid concluding that the
core values that modernists attribute to Islam come from Western
political thought, and the validity of this claim is far less
politically relevant than the perception that Islamic modernism is
a Western project dressed in a thin Islamic garb. Why sweat through
a complicated series of interpretations to conclude that Islam
demands, for example, equal rights for women or equality of
citizenship for Muslims and non-Muslims when it is far easier and
perhaps more honest to embrace Western ideas? Islamic
fundamentalists insist that a literalist reading of the Koran is
the only defense against a slippery slope that will eviscerate
Islamic laws of whatever distinct message God meant them to have.
The efforts of Islamic modernists to advance an Islamic Reformation
have been especially susceptible to such fundamentalist critiques
(Brumberg Islam Is Not the Solution 100) Essentially, a policy of
Islamic Reformation suffers because it greatly underestimates the
political, social, and ideological obstacles required to
disseminate a liberal Islamic ethos (Brumberg Islam Is Not the
Solution (or the Problem 98). Moreover, both secularist autocrats
and fundamentalist Islamists can invoke the above critique at the
bargaining table; making it exceptionally difficult for the
moderate Islamists message to be received and believed. Brumbergs
argument sheds light on the Rome Accords and why it failed. Even
with overwhelming representationroughly 80 percentthe deal was not
agreed upon by the
17. Malis 17 military or the extremist GIA. The military might
have been skeptical of the moderate message, seeing it as a faade
for more fundamentalist interests, and as such, chose not to be
involved in the talks. The GIA could also be dissatisfied with the
moderate message, believing that it is either a watered-down
interpretation of Islam or a veiled form of Western democracy.
Appropriately, Brumbergs argument raises concern for the likelihood
of negotiated compromise when religious interests are involved. For
the Algerian case, does the prospect for negotiated compromise
remain bleak? In order to answer this question, our attention must
be directed towards the latter half of the civil war. The Wake of
the Rome Accords (19961999) The latter half of the civil war
consisted of two parts. The first, from 1996 to 1999, includes the
bloodiest period of the civil war. However, emerging from violence
is also a cease- fore agreement in 1997. To start with, the
characteristics of the violence committed gives us insight into the
power of the actors involved. According to figures reported by
various news sources, there were a total of ninety-one massacres
between August 1996 and January 1999. The number of victims ranged
between 4 and 375 but over half (48) were of forty or fewer deaths
(Kalyvas 249 Table 1). The majority of the massacres took place in
an area roughly 150km2 south of Algiers dubbed the triangle of
death (Kalyvas 247). One might predict that the majority of the
violence was committed by the regime towards the Islamist
opposition and its supporters. However, the opposite was the case.
There is substantial evidence that many among the deadliest
massacres have been perpetrated by the Islamists guerillas, in
particular the GIA (Kalyvas 253). Proof of this can be extrapolated
from the selectivity of the killings. Kalyvas also asserts that
most massacres in Algeria were not random (Kalyvas 253). Rather,
attackers targeted specific neighborhoods and, in particular,
three
18. Malis 18 groups of individuals: local opponents (members of
the security forces, informers, or state- sympathizers), people
supporting competing guerilla organizations (such as the AIS), and
former sympathizers who either switched sides, refused to help the
rebels, or were about to do so (Kaylvas 254). Indeed, the
most-targeted group was these former guerilla sympathizers. In just
three months, between July 12 and October 12, 1997, 1690 people
reportedly lost their lives in these massacres; nearly 48% of the
total massacre victims (August 1996 to January 1999) (Kalyvas 256).
The following quote by Antar Zouabri, the GIA leader from
1996-2000, illustrates the groups position on violence throughout
the conflict: In our war, there is no neutrality except for those
who are with us, all others are renegades (Takeyh 70). While on the
one hand you have an increase in violence, in the form of civilian
massacres predominately committed by the GIA, you also have, in
1997, a move towards reconciliation through a cease-fire agreement
between the military and the AIS (signed on September 21st ). The
ceasefire was made possible through several approaches applied by
the AIS. First, the AIS sought to distinguish itself from the FIS,
whose political leadership had been determined ineffective by the
failure of the Rome Accords, and the GIA, who were far too
extremist to participate in an agreement. To do so, the AIS adopted
a bottom-up approach that focused on mid-level military officials
and not the political leadership (Ashour 3). By contacting
mid-level army officials of the National Popular Army, many of
which who had blood ties with commanders of the AIS, they were able
to influence the soldiers that were actually doing the fighting.
Additionally, interactions between the AIS and other moderate
Islamists and non- Islamists factions were important in influencing
the cease-fire (Ashour 8). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its
renouncement of violence against the Egyptian regime in the 1970s
greatly influenced the AIS leadership position on conflict
resolution (Ashour 8). As a result,
19. Malis 19 there has been an increasing trend within Islamist
groups towards pro-democratic institutions and policies that focus
on conjoining family law, human rights, and economic equity with a
traditional focus on cultural views (Takeyh 70). Moreover,
de-radicalization manifested itself in the rhetoric championed by
Islamist parties. In 1997, the MSP changed its slogan from Islam is
the Solution to Peace is the Solution (Boubekeur 2). The cease-fire
represents a clear shift in power away from the extremists towards
the moderates. Part of the reason for this shift can be seen by the
characteristics of the violence. The increasingly violent tactics
of the GIA that were often aimed at innocent civilians Islamist
supporters show that the extremists were losing power. Defections
from the GIA and other armed groups were common. This is
illustrated by the extremist oppositions attempt to retain control
through coercion in the form of punitive expeditions that targeted
believed sympathizers. Moreover, the GIAs use of violence
inevitably lost it support and essentially confined them to the
fringe of political discourse whereas moderate Islamist parties
were able to gradually reenter the political sphere. From this, the
AIS were able to negotiate with the military to form a cease- fire
agreement that began the reconciliation process. Reconciliation
(19992005) While the de-radicalization process began in 1997 with
the cease-fire agreement, the real effort took place in the late
1990s and early 2000s. President Abdelaziz Bouteflikawho took
office in 1999was able to successfully appease most of the Islamist
parties by effectively dealing with the issues of political
prisoners, social reintegration, the political rights of the de-
radicalized groups, and the role of the military in politics
(Ashour 9). Additionally, an amnesty agreement between the
government and the AIS, which officially declared the groups
20. Malis 20 dissolution, tens of thousands of political
prisoners were released and official apology was given to thousands
of former FIS and AIS members (Ashour 9). The issues of social
integration, political rights, and the role of the military are
more difficult to immediately resolve. Elections continued to be an
area of contention between the regime and Islamist parties, when in
2007, the FIS were closed from the participating in the
parliamentary election. Additionally, a number of former AIS
leaders seeking office, have been targeted in assassination
attempts from GIA memberseither being killed or maimed in the
process (Ashour 10). Lastly, the future role of the military in
Algeria was a contentious issue because many of the military
officials involved in the cancellation of the 1991 elections were
among the groups who had who negotiated and supported the 1997
ceasefire and de- radicalization process. Tactfully, Bouteflika
negotiated the issue by professionalizing the military. This
involved the removal of over 800 senior military officials, all of
whom were given comfortable pensions (Ashour 10). On September 29,
2005, the Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation is approved
in a national referendum, garnering 97 percent of the vote. The
Charter, which came into force on February 2006, provided for
compensation for the victims of the civil war. Additionally, it
granted amnesty for the members of armed groups who turned
themselves in to authorities before the end of August 2006
(Algeria). Furthermore, it prohibits those who were involved in
"mass killings, rape or attempts to set off explosives in public
places" from receiving amnesty (Algeria). The Future of Islamism in
Algeria Conservative casualty estimates place the number dead or
missing at approximately one- hundred thousand by the end of
conflict in February 2001. Nevertheless, ODonnell &
Schmitter
21. Malis 21 define the end of a transition as when abnormality
is no longer the central feature of political life, that is, when
actors have settled on and obey a set of more or less explicit
rules defining the channels they may use to gain access to
governing roles, the means they legitimately employ in their
conflicts with each other, the procedures they should apply in
taking decisions, and the criteria they may use to exclude others
from the game (65). Thus, the cease-fire arrangement and the
reconciliation process that culminated in the National Peace
Charter on Reconciliation can be interpreted as a gradual move
towards certainty where the rules of the game become established
and made explicit. This was made explicit by the Charter in a
couple of ways. For one, the Charter provide concessions to those
who chose to moderate and subsequent elections illustrate the some
political openness has been established. In addition, the Charter
secured that the regime won on moral grounds. As a report by
Amnesty International in 2006 stated, the Charter denies that the
security forces and state-armed militias have been responsible for
serious crimes, thus conferring systematic impunity. This denial
stands in stark contrast to a body of evidence which points to
their responsibility for thousands of cases of torture,
extrajudicial executions and "disappearances", some of which
constitute crimes against humanity (Algeria). Regardless of the
soundness of the Charter in 2006, recent surveys seem to suggest
that the future is bright for both sides. While only one-third of
the respondents believed that it would be better for the country if
people with strong religious beliefs held public office (Tessler
12), moderate Islamists groups, such as the Algerian Muslim
Brotherhood (HAMS, or MSP), do exist in civil society. Accordingly,
encouragement by the international community would be beneficial
for future relations between the regime and moderate Islamists,
which in turn, could assist in further political legitimacy for
Islamism.
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