Can We Believe Recent Data on Birth Expectations in the United States?

DEMOGRAPHY@ Volume 11, Number 1 February 1974

CAN WE BELIEVE RECENT DATA ON BIRTHEXPECTATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES?

Judith BlakeGraduate School of Public Policy and International Population and Urban Research,University of California, Berkeley, 2607 Hearst Avenue, Berkeley, California 94720

Abstract-A share of the recent decline in birth expectations of young American wives may be due to the historically unique stimulus of intense publicattention to population growth and family size. Data on whites fromnumerous national surveys provide at least four types of evidence favoringthis thesis: a sudden massing of responses in the two-child category (theZPG formula) ; a tolerance for the large family; an aversion to childlessness and the one-child family; and an inconsistency between respondents'evaluations of the family cycle and childspacing, on the one hand, andtheir personal acceptance of the two-child norm, on the other. The lackof congruence in American reproductive attitudes at present suggests thatsome conservatism might be wise in accepting current birth expectationsas valid indicators of the long-run intentions of youthful cohorts.

In late 1972, the United States Bureauof the Census lowered its populationprojections for the United States up tothe year 2020 (U. S. Bureau of theCensus, 1972a). The decision to revisethe projections was based both on thecontinued decline in period birth ratesand on survey data concerning the birthexpectations of young wives (U. S.Bureau of the Census, 1972b). With acrude birth rate of 15.6 in 1972, a general fertility rate of 73.4, and birth expectations averaging 2.3 alleged bywives 18 to 24 in June 1972, the CensusBureau understandably felt compelledto react.

Nonetheless, as demographers knowwell, at least one of the indicators, theperiod rates, could change quite radically and in a relatively short period oftime. If birth rates were to rise, thenthe case for downwardly revised population estimates as far in the future asfifty years would be less appealinglyclear-cut. However, even then one mightbe tempted to argue that the evidence

of extremely low birth expectationswould still remain. Surely these tell usthat no baby boom is in the offing.Have we any reason to believe that theseexpectations will not remain constantat their present low level or drop evenfurther?

The present paper brings a variety ofsurvey data to bear on this question. Itadvances the thesis that a share, perhaps a' major share, of the recent changein birth expectations stems from intense but short-run influences on publicopinion, some of which may even becontributing to biased responses. In particular, it seems important to take account of a historically unique stimulusthat has become dominant during thepast six or seven years, namely, thatduring this time family size has becomea public and a publicized issue. The"population problem," the need for zeropopulation growth, the desirability ofthe two-child family as a means ofachieving a stationary population have,for the first time, become subjects of

25

THE INCREASE IN THE

"TWO-CHILD" RESPONSE

The 1972 birth expectations of American wives aged 18 to 24 (collected bythe Current Population Survey of theU.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972b) represented a major decline in fertility expectations since 1967, when the CensusBureau first solicited information of

26 DEMOGRAPHY, volume 11, number 1, February 1974

massive propaganda. Thus, we are faced this type. On the average, total birthswith the nagging methodological prob- expected by wives in the 1967 surveylem that responses to questions on birth were 2.9, but by 1972 this figure hadexpectations and family-size ideals or dropped to 2.3. This reduction came-desires may, in recent years, have been about, moreover, through a disproporinfluenced by an element that is quite tionate increase in responses in the twoexternal to any major change in long- child category. Whereas, in 1967, 37 perterm motives. Inundated by a sudden cent of young wives expected a total ofwave of antinatalist propaganda, re- two children, by 1972, 57 percent lookedspondents may be giving stereotyped forward to a family this small-a 54responses, or many may feel embarrassed percent increase in the proportion exto say that they want or expect more pecting two children over approximatelythan two children (the ZPG formula). a five-year period.

What suggests that recent responses The trend in birth expectations is sub-not only have a heavy stereotypical stantiated by survey results on idealcomponent but that they also may be family size that I have commissioned,poor indicators of long-term desires or through the Gallup poll, since the midbehavior? First, there is the sudden 1960's. These data, collected from bothmassing of responses in the two-child men and women, have been combinedcategory. Second, there is the remarka- with previous survey findings on idealble tolerance for the large family. Third, family size going back to 1936 and, forthere is the aversion to childlessness and whites, are shown in Table 1. It is evithe one-child family. And, fourth, there dent that since late 1970 average idealis the fact that respondents' evaluations family size among adults of all ages hasconcerning the family cycle and child- dropped to the lowest point shown inspacing are not, taken together, con- this series of observations. Among adultsgruent with their personal acceptance of under age 25 (that is, in the same agethe small family. category as the respondents interviewed

In sum, this paper attempts to show by the Bureau of the Census concerningthat respondents do not have, at present, birth expectations) family-size idealsa stabilized and consistent utility scale (Table 2) were also at record lows durregarding family size (Simon, 1963). ing 1972: 2.6 for men and 2.7 for women.This is to say that, if one presents sam- Characteristically, the ideals are someples of adult Americans with a range of what higher than the expectations.items relevant to family size, respon- When the distribution over time ofdents make choices that are incongruent responses concerning ideal family sizewith a preference for extremely small is examined (Table 1), one of the firstfamilies. At the least, this fact is a things that commands attention, as withwarning against placing too much con- the birth expectations, is the sudden infidence in the stated expectations. crease during the past four years of

those stating a preference for two children. This contrasts sharply with theperiod from 1936 to the late 1960's,which manifested a regular change inthe percentage choosing the two-childfamily (Figure 1). Between 1936 and1953, approximately 30 percent of adultmen and 27 percent of adult women expressed a two-child preference. Then,during the late 1950's and early 1960's,

Birth Expectations 27

TABLE I.-Distribution of Number of Children Considered Ideal' by White Menand Women of Voting Age,United States, Selected Years, 1936-1972

Survey Number of Children TotalDate 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Percent (N)b X

White Men

1936 2 33 32 21 7 5 100 1,750 3.21941 1 31 28 23 8 7 100 1,874 3.21945 1 23 27 28 11 9 100 1,241 3.51947 1 29 32 26 5 6 100 1,297 3.31952 0 30 31 25 6 7 100 916 3.31953 2 29 31 27 6 5 100 694 3.21957 1 21 40 27 8 3 100 564 3.31959 1 22 34 27 8 8 100 593 3.51963 1 23 33 29 6 7 100 597 3.41966 1 27 35 28 5 4 100 540 3.21967 0 28 37 27 4 4 100 669 3.21968 0 30 33 22 8 6 100 710 3.3

June 1970 1 41 26 20 6 5 100 652 3.1Sept 1970 3 49 26 14 3 3 100 659 2.7Aug 1971 2 49 26 16 3 3 100 634 2.8Nov 1971 3 46 23 18 5 4 100 679 2.9Jan 1972 2 50 22 17 5 3 100 679 2.8Mar 1972 2 54 21 15 4 4 100 655 2.8May 1972 1 46 24 19 6 3 100 647 2.8June 1972 2 48 27 16 3 3 100 664 2.8Sept 1972 2 50 22 18 3 4 100 644 2.8

White Women

1936 2 33 33 24 5 3 100 633 3.11941 2 28 25 30 5 7 100 92C 3.21945 1 21 27 37 7 7 100 1,421 3.51947 2 26 28 33 6 4 100 1,324 3.21952 1 26 28 33 5 6 100 937 3.31953 1 27 29 30 7 6 100 648 3.41957 1 17 36 37 4 4 100 622 3.41959 1 16 27 44 7 5 100 637 3.61963 1 17 29 40 6 7 100 639 3.51966 2 17 34 39 4 4 100 566 3.41967 1 23 30 38 4 4 100 651 3.41968 0 25 31 31 7 6 100 732 3.4

June 1970 0 39 22 27 6 6 100 682 3.2Sept 1970 2 39 24 27 3 4 100 694 3.0Aug 1971 1 45 24 21 5 3 100 659 3.0Nov 1971 2 43 24 22 4 4 100 681 3.0Jan 1972 2 46 23 21 l. 3 100 695 2.9Mar 1972 2 44 24 21 5 4 100 665 3.0May 1972 1 48 21 20 5 5 100 655 3.0June 1972 2 48 20 20 4 5 100 670 2.9Sept 1972 1 49 21 20 5 4 100 666 2.9

a- The following question was asked: "What do you consider is theideal size of a family--a husband, wife, and how many children?"

b- ~a1 number of respondents giving codab1e answers to the questionon ideal family size.

Source: Gallup surveys.


TABLE 2.-Distribution of Number of Children Considered Ideal by White Men and Womenof Voting Age under Age 25, United States, Selected Years, 193&--1972

Survey Number of Children TotalDate a 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Percent (N) X

White Men

1936 a 3 38 34 17 4 4 100 261 2.91941 2 2 39 28 18 8 3 100 172 3.01945 a a 37 29 25 7 2 100 59 3.11947 1 1 38 35 18 4 3 100 91 3.01952 a 0 33 56 0 7 4 100 30 2.91953 0 0 44 36 11 6 3 100 37 3.01957 0 0 27 42 23 3 0 100 33 3.01959 5 3 22 24 32 11 3 100 37 3.21963 3 a 21 42 24 0 10 100 39 3.41966 a a 39 44 12 5 a 100 46 2.81967 a a 33 29 26 10 2 100 44 3.21968 0 a 38 46 11 3 2 100 38 2.91970a a 2 55 29 8 4 2 100 108 2.71971a a 4 60 17 12 4 3 100 218 2.61972a 1 4 57 21 12 3 2 100 538 2.6

White Women

1936 0 2 36 43 16 2 1 100 94 2.81941 0 2 39 37 19 1 2 100 95 2.91945 0 1 25 36 30 5 3 100 172 3.31947 1 1 27 35 27 6 3 100 151 3.11952 a 1 34 30 33 1 1 100 86 3.01953 a 0 29 35 27 6 3 100 69 3.21957 a a 20 40 38 2 a 100 45 3.21959 a 0 23 26 47 2 2 100 44 3.41963 a 3 13 37 34 8 5 100 42 3.51966 0 4 26 41 23 2 4 100 52 3.11967 0 a 30 32 36 2 a 100 48 3.11968 0 0 31 31 27 8 3 100 62 3.31970a 0 2 53 26 15 2 2 100 134 2.81971a 1 3 49 20 17 7 3 100 209 2.91972a 0 3 56 20 17 2 2 100 450 2.7

a- For 1970 and 1971 tabulations are based on a combination of twosurveys in each year; for 1972 five surveys have been combined.


the proportions in this category were doubled among women and rose by 67reduced to a little over 20 percent for percent among men of all ages. It is hardmen and 16 to 17 percent for women. to pinpoint any single social and eco-During the late 1960's the proportions nomic change in this country sufficientlystarted rising gradually among both men sudden and influential to lead respon-and women. But, between 1968 and 1972, dents to revise their family-size prefer-those alleging a two-child preference ences so drastically.

Birth Expectations

It can be argued, of course, that notone, but many, social and economicchanges have had cumulative antinatalist impact on family-size preferences.One can even presuppose that these influences have been peaking in their ef-

29

fect during the past four or five years.For example, the anti familial messageof the counterculture, the women's liberation movement, and the economicrecession may be mentioned. However,such influences would normally be ex-

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1960 1965 1970


FIGURE I.-Percentage of White Men and Women of Voting Age Saying That Two ChildrenAre Ideal, United States, 1936-1972


pected to impinge primarily on the been similar among all age groups durfamily-size preferences of the young. ing this period. In each age group, theYet an examination by age and sex of proportion idealizing two children bethe proportions idealizing two children tween 1967 and 1972 has more than(Figures 2 and 3) shows a large increase doubled among women. Among men, theamong all age groups since the late largest relative increase has been among1960's. Indeed, the relative increase has those aged 45 and over-a doubling of

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FIGURE 2.-Percentage of White Men Saying That Two Children Are Ideal, by Age, UnitedStates, 1936-1972


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FIGURE 3.-Percentage of White Women Saying That Two Children Are Ideal, by Age,United States, 1936-1972

the proportion. Clearly, therefore, someinfluence is exerting similar effects onall age groups. This is all the more remarkable when one remembers thatmany older cohorts have had considerably more than two children and, hence,

now seem to be disavowing their ownreproductive behavior.

Even if we are led, therefore, to suspect that antinatalist propaganda hasbeen a principal influence on family-sizeresponses in all age groups, we cannot


conclude that a genuine change of heartconcerning family size has not occurred.Perhaps in the course of four or fiveyears Americans have taken an irreversible quantum jump and revolutionized their views concerning family size.Although there is no simple and elegantway to test this hypothesis, we can examine how congruent it is with otherpreferences concerning family size andthe family cycle.

ARE MORE THAN Two Too MANY?

One test of the public commitment tothe two-child family concerns how normative it is. Are more than two childrenregarded as "too many"? Do peopletake a sufficiently judgmental view oflarger families to be willing to characterize them as "too large"?

To ascertain at what upper familysize level a normative view can beelicited from respondents, I tried thefollowingquestion:

"According to your personal tastes andpreferences, what size family do youthink is too large; a husband, wife, andhow many children?"

I commissioned this question on Gallupsurveys in October 1970 and August1972, as well as on a special Gallupsample of youth-half in college andhalf of various educational levels outside of college-in June 1971.

As may be seen from Table 3, theaverage family size considered "toolarge" among all the samples, with theexception of white males currently in

TABLE 3.-Distribution of Family Size Considered "Too Large" by White Men and Womenof Voting Age in October 1970 and August 1972, and by White Youth, Those in College and

Those 18-24Years Old Not in College, June 1971, United States

Survey Date Number of Children Totaland Sex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-8 9-10 11+ Pet. (N) i

Whites of Voting AgeOctober 1970

Men 0 2 20 20 24 13 10 5 6 100 617 5.4Women 0 2 14 19 27 17 10 6 5 100 659 5.5Total 0 2 17 20 25 15 10 6 5 100 1.276 5.5

August 1972Men 1 2 19 24 21 13 7 5 8 100 647 5.4Women 0 2 16 23 23 17 10 4 5 100 661 5.3

Total 0 2 17 24 22 15 9 5 6 100 1.308 5.4

White Youths (18-24)

June 1971Not incollegeMen 0 2 14 19 26 17 9 6 7 100 471 5.1Women 0 1 11 17 30 15 12 7 7 100 512 5.5

Total 0 1 12 18 28 16 11 7 7 100 983 5.3

In collegeMen 1 1 19 25 25 12 10 2 5 100 548 4.8Women 0 1 16 21 23 15 11 6 7 100 350 5.3Total 1 1 18 23 24 13 10 4 6 100 898 5.0


Birth Expectations

college, was well over five children. Evenwhen the data are tabulated by age, religion, and educational level (not shownhere), it is rare to find a mean familysize considered too large that is belowfive children.

It thus appears that, although approximately 50 percent of the respondents in recent surveys judge the twochild family to be ideal, less than 20percent would designate the three-childfamily as too large, and only an additional 20 percent or so would say thatfour children are too many. Quite clearlythe notion of "too large" for most respondents does not mean larger than twoor even larger than three.

The fact that the two-child familydoes not seem to be truly normative hasat least two important implications forour judgment of the intensity and steadfastness of the recently expressed twochild preference. First, this preferencedoes not seem to involve such a sense ofcommitment that many individualswould feel greatly concerned aboutchanging their preferences in the future.Second, any notion that importantsources of informal moral pressure prevail among us to have only two childrenseems to be naive. For all but a smallminority of respondents, at least threechildren are tolerable; for the majority,at least four are not too many. Indeed,for more than a third of respondents atleast five children are acceptable. Hence,even if we were to assume that disapproval of families of more than two children would be openly expressed were itto exist, such disapproval does not, atthis time, appear to characterize American sentiment.

THE AVERSION TO CHILDLESSNESS AND

THE ONLY CHILD

Widespread tolerance for families withmore than two children is not matchedby tolerance for families with one ornone. A willingness to regard childlessness and the only child as desirable or

33

even acceptable is still rare. Hence, regardless of the nature of white Americans' motives for preferring smaller families in recent years, people do notappear impelled to redefine their viewson childlessness and the one-child family. This conclusion emerges from a number of different types of survey data.

First, when respondents are questionedconcerning their family-size preferencesor ideals, it is quite clear (Tables 1 and2) that there has been no notable increase over time in the proportions idealizing childlessness or the only child. Infact, it is fair to say that, among respondents in general, and even amongthose under age 25, virtually no onevolunteers these two responses.

Conversely, special groups in the population, such as those currently in college, do appear to have changed somewhat over time regarding tolerance forchildlessness and the only child. In MayJune 1961, Gallup asked a special youthsample the following question, "Howmany children would you like to have?"I commissioned this question again forthe youth sample (already discussed ina previous section) in June 1971. Table4 shows not only a major overall shift inthe distribution of desired family size forthese two samples of college youth, butalso an increase in the proportions preferring childlessness or the only child. In1961, only three percent of college menand women chose childlessness and theonly child. By 1971, childlessness-onlychild responses had risen to ten percentamong men and 13 percent amongwomen. Even in this atypical population,however, it is clear that childlessnessand the only child are not very popularresponses.

It is tempting to argue, however, thatquestions concerning ideal family size,or the number of children the respondentwould like to have, inhibit the mentionof childlessness. Indeed, there may evenbe some inhibition of the "only child"response. As one effort to overcome such


TABLE 4.-Distribution of Number of Children Wanted" by White College Youth Accordingto Age,United States, May and June 1961 and June 1971

Age oNumber of Children

1 2 3 4 5

White Men

Total6+ Pet, (N)

College youth 1961Under 2020-2223-24Total


232

6767

1 26 40 24o 28 28 301 26 39 24

2 52 23 114 58 18 98 59 21 33 56 19 9

White Women

333

3223

144 100 325 3.18 100 38 3.35 100 377 3.1

3 100 177 2.62 100 231 2.41 100 66 2.23 100 474 2.4



o1

1

99

9

o 9 35 35 172 15 32 33 10

2 15 32 33 10

5 44 18 14 63 55 18 11 2

4 49 18 12 4

4 100 23 3.77 100 339 3.6

77 100 369 3.6

4 100 174 2.62 100 143 2.4

104 100 327 2.5

Too few eases for analysis.a- In both surveys respondents were asked, "How many children would you

like to have?"Source: Gallup surveys of youth, May and June 1961 and June 1971.

possible biases, I commissioned the following question:

"According to your personal tastesand preferences, what size family doyou think is too small?"

This question was asked just before theone on the family size considered "toolarge." Unfortunately, on the 1970 survey the childless category was inadvertently omitted and, hence, those dataare not usable.

It seems apparent from Table 5 that,for the white population generally, childlessness and the only child are rated negatively. It is not clear from these answerswhether respondents who said that achildless family is "too small" meanthat a one-child family would not be"too small," or whether they mean, "Imust say that being childless is goingtoo far. Having one child is also toosmall, but I want to emphasize that Idon't think people should be childless."

In spite of this possible ambiguity of

Birth Expectations

interpretation, the question does differentiate respondents in some of the expected directions (detailed tabulationsnot shown here). Grade-school educatedrespondents of both sexes are not onlyless likely than those with more education to rate childlessness and the onlychild as "too small," they are also morelikely to regard each of the higherbirth orders as "too small." Indeed, theaverage family size judged to be toosmall by the grade-school educated isalmost double that of the college educated-1.6 as against 0.9. Moreover, thecollege youth are more likely than eitherthe noncollege youth or the generalpopulation to respond in terms of childlessness, rather than one child, as beingtoo small. Religious differences are insignificant. In the August 1972 adultsample, the mean family size consideredtoo small is 1.2 for Catholic men and 1.1for non-Catholic men. Among women,

35

the figures are 1.3 and 1.1, respectively.Moreover, the distributions for Catholics and non-Catholics are very similar.Catholic-non-Catholic differences in theyouth sample are equally unimportant.It is surprising, perhaps, that religiousdifferences are not greater. PossiblyCatholics are reluctant to characterizethe two-child family as "too small,"either because they believe the interviewer may be offended, or because theydo not wish to make pejorative statements about small family size.

Although it seems evident that theone-child family is not considered desirable, this subject can be exploredmore directly through a question concerning the only child asked in 1950,which I commissioned again in 1972. Atboth dates, respondents were asked:

"Do you think being an only child isan advantage or a disadvantage?"

TABLE 5.-Distribution of Family Size Considered "Too Small" by White Men and Womenof Voting Age in August 1972, and by White Youth, Those in College and Those 1S-24 Years

Old Not in College, June 1971, United States

Survey date Number of Children Totaland Sex a 1 2 3 4+ Pet. (N) X

Whites of Voting Age

August 1972Men 23 56 12 7 2 100 635 1.1Women 18 65 9 5 3 100 656 1.1

Total 20 61 11 6 2 100 1,291 1.1

White Youths (18-24)

June 1971Not in collegeMen 24 63 7 6 0 100 455 1.0Women 17 71 6 5 1 100 512 1.0Total 20 67 6 6 1 100 967 1.0

In collegeMen 36 53 7 3 1 100 529 0.8Women 31 58 6 3 2 100 331 0.9Total 34 55 7 3 1 100 860 0.8



If anything, by 1972 more respondentsregard the only child as disadvantagedthan 22 years previously (detailed tabulations not shown here). By 1972, 80percent of white Americans allege thatbeing an only child is a disadvantage,as compared with 76 percent in 1950.Respondents who are themselves singletons are, at both dates, less likely torate the only child as being at a disadvantage than respondents who had siblings. However, even the only childrenin the samples preponderantly regard theonly child as disadvantaged-this response being offered by approximately60 percent of the male and 70 percent ofthe female singletons at both dates. In1950, there was a noticeable educationaldifferential in the propensity to regardthe only child as disadvantaged. Of thecollege educated, 91 percent of the womenand 83 percent of the men claimed disadvantage for the singleton, but thisevaluation was made by only 73 percentof grade-school educated women and 64percent of grade-school educated men.By 1972, the educational differentialamong men had disappeared, because thegrade-school educated had become lessapproving of the one-child family andthe college educated more so. Amongwomen, a differential still existed, but itwas less than in 1950 because of thegreater approval among college-educated women of the one-child family.

The question about the only childdemonstrates that there is overwhelming consensus among white Americansconcerning the disadvantage experiencedby an only child. Such a degree of consensus leads us to speculate that informal social controls may operateopenly and strongly against those couples who intend (or are even considering) having one child. Grandparents,friends, pediatricians, ministers, teachers, baby-sitters-the entire roster ofsocially significant individuals who arein intimate contact with young parentscan feel secure in openly expressing the

belief that it is "unfair" to have an onlychild if one can avoid it. This is a belief that just about everyone shares.

What about childlessness? Perhaps adirect question on this topic might elicita more favorable response than haveprevious questions concerning familysize. With this in mind, in February1973 I commissioned the following question on a Gallup survey:

"Some people say that married life ishappier if you do not have children tocare for. Others say that marriage ishappier when there are children.Speaking for yourself, what is youropinion?"

(l ) Happier without children(2) Happier with children(3) Don't know

The belief that marriages are happierwith children characterizes 85 percent ofwhite respondents (detailed tabulationsnot shown here). Marriage is adjudgedhappier without children by eight percent of men and six percent of women.Among both sexes by age, younger people are somewhat more likely to thinkthat a marriage is happier without children than are older respondents. Thereis no religious difference in response tothis question, but an educational gradient is apparent. Among men, the college educated are somewhat more proneto favor childlessness, and less likely tofavor children than are those of lessereducation. Even among college-educatedmen, however, only nine percent say thata marriage is happier without children.Among women, there is no difference byeducational level in the proportion whosay that a childless marriage is happier(five to six percent) , but there is an educational difference in the proportionssaying that having children makes ahappier marriage and in the "don'tknow" response. College-educated women

Birth Expectations

are more reluctant than less-educatedwomen to say that children make a happier marriage (79 percent as against 88percent), and 16 percent say that they"don't know," as compared with six percent among those of lesser education.

It thus appears that college-educatedwomen are not willing to affirm the virtues of childlessness, but they are not asready as other women to extol the advantages of having children. This group ofwomen is more "on the fence" than othergroups. The results by educational levelfor those under age 45 (not shown here)affirm that college-educated respondentsfeel a conflict concerning this question.Among both men and women having acollege education, there is a larger proportion of "don't know" responses compared to the high school educated, alesser willingness to say outright thatchildren make a marriage happier, and,yet, no significantly greater propensityto make a choice in favor of childlessness.

Thus, the attitudinal balance againstchildlessness seems to be overwhelming.Moreover, there does not appear to bean important vanguard in our population that is committed to childlessnessas a desirable goal. Even the college educated, although less likely to believethat having children makes a marriagehappier, are not proponents of childlessness.

In sum, the results presented in thissection seem to indicate rigidity of attitudes toward childlessness and the onlychild. It would appear that it is not onlyregarded as desirable to have a family,but, as well, to have a family of at leasttwo children. These results serve furtherto explain the marked concentration ofresponses in the two-child category whenrespondents are asked about their family-size preferences. Two children arethe lower limit for respondents-even ifthey are reacting to stimuli concerningthe population problem and the need forzero population growth.

37

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FAMILY CYCLE

AND BIRTH SPACING

A two-child family has implicationsfor a couple's life cycle that differ substantially from those implicit in a family twice as large or larger. In particular, parents of two children can normallyexpect to spend a relatively short timehaving young children in the home, anda very long period in the so-calledempty-nest stage. Couples desiring twochildren will, therefore, almost inevitably need to be less emotionally orientedtoward children than those for whomchildbearing and child-rearing comprisethe major share of adult life.

At a time when such an unusual percentage of white Americans express atwo-child preference, it is relevant toknow how respondents evaluate the various stages of the family cycle. Are theirreactions congruent with the familycycle conditions imposed by a two-childfamily? In September 1972, I commissioned the following question on a Gallup survey:

"A typical married couple usually goesthrough a number of stages in the family cycle from marriage to when thelast child leaves home. Which of thefollowing stages do you think is thehappiest?"

1. Before the couple has children2. When the babies are being born

and the children are very young3. When the children are all in

school4. When the children have left

home (for college, or work, ormarriage)

5. All equal, can't choose

Table 6 shows that the modal periodchosen by both men and women is theone during which reproduction is actively taking place and the children arevery young. More than 40 percent of themen and 50 percent of the women choosethis period as the happiest in a couple's


TABLE 6.-Percentaged Responses to the Question, "A Typical Married Couple Usually Goesthrough a Number of Stages in the Family Cycle from Marriage to When the Last ChildLeaves Home. Which of the Following Stages do You Think is the Happiest?" White Menand Women in the United States by Religious Affiliation, Age, and Educational Level,

September 1972

8 6 100 1677 4 100 509

4 5 100 1565 3 100 1539 6 100 365

11 8 100 1065 3 100 3148 6 100 253

7 5 100 676

6 4 100 1888 4 100 501

5 4 100 1667 3 100 2018 5 100 318

9 3 100 957 4 100 4018 6 100 190

4 100 689

5 100 1,365

Happiest StageBefore WhenCouple Babies Children Children

Selected Has Being All in Have LeftCharacteristica Children Born School Home

White Men

ReligionCatholic 12 45 20 9Non-Cstholic 12 41 25 11

AgeUnder 30 23 47 14 730-44 13 45 25 945 or more 7 39 27 12

EducationGrade school 12 34 26 9High school 12 47 21 12College 13 39 25 9

Total 12 42 24 10

White Women

ReligionCatholic P 52 21 9Non-Catholic 11 50 22 5

AgeUnder 30 19 54 15 330-44 7 50 28 545 or more 7 50 21 9

EducationGrade school 7 59 18 4High school 8 52 23 6College 14 44 22 6

Total 10 51 22 6

Grand Total 11 46 23 8

Source: Gallup survey.

AllEqual,Can'tChoose

NoOpinion

Total

Pet. (N)

life. Although there is a tendency foryounger respondents to evaluate theearly stages of the family cycle morehighly than older respondents, and forolder respondents to give more favorablemention to the later stages, the periodof childbearing is the clear favoriteamong respondents of all ages.

It is noteworthy that those under age30 are the most likely to regard activereproduction as the happiest time, although this age group has the smallestfamily-size ideals. On the other hand,men and women under age 30 are alsomore likely than older respondents toregard the pre-reproductive period asthe most happy. Nonetheless, for respondents under age 30, 61 percent of

the men and 69 percent of the womenregard either the period of active reproduction or the period when the childrenare in school as the happiest time in acouple's life. Only seven percent of youngmen and three percent of young womenview the empty-nest stage in these terms.

Although the differences betweenCatholics and non-Catholics are notlarge, lesser-educated women appearedto be markedly more prone than those ofhigher education to value the period ofactive reproduction as the "happiesttime": 59 percent of the grade-schooleducated versus only 44 percent of thecollege educated. No similar educationalgradient is evident for men.

After the question concerning the hap-

Birth Expectations

piest time in a couple's life, respondentswere asked a similar question about the"next happiest time." Table 7 shows theconcentration of the two choices (jointlytabulated) in the childbearing and child-

39

rearing stages of life. In fact, for almosthalf the men and slightly more than halfof the women, both the first and the second happiest times are centered on thisperiod. Among respondents under age 30,

TABLE 7.-White Respondents' Choice of the Second Happiest Stage in a Couple's Life According to Their Choice of the Happiest Stage. Men and Women of All Ages and Those

underAge 30, United States, September 1972

Second Happiest StageBefore When BabiesGouple Being Born Child-Has and Child- Children ren Have

Happiest Stage Child- ren Very All In Leftby Sex ren Young School Home (N)

All Ages

Before couple has childrenMen 0Women 0

When babies being bornand children very young

Men 26Women 26

Children all in schoolMen 18Women 19

Children have left homeMen 21Women 16

Before couple has childrenMen 0Women 0

When babies being bornand children very young

Men 47Women 31

5649

oo

4657

3349

Under 30

7263

oo

2629

4951

oo

4030

1419

3651

1621

2217

3120

oo

1116

1512

8268

284348

159150

7043

3632

7390

Note: For ease of presentation the small proportions of respondents whogave "no choice" or "no opinion" responses to either question arenot shown in this table. Thus, the percentaging is horizontal butdoes not add up to 100. The base figures (N's) are, however, thetotal bases. For respondents under age 30, those who gave answersthat did not fall in the first two categories with respect to the"happiest stage"are not tabulated here according to the "secondhappiest stage"because of the small number of cases.


The average desired interval for subsequent births (Table 8) was slightlyshorter than, but very similar to, the desired first-birth interval. However, forsubsequent birth intervals as comparedwith the first, responses were much moreconcentrated in the "2-to-Iess-than-3years" category. The standard deviations for first-birth intervals were 1.35for men and 1.21 for women (Table 8).But, for subsequent birth intervals, theywere .79 for both men and women. It isthus clear that not only are all desiredbirth intervals short, but also, for thoseafter the first, there is less deviation fromthe two-year average than for the firstinterval. Respondents agree more closelyon the desired age difference between offspring than they do on how soon reproduction should start after marriage. Thisfinding implies that, after reproductionhas begun, considerable attitudinal inflexibility presently obtains concerningbirth spacing.

"Assuming that a couple can have ababy at about the time they want it,what in your opinion is a desirablelength of time after marriage for thefirst baby to be born?"

Twenty-four percent of the men and 22percent of the women believe that lessthan two years between marriage and thefirst child is desirable. Almost 60 percentof the men and 66 percent of the womenfeel that less than three years is desirable. Only 11 percent of the men andnine percent of the women would havea couple wait four or more years beforehaving the first child. In the light offamily-size ideals, combined with respondents' evaluations of the family cycle, an average desired first-birth interval of 2.4 years seems short (Table 8).Yet, it is longer than the average actualfirst-birth interval for whites (1.6 years)found by Ryder and Westoff in the National Fertility Study of 1965 (Ryderand Westoff, 1971). Even so, a desiredfirst-birth interval of approximately two


41 percent of the men and 48 percent of and a half years, if realized in practice,the women choose the childbearing and would not greatly decelerate Americanschildrearing periods as the first and sec- in their progress through the family cyond happiest. Among youthful respon- cle and toward the disvalued period ofdents (as may be seen in Table 7) there the empty nest. In this regard, it is noteis a marked avoidance of the empty- worthy that, among both men andnest stage as being either the first or sec- women, the average first-birth intervalond choice. considered desirable by the grade-school

We must conclude that respondents' educated is only two years. By contrast,views of the happiest time in the family among college-educated men this intercycle seem far from emphasizing the val is 2.7 years, and among college-educompanionate marriage implicit in a cated women it is 2.4 years.small-family goal. For respondents of all What of the interval between chilages, educational levels, and among dren? If Americans were satisfied with aCatholics and non-Catholics, children fairly large age difference between offquite clearly make the marriage. spring, this would prolong the childbear-

One can, of course, argue that wider ing and child-rearing period. To gainspacing of even a small family could some information about respondents'prolong the happiest period for couples. views on birth spacing, I asked:It is, therefore, of interest to ascertain "If a couple is going to have morehow respondents evaluate childspacing than one child, how far apart is it goodoptions. On the same survey, respon- to have the children spaced-that is,dents were asked: how long should it be between the birth

of one child and the birth of thenext?"


TABLE 8.-Mean First and Subsequent Birth Intervals Considered Desirable' by White Menand Women in the United States by Religious Affiliation, Age, and Educational Level,

September 1972

First SubsequentBirth Interval Birth Intervals

Selected Std. Std.Characteristics X Dev. (N) X Dev. (N)

White Men

ReligionCatholic 2.3 1.35 167 2.0 .71 167Non-Catholic 2.4 1.35 509 2.2 .81 509

AgeUnder 30 2.5 1.47 156 2.1 .86 15630-44 2.7 1.50 153 2.1 .75 15345 or more 2.2 1.17 365 2.2 .78 365

EducationGrade school 2.0 1.19 106 2.2 .81 .106High school 2.3 1.30 314 2.1 .71 314College 2.7 1.41 253 2.1 .87 253

Total 2.4 1.35 676 2.1 .79 676

White Women

ReligionCatholic 2.0 1.07 188 2.3 .90 188Non-Catholic 2.4 1.25 501 2.3 .75 501

AgeUnder 30 2.4 1.34 166 2.3 .86 16630-44 2.4 1.27 201 2.3 .73 20145 or more 2.2 1.09 318 2.4 .78 318

EducationGrade school 2.0 1.00 95 2.3 .83 95High school 2.4 1.26 401 2.3 .79 401College 2.4 1.20 190 2.4 .76 190

Total 2.3 1.21 689 2.3 .79 689

Grand Total 2.4 1.28 1,365 2.2 .79 1,365

a- Respondents were asked the following two questions: "Assuming thata couple can have a baby at about the time they want it, what inyour opinion is a desirable length of time after marriage for thefirst baby to be born?" and "If a couple is going to have more thanone child, how far apart is it good to have the children spaced--that is, how long should it be between the birth of one child andthe birth of the next?"



The series of questions concerning thefamily cycle and birth spacing, coupledwith the series on family-size preferences, bring out some major inconsistencies in respondents' views. On the onehand, recently there has been a sharprise in preferences for a small family-atrend that is congruent with the smallfamily expectations found by the Bureauof the Census. On the other hand, thereappears to be a preference for a childoriented marriage, coupled with consensus about starting a family soon aftermarriage and spacing children closely.Although it may seem logical that peoplewho are child-oriented would wish to geton with starting a family, pairing thisdesire with close subsequent spacing almost inevitably leads to a disproportionately long empty-nest period-unless acouple is going to have a family that isvery large indeed. Even on the assumption of a moderately sized family, say ofthree or four children, plus the youthfulmarriage age in the United States, couples would reach the empty nest whilestill in early middle-age. In fact, this isprecisely what is currently happening,even to couples who had the relativelylarge families of the baby boom. Respondents' views concerning birth intervals, when put into practice, thus guarantee that couples precipitate themselvesrapidly toward the most disvalued period in their married lives-the state ofthe empty nest. In this day of affluenceand consumption, it is of genuine interestthat more respondents do not place ahigher value on prolonging the periodbetween marriage and the birth of thefirst child.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

At the present time, the gross indicators of fertility change in the UnitedStates point downward. Not only areperiod fertility rates the lowest ever observed in this country, so also are thebirth expectations of young wives. Because the ability of demographers to

project the size and structure of theAmerican population into the future depends so heavily on assessing the probable course of reproductive behavior, itis imperative that each component offuture fertility levels be consideredseparately. Thus, for example, an increase in the number of women in theprime reproductive ages, a rise in firstmarriages, or a decline in marital dissolutions could lead to a short-term increase in the crude birth rate even without any change from current low birthexpectations. But, given the ability ofAmericans to limit their total family size(an ability that was dramatically demonstrated as far back as the nineteenthirties), the long-run level of periodbirth rates rests on whether or not asmall-family pattern is here to stay. Weare, therefore, most concerned with howmuch confidence can be placed in thestability of current birth expectations asa component of future fertility levels.

Although the validity of birth expectations can be evaluated in relation toactual birth behavior, to some extentthis procedure simply begs the question:very young women have the option toincrease their family size over a periodof many years in the future should theirbirth expectations be augmented. Therefore the present paper has approachedthe data on birth expectations from thepoint of view of their congruence withother relevant family-size preferencesand attitudes rather than their congruence with current fertility performance. The question has been raised ofwhether recent birth expectations maynot have been influenced, on a shortterm and relatively superficial basis,by antinatalist propaganda concerningfamily size-an influence that has notpermeated to other relevant attitudessuch as those regarding large families,childlessness and the only child, or thestages of the family cycle.

Survey results relating to these topicssuggest that white Americans do not

Birth Expectations

presently have a stable and consistentutility scale regarding family size. Although family-size ideals are well underthree children, respondents are highlytolerant of large families and noticeablyintolerant of the one-child family orchildlessness. Moreover, evaluations ofthe various stages in the family cycleshow a majority predilection for theperiod when children are in the household, rather than for either of the periods when the couple is "free" of children and able to concentrate on eachother and their own personal preferences. Views on these subjects differ, ofcourse, according to respondents' ageand socioeconomic status, but the striking thing about the data is how little,rather than how much, variation thereis. Although a more refined analysis willdoubtlessly show that some subgroupsare more consistently antinatalist thanothers, the impression is that no numerically important vanguard in our population is taking the lead in full-scale antinatalism.

These results suggest that some conservatism in interpreting recent data onbirth expectations might be wise. Indeed, the suddenness of the shift in expectations to the two-child categoryshould itself arouse suspicion. In analyzing this shift, data on ideal family sizehave proved of unique value. Unlikebirth expectations, family-size ideals canchange throughout the age structure.That the change in these ideals has occurred almost proportionally in all agegroups suggests that the stimulus hasnot been one most likely to impingeprimarily on the young, as would obtainwith changes such as the women's liberation movement or the counterculture. Itseems probable, therefore, that respondents of all ages have been affected intheir replies to questions on family sizeby antinatalist media messages on thissubject. This does not necessarily meanthat views concerning family size havenot truly been revised, but more con-

43

fidence that a profound change hadtaken place would be warranted if thesmall-family preference were backed-upby congruent attitudes concerning thefamily cycle, the one-child family, childlessness, and the large family.

Given the attitudinal inconsistenciesreported in this paper, what can we sayabout how they will be resolved? Clearly,before resolution is possible, such inconsistencies must first be apparent to theindividuals involved. As is well known,people can entertain inconsistent attitudes simultaneously as long as suchattitudes are kept compartmentalized.When it comes to desires concerningfamily size, time (and, a fortiori, age)forces confrontations of incongruentgoals and preferences. As young womenapproach their thirties, they must decidewhether they really wish to be childlessor to have only one child. As the fortiesloom, couples face the irrevocable decision of living alone for a quarter of acentury or more or filling these yearswith one or two additional children.One may expect that a di..<Jtribution ofresolutions to these conflicts will result.Not everyone, not even most people,will necessarily resolve them in a manner consonant with very small families.

Indeed, the balance may hinge onhow favorably individuals' existing lowfertility situations compare with the preexisting attitudes toward the family recounted in this paper. If the current"test" of antinatalism is a success-ifpeople are actually so much enjoyingtheir freedom from family obligationsthat they would find a change painfulthen they will discard their former viewsabout the importance of children to happiness. But, if they are enjoying the lowfertility present only because they regard it as a transient period in theirlives, or if it is already beginning to pall,then the effect of the behavioral testmay be to reinforce, rather than negate,the pre-existing attitudes toward the importance of the family.


Finally, it should be acknowledgedthat some readers may regard the recentdecline in American fertility rates andexpectations as entirely predictable interms of demographic transition theoryand the lower reproduction of Europeancountries. Yet, in fact, demographictransition theory affords no enlightenment concerning variability around lowlevels of family size. In so far as thistheory is helpful at all, it relates solelyto the transition from "high" to "low"vital rates, with no specification of theactual levels at the "beginning" and the"end." Demographic transition theorydid not lead us to anticipate the socalled baby boom, nor could the reproductive levels of Americans, Canadians,and the people of Australia and NewZealand have been predicted from thoseof Europeans. It is in the context, therefore, of the lack of a theory of lowfertility, coupled with the sudden changein actual and expected reproductivity inthe United States, that the hypothesispresented in this paper has been advanced. Demographers require a highdegree of precision in predicting fertilitybecause of the enormous cumulativeeffect on population projections of relatively small changes in family size. Inthe absence of an elegant set of theoretical expectations, our need for suchprecision constrains us to take particular

account of possible short-run influenceson reproductive motivation and behavior.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I acknowledge support from the FordFoundation and the National Instituteof Child Health and Human Development (5 TOl HD00375-9). I also thankIrving Crespi of the Gallup Poll for hishelp in the collection of the data presented in this paper. Heidi Nebel andBronia Johnson were in charge of dataprocessing, and Eric Larsen and LindaWilson provided research assistance. Appreciation is due Jan Seibert for editorialadvice.

REFERENCES

Ryder, Norman B., and Charles F. Westoff.1971. Reproduction in the United States, 1965.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Simon, Herbert A. 1963. Economics and Psychology. In Sigmund Koch (ed), Psychology:A Study of a Science. New York: McGrawHill.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1972a. Projectionsof the Population of the United States byAge and Sex: 1972 to 2020. Current Population Report, Series P-25, No. 493, December 1972. Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting Office.

--. 1972b. Birth Expectations and Fertility:June 1972. Current Population Report, SeriesP-20, No. 240, September 1972. Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Can We Believe Recent Data on Birth Expectations in the United States?

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