PREFACETO THE

FIRSTENGLISHEDITION

Cancun, Fantasy of Bankers, was originallya series of journalistic reports written at theend of 1984. In its first version the text waspublished in unomásuno(then Mexico'sleading intellectual national daily newspaper)and Novedades de Quintana Roo at thebeginning of 1985. The enlarged manuscriptappeared in book form that August this wasthe first edition and, a few weekslaterContenido Magazine published acondensation. A second edition waspublished two years later. Five years later,the story is still fascinating. But the cast hasgone through many changes. There's a newgovernment, resignations abound amongfunctionaries, pioneers have changedresidences and even abandoned this world.The warning is inevitable: all citations oftime today, now, at the moment date backat least five years.

cancun,fantasyofbankers

DURING THE MIDDLE OF THEsix-year term of President

Diaz Ordaz, a group of bankers conceived an absurd project: found atourism city in dense jungle with the basic idea of capturing foreign ex-change.

The plan appeared to have neither head nor feet. As the site of theirUtopia, the bankers had chosen the Territory of Quintana Roo,geographically and logistically the furthest and most forbidding area inthe nation, 2,000 kilometers from Mexico City and without a single inter-national airport. The beaches selected were located 200 kilometersfrom the nearest city, barely accessible by jeep paths snaking throughswamps.

Any reasonable observer could have confronted this group with ajudicious question or two. Where, for example, were the half a millionpeople needed to colonize the city going to come from in the little thatremained of this century? That was the figure envisioned in the prelimi-nary outline, but the document lacked a master colonization plan. Thecolonists would have to come voluntarily, arriving in the zone spon-taneously.

t h e document said that the area would have outstanding hotelcapacity, but to date not one investor had shown the least interest in thematter. In reality, not even they knew. The rows of fully- outfitted hotels,the intense traffic of an international airport, the reservations systemconnected to the world, the creation of thousands of jobs, and the cap-ture of mountains of foreign exchange existed only in the imaginationsof the plan's creators.

Moreover, there was one detail that could justify any form of skep-ticism. The authors of the plan were career bankers. Not one had anyexperience whatsoever in tourism. As if this were not enough, theopinions of the official organizations connected with tourism theDepartment of Tourism and the National Tourism Council not merelyhad not been solicited, but also had been ignored with complete disdain.By all means, the scheme did not include among any of its ingredients asingle dot of common sense.

But the bankers showed extraordinary tenacity. They convinced theDirector of the Bank of Mexico, the Secretary of the Treasury, and, final-ly, the President of the Republic. The project was set in motion. The suc-ceeding president Echeverria did not like the idea, and froze itsfunding upon taking office. Part of his cabinet was openly opposed tothe plan, while another part intended to boycott it. Utopia appeared to becondemned to die of starvation.

The bankers insisted time after time, always with the same refrain.They went out and gathered allies, recruiting partisans. To make a longstory short, that very same doubting President Echeverria wound up notmerely convinced but also irretrievably enchanted by the project. Withthe following administrations there were no problems because both suc-ceeding presidents participated as functionaries at the beginning ofdevelopment.

Today, the bankers' plan is the third most populous city on theYucatan Peninsula, second in economic capacity. It will soon pass Cam-peche in population and, by the beginning of the next century, equalMerida in both areas. For now, the face of the Mexican Caribbean hasbeen radically changed and the tourism currents which flow to andthrough the region have been altered profoundly.

It's no longer Utopian. In little more than a decade, the number ofvisitors to the Cancun area has multiplied by a factor of twenty and be-come a determining factor in the country's tourism balance. At the sametime, it has become an important diplomatic arena. During the past fewyears, more than fifty heads of state have come to visit, surpassingMexico City in this regard.

Cancun, in brief. 'A community that arose from nothing, that grew in the minds of the ur-

banologists, that was constructed within the area of the drawing boards,that was seen populated by virtue of demographic calculations and be-came a multi-million dollar business...before the cornerstone of a singlehouse was laid.

Cancun is...Kemil Rizk, Director of Fonatur: "It's an excellent business for the na-

tion. It's the destination that attracts the most foreign visitors afterAcapulco, and, consequently, the most foreign exchange. It's also agood business for Fonatur, as it enables us to obtain resources that canbe directed to other developments.

Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, Governor of Quintana Roo: "It's the most im-portant city in the state. It's difficult to imagine what the state profilewould be if we hadn't developed this project. Cancun represents 66 percent of the state gross product and 67 per cent of its tax collections. Tome, it's one of the Revolution's greatest successes."

Sigfrido Paz Paredes, Director of Aeromexico: "Cancun was an ex-traordinary school, a seedbed of the first order. The present Secretary ofTourism, the three Sub-Secretaries, the Chief of Staff, the Director of

Fonatur, and I myself were all involved in the development. It is the mostimportant tourism accomplishment in the country's history.

Joaquin Gonzalez Castro, Mayor of Cancun: "It's a mosaic and alaboratory. There are no natives here. We're all immigrants. This hascreated a highly energetic society, formed by courageous men andwomen, whom I would call 'spiritual nomads'. Cancun is a promisedland."

Antonio Enrfquez Savignac, Secretary of Tourism: "Cancun is aMexican development, conceived, planned, constructed and ad-ministered by Mexicans. This is important because it is the world's firsttourism development developed from a base of zero. After Cancun,many countries have wanted to follow the route drawn by Mexico. Butno other project has had the success of ours. Cancun is a Mexican tri-umph."

And this is the story of Cancun.

thehuntforforeignexchange

A;MONG HIS ACQUAINTANCES,Ernesto Fernandez Hur-

tado is known as a serious man. Discreet of manner, sparing of speech,with a demeanor at once courteous yet ceremonial, his is the perfectpicture of the banker, that constant and conscious search for serenityand tranquillity.

The portrait fits the person. Fernandez Hurtado has been a traditionalbanker all his life. A career economist, he spent the first 33 years of hisprofessional life in the Bank of Mexico, scaling the entire pyramid until hearrived at the position of Director General. Possessing a post-graduatedegree from Harvard, he had ample opportunity to demonstrateacademic solidity during the happy years of the Mexican miracle.

Until 1966, Fernandez Hurtado occupied the sub-directorship of theBank of Mexico, whose hierarchy was headed by Rodrigo Gomez, oneof the principal ideologists of moderate growth. Above both, in theSecretary of the Treasury, was no one less than Antonio Ortiz Mena, thefather of stable development. They were a fine team of prudent bankers,trying to conduct the country through an economic breakthrough withfew surprises and less upsets. Paradoxically, it would be this group ofconservatives who promoted the carrying out of a project as audaciousas Cancun.

11

ErnestoFernandezHurtado,chairman

of Bancomer

functioned with relative success and domestic production was growingat a rate of six per cent annually, while population increase scarcelyreached 3.5. It was true that the proposed strategy would permit con-centration of wealth in few hands, but from the bankers point of view, thepriority was how to create wealth, not how to distribute it.

Moreover, Ortiz Mena and his people were convinced that it was notpossible to grow more rapidly. Given the characteristics of the existingindustrial plant, any heating up would have as inevitable consequencean explosive increase in imports. In order to pay for them, it would benecessary to seek foreign loans, thus creating a vicious circle leading toan unsustainable financial imbalance for the stability of the peso. In

Cruises represent aflourishing business inthe tourism sector and

have been veryfashionable since the

1960s. Many shippinglines include Mexicanports on their routes,predominantly those

along what is known asthe Mexican Riviera,

that is, the Pacific coast.In the Caribbean they

make an averagestopover of 24 hours atCancún and Cozumel

The economic potentialof cruise vacations

promises to continue togrow rapidly over the

next few decades.

other words, the collapse of fixed exchange rates and devaluation.As a matter of fact, under normal conditions it was quite a problem

merely to maintain an exchange rate of 12.5 pesos to the dollar. Importsalways exceeded exports and the deficit had to be covered with foreigncredit. As a result, the capture of foreign exchange was one of the Bankof Mexico's constant worries and one of Fernandez Hurtado's principalareas of responsibility. Two decades later, at the head of the country'smost important commercial bank, Fernandez Hurtado held firm opinionsabout that: "The Achilles' heel of this country's economy was, is and willcontinue to be its inability to capture sufficient foreign exchange. Therelies the origin of the better part of our ills."

According to classic liberal theory, the only way to obtain hard curren-cy was to succeed at exporting more than importing. On that premise,government institutions had adopted a defensive policy, import substitu-tion, which basically consisted in protecting local capital that decided toproduce goods normally coming from the outside.

The results were discouraging decades of development of over-protected and dependent industry, a true parasite in a captive marketthat had to support the combined strategies of high prices and lowquality. Both factors impeded participation in international markets insuch a way that the ancient longing to obtain foreign exchange in thismanner had gone up in smoke, and by the middle of the sixties, thestrategy had suffered a considerable loss of prestige. Fernandez Hur-tado said, "Applied fully, import substitution is a policy that wore itselfout. Thus would have happened to us at any rate."

It was necessary to seek new alternatives. There was a very promis-ing possibility, a post-World War II activity that had reached un-suspected levels massive tourism. Some undeveloped countries,principally Spain, had practically resolved their foreign exchangeproblems this way. Fernandez Hurtado had real experience in that

12

respect: "When I began at the Bank of Mexico my job consisted ingathering statistics about the balance of payments, specifically in the in-visible areas, which included tourism. And so I went out on a pilgrimageof the city's hotels carrying very elementary questionnaires how muchdid each tourist spend, what countries did they come from and so on.Later, when I was manager of the international division, we carried outdetailed studies of tourism expenditures at the border. And this waswhat really oriented us. We didn't know much about tourism, but we hada very clear idea of its potential for generating foreign exchange."

Fernandez Hurtado decided that it was worthwhile to entrust some-one to investigate the matter in depth.

The school bell rang. The choice fell on a young banker, 35, with apost-graduate degree from Harvard, named Antonio Enrfquez Savig-nac. His studies finished, after marrying a most Bostonian young aris-tocrat, Enriquez Savignac became a loan officer at the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, where he remained for about three years. After afleeting stay in Wall Street, he had been incorporated into the hosts ofthe Bank of Mexico at the beginning of the presidential term. NowFemadez Hurtado conferred upon him an enviable task to travel atgovernment expense to the principal tourism destinations of Mexico andthe world, with the goal of preparing an assessment of this activity andexploring the possibilities for Mexico in such territory.

It was a job that undoubtedly invited dissipation, but Enriquez Savig-nac took it very seriously. During eighteen months, he examined thevarious tourism basins, concentrating on those that represented directcompetition for Mexican attractions Florida, Hawaii and the Carib-bean. He simultaneously submerged himself in a world of statistics onper capita income, recreational spending, behavior and flow of tourismcurrents, return on investment, availability of financing, design and ex-ecution of new developments, and several dozen other technical in-dicators.

In the middle of 1967, Enriquez Savignac was able to show theresults of his studies to his superiors. Some of his conclusions weresurprising; for example, that at the world level tourism was increasingmuch faster than exports. As a result, traditional destinations theMediterranean, Hawaii were generating record earnings, while somenew areas Yugoslavia, Morrocco, the South Pacific and Far Eastwere beginning to acquire renown.

Something else had happened in the Caribbean. Florida had been al-most fully developed as a tourism center. With the closing of the Cubanbeaches and casinos after the Revolution, all of the islands in the zonehad hurried to become alternate destinations. To complement existinginstallations in Montego and Kingsport, Jamaica had put into operationtourism developments in Ocho Rios, Port Antonio and Negril. Freeport,Paradise Island and Treasure Cay had opened in the Bahamas, andPuerto Rico's hotel capacity had tripled. The same path was being fol-lowed by the Virgin Islands, Martinique, Barbados, Guadeloupe andTrinidad. Even Venezuela was studying the possibility of exploiting itsCaribbean coast more successfully.

This dynamic international panorama contrasted remarkably withwhat was happening in Mexico. In the first place, there wasn't one or-ganization overseeing tourism, but two the Department of Tourism andthe Tourism Council. The Tourism Council, created by President LopezMateos in 1958 to honor the institutional status of ex-President Aleman,had monopolized all tourism promotion task and their budgets but

Statistical surveyson tourists ' originsand destinationshave become verycomplex. In the caseof Mexico, touristflows have beencalculated to thesmallest percentage.The diagrams belowsummarize suchinformation. The US.market, for example,is divided here intolarge zones, whereasthe detailed surveysactually showed thenumber of visitors perstate in that countryand per county alongthe border zone.

had focussed them according to the personal perspective of its director.In practice, this could be summed up in one word Acapulco.

The Council's preeminence seriously weakened the Department andimpeded even minimally coherent management of the sector. A plan ofnational goals was never created nor published, neither was theproblem ever contemplated as a whole. The conclusions of EnriquezSavignac's study affirmed that tourism growth had come spontaneously,that hardly any public sector help existed, that no financing programswere in operation, nor were there specific hotel credits, that promotionwas insufficient and that the national tourism offering was scanty atbest.

From that point, Enrfquez Savignac became an expert in the matter.

AntonioEnriquezSavignac,

Secretary ofTourism

CHRISTA COWRIE

He continued being a banker, but he managed the theme of tourism withabsolute fluidity. "It was a little strange," he comments. "We began bylooking for foreign exchange and we wound up with an entirely differentanimal in our hands."

The animal in question was suffering from anemia. Between 1961and 1967, tourism had registered a 12 per cent increase annually inMexico, compared with 24 per cent in the Far East and 46 per cent forthe Pacific Islands. In 1967, a little more than twenty million travelershad visited Florida, and four million had gone as far as the Caribbean is-lands, in frank contrast to Yucatan, which had received only 60,000 for-eigners in the same period. The Mexican tourism offering was evenworse, in the quantity as well as quality of rooms, concentrated inAcapulco.

A logical response would have suggested diversification, the creationof new tourism centers. What kind? Where? No one knew at the Bankof Mexico, but Fernandez Hurtado had already selected the person tofind it out. Enriquez Savignac would have a new assignment.

thebeachhunters

ANTONIO ENRlQUEZ SAVIG

. nac never understood themeaning of "9,000 kilometers of coast" until he had to examine it step bystep: "Mexico is an immense country, incredibly rich and complex. Younotice this when you fly over the coasts dozens of ideal places, trueparadises that remain completely virgin."

The first glimpse took several months. At that time, Pedro Donde Es-calante had joined the team. Later Sub-Secretary of Planning, he wasthen a young professional who did not hide his eagerness to know everycorner of the country. He and Enriquez Savignac alternated in thesearch. "We concentrated on the coast, because our previous studieshad revealed that the beach was the principal attraction sought by theforeign tourist. But the number of potential beaches that this country has

15

Infra-red photograph of theBaja California Peninsula and

the Sonoran coast taken from ameteorological satellite. Thescale is approximately 1 to 3

millions. No humanconstruction is perceptible, not

even the San Diego-Tijuanamegalopolis.

The natural rockformations at the

extreme south end ofBaja California. It

wasn't mere chance thatcaused Los Cabos towind up among the

selected sites.

Antonio Ortiz Mena

Rodrigo Gomez

is almost inconceivable."Dondé Escalante recalls a somewhat unconventional routine: "We

spent many years in two almost antagonistic activities. One, touring thenation's beaches, arriving by plane, helicopter, boat or mule-back,sleeping in tents or in the vehicles, living in intimate contact with nature.And, on return, cloistered in offices making statistical graphs and charts,feeding the computers our data, making cost-benefit evaluations. It wasa strange kind of work."

In any case, it generated real enthusiasm among the functionaries ofthe Bank of Mexico. Fernandez Hurtado himself—"We're going to treadthe beaches," he would say occasionally would be included in thegroup of explorers. Wenceslao Salas, another member of the originalteam, participated in some of the trips: "It was quite arduous. We wouldhave no kind of privacy or comfort. There were expeditions that lastedtwo or three weeks."

At this stage, the Spanish businessman Juan March, was a sig-nificant personality advising the group in an absolutely spontaneous andcomplementary manner, due to his close friendship with FernandezHurtado. March was a valuable counselor, given his enormous personalexperience in the tourism field, where he could be considered an expertand an innovator. Aboard his private yacht, March had circled the globeon many occasions, studying tourism developments from the point ofview of the investor. Settling finally in Mexico, he acquired from thehands of Manuel Suarez a knoll with Acapulco Bay in the bargain-theoretically without tourism possibilities and constructed Las Brisas,a hotel concept so versatile that it continues functioning to date withoutmodifications. But his most important facet was the experience he hadacquired. Suddenly it would be suggested to do this or that thing and itwould turn out that the same thing had been done in Jamaica or in Puer-to Rico or in the Greek islands and, March knew, had been a failure. Be-cause of this, his participation in the strategy search was not scorned.

On the other hand, although the original criterion of foreign exchangecapture remained vaild, the investigations of Enriquez Savignac sug-gested that other factors would have to be considered. For example, itwas clear that tourism required the intensive use of manual labor, as thetraditional positions cooks, waiters, chamber maids, guides are im-possible to mechanize. Even more, training the necessary was minimal,unlike industrial transformation. Any person could carry out these tasks

with reasonable efficiency after a few weeks practice.This opened the possibility of locating the sites of the new develop-

ments in the nation's neglected areas, attempting to alleviate the socialtensions produced by the pauperization of rural centers. Implied as wellwas the possibility of geographically relocating important populationstrata, changing the historic tendency which had brought us to hide our-selves in the country's central mountains.

With these elements in mind, the Bank of Mexico team agreed to con-centrate forces in five key areas: [1] the peninsula of Baja California,especially in the southern portion, where a weak economy and shortageof population had motivated concern for several federal administrations;[2] the coast of the states of Jalisco and Colima, which could function asescape valves for the western mountain zones; [3] the coast of thestates of Michoacan and Guerrero, from Acapulco above, alleviatingport congestion and opening new opportunities for the area; [4] thecoast of the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas, one of the nation's poorestagricultural regions; and [5] the Yucatan Peninsula and, especially, theCaribbean zone, in which Mexican presence shone in its absence.

The exploration and analysis of the proposed regions consumedmore than a year the end of 1967 and all of 1968. This is hardlystrange when considering the range of themes examined climate(days of sunshine, prevailing winds, rain), geographical location (pos-sibilities of access, map of immediate roads, table of air distances), ex-isting infrastructure, sources and potential of water supplies, electricityand fuel, population and its characteristics, area of influence and sur-rounding region, beach qualities, vermin, history of natural catastrophes(hurricanes and earthquakes), probable tourism competitors, landownership...

The process was slow because the questionnaire was applied rigidlyto a great number of alternatives. In the Yucatan Peninsula alone, forexample, six distinct locations were investigated: Celestun (where theprevailing winds proved to be an insuperable obstacle), Progreso(which had problems of land ownership and coastal configuration), IslaMujeres (which was too small for any plan), Cozumel (where watersupply turned out to be too expensive), Akumal (with severe unpleasantfauna problems or, to be less drastic, mosquitos) and Cancun.

However it might be desired, by the end of 1968 the Bank of Mexicotechnicians had selected six ideal points to lodge new tourismdevelopments. Two were in what was then the South Baja California Ter-ritory —the Los Cabos corridor, at the Southern point of the peninsula,with incredible natural formations; and Loreto, some 200 kilometersnorth of La Paz, on the calm waters of the Sea of Cortez. Both had abasic difficulty the transpeninsular highway had not yet emerged fromthe planning stages, so they would have to be limited to aerial andmaritime connections, or, better, wait until the highway would be ready.

Two other sites were in Oaxaca. One of them, Puerto Escondido, isan opening to the sea scarcely a few kilometers in length. In reality, itlent itslef only to modest development. The other, Huatulco, is a chainconsisting of nine ample and beautiful bays with an extraordinary varietyof beaches. To be truthful, Huatulco was the bankers' favorite project. Ithad a certain historical flavor. During the colonial era, it had functionedas a working port and some experts said that it was through there thatcertain prohibited books of the French Revolution had been introduced,among whose recipients was Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, whobegan the uprising that lead to Mexico's independence from Spain.Years later, the community was witness to the treason of Picaluga, whocaptured Guerrero by trickery in Acapulco and delivered him to Huatul-co, where this hero passed into the hands of conservative troops in anidyllic spot now known as Delivery Beach. As a probable tourismdevelopment, however, Huatulco shared a problem with Puerto Escon-dido—the coastal highway was no more than a plan and the nearestport, Santa Cruz, was 100 kilometers away, so that the only option was

The six resort siteson the coastselected bybankers. Fifteenyear later, all butone are inoperation.

Pedro Dondé Escalante

air travel. Or, better, to wait until the highways were ready.A fifth site was found in Guerrero Ixtapa, only a few kilometers from

Zihuatanejo. This plan contemplated taking advantage of the zone's ex-isting infrastructure and creating an additional tourism center within thestate of Guerrero. A potable water system already existed, so did an air-port, so did a highway (even if not on the coast). But Ixtapa was also aproject of medium dimensions, so it was approved and put in theportfolio of plans pending.

By this time, without any doubt, the bankers' hearts were elsewhere.A slender tongue of land in the form of the number seven attached likean oyster to the eastern coast of Quintana Roo had thoroughly seducedand enraptured the group. Technically speaking, it was an island, as twonarrow channels separated it from the continent. Lodged in the hole ofthe 'seven' were a series of brackish lagoons, fed by the sea as well asby uncountable cenotes, sinkholes.

The island in question was called Cancun, or Kankun, or Kan Kun...It could be given any name. The fact was it had passed all the tests.

The quality of its beaches and the sand was extraordinary. Watertemperature was temperate and tended to be stable. Thanks to thelagoons, the distance from dry land was sufficient to make it easy tocontrol noxious fauna. And given the topographical characteristics,hotels could be lined up one after another, all facing the beach. Therewas some basic infrastructure a highway passed less than tenkilometers away and nearby Isla Mujeres had some tourism ex-perience, however limited.

Enriquez Savignac invited Fernandez Hurtado to see the newparadise and his calculations were confirmed the traditional bankerwas stricken by love at first sight. The feasibility studies had been well-done, the qualifications for each entry were satisfactory and the placewas openly gorgeous. Fernandez Hurtado recalls, "I was impressed bythe great quantity of usable beach, because that's what we needed tojustify the large investment that an international airport would require.But what really seduced me was the place that we landed, the naturalcove of Punta Cancun. It was paradise itself." By the time the two menleft the island, the decision had been made.

Rodrigo Gomez approved the plan and it was taken to Ortiz Mena.Ortiz Mena, after conferring with Javier Rojo Gomez then territorial

governor approved the project and it was taken to Díaz Ordaz. Andone fine day at the beginning of 1969, Fernandez Hurtado and EnriquezSavignac had lunch over some good news. The project had the ap-proval of the president.

Cancun would be the new face of the Mexican Caribbean.

Until the end of '60s,Zihuatanejo was a tourism

destination with littlesuccess. But it had a basic

infrastructure and waslocated in a poverty-stricken

and conflict-filled region,urgently needing economic

assistance. This situationhastened the approval of the

Ixtapa Project, practicallyCancun's twin.

inafarcornerofMexico

J OSE DE JESUS LIMA HAS

spent most of his life on IslaMujeres. He is a fairly rich man, with several farming properties andsome real estate investments. His real fortune is not located in hiswealth, but rather in his contacts. For many years, Pepe Lima has en-joyed the affection and friendship of the powerful.

On his remote island, very few men could boast of having a telephonebook that included the private numbers of such weighty names asMiguel Aleman Valdes, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Anibal de Iturbide, ManuelBarbachano Ponce, Javier Rojo Gomez. Friendship aside, Lima mar-ried Rebeca Zuno, daughter of the Jaliscan patriarch Jose GuadalupeZuno and sister of Maria Esther.

At the beginning of 1969, Lima was director of Sports Promotion ofthe National Tourism Council, a post created by Aleman expressly tochannel Lima's enthusiasm for regattas. In any case, it was a well-merited job, as no one had exercised greater energy to develop thezone touristically. During the six-year term of President Ruiz Cortines,Lima had suggested to Carlos Lazo, Secretary of Communications and

Public Works, that the highway that then ended in Valladolid, in the east-ern portion of Yucatan, be brought to the coast of Quintana Roo. Lazoallowed himself to be convinced because he had a much more am-bitious plan a ferry which would unite Puerto Juarez and Isia Mujereswith Havana and Florida. The ferry never got to function, but at least thehighway which Lima wanted so much was completed.

Motivated by this success, Lima invested a good part of his fortune inthe construction of a 30-room hotel on Isia Mujeres, which he named theZazil-Ha. In May 1964, he arranged for President Lopez Mateos himselfto come to the island to open it.

To complete the picture, Lima was the owner of a strip of Cancun,land that he used to grow coconuts and had constructed his leisurehouse, the only solid building on the island. It was a simple two- roomresidence, built at the top of a dune, looking out on the Caribbean Sea.It was the only refuge for many kilometers around.

As a result, when the Bank of Mexico technicians began snoopingaround in the region, they were quickly detected by Lima. Even thoughthe new arrivals did not bear imposing credentials in fact, had nothingto do with the tourism sector organizations for Lima there were nogreys. Definitely count on him for approval if someone were disposed toinvest in the region, even a little hotel, not to speak of an entire tourismcity. He had devoted his life to that battle...

If Quintana Roo was at then the furthest corner of Mexico, the easterncoast of the state was itself the furthest corner of Quintana Roo. In fact,there was nothing worth mentioning along the entire lengthy of coastfrom Cabo Catoche to Chetumal. The main coastal settlement was*Puerto Juarez, a tiny political sub- division of Isia Mujeres which hadonly 117 inhabitants. Pablo Pacheco, the deputy mayor, was also simul-taneously postman, telegrapher, bailiff and jailer, jobs which he carriedout on a bicycle owned by the municipality.

President Lopez Mateos traveled to IsiaMujeres to dedicate Pepe Lima's hotel. The

chief of state adored the region. Beforefinishing his term he built a house on

Cozumel, with the professed aim of makingit a permanent retirement. This he neverdid, but he became an assiduous vistor to

the area. Lopez Mateos was the firstpresident of Mexico to understand thetourism perspectives of Quintana Roo.

A few kilometers south, Cancun could be found, which had very fewinhabitants Emilio Maldonado and his family, Cachito and Gabuch.They were caretakers of the coconut plantations and were living totallyseparated from the rest of the world, surviving on fishing and food-gathering. Maldonado recalls those times: "I would go to Isla Mujeresevery month or so to buy the most necessary. But we were very iso-lated. Today I can hardly believe what has happened on the island. It'slike a miracle."

At the end of the island strip was Lima's house, occasionally used forrecreation. Thirty kilometers further down was Puerto Morelos, an im-poverished fishing village. Not that there was nothing to fish for lobsterand conch were abundant. The problem was that there were no cus-tomers. When the first workers arrived in the area, the fishermen offeredlobster tails at two pesos each(about .16 us)—the minimum salary wasthen thirty pesos ($2.40 us)—and felt they had made a good deal.

The next spot on the map was Playa del Carmen, a fetching name fora simple pier where the passenger boat that served Cozumel docked—and docks. Near Playa del Carmen, convinced and encouraged byLima, Anibal de Iturbide had constructed a mansion in an idyllic place,Chakalal. It is a small cove protected from the prevailing winds, ending

The three original inhabitantsof Cancun: Emilio Maldonado(above), Cachito and Gabuch.Cancun has not been generouswith its primitive dwellers.

Pablo Bush

mouth of a cenote, both part of the property. The only inconveniencewas that access to the house was only by boat.

Further south, some 100 kilometers from Cancun, was a tiny tourismdevelopment—Akumal. Its owner and creator, Pablo Bush, was agenuine pioneer in the area. With unlimited confidence in the region,many years before the Bank of Mexico entered the game, he had con-structed a group of rustic cabins and had tried to set up a nautical club.When he became aware of the plans, Bush pressured heavily forAkumal to be selected as the seat of the development. There were goodreasons. Bush and Iturbide were owners of a strip of beach...34kilometers long! This monopoly assured the rejection of the Akumal op-tion, but Bush continued his own expansion plans and built a hotel andsub-division that still operate with great success. President Echeverriaexpropriated 26 of the 34 coastal kilometers to form the tourism trustFidecaribe.

About twenty kilometers south of Akumal was the archaeological zoneof Tulum, found at that time hardly visited because of the difficulties thataccess represented. And from there down... nothing. From Tulum toChetumal, a practically uninhabited coast of some one hundredkilometers. If we except the state capital, the entire eastern coast of theterritory did not contain more than a thousand permanent residents.

The exceptions to this were the islands, situated a few kilometersfrom the continental shelf. Isla Mujeres, in the northern part, counted alittle more than six thousand inhabitants, which yielded a considerabledensity relative to its humble dimensions. A few kilometers south, thecountry's largest and most populated island, Cozumel, had some30,000 souls.

Additionally, Cozumel was the only site in the region that registeredany tourism activity worthy of the name. It had exactly two hotels—thePlaya, with eighteen rooms, constructed by the local government and

Quintana Roo contains more than 800kilometers of coast with some of the best

beaches in the country, as well as the onlyislands capable of attracting

tourism—Isla Mujeres and Cozumel. As ifin counterpoint, with the exception of the

southern area, the agricultural qualities ofthe land are extremely poor. There is nodoubt that the future of the state will be

found in the sea, whether it be tourism, orfishing activity, a field that has not

received the attention it deserves and ispractised with rudimentary techniques.

operated by a private concessionaire, and the Playa Azul, a group of sixbungalows located on the northwest coast. Moreover, the conces-sionaire of the Playa and the owner of the Playa Azul were the sameperson, businessman Nassim Joaquin, who was at the same timeMexicana's representative on the island.

This concentration of tourism activities in a single person had achance origin, however. Joaquin recalls, "In 1960 an American journalistfrom Holiday magazine appeared saying that he wanted to rent a room.As there were no hotels, I found him a house on the beach, with threebedrooms and the service of a cook and housekeeper. I didn't set therent, but rather the owner—five pesos a day (then .40 us). Well then, hestayed about two or three months, left, and then suddenly an article ap-peared in Holiday saying that Cozumel was paradise. Soon afterdozens of Americans showed up asking for Sr. Joaquin to rent them thesame house."

Once the flow was channeled, Joaquin convinced the territorialauthorities to lease him an old abandoned hotel, a building originallyerected by the administration of Margarito Ramirez and closed as un-profitable. There were good reasons for its failure to function—eachbathroom was shared by two rooms. But Joaquin remodelled it and inone way or another succeeded in capturing and satisfying the incipientavalanche of visitors.

Cozumel was one of the sites seriously considered as the location ofa Caribbean tourism development. Again, Joaquin: "I believe that the is-land fascinated Enniquez Savignac. He came here many times to talkwith me. We would sit on the beach and there he would take out hisquestionnaires. He wanted to know everything—how many tourists,from where, how much they would spend, what they said." The pos-sibility of Cozumel finally confronted an unsolvable problem—potablewater. The prior studies indicated that the water table was insufficient tocover the needs of widespread tourism development in the long term.The only proposed solution—transport water from outside—was judgedexcessively costly. Despite this, it never appeared totally fair to theCozumeleños that the Bank of Mexico's final decision should tall on thedesolate reaches of the coast, almost without resources or population.

Population scarcity had been a historical constant in Quintana Roo, acharacteristic intimately tied to its backward and disconnected condi-tion. During the entire colonial period, the mainland territory remainedvirtually virgin, populated only in the surroundings of Lake Bacalar,Cozumel and Isla Mujeres, sites frequently visited by pirates. In thesecond half of the 19th Century, Mayas defeated in the War of the Cas-tes sought refuge in the central area—today known as the MayanZone—and continued their resistance for several more decades, untilthe soldiers of Porfirio Diaz took Chan Santa Cruz—today Felipe CarilloPuerto—the last rebel bastion.

The first colonization attempt also took place during the Díaz ad-ministration. In 1898, following the dictator's personal instructions, Vice-Admiral Othon P. Blanco transported a group of colonists as far asChetumal Bay and, on a pontoon barge, founded the town of PayoObispo, the direct ancestor of Chetumal. In 1902, Quintana Rooadopted its present name by Presidential decree on being segregatedfrom the State of Yucatan and passing to the direct control of the Presi-dent of the Republic.

The change was more formal than real. During the last years of theDiaz regime, the territory became a land of exile and imprisonment. Inher book, Quintana Roo de siempre (Eternal Quintana Roo), Lilia Arellanopoints out, "The great landholders practiced slavery in a not very dis-guised form. They purchased political prisoners, common criminals andvagrants for 25 pesos a head in Veracruz and forced them to work in thechicle and logging camps."

Fine hardwoods and chicle (used as a base in chewing gum) con-stituted the base of the local economy during the better part of this cen-

The old CozumelNassim Joaquin

of

President Cardenas explores the coast ofQuintana Roo during his visit to theYucatan Peninsula.

tury. The sales of these commodities were not controlled by Mexico,however, but rather by neighboring Belize, on which practically allregional business depended. As a result, one of the most significantfigures in Quintana Roo then was an American trader, Robert S. Tour-ton, who had virtually monopolized the purchase of Mexican chicle.Tourton used to have a representative in Chetumal, Pedro ManuelMartinez, and at their meetings were attended only by Tourton'ssecretary and Martinez's son. Politics is the natural daughter of busi-ness. Tourton's secretary was George Price, for 25 years Prime Ministerof Belize. Martinez's son was Jesus Martinez Ross, who was to becomethe first governor of the State of Quintana Roo.

In 1936, President Cardenas visited Quintana Roo. He wastransported by boat from Progreso and, on arriving at Playa del Car-men, because of the shallow draught and the shaky dock, he had to divein and swim to dry land. The first highway that connected the territorywith the rest of the country was dedicated in the time of President LopezMateos and was the bridge that united Merida with Chetumal (discount-ing Carlos Lazo's highway, which only communicated with the hundredor so inhabitants of Puerto Juarez).

In the following Presidential term, the Bank of Mexico techniciansselected this territory as the seat of the most ambitious tourism develop-ment in the nation's history. This was more than Jose de Jesus Limahad ever dreamed. He would have preferred the development for IslaMujeres, but when Cancun was selected he enthusiastically approved.In fact, he lent his house in Cancun permanently to the Bank of Mexico,

The War of the Castes swept theMayas to the eastern portion of

the peninsula, where theysurvived in highly precariousconditions. In 1901, General

Ignacio Bravo took Chan SantaCruz—today Felipe Carillo

Puerto—the rebels´last bastion.The Maya Zone continues to bethe poorest region of Quintana

Roo today.

Pepe Lima's house in 1972, as itwas found by the pioneers of

Infratur. The installations havebeen amplified and now include

two more houses and a swimmingpool, but the original building has

hardly suffered modifications.Today, it forms part of the

residential complex where theMexican government lodges

distinguished visitors.

Pepe Lima and hisbrother-in-law,President Echeverria, onthe southern beach ofCancun. In the followingpicture, the President'swife, Maria Esther, takesthe hand of her sister,Rebeca Zuno de Lima.

and later, when they bought it from him, accepted a merely symbolicpayment.

Cancun's luck would not depend on Lima nor on the Bank of Mexico'stechnicians. Practically the entire six-year term of Díaz Ordaz had beenconsumed between the research and the selection of the place. Aproject of this magnitude would require the definite approval of the nextgovernment or would be condemned to disappear.

The year had one more surprise for Pepe Lima. In the month of Sep-tember, the PRI nominated his brother-in-law, Luis Echeverria Alvarez,as candidate for President of Mexico.

thelittleCaribbeanisland

ARCHITECT JAVIER SOLOR-zano was the f irst ur-

banologist who imagined what the urban design of Cancun would haveto be. In his capacity as planner in the firm headed by Enrique andAugustin Landa, Solorzano had demonstrated an extraordinarycreativity in the technical solution of varied and complex problems. By1969, before he had reached forty, his resume would already include aremarkable series of projects—the Legaria Mint and currency printingplant; the 20th of November Hospital; the French Church of Polanco;the Stock Exchange building and the demolition of the facade of theArbeu Theater to reveal the hidden front of the church of San FelipeNeri. The only thing he hadn't planned was a city and this city wasCancun...

Now Sub-Director of Development at Fonatur, Solorzano vividlyrecalls that challenge: "It wasn't an easy project. The island was 17kilometers long, equivalent to the distance that separates Xochimilco [asuburb of Mexico City] from the Zocalo [the capital's central plaza]. Butin some parts it wasn't even 50 meters wide. And there they wanted toplace great hotels, shopping centers and a golf course."

Solorzano made a thorough study of the island. Eliminating the widthof the mangroves—which from the air appeared to be firm land—he dis-

The Cancunsymbol,

by FONATUR

The only human work appearing onthe Cancun horizon in 1970 was a

primitive trail, which can be seen as athin white line in the right-hand

portion of the photograph. A goodpart of the mangroves, which may be

seen on the banks of the lagoon,turned out to be swamps.

Javier Solorzano

ARCHIVO RAFAEL LARA

covered that in some parts the coastal highway wouldn't even fit whenthe twenty meters of Federal Zone on both beach and lagoon was dis-counted. For passage, the island would be reduced to a narrow duneseparating the interior lagoon from the sea. The urbanization pos-sibilities for these formations were practically nil. As a result, the urbandesign proposed by Solorzano surprisingly included the audacious—al-most the entire interior roadway, a good number of business zones andfourteen of the eighteen holes of golf were located... ¡in the lagoon! Theauthor remembers, "There could be no alternative. We would have hadto fill out the island to a minimum of 250 or 300 meters. The grand hotelswould not fit in any other or they would remain well separated by wastedland. As to the golf course, the only solution was to take it off the mainroute. If we were to have placed it full length, it would have occupied halfthe island."

The proposal, then, was to fill the lagoon. There was no problemabout material. Yucatecan sand, known as sascab, had proved to beformidable fill. But costs would explode and progress would have tobe held back. Solorzano was invited to discuss the problem on manyoccasions with the heads of the project, Fernandez Hurtado andEnrfquez Savignac. And there on the carpet—"the island was so largethat the plans wouldn't fit on any desk"—with suggestions such aslet's twist it here or let's cut out there, Cancun took on its ultimate sil-houette.

In these meetings it was decided, for example, that the entire islandwould be destined to be a hotel zone, locating the city proper at the ex-treme north of the mainland and the international airport exactly at theopposite pole. For the city itself, a novel design was adopted, knownamong urbanologists as the broken plate. Acccording to this concept,the urban areas would be distributed in independent blocks, each onewith its own schools, shopping, services, green spaces and so on. Thisdesign revoked the traditional grid square design, substituting for itperimeter avenues on which retornos opened, conceived to slow downhigh speed traffic. These blocks, known in Cancun as super- manzanas[after the traditional manzana, for city block], contain many exclusivelypedestrian zones, which facilitate the functioning of various environ-mental protection programs. Moreover, this was another obvious con-cern in the original design, which foresaw the existence of numerousterritorial reserves free of construction. Except for the filled areas, thelagoons would be respected and preserved as ecological environments.With these elements, Enriquez Savignac calculated the definite dimen-sions of the development. From the beginning, these would comprisethe entire island, the site to be occupied by the city, the ecological stripprotected from development and all of interior lagoons—something like

The design of Cancunwas not merely a work ofaudacity andimagination. In reality,the urban concepts wereruled by very stricttechnical criteria, onmany occasions the fruitof cybernetic matrices,which in time gave birthto the story that the sitehad been selected by acomputer.

11,000 hectares, of which more than 4,000 were covered by water.Once the limits were defined, it would be necessary to find the owners

of the land. Even though it would not be known whether to proceed byexpropriation, direct purchase, or whatever other arrangement, it wasnecessary first to know with whom it would have to be arranged.

The project ran into luck. Of the 7,000 hectares of firm land, a littlemore than 2,000 were national property—which would be assigned atno charge by the federal government—and, as well, in that 5,000 werecooperative parcels belonging to the cooperative of Isla Mujeres, es-tablished on the land of the old Santa María hacienda. Theoretically,these properties would be nationalized and handed over to the develop-ment. Finally, some hectareas—hardly a few hundred—remained inprivate hands.

But these few were indispensable, because they included almost theentire island and without the island there could be no hotel zone. Duringalmost all of 1969, Enrfquez Savignac dedicated himself to searchingfor the owners. For this he counted on the help of Carlos Nader, anenterprising lawyer, who confronted the thankless task of submerginghimself in the chaotic title registries of Isla Mujeres and Chetumal. Histask lasted several months, but at the end he achieved a highly satisfac-tory property management identification of the island and its surround-ings. With this information at hand—and given the small number ofowners—the Bank of Mexico decided against expropriation, avoidingthe mistrustful business climate that this action would generate, butrather to acquire the properties case by case.

This strategy had a little problem. The Bank of Mexico had decided topay for the properties at commercial prices, but it was obvious that thissudden interesting news would spread immediately and, in well-knowndynamics, would set off galloping speculation in the rest of the proper-ties. But Nader was an ingenious and astute negotiator. He went to liveon Isla Mujeres, introducing himself as a landowner interested in pur-chasing Cancun and everything around it. He displayed decisivenessbut not desperation and, slowly, went about acquiring parcels, sup-posedly for his personal portfolio.

When the majority of the property had fallen into this disguised trap,

Practically the entireisland was in private

hands when Infratur setthe project in motion.

Punta Cancun, one of theprettiest coves on the

tongue of land, was alsoone of the areas whose

acquisition turned out tobe the most conflictive.

This end was reserved toharbor luxury hotels and

the Convention Center.

he had to fight—now openly—with the reticents. An engineer Ponce, ofMerida, was owner of Punta Nizuc, located exactly at the base of the'seven. Ponce had acquired the land with the idea of developing a sub-division, but the plan had never crystallized. So he sold it, grumbling alittle and haggling over the price, but he sold.

The coconut groves of Jose de Jesus de Lima were another propertyend, supposedly, his beach house. In practice, this residence had beenconverted into the Bank of Mexico's headquarters. In fact, the house isstill part of the residential complex in which official guests are lodged.Lima looked on the project sympathetically, so he sold.

At the upper end of the 'seven,' exactly at the angle the two lines form,Punta Cancun is found. The land was property of the acting cacique[strongman] of Isla Mujeres, Ausencio Magana, who had accumulatedquite a fortune controlling the fishing fleet—he was the only buyer ofproduction—and the transportation boats in the years prior to the arrivalof the ferry. Magaña wasn't very tough. A little pressure was sufficient toconvince him. And so he sold...

But he didn't sell to the Bank of Mexico, rather to an EngineerStrauss, also from Merida, who offered him a few cents more per squaremeter. Strauss was of German origin and could not legally own coastalproperty, but the operation had been cleverly concealed. And Straussrefused to sell. Enrfquez Savignac invited him to the place in question tooffer him some explanations. After the definition of the lines of municipalproperty, and the appropriation of the federal zones—twenty meters ofbeach on either side—hardly anything remained. That's the way it is,Strauss agreed, but I'm not selling. His property remained blocked, un-usable, out of service. Yes, said Strauss, but I'm not selling. Theydecided to take energetic measures, and within a few weeks, themanagement of Cordemex [the parastatal sisal commercialization com-pany] threatened to cancel some juicy contracts. That's all right, saidStrauss, but I won't sell. They even threatened to apply Rule 33, [depor-tation]. I'll leave, said Strauss, but I won't sell. And he did not sell. Yearslater, there was no remedy but to come to a price with him.

There was one even more stubborn personality—Coral de Martinez,

ARCHIVO JAVIER SOLORZANO

owner of a little more than six hectares and a resident of Mexico City.The deal with her was not closed until 1984, at astronomical prices, ofcourse.

Unfortunately, Carlos Nader, the man who contributed most to thesuccess of the planting, was not present at harvest time. Cancun wasalways a plan for him, never a reality. In 1970, when he had almost com-pleted his task and was bringing to Mexico City the notarized docu-ments that granted the Bank ownership of the island, the plane in which

he was travelling crashed at Bacalar, in the reaches of Chetumal. Acentral street of Cancun carries his name in memory.

Nader's death was a dramatic event, as he formed part of the intimategroup of experts who had gathered in turn around Enriquez Savignacfrom the beginning of the adventure. Aside from Nader, who handled thelegal aspects of the project, the team had three other personalities: Ar-mando Basurto, who functioned as project manager of Ixtapa; Wences-lao Salas, an expert in international banking law, who had beendesignated Cancun project manager; and Pedro Dondé Escalante, incharge of marketing studies and the operating plans of the new centers.

By 1969, however, this organization was proving to be insufficient.For that reason, the Bank of Mexico decided to create a trust to bedirectly responsible for the tourism developments. Thus, with thepresidential farewell and patronage of Ortiz Mena, the National In-frastructure Development Fund [Fondo Nacional de InfraestructuraTuristica] was formed, adopting the acronym Infratur, in accordance withthe style of the time.

The first formal meeting of the technical committee, at which the prin-cipal appointments were issued, took place in August. The position ofdirector fell on Rodrigo Gomez and administrator on Enrfquez Savig-nac—with the title of delegado fiduciario especial, Special FiduciaryDelegate—as the secretariship of the committee was being assigned toa young lawyer, 34, then Sub- Director of Credit in the Department ofHacienda,more or less equivalent to the American Treasury.

The functionary in question showed himself to be discreet andreserved during the first meeting, but in those that followed he raised hisvoice in song. In the first, he urged Enrfquez Savignac to deliver to thecommittee the proposed budgets for Infratur for 1970, in order to makea formal request to the Presidential secretariat to authorize the expendi-tures. Enrfquez Savignac answered that such a thing was impossible.Infratur still neither had offices nor employees. Calculating how muchmoney would be necessary to begin Cancun and Ixtapa would be mere-ly speculative.

It was an important problem, as the Presidential secretariat cus-

The configuration of the islandrequired filling a "pocket" inthe lagoon to provide room forthe golf course. A fleet of dumptrucks made trip after trip,transporting hundreds ofthousands of cubic meters ofsascab. A great part of Cancunis, in reality, a work ofengineering.

Carlos Nader

tomarily would assign in the month of November the budget endow-ments for the following year. If Infratur were to remain outside the pack-age, it could lose an entire year for lack of funds. But the lawyer returnedto his charge. In the October meeting he suggested soliciting a "tricktrunk" of extra-large dimensions and use the influence of the membersof the committee to achieve its approval, even without the requisitesdemanded by budgetary mechanics. Even when it was reduced by for-mal debate, something would always remain to begin progress.

It was a good tactic and it produced results. Three months later thefirst campsite was installed and they could begin work, thanks to thisnew and unexpected ally of Cancun. With time, he would turn out to bea superbly valuable partisan, as this strategist of official finance wasnamed Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (who in 1982 became President ofMexico).

Miguelde la

Madrid

thejungleunknown,habitat,challenge...

IN 1967. JAVIER ROJO GOMEZ,from the State of Hidalgo, was

named Governor of the Territory of Quintana Roo by President Diaz Or-daz. Founder of the National Federation of Country People, twice gover-nor of Hidalgo, mayor of Mexico City, Rojo Gomez arrived in the statewith great political prestige. Given his experience, the appointmentcould have had a notably honorary character.

But Rojo Gomez played the role to the hilt. Instead of being a sickman, he governed vigorously. He drew the map of the state highwaynetwork, improved communication with the islands, speeded the adop-tion of modern agricultural production systems, cleaned up state finan-

Rojo Gomez looksat Echeverrfa

during the firsttour of the

presidential term.

The first camps wereinstalled in what is

today the center of thecity, on an axis which

later would becomeTulum and Nader

Avenues. In the firsthouses, local customs of

construction were theonly recourse, especially

with reference to roofs,made of palm thatch

following Mayatechniques. The only

social center, as in alladvanced base camps,

was the communaldining room.

ces and multiplied the local budget. Of course, his personal contactswere predominant at the bottom line. Quintana Roo was a territory. Theamount of its spending was unilaterally determined by the Federal go-vernment.

Rojo Gomez had well-placed friends. One of them, the influential Se-cretary of the Treasury, Antonio Ortiz Mena, virtually worshipped him. Atthe beginning of his career, Ortiz Mena had served as private secretaryto Rojo Gomez, who acted as his political godfather when the time cameto obtain his first assignments. Ortiz Mena never would forget the pro-tection he received. There are those who assert that it was he who con-vinced Rojo Gomez to emerge from his political retirement and acceptthe governorship of the territory. However it might have been, it is truethat Ortiz Mena used to visit his mentor frequently in faraway Chetumal,and in 1970, he went to congratulate him personally in his home on thevery day that his appointment was ratified. It is difficult to know, but notto imagine, to what point this friendship influenced the Bank of Mexico'sdecision to push the development of Cancun. It is certain that Rojo Go-mez was enthusiastic about the project. He visited the island on variousoccasions and became its most persuaded promotor. He constantly ur-ged and pestered the funcionaries of Infratur to begin work immediately.

Parallel to the fills, theconstruction of the firsttourism lodgings beganon the island. In anycase, by the beginningof 1972, Cancún stillshowed a quite desolateaspect.

In order to cross the clarityof the Nichupte River, thepioneers constructed aprovisional wooden bridge,which by 1971 registeredoccasional tourism traffic,basically consisting of peoplefrom Merida and easternYucatan. Curiosity was theprincipal incentive.

The first campsite was established in January 1970. It was a tinygroup of workers captained by a sole engineer, hired by the ConsorcioCaribe company, to which Infratur had assigned the first jobs. In reality,Consorcio Caribe was yet another invention of the Bank of Mexico. Du-ring the second half of 1969, the officials in charge of the project hadsounded out several construction companies, but not one of them hadshown any interest in carrying out the initial jobs. The explanation wasvery simple. Working conditions would be absolute hell. There were notowns in the area from which workers could be recruited, nor deposits ofmaterials, nor maintenance shops for the equipment. Thus the result ofthe probe was clear. Courteously, but firmly, everyone declined.

Fernandez Hurtado went back to his old acquaintances. This time heturned his gaze upon someone who in spite of having been consideredone of the best builders in the country had suffered reverses—JoseGarcia de la Torre. A native of Pachuca, civil engineer of the old school,distinguished roadbuilder during the term of Aleman, García de la Torre en-joyed enormous prestige in the construction world. Among his long list offinished projects, was the construction of a cement boat in Veracruz, on in-structions of General Heriberto Jara, when it was believed that this exploitwas technically impossible. But Garcia de la Torre was a true adventurer,with all the contradictions that category implies. At 70 years of age, he wasstill planting trees, but had never established a fixed residence.

Clearing was—andstill is—one of the

basic costs ofconstruction in the

jungles of QuintanaRoo. This is the typical

look of the beginningof road making.

ARCHIVO RAFAEL LARA

His financial situation was as fickle as his life. Many times rich, he al-ways wound up embarking on romantic and risky businesses, which in-variably led him to ruin. And this was exactly his situation at the end of1969, when he was contacted by Fernandez Hurtado and formally invi-ted to join in the Cancun adventure.

Of course there had to be a problem to resolve. At that time, Garciade la Torre no longer had a construction company. Fernandez Hurtadoturned to a strategy recalling Solomon. He called together three impor-tant Bank of Mexico contractors—Raul Chazaro, Augustin Ibaiiez, Igna-cio Cortina—and explained the problem to them and persuaded them toform a new company, putting it under the command of the prestigiousbuilder. Thus was born Consorcio Caribe.

And thus, at the beginning of 1970, the first engineer, Daniel Ortiz,arrived at the place of the deeds: "The first week, we slept in our cars,while we cleared the bush and could put up a hut. We cooked on camp-fires and we bathed in the lagoon, where the brackish water curdled thesoap. It was quite a primitive existence."

But the discomforts could be explained by knowing Ortiz's specific as-signment: between January 23rd and March 15th, his mission consistedin opening a five kilometer track and building a provisional bridge overthe Nichupte River with the incredible aim of making it possible for pre-sidential candidate Luis Echeverrfa to inspect the island during his elec-toral campaign tour. Once in contact with the terrain, Ortiz understoodthat his mission was impossible. And so he communicated his impres-sions to Mexico. The road might be possible. The bridge was out of thequestion. The immediate problem was manpower, but Ortiz ran intoluck. A few kilometers south, about where the airport is now located, acamp of chicle-gatherers were facing a financial disaster. The harvesthad been very bad, provisions were running out, and the specter of hun-ger hovered over the group. So the appearance of Ortiz, offering steadywork and steady money, was providential.

By the end of 1971,the dismantling of the

provisional bridge wascarried out. The

photograph was takenfrom the structure of

the final bridge.

The deal worked out magnificently. In exactly fifteen days, the eightyhired chicleros cut at the point of machete some 54,000 square metersof open path, right to the bank of the river. Echeverria could not step onthe island, but at least he would be able to see it close up. The problemwas that the candidate arrived in Puerto Juarez a little late, and so he pi-tilessly ignored this titanic effort and continued on his way. It was in acertain sense a rather paradoxical snub, given the number of times hewould return to the island as President.

Moreover, Garcia de la Torre himself arrived in Cancun at the begin-ning of March and work picked up pace. The first plan contemplated theconstruction of a campsite, building the first fifteen houses and startingup the coastal road. It was not too much, but the work conditions were

extreme. In summer, some of the workers preferred to sleep buried insand with a protection over the face rather than put up with the insect at-tacks in the dormitories.

Ortiz was the only man who left the purgatory from time to time, butthis hardly represented any great pleasure: "I had to travel 320kilometers to go to the bank and withdraw money, ninety kilometers tothe telephone and some thirty in order to buy bottled sodas. I could havegone to Isla Mujeres as well to use the telephone, but long distance callscould require an average wait of five hours. So during the first fivemonths, I averaged ten thousand highway kilometers monthly".

Today Director of Fidecaribe, Ortiz could be considered the area'sfirst immigrant. But the camp was rapidly populated. Drawn by the mag-net of stable income people began to come down from the cooperatives,from the ranches, even from the far-flung flocks of the chicleros.

Cancun inspired a kind of euphoria in the recent arrivals. Even theprofessionals—engineers, topographers, architects—generally at firstresentful at moving into the advance base camps, would soon changeand become captivated by the area, living in any kind of discomfort as ifit were nothing, acting as if to settle forever in Cancun were absolutelyinevitable.

Such was the case of engineer Rafael Lara y Lara, who after havingworked for ten years in the Department of Public Works, by chance ma-de the acquaintance in an airplane of Manuel Morales Zacarias, then te-chnical director of Infratur. Morales described the development to him.Lara decided to give it a look, and three months later he moved into theencampments, in tact, Lara was the first engineer who settled in Can-cun with his family—including his second daughter, three years old—and built the first private house in the city.

Cancun was being born. Black storm clouds were beginning to dar-ken the panorama, however, even though the pioneers ignored them.By the middle of 1970, for example, it became clear that it would be im-possible to obtain international credit support before the end of the cu-rrent Presidential term. This measure formed part of Infratur's overallstrategy. The technicians considered it useful to tie the Cancun and Ix-tapa projects to international loans in order to avoid the risks inherent inchanges of Presidents, considerably reducing the likelihood that theprojects could be cancelled.

From this perspective, at the end of 1969 Infratur formally applied tothe Inter-American Development Bank for a credit of 21.5 million dollars,equivalent to a little less than half the investment required for the firststage of Cancun. But the IDB insisted that no precedent existed in theentire world for tourism cities developed from a base of zero, and itwould require new feasibility studies and a more detailed description ofthe financial mechanics. The IDB asked for more time. In the languageof international banking, this signified a delay of several months.

The IDB's request was absolutely reasonable. Negotiation of interna-tional credits had always been a slow and torturous process, requiringthe participation of experts in many specialties, so that the discussionswould not be obstructed in trying to clarify the multitude of technical cri-teria the contracts included. In the case of Cancun, the situation wascomplicated by the very nature of the project and the lack of antece-dents.

The Cancun duty manager, Wenceslao Salas defended the colors forthe Mexican side: "We wrote the loan document, making every kind ofeconomic and financial evaluations, obtained the approval of the LoanCommittee and, from there, went on to create the contracts—of the gua-rantee, of the project, of the loan. Saying it this way sounds really easy.In reality, it was extraordinarily complicated. We had to go to Washing-ton dozens of times. Each advance in the clauses was a genuinetriumph. Imagine—it was necessary to put in the entire urban plan, theconstruction of a new city, in each contract. To top it off, the IDB insistedon tying the development of the infrastructure—which would depend+ on

The first birthcertificate registeredunder Caneiin is dated1975 and belongs toSusana Yvette HerreraMontiel. It is in fact anerror: Caneún formedpart of the municipalityof Isla Mujeres at thattime and all births wereregistered there. Butbabies —and later ahand of healthyyoungsters—werealways a daily part ofthe camps.

Once the project was set inmotion, official visits becameroutine things. In the picture,during the inaugural flight of

the Bank of Mexico'sGrumman plane, appear from

left to right Ruben Zaldivar,Juan March, Ernesto

Fernandez Hurtado, ex-President Miguel Aleman,Hugo B. Margain, Agustin

Salvat and Antonio EnriquezSavignac, in charge of the

Cancun Trust.

us—to the number of hotel rooms constructed, a field we would promotebut would not directly control."

The matter became so complicated that Salas spent almost all of1970 negotiating, only to find himself at the end with yet another requestfor more time. An important element now entered. In December of thatyear, the Mexican government would change. Cancun would be subjectto the good will of the next regime and there was some evidence that theproject could not count on true sympathy.

The now president-elect Luis Echevema had not visited the encamp-ments during his campaign, nor had he made any clear statements infavor of the matter. On the contrary, some of his close associates hadcriticized it publically as a "foreignization plan," claiming that it would "com-promise national sovereignty and attack Mexicanism."

To complicate things further, Rodrigo Gomez, director of the Bank ofMexico, died suddenly. And just two days later, Antonio Ortiz Mena wasremoved as Secretary of the Treasury. For sure, one of the promotors ofthe project, Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado, would remain at the head ofthe Bank of Mexico, but no one knew the point of view of the new cabi-net minister, Hugo B. Margain, and this could be definitive.

Echeverrfa took office December 1st and on December 12th traveledto Quintana Roo. But neither in this trip did he support the Cancun pro-ject. It was basically a courtesy visit to Governor Javier Rojo Gomez,who was now gravely ill. Rojo Gomez would die before the year wasover, on December 30th, denying Cancun another ally.

Now everything depended upon the will of the new government...

asmallbureaucraticquarrel

PRESIDENT LUIS E C H E V E R R I Adid not like the Cancun pro-

ect. Someone had told him the development was a private business of Or-tiz Mena, and Ortiz Mena was the new president's least favorite person inthe entire Mexican government. Almost immediately on assuming power,he asked Hugo Cervantes del Río to investigate the matter.

Merely a glimpse was enough for Cervantes del Río to realize that therumor was false. Almost all the land Cancun would occupy was nationalproperty, the majority in cooperatives that were controlled by the Depart-ment of Colonization and Agrarian Affairs. The private properties wereminimal and did not represent a big business from any point of view.

And, according to the plan, everything would pass into the hands of In-Ifratur to avoid any possibility of speculation.

But the Presidential Secretary had his own plans. From 1966 to 1970,Cervantes del Río had been governor of another great federal territory,Baja California Sur, during which he joined in friendship with a local po-litician, Milton Castellanos. In the first few weeks of the new administra-

PresidentLuis Echeverria

Hugo Cervantes del Río

Augusto Gomez Villanueva

Hugo B. Margain

tion, the PRI proposed Castellanos as governor for the northern part ofthe peninsula, and Cervantes del Río pressured for the formation of theCommission for the Integrated Development of Baja California, knownby its Spanish acronym as Codibac.

The reason was obvious. Both politicians had forged great plans forthe region, and one of them was the creation of tourism centers. Cancunwas in their way. Cervantes del Río managed to convince the Presidentto study the matter in greater depth, and, at his department's expense,hired a firm of American consultants expert in the specialty, who withina few months produced a study with predictable result—Cancún wasnot a viable project.

Cervantes del Río had some natural allies in his strategy of dissua-sion. The most important was the group captained by Augusto GomezVillanueva, who apparently for ideological reasons, was frontally oppo-sed to the development. His followers warned that the project amountedto "foreignization," and also hurling the head- splitting argument of "ef-fective loss of national sovereignty."

Another element possibly influenced this attitude. During the term ofDíaz Ordaz, the head of the Department of Tourism, Agustin Salvat, hadconceived the creation of an enormous nautical club on the coast of thestate of Nayarit, a few kilometers from Puerto Vallarta. Because it dealtwith communal lands, Salvat had put forth the idea of the creation of atrust which would administer the property and look out for the interestsof the campesinos, the country-folk who formed the membership of thecooperative or ejido. So, almost on the rebound, a tourism develop-ment—the Bahia de Banderas Trust—fell into the hands of the Depart-ment of Colonization and Agrarian Affairs. Gomez Villanueva gave thistoy to his soul-buddy, Alfredo Rios Camarena, and dedicated himself toboycotting Cancun. He was in a memorable position to do so. Of the7,000 hectareas Cancun would occupy, 5,000 were in agricultural te-rrain controlled by the DCAA. So only delaying their delivery...

But Cancun also had allies, beginning with the phlegmatic Secretaryof the Treasury, Hugo B. Margain. Because Infratur was a dependencyof the Bank of Mexico, and the Bank of Mexico a dependency of Trea-sury, Margain could consider it his project. Moreover, he was convincedof the seriousness of the studies and the intellectual honesty of their aut-hors. And so he entered the pursuit of the international loans and he ur-ged the DCAA to make delivery of its lands, while at the same timeattempting to convince President Echeverria in favor of the idea.

At the institutional level, a paradoxical situation had been created. Onone side, Margain and the bankers were pressuring for authorization tocontinue construction. On the other, Cervantes del Río was scheming toplace the existing funding with the Baja California coast. Further on, Go-mez Villanueva's team, brandishing nationalistic banners, ground itsown axes. Position unknown, Secretary of Tourism Agustin OlacheaBorbon appeared to have no idea what would happen. At the middle ofthe scramble, President Echeverría received versions that no longercould be called merely divergent, but rather openly antagonistic.

The battle lasted a little less than a year. Meanwhile, Cancun was atthe point of coming to an untimely end. Enriquez Savignac, appointedDirector of Infratur, recalls: "The President's secretary froze the funds onus, even though they had supposedly already been authorized. We hadto slow down many projects and postpone implicitly urgent work. In all of1971, we invested hardly 30 million pesos [2.4 million 1971 dollars] ofthe more than 200 million we had calculated. And the major part of thismoney came from the Bank of Mexico on the sole order of Ernesto Fer-nandez Hurtado."

Settling accounts, the balance of power would not be tipped by any ofthe three groups, but rather by an interested party who had remained re-latively neutral—the territorial governor- designate, David Gustavo Gui-tierrez Ruiz. Filled in on the details of the project by Fernandez Hurtadohimself, he had formed a favorable opinion of it, but he had conducted

President Echeverria andGovernor Gutierrez Ruiz onan inspection tour ofCancun. In the committeeappear Jesus Martinez Ross,Jesus Castaiieda, EugenioMendez Docurro and, in therear, Pedro Ojeda Paullada.

himself cautiously with the factions in the battle. One fine day, however,he was invited to speak openly.

It was an invitation he could not decline: "One Sunday, I was sum-moned to Los Pinos [the Presidential residence]. The Presidentreceived me and invited me to walk in the gardens. Abruptly, he beganto talk about Cancun. He told me that he was tired of hearing so manystories, that the affair had turned into a dilemma. Then he added that hehad to make a decision, that the thing couldn't continue prolonging itself.And he asked me what I thought...

Guitierrez Ruiz' response might have been decisive: "My opinion was100 per cent favorable. I gave several reasons. Quintana Roo had littlepopulation, but the Cancun area had none. Tourism was the onlyresource that could be developed in the area. The financial aspectswere well structured, and so on. The future of the state depended ingood measure upon this project, I told him. President Echeverria lookedat me for a few moments and then he said to me/Very good, Mr. Gover-nor, we shall go forward."

David Gustavo didn't lose a single day. He immediately got in touchwith everyone involved. If he had previously kept his distance,he wasnow more Catholic than the Pope. "It was the critical moment. So I triedto put the pressure on all sides, on Enriquez Savignac to hurry up, onAugusto to turn over the land, on Margain to pressure Augusto, onFernandez Hurtado about the money, and always on Enriquez Savig-nac."

For Cancun, September 1971 was a month of rebirth. Echeverria men-tioned the development by name in his first report to the nation [theequivalent of the American State of the Union address]. A few days later,the Department of Agrarian Affairs turned over to Infratur the 5,000 hec-tareas under its control, even though this was conditional on the forma-tion of an ejido [a farming cooperative]. Toward the end of the month, theInter-American Development Bank informed the Secretary of theTreasury that a credit of 21.5 million had been approved, with a term ofeighteen years, with three years grace, at eight per cent annual interest,representing 45 per cent of the resources the first stage of Cancunwould require.

The entire world had to see thebeginning of Cancun. In thephotograph, shirt open, Jose

Lopez Portillo, in his first visitto the development, followed by

Carlos Loret de Mola. In thebackground, Wenceslao Salas,

Cancun project manager.

Wenceslao Salas

Wenceslao Salas recalls this moment: "It was the starting signal. It"must be taken into account that the IDB only authorized credits for theforeign component of the plans, that is to say, it only financed foreign ex-change. Without its participation in the matter, it could not have beengotten off to a solid start. This obstacle had now been overcome.Cancun could finally take off."

Work intensified rapidly. The dredging of the lagoon was assigned toProtexa, a Monterrey company, and Consorcio Caribe began the workto build the real bridge over the Nichupte River. To carry out this taskthey counted on the experience of Garcia de la Torre, but the Infraturtechnicians wanted to be sure. Thus, Manuel J. Castillo arrived at theencampments in October 1971 with the responsibility of General Super-intendent. His resume included the construction or supervision of somany bridges that they would have extended some twelve kilometersplaced end to end. Among the better known are the international bridgesacross the Rio Bravo [in the United States called the Rio Grande] atReynosa, Laredo and Ciudad Camargo, the drawbridge of Coatzacoal-cos and the Tampico bridge across the Tamesi.

At first glance, this would appear to have been too much experiencefor a river as unspectacular as the Nichupte—hardly forty meters wide—but Castillo had a different opinion: "This little bridge had all the designproblems imaginable. It was a bridge with a vertical curve and a horizon-tal curve. That is to say, while the road turned, it was simultaneouslyrising or falling."

Castillo's principal job, however, was not to be the bridge—which wasfinally settled as a Garcia de la Torre project—but rather a much moredelicate task: to organize and control the country's most populated andcomplex construction camp. From the beginning of work in 1970, therehad been a constant avalanche of workers. At the end of 1971 andduring the length of 1972 it reached spectacular levels. There weretimes when there were more than 5,000 workers in the area, with all thedislocation that this implied.

When Castillo arrived in Cancun, the encampment left much to bedesired. To begin with, Infratur had no offices. Rafael Lara as well hissubalterns used their homes as offices. So did the paymaster. The

Two Cancunpioneers:

Manuel J.Castilloand Daniel Ortiz.

dining hall, a key point in the functioning of the instalations, simul-taneously operated as a cantina, which caused more than one disor-der. These binges customarily wound up in Valladolid, by the easiestway at hand. On many occasions the high-spirited revelers "borrowed"the camp's trucks, a prank that more than once ended in accident.

Castillo imposed order. It would be tedious to enumerate the discipli-

nary measures he adopted, but the fact is the misconduct stopped, and,despite this, good feeling prevailed. Later, the inhabitants changed thetitle of his post to "Superintendent and General" in recognition of the Ge-neral Superintendent's steely character.

In addition to these adjustments, Castillo took on fully the plan of workthe project contemplated. This covered four areas of activity: [1] urbani-zation, centered primarily in boulevard construction; [2] conduits, whichincluded the network of underground lines feeding gas, water and elec-tricity; [3] dredging and filling, which contemplated the widening of theisland and the formation of a pocket in the lagoon to contain the golfcourse, and [4] the airport.

If resources had been scarce, they now flowed generously, so muchso that Enriquez Savignac considered it only prudent to request theBank of Mexico to locate an expert auditor in Cancun. The appointmetfell on Jose de Jesus Martinez Juarez. His arrival faithfully illustrates thecamp's prevailing conditions. "I was seeing the jungle for the first time. Itwas fascinating—everything so green, so moist, so beautiful. But thefirst morning, when I was on my way to breakfast, I was intercepted bya terrible-looking monster, between pre-historic and antidiluvian. I wasparalyzed. Finally, since it wasn't moving, I made a large circle to avoidit. No one was impressed by my story. There were plenty of iguanas inCancun."

During this first stage, the tasks that undoubtedly consumed the grea-test energy and resources were the operations of dredging and filling. Ingeneral, this was slow and painful work. Tons and more tons of sea sandwere extracted from the bottom of the ocean and deposited in the la-goon bed, with the aim of enlarging the dimensions of the island to pro-vide room for the proposed urban plan. Rafael Lara y Lara was incharge of supervision. "The dredges were working 24 hours a day andcontinued doing so until 1973. Hundreds of thousands of cubic meterswere moved, perhaps millions, no one knew precisely. Afterward it wasnecessary to improve the soil with dry matter and compact it well, as he-

The cooks were centralpersonalities in the life of theencampments. In the case ofCancun, Alicia Canche and LuisaCanche became genuineinstitutions. Alicia continuesworking in the Fonatur guesthouse. Luisa owns a restaurant.Furthermore, Dona Luisa becameCanc{un's first mother-in-law, byvirtue of her daughter's marriageto a villager.

ARCHIVO RAFAEL LARA CHRISTA COWRIE

Sigfrido Paz Paredes

Fernandez Hurtado andEnriquez Savignac with thePresidential Chief of Staff,

Jesus Castarieda, on aworking tour of the island.

Manuel Castro

re on the island the solid rock runs between seven and eleven meters.It was a titanic labor that today would be impossible. In that era, a meterof fill cost twelve pesos [about one dollar], today it costs a thousand. Wepractically constructed half the island."

They worked according to a master plan, but improvised events werenot entirely alien. Thus it was necessary to relocate badly designedstreets, straighten up a crooked dock, use all the tractors existing in thearea to re-arrange a pedestrian bridge. There were also inspired stro-kes. Exasperated by the stench produced by the miasmas of the la-goon , Sigfrido Paz Paredes, then Sub-Director of Infratur, authorizedon his own a marine connection channel. The contracts with the IDB fo-resaw the existence of this waterway, but its construction had been heldoff pending the delivery by University of Mexico scientists of a hydraulicsimulation that would guarantee its proper functioning. An arbitrary cut

could have been disastrous, not only in economic cost, but also becau-se of the environmental destabilization it could produce in the entireecosystem. Paz Paredes was lucky. His improvised channel functionedso well that today it is offically known as Canal Sigfrido.

Furthermore, the incorporation of Paz Paredes into the Infratur teamwas a result of the fourth task of the master plan, the airport. At that time,Paz Paredes was one of the few Mexican experts in airport planningand Enriquez Savignac did not want to leave any loose ends. In truth, inthose days an airport did exist in Cancun, laid out almost at the begin-ning of construction in a highly improvised form. The builder was ManuelCastro, a young Yucatecan engineer who did not then even know of theexistence of Cancun: "I had been hired by some investors on Isla Muje-res to equip a sub-division. So I come down with my machines andwhen I get to Puerto Juarez I sit myself down to wait for them to comefor me. I was a little nervous because the trucks that transported the ma-chines charged high rates, but the days began to pass and no one ap-peared."

Castro's anxiety lasted four days. "I was already half desperate whenone fine day a gentleman appeared who introduced himself as DanielOrtiz and asked whose machinery it was. 'It's mine,' I said. And so heproposed that he would pay me double what I had been promised in IslaMujeres if I would help him do some jobs on terra firma. I thought he wasa little crazy, but then he took me to Garcia de la Torre and this one toldme that they weren't going to pay me double but triple, but that what had

ARCHIVO JAVIER SOLORZANO

Despite its rustic appearance,the original airport functionedadequately until 1973. In 1976,when it was long out of service,a commercial jet landed bymistake on the narrow strip,causing real alarm among thepopulation. All theseinstallations have nowdisappeared.

to be done was to make an airport in four months. That convinced methat they were in fact crazy, but anyone who would pay what they werepaying had the right to make an airport in the middle of the jungle."

Castro put his machines to work at a feverish pace. The airstrip wasready in less than the stipulated time and the planes of the Bank of Me-xico began to bring in visitors. Some were enchanted with the project,others more cautious, and some confessed frank skepticism. Amongthe skeptics was Crescencio Ballesteros, the principal stockholder inMexicana. There are still those in Cancun who remember him commen-ting to his old friend, engineer Garcia de la Torre, "Look, Pepe, excuseme for telling you this, but I don't believe that any Mexicana jet will everland here."

i

theconstructionofparadise

T HE BEGINNING IS EASY, 1710-re or less. First, draw the

complete plans of a tourism city, from its very foundations up. Then sellthe idea to the President of the Republic. Don't be disheartened if theadministration changes and the new President displays skepticism.Convince him, even if this means a battle with his cabinet.

Follow up by getting some international loans. Do not delay the begin-ning of construction. Move millions of cubic meters to construct your pa-radise, and even if it costs dearly, put all the installations underground,so that everything will look nice when the tourists come. Of course youdo have to think about where the tourists are going to sleep...

Well, then, go see the hoteliers, those simple fellows who accuse thegovernment of creating and being unfair competition. . with just onechain of hotels! Offer them the best locations, the most beautiful, thecheapest. They will tell you, no, it's too risky. Argue that you have the

Alberto Bojorquezsupport of the President, the Governor, the Inter-American Develop-ment Bank and the Pope's blessing. They will tell you, hmmm, we arenot sure. Give them advice, get them loans, lower their interest rates,set up their businesses, beg them, plead with them, promise them thepearls of the Virgin. They will tell you, thanks, now we'll think about it.Don't call us. We'll call you.

There was no way...From 1969 on, they began searching for investors and by 1972 the

first one still hadn't appeared. First Rojo Gomez, then Gutierrez Ruiz,had organized tours and conferences for the hoteliers of Chetumal andCozumel and obtained a unanimous response—pure evasion. Thenthey invited them from Merida, much more powerful, perhaps a little mo-re courageous. More evasive. Agustin Olachea and Enrfquez Savignacwent to the national hoteliers, the veritable sharks of the business. Notone committed himself. As a last resort, perhaps the internationalchains? Identical response. Even the Secretary of the Treasury wentaround promoting the matter and was unable to obtain a single custo-

The first grand hotelunder construction, theCancun Caribe,required the financialparticipation of Infraturand several banks. Itcontinues functioningtoday, operated by anAmerican chain.

The traffic circle wherethe highway ended was

constructed in onenight, a feat of

engineering withprecise aim--fishing

for investors.

mer. And, really, it was difficult to imagine a tourism city without hotels.But Fernandez Hurtado had not been a banker all his life in vain.

As a result, he ignored the hoteliers and resorted to his old friends. Itis impossible to know what type of arguments he used, but the fact isthat he convinced several private banks—in Mexico City, Merida andMonterrey—and turned them into pioneers. The formula was the fo-llowing: the banks would construct a medium-sized hotel—the Can-cun Caribe, 203 rooms and 23 bungalows—and Infratur wouldprovide the land, in return for 19 percent of the equity.

Thus, in the middle of 1972, it was possible to lay the cornerstone ofthe first hotel. Given its size, however, it was obvious that it would not bein operation for at least two years. And even though it might seem incre-dible, the tourists were already beginning to arrive. The majority wereadventurers who had somehow heard the name Cancun, and, with theirbackpacks their only luggage, gone forth looking for it. But entire fami-lies also arrived and, once in a while, an organized group.

They did not find any place to sleep and their stays were plagued bydiscomforts. This situation inspired Jose Garcia de la Torre to put him-self at risk once more. Without thinking too much, he asked Daniel Ortizto draw up the plans for a minimal hotel, twelve rooms, almost entirelyconstructed of wood.

Ortiz was constructing a tourism city, but his knowledge of the hotelbusiness was nil. He himself knew that the design was a mistake: "Manypeople said that it looked like a shoe box and, well, it was quite ugly. Itlooked, shall we say, like. . . a shoe box. Fortunately it never got pastthe drawing board."

Actually, it was Enrfquez Savignac who in the final instance vetoed

the building. As soon as Garcia de la Torre presented himself to showhim the plans, the then-director of Infratur detected the many flaws. So-me had to do with the strength of the materials, others with the design ofthe property, yet others with financing problems and, finally, strong ob-jections could be made to the profitabity of a hotel of this size. Experien-ce demonstrates that a hotel of twelve rooms is always a bad business.

But Enrfquez Savignac had not spent so many years looking for in-vestors in order to allow the first candidate to escape. On the contrary, heconvinced Garcia de la Torre to embark on a much more ambitious ad-venture—a 72-room hotel on the beach, entirely designed by Fonaturtechnicians. And this offer included a package—not just the design, butalso the land and, in passing, a loan to get the property started.

Garcia de la Torre remained fascinated with the idea. Because he lac-

The most famous ofCancún's posters

Celebrated motifsof propaganda

ked sufficient resources, he went looking for partners. One of them washis nephew, Diego de la Peña, a well-known builder in Mexico City, whocounted among his achievements the urbanization of the sub-divisionBosques de las Lomas, considered a very difficult project because ofthe multi-level terrain.

This was the origin of Cancún's first formal hotel, the Playa Blanca,dedicated in September, 1974. The entire upper strata attended the ce-remony, but even this brilliant glare could not conceal the precariousoperating conditions. Recalls De la Peña, who became the owner of thehotel at last, "We weren't connected to the drinking water system, soFonatur had to deliver water daily by tank truck. We weren't connectedto the sewer system, so we had to construct rudimentary septic tanks.We weren't connected to the electrical system, so we had to install pro-visional generators to provide juice for the air conditioners."

Despite these annoyances, plans multiplied, and, as luck would haveit, not a single full-time hotelier participated in them. The next one to beinspired was Alberto Bojorquez, a travel agent, who began the construc-tion of a little 25-room hotel next to the Playa Blanca. Then Banamexpurchased one of the best properties on the island, Punta Cancun, des-tined to lodge a branch of the Camino Real. At about the same time, thepara- statal company Nacional Hotelera started up the construction ofthe Hotel Presidente. And, on the island's southern extreme, Infratur itself put up a semi- horizontal 300-room hotel which it had previouslyarranged to be operated by Club Mediterrane.

But Enriquez Savignac and his team understood perfectly that Can-cun would never function if they were unable to convince the hoteliers tojoin in the adventure. As a result, the experience of Playa Blanca wasrevived and adopted as an integrated system which left nothing to chan-ce. Infratur would define the sites, draw up the architectural plans of thehotels, even begin construction, and, en route, try to convince investors.

Stunts of engineering were a parallel strategy. They did not follow apredetermined standard, but gave excellent results. Daniel Ortiz recallsthe enormous effects produced by their spontaneity: "One weekend,Fernandez Hurtado dropped in with a group of investors. The coastalhighway just about reached the Cancun Caribe hotel, scarcely half-built,and the street abruptly ended in an unfinished dirt road. Fernandez Hur-tado commented that it looked awful, and his companions agreed. Thenthey went to the guest house to sleep. Well, it was a matter of workingall night. We sliced and levelled and filled and smoothed and, finally, weplanted a palm tree in the center. The sun rose on a highway perfectlyfinished in a perfect traffic circle. I believe that we dazzled them."

At the same time, Enriquez Savignac and Paz Paredes, promoted toadjunct director of Infratur, had decided to start a publicity campaign forthe new tourism center, at the international as well domestic levels. Toget it going, they hired Guillermo Grimm, a tourism promotion specialistwho until then had worked in the private sector.

Grimm carried out his work with extraordinary efficiency. Within a fewmonths after his appointment important quantities of visitors began toarrive in Cancún, among them some perfectly equipped golfers, withtheir bags and everything, when there was yet no golf course. Grimm'stalent also was the source of a poster that became world-famous—afootprint in the white sand of Cancún seconds before being erased bythe foam, with the turquoise sea as background.

On the other hand, it had to be recognized that the arrival of the gol-fers would have been better if more expected, but this was a result of thedelay in the construction of the course. The golf course was a goodexample of the pitfalls that the builders encountered on the way and thedoses of imagination required to resolve them. From the beginning, thedesign of the course had been assigned to an American expert, RobertTrent Jones. The choice resulted as expected. The course is smoothand harmonic, taking perfect advantage of the irregularities of passage

and containing many degrees of difficulty to delight duffers or professio-nals. The problems came later. Some of the subterranean brackish wa-ter currents practically touched the land surface and, with the changesof the tides, the low parts were flooded. The accumulated salt wound upkilling the turf.

Francisco Javier Alvarez was in charge of coming up with a solution:"We made infinite tests. We compacted the sand, lay down covers ofrock and earth, compacted again, filled some parts more and nothing.The brackish water continued to rise. Finally we discovered a totallyunexpected alternative. To begin, we forgot about topsoil. We plantedgrass directly on the sand. Then we flooded the sand with freshwater,with the aim of forming a cushion which impided the climb of saltwater.And this produced results. It's necessary to keep the subsoil of the cour-se soaking wet, but it works. The players never notice."

In this way, resolving problems on the way, Cancún took form. Thefirst cement skeletons were appearing on the coastal highway, their im-posing mass omen of the boom. The beach was being populated withhotels. Not far from these towers of recreation, however, a problem ofconsiderable importance was beginning to show its face. Even beforebirth, Cancún already had its "lost city."

Attraction of colonists and workers had exceeded all expectations. By1971, almost 6,000 people were living in camps, or, even worse, weresettling unregulated within the borders of the lands controlled by Infratur.Recalls Alfonso Alarcon, in charge of city planing: "I went to see Enri-quez Savignac and I explained the problem to him thoroughly. I told himthat we were going to create a precarious center that we were not goingto regularize even in twenty years. I believe that he understood the prob-lem, but our hands were tied. There was no way that we were going tohand over to the people urban land without water, without sewers, withelectricity. It would have been the same."

Part of the problem, of course, had been caused by the rigid norms ofInfratur and the project itself. This foresaw the creation of a perfect com-munity, basically middle-class, in which the regular inhabitants of Can-cun would live. But there was no place for the poor. And Mexico, simplyand plainly, is a country of the poor.

Enriquez Savignac gave Alarcon instructions to act pragmatically andthis, according to his own words, knocked down the barriers. He evenauthorized prices as low as ten pesos [less than a dollar] a square me-ter, with his superior's agreement, for buyers who could demonstratesufficient economic fragility. Among the other measures he took was therelocation of the spontaneous market which had formed in the outer re-aches of the city at the crossing of the Merida highway. It was called,precisely, "The Crossing."

Guillermo Grimm and theposters of Cancun

The urbanologists of Infratur found an original Mayanruin in what was to be the golf course. With great insight,

they decided to restore it and leave it in place, even thoughthis meant modifying the design of the course slightly.

Alarcon gives details of the move: "The construction of a definitivemarketplace, the 23, was foreseen. So I went and told the squatters atleast to move to the neighboring block, inside the Infratur line. I don'tknow if it was better or worse. Soon, the thing became a pigste for me.The booths piled up in an extraordinary way and this almost became aghetto, with all kinds of hiding places, secret illegal liquor outlets, hiddenprostitution. And it was the only place that you could go shopping. Peo-ple called it Calcutta, and it really did have a certain Asiatic flavor."

When the new marketplace was ready, of course, no one wanted tomove. The first had to be convinced, the next pressured, a few morethreatened, and the last removed by the police. While this was being re-solved, approximately a thousand heads of family were demanding lotsand Alarcon simply could not deliver them.

The real obstacle, however, was those who weren't even demanding.Alarcon recalls: "The plan never took into account the philosophy of theMayas of Quintana Roo. In the jungle, property is held in common. Onebuilds his house wherever he wishes, on any vacant site. It's been thatway for generations, for centuries. Now when they come to Cancun theyfind themselves in another world with rules that say that they have tobuy land and contract credit to pay for it and build according to certainspecifications and demonstrate previous solvency. And you know whathappens? They never understand it. But this is our problem, not theirs.It is we who should have foreseen this behavior."

Finally, after investigating a possible solution, in 1975 the Puerto Jua-rez Trust was created, with the exclusive mission of attacking the ava-lanche of the precarious. It was not an easy task. It constituted the firstcase in the history of the country in which a city, before being a city, al-ready had an urban cancer.

thetorridpassionofluisecheverria

IN 1970, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATELuis Echeverria had believed

that Cancun was a private business of Ortiz Mena. In 1974, everyone inMexico believed that Cancún was a private business of Luis Echeverria.

It is certain that Echeverria had fallen in love with Cancun. Versionsdiffer as to when he saw it for the first time. Martinez Ross believes thatit was in December 1970, during his first visit to the territory, when RojoGomez was still alive. Gutierrez Ruiz says that in May 1970 Echeverriabrought Costa Rican President Jose Figueres to see Cancun. But Josede Jesus Lima gives the most significant date, asserting that Echeverriawas part of a committee of officials that Lima himself guided to the de-serted island with promotional aims as early as 1964, when the futurePresident was Sub-Secretary of the Interior.

The fact of the matter is that he was enchanted. But his plans werenot limited to Cancun. Recalls the governor at the time, Gutierrez Ruiz:"The idea of converting the territory into a tree and sovereign state wasexclusively his. And he gave me instructions to work toward that end."

The four municipalitiesof the territory became

seven when it turnedinto a state. Shown in

shadow in the lowersketch, the new and

controversialmunicipality of Benito

Juarez, site of Cancun.

Echeverriareceived Costa

Rican PresidentJose Figueres in

Canciin, the firstforeign head ofstate to visit the

island.

There were a lot of things to be done. The census of 1979 had revea-led that Quintana Roo had no more than 255,000 inhabitants, not evenenough to have two Representatives. But the most serious problemsderived from the state's internal structure. In the first place was the dis-tribution of these few inhabitants, the majority of whom were concentra-ted in the south, engaged not very enthusiastically in agriculture.

Next, communications. Nothing existed that even resembled a coasthighway and normal traffic between the north and south of the state hadto take place via Yucatan. When Infratur's technicians arrived on the is-land, the then-Secretary of Public Works had begun construction of thePuerto Juarez-Tulum highway independently of the tourism project, butit advanced literally at turtle's pace. The jungle and the lack of mainte-nance destroyed the road faster than SOP could build it, a common phe-nomenon with all of the state's roads, which enjoyed a justified fame forinefficiency. During the time of Rojo Gomez, a local journalist urged theGovernor to widen the Merida-Chetumal highway, for the simple reasonthat the pot holes no longer fit.

To complicate things further, there were four free-trade perimeterswithin the state, that is, tax-free zones, open to international business—Chetumal, X-Calac, Cozumel and Isla Mujeres. And there were customshouses at the borders of all of them. Guitierrez Ruiz comments, "Theentire territory was dotted with sentry boxes. Not even the Quintana-roenses could move freely within their own territory."

Of course, the Cancun project made things a lot easier for the plan toconvert the territory into a state, practically resolving the entire future ofthe northern part—the coast to be dedicated to tourism and the innerareas to agriculture, oriented toward supplying the recreation centers.

The problem was the south. Even though Chetumal had excellentlogging areas nearby, it was relatively distant from the important cen-ters of consumption. At that time, Chetumal itself hardly totalled 43,000 in-habitants. Commerce was an unstable alternative. In neighboring Belize,the free zone operated without restrictions, so the only market that itcould capture with certainty would have been Yucatan.

Gutierrez Ruiz tried to resolve these matters step by step. Between

1971 and 1973 he re-started the Carrillo Puerto-Tulum highway, reuni-ting the coast with the rest of the state. In 1973, he convinced PresidentEcheverria to declare the entire territory a free trade zone, eliminatingthe obstacles to internal circulation and providing Cancun (which had

been outside the free trade perimeters) with yet another attraction.The most painful task turned out to be the Alvaro Obregon sugar mill,

conceived to develop the southern strip, an old plan which had beenabandoned during the time of Lopez Mateos: "I dedicated the greatestamount of time and energy to it. No one wanted it at the beginning, neit-her the Secretary of Agriculture, nor the Sugar Commission, nor thebanks. They said that the land wasn't suitable for it, in spite of the factthat experience demonstrated the contrary. And so I was grinding andgrinding with one and another, almost persecuting them. PresidentEcheverria once admonished me harshly,'You're very stubborn, Mr.Governor,' when i put forth the matter for the hundredth time. And Isaid,'I am stubborn, Mr. President, because I know that this is good forQuintana Roo.'"

It was not strange that the idea would provoke such resistance. Theproject contemplated the construction of a mill with the capacity to pro-cess a million tons annually, which would make it at one stroke the mostimportant in the Southeast and one of the ten most important in thecountry. All the sugar cane was to come from the surrounding coopera-tives, whose production frequently did not meet expectations. Despite e-verything, Gutierrez Ruiz got all the necessary signatures, and in 1974the construction of the monster began.

With this, President Echeverrfa judged it advantageous to acceleratethe formal conversion of the territory. The formalities were rigorously ob-served. The Federal Congress authorized the Governor to convoke aConstituent Congress, whose management was assigned to a veryyouthful Cozumel politician, Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, scarcely 24 yearsold. Following an outline created by Guitierrez Ruiz, the delegates wrotethe local Constitution, dividing the state politically into seven sub-divisions, removing Cancun from the jurisdiction of Isia Mujeres and as-signing its headquarters to the new municipality of Benito Juarez.

The affair excited enormous controversies. The inhabitants of IslaMujeres, who al.eady felt injured when the option of puttting the pro-ject's seat of government there had been discarded, now faced raw re-ality. Their municipality would be curtailed and the most productive areawould become independent. To top it off, the map created by David Gus-tavo's administration tore away all of Isla Mujeres' mainland territory and

Echeverria and DavidGustavo inspect publicworks in the hotel zone,accompanied by JulioHirschfield Almada andJulio Sanchez Vargas. Inthe background, AntonioEnriquez Savignac, thenDirector of Infratur.

David Gustavo Gutierrez Ruiz

ARCHIVO GARCIA DE LA TORRE

In front of the house ofPresident Echeverria under

construction, engineerGarcía de la Torre explains

the functioning of the Mayanarch to the President.

Observing are Jose CampilloSaenz, Jesus Castaneda andLucha García de Campillo

Saenz. In the rear in the rightcorner, in impressive

platform sandals,Rosa Luz Alegria.

imprisoned the municipality of Isla Mujeres within the limits of the island.Pedro Joaquin had to negotiate an agreement: "An assembly was ca-

lled on the island. All the bigshots were there, set for war—the Limas,the Pastranas, the Magafias. The truth is they were right. A good part ofthe mainland properties belonged to the islanders and, in case the terri-torial lines were modified, they would have to come to terms with a fara-way municipality. They understood the ceding of Cancun as painful butinevitable. What they were fighting about was the rest, so we modifiedthe design and achieved a more coherent partition."

To succeed himself, Gutierrez Ruiz suggested the candidacy of Mar-tinez Ross and Martinez Ross demonstrated complete satisfaction withthe suggestion. For Mayor of Cancun, Gutierrez Ruiz suggested thecandidacy of Alfonso Alarcon.. . and Martinez Ross demonstrated ab-solute dissatisfaction with the suggestion. Despite this, for GutierrezRuiz, the decision's pragmatism was irreproachable: "Cancun was tooyoung a project, and required special care. Who better to exercise itthan those who had built it step by step and who understood it in depth?"

The outcome appeared logical to Alfonso Alarcon: "As the one incharge of the project for Fonatur—Infratur and a little fund of NacionalFinancera called Fogatur had merged in 1974 to form Fonatur, still un-der the baton of Enriquez Savignac—I had become the authority de fac-to if not dejure. For example, when we had a wave of robberies, Iinformed the authorities and what they did was send some police andput them under my command. I handed out the licenses for booths in themarket, for opening businesses, for the sale of food and so on. Also Iwas in charge of turning over land. I was a kind of mayor—In quotationmarks."

Moreover, the candidate's selection had nothing less than Presiden-tial endorsement: "I had never been a politician, nor did I know how tohandle that sort of thing. David Gustavo had already asked me if I wouldaccept, but in a way that I could not reject. One day I was summoned toa dinner at Casa Maya, you know, one of those action-filled dinners ofEcheverria, with half the cabinet and everything. To top it off, I arrived la-te and—Lord save me!--they seated me next to the President. The din-ner was an interrogation. The President in person was subjecting me toan examination and I was trying to answer the best I could. Finally,Echeverria stopped cross-examining me and began conversing with ot-her people. I was in no way sure of how it had gone for me, except tothink that he had flunked me, but at the end of the dinner Jesus ReyesHeroles, then PRI's president, approached me and roguishly said,'Hello,Mr. Mayor."

Of course, when a President of the Republic shows so much interestin a town of 8,500 inhabitants as personally to select its municipal presi-dent, it's plausible to suppose that his concern goes beyond the limits ofgood government. And the rumor spread like wildfire—Cancun was anEcheverrfa business. Even today, this is a well-accepted commonplace.

Is it true? Enriquez Savignac believes that the rumor is unfounded:"Infratur-Fonatur controlled the sale of land and I believe that specula-tion was avoided to the maximum. Clearly some cases can be g iven-people who bought and never built, as always, and later sold at greatprofit. But I am sure that no one could have done that on a large scale.Moreover, Echeverria openly purchased property on the beach and builthis house on it. And he paid us to the last cent."

The house in question, registered on the name of his daughter,Maria Esther, is certainly splendid. The 2,400 meters of land lodge a

The house of Echeverriain all its magnificence.The residence occupies asite of 2,400 squaremeters, with a spectacularbeach frontage.

very ample garden and the architectural design takes advantage of themulti-leveled site to descend in step-by- step terraces to the beach. So-me of the windows and doors are constructed according to the techni-que of the Mayan arch, which confers a touch of originality on theproperty. The decor obeyed the affection which the President always feltfor austerity. The complex is far from being ostentatious, although its di-mensions are quite respectable.

To top it off, Echeverria has decided to make life difficult for the gos-sips. If he does have business interests, they are well hidden. And thehouse, his only publicly-known property, was sold at the beginning of1985 to Jim Plante, a Texan millionaire. Perhaps it pained the President

to let go off his little fief, but the price must have been a consolation—amillion dollars, on one showing, in cash.

of loveaffairs,forgetfulness,reverses,and failure

W ITHOUT PREVIOUS NO-

tice, without any ce-remony, the members of the Presidential staff would show up in theoffice of the mayor of Cancun.

"Licenciado Alarcon, Mr. President is waiting for you."Go in a sudden trip to Villas Tacul, where the President usually stayed.

Echeverria was accustomed to arriving on impulse, no welcoming com-mittee or escort, usually on Saturday. He was accompanied by hisdaughter-in-law, Rosa Luz Alegria, acting in the place of secretary. Itwas strikingly unusual— direct contact between the President of Mexicoand the mayor of a town with a population of 8,500.

"I have seen garbage piled up on the sidewalks, licenciado. I see so-me dirty streets. . ."

"We don't have sanitation equipment, Mr. President. We've requisi-

tioned it, but. . ."

AlfonsoAlarcon

first mayorof Cancun.

Guillermo Rossell

Romarico Arroyo

Mario Mova Palencia

"What do you need?""Basically, five garbage trucks and a sweeper.""And how much does this cost?""Plenty.""Take a memo, Rosa Luz. . . "In a few days, Mario Ramon Beteta

then Secretary of Finance, would be calling, half-serious, half-joking, fo-llowing the instructions he had received: "Licenciado Alarcon, I'm goingto plead with you not to bother Mr. President with your provincial pro-blems. Call me and I will take care of you with great pleasure. Ah, yes, Ihave here a check for the trucks and the sweeper. . ."

But Alarcon continued bothering, Echeverrfa listening, Rosa Luz ta-king notes and, in a few days, Mario Ramon Beteta calling. In this way,Cancun obtained a firehouse and fire-fighting equipment, buildings forthe police, Federal Highway Patrol and Conasupo [the government-sponsored supermarket chain], the Alfredo V. Bonfil School, the RedCross hospital, immigration offices, Markets 23 and 28 [numbered afterthe super-manzanas in which they are located]. . .

State Governor Jesus Martinez Ross did not like it one bit. Not onlywas he being jumped over, but also the President's constant interven-tions were provoking a fracture in the incipient local political order: "Can-cun had become a state within a state. It was Fonatur that was makingall the decisions. And Alfonso Alarcon was a Fonatur person. Fonaturwas not paying taxes on hotel properties. Fonatur established theamount of the property taxes in the urban area. Fonatur was in controlof the state tax collection department. Fonatur said when and where. Infact, the state government was forced to sign an agreement ceding tothe municipality its power to issue construction permits."

Taking the other side into account, this judgment was perhaps a littleexaggerated. Recalls Alarcon: "I was between two currents, betweenthe wishes of the governor and those of Fonatur. And I tried to act aswhom I was supposed to be, mayor of Cancun, elected by the people.So I had my run-ins with Martinez Ross, but also with Enrfquez Savig-nac. Even I have to acknowledge one thing—they both behaved likegentlemen. They always respected my mission, and never directedwords appearing to be orders at me. Each one simply wanted to pull forhis own side."

Moreover, it wasn't absolutely strange that control of Cancun was ge-nerating such a tug of war. Growth of development had passed all ex-pectations and it was on its way to becoming the most important city inthe state. In exactly seven years, since the establishment of the first en-campments in January, 1970, to the end of the Echeverrfa regime, Infra-tur had realized truly impressive accomplishments. The hotels alignedalong the length of the coast road now totalled 23 and the number ofrooms exceeded original predictions. The international airport had beeninaugurated in 1973 and several American and European lines werenow operating regularly, along with the two domestic airlines. The coastroad had been completed, even though the airport spur only had one la-ne. And in the city, 1,600 houses were being completed—sufficient tohouse some 8,000 persons—but the urban infrastructure and serviceswere capable of supporting 25,000 inhabitants. But the most surprisingwas the efficiency of operation. In 1976, Fonatur had only 195 emplo-yees.

Such were things in 1976 when the Governor's Meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank took place in Cancun. The bank had fi-nanced the development. Significantly, it was presided over by AntonioOrtiz Mena, the Secretary of Finance who had authorized the project.More than a thousand bankers attended the meeting. Special audito-riums had to be set up, as that many persons could not fit even in theConvention Center. But the meeting had an obvious reason—todemonstrate to the world the biggest and best success obtained from anIDB loan.

A few months later, Echeverria's term came to its end. Enriquez Sa-

During Rosa LuzAlegria'sadministration ofSectur, futuristichigh-speed hydrofoilswere put into service,uniting Cancún andneighboring Cozumel.Unfortunately,someone forgot theforce of the waves inthe marine channelseparating the twocoasts, a decisiveoperating factor forthese kinds of vessels.As a result, the shipsremained in port morethan half the time,whether for repairs orbecause of badweather. They werefinally sent toVeracruz, where theyalso failed. Some yearslater, the giganticinvestment was worthonly its weight as junk.

vignac was promoted to Sub-Secretary of Tourism and the directorshipof Infratur was assigned to Romarico Arroyo, a qualified professional infinances who had joined the team in 1972 to manage the credit opera-tions in which the fund directly intervened.

The matter appeared to function under a certain surface calm duringthe first year. But a silent war was taking place. The new Secretary ofTourism, Guillermo Rossell de la Lama, did not sympathize entirely withthe founders of Cancun. He went to war against them and harvested re-signations—Enriquez Savignac, Romarico Arroyo, Pedro Donde, Gui-llermo Grimm, Oscar Corral, Martinez Juarez, Kemil Rizk.

During the succeeding years, Fonatur followed an erratic course. Jo-se Antonio Murillo, Arroyo's successor, considered the instructions hereceived so arbitrary that he wound up opposing the secretary of thebranch himself. Rossell fired him and substituted in his place, MiguelAngel Reta, but forgot a required procedure—consult with the Presi-dent. Lopez Portillo fired Reta and handed over the Fund to Mario MoyaPalencia, who had been his strongest competition for the presidentialnomination. Moya put the house in order, but at the same time, conver-ted it into his political sanctuary and created an enormous number of di-rectorships and consultancies for his group, with the inevitable chargesof bureaucracy which such conduct implies. Finally, Rossell was relie-ved by Rosa Luz Alegrla, at the middle of the term, who added her doseof whimsey to an already chaotic and confused situation.

Rosa LuzAlegria

ALMAMAQUE DE MEXICO

ALMANAQUE DE MEXICO

Jesus MartinezRoss, firstgovernor

of the state.

FelipeAmaro

Santana

Things had also changed with reference to Cancun. Alfonso Alarconhad lost his protector and Lopez-Portillo always treated him frostily. L6-pez-Portillo was aware of the development from its beginnings. As Pre-sidential Sub-Secretary in 1969, he had authorized the specialentitlements that had permitted the project to be started up. He alwaysdemonstrated a certain disaffection for Cancun's luck, however, and thisattitude was not modified by his arrival at the top. Thus the pressures onthe municipal president intensified, as much on the part of Fonatur aswell as the local government. Alarcon exploded. He went to Mexico andverbally resigned before Jesus Reyes Heroles, Secretary-designate ofthe Interior in the new regime. The old politician handled the situationskillfully. He consoled him as well as he could and sent him home.

At the bottom, the struggle was for the succession in Cancun. Thenew authorities at Fonatur wanted a mayor who would represent theirinterests. Therefore they were supporting a more-or-less spontaneousmovement promoting the candidacy of Rafael Lara y Lara, the engineerwho had been the first technician to settle in Cancun. As well as knowingthe project like the back of his hand, Lara had become a kind of leaderof the original colonists, who had in turn gathered in an informal asso-ciation.

But Martinez Ross had other plans. The gradual distancing of Cancunhad transcended the limits of political disagreement and was visibly af-fecting the social management of the state. In fact, open resentmentagainst Cancun was being created. . right in Quintana Roo! In Chetu-mal, in Cozumel, even in Isla Mujeres, people considered the interven-tion of the official dependencies excessive and labeled the new centersomething rather alien to local interests.

The PRI's general delegate in the area, Victor Cervera Pacheco,diagnosed the situation accurately. Another Fonatur municipal presidentwould win in Cancun, but would be highly unpopular in the rest of thestate. The best was to have recourse to a conciliator, and the selectionfell on the then-president of the Court of Justice, Felipe Amaro Santana.

Like any good conciliator, Amaro Santana arrived on the field of battleready for war. Martinez Ross had already made an inelegant gesture athis own inauguration, commenting in front of a group of journalists thatwith the change, at last, he now felt in Quintana Roo. Amaro's inauguralspeech took the same tone—regain Cancun for the state, supposedlyfrom the hands of Fonatur. So he started his term furiously. The fol-lowing day, he jailed four Fonatur employees who were wanderingabout drunkenly making a racket. He kept them prisoners the entirenight and made them pay an adminstrative fine. Immediately after, hesummoned the local head of Fonatur and warned him that the excesseswould have to end.

What never ended was Amaro's belligerent attitude, suddenly trans-formed into a medieval warrior in his crusade against Fonatur. The newadministration traded conciliation for direct confrontation, with terribleresults for the city. For example, Amaro "ordered" Fonatur to turn the pu-blic beaches over to the municipality, but since the law forbide the fidei-comisosio unilaterally cede their holdings, his demand was justifiablyignored, with the consequent deterioration of his public image. Withoutfurther ado, he sponsored a trespass and, violating all ordinances, aut-horized the operation of a cantina at Playa Langosta.

He did more impudent things. One fine day he informed the directorof Fonatur that he had decided to close the coast highway and the workof enlargement being carried out, because they did not have the requi-red municipal permission. His listener had no more to do than to makea call to Mexico. That same night, Amaro was summoned to Mexico toexplain his conduct. In any case, tangling with his assaults consumedmuch more energy and time than they deserved.

His executive achievements, moreover, were quite modest. Amaroset in motion a program called Social Integration and National Identity,which theoretically tried to get the people of Cancun to acquaint them-selves with their roots and identify with them, even though they were na-tional, as local ones did not exist. The program encouraged acarnival—which still hasn't taken fire—the organization of the first regio-nal fair (1980), the creation of a radio station, Radio City Hall, and theerection of an enormous monument to Mexican history, re-baptized"The Blender" by Cancunenses (equal fortune of the monuments to Jo-se Marti—"The Bananas"—and the North-South Meeting Commemora-tive—"The Insectronic").

Amaro's program also included a campaign of regional baptisms.

Amaro and Cubansculptor Jose cleLarra pose in frontof the Monument ofthe History ofMexico,mischievously re-baptized "TheBlender" by theCancun community.

EXCELSIOR

Rafael Lara,soul of the pioneer

residents'group.

Thus on the original old baseball stadium they imposed the name of Ja-cinto Canek; upon the municipal auditorium for social events, that of Ce-cilio Chi; a sports park, Venancio Pec, and so on in like style. Everythingseemed to be going along fine when a Cancun lady, fed up with so muchindigenous nomenclature, confronted the municipal president in a res-taurant and publicly demanded that he call off the Saints Day epidemic.If you like those names so much, she told him, give them to your chil-dren.

Despite his mistaken behavior, given the factionalism so common toour political system, Amaro Santana was convinced he had done a goodjob. In the end, all he had done was carry out the governor's instruc-tions, attempting to put reins on Fonatur. Clearly, this had caused cer-tain friction and his popularity was hovering at pavement level, but it wasevident that he merited a great reward. Something as great, perhaps, asthe great. . .

This was the situation on the 24th of November, 1980, when a dinner

CHRISTA COWRIE

was celebrated in the Cecilio Chi salon attended by some 200 persons.Presiding, Governor Martinez Ross, Mayor Amaro Santana, and specialinvited guest Enriquez Savignac. The motive of the party, the first tenyears of Cancun. Lara y Lara had reunited the original colonists and ithad been arranged to give them diplomas. They were involved in thiswhen unexpected news arrived from Chetumal. The Party sectors hadjust finished nominating Pedro Joaquin Coldwell for next Governor.

vacationarena,diplomaticarena

D1 ESPITE HIS HUMBLE ORIGINS,

Rodolfo Leal Moguel hashad the luck of knowing an impressive number of the world's importantpersonalities. Few Mexicans could presume to a similar list—the Shahof Iran, Marshall Tito, Indian president Zail Singh, his German counter-part Walter Scheel, banker Jacques de Laroisiere, King Gustave ofSweden, Premier Gaston Thorn of Luxemburg, Prince Faisal of SaudiArabia, Brazilian president Figueiredo, Henry Kissinger, Robert MacNa-mara. . .

In the field of letters, he has been introduced to individuals of themeasure of Nicolas Guillen, Julio Cortazar and Gabriel García Márquez.Nor has he neglected more frivolous activities. Recently he accompa-nied vacationing Dodgers pitcher Fernando Valenzuela.

At the national level, Leal Moguel has served his turns at the top, ha-ving taken care of four Mexican presidents—Miguel Aleman, Luis Eche-

Rudi andhis boat

CHRISTA COWRIE

The diplomaticpersistence of the charrosombrero: Fidel Castro,

Maragret Thatcher,Ferdinand Marcos.

ARCHIVO RAFAEL LARA

verria, Jose Lopez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid. Today he knows theentire cabinet personally and recalls dozens of tasty anecdotes featu-ring national political stars. Of course he speaks respectfully of all ofthem, but in his heart he has chosen a favorite for the next presidentialrace.

The curious thing is that Rodolfo Leal Moguel—Rudi, to everyone—has developed so many relationships in one house, the Fonatur guesthouse in Cancun. Rudi and the property have a common history. Theyhave been together since the first stone was laid, brought to the coast inRudi's own launch, back in 1968.

Since then, Rudi has been the informal host of the house—chief ste-ward, head of maintenance, chief of security, kitchen supervisor, emer-gency lifesaver, distinguished visitors' guide, all these posts carriedout—never officially—with a masterful sense of improvization.

In reality, it was Rudi's lot to live the parallel history of Cancun, a tro-pical paradise suddenly converted into a diplomatic arena—summitmeetings. In its short life—the first hotel hardly in operation elevenyears—Cancun had received more than fifty heads of state.

Rudi's list is incomplete. It does not include the King and Queen ofSpain, nor Reagan, nor Mitterand, nor Indira Gandhi, nor Queen Eliza-beth, nor Sandra Pertini, nor Olof Palme, nor dozens more of those na-mes that shine so well in headlines. Moreover with so many celebritiesin the hotels together, the people of Cancun have wound up surfeitedwith importance. They simply treat them like anyone else.

With one exception. . .One visit jolted the people, aroused controversies, revived Panameri-

can dreams.Felipe Amaro Santana, then municipal president, recalls that mo-

ment: "Cancun went crazy. Hundreds of people poured out to the Hotel

Zone to see him. They went by truck, on bicycle, on foot, however theycould. It was as if an idol had appeared."

Fidel Castro, in flesh and blood.Amaro continues, "The gringo tourists were petrified. For them, ima-

gine, it was the Devil in person. After they had time to react, they wantedto touch him and get his autograph and greet him. But it's something dif-ficult to describe. Fidel has a magnetism that you have to feel to belie-ve."

Castro arrived by yacht at Cozumel and later flew to Tulum, where hevisited the ruins. From there he moved to Cancun. In order to reducerisk, they considered it useful to make this last leg by helicopter, landingon the golf course right in front of the Hotel Presidente. Any other waywould have required guarding many kilometers of highway from the in-ternational airport. Afterwards, all this precaution turned out to be use-less.

Amaro again: "The people broke through the barriers and got nearhim. According to plan, Fidel was to arrive at the hotel in less than fiveminutes from landing. But with the crowds, it took more than a half hour.And this happened throughout the visit. Wherever he went, people werewaiting. No one had to bring them out in busses."

Castro left and calm returned. . momentarily. Eight days later Presi-dent Lopez Portillo returned to receive his Costa Rican colleague, Ro-drigo Carazo Odio. And, by surprise, in a declaration issued in the mainreception area of the Camino Real, broke off relations with Somozan Ni-

A warm reception forPresident Reagan.

caragua.The international battle that drove Cancun completely crazy was the

one in which twenty-three of the nations from the world's most diverselatitudes played the leading role on the occasion of the North-SouthMeeting of October, 1981, celebrated in the installations of the SheratonHotel. The preparations began years in advance.Alejandro Cardini, at that time public relations director of the local

government.remembers the schism: "Cancun took a spectacular leapforward, because they constructed in months things that had been awai-ted for years. Which? Well, the peripheral road which goes around thelagoon was completed, the Social Security hospital was constructedand endowed with the most advanced equipment, the entire Hotel Zone

The Presidents ofContadora, in July 1983,in front of Caneunpalapas: BelisarioBetancur, Luis HerreraCampins, Miguel de laMadrid, Ricardo de laSpriella.

uNOMASUNO

The North-SouthMeeting made life in

Cancun dizzy for a coupleof weeks. The security

measures around theSheraton were extreme,

not strange whentwenty-four heads of state

met at the same table for

was illuminated, the water treatment plants enlarged, the airport installa-tions improved and the runway lengthened, and a television station wasconstructed."

If the city changed, so did the Sheraton, needless to say, seat of theevent. Recalls sub-manager Alfredo Castro, "The hotel was physicallyoccupied by the government. They painted different areas different co-lors—blue, red, green—and gave us all access badges. All the entran-ces had metal detectors. The entire hotel was surrounded by soldiers,and two Mexican warships were stationed at the beach. Meanwhile, he-licopters and planes were making reconnaissance flights over the areaevery few minutes."

The hotel lobby was totally transformed. Walls were turn down, othersthrown up, and an interior garden planted, with vegetation flown in fromMexico City. All the commercial areas were turned into rest zones for theworld leaders, and some of the banquet salons were fitted out as press

UNOMASUNO

rooms. The entire conference area was laid with sky blue carpet broughtby plane from Mexico City—and furnished with sea blue couches—sa-me origin, same method—within a few hours. A suite and ten rooms we-re assigned to each delegation, two or three of which were convertedinto offices, requiring additional telephone and telex installations.According to Castro, Reagan was the most exceeded: "Not content with

the security measures, their own metal detectors were brought and pla-ced in front of the door of their suite. Inside the room were situated thesecurity agents with six German shepherds trained to detect arms andexplosives. They also brought an immense desk and had to remove adoor to get it inside the room, supposedly for bilateral talks."

The Reagan desk was well-visited right away. The whole world hasmatters pending with the United States. Other leaders, less sought- af-ter, enjoyed the beauty of the island more. Some never even appearedto leave home. Ferdinand Marcos, virtual dictator of the Philippines,used to spend all his afternoons closed up in his room consulting with

A photograph that wentaround the world,taken on the grounds of theFonatur Guest House. In front:Ronald Reagan (United States),Simeon Ake (Ivory Coast),Mohammad Huq (Bangladesh),Benjedid Chadli (Algeria),Hans-Dietrich Genscher (WestGermany), Pierre ElliotTrudeau (Canada), Jose LopezPortillo (Mexico), Fahd BinAbdul (Saudi Arabia), Willebald

his faraway ministers.Castro adds an anecdotal aspect: "The worst mess was food. Each

head of state brought his own chef and his own foods. During the officialbanquets, of course, they all ate the same, but during the rest of the timeit was each to his own taste. Think about only that—twenty-four chefs,each with four or five assistants, all accustomed to command in theirown countries, and here all put in the same kitchen. The Indian was figh-ting with the American, the Frenchman with the Chinese, the Venezue-lan with the Swedie, and so on."

The Mexican government, in any case, took care of making amendsto the owners of the hotel for all this annoyance. The bill it paid after aweek of fuss amounted to the equivalent of a million dollars.

Pahr (Austria), Ramiro Saravia(Brazil), Zhao Ziyang (China)and Ferdinand Marcos(Philippines). Standing: SergejKraigher (Yugoslavia), JuliusNyerere (Tanzania), MargaretThatcher (Great Britain), ZenkoSuzuki (Japan), Lyr Jon Forbes(Guyana), Francois Mitterrand(France), Indira Gandhi (India),Alhaji Shehu (Nigeria),Thdrbjorn Falldin (Sweden),Luis Herrera Campins(Venezuela) and KurtWaldheim (United Nations).

CHRISTA COWRIE

The gauntlet onAvenida Tulum

threefacesofcancun

TODAY, NOT ONE CANCUNexists, but rather three.

The first is the Hotel Zone, the narrow urbanized strip that once was adeserted island—around 6,000 hotel rooms which lodge a little morethan 750,000 tourists annually.

The second, the city planned by Fonatur. It has somewhat more than35,000 inhabitants, is organized into super-blocks, a modern urban con-cept that enormously facilitates providing services.

And the third, Puerto Juarez, the lost city, the misery belt of Cancun,something like 60,000 inhabitants with deficient services of potable wa-ter, electricity, land title, garbage collection and, especially, sewers.

The present municipal president, Joaquin Gonzalez Castro, does notlike such an arbritary division: "There is only one Cancun and one poorlydistributed wealth which is the origin of many contrasts. And without in-

The downtownrestaurants

battle forcustomers.

Some of thetricks used-sing

menus, ringwelcome bells,

applaud the diners.

Cancun today is home to alittle more than 100,000

Mexicans, a community thathas become the third largestcity on the peninsula. In the

photograph, the urbanconglomerate can be seen in

the foreground, the HotelZone and the Caribbean in

the distance.

dulging in demagogic illusions, we are integrating the marginal zones atvery good speed."

In any case, the division is not capricious. Poverty begins almostexactly where Avenida Lopez Portillo ends, that is, the old border of theareas controlled by Fonatur. At the border where Federal control ended,spontaneous settlement began.

Recalls Alfonso Alarcon, first municipal president (1975-78): "Theproblem clearly overflowed on us. We did a little, but the people cameas if attracted by a magnet. When I became mayor, we were 8,500when I left, almost 25,000. Triple in three years. . ."

During this time, the Fideicomiso Puerto Juarezwas created, (the Puer-to Juarez Trust), an organism in which Fonatur and the state participated,covering an area of 60,000 hectares comprising the old Santa Maria Ha-denda.The main effort consisted on regularization, which reached a satis-factory rate. But there were no resources for much more.

Felipe Amaro Santana succeeded Alarcon in the municipal govern-ment (1978-81): "When I made my electoral campaign, the Colonia wasan endless line of pot holes. They looked like battle trenches, severalmeters deep.When it rained they were real death traps. An automobilewould easily fit inside."

The second step was paving. In order to avoid cyclical flooding, thestreets were artificially raised above the surrounding terrain by means ofartificial fill. It was a good solution for the streets, but a disaster for thehouses, because upon being surrounded by avenues which acted likedikes, the blocks became artificial lakes.

During the term of Martinez Ross the state government did not de-monstrate very much enthusiasm of any kind for the Colonia. They weredealing with a Fonatur planning error, of course. It was not a pleasanttask to pay the bill for cleaning it up.

In 1982, at the direction of new governor Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, thelocal government set in operation a program called New Horizons,which essentially consisted of providing basic services and housing.And during four years almost all the fiscal surplus of Cancun was absor-bed by the project, as were considerable state resources as well. In theopinion of the mayor, "New Horizons is the nation's most ambitious ur-ban rehabilitation and development project, involving in the solution ofthe problem all units at all three levels of government.

As a result, Cancun today continues to have a lost city, but it is theleast lost city in the country. The water network has been extended to 90per cent; electricity, 100 per cent, and pavement to 80 per cent, while re-gularization of land ownership reaches 95 per cent.

The installation of the networks, of course, does not necessarily sig-nify that all the homes have all services. The water system does exist,but many houses are not hooked up. The same thing has happened withelectricity. Street lights function, but the interiors of many houses are stillilluminated by oil lamps.

Gonzalez Castro asserts: "It's a phase. It would be absurd for us tohave gotten this far and be held back. But the problem of resourcesdoes exist. The majority of the people now own their own land and arepaying for it. They also have to pay for services, and installing water in

The construction boom hasbeen a constant in theexistence of Cancun. Andcolor has been another.Even the public housing ofthe New Horizons programtestifies to the chromaticexuberance of tropical

CHRISTA COWRIE

Whole armies ofmasons andlaborers are

recruited in thelabor market. Inmany specialties

(plaster, plumbing,carpentry) there is

a chronic scarcity ofqualified personnel

and wages haveclimbed to very

high levels.

the home is not cheap today. We have public water outlets where theycan go and supply themselves, so they can have water meanwhile."

The Puerto Juarez colony has absorbed a little more than 4.6 billionpesos during the last three years [since 1982, say $10 million US in ave-rage 82-85 pesos] from federal and local resources. The gravest prob-lem remains to be resolved, sewers. The subsoil in the settlement hasturned out to be a very resistant layer of rock. Consequently, the insta-llation of sewer lines requires the use of explosives. The alternative, pickand shovel, is extremely tedious.

Because there are no sewers, almost the entire population of the Coloniadefecates outside. The municipal government has started a programof constructing septic tanks, authorizing very accessible loans to ho-meowners, but success has been limited. In the past year, only 500 sep-tic tanks were installed and nothing indicates an accelerated rate in thefuture. The deficit is now calculated to be 4,000 tanks, so the problem offecalwaste does not appear to have a solution in sight.

The current director of Aeromexico, Sigfrido Paz Paredes, conside-red the problem at its beginning and today records his memory of the re-sults: "There has never been a project that hasn't suffered changeswhile in progress. This is valid for a simple house, a thousand times mo-re so for a complete city. Because Cancun had a part that wasn't plan-ned, we had to re-plan and inject large doses of imagination andenthusiasm. After Fonatur, the local government has done a great job.They have adopted novel plans and propelled them decisively. I believethat the Puerto Juarez problem is a problem on the way to being sol-ved."

One of the measures has been to stop looking at the Colonia as anisolated problem and seek integrated solutions for the entire urban com-plex. This task is partially the responsibility of a coordinating commis-sion headed by Jorge Lobo, head of operations with respect to theMunicipal Urban Development Plan. In his opinion, the panorama is fa-vorable: "Some problems are being solved. The rate of water delivery,presently 3.5 cubic meters per second, guarantees the demand until1988. Putting in sewers is a question of time. The routing was complica-ted for us, but in the new neighborhoods we have restored the traditionalgrid, less expensive than the original. In my judgment, the principle cha-llenge will be to accomodate hotel zone growth to the urban zone's."

The search for this balance confronts some problems: "There aremany departments that have voice and vote, and this complicates mat-ters. Each one has its own priorities, its criteria, its norms and its method

of killing fleas. And so sometimes we get in each other's way."The excess of departments is especially notorious in the hotel strip.

First, the ocean, which as an ecological reserve, is the responsiblity ofSedue [Secretary of Ecology and Urban Development]. Then the twentymeters of federal zone, assigned to the Maritime Secretary. Then thehotels, regulated by Sectur. The municipality controls the coast highway,but the gardens in the dividing malls continue to be Fonatur area. Afterthis comes the lagoon, Sedue again, and to this it would be necessaryto add the service suppliers—water, the state government; electricity,Federal Electricity Commission; gas, direct with Pemex. Gonzalez Cas-tro comments: "No doubt so many participants do make municipal lifevery complex."

Much further from the urban problems—in some ways in commonwith other Mexican cities—there was a cultural phenomenon in Cancunworth noting—worth a full depth study, in fact—which cuts directly intothe community social profile: the incorporation into Mexican society ofthe Maya of Quintana Roo.

Since the end of the War of the Castes, the Mayas of Quintana Rooand a good part of the eastern and southern areas of Yucatan have livedin a virtually complete state of isolation. Cancun—and the series ofroads built around it—broke the shell and made possible the indigenouscountry folk's entrance into civilization. But it was too abrupt a change.

Daniel Ortiz recalls the organization of the first encampment: "In thesecond week of work a group of workers arrived, about 80 chicleros.They're strong men, accustomed to heavy work, and so I was happy.But of the 80, only three spoke Spanish. The other 77. Maya. And sothat they could understand me—we were clearing bush, each man as-signed a designated area—I had to fasten strings to the trees and ex-plain to each one in sign language what they meant."

Pioneer resident Jorge Gleason: "The first telephone in Cancun waslocated in my house, and, of course, it became a communal apparatus.Everyone made and received calls there. During the day, we answered,but at night we assigned a Maya. Curiously, during the day many peoplecalled, but no one at night. Finally, it occurred to me one day to ask theman on duty if he was sure that no one had called. 'No one,' he replied.'You're sure the telephone never rang?' I insisted. 'It rang,' he told me.It rang all night.' The telephone rang, but he didn't know that he had toanswer it."

The first months are the hardest. Even though many country peoplespeak in Spanish, they really think in Maya. So they say things such as"I looked for it and didn't look for it," wishing to say "I looked for it but Idid not find it," because only one word is used for both actions in Maya.Or, equally, "I will lend you a shovel," wishing to say, "Lend me a shovel,"according to the correct formula in their language. The Mayan countryfolk, called mayitas with a certain perjorative flavor, literally jumped cen-

Many fortunes havegrown parallel withCancun: Abid Burad inhis auto businesscenter, Santiago Pizanoin sporty repose,Cotty Trujillo andfamily at a reception intheir hotel.

The two ends of theseven: Piinia Cancun

above, at the angleformed by the two

lines; and Puma Nizucat the base of

the islet. The numberof hotels

correspondingto the first stage

contrasts markedlywith the relativeisolation of Club

Mediterrane.

Carlos Constandse

turies when they left their jungle habitat and joined the world of Cancun.Other country-folk don't have so many problems. In fact, many have

found in Cancun the Mexican version of the Promised Land, a virgin te-rritory replete with possibities and achievements. The stories are as va-ried as they are similar:

Punished by his father, Cotty Trujillo arrived in Cancun twelve yearsago, at the wheel of a dump truck. In the jargon of construction they arecalled dumpers and earn by piecework, transporting loads of sand andgravel. Trujillo did more turns than anyone. Today he's owner of theCotty, a 60-room hotel, which leaves him sufficient time and money todedicate himself to his favorite business, a marina.

Another dumper, Santiago Pizano, arrived in Cancun with two oldtrucks, two new children and his wife. His present business, MaterialesPizano, specializing in the construction line, is billing several million pe-sos a month.

Adib Burad Cabrera sought a sentimental refuge in Cancun after a di-sappointment in love in his native Campeche. Son of the owner of anautomobile parts outlet, Burad quickly repaired dozens of vehicles thatremained halted for weeks for lack of parts. He opened what was thenthe port's first auto parts supply and, in a few years, was a millionaire.The business was too small for him and so he sold it and dedicated afew vears to real estate. In a few weeks he will open an automotive bu-

siness center he owns in Cancun.Manuel Castro Lopez was hired as a topographer. But his work tur-

ned out to be obstructed by lack of materials and, even worse, replace-ment parts. And so he had the idea to form a company called Equipmentfor Roads, which today occupies the leadership in its line in all QuintanaRoo.

Enrique Arce Guzman arrived as a foreman at Consorcio Caribe. To-day he is owner of a fleet of dump trucks and principal partner of a que-bradora, a sand and gravel plant. His comfortable economic positionpermits him to dedicate himself to promoting his favorite passion, figh-ting cocks.

Rafael Lara y Lara was one of the first engineers on the island. Heworked at Fonatur several years and, in 1978, was close to obtainingthe ruling party nomination for municipal president. He hasn't donebadly as an independent builder. Among his works are the Isla MujeresPalacio Municipal, the Secretary of Public Works in Chetumal, the Can-cun packing plant, a dozen condominiums, the enlargement of the Bo-jorquez Hotel, part of the Hotel Casa Maya and around 350 private

Enrique Arceand his cocks.

CHRISTA COWRIE

The ten businesses ofAbelardo Vela

houses. This year, Lara expects to bill several hundred million pesos.Money and more money. It's possible to obtain examples by the do-

zens and all would have the same common denominator—economicsuccess. Not only status but also prestige seem to depend upon the sizeof the bank account. The proto-humans of Cancun, the examples to fo-llow, according to well-generalized opinion, the spiritual guides of thevox populi, without exception bear the seal of prosperity printed on theirfaces.

There are names that are on everyone's lips. Carlos Millet, for exam-ple, owner of Place Vendome shopping center. Or Salim Abraham, ow-ner of Supermercado San Francisco de Asis. Or Abelardo Vara, whocame to Cancun as a hotel manager and today is partner in ten busines-ses. Or Carlos Constandse, migrating from Mexico, with multiple realestate interests. Or Alfredo Cabrera, in restaurants and the automotivesline. Fortunes of many million pesos.

Of course the richest remained poor in comparison to the big hote-liers. A 300-room beach hotel is worth no less than five billion pesos[about 25 million 1985 dollars]. Here other names are heard: Gaston Az-carraga, Agustin Legorreta, Yolanda Vargas Dulche, Humberto Lobo,the ICA Group, the Visa Group. But the biggest hoteliers don't live inCancun, so the local rich exercise the entertaining role of community

leadership. And the only requisite is accumulation.Cancun is a river of money for its fortunate. A single case: in the

nigh season, Carlos 'n' Charlie's restaurant averages 800 mealsdaily, which, according to a good restauranteur (Alex Cardini), shouldrun about twenty dollars a unit. Eight hundred times twenty is 16,000dollars. . .daily!

Of course, this is a very popular company, but the truth is no businessfails in Cancun. Municipal President Joaquin Gonzalez Castro explainsit this way: "The demand for services is very great, the same for quali-

CHRISTA COWRIE

FONATUR

fied personnel. Anyone who knows how to do anything has work in Can-cun. Here we even lack lawyers, supposedly surplus in the country. The-re are times when we have problems finding professionals to occupypositions as district attorney's agents, judges too."

Money is a kind of god in Cancun and in the final instance everythingcomes from the Hotel Zone. But it's working very efficiently. In recent

Times have changed inCancun. Lobsters are nolonger the same size and

neither are the prices. Thelobsters shrank, the pricesexpanded. The only thing

that remainsunchangeable is the

generosity of theCaribbean sun.

years, occupancy has been better than 90 per cent, considered satura-tion in tourism terms. At present, a little more than 6,000 rooms are inoperation, but this number is increasing rapidly.

In any case, with this demand, it's not strange that Cancun should bethe country's most costly tourist destination. A hotel room, between15,000 and 40,000 pesos [60 to 610 dollars]. Breakfast, between 600and 1,200 pesos [2.5 to 5 1985 dollars]. A highball on the beach, 500 pe-sos [two 1985 dollar]. A lobster 2,500 to 4,000 [$10 to $16]. A boat to gofishing, 10,000 pesos an hour [40 1985 dollars].

With statistical graphs in hand, Sectur demonstrates that the reputa-tion is unjustified. There are inexpensive lodgings in Cancun. But Secturitself assures that the polls that it takes show clearly that the tourists co-me to Cancun seeking beach pleasure as their number one goal. Andthe inexpensive lodgings are found far from the beaches. Of course theFonatur plan contemplates opening and supporting many public bea-ches. In fact, some of the best—Las Perlas, Langosta, Caracol— werereserved for that purpose. But curiously, in fifteen years, they havehardly gone beyond being open to the public and in no case been fittedout. There are no public toilets, nor dressing rooms, nor sunshades, norrestaurants, nor lifeguards.

Otherwise, however, the exquisite cares that Fonatur takes in the pre-servation of the area and its tourism image must be recognized, an as-pect that pays attention to the most unsuspected facets. For example, in1984 there were 22 drownings in Cancun. Fonatur made a study of thisand discovered that some of these deaths were unavoidable—peoplewho had gone into the sea in states of drunkeness or under the effectsof drugs. But in at least a pair of cases, the accidents could have beenforeseen.

This was the case of the parachutes drawn by speedboats that be-cause of the prevailing winds are highly popular in Cancun. Fonatur af-firmed that a good number of the boats suffered constant mechanicalfailures and that equipment quality was below par. It could not be provedthat these factors had caused deaths, but cases were reported in whichthe boat had failed in middle passage and the parachutes fell down, tou-rist and all, or even similar cases in which the line had snapped.

Fonatur pushed new regulations. Each boat, in the first place, mustcarry a second crew member, whose only responsibility would be tohelp the tourist in case of a breakdown, even if it were the scarce help

Cancun presumesto have theworld's bestdiscoteque—18,000lights operated byfour computers,four video screens,hardwood floor and1,200 seats. Gettingin is the problem.The place isjammed evenmid-week.

JoaquinGonzalez Castro,

Mayorof Canciin

of getting the lifeguards to come. Then, the lines—of silk and nylon—haveto be replaced every month, the harness every six months and theparachutes every two years, even if still usable. Finally, any violationof these regulations implied license cancellation. In the first threemonths of this year, not a single accident was registered involving theparachutes.

Another advantage of wealthy Cancun is that the tourist spends—andleaves in the country—an average of 100 dollars a day. But one mustnot be unjust with Fonatur. The plan was to create tourism business andCancun functions for the tourists, not even for the rich. In fact there arepractically no private residences on the entire island. They hardly reacha hundred and the better part are aligned along the golf course, in a na-rrow stretch where hotels simply won't fit. And these, of course, do costa lot.

At this time, the original expectations have been achieved with a no-table degree of accuracy. Cancun is receiving 750,000 visitors a year, afigure that places it among the nation's top three beach resorts. And the-re is surely much more to come in the distance. After all, at only fifteenyears old, Cancun it's barely an adolescent.

cancun,profileof themexicanCaribbean

IN THE BOOK THAT DISTINGUISHED

visitors to Cancun sign, thereis an entry that reads: "Scarcely ten years since this site was selectedfor a tourism development, I render full and warm homage to the truefounder of Cancun, the one who conceived, encouraged, financed andpromoted what is today a deed: Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado; and to allshall read this, it pleases me to inform you, who was the quiet, modest,honest but visionary Mexican to whom we all owe the pleasure of thistourism paradise."

The notation is dated July 1977 and the signature is that of Secretaryof Tourism, Antonio Enriquez Savignac. Coming from whom it comes,the text has a remarkable degree of detachment, as Fernandez Hurtadoand Enrfquez Savignac were close partners in the first years of Cancun.

Pedro Joaqui'nColdwell:

"We continueforward."

The first as creative brain, the second as executive arm.Alfonso Alarcon, first municipal president, today entirely out of the

tourism sector, has his own version: "I don't know whose idea it was, butthe construction of Cancun is the exclusive achievement of Savignac.To begin with, he motivated us to an incredible work mystique. We werethe project and the project was our very life. We were willing to do any-thing, to give up our souls, to go through any kind of privation to carry itforward, all in exchange for really miserable salaries. Who knows howhe did it, but he had us totally hypnotized."

Another important personality, David Gustavo Gutierrez Ruiz holds adifferent opinion: "Of course, the intellectual and material authors ofCancun are Fernandez Hurtado and Enriquez Savignac. But the creditfor its actualization, the force that permitted it to begin and consolidate,was the political will of President Echeverria."

Gutierrez Ruiz holds that the development of Cancun was one of themost important achievements—not merely local, but also national—ofthe 70-76 term, an opinion shared by his successor in the governorship,Jesus Martinez Ross: "Without Echeverria, Cancun would have remai-ned a plan, like so many plans that have never left desks. I have no fearin making public the enormous admiration I feel for the work of the go-vernment of Luis Echeverria. His name and Cancun's will be tied fore-ver."

The opinion of Governor Pedro Joaqufn Coldwell is found to be tem-pered by distance: "Cancun is a triumph of institutional continuity. It wasbegun with Dfaz Ordaz, but was effectively supported by Echeverria, byLopez Portillo and by Miguel de la Madrid. The federal, state and localgovernments participated, each to the measure of its possibilities. Andthe only beneficiary was the nation. For me, it is palpable proof of natio-nal institutions working well."

But if speculating on the paternity of Cancun could well be idle, per-haps it would not be so much so to speculate on its future. And a good

Tulum

Cozumel Isla Mujeres

Chemuvil

Cancún will probably growtoward the south, integratingitself with the tourismcorridor of the eastern coastof Quintana Roo. Along the150 kilometers that separateTulum from thedevelopment, there are atleast a dozen coves andbeaches with enormouspotential,to which are added thetraditional alternatives,Cozumel and Isla Mujeres.The future of the MexicanCaribbean is promising.

Xel-Ha

tool could be the predictions of Fonatur itself. On taking account, the cal-culations and projections adopted by the creators of the project at theend of the 60s, have been achieved with surprising accuracy (which hasnot happened with other master plans, beginning with Cancun's twin, Zi-huataneo).

The original sketch divided the Cancun Hotel Zone into three parts.The first extended from the city, at the north end, to the site where theHotel Sheraton is found, covering more or less half of the total islandlength. In this territory, the construction of 7,500 hotel rooms is contem-plated. Today there are a few more than 5,000 and Fonatur still ownsfour or five large hotel parcels on which, theoretically, the 2,000 remai-ning will be located.

The second step is even more ambitious. It extends from the HotelSheraton to Punta Nizuc, where Club Mediterrane is in operation and itis supposed to contain 11,000 rooms. To date, there are 500 in opera-tion and 1,700 under construction, some almost finished. Enriquez Sa-vignac is committed to opening a minimum of 1,200 rooms annuallyfrom 1985 to 1988.

Orlando Arroyo, local Fonatur Director, speaks about the third andlast stage of Cancun: "This is still a nebulous project and it is better thatit should be. No one knows how Cancun will function with 18,000 rooms,those of the first two stages. This should take place in 1994, not at theend of the present term but rather of the next. The problem is that we areplaying with many unknowns. How many inhabitants will we have?Where are we going to continue getting tourists from? How will the Ca-ribbean market evolve?"

The number of inhabitants is important. In a small tourism center, it is

Kemil Rizk

Orlando Arroyo

supposed that each hotel room generates a direct job and an indirectjob, that is to say, work for two heads of family, representing ten people.But as tourism destinations grow, this ratio changes. Later there are onedirect and two indirect, then one and three, etc. Acapulco, with 28,000rooms, has almost a million population, that is 35 inhabitants per room.Of course, this does not mean that the 35 Acapulquenos depend on asingle room, but rather that cities complicate and diversify when theygrow. To date, Cancun has 6,000 rooms and 100,000 inhabitants, a ratioof 16 to 1. Fonatur calculates that this figure could increase to 25 on thecompletion of 25,000 rooms, which would give a population of 450,000inhabitants.

Orlando Arroyo again: "A city of 450,000 is just about medium-sizedfor this country. But we're talking about 18,000 rooms in 1994, only nineyears from today. The problem isn't the absolute figure—350,000 morepeople—but rather the relative: from 100,000 to 450,000 in nine years.It is a colossal leap."

Moreover, Fonatur might be short in its ratio of 25 to 1, because Can-cun appears destined to become the economic axis of the east coast ofthe peninsula and, eventually, of the entire Mexican Caribbean.

Kemil Rizk, Director of Fonatur nationally, offers his ideas on the sub-ject: "Cancun not only changed the Caribbean's physiognomy and tou-rism currents flow. It also did something more important. It changed ourconcept of tourism activity forever. It's true that we have natural attrac-tions, true that we're close to the potential markets, true that we're hos-pitable, but today we know that all this is not enough. Now we know thatplanning is needed, that loans are needed, that specialists are needed,and, above all, a large dose of courage and energy. Now we know howto put the package together. We have found a good formula."

Rizk by all means knows that the formula doesn't produce results bymagic: "We made many errors in building Cancun, in planning as well asin execution. But the basic concept has been demonstrated to havebeen correct. From this base, we can confront the development of thenew centers with greater optimism. We're going to give the final push toIxtapa, reinforce our activities in the Baja California Peninsula, and, inOaxaca, we have begun Huatulco. And in Cancun itself, our plans areeven more ambitious."

Based on these projections, it would not be exaggerating to foreseeexplosive tourism growth for the east coast of Quintana Roo for the co-ming decades. Some clues:

• A narrow strip of territory of great natural beauty, very similar toCancun—sea one side, lagoon on the other—extending almost to IslaContoy have been acquired by a group of investors among whom standout Carlos Hank Gonzalez and Paulino Rivera Torres. Plans to begintourism development in the area are very advanced.

• A serious intention exists to develop the coast of the middle part ofthe state, a 30-kilometer beach strip situated north of Tulum. An organi-zation called Fidecaribe undertook the construction of the installations ofa beach called Aventuras, and a small business center is functioning inthe cove of Xel-Ha. There is a more ambitious plan to convert this transitroute into a terminal zone (where tourists sleep), integrating the beachesof Chemuyil and X-Cacel with these and the existing center at Akumal aswell. These projects will have to be a task for the state government, asFidecaribe is in the process of being liquidated.

• Given the quality of the beaches and the environmental beautybetween Cancun and Fidecaribe, it is very possible that spontaneousdestinations will arise. An isolated case, but not unique: the cove of X-Caret. Less than two kilometers from the coast highway, the little cove isavailable for the practice of aquatic sports and has the mouth of a ceno-te and some Mayan ruins only a few meters from the beach.

• Two important points can be counted on to close the pincers, IslaMujeres and Cozumel. Both have drawbacks for massive hotel develop-

Fonatur's forecastsfor the urban

growth of Cancunhave been achieved

with notableprecision. This

punctuality partlyobeyed the control

which the trustexercised over its

salable property, and,as a result, over the

advance of urbanblight. For the year

2000, municipalprojections

contemplate a cityarea easily four times

larger than today.

ment—Isla Mujeres, land scarcity, given its diminutive size; Cozumel,the supply of potable water. Each can provide services complementingthe general attractions of the area, however. Cozumel, for example, re-ceives 350,000 day-tourists a year, passengers on the cruise ships,which arrive between 7 and 9 A.M., and leave at night. Unfortunately, theexisting superstructure is very poor—the number of restaurants is small,the diving and sailing clubs have few boats, the variety of handicrafts isvery limited, the only aquarium is a disaster and prices are higher thanCancun. There are studies estimating that Cozumel could capture up toa million of this kind of tourists, but the focus has to be changed.

• Private boats are another important option. In Florida alone, wit-hout any doubt the principal market, there are more 30,000 privateboats larger than fifty feet, that is to say, able to cross the Gulf of Mexico.The problem is that they can't dock in Cancun, simply and only becausethere is no marina. This is certainly contemplated in Fonatur's plans andit is a good sized marina, that will host some 5,000 ships a year and willbe complemented by a private marina, also already approved. In Cozu-mel, at the same time, there are two small bays that could be fitted outfor the same purpose. But the mother lode is found on Isla Mujeres.where the Nacax marina, by means of enlargement, could have capa-city for 22,000 ships a year.

• Finally, it would be worthwile to consider the undiscovered coasts

HOTEL PANORAMA OF CANCUN

YEAROPENING HOTEL ZONE ROOMS BY TOTAL

YEAR

1974 Villas Tacul 60Playa Blanca 161Caribe Cancun (Bojorquez) 111 332

1975 Camino Real 291Presidente 197Villas Presidente 100 588 920

1976 Club Mediterrane 300Carrousel 111DosPlayas 88 499 1419

1977 Kin Ha 127Club Verano Beach 77Vacation Club International 200 404 1 823

1978 Carisa y PaIma 98Maya Caribe 40 138 1961

1980 Casa Maya 257Sheraton 471Cancun Viva 210 938 2 899

1981 Calinda 280Krystal 328Club Lagoon 91Sina 37 736 3 635

1982 Fiesta Americana 281Mission 189Crea 88 558 4193

1983 Hyatt Regency 301Aristos 222 523 4 716

1984 Exelaris Hyatt 202Girasol 66Brisas 54 332 5 048

1974-84 DOWNTOWN: America, Antillano, Arabe, At- 1292lantis, Batab, Canto, Caoba Bonampak, Cari-be International, Carrillos, Colonial, Coral,Cotty, Flamboyanes, Hacienda, Handall, Ko-kai, Komvaser, Marfa del Lourdes, Marrufo,Novotel, Parador, Plaza Caribe, Plaza del Sol,Plaza Tulum, Rivemar, Soberanis, TropicalCaribe, Villa Maya, Yaxchilan.

In less than onedecade,the Cancunairport has becomethe country's fifthlargest in numbersof passengers duringthe tourist seasonand the eleventh intotal users. In fact,of the 750,000 visitorswho arrive inCancun a year, morethan half do it byplane.

of Isla Mujeres and Cozumel. It's true that given that they face the opensea, they have been traditionally unappreciated. But now the situation isbeginning to change. After all the principal competition is the Caribbeanislands. Don't they all have undiscovered sides?

Cancun still has a lot to grow. Governor Pedro Joaquin Coldwell com-ments: "The vocation of Quintana Roo is tourism. We have 860 kilome-ters of coast and we are exploiting less than 50. The immediatechallenge is development and I am sure that we can do it. With Cancun,we've demonstrated our spirit, ability and imagination. We're continuingforward."