Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture

Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture27

CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY – ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXIV , NO. 1 1998

Canadian Federalism,Internationalization andQuebec Agriculture:Dis-Engagement, Re-Integration?GRACE SKOGSTAD

Department of Political ScienceUniversity of TorontoToronto, Ontario

Les deux côtés des relations entre l’agriculture canadienne et québécoise ont été formés par le systèmefédéral canadien et les développements dans l’environnement commercial international. Le premier côté, ledésengagement de la communauté agricole québécoise du système fédéral canadien, remonte à la politiqueagricole expansionniste du gouvernement québécois, au rôle diminué des dépenses fédérales dans l’agricul-ture québécoise et aux effets diviseurs de la négociation d’accords commerciaux internationaux. Le deuxièmecôté des bonnes relations dans les secteurs où l’offre nationale est gérée, est lié aux structures de décisioncorporatives nationales flexibles qui fournissent des liens sociaux vitaux reliant le secteur laitier québécoiset celui de l’extérieur du Québec. La restructuration de la relation Canada-Québec dans le secteur agricole endonnant au Québec l’entière juridiction sur l’agriculture ou en intégrant d’avantage le secteur agricole québécoisà la fédération doit être évaluée dans le contexte de pressions internationales et de restrictions fiscales.

The two faces of relations between Quebec and Canadian agriculture have been shaped by Canada’s federalsystem and developments in the international trading environment. The first face, the disengagement ofQuebec’s farm community from the Canadian federal system, can be traced to the Quebec government’sexpansionist agricultural policy, the diminished federal expenditure role in Quebec agriculture, and thefissiparous effects of the negotiation of international trade agreements. The second face of good workingrelationships in the national supply-managed sectors is linked to flexible, national corporatist decision-making structures which provide a vital social glue linking Quebec’s dairy sector with that outside Quebec.Restructuring the Canada-Quebec relationship in agriculture by either giving Quebec sole jurisdiction foragriculture or integrating Quebec agriculture more fully into the federation must be assessed in the contextof internationalizing pressures and fiscal restraints.

INTRODUCTION

Canada’s federal system was importantly impli-cated in the outcome of the 30 October 1995

Quebec referendum on sovereignty. The results, said

Bob Young (1996, pp. 351-2), constituted a failinggrade for federalism on the significant criteria of itsperceived flexibility and economic benefits. This in-dictment of federalism would appear to have been asforthcoming from Quebec’s farm community as from

28 Grace Skogstad


the francophone population as a whole. Although theabsence of individual-level voting data precludes anyfirm conclusions about how Quebec’s farm commu-nity voted in the 1995 referendum, aggregate-level dataand close observers suggest that farmers’ voting be-haviour mirrored that of francophone voters as a whole:that is, a slim majority in favour of Quebec’s sover-eignty (Belzile, H. 1995). The post-referendum state-ments that Quebec’s farm union leader directed toCanada’s minister of agriculture and agri-food werehighly critical of Canada’s federal system. Quebecagriculture, declared the president of the Union desproducteurs agricoles (UPA), Laurent Pellerin, cannotfunction in the federal system, and the Government ofCanada, is incapable of working with Quebec farmerson a daily basis (Belzile 1995b). The referendum out-come, said Pellerin (1995d), indicated Quebec farm-ers’ desire for Ottawa to terminate its involvement inQuebec agriculture and cede legal authority over agri-culture to the Province of Quebec.

The UPA president’s appraisal of Canadian fed-eralism was not new. At the annual convention oftheir farm union in 1990, in the aftermath of thedefeat of the Meech Lake Accord and at the heightof Quebecers’ support for sovereignty, the UPA en-dorsed Quebec’s economic and political independ-ence.1 Then UPA president, Jacques Proulx, had ren-dered a similarly scathing critique of Canadian ag-ricultural policies and federalism four years earlierin the UPA brief to the Belanger-Campeau Commis-sion (Union des producteurs agricole 1990, pp. 9-17). The UPA brief concluded that the province mustobtain exclusive jurisdiction over agriculture to endthe discriminatory and costly effects of federalismand to enable Quebec agriculture to realize itspotential.2

This severe criticism of federalism is curious inlight of the importance of Canadian supply man-agement to Quebec farmers. Given that just underone-half of Quebec farmers derive their income fromthe dairy and poultry supply managed sectors, thereal possibility that these same farmers voted in fa-vour of sovereignty is puzzling. The puzzle is partly

solved by recognizing that some Quebec farmersapparently believed that Canadian supply manage-ment would survive Quebec’s political independencefrom Canada (Wilson 1995); that is, that EnglishCanadian pragmatism would prevail and result inan economic union, of which one pillar would besupply management. This latter perception owes itsorigins not only to the referendum debate in theQuebec farm community but also to the broadersocietal debate regarding the effects of internationaltrade agreements and regionalization on domesticpublic policies.

The discussion which follows probes into the re-lations between Quebec and Canadian agriculturein an effort to understand how Canada’s federal sys-tem and developments in the international tradingenvironment have contributed to, first, significantnumbers of negative perceptions of the Canadianfederal system in the 1990s and second, the appar-ent belief that an independent Quebec could main-tain an economic association with Canada in sup-ply management. The general argument is that Que-bec farmers’ relationship with and perceptions ofthe Canadian federal system reflect the cumulativeimpact of domestic agricultural policies and the in-ternationalization of domestic Canadian agriculturalpolicy.

The first part of the essay examines the develop-ments in Quebec and Canadian agricultural policyduring the past two decades, as well as those in Ca-nadian trade policy over the last ten years, whichhave led to the first face of relations between Que-bec agriculture and Canada: the relative overall dis-engagement of Quebec’s farm community from thefederal system. Explanations focus on the Quebecgovernment’s expansionist agricultural policy overthe past two decades and the rise of corporatism inthe Quebec agriculture sector. Both developmentshave resulted in Quebec farmers becoming increas-ingly integrated within Quebec-based state andsocietal networks. At the same time, an importantdiminution in the federal expenditure role in Que-bec agriculture, and a decline in the proportion of



Quebec farmers benefitting directly from Canadiansupply management, raises doubts in the provincialfarm community about the benefits afforded bymembership in the Canadian federation. Internation-alization, whose effects are to compound internalfissures, is also disintegrating when coupled withthe consequences of provincial state-building andfederal fiscal constraints.

The second part discusses the important excep-tion to this pattern of disintegration and the secondface of relations between Quebec agriculture andCanadian federalism: the economic and politicalrelationships which exist in the supply-managedsectors of dairy and poultry. The good relations hereare the consequence of corporatist decision-makingstructures at the pan-Canadian level that provide a“social glue” (Meisel 1995, p. 344) and link farm-ers inside and outside Quebec. Ironically, as the 1995referendum debate reveals, supply management wasused as ammunition by both federalists, who citedit as an example that federalism works, and bysovereignists, as a mutually beneficial policy thatwould incite Canada and Quebec to maintain an eco-nomic association.

Options for restructuring Canadian and Quebecagricultural policies and relations are examined andappraised in the third part of the paper. Two broadoptions are considered: giving the province of Que-bec exclusive jurisdiction over agriculture and re-forms to integrate Quebec agriculture more fully intothe Canadian federation. Recent domestic agricul-tural policy reforms offer proof of federalism’s flex-ibility and attempt to reduce the duplication andperceptions of inequitable treatment that havefuelled Quebec agrarian discontent with federal gov-ernments. While curtailments in Ottawa’s directtransfers to producers undermine perceptions thatCanadian federalism affords visible economic ben-efits, developments in Canada-US trade relationslikely have the opposite effect and work tostrengthen beliefs about the value of membershipin the Canadian federation. In the late 1990s, theunrelenting internationalization of domestic policy

and markets introduces a new calculus into federal-ism whose effect is as likely to reinforce supportfor a policy-capable Canadian government as it isto undermine it.

QUEBEC AGRICULTURE’ S DISENGAGEMENT

FROM THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Federalism, John Meisel (1995, pp. 343-44) remindsus, functions best when it is flexible, asymmetrical,offers clear economic or other benefits, and is sus-tained by “an appropriate social, psychological, andemotional infrastructure.” Over the past twodecades, the asymmetry that has come to character-ize Quebec’s relationship with the remainder ofCanada is disintegrating, rather than integrating,insofar as it lacks a supportive associational andsocietal grid. As well, the perceived economicbenefits and flexibility of Canadian federalism areoften deemed to have declined.

Domestic Agricultural Policy and Quebec’sAsymmetryIn 1976, Quebec agriculture was described as “en-dangered” (Bernier 1976, p. 432) as the exodus offarmers continued amid low commodity prices(Kesteman et al. 1984: Tableau 9, p. 182; Tableau13, p. 264). Two decades later, in 1995, Quebecfarmers had the highest net operating incomes ofall farmers in Canada (Agriculture and Agri-FoodCanada 1996, p.14). Moreover, Quebec farm in-comes were more stable than those in either of theother two important agricultural regions, Ontario andthe Prairies (Gouvernement du Ministère del’Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l’Alimentation).As Table 1 shows, Quebec’s agriculture sector ismuch more diversified today than it was in 1980.Although dairy remains overwhelmingly Quebec’smost important commodity sector, the number ofdairy farms is half what it was in 19763 and the sig-nificance of the sector to the overall fortunes of Que-bec’s agricultural economy has declined. As Table1 further reveals, so has the importance of supplymanagement more generally. In 1977, sales in the

30 Grace Skogstad


supply-managed sectors as a whole (dairy and poul-try) accounted for 60 percent of total farm cash re-ceipts; in the mid-1990s, they comprise 45 percentof total farm cash receipts.4

This appreciable improvement in the economicfortunes of individual Quebec farmers over the pasttwo decades is the result of both Canadian and Que-bec public policies; the diversification of the sectoris the result principally of provincial agriculturalpolicies. These policies are the Canadian system ofsupply management in the dairy sector and a hostof provincial agricultural expenditure and regulatorypolicies.5 Quebec income levels rose steadily after1966 when the Canadian Dairy Commission wasestablished (Kesteman et al. 1984, pp. 182, 264).Since its full implementation in 1975, national dairypolicy has directly benefitted Quebec dairy produc-

ers who hold 47 percent of national industrial milkquota. In 1995, the instruments included direct fis-cal transfers and supply-management instruments ofproduction controls, guaranteed prices, and protec-tion against imports. Poultry supply management hasbrought the same benefits of raising and stabilizingproducer incomes. In 1992, the average net farmoperating income of dairy, and poultry and egg farmswas $36,000 and $29,700 respectively as comparedto the overall Canadian average of $16,500 (Rizviet al. 1995, p. 3).

Notwithstanding the importance of Canadiandairy subsidies and pan-Canadian supply manage-ment to the recovery of Quebec agriculture from themid-1960s onwards, provincial regulatory and finan-cial policies also figure large. Of the four publicpolicies that Quebec farmers define as the pillars ofQuebec’s agricultural policy, the Quebec govern-ment increasingly predominates in three: incomestabilization (dating from 1975), provision of credit(originating in 1936), and crop insurance (since1967). Since 1956, the province has supported andbeen important to the maintenance of the fourth pil-lar, regulated marketing. However, the efficacy ofcollective marketing legislation to enhance producermarketing power for products traded inter-provincially is contingent upon not only Quebecmarketing legislation but also enabling legislationof Ottawa and the other provincial governments.

Because they exclude the benefits of supply man-agement, expenditure data are an inaccurate meas-ure of the relative significance of Canadian and pro-vincial policy to the Quebec agri-food sector. None-theless, the appreciable role of the Quebec provin-cial government in Quebec’s agriculture sector isclear. Levels of federal and provincial agri-foodspending have virtually reversed themselves over thepast 30 years. In the mid-1960s and early 1970s,Ottawa accounted for 68 percent of total net expen-ditures in agriculture (Agriculture Canada 1977:Table 5, p. 284; Table 9.2, p. A248). In the 1990s,Ottawa’s share of agri-food expenditures in Quebechas ranged from 29 to 40 percent; the Quebec

TABLE 1Relative Importance of Supply-Managed and Non-Supply- Managed Commodity Sales 1977, 1994

Percentage Cash Receipts

1977 1994

Supply-ManagedDairy 46 33Poultry 14 12

Sub-total 60 45

Non-Supply-ManagedCattle 8 11Hogs 18 18Grain and Oilseed - 7Fruits and Vegetables 9 18Other 4

Sub-total 39 44

Total 99 99

Source: For 1977 data, see Agriculture Canada (1981),Table 18, p. 34. For 1994 data, see Gouvernement duQuébec, Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Pêcheries et del’Alimentation (1995).



government’s share of total agri-food expendituresreached an unprecedented high of 71 percent in1995-96 (Table 2). As the table also shows, althoughall provinces have assumed a greater share of finan-cial responsibility for agriculture, the provincialshare of total agri-food spending in Quebec has beenappreciably higher than that of any other provincewith a significant agri-food sector. As Ottawa’s vis-ibility in Quebec agriculture has diminished overthe past decade and a half, criticisms abound thatOttawa has offloaded its fiscal responsibilities andabdicated its traditional leadership role to the prov-inces. This view prevails across the Canadian farmcommunity as a whole but is especially evident inQuebec.

With the Quebec government’s agricultural ex-penditures overwhelming those of the Canadiangovernment, it is the Quebec agricultural ministrywhose beneficial presence has been most directlyapparent. Two features of the provincial spendingreinforce its political payoff: first, provincialspending tends to be universal and widely disbursedwith virtually every farmer receiving benefits; andsecond, significant amounts of provincial monies are

linked to direct program payments, such as incomestabilization. Quebec farmers receive over half oftheir income from direct program payments (Agri-culture and Agri-Food Canada 1995, pp. 32-34).

The inordinately high level of Quebec govern-ment agri-food spending reflects the bipartisan sup-port which Quebec agriculture has enjoyed underboth Liberal and Parti Québécois (PQ) governments.Liberal premier Robert Bourassa equipped Quebecfarmers with the legal instrument to augment theirbargaining power when, in 1972, he recognized theUPA as a monopoly union with the right to collectmembership dues from all Quebec farmers.6 OtherLiberal measures to promote the development of theagriculture sector included a generous incomestabilization program. Quebec’s expansionary agri-cultural policy continued with PQ Premier RenéLévesque, whose sovereignist agriculture ministerplaced a high priority on provincial self-sufficiencyin foodstuffs (Québec 1978; Skogstad 1987, pp. 70-71). The traditional exceptionalism accorded agri-culture in most industrialized countries in the post-war period has been especially prevalent in Quebecwhere there is a widespread perception that Quebec’s

TABLE 2Provincial Agri-Food Spending as a Percentage of Total Agri-Food Spending

1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96

Quebec 60 66 63 62 65 65 71Ontario 46 53 51 48 56 55 61Saskatchewan 22 28 21 30 30 18 22Alberta 54 51 36 45 52 46 44Manitoba 23 30 19 29 33 33 27British Columbia 44 47 50 43 40 44 48New Brunswick 43 42 34 37 39 43 42Nova Scotia 60 57 53 54 61 58 58Prince Edward Island 45 49 34 35 40 39 35Newfoundland 61 61 54 62 58 60 60

Average 40 43 43 41 45 40 40

Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1997, February), Table C.1, p. 40.

32 Grace Skogstad


rural and agrarian communities embody society-wide norms of collectivism and cooperation. As thekeystone of Quebec society, Quebec farmers argue,agriculture must be accorded a central place and fi-nancially supported by Quebec governments(Pellerin 1995a). Equally important to this under-lying societal support in explaining the political in-fluence of Quebec farmers is the sheer organiza-tional strength of Quebec farmers’ monopoly union,the UPA. United and equipped with considerablepolicy expertise, the UPA has successfully articu-lated a vision of agriculture’s unique role in pre-serving a distinctive Quebec society, whether thatbe a francophone society or a society with vital ru-ral communities. Quebec farmers through the UPAhave struck a close relationship with officials in theprovincial ministry responsible for agriculture(MAPAQ).7 Working in concert with the ministryand other key players in the agro-food sector (in-cluding cooperatives), the UPA has had significantinput into provincial agricultural policy. It has notalways prevailed — the UPA opposed the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) whichthe Bourassa government supported — but it hassucceeded in the main in achieving its policy objec-tives at the provincial level (Skogstad 1990, pp. 59-90).

In the mid-1990s significantly more Quebec pro-ducers are less inclined to see themselves economi-cally benefitted directly by federalism and federalpolicies than they did 15 years earlier. For the non-supply-managed component of Quebec’s farm com-munity (producers other than dairy and poultry) pro-vincial agricultural policies bear more visibly ontheir economic well-being than do the Canadiangovernment’s initiatives to access and secure exportand domestic markets. With Quebec City the locusof key policy decisions, Quebec producers in non-supply-managed sectors have little need to formpolitical alliances with other Canadian farm organi-zations. Their links with other producers in the Ca-nadian farm community are much weaker than theyare to groups and governments within their ownprovince.

After 1993, when Laurent Pellerin replacedJacques Proulx (1981-93) as president of the UPA,and Ralph Goodale became Minister of Agricultureand Agri-Food Canada (1993-97), more cordial re-lations transpired between the Government ofCanada and Quebec’s farm union. Minister Goodalewas well liked in Quebec, where he was perceivedas accessible, willing to listen, and a strong sup-porter of orderly marketing and supply manage-ment.8 His working relationship with Pellerin, whohas returned UPA to national agriculture policy-making forums, was good. Whether these improvedpersonal relations translate into better institutionallinks and comprise the glue needed to build sharedconcepts of community is more difficult to discern.Except for dairy policy (the current chair of theCanadian Dairy Commission is the former head ofQuebec’s supervisory marketing council), Quebec’sconnections to Ottawa do not appear to go very deepinside the agriculture ministry. In any event, the con-trast between UPA’s relationship with Ottawa and itsrelationship with the Quebec MAPAQ is sharp.

Under Pellerin’s presidency, UPA’s relationshipwith the CFA has become much more amicable.Again, changes in the presidency of the UPA andCFA play a big role here. But the CFA itself has adiminished capacity to serve as an intermediary be-tween the two linguistic farm communities owingto the splintering and provincializing of the farmcommunity in western Canada. The challenges ofdeclining government fiscal support for agricultureand trade agreements have caused all provincial farmcommunities to look inward. Ties with counterpartsin other provinces have weakened as Saskatchewanfarmers deliberate their future among themselves,and their Alberta and BC counterparts do likewise.English-Canadian farmers have not generally re-placed their interprovincial organizational networkwith a strong intraprovincial corporatist network ashas occurred in Quebec. The lesson for many Que-bec farmers, especially those in non-supply-managed sectors, is likely to continue to be that theirmost powerful allies are to be found within theirprovincial borders, not outside them.



Internationalization and Internal FissuresInternationalization, that is, the increasing impactof factors outside Canada’s national boundaries ondomestic agricultural policy-making (Doern, Pal andTomlin 1996, p. 3), has directly propelled Canadato sign international trade agreements in order topreserve and expand its markets, including agricul-tural markets. Internationalization has had at leastthree effects on the Canada-Quebec relationship.First, the negotiation of international trade agree-ments weakened ties between the English-Canadianand Quebec farm communities as a whole. Second,incorporation of the neo-liberal tenets which under-lie internationalization and international agreementsinto domestic agricultural policy has highlightedideological cleavages in the Canadian farm commu-nity and allowed Quebecers to perceive themselvesas philosophically isolated in the Canadianfederation. And third, with its expenditure and regu-latory latitude over agricultural policy diminishedby international agreements (Skogstad 1995a) anddeficit-driven fiscal restraint, the Government ofCanada’s capacity to demonstrate the continuingbenefits of federalism to Quebec agriculture is fur-ther handicapped.

In 1980, at the time of the first Quebec referen-dum, the GATT was the only multilateral tradeagreement that affected Canadian agriculture. It le-galized national governments’ protection of domes-tic producers from foreign competition (if they man-aged domestic supplies), even while it left un-checked government subsidies for export-orientedcommodity sectors. In using both freight-rate sub-sidies to render western-Canadian grain and oilseedsmore competitive in international markets and bor-der controls to shield the central Canadian supply-managed dairy and poultry sectors from competi-tion, the Government of Canada was able to prac-tise an agricultural trade policy that required nomajor internal tradeoffs.

In negotiating, first, the Canada-United StatesFree Trade Agreement (1986 - January 1989), theUruguay Round of GATT (1986-December 1993),

and the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA, implemented in 1994), the Canadian gov-ernment faced considerable pressure to make somevery difficult choices between continuing to restrictforeign entry into its domestic market (protectingsupply management) and seeking greater access toothers’ markets (promoting the economic interestsof its grains and oilseeds sectors). Throughout thesenegotiations, it resisted the tradeoff. Much to theannoyance of the United States, supply managementwas kept off the table during the negotiation of theCanada-US Free Trade Agreement. With the CairnsGroup and the USA both determined to liberalizeagricultural markets during the Uruguay Round ofGATT negotiations, Canada could not exempt sup-ply management from the trade talks. However,again its objective was to promote simultaneouslythe contradictory goals of its domestic-oriented andexport-oriented agri-food sectors: that is, to askother countries to open their grain markets, evenwhile seeking to keep its poultry and dairy marketsclosed to foreign competition.

Canadian negotiators were largely successful inmaintaining protection from foreign imports forCanadian producers of dairy and poultry supply-managed commodities. But they did not realize their,and the dairy farmers’, preferred outcome: to main-tain GATT Article XI.2.c. which protected domes-tic producers from imports where domestic produc-tion was managed and controlled. The UruguayRound GATT agreement, struck in December 1993and implemented in 1995, does not disallow importcontrols, but it does require Canada to accept largerquantities of imports of supply-managed commodi-ties. In addition, volume import quotas must be con-verted to tariffs, which, although set initially at veryhigh levels, will be gradually lowered over time.

The terms of the FTA/NAFTA and GATT tradeagreements do not show any abandonment of Que-bec farmers’ interests by the Government of Canada.Quite the contrary. For most observers, Canada’sdetermination to maintain border protection for sup-ply-managed commodities not only defied very long

34 Grace Skogstad


odds, but put its negotiators in a virtually untenableposition. As measured in terms of the gap betweenthe professed goal and the GATT outcome, the termsCanada negotiated for the sectors of Quebec agri-culture most directly impacted by internationalagreements did not prejudice the interests of Que-bec supply-managed producers any more than theydid those of western grain and oilseed producers.9

Despite this, the negotiation of the trade agreements,and the internal debate about reforming agriculturepolicy precipitated by the Uruguay Round of GATThave been fragmenting.

1. Isolation and Fragmentation During theGATT Round

Its trade policy objectives at odds with those ofwestern Canadian grain and oilseed producers in theregional base of the Conservative federal agricul-ture minister, Quebec’s farm union was highly sus-picious of the commitment of the Government ofCanada and Canadian farm organizations to supplymanagement. Liberalizing market advocates in thewestern grains sector, including Saskatchewan’sConservative premier Grant Devine, criticized theCanadian government for jeopardizing westernCanadian grain growers’ best interests by persist-ing with its two-pronged trade strategy (Cooper1992, pp. 218-19). The wedge which had openedup between English-Canadian farm organizationsand the UPA in the early 1980s over grain transportfreight-rate reform further widened. Although theCFA publicly and continuously supported the Que-bec farm community’s quest to have Article X1 re-tained and fortified, the UPA viewed the CFA’s sup-port as woefully inadequate. The CFA’s resourceswere meagre compared to those of the UPA; theCFA’s staff amounted to less than a dozen officialswhile UPA’s numbered some 800. The CFA wasriven by internal divisions while the UPA’s mem-bership was cohesive. Thus, rather than the GATTRound becoming an opportunity to build solidarityacross the two linguistic farm communities in theface of a common challenge, the two organizationswent their own way, devising their own separatestrategies and lobbying campaigns. The incumbent

UPA leadership took full credit for the GATT out-come, arguing that the high tariffs on supply-managed products would not have been achieved butfor its unrelenting lobby in Canada and Europe. InUPA’s words: “the whole political community inQuebec had to be mobilized in order for us to get ahearing, to be understood and change the directionof Canada’s policy” (1990, p. 11).

2. Adjusting to Market LiberalizationDeveloping a strategy for adjusting Canada’s agri-cultural community to the new, more competitiveregional and international trading environment hasrequired provincial and national governments tobuild a consensus in the farm community for moremarket-oriented reforms. Ottawa’s consensus-building initiative began formally in December 1989when the minister of agriculture struck several taskforces to debate current agricultural programs, somewith the mandate to reform existing programs to takeaccount of new problems and realities (Agricultureand Agri-Food Canada 1994). Although provincialgovernments like Saskatchewan and Alberta alsodebated agricultural reform with their farm commu-nities, farm organizations and individual farmers inthese provinces were also involved in the federalagricultural policy debate. The exception is Que-bec’s farm community. Quebec’s farm communityand its provincial government remained at the mar-gins of the reformist strategy of the Government ofCanada,10 debating its future and the future role ofgovernments in the agri-food sector largely withinthe confines of its provincial borders. The QuebecMinistry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food(MAPAQ) unveiled its consultative strategy in June1992 (Secrétariat du Sommet sur l’agriculturequébécoise 1992). The specific objectives of theCanadian and Quebec governments varied but acommon objective of both was to reduce agricul-ture’s dependence on government financial transfers.The filière (network) approach, a province-widestrategy, has involved all segments of the agri-foodsector (producers, processors, credit unions and fi-nancial institutions, distributors, retailers, govern-ments) in some 19 working groups.11 The



expectation of a greater internal cohesion on agri-food policy generally has been realized in some com-modity sectors, where links among producers, proc-essors, distributors, and public officials have beenstrengthened. Dialogue has, however, broken downin others (Dessureault 1996; Belzile 1996c).

The market-adjustment debate in the rest ofCanada has divided the farm community along philo-sophical lines and fragmented it organizationally.A gulf has opened up in prairie Canada betweenthose producers who espouse a market-driven modelof agriculture wherein government plays a minimalrole and individual farmers are self-reliant, and thosefarmers who continue to believe governments havean important role to play in regulating markets andstabilizing income. This ideological diversity inwestern Canada contrasts with the philosophicalhomogeneity of Quebec where a state-assistancemodel which reiterates the importance of collectiveaction at both the state and societal levels continuesto predominate (Belzile 1995c). To the extent thatAgriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) haschampioned the neo-liberal model, federal agricul-tural policy and federalism are seen again to be in-stitutions that undermine Quebec agri-food goals.The reformist debate in Quebec, justified as an ex-ercise in making more effective use of available fis-cal resources, was not, at least initially, perceivedas an abandonment of agriculture. The Quebec gov-ernment began the debate by reiterating its commit-ment to the four pillars of Quebec agricultural policyand stressing that it was “not looking to reduce gov-ernment support, but rather to make effective use ofthe resources available” (Quebec. Ministry of Agri-culture, Fisheries and Food, p. 1). As will be de-tailed more fully below, the province has made im-portant cuts in its transfers to Quebec farmers. Al-though these initiatives have been fiercely resistedby the UPA, sheer reductions in provincial finan-cial support are not likely to produce a shift of loy-alties to Ottawa. The long-established corporatistnetwork that characterizes the relationship betweenQuebec farmers and the Quebec ministry responsi-ble for agriculture (MAPAQ) and its norms of trust

give MAPAQ officials a useful forum in which toattempt to persuade farm leaders of the necessity ofreductions in agricultural spending. Unable to de-fend its transfer reductions via a similar institution-alized dialogue, except in the dairy sector, Ottawa’sretrenchment measures are more likely to be labelledas discriminatory treatment than are those emanat-ing from Quebec City.

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT AND THE REFERENDUM

DEBATE

Despite the decline in the proportion of farmers pro-ducing supply-managed commodities — from ap-proximately two-thirds of Quebec farmers in 1980to about one-half in 1995 — the fate of Quebec’sdairy sector in an independent Quebec predominatedin the 1995 referendum campaign, as it had in the1980 debate. The UPA remained neutral in both cam-paigns. Its intervention was confined to the obser-vation of its chief policy advisor, at the end of thereferendum campaign, that federal ists andsovereignists alike had invoked exaggerated sce-narios. Contrary to what the sovereignists promised,UPA executive director Claude Lafleur (1995, p. 4)suggested that the transition costs of sovereigntywould not be minimal. Nor would independence, asthe federalists warned, isolate Quebec farmers.

Sovereignists sought to reassure voters that in anindependent Quebec, it would be business as usual.They argued there was only a small probability thatQuebec’s dairy sector would lose access to the Ca-nadian market in the event of Quebec sovereignty(Belzile 1995a). First, PQ-commissioned studiesargued that Canada needs Quebec milk and couldnot replace Quebec dairy products in the short termwithout either occasioning prohibitive costs to Ca-nadian consumers or undermining English-Canadiandairy farmers’ own viability (ibid.). This depend-ence on Quebec dairy supplies gives Canada an in-centive to bargain to maintain the economic unionin supply management. Second, PQ-commissionedstudies argued that supply management would not

36 Grace Skogstad


be disrupted in the event of Quebec’s independencebecause its destabilization would expose English-Canadian dairy farmers to a worse spectre: the im-mediate attention of the US. Already contestingCanada’s dairy import tariffs, and determined to putan end to supply management, the US would useany attempt by English-Canadian farmers to bartera better deal for themselves vis-à-vis Quebec’s dairysector to put an end to supply management once andfor all. Without the united Canada-Quebec front,without the preponderant weight of Quebec, the di-visions in the Canadian dairy industry would spellthe death knell of supply management and result insevere economic losses for English-Canadian dairyfarmers (Morisset 1995).

Federalists rebutted by arguing that the risks ofsovereignty were not minimal because the status quoin supply management would not be maintained inan independent Quebec (Romain, Larue and Lam-bert 1995, p. 5; Buckland 1995). Canada was notdependent upon Quebec milk supplies; EnglishCanada could rapidly increase its milk productionto make up for the shortfall induced by Quebec’sseparation, using other instruments at its disposalto give its dairy industry time to adjust its produc-tion and processing capacity to the needs of the in-terior market. In response to sovereignists’ claimsthat English Canada was as interested in maintain-ing the status quo of the current economic union insupply management, some federalists openly agreed(Buckland 1995).12 However, those English-Canadian dairy farmers interested in negotiatingwith an independent Quebec in order to maintaineconomic and political stability were not likely toprevail. Supply management, these federalists re-minded Quebec voters, was not as strongly sup-ported throughout the rest of Canada as in Quebec.Nor would continuing the economic partnership insupply management finesse American interest in re-opening their unfinished dossier on supply manage-ment. Such an outcome could not be circumventedeven by a Canada-Quebec economic partnership.Concessions — a more rapid lowering of tariffs thanprovided under GATT — would have to be made to

the US to obtain American support in facilitatingthe period of transition after Quebec secession. Inshort, the national milk policy could not be preservedin an independent Quebec, regardless of whether thatindependence was coupled with an economic part-nership with Canada.

These federalist warnings were echoed by Cana-da’s minister for agriculture and agri-food, RalphGoodale, who repeated that supply management isa Canadian public policy, one by which the Cana-dian Government protects Canadian producers(Groulx 1995). He warned that only a “no” votecould guarantee the economic benefits and marketprotection afforded by current national dairy policyand international trade agreements (Ibid.; WesternProducer 1995).

In short, both federalists and sovereignists agreedthat supply management is an example of a success-ful working relationship Quebec farmers have withproducers in the other Canadian provinces. Whether“commercial agreements like those in dairy andpoultry supply management, negotiated on a busi-ness-like basis” (Pellerin 1995c)13 can survive out-side the federal system was the source of conten-tion. Sovereignists argued that they could and wouldbe maintained in a Canada-Quebec economic union;federalists denied both claims.

Perceived as a model of flexible federalism in anera of market-liberalization pressures, dairy andpoultry supply management merit a closer look.Both sectors reveal the importance of societal net-works of interaction in building trust and supportfor a federal system. While the nature and outcomesof the reformist discussions underway in Canada andQuebec approximate a two-solitudes model, thosein the dairy and poultry sectors assume a differentpattern. The challenges posed by the GATT havedrawn the Quebec dairy and poultry producers intocloser contact with their Canadian counterparts. TheGATT required Canada to admit a higher level ofimports of dairy and poultry products and raised thespectre of greater future competition for Canadian



dairy and poultry processors from lower cost Ameri-can imports. Together, producers and processorswere able to formulate adjustment strategies de-signed variously to circumvent as well as to pre-pare for the GATT-induced market liberalization oftheir sectors. Thus, in August 1995, Quebec and fiveother Canadian provinces agreed to implement adairy policy which entails a greater degree of har-monization of provincial policies than its predeces-sor. The objective is a more fully developed nationaldairy policy that, for example, pools fluid and in-dustrial milk prices across provinces and harmonizesprovincial inspection standards (Tower 1995a). TheUPA president described the agreement among thesix provinces as an “inspiring” example of how milkproducers had joined together to face the new mar-ket challenges created by the new GATT rules(Pellerin 1995b).

The reforms in the broiler sector differ in mov-ing more toward provincial self-sufficiency in sup-plies, but even here there has been accommodationof the Quebec chicken sector (Paradis 1995; Tower1995b). In short, the regulatory framework for theeconomic union that allows dairy and broiler pro-ducers throughout Canada to share the Canadiandomestic market has been successfully restructuredthrough political cooperation and concessions acrossprovinces. Mutual economic interests have madethese reforms possible. So has a shared commitmentto collective marketing and trust-ties developedthrough the institutional cement of pan-Canadiancorporatist networks. If interstate federalism hasproven flexible in the instance of supply manage-ment, it is because a political relationship has beenestablished among Canadian, including Quebec,dairy and poultry farmers. It is this political rela-tionship, and its attendant “social glue” that ena-bles mutual long-term economic interests to be ad-vanced at the expense of conflicting short-term eco-nomic goals.

In summary, Quebec farmers experience an asym-metrical political relationship in the Canadian fed-eral system. In an important sense, the asymmetry

is sociologically rooted in a different language, his-torical tradition, and set of values which includes astrong communitarian ethos. These sociological dif-ferences have positioned Quebec farmers more stra-tegically in their provincial society than farmerselsewhere in Canada, with the possible exceptionof Saskatchewan. As noted earlier, the collectivesolidarity which unites Quebec farmers has beenreinforced over time by the agricultural policies ofQuebec provincial governments. Accordingly, evenwhile Quebec farmers share goals and policy instru-ments with their counterparts elsewhere in the coun-try, the government which is perceived as primaryin helping to fulfil these goals is the provincial gov-ernment, not the federal.

Second and concomitantly, a large number ofQuebec farmers have become sociologically andpsychologically detached from the farm communityin the rest of Canada. Never very strong, and vul-nerable to the individual linguistic skills, personalstyles, and objectives of farm leaders, Quebec’sassociational ties with the Canadian farm commu-nity are fragile. They are no worse or better todaythan they have always been, and indeed, they arebetter than they were during the period of Conserva-tive ministers of agriculture and the UPA presidencyof Jacques Proulx. However, such feebleassociational links do not provide the institutionalbase to allow the two farm communities to appreci-ate more fully the extent to which they share simi-lar goals and benefit from cooperation. Exchangeacross the two linguistic farm communities that isrestricted to commerce is as likely to stimulate com-petition in an era of regional and global trade agree-ments as it is to foster cooperation.

POST-REFERENDUM DEVELOPMENTS AND

REFORM OPTIONS

In a context of government budgetary restraints, in-ternational trade agreements, and continuing inter-nationalization of agricultural markets, there are twooptions for dispelling Quebec agrarian discontent

38 Grace Skogstad


with the current federal system and restoring its le-gitimacy. The first is to give the Province of Que-bec exclusive legal authority for agriculture. Thesecond option is to attempt to integrate Quebec ag-riculture more fully into the federal system. Thissection examines the merits of each of these twooptions and analyses how ongoing developments inthe international/continental political economies, aswell as recent initiatives by the Government ofCanada to render federalism more workable, arelikely to bear on the relative attractiveness of eachof these options.

Option 1: A Transfer of Jurisdiction overAgricultureSuccessive annual congresses of the UPA have de-manded a complete repatriation of agriculture (withfiscal compensation) to Quebec (Turcotte 1994,p. B1). Agriculture was named as one of the 22policy fields which the Liberal Party’s 1991 AllaireReport recommended be transferred exclusively tothe provinces. The call for a jurisdictional transferwas repeated by the UPA in the immediate aftermathof the 30 October 1995 referendum (Belzile 1995b),and appears to have widespread support throughoutQuebec (Mackie 1995).

The support for terminating Ottawa’s shared ju-risdiction for agriculture is based upon a three-foldcritique of federal policies, as first articulated bythe UPA in 1990. First, federal agricultural policieshave favoured western Canadian agriculture andmeant disproportionately low levels of federalspending in Quebec. Second, federalism has meantadditional costs to Quebec taxpayers owing to theduplication of federal and provincial programs, andbecause Quebec has “had to adopt our own programsadapted to the Quebec situation to mitigate the de-ficiencies in these policies and the unfairness toQuebec of federal transfer payments.” And third,federal income stabilization policies have under-mined Quebec producers’ democratic rights, by, forexample, requiring that provincial programs con-form to federal standards if they are to receive fed-eral funding.

A jurisdictional change that left the provincialgovernment solely responsible for agriculture wouldhave one obvious benefit. The transfer would be ofclear symbolic importance, denoting Ottawa’s in-tention “to respect the difference” that character-izes Quebec agriculture (Pellerin 1995d, p. 4). Giv-ing Quebecers exclusive authority to design all theiragricultural programs as they choose would recog-nize Quebec agriculture’s unique position in theCanadian federal system and its dist inctivecommunitarian ethos. The symbolic importance ofa jurisdictional transfer is likely to be greater thanits practical consequences; as elaborated below,Quebec (like other provinces) has been given con-siderable scope in recent years to configure and de-liver shared-cost, income-support programs accord-ing to its own preferences.

Ceding exclusive control over agriculture to theprovince is, to some degree, consistent with Otta-wa’s retreat since the mid-1990s from its traditionalrole of providing direct income support to the agri-food sector. In 1995-96, program payments (directincome transfers) comprised 20 percent of federalexpenditures as compared to 41 percent of provin-cial payments.14 The 1996 budget announced thephased elimination by 2001-2 of the $160 millionfederal industrial milk subsidy, worth $76 millionto Quebec farmers (Belzile 1996a, p. 1). Even whileit promised the dairy sector a five-year dairy policyto replace the lost dairy subsidy, the termination ofthe subsidy will leave the federal government with-out a federally delivered agricultural program at thegrassroots level in Quebec. As Table 2 shows,AAFC’s general retreat from direct income supporthas not spared any province. Western Canadian prov-inces have been forced to assume more of the costsof stabilizing producers’ incomes and are projectedto do so in the future. Nonetheless, Quebec contin-ued to be distinct among provinces in terms of theimportance of its spending for agriculture.

Rendering the province exclusively responsiblefor agriculture can also be seen to accord with theconstraints of international trade agreements. The



domestic policy instruments deemed “green”/legalunder the World Trade Organization (WTO) are onesthat might be most appropriately performed by lo-cal governments better able to respond toterritorially specific challenges and goals. Theseprograms include those for research and develop-ment, agricultural credit, and workforce training.The Quebec government and its provincial agenciesdominate in expenditures for agri-food credit andworkforce education. While the Government ofCanada’s expenditures for research in the provinceare about twice those of the provincial government,the Quebec government still plays a more impor-tant funding role here than virtually all other prov-inces (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 1997,pp. 44, 49).

If the foregoing factors strengthen the case forOttawa vacating agriculture and giving exclusiveauthority to the Province of Quebec, other domes-tic and international developments suggest caution.First, vesting exclusive authority over agriculturein the provincial government’s hands would leaveQuebec’s farm community quite vulnerable. TheUPA’s relations with the PQ government andMAPAQ have become tense over the past year asthe UPA finds itself at odds over provincial envi-ronmental policy, PQ efforts to restructure provin-cial dairy corporatist networks, and to curtail agri-cultural spending.15 The UPA’s preferential positioninside provincial concertation and corporatist net-works has been cast in doubt (Gagné 1996a; Gagné1996b, p. 1; Groulx 1996). In short, developmentsin Quebec agricultural policy subsequent to the 1995referendum have exposed the negative face of a sin-gle level of government having exclusive authorityfor agriculture.

Second, ceding exclusive jurisdiction over agri-culture to the Province of Quebec ignores the factthat trade policy has become an important dimen-sion of agricultural policy. International trade agree-ments and international market integration make itdifficult to disentangle agriculture and trade policy.Trade policy — and hence the government which

exercises it — has a crucial impact on the fate ofdomestic agricultural sectors. At the same time, theconsiderable uncertainty that exists with respect tothe security of continental markets, as rules-basedtrade continues to struggle to win out over power-based trade, reinforces the logic of consolidatingexecutive authority for external agricultural tradepolicy in a single government.

Canada’s experience in the post FTA/NAFTA eradefies the prediction that these agreements wouldsecure Canada’s entry into the US market and putan end to American trade harassment of foreign com-petition. Canada has faced a more or less continualspate of trade disputes since the FTA was imple-mented, as American domestic interests attempt tothwart Canadian exporters’ access to the US marketand gain further access for their own exporters toCanadian markets. In 1994, Canada was led tonegotiate — and to limit — access for its wheatexporters into the US market for a year (Skogstad1995b). Canada’s monopoly wheat and barleyexporter, the Canadian Wheat Board, has been la-belled by American private grain traders and the USgovernment as an instrument of “unfair” trade, onethey will target at the 1999 World Trade Organiza-tion meeting. The United States’ irrevocable oppo-sition to supply management is well known. In 1995,the US referred tariffs Canada implemented underthe GATT/WTO agreement on supply managed dairyand poultry imports to an international dispute reso-lution panel. Canada prevailed when the panel ruledin December 1996 that the tariffs were legal, withinthe terms of both the NAFTA and the GATT/WTO(NAFTA Arbitral Panel 1996). Despite the panel’sconclusion, the US trade representative and agricul-ture secretary expressed their continuing determi-nation to mount pressure on Canada until the tariffsare eliminated (Fagan 1996).

The bilateral supply-management dispute, and thepanel ruling supporting its current high level of do-mestic market protection, have important implica-tions for the Canada-Quebec agricultural relation-ship. First, the dispute and the American reaction to

40 Grace Skogstad


the panel’s ruling, confirm that the “rules” laid downin the FTA and NAFTA have not completely dis-placed “powering” as a tool in the US trade policyarsenal. The US will continue to pressure other na-tions to harmonize their policy instruments alongAmerican liberal lines. To the extent that powerpolitics and trade harassment remain an importantpart of US trade policy, membership in a mid-sizedeconomy like Canada would seem to offer strategicadvantages as far as bargaining power is concernedover that of membership in an independent Quebec.In short, Canada’s trading experience within theFTA/NAFTA undermines the sovereignist claim thatinternationalization and international trade agree-ments free up small economies for political inde-pendence (Parti Québécois National ExecutiveCouncil, pp. 6, 27).

Second, the international panel ruling removesthe uncertainty which plagued not just the future ofsupply management but the scope of policy author-ity of the national government at the time of theQuebec referendum. The panel ruling is a clear af-firmation of the continuing policy capacity of theGovernment of Canada, even in an era of progres-sive market liberalization. A contrary ruling thatdenied Canada’s right to preserve the protection af-forded by supply management would certainly havevindicated separatist claims that membership in theCanadian federal system carries few benefits forQuebecers. Moreover, in ruling that the GATT/WTOtakes precedence over the NAFTA, the internationalpanel also made it clear that it was upholding rightsCanada enjoyed as a signatory to earlier GATTagreements. Even were it to succeed in becoming amember of GATT, would an independent Quebec, nota signatory to previous GATT agreements, have thoserights? The panel’s ruling raises doubts that it would.

Currently, agricultural trade policymaking is defacto shared. Provincial agricultural ministers areclosely consulted on agricultural trade matters, havesignificant input into trade agreements, and shapenational responses to agricultural trade disputes.Were Quebec to exercise exclusive authority over

agriculture, Quebec members of parliament wouldpresumably have to exempt themselves from discus-sion of agricultural matters in the Canadian govern-ment. The result could well be that Quebec farmerswould find their own power to shape Canadian ex-ternal trade policy diminished. Thus, a jurisdictionaltransfer of agriculture to Quebec could well leavethe province weakened in terms of its capacity toaffect much of the policy that most matters to thewell-being of agriculture.

Option 2: A Fuller Integration of QuebecAgricultureSince its election in 1993, reforms to demonstratethe flexibility and economic efficiency of federal-ism have had a high priority on the agenda of thefederal Liberal government. Such reforms in agri-food policy speak to the effort to reintegrate theQuebec farm community into the federal polity byundermining their critique of Canadian federalismand federal policy. That critique has centred on Que-bec’s unfair share of federal funding, the distortionof its priorities by Ottawa’s insistence on nationalprograms and national standards (Pellerin 1995d)and inefficiencies arising from overlap and duplication.

Before examining Ottawa’s initiatives to demon-strate the efficacy and efficiency of federalism, itbears reminding that Ottawa has traditionally de-ployed a number of asymmetrical options to renderCanadian federalism more flexible. Configuring fed-eral programs to conform to the wishes of Quebecand other provinces is not new. The device of ad-ministrative delegation of powers has been adroitlyused for over 30 years in agricultural marketingboards. Agriculture is a veritable potpourri of bilat-eral agreements and arrangements designed to tailornational programs to provincial fiscal capacity andlocal conditions.

Since the mid-1990s, AAFC’s strategy to accom-plish expenditure restraint and inject greaterefficiencies into the federal system has been to pro-mote financial and regulatory partnerships with theprovinces and the private agri-food sector. Three



prominent examples of initiatives designed to ac-complish these goals are the reform of farm incomesafety nets, the creation of the Canadian FoodInspection Agency, and the distribution of federaladaptation funding via producer-controlled agencies.The reform of income safety nets has given prov-inces more latitude in designing their programs, evenwhile requiring producers and provincial govern-ments to pick up an enhanced proportion of theircosts. In the face of resistance from both Quebecand Alberta, the federal Ministry of Agriculture andAgri-Food retreated significantly from its objectiveof establishing a nation-wide income safety net forfarmers. It responded to Quebec pressure to funnelfederal funds through Quebec City and the prov-ince’s existing income stabilization plan (Belzile1994). As each province has acquired the opportu-nity to configure its own provincial safety net pack-age to meet its own philosophical and economicobjectives, Canadian agricultural policy has becomemore decentralized and more variable across allprovinces.

In food inspection, “an area fraught with juris-dictional fragmentation” (Doering 1996, p. 6) andone the UPA singled out before the Belanger-Campeau Commission as a costly example of “pureduplication” (Union des producteurs agricoles,p. 154), efforts are underway to avoid duplicationand plug gaps in food inspection. A single agency,the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) wascreated in 1997 to consolidate all federally mandatedfood inspection and quarantine services formerlyspread across three federal departments. The inte-gration of federal and provincial food inspectionunder the rubric of a Canadian Food InspectionSystem has been underway since 1994; several pro-vincial governments, including Quebec’s, are seek-ing bilateral agreements with the CFIA to permit itto carry out inspection activities or provide serviceswithin their province. Even the most recalcitrantprovinces of Quebec and Alberta have greeted thefederal-provincial cooperation in harmonizing foodinspection standards with applause (Canadian FoodInspection System 1996). In this regulatory arena,

the intergovernmental partnership is accompaniedby a public-private partnership as the agri-food in-dustry is being required to share the costs of foodinspection services.

AAFC’s decision to disperse federal adaptationfunds, designed to compensate for the terminationof federal freight rate subsidies, via producer-controlled bodies represents a third example of itsendeavour to forge new public-private relationships.In this instance, in Ontario and Quebec, producerorganizations have been entrusted with determiningthe appropriate distribution of these adaptation funds(Paradis 1996).

These reforms can reasonably be expected to tem-per Quebec farmers’ complaints of costly duplica-tion and strait-jacket federal policies. But do theymeet the demand that Quebecers receive equitabletreatment in the federation? Whether Quebec re-ceives its “fair share” of federal funding will ofcourse always be a matter of debate, and one thatno province is likely to allow Ottawa to win. Muchof Quebec’s perception of its inequitable access tothe spoils of federalism has rested on the belief thatthe western grain sector — and in particular, Sas-katchewan farmers — received “preferential” treat-ment; a case in point was the large sums of federalmoney which went to prairie Canada in the late1980s to help grain farmers cope with their worstdebt crisis since the 1930s Depression. The impend-ing loss of the federal dairy subsidy by the turn ofthe century continues to fuel this sense of unjusttreatment.

In its defence, Ottawa can mount two argumentsto rebut the claim that Quebec agriculture has notreceived fair treatment by federal governments.First, Quebec’s proportion of federal funding is inkeeping with its share of total Canadian farms (seeTable 3) and reflects the relative importance ofagriculture to its overall provincial gross domesticproduct (see Table 4). If Ontario and not Saskatch-ewan is the benchmark, and one could argue thatOntario is more appropriate since it is the other

42 Grace Skogstad


TABLE 3Distribution of Federal Agri-Food Spending by Province

Percent of TotalCanadian Farms 1989-90 1991-92 1992-93 1994-95 1995-96*

$ millions (%)

Quebec 13.6 422 (10) 402 (7) 404 (10) 273 (9) 248 (9)Ontario 24.5 625 (15) 594 (10) 593 (14) 407 (13) 372 (14)Saskatchewan 21.7 1,323 (32) 2,212 (37) 1,222 (29) 915 (30) 794 (30)Alberta 20.4 685 (17) 1,213 (20.5) 810 (19.5) 543 (18) 497 (18.5)Manitoba 9.2 439 (11) 806 (14) 461(11) 357 (12) 304 (11)

Total 4,112 5,913 4,151 3,033 2,678

* forecastSource: See Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1995, September): for percentage of total Canadian farms in provinceFigure B.2, p. 27 and for government spending, Table C.1, p. 40.

TABLE 4Agri-Food GDP as a Percentage of Total Provincial GDP

Quebec 4Ontario 9Saskatchewan 11Alberta 5Manitoba 7

Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1995,September), Table C.7, p. 53.

major provincial beneficiary of supply management,Quebec does receive an equitable amount of federalfunding. Table 3, which allows a comparison of thetwo provinces’ share of federal funding relative totheir proportion of total Canadian farms, shows thatQuebec fares slightly better than Ontario. And sec-ond, expenditures tell only part of the “equity” story.Compared to other provinces, a far higher propor-tion of Quebec farmers (the almost one-half subjectto supply management) continue to be largely insu-lated from international market competition; the1995 elimination of western grain freight rate sub-sidies leaves prairie grain growers’ incomes morefully determinant on international prices. In the late1990s, Quebec farmers as a whole may even be saidto occupy a preferential position in the Canadianfederal system.

Federal initiatives to render federalism moreworkable constitute one element in the calculus toquell Quebecers’ discontent with the current federalsystem and restore its legitimacy. Internationaliza-tion is, of course, the other significant element. Asthe preceding section has highlighted, the Canadian

government can point to some tangible evidence thatit has not been neutered by international trade agree-ments, but rather, has negotiated adroitly to servethe interests of both domestic- and export-orientedagricultural interests. While such outcomes have thepotential to demonstrate the advantages of member-ship in the Canadian federation, whether they serveto offset the disintegrating effects of thecontinentalization of a number of key agri-foodmarkets in the wake of the FTA (1989) and NAFTA(1994) is more problematic.



Canada’s trade with the US has risen sharplysince the FTA was signed. In 1984, 30 percent ofCanadian agri-food exports went to the US; by 1993,increases in exports of live animals, meat (beef), andbeverages had pushed the figure to 55 percent(Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 1994, p. 30A).More important still is that southerly trade has risenmuch more for some commodities and hence forsome regions — western grains, oilseed and beefcattle, central Canadian beverages — than for others,including Quebec. The increasing importance of USmarkets and the fact that they cannot be taken forgranted works to disengage regions from one an-other; at the same time it creates differences of in-terest within regions. Thus, a western Canadiangrains sector that was preoccupied with an internaldispute over what marketing mechanism best posi-tions farmers to be competitive in US markets, hadscarcely time to turn an eye to the Quebec referen-dum. As the Canada-US trade relationship is pushedto centre stage, the cleavage widens between thoseprovinces like Quebec for whom the domestic mar-ket and east-west trade is still primary and thoseprovinces whose economic well-being depends lessupon nurturing domestic commercial relations thanit does upon fostering foreign-trade harmony.

Nor is supply management spared by thecontinentalization of agri-food markets. Provincialimbalances in production and consumption capaci-ties continue to ensure market interdependence anda shared interest in the Canadian economic andpolitical union. However, even while domestic mar-ket protection remains intact for the medium term,the rules of the game have changed in supply man-agement, owing to the enhanced necessity forproducers and processors to be increasingly com-petitive vis-à-vis their American counterparts. GATTArticle X1.2.c required countries to control (80-85percent) of their domestic production in order tolimit foreign imports. This external constraint cre-ated an incentive to share the Canadian market. Italso meant that larger provinces had more leverageto negotiate a bigger market share; their threat towithdraw from the national market-sharing arrange-

ment could bring the system crashing down as lowcost imports could then not be legally preventedfrom flooding in. Under the new GATT, however,

the maintenance of tariff protection for dairy,poultry, and eggs is not dependent upon the main-tenance of a supply management system. Theexternal threat is ended (tariffs remain no matterwhat happens internally) and a single provincecannot make a threat to open the flood gates tocheap foreign product. If a breakdown in supplymanagement occurs, there can be an internal fightamong the provinces in Canada over marketshare. Bargaining power will eventually shift to-ward the most cost efficient producer. (Rosaasenet al., pp. 2-3)

Quebec’s chicken producers have already experi-enced the new rules of the game as Ontario’s chickenindustry flexed its new “market power” muscles in1994. They boosted their chicken production beyondtheir market share and unilaterally allowed proces-sors’ market demands to determine their production.The drop in chicken prices ricocheted in Quebec’schicken sector; hard bargaining and compromiseson both sides yielded a tolerable but fragile solu-tion to the skirmish.

In the dairy industry, Quebec and pan-Canadiancorporatist networks have been equally severelyjeopardized by international competitiveness pres-sures that have exposed intra-sectoral differences ofinterest between producers and processors. Thesepressures have been compounded by the Govern-ment of Canada’s 1996 decision to terminate its in-dustrial milk subsidy. A standoff has developed asproducers have sought to recapture lost dairy subsi-dies with higher prices in the marketplace, and re-sisted processor efforts to acquire more say overpricing and supply (Belzile 1996b; Belzile 1996d).While de-stabilized, the longstanding networks thathave linked processors and producers with govern-ment officials in provincial and Canadian dairypolicymaking, have not been disbanded. Govern-ments continue to accord them a primary role in

44 Grace Skogstad


formulating and building a consensus for policiesappropriate to an era of market liberalization. To theextent that they are successful, supply managementcorporatist networks will facilitate Canada’s adjust-ment to the international political economy — notby severing economic groups in one region from oneanother, but rather by facilitating their working to-gether to achieve mutually compatible goals. In theabsence of such intra-sectoral and inter-regionalnetworks, the continentalization of agri-food mar-kets is likely to be disintegrating, as Canadian pro-ducers and processors in different provinces focuson pursuing their narrower self-interests.

CONCLUSION

The face the Canadian federal system presents toQuebec agriculture in the late 1990s is arguablyquite different from its visage at the time of the 1995Quebec referendum. Canadian agricultural policycan be described as less riddled with duplication andmore flexible in responding to particularisticconcerns. Complaints of Quebec’s inequitable shareof the spoils have been undermined by Ottawa’s scal-ing back its direct financial assistance to all com-modities and provinces, including eliminating west-ern grain transportation subsidies. Agriculture andAgri-Food Canada has redefined its relationshipswith provinces and the agri-food industry, enteringinto partnerships for funding farm-income safetynets, agriculture research, and food inspection. How-ever, Canadian federalism is leaner in the late 1990s;direct Canadian government transfers to producers,more meagre. If these reduced federal transfers forfarm-income support constitute a negative entry onthe score card of the financial benefits of member-ship in the Canadian federation, the decline in theQuebec government’s total agri-food expenditures,and the contribution to the financial security andprofits of supply-managed producers stemming fromthe positive internal panel ruling upholding the highimport tariffs on supply-managed products, are bal-ancing positive entries.

Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s current pref-erence for partnerships with provinces and the agri-food industry in designing and delivering agri-foodpolicies appears to be the defensible and appropri-ate course of action to redress negative views of thefederal system. It is certainly a decentralist strat-egy, but one that falls short of a wholesale transferof jurisdiction over agriculture to provinces. Asnoted above, agriculture and trade policy are inter-twined, so much so that Quebec’s agri-food sectorcan be expected to appraise the benefits of federal-ism increasingly in terms of Ottawa’s capacity tomanage its bilateral trading relationship with the USto their benefit. With exclusive legal authority forexternal trade policy, Ottawa has a major vehicleby which to affirm the merits of membership in theCanadian federation. If it continues to be willingand successful in devising a trade policy that effec-tively resists American demands to dismantle Cana-da’s distinctive programs and to converge on Ameri-can policy instruments, the Canadian governmentcould do much to redeem itself in the eyes of theQuebec farm community. An important test loomsahead when agricultural negotiations for the nextround of the World Trade Organization begin in 1999and international pressures on supply managementintensify. To build a consensus for the concessionsthat Canada will most certainly have to make ongreater foreign access to the Canadian domesticmarket, the strategy followed in previous trade ne-gotiations of a continuous and fully informative dia-logue with the provinces and the agri-food commu-nity will clearly be vital.

However, restoring Quebec farmers’ faith in thefederal system and strengthening their attachmentsto the federal system obviously goes well beyondappealing to their economic self-interest and deliv-ering economic benefits. It also goes beyond thepolicies and actions of governments. This article hasargued the importance of a social infrastructure thatlinks Quebec’s agri-food community with that out-side the province. Such institutional links acrosscitizens and between citizens and the Canadian



government, cannot be expected to undercutQuebecers’ emotional attachments to their provinceor to arrest the nationalist sentiments that charac-terize the relatively youthful Quebec farm commu-nity.16 But, as dairy supply management demon-strates, long-standing associational ties betweenQuebec farmers and those in other provinces can bea mechanism for building trust and respect acrosslinguistic communities. While the major onus forbuilding associational bridges must rest on theshoulders of farm leaders throughout Canada, in-cluding Quebec, the Government of Canada couldhelp to create and fortify such societal links by grant-ing more formal recognition to the views of organi-zations like the Canadian Federation of Agricultureand the National Farmers Union which strive to bepan-Canadian in their outlook.

In conclusion, the interrelationship between Que-bec agriculture, Canadian federalism, and interna-tionalization is evolving and will continue to evolve.Agriculture is but one example, albeit a powerfulone, of how the roles of governments and the vi-ability of political communities are being reshapedby broader continental and global trade and eco-nomic developments. Federal systems, especiallythose whose constituent communities are as distinc-tive in their interests, traditions, and organizationsas those in Canada, may be particularly vulnerableto internal factionalism in the face of globalizationand continentalization. Whether their schism is in-evitable or not is much more debatable. It wouldappear, at least to this author, to be contingent uponthe actions and strategies of governments and lead-ers in the political arena and in society.

NOTES

The constructive comments of officials in Canadian andQuebec farm unions and of colleagues David Cameron,Bil l Coleman and Richard Simeon are grateful lyacknowledged, as are the helpful comments of the threeanonymous reviewers for Canadian Public Policy/Analysede Politiques and the research support of the Social

Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada,Research Grant 410-92-0260.

1The following year, the UPA leader, Jacques Proulx,served on the Commission on the Future of Quebec (theBelanger-Campeau Commission) and signed its report.The UPA subsequently backed off its ringing endorsationof Quebec independence during the Belanger-Campeauhearings. It opted for a position of official neutrality in1992 and retained this neutral stance during the 1994-95regional hearings on the PQ Bill on the Future of Quebec.

2The Bourassa Liberal government commissioned in-ternal studies in the early 1990s (in the wake of the de-feat of the Meech Lake Accord and pending theCharlottetown Round talks) that also recommendedexclusive provincial jurisdiction over agriculture, withfederal fiscal compensation. The single “hiccup” was sup-ply management. In constitutional negotiations to trans-fer jurisdiction over agriculture to the province, the reportsuggested that Quebec should put the highest priority onmaintaining supply management, recognizing that itwould likely have to accept some diminution in its quotashare. See Lessard (1994, p. 3).

3In 1976, there were 24,072 dairy farms with sales of$2500 or more in Quebec. In 1994-95, Quebec dairy farmsnumbered 11,782. For the 1976 figure see AgricultureCanada (1981) Table 5, p. 7. For the 1994-95 figure, seeCanadian Dairy Commission (1995), p. 12.

4The supply-managed sectors continue to be very im-portant, as is fully revealed when account is taken of jobsin the food-processing sector. The food and beverage-manufacturing sector is the most important manufactur-ing sector in Quebec (15.3 percent of total value). Dairyproducts account for 25.9 percent and meat and poultry23.0 percent by sales; by employment, the figures are 10.9percent for milk products and 16.4 percent for meat andpoultry products. See Ministère de l’Agriculture, desPêcheries et de l’Alimentation (1995).

5Of the programs which deliver direct financial assist-ance to Quebec’s agricultural sector, only agriculturalcredit (begun in 1936) and the right of collective market-ing (1956) were in place prior to the modernization ofQuebec agriculture which began in the late 1960s andearly 1970s. The programmatic foundation of Quebecagriculture today includes: crop insurance (begun in1967), income stabilization (dating from 1975), and

46 Grace Skogstad


provision for Quebec farmers to organize in a monopo-listic union (1972).

6Despite the Bourassa government’s recognizing theUPA as the monopoly union of Quebec farmers, the UPAwas instrumental in the Liberal government’s electoraldefeat by the Parti Québécois in 1976.

7For example, when Marcel Landry, a former UPA of-ficial, became the minister in charge of agriculture(MAPAQ) in the PQ government elected in 1994, he chosea number of UPA officials as his main advisors.

8Goodale’s accessibility and persuasive skills werefully evident during his appearance at the UPA annualcongress in Quebec City in December 1993 to explainand defend the Canadian government’s abandonment ofits defence of Article X1.2.c in favour of tariffication.

9The UPA roundly criticized this second best outcome,even while one of its economists (Proulx 1994) stressedthat there was no short- or even medium-term threat tosupply management.

10Quebec withdrew from national fora in several policysectors in the wake of the defeat of the Meech LakeAccord in 1990.

11MAPAQ’s Information Document (p. 12), whichlaunched the reformist debate in Quebec, noted “the in-teraction of institutions, governments, universities, co-operatives, farm consolidations and farm unions, has cre-ated a partnership that is almost unique within [the] Que-bec economy.”

12Arguing that Quebec farmers face greater economicinsecurity outside Canada than inside, Buckland none-theless states that Canada without Quebec would have aweakened capacity to defend supply management and tar-iffs on imports of dairy and poultry products. Peter Leslie(1994, p. 44) has made this same argument more gener-ally. Leslie argues that Canada will negotiate an economicpartnership with a sovereign Quebec to avoid the loss ofbargaining power with the United States that would fol-low disruption of the present Canadian economic union.

13Pellerin’s appraisal of supply management in 1995differs from that in the UPA brief to the Belanger-Campeau Commission (p. 155) which cited interprovin-cial trading tensions over eggs at the beginning of the1970s as proof of the “frictions and ... decades of long

and costly legal spats related to the lack of clarity in theConstitution.”

14See Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1997) p. 41.Program payments had accounted for an average of 43percent of federal expenditures on agriculture over theprevious ten-year period, 1985-95. See ibid., p. vii.

15Total Quebec provincial government expenditures insupport of the agri-food sector have declined since 1990-91 when they peaked at $697 million. They are estimatedto be $586 million in 1996-97. See Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1995), Table C.1, p. 40; Agriculture andAgri-Food Canada (1997), Table C.1, p. 40.

16Among Canadian provinces, Quebec has the largestpercentage of farmers in the 30- to 44-year range and theyoungest farm population as a whole. See AgricultureCanada (1992) Figure 3.2, p. 111.

REFERENCES

Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1994), Future Direc-tions for Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food: A Vi-sion (Ottawa).

____ (1995), Farm Income, Financial Conditions andGovernment Expenditures. Data Book, September(Ottawa: Policy Branch, Agriculture and Agri-FoodCanada).

____ (1996), Farm Income, Financial Conditions andGovernment Expenditures. Data Book, September(Ottawa: Policy Branch, Economic and Policy Analy-sis Directorate, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada).

____ (1997), Farm Income, Financial Conditions andGovernment Assistance. Data Book, February (Ottawa:Policy Branch, Economic and Policy Analysis Direc-torate, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada).

Agriculture Canada (1977), Orientation of CanadianAgriculture. Volume 1. (Ottawa: Agriculture Canada).

____ (1981), Selected Agricultural Statistics for Canadaand the Provinces 1981 (Ottawa: Supply and ServicesCanada).

____ (1992), An Economic Overview of Farm Incomesby Farm Type (Ottawa: Agriculture Canada, PolicyBranch).

____ (1993), An Economic Overview of Selected FarmTypes, Canada, 1991, Farm Economics and RegulatoryPolicy Division Working Paper 12-93 (Ottawa:Agriculture Canada, Policy Branch).



Belzile, A. (1994), “Entente entre le fédéral et le provin-cial” La terre de chez nous, 24 février-2 mars, p. 1.

____ (1995a), “Aucun risque sérieux selon deuxchercheurs,” La terre de chez nous, 24-30 août, p. 7.

____ (1995b), “Le président de l’UPA réclame le retraitdu Québec des programmes fédéraux,” La terre de cheznous, 2-8 novembre, p. 1.

____ (1995c), “L’UPA entreprend une vaste démarche deconsultation,” La terre de chez nous, 14-20 décembre,p. 9.

____ (1996a), “Les producteurs laitiers y goûtent encore,”La terre de chez nous, 20-23 mars, pp. 1-2.

____ (1996b), “La Régie devant un défi de taille,” La terrede chez nous, 29 août-4 septembre, p. 3.

____ (1996c), “Mettre l’accent sur les marchés,” La terrede chez nous, 17-23 octobre, p. 11.

____ (1996d), “Les clients changent, les entreprisesdoivent s’adapter,” La terre de chez nous, 7-13novembre, p. 6.

Belzi le, H. (1995), “Le monde rural appuie lasouveraineté,” La terre de chez nous, 2-8 novembre,p. 2.

Bernier, B. (1976), “The Penetration of Capitalism inQuebec Agriculture,” Canadian Review of Sociologyand Anthropology 13(4):422-34.

Buckland, R. (1995), “La séparation et ses lourdesconséquences,” La terre de chez nous, 2-8 mars, p. 5.

Canadian Dairy Commission (1995), Annual Report 1994-1995 (Ottawa: Canadian Dairy Commission).

Canadian Food Inspection System (1996), Newsletter(Nepean, Ontario).

Cooper, A.F. (1992), “Agriculture and the GATT: TheSearch for Balance in Canadian Trade Policy,” inCanada: The State of the Federation 1992, ed. D.Brown and R. Young (Kingston: Institute of Intergov-ernmental Relations, Queen’s University).

Dessureault, M. (1996), “Le rendez-vous des filières agro-alimentaires,” Bovins du Québec, octobre, p. 3.

Doering, R.L. (1996), “Alternative Service Delivery: TheCase of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency(CFIA),” Unpublished paper prepared for a presenta-tion to the Department of Justice, Alternative ServiceDelivery (ASD) Workshop, Ottawa.

Doern, B., L.A. Pal, and B.W. Tomlin, eds. (1996), Bor-der Crossings: The Internationalization of CanadianPublic Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press).

Fagan, D. (1996), “Canada ‘slam dunks’ U.S. in farm dis-pute,” Globe and Mail, 3 December, p. B1.

Gagné, J.C. (1996a), “L’UPA attend le ministre Julien depied ferme,” La terre de chez nous, 5-11 décembre,p. 34.

____ (1996b), “Le Ministre Julien au Congrès: Toute unecôte à remonter,” La terre de chez nous, 12-18décembre, pp. 1-2.

Groulx, F. (1995), “Le non de Ralph Goodale ‘Plus fortsunis’” La terre de chez nous, 19-25 octobre, p. 1.

____ (1996), “Un congrès dont le ministre se souviendralongtemps,” La terre de chez nous, 12-18 décembre,p. 3.

Kesteman, J.-P. et al. (1984), Histoire du SyndicalismeAgricole au Québec (Montreal: Boréal Express).

Lafleur, C. (1995), “Éditorial: Les études de monsieurLe Hir,” La terre de chez nous, 5-11 octobre, p. 4.

Leslie, P.M. (1994), “Asymmetry: Rejected, Conceded,Imposed,” in Seeking a New Canadian Partnership,ed. F.L. Seidle (Montreal: Institute for Research onPublic Policy).

Lessard, D. (1994), “Québec devrait occuper le terrain,”La terre de chez nous, 17-23 novembre, p. 3.

Mackie, R. (1995), “Most Quebeckers Want Power Shift,”Globe and Mail, November 28, p. A4.

Meisel, J. (1995), “Multinationalism and the Federal Idea:A Synopsis,” in Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Mar-kets, and Governments in a Changing World, ed. K.Knop, S. Ostry, R. Simeon, and K. Swinton (Vancou-ver: University of British Columbia Press).

Morisset, M. (1995), “Quotas laitiers québécois et peurscanadiennes,” La terre de chez nous, 23-29 mars, p. 5.

North American Free Trade Agreement Arbitral PanelEstablished Pursuant to Article 2008 (cited as NAFTAArbitral Panel) (1996), In the Matter of Tariffs Appliedby Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Prod-ucts. Final Report of the Panel. 2 December.

Paradis, I. (1995), “Trêve entre le Québec et l’Ontario,”La terre de chez nous, 24-30 août, p. 3.

____ (1996), “L’UPA va gérer les fonds d’adaptation,”La terre de chez nous, 18-24 avril, p. 3.

Parti Québécois National Executive Council (1994), Que-bec in a New World: The PQ’s Plan for Sovereignty,trans. R. Chodos (Toronto: James Lorimer).

Paulin, R. (1995), “Goodale se tourne vers l’unité,” Laterre de chez nous, 9-15 novembre, p. 3.

Pel lerin, L. (1995a), “L’avenir du Québec etl’agriculture,” La terre de chez nous, 2-8 fevrier, p. 2.

____ (1995b), “L’avenir est encore à la gestion de l’offre,”La terre de chez nous, 27 avril-3 mai, p. 4.

48 Grace Skogstad


____ (1995c), “Il faudra vivre avec l’un ou l’autre choix,”La terre de chez nous, 19-25 octobre, p. 4.

____ (1995d), “Editorial: Un appel à la différence et auxchangements,” La terre de chez nous, 2-8 novembre,p. 4.

Proulx, Y. (1994), “Supply Management: Perspectives forthe 21st Century,” in Supply Management in Transi-tion: Towards the 21st Century, ed. G. Coffin, A.Schmitz and K. Rosaasen (Ste. Anne de Bellevue,Quebec: Macdonald Campus of McGill University).

Québec. Secrétariat des conférences socio-économiques(1978), L’Agro-Alimentaire pour une stratégie dedéveloppement (Québec).

Quebec. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food(1992), Information Document. Conference on Que-bec Agriculture (Quebec City).

Québec, Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Pêcheries et del’Alimentation (1995), Le Québec bioalimentaire enun coup d’oeil.

Rizvi, S. et al. (1995), Total Farm Family Income by FarmType, Region and Size, 1992, Farm Analysis BulletinNo. 98 (Ottawa: Farm Economics Division, PolicyBranch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada).

Romain, R., B. Larue, and R. Lambert (1995), “L’avenirdu secteur laitier dans un Québec souvrain,” La terrede chez nous, 12-18 octobre, p. 5.

Rosaasen, K.A., J.S. Lokken, and T. Richards (1995),“Provincialism — Problems for the Regulators and theRegulated. Growing Together?” in Supply Managementin Transition: Towards the 21st Century, ed. G. Coffin,A. Schmitz and K. Rosaasen (Ste. Anne de Bellevue,Quebec: Macdonald Campus of McGill University).

Secrétariat du Sommet sur l’agriculture québécoise(1992), Information Document. Conference on QuébecAgriculture; and Final Declaration. The QuébecAgriculture Summit (Québec).

Skogstad, G. (1987), The Politics of Agricultural PolicyMaking in Canada (Toronto: University of TorontoPress).

____ (1990), “The Farm Policy Community and PublicPolicy in Ontario and Quebec,” in Policy Communi-ties and Public Policy in Canada, ed. W.D. Colemanand G. Skogstad (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman).

____ (1995a), “Agriculture,” in Border Crossings: TheInternationalization of Canadian Public Policy, ed.G.B. Doern, L.A. Pal, and B.W. Tomlin (Toronto:Oxford University Press).

____ (1995b), “Warring Over Wheat: Managing BilateralTrading Tensions,” in How Ottawa Spends 1995-96,ed. S.D. Phillips (Ottawa: Carleton University Press).

Thibodeau, J.-C., P. Rioux and Y. Martineau (1995),“Solidité et productivité caractérisent l’industrie agro-alimentaire du Québec” as summarized and reportedin “Trois chercheurs de l’INRS vantent sa solidité,”La terre de chez nous, 24-30 août, p. 5.

Tower, C. (1995a), “New milk era dawns with nationalprice pool,” Western Producer, August 17, p. 19.

____ (1995b), “Eight provinces sign deal on chicken al-location and pricing,” Western Producer, September14, p. 6A.

Turcotte, C. (1994), “Le Québec devra-t-il céder unepartie de ses pouvoirs en agriculture?” Le Devoir, 9-10 juillet, p. B1.

Union des producteurs agricoles (1990), “Mémoireprésenté à la Commission parlementaire québécoisepar l’Union des producteurs agricoles: L’avenirpolitique et constitutionnel du Québec,” in CanadaAdieu? Quebec Debates Its Future, trans. R. Fidler(Lantzville, B.C. and Halifax: Oolichan Books and theInstitute for Research on Public Policy).

Western Producer (1995), “Supply management retainedonly because of vote: Goodale,” November 9, p. 60.

Wilson, B. (1995), “Quebec farm leader calls referenduma cry for change,” Western Producer, November 16, p. 58.

Young, R. (1996), “Conclusion: The Paths Ahead,” inQuébec-Canada: What Is the Path Ahead? ed. J.E.Trent, R.Young, and G. Lachapelle (Ottawa: Univer-sity of Ottawa Press).

Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture

Documents

Transcript of Canadian Federalism, Internationalization and Quebec Agriculture