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Defence Research andDevelopment Canada
Recherche et développementpour la défense Canada Canada
3-D SOVIET STYLELessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan
Dr. Anton Minkov, SJS-DSOA, Dr. Gregory Smolynec, CEFCOM-ORAT
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3-D Soviet Style. Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan
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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defence Research and Development Canada,Canadian ExpeditionaryForce Command (CEFCOM-ORAT),101 Colonel By Drive ,Ottawa,Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2,
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Counterinsurgency Leaders? Workshop, 27-29 Oct, Fort Leavenworth, KS
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
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State of Research
• Russian assessment inadequate
• DRA officials memoirs in Dari
• Most studies usually portray Soviet experience in negative terms or dismissed it outright as irrelevant
• Focus usually on the military campaign
• Discussion of Soviet COIN as comprehensive effort (military, economic development and state building experience) virtually non-existent
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Presentation Overview
• Relevance of Soviet Experience
• Defence – military ops
• Development – social, political, economic
• Diplomacy – internal efforts
• Conclusion – Lessons (to be) learned
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Chronology of Soviet Engagement
• 1979 Soviets invade & bear brunt of fighting
• 1985 Increased Afghan Army role
• 1986 Soviets limit combat operations
• 1989 Soviet withdrawal
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The Costs
Soviet Union
• Killed…........ 15,000
• Wounded….. 54,000
• Illnesses…. 416,000
• Political failure
Afghanistan
• Killed …1-1.3 million
• Refugees…..5 million
• Civil war, failed state
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Afghans Killed per Year
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
April1978
April1979
April1980
April1981
April1982
April1983
April1984
April1985
April1986
April1987
April1988
Brezhnev Andropov
Chernenko
Gorbachev
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Is Soviet experience relevant?
• Afghan geography
• Ethnic & social divisions are persistent
• Basis for state legitimacy still very elusive
• The border with Pakistan
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Is Soviet experience relevant?
• Military presence needed to provide security to the new regime
• Challenge of balancing military ops with civil affairs
• Underrated insurgency – culture of resistance & the ideology of Jihad
• “Limited Contingent”
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Military Ops - General observations
• Initial strategy
• Different kind of war
– Elusive and decentralized enemy
– Terrain not conducive to mechanized operations
– Most operations - small scale
• Forces not enough to control all territory
• Overriding principle - minimal casualties
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Air L
ift
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Military Ops - General observations
• Initial strategy
• Different kind of war
– Elusive and decentralized enemy
– Terrain not conducive to mechanized operations
– Most operations - small scale
• Forces not enough to control all territory
• Overriding principle - minimal casualties
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Soviet Bases
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Defence - General observations
• Initial strategy
• Different kind of war
– Elusive and decentralized enemy
– Terrain not conducive to mechanized operations
– Most operations - small scale
• Forces not enough to control all territory
• Overriding principle - minimal casualties
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“The War of the Roads”
• Mujahidin’s standard tactics: the road ambush & road mines/ IEDs
• Blocking roads - a strategic goal: Mobility / re-supply & Afghan economy critically affected
• Soviets devote large forces to route protection
• Mujahidin mine/IED ops sophisticated: plastic mines
• Losses due to mines: 11,289 trucks, 1,314 APCs, 147 tanks, 433 artillery pieces, 1,138 command vehicles
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Mines & Ambushes
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Adjustments - Strategic
• Focus on controlling the LOC
• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency
• Deal making
• Security outposts
• Building up the strength of DRA Forces
• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986
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Military activities 1980-84
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Adjustments - Strategic
• Focus on controlling the LOC
• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency
• Deal making
• Security outposts
• Building up the strength of DRA Forces
• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986
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Soviet Counter-Insurgency Approach
“I hold it a principle in Asia that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on your enemy.”
General M.O. Skobelev,
Conqueror of Turkestan, 1881
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Effects of War - Destruction of Irrigation
0%
24%20%
12%
0%
36%
30%
13%
12%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1978 1980 1985 1986 1987
% F
arm
ers
Reported by Farmers in Afghanistan Reported by Farmers who left Afghanistan
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Effects of War - Bombing of Villages
0%
53%
38%
22%
0%
65%
49%
23%
21%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1978 1980 1985 1986 1987
% F
arm
ers
Reported by Farmers in Afghanistan Reported by Farmers who left Afghanistan
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Adjustments - Strategic
• Focus on controlling the LOC
• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency
• Deal making
• Security outposts
• Building up the strength of DRA Forces
• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986
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Fayzabad, Village Sari, The regiment’s command in negotiations with the local elders
Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense CanadaSoviet solders and “friendly” mujahidin. Ceasefire
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Adjustments - Strategic
• Focus on controlling the LOC
• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency
• Deal making
• Security outposts
• Building up the strength of DRA Forces
• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986
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Outpost 21, Rukha, Panjshir Valley
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The command point
Post 21’s helicopter landing and radio-signal interceptor
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Road and Convoy Security Posts
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Adjustments - Strategic
• Focus on controlling the LOC
• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency
• Deal making
• Security outposts
• Building up the strength of DRA Forces
• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986
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Growth of DRA Forces
137,000
200,000
260,000
310,000
310,000
300,000
240,000
180,000
100,000
87,000
330,000
-
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
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Desertion RatesNumber of Desertions per Year
35,05830,941
30,945
25,432
38,600
29,048
32,433
28,550
30,680
42,544
-5,000
10,000
15,00020,00025,00030,000
35,00040,00045,000
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Percent Desertions per Year
22%
17%
21%
15%
25%
11% 11% 9%10% 12%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
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DRA Forces breakdown (1988)
• Government Forces– Army 90,000 – Border Guards 42,000 – Gendarmerie 96,700 – KhaD 68,700 – Special Guards 11,500
• Total 308,900
• Militia on the side of government – Tribal 62,000 – GDR 35,000 – Self-defence 53,000
• Total 150,000
Grand Total 458,900
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Force Level to Population Ratio Comparison
• Afghanistan (1988)
– 26:1,000 (Soviet + DRA forces)
• Iraq (May 2008)
– 22:1,000 (26:1,000 including Sons of Iraq).
• Afghanistan (2009)
– 7.6:1,000
• Required as per past COIN experience
– 425,000 – 640,000
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DRA Air Force
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Women in DRA Forces
DRA Air Force woman officer at Lycee graduationceremony in Baghram, Autumn, 1987.
Female village self-defence group
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Soviet soldiers with the local self-defence unit, Badahshan
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Adjustments - Strategic
• Focus on controlling the LOC
• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency
• Deal making
• Security outposts
• Building up the strength of DRA Forces
• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986
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Soviet and DRA Forces Deaths
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Red Army deaths DRA Army deaths
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Border Sealing Activities
19
14
16
13
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1983 1984 1987
Border Sealing Activities
53
3730
85
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1983 1984 1987
Ambushes (daily)
Caravan Interceptions (monthly)
By SovietBy DRA
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Soviet – Afghan joint operation
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Handing Battalion's Position to the Afghan Army
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Joint operation with KhaD captures a mujahidin leader
KhaD officers with captured mujahidins
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Afghan and Soviet troops in ambush position
After successful operation, Parwan, April 1987
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Adjustments - Tactical
• Tactics devised to minimize losses
• Armed group concept
• Bounding overwatch
• Improvement of air assault and helicopter gunship tactics
• Enveloping detachments
• Use of special forces
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Михаил БзычкинThe Soviet soldier
66 Reconnaissance company. Jalalabad
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Spteznaz in action: Destroying a supply caravan, 1987
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Galina Podzarev, an actor from Moscow Cascade - the favourite band of the 40th Army
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Adjustment - Force Structure
• Shift to smaller, independent units
– 7 divisions 4 divisions + independent units
• Withdrawal of tank and anti-aircraft regiments
• Decentralization of fire support and assets
– shifted from army and division level to battalion level
• Air power, air mobility used as a force multiplier
– helicopters increased from 50 to 300
• Use of special forces
– 20% of all Red Army special forces
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Adjustment - Equipment and Training
• New systems tested and introduced
– personnel carriers, helicopters and helicopter gunships, but not tanks
• Improvements to infantry’s personal gear and firepower
• Specialized mountain warfare training schools
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The GP-25 "Koster" ("Bonfire") under-barrel grenade launcher
The RPG-18 "Mukha" ("Fly")
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Social and State Development
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Traditional Functions of State in Islam
• External security (against enemy forces)
• Justice
• Ensuring overall support for Muslim institutions and religion
• Policing, social justice, education, health
– responsibility of individual communities and Islamic charities (waqf)
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Development: State Building Strategy
Regime stabilizing
Party State
Expanding the Social Base Defeating the ‘reactionary’ forces
Expanding government control
Red Army
Reforms Education
Police Afghan Army
Regime change
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The Afghan Party StatePDPA Structure State Institutions
Politburo
Central Committee
Party Congress
PDPA Province
President
RC Presidium
Revolutionary Council
PM, Ministers
Governors
Loya Jirga
Provincial Jirga
District Jirga
Village Jirga
PDPA District
PDPA Sub-district
Commissioners
Commissioners
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Growth of PDPA
PDPA and DYOA Membership Growth
205,000200,000
-
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year
PDPA membership DYOA membership
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Activists of the Afghan Women's Democratic Organization
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Secretary of the local Committee of the PDPA, Kalay-Dana, Parwan, 1986
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“Delivery” of PDPA activists in Parwan, 1987
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Development: State Building Strategy
Regime stabilizing
Party State
Expanding the Social Base Defeating the ‘reactionary’ forces
Expanding government control
Red Army
Reforms Education
Police Afghan Army
Regime change
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Other Pushtun 49.3%Pushtun
67.6% Durani 18.3%Tajik/Sunni
23.9%
Shia 8.5%
Ethnic Politics
• Ethnic equality guaranteed in 1964
• Khalq and Parcham – ethnic composition
• Language reforms as ethnic politics
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Ethnic Policies and Counterinsurgency
• Ethnic Favourism
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
1981/2 1983/4 1984/5 1986/7 1988/9
PushtunsTajiksOther
Ethnic Composition of PDPA
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From Ethnic Rivalry to Ethnic War
Senior Officers
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1978 1987/88
Pushtun Tajik Other
Troops
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1978 1989
Pushtun Tajik Other
• Ethnic policies changed the balance of power
Ethnic Composition of the DRA Army
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Development: State Building Strategy
Regime stabilizing
Party State
Expanding the Social Base Defeating the ‘reactionary’ forces
Expanding government control
Red Army
Reforms Education
Police Afghan Army
Regime change
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Development: State Building Strategy
Regime stabilizing
Party State
Expanding the Social Base Defeating the ‘reactionary’ forces
Expanding government control
Red Army
Reforms Education
Police Afghan Army
Regime change
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Government Control, 1988
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Soviet and DRA Bases
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Limits of Military “Pacification”
1,005
1,252
1,819
1,535
1,319
292292292292292
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Freed' by military activities villages Remained under government control
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Number of Villages under Government Control
11,265
5000
6,100
8,861
7,265
6,9706,6796,3886,0975,8065,515
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Under government control Under temporary control
Beginning of National Reconciliation
Beginning of Soviet withdrawal
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Diplomacy: Internal
• Unifying PDPA’s factions
• Pacification Policy
– agreements with local leaders and mujahidin
• Loya and local Jirgas (1985, 1988)
• Integrating the ulema (religious scholars) within state run religious system
• Agitprop (CIMIC)
• Promotion of national reconciliation and unity
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Agitprop
• Part of force structure
• Composition
– Military staff
– Medical personnel
– Party representatives
– Entertainers
• Function
– Spread of information, distribution of fuel, food, medical help, reconnaissance, negotiations
• Initiative gradually “Afghanized”
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The Agitprop detachment, 1987. Parwan Province. Durani village.
Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense CanadaFuel distribution, 1986
Meeting devoted to the 68-th Anniversary of the October Revolution, 1986 Movie watching. 1986
Agitprop of the 108th MRD, 1985
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Change of Strategy: National Reconciliation
• Launched in 1986
• More inclusive government
• Reversal of controversial reforms
• Socialism replaced with nationalism
• Promoting Islamic character of the state
• Accommodating and buying off resistance commanders
– ….but not challenging their authority
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Results - Civilian Casualties
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9
Afghanistan
Iraq
• Civilian deaths decrease by 65-70% (1986-87)
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Results - Reconciliation Process, 1986-89
• By 1990, 25% of all non-government armed units had signed “reconciliation” agreements and 40% ceasefire agreements
42,000
82,000
60,000
125,000
45,000
11,5336,9136,000
-
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1986 1987 1988 1989
Mujahideengoing over tothegovernment
Mujahidin indiscussionswithgovernment
Beginning of Soviet withdrawal
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Development: Economic
• Extensive prior Soviet economic investment
• Increasing the state share of national income
– 1975 -10%; 1988 - 20% of GDP
– in manufacturing - 80%
– in the construction sector – 90%
– in transportation – 60%
– Oil and gas exploration – 100%
• Domestic revenue, excluding sales of natural gas
– Growth of 142 % from 1977 to 1989 (13% per year)
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Development: Agriculture
• 60% of GDP, source of income for 80% of population
• Land reforms counterproductive
• Overemphasis on cooperatives, state farms
• Object of contention
– cash crops vs. foodstuffs
• Target of the counterinsurgency strategy
– 20% of villages destroyed
• Ultimate result – destruction, import of foodstuffs
• Opium production
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Development: Trade
• Objective – increase bilateral trade
• Gas exports, mining
– Exports at below market prices to USSR
– Soviet technicians
• Manufacturing not encouraged
• Economic integration
• Economy survives on foreign aid
• Corruption
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Trade
28%
57%
68%59%
64%
37%
33%
72%
87%
71%
61%
34%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Exports to USSR Imports from USSR
The April Revolution
Soviet invasion
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Development: Trade
• Objective – increase bilateral trade
• Gas exports, mining
– Exports at below market prices to USSR
– Soviet technicians
• Manufacturing not encouraged
• Economic integration
• Economy survives on foreign aid
• Corruption
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Soviet Military Aid (in Millions of Rubles)
3,972
1,629
1,063.4
579.1516.3366.3277.9231.5267.6 221.4
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Decision to withdraw,
Building Afghan Army capacity
Beginning of withdrawal
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Wheat Supply (in tons)
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
From USSR From domestic sources
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Expenditures and Revenue
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
mill
ions
of a
fgha
nis
State expenditure Revenue and aid
Debt
National reconciliation
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Sources of State Revenue
75%
25%
State Income, 1988
30%
70%
Customs and taxes
Natural Gas sales, financial aid
Customs and taxes
State Income, 1991
Soviet Financial Aid
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Economic Aid Comparison
• Afghanistan (1980-1989)– Soviet aid (converted in 2007 dollars) - $29.7
billion, $1,980 per capita
• Afghanistan (2002-2009)
– Disbursed US and international aid - $44.4 billion, $1,346 per capita
• Iraq (2003-2008)
– Combined international aid to Iraq - $73.4 billion, $2,622 per capita
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Defeat or Strategic Withdrawal?
• Decision for withdrawal made in 1985
– Based on shift of Party’s global strategy
• DRA army demonstrates increasing capacity
• National Reconciliation progressing
• Effects of Red Army withdrawal are positive
• The Regime survives
– … but depends on foreign aid
– … and is weakened by ethnic conflict
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Lessons (to be) learned
• Denying sanctuary in Pakistan impossible with a “limited contingent”
• Red Army’s battlefield victories could not be translated into strategic success
• Level of political commitment is more important• Getting things done in Afghanistan requires local
engagement …. but runs the risk of perpetuating local power
centers that challenge central authority• Secular values conflict with Afghan traditional
values• Is strong, centralized, democratic Afghanistan
fesible?
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Lessons (to be) learned – Exit strategy
• Red Army withdrawal removed a principal cause of war for the insurgents
• The policy of “National Reconciliation” was more successful than military operations
• Building Afghan security forces was a viable exit strategy
• Focus on long term economic sustainability is most important
• Keep supporting a friendly regime in Kabul at all costs
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Questions?
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References
• “Report to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Situation in Afghanistan.” October, 1979
• CPSU CC Politburo Transcript, 13 November 1986.• M. F. Slinkin,. Afganistan. Stranici istorii (80-90-e gg. XX v.)
[Afgnanistan. Pages from History (80s—90s of the 20th century)]. Simferopol 2003.
• G.F. Krivosheev,. Rossiya i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: Poteri vooruzhennykh syl, Statisticheskoe issledovanie [Russia and USSR in the Wars of the 20th century: Losses of the Armed Forces, Statistical Review. Moscow, 2001.
• M.A. Gareev,. Afganskaya strada [The Difficult Battle for Afghanistan]. Moscow 1999.
• A.A. Lyakhovskii,. Tragedia i doblest Afghana [The Tragedy and Glory of the Afghans]. Moscow 1994
• V.I. Varennikov, Interview. February, 2007..
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References
• Grant Farr, Azam Gul, 1984. “Afghan Agricultural Production, 1978-1982,”Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 8, 1: 65-79.
• Antonio Giustozzi, 2000. War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992.Washington
• The Russian General Staff,. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. translators & editors Lester W. Grau & Michael A. Gress, Lawrence, Kansas 2002
• Scott R. McMichael, 1991. Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London
• M.S. Noorzoy, 1985. “Long-term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study,” IJMES, 17: 151-173
• Milan Hauner, Robert L. Canfield, ed., Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: Collision and Transformation. Boulder, San Francisco, London: 48-58
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