Can the Reasonable Person Still be “Highly Offended”? An Invitation ...

CantheReasonablePersonStillbe“HighlyOffended”? 199(2008)5:1&2UOLTJ199

Copyright2008©byKarenEltis.

* AssociateProfessorofLaw(Professeureagrégée)CivilLawSection,UniversityofOttawa,FacultyofLaw.ImmediatepastDirector,HumanRightsResearchandEducationCentre,UniversityofOttawa(Canada)andCo-Director,BijuridicalNationalProgram.SheholdslawdegreesfromMcGillUniversity,HebrewUniversityofJerusalemandColumbiaUniversity.AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheInternationalAssociationofScienceandTechnology’sAnnualConferenceinWashingtonDC(February2007).

The privacy TorT’s coherenT developmenT away from The narrow “right to be left alone,” inhibited by connotations of physical space and proprietorship, may be well informed by comparative inquiry. Accordingly, this article undertakes to shine the light of comparative analysis on the dilemmas of American tort law, as they pertain specifically to privacy. If privacy continues to be defined by reference to seclusion, technological imperatives necessarily dictate that the sphere in which one can reasonably claim solitude will contract. That, in turn, augurs poorly for the prevailing expectation-driven tort standard. In sharp contrast to what might be characterized as the common law’s oftentimes rigid vision of privacy torts, the civil legal method—captivated by the French and Quebec experience surveyed here—favours a more flexible construction of actionable privacy infringements. Most importantly perhaps, privacy is deemed a “personality right”—an idea central to the civilian tradition but alien to the Anglo-American system. Removed from the “reasonable expectations” doctrine and free of express references to seclusion, civilian jurisdictions’ principled approach to civil liability (“tort”) seems better able to protect individual privacy in intangible fora (such as “cyberspace”) because it regards certain dignity-based personality rights as inalienable. Under this conceptual framework, human beings enjoy personality rights in private law by reason of their very personhood, regardless of express statutory or jurisprudential intervention, or spatial or proprietary constraints. Conceiving the right to privacy as a personality right in civil liability (“tort”), allows the civilian legal method to grasp privacy as a zone of intimacy delineated not by space or ownership but by the basic needs of personhood—as a right to preserve a state of mind of tranquility. Commensurate with privacy management in the technology age, the civilian view of privacy as a personality right merits further examination with an eye towards informing the development of privacy torts in Anglo-American law.

le développemenT cohérenT de la responsabiliTé délicTuelle pour atteinte à la vie privée qui s’écarte du strict « droit d’être laissé tranquille » et entravé par des connotations d’espace physique et d’entreprise individuelle, pourrait bénéficier d’une étude comparative. Cet article entreprend par conséquent de jeter la lumière de l’analyse comparative sur les dilemmes posés par le droit de la responsabilité délictuelle américain en ce qu’ils relèvent précisément de la protection de la vie privée. Si l’on continue de définir la vie privée en référence à l’isolement, les impératifs technologiques dictent que la sphère au sein de laquelle on peut raisonnablement revendiquer la solitude finira par se rétrécir inévitablement. Ceci augure mal pour la norme en responsabilité délictuelle axée sur les attentes de la personne raisonnable. Par comparaison avec la vision que la common law a des délits en matière de vie privée et que l’on pourrait qualifier de souvent rigide, la méthode prévalant en droit civil — représentée par l’expérience française et québécoise analysée ici — favorise une construction plus souple des atteintes à la vie privée donnant ouverture à des poursuites. Plus important encore peut-être, le droit à la vie privée est censé être un « droit de la personnalité » — une notion qui réside au cœur même de la tradition civiliste mais qui demeure étrangère au système anglo-américain. Loin de la théorie de « l'expectative raisonnable » et libérée des renvois explicites à l’isolement, l’approche envers la responsabilité civile (« tort »), fondée sur des principes, propre aux ressorts de droit civil semble plus à même de protéger le droit individuel à la vie privée dans le cadre de forums intangibles (tels que le « cyberespace ») du fait qu’elle considère les droits de la personnalité fondés sur la dignité comme inaliénables. En vertu de ce cadre conceptuel, les êtres humains bénéficient de droits de la personnalité en droit privé en raison de leur identité individuelle, peu importe l’intervention légale ou judiciaire expresse ou les contraintes spatiales ou liées à propriété. Le fait de concevoir le droit à la vie privée comme un droit de la personnalité en matière de responsabilité civile (« tort »), permet à la méthode juridique civile de considérer la vie privée comme une zone d’intimité définie non pas par l’espace ou la propriété, mais par les besoins fondamentaux inhérents à l’identité individuelle —comme un droit de conserver un état d’esprit paisible. Comparée à la gestion de la vie privée à l’ère de la technologie, la conception civiliste de la vie privée en tant que droit de la personnalité mérite que l’on s’y penche sérieusement dans l’optique d’éclairer l’avènement d’un régime de délits pour atteinte à la vie privée dans le droit anglo-américain.

Can the Reasonable Person Still be “Highly Offended”? An Invitation to Consider the Civil Law Tradition’s Personality

Rights–Based Approach to Tort Privacy

KarenEltis*

200 university of ottawalaw & technology journal www.uoltj.ca

201 1.INTRODUCTION

207 2.THEMEAGERPRIVACYTORT:THEPROPERTYORIGINSOFREASONABLE

EXPECTATIONSANDSECLUSIONATCOMMONLAW

211 3.THECIVILIANAPPROACH

211 3.1. The General Codal Principle: Twin Pillars of Flexibility and Permanence

214 3.2. Personality Rights and “Tort” Privacy in Civil Law Reasoning

217 4.COMPARINGAPPROACHES:DRAWINGONCOMPARATIVEANALYSIS


Can the Reasonable Person Still be “Highly Offended”? An Invitation to Consider the Civil Law Tradition’s Personality

Rights–Based Approach to Tort Privacy

KarenEltis

(2008)5:1&2UOLTJ199

Thattheindividualshallhavefullprotectioninpersonandinpropertyisaprincipleasoldasthecommonlaw;butithasbeennecessaryfromtimetotimetodefineanewtheexactnatureandextentofsuchprotection.–SamuelDWarrenandLouisDBrandeis,1890

1. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme CourT of Canada onCe obServed ThaT GeorGe orwell inhisclassic novel 1984, describes a society “whose citizens had every reason to expectthattheireverymovementwassubjecttoelectronicvideosurveillance.Thecontrastwiththeexpectations of privacyinafreesocietysuchasourowncould not be more striking.”2 But have the often times overwhelmingencroachmentsonprivacythatareincreasingly—albeitincrementally—visitedonpersonsintheageoftechnologyservedtodesensitizeustotheirunreasonableness?Havetheyaccordinglycometogaintacitacceptanceinsomecontexts? Iftortlaw’sviewofprivacy inthecommonlawworld is,byandlarge,predicatedonsociety’sconstructionof“reasonableprivacy,”thenthechangingnatureoftheseexpectationsinvitesustoperhapsrethinktheapplicablestandard.

Todate,suchexaminationshave,forthemostpart,beenuni-systemic,focusing either on common law or civil law systems. Given the great promiseinstantiatedbythemigrationof ideas—inprivate lawnolessthanin itspubliccounterpart3—the following proposes a comparative analysis of the rationalesunderlying“tort”recoveryforprivacyviolationsinthecommonlawandcivillawtraditions.4Itwillfocusspecificallyonthetheoreticalunderpinningsonwhichthe(continental) civil legalmethod rests, as itpertains toprivacyandcivil liabilityspecifically.ParticularemphasiswillattachtotheQuebecexperience,fromwhich

1. SamuelDWarrenandLouisDBrandeis,“TheRighttoPrivacy,”(1890)4:5Harvard Law Review193–220,availableatLouis D Brandeis School of Law Library,<http://library.louisville.edu/law/brandeis/privacy.html>atp.193.

2. R v Wong,1990SCC36,<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990rcs3-36/1990rcs3-36.html>,1990:3Supreme Court Reports47(emphasisadded).

3. Althoughthelatterhascertainlybeentheobjectofgreatercomparativeanalysis,whereastheformerregrettablyhasnot.

4. Orcivilliabilityasitisknownincivillawjurisdiction.

1


usefulconclusionscanplausiblybedrawn.5Conceivably,theseconclusionscan,inturn,informtheevolutionofprivacytortsintheUnitedStatesandothercommonlawjurisdictions.6

While not all jurisdictions that adhere to the common law traditionrecognizetheactionabilityofprivacytorts,7thosethatdo—theUSspecifically—have generally done so only if the impugned privacy infringement would bedeemed“highlyoffensivetoareasonableperson.”8Thus,anindividual’srighttoprivacyisassessedbyreferencetosociety’sconceptionofthemeasureofprivacythatoneisentitledtoreasonablyexpect.Thatstandard,thisarticlesubmits, isparticularly awkward when such expectations are rapidly eroding precisely byreasonofeventual socialhabituation to recurring intrusions.Paradoxically, themore we are watched, the less privacy we expect. The less we are bothered,themoreweexpectothers to share inour complacency.Therefore, ifprivacycontinuestobedefinednegatively9as“therighttobeleftalone,”10technologicalimperativeswillnecessarilydictatethatthesphereinwhichonecanreasonably

5. Duetoitshybridcharacter,featuringacontinentalsystemthatishighlyinfluencedbythesurroundingcommonlawsystems,theQuebecexperienceprovidesusefulinsight.AsLaraKhouryobservesinadifferentcontext:“The[…]provinceofQuebec[…]isofparticularinterestbyreasonoftheinfluenceofthecommonlawonitscivillawsystem.”LaraKhoury,“TheLiabilityofAuditorsBeyondTheirClients:AComparativeStudy,”(2001)46:2McGill Law Journal413–471,<lawjournal.mcgill.ca/abs/vol46/2khour.pdf>atp.416.

6. Whileabroaderdiscussionisoutsidethescopeofthisarticle,sufficeittonotethatincommonlawCanadathestatutorytortoftheinvasionofprivacyvariesbyprovince.BritishColumbia,Manitoba,Newfoundland,andSaskatchewanhavecreatedastatutorytortofinvasionofprivacy:Privacy Act,(1996)Revised Statutes of British Columbiach.373,<http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/P/96373_01.htm>[Privacy Act BC];Privacy Act, (1987)Revised Statutes of Manitobach.P125,<http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/p125e.php>[Privacy Act MB];Privacy Act,(1990)Revised Statutes of Newfoundlandch.P-22,<http://www.assembly.nl.ca/legislation/sr/statutes/p22.htm>[Privacy ActNF];Privacy Act,(1978)Revised Statutes of Saskatchewanch.P-24,<http://www.publications.gov.sk.ca/details.cfm?p=767>[Privacy ActSK]>.TheCanadiancourtshaveleftthedooropenforageneralAmerican-styleprivacytortandhavenotrejecteditasinEngland.ForabroaderdiscussionseeJohnCraig,“InvasionofPrivacyandCharterValues:TheCommon-LawTortAwakens,”(1997)42:2McGill Law Journal355–402,<http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/abs/vol42/2craig.pdf>.

7. Australia,arguablyuntilrecently(seeGrosse v Purvis(AUSQLDistCt,2003),<http://www.austlii.edu.au//cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/qld/QDC/2003/151.html?query=Grosse%20v%20Purvis>,upholdingacommonlawtortofinvasionofprivacy),theUK,andpartofcommonlawCanadamostnotablyhavenotexpresslyrecognizedsuchafree-standingtort.“IncommonlawCanada,ontheotherhand,therighttosecrecyreceivesevenlessprotectionthanintheUnitedStates,sinceitisnotyetclearwhetheracommonlawrighttoprivacyhasbeenacknowledgedbythecourts.”PatrikSFlorencioandErikDRamanathan,“SecretCode:theNeedforEnhancedPrivacyProtectionsintheUnitedStatesandCanadatoPreventEmploymentDiscriminationBasedonGeneticandHealthInformation,”(2001)39:1Osgoode Hall Law Journal77–116,<http://www.ohlj.ca/archive/articles/39_1_florencio_ramanathan.pdf>atpp.94–95.ForamorethoroughdiscussionofthestateofthelawinthesecountriesseeCraig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6.RegardingAustraliaseeMNorton,KClark,andKSainty,“ACommonLawRighttoPrivacyforAustralia?”<http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/default.asp?task=read&id=12832&site=LE>,discussingtheleadingAustraliancaseoncommonlawprivacyrights,Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats,2001HCA63,<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2001/63.html?query=Australian%20Broadcasting%20Corporation%20v%20Lenah%20Game%20Meats>,(2001)185Australian Law Reports 1,wheretheysummarizedthat“theHighCourtrefrainedfromrecognizingaseparaterighttoprivacy,butleftopenthepossibilityofanewtortofinvasionofprivacy.”ThearticlealsodiscussesNewZealandwhereanewtortofprivacywasrecentlyrecognizedinHosking v Runting,2004NZCA34,<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZCA/2004/34.html?query=hosking%20w/5%20runting>. TheNewZealandtortofprivacy,asintheUS,hastworequirements:(i)a“reasonableexpectationofprivacy”musthaveexisted;and(ii)thepublicationmustbeconsideredhighlyoffensivetoanobjectivereasonableperson.WithrespecttotheUK,thecaseofCampbell v Mirror Group Newspapers,2004UKHL22,<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd040506/campbe-1.htm>,isofparticularinterest.TheHouseofLordsheldthatprivacyinfringementsinpublicplaceswereactionableasabreachofconfidence,thusreflectingtheacrobaticsattimesperformedundertheAnglo-Americansystemforpurposesofdefendingprivacyintheprivaterealm,asdiscussedbelowinpart2.

8. Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts(TheAmericanLawInstitute,1977),s.652B,availableat<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy/Privacy_R2d_Torts_Sections.htm>[Restatement (Second) of Torts].

9. InBerlinianterms,referringtoIsaiahBerlin’sTwo Conceptions of Liberty, inIsaiahBerlin,Four Essays on Liberty(OxfordUniversityPress,1990)118–172.

10. WarrenandBrandeis,“TheRighttoPrivacy,”supra note1atp.193.


claimsolitudewillcontract.That,inturn,augurspoorlyfortheexpectation-drivenprevailingtortstandardprevalentatcommonlaw.11

Strikinglysymptomaticoftheemergenttendencytoanticipate,expect,andevenacquiescetoprivacyintrusionsonceconsidereduntenablearerecentpolls indicating that most Americans deem warrantless wiretapping of theirprivate phone conversations and email “reasonable.”12 Taken to its logicalconclusion,itstandstoreasonthattheexpectation-focusedstandard,centeringontheperceivedreasonablenessoftheinvasionofprivacy,renderseventhemostmanifestintrusionspresumablyinactionableintort.Whatismore,itwouldappearthat expectation-based torts standards not only shape normative evolutionsbutsocialperceptionsofprivacy,asoneeminentCanadiansociologist’s studyreinforces,13thusleadingtoanuntenabletautologyintheprivacycontext.Thismight—and should, as this paper argues—impel us to revisit the standard bywhichtheindividual’srightofactionintortisassessedandthetraditionalthinkinganimatingitsuse.

Incontradistinctiontoitsciviliancounterpart,thecommonlawtraditionseemstoplacegreatemphasisontheterritorial aspectofprivacy,thatistosayseclusion.Accordingly,itissaidthat“Americanscarveoutspacewherelawmayintrudeandnofurther”(privacyzone).14

Historicalanalysisplaysanimportantroleincomparativestudy.15Forourpurposes,thisterritorialvisioncanbetracedbacktothecommonlawtradition’shistorical understanding of privacy as deriving from property.16 In the contextof the information age, as the preceding example of warrantless wiretappingillustrates,the“reasonableexpectationofprivacy”criterionisfallingintorapiddesuetude, for not only does it fail to adequately respond to contemporarycircumstance,17 but it tends to reinforce social tolerance of intrusions once

11. AndenshrinedintheRestatement (Second) of Torts,supranote8ats.652B.SeealsoShaunBSpencer,“ReasonableExpectationsandtheErosionofPrivacy,”(2002)39:3San Diego Law Review843–915.

12. AccordingtoarecentAngusReidpoll:“ManyadultsintheUnitedStatesseenothingwrongwiththedomesticelectronicsurveillanceprograminitiatedbytheirfederalgovernment,accordingtoapollbyTNSreleasedbytheWashingtonPostandABCNews.Fifty-fourpercentofrespondentsthinkwiretappingtelephonecallsandemailswithoutcourtapprovalisanacceptablewaytoinvestigateterrorism.”AngusReid,“ManyAmericansAcceptNSASurveillance,”(19March2006),<http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/11182>;SeealsoDavidLyon,“GlobalizingSurveillance:ComparativeandSociologicalPerspectives,”(2004)19:2International Sociology135–149.DiscussingCanadians’penchantforacquiescingtosurveillancefromasociologyperspective,Lyon’sstudyinterestinglyrevealsthatwhileCanadiansdonotseemtoattachaveryhighvaluetotheirprivacy,Quebeckers(governedbythecivillawtradition)do.Whilethatinitselfbynomeansdefinitivelypointstothelegaltradition’sdeterminativeinfluenceonpublicperceptionofprivacy,itdoesraisequestionsastothelaw’simpactoncultureandviceversa.

13. Lyon,“GlobalizingSurveillance,”supra note12.14. “In[commonlaw]Canada,‘privacy’includes‘anarrowsphereofpersonalautonomywhereinindividuals

maymakeinherentlyprivatechoicesfreefromstateinterference.’[…]ThatistheAmericanconceptionasperGriswold v. Connecticut(1965),inasystemwherepersonalityrightsareunknown,”AdrianPopovici,“LeRôledelaCourSuprêmeenDroitCivil,”(2000)34:3Revue Juridique Thémis607–624,<http://www.themis.umontreal.ca/pdf/rjtvol34num3/popovici.pdf>atp.618,quotingGodbout v Longueuil(City),<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1997/1997rcs3-844/1997rcs3-844.html>,1997:3Supreme Court Reportsatpara.66(author’stranslation).PopovicicitesWPageKeeton,DanBDobbs,RobertEKeeton,andDavidGOwen,Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts,5thed.(West,1984)atpp.866–867;andLaurenceHTribe,American Constitutional Law,2ded.(FoundationPress,1978)atp.775.SeealsoDanielPollack,Contrasts in American and Jewish Law,<http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/contrasts.html>,from“Preface”toDanielPollack,ed.,Contrasts in American and Jewish Law(YeshivaUniversityPress,2001).

15. Foramorein-depthdiscussionoftherelationshipbetweencomparativelawandhistoricalanalysis,seeMathiasReimanandAlainLevasseur,“ComparativeLawandLegalHistoryintheUnitedStates,”(1998)46American Journal of Comparative Law Supplement1–15.

16. AsdiscussedinPart2below.17. Spencer,“ReasonableExpectations,”supranote11.


deemedunreasonable.18In this vein, the comparative approach offers a particularly edifying

perspective. Shining the light of the comparative experience on the theoryunderlying the precarious privacy tort, while being mindful of the history andpolitical culture animating the privacy tort, can serve to inform its coherentevolution.19 As sociologist David Lyon observes, “it is important to note thatprivacy is a highly mutable concept, both historically and culturally relative. Ifprivacyisdeadthenitisaformofprivacy—legal,relatingtopersonal property […]—thatisarelativelyrecenthistoricalinventioninthewesternworld.”20

Forourpurposes, in sharpcontrast towhatmightbecharacterizedasthecommonlaw’slibertarianandoftentimesrigidvisionofprivacytorts,21thecivillegalmethod,exemplifiedbytheFrenchandQuebecexperience,favoursamoreflexibleconstructionofactionableprivacyinfringements,asexposedbelow.Mostimportantlyperhaps,privacyisconsideredtobea“personalityright”—anideacentral to the civilian tradition but alien to the common law.22 Succinctly put,“personality rights focus on the être—the being—in contrast with the avoir—thehaving”23andare thereforedivorced frompropertyor territory.Thesearesubjectiverightsderiving from personhoodandattachingtopersonality,whichtimeorevolvingnotionsoftheprivatespherecannotdilute.Centralamongthesepersonalityrightsisprivacy.24Asshallbediscussedingreaterdetail,personalityrightshavebeenrecognizedwithinthe“delictual”25orcivilliabilitycontext26forprivacyprotectionpurposesandarepredicatedondignity.27

Thepracticalresultofthisdistinctionisasfollows:aspersonalityrights,

18. Lyon,“GlobalizingSurveillance,”supranote12atpara.25.19. AccordingtoErnestWeinrib,aleadingtortscholarinCanada,“privatelawstrivestoavoidcontradiction,to

smoothoutinconsistencies,andtorealizeaself-adjustingharmonyofprinciples,rules,andstandards.”ErnestWeinrib,The Idea of Private Law (HarvardUniversityPress,1995)atp.12.

20. DavidLyon,“Surveillance,Power,andEverydayLife,”inRobinMansell,ChrisanthiAvgerou,DannyQuahandRogerSilverstone,eds.,Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies(OxfordUniversityPress2007),449-467atp.459.

21. Thecommonlawdividesprivacytortsintocategoriesofrecognizedtorts.SeeKeetonet al.,Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts,supra note14atpp.866–867.

22. Personalityrightsarealsoknownas“primordialrights”byreasonoftheirimportance.SeeFranceAllard,“Lesdroitsdelapersonnalité,”inCollection de droit: Personnes, famille et successions(ÉditionsYvon-Blais,2005–2006)59–77.AccordingtoSamuel,“forbetterorforworse,theconceptofle droit subjectif[subjectiverightssuchaspersonalityrights]haslittlerelevanceinEnglishlaw.”GeoffreySamuel,“‘LeDroitSubjectif’andEnglishLaw,”(1987)46:2Cambridge Law Journal264–286atp.286.PersonalityrightshavebecomeincreasinglyimportantinQuebeclawasLaverneAJacobsremarks:“QuebecCivillaw[…]overthepastthreedecades,hasincreasinglyplacedcentralemphasisonthepersonandpersonalityrights.”LaverneAJacobs,“Integrity,DignityandtheActRespectingIndustrialAccidentsandOccupationalDiseases:CantheActProvideMoreAppropriateCompensationforSexualHarassmentVictims?”(2002)30Revue de Droit Université de Sherbrooke281–316atp.316(onlineversion,<http://www.usherbrooke.ca/droit/fileadmin/sites/droit/documents/RDUS/volume_30/30-2-jacobs.pdf>).

23. AdrianPopovici,“PersonalityRights—ACivilLawConcept,”(2004)50:2Loyola Law Review349–358.SeealsoAlainSeriaux,“Lanotionjuridiquedepatrimoine:Brèvesnotationscivilistessurleverbeavoir,”(1994)93:4Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil801–806;Allard,“Lesdroitsdelapersonalité,”supranote22,observingthattheserightsgenerallydonothaveanyinherentmonetary/pecuniaryvalue,astheyderivefromandinheretopersonhood.

24. SeeAllard,“Lesdroitsdelapersonnalité,”supranote22;LouisLeBel,“LaProtectiondesDroitsFondamentauxetlaResponsabilitéCivile,”(2004)49McGill Law Journal231–254,<http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/abs/vol49/2lebel.pdf>.

25. “Delictual”isroughlycivilianterminologyfor“tort,”nowreferredtoas“civilliability.”26. Asitisreferredtointhattradition.27. AccordingtoAdrianPopovici,oneoftheleadingauthoritiesofcivilliabilityandciviliantheoryinQuebec,

«Ledroitcivilquébécoisdemeurefidèleàlatraditionciviliste,quielleprivilégielanotiondedroitssubjectifsinaliénables.Cesdroitsdepersonnalitéintangiblesnesauraientêtreassimilésauxdroitspropriétaires,carilsdécoulentdelapersonnalitéjuridiquedudétenteur[…]l’idéed’uneprotectiondelapersonnalitéhumaines’enracineetprendcorpssouslaformededroitssubjectifs.”GregoireLoiseau(«Desdroitspatrimoniauxdelapersonnalitéendroitfrançais»(1997)42McGill Law Journal319at328.


privacyrightsinprivatelawareinalienableand,assubjectiverights,cannotbe“reasonably”violatedintheprivatelawcontext.28Suchintrusionsarethereforedeemed“faults”(roughlyequivalenttoatort)andthedamagethattheycauseis actionable regardless of whether it occurs in seclusion (within the privacy“zone”)oris“consented”toindividuallyorbytacitsocialacquiescence(asthesurveillance example of acquiescence to warrantless wiretapping illustrates.29Moreover,therationaleunderlyingtheseprivacyprotectionsinthecivilianideaof tort is inherentlypersonality-ordignity-based, rather thananimatedbythelibertarianideaof“beingleftalone”inareasdelimitatedbyspace,asWhitman

demonstrates.30

Theformerconception, it issubmitted,seemstobettercomportwithCharlesFried’srelationalunderstandingofprivacyas“inherenttothenotionsofrespect, love,friendshipandtrust,andthatclosehumanrelationshipsareonlypossibleifpersonsenjoyandaccordtoeachotheracertainmeasureofprivacy”31thandoesanunderstandingclingingtothenotionofisolationorseclusion.

28. SeeFranceAllard,“Lesdroitsdelapersonalité,”inCollection de droit: Personnes, famille et successions(EditionsYvon-Blais,2005-2006)59-77,notingthatthesepersonalityrightscannotbealienatedorrenouncedastheyinheretopersonhood.Regarding“reasonableviolations,”ithasbeenarguedthatpersonalityrightscannotbe“reasonably”violatedinthesamewaythatgovernmentmightjustifycertaininfringementsunderconstitutionallawstandards.Popovicihaswrittenquiteextensivelyontheimportantdistinctionbetweenthenotionofrightsandtheirlimitationsinprivateandpubliclaw.Tosummarizetheargument:whereasSection1oftheCanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms,forinstance,allowsgovernmenttoinfringeonconstitutionallyprotectedrightsandfreedomsifitcanshowthatsuchinfringementsare“demonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety,”aviolationofaprivatelawright,oncedemonstratedbyplaintiffcannotbejustifiedbythedefendantinvokingtheviolation’spurported“reasonableness.”AsPopoviciexplainsinadifferentcontext:

neithertheconceptnorthecontentofanindividualrightisidenticalinconstitutionallawand[private]civillaw[…][T]heconstructionof“therighttoprivacy”inprivatelaw[undertheciviliantradition] is not necessarily the same as in public law. Therefore, what is deemed to be alegitimateorreasonable infringementbytheState isnotnecessarilysuchat thehandsofanindividual [in the private law realm]. Nor is the opposite true. These are two separate legalstandards—verydifferentprocesses indeed.Thus,whileauthorizedelectroniceavesdropping[underawarrant]mayviolatetherighttoone’sprivacy,itcanbejustifiedunderarticle1oftheCharter. Accordingly, there can be a licit [reasonable] violation of a protected right inconstitutional law (the same can be said for mandatory vaccination). In private law however,infringementsonrightsarenecessarilyillicitatthehandsofaprivateparty.

Popovici,“LeRôledelaCourSuprêmeenDroitCivil,”supranote14atpp.615–616(author’stranslation).29. Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa, <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998rcs1-591/1998rcs1-591.html>,

1998:1Supreme Court Reports591atpara.17:“Areasonablepersonrespectstherightsandfreedomsofeveryoneandcarriesouthisorherobligationswhilebearinghisorherownrightsinmind.”Aubrybroughtanactionincivilliabilityagainsttheappellantsfortakingandpublishingaphotographwithoutherconsent,albeitinapublicplaceinMontreal.

30. ToparaphraseWarrenandBrandeis,“RighttoPrivacy,”supranote1atp.195,quotingThomasMCooley,A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract,2ded.(Callaghan&Co.,1888)atp.29;LouisHenkin,“PrivacyandAutonomy,”(1974)74:8Columbia Law Review1410–1433atpp.1419,1425,discussingthe“righttobeletalone”as“themoralfreedomoftheindividualtoengageinhisorherownthoughts,actionsanddecisions.”SeealsoJoelFeinberg,“Autonomy,Sovereignty,andPrivacy:MoralIdeasintheConstitution?”(1983)58:3Notre Dame Law Review445–492;DanielROrtiz,“Privacy,Autonomy,andConsent”(1989)12:1Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy91–97;andMichaelJPerry,“SubstantiveDueProcessRevisited:ReflectionsOn(andBeyond)RecentCases,”(1976)71:4Northwestern University of Law Review417–469atp.440.AsWhitmanexplains:“ItisthecontrastbetweentwoconceptionsofprivacymostrecentlydistinguishedbyRobertPost:betweenprivacyasanaspectofdignityandprivacyasanaspectofliberty.Continentalprivacyprotectionsare,attheircore,aformofprotectionofarighttorespectandpersonal dignity.Thecorecontinentalprivacyrightsarerights to one’s image, name, and reputation.”JamesQWhitman,“TheTwoWesternCulturesofPrivacy:DignityversusLiberty,”(2004)113:6Yale Law Journal1151–1221,<http://yalelawjournal.org/113/6/1151_james_q_whitman.html>atpp.1160–1161.

31. CharlesFried,“Privacy,”(1968)77:3Yale Law Journal475–493atpp.477–478,citedinCraig,“InvasionofPrivacyandCharterValues,”supra note6atp.361.AccordingtoFried,privacyislinkedtorespect,love,friendshipandtrustandisthe“oxygen”bywhichindividualsarecapableofbuilding“relationsofthemostfundamentalsort.”


In the same vein, the civilian approach, basing recovery on objectiveloss32—albeit intangible loss such as dignity—that derives from the inherentlyunreasonableviolationofapersonalityrightisedifying.Inalienablerights,whoseviolationbyprivateparties33isjudgedunreasonablebythecivillegalmethod,canarguablyweathertechnologicalevolutioninawaythatfluctuatingsocialperceptionsoftheprivacy“zone”mightnot.Iftortlaw’sveryobjectiveistoregulatehumanrelationships through corrective justice34 this approach merits further attention,withaneyetowardsdevelopingcoherentprivacytortreasoning.35

Inviewofthat,thisarticle’sobjectiveistwofold:First, itquestionsthecontinueduseof the“reasonableexpectationofprivacy”model,prevalent inAmerican lawwith its referencestoseclusion.Thenarrowfocusonterritorialand/orproprietarynotionsof“seclusion,”itwillbeshown,derivesfromhistoricallyentrenchedproperty-basedreasoning,whichfailstocapturethecomplexityoftheprivacyvalueinmoderntimes.Tortlawstandards,whichareshapedbyandcaninturnfashionnarrowingsocietalperceptionsofprivacy,ill-comportwiththeimperativesoftechnology.Thisisparticularlytruewhenheightenedsurveillancecuriouslytendstofostercomplacencyratherthanaversion.36

Second, and most importantly, the article sets forth an alternativeconceptionof“privacytort”reasoning,gleanedfromtheprecedingcomparativeexercise, specifically the civilian tradition’s flexible personality rights-basedapproach to civil liability. Under the civilian tradition, the right to privacy isconsidered a fundamental attribute of personhood and therefore actionableoutsideanyspatialorproprietary“privacyzone.”

Those attributes of the person called “personality rights” arecharacteristicofthecontinentallegaloptic.Theyareinternalanddivorcedfromspace or time and thus able to better withstand technological advances. Thiscomparativeperspective to theprivacy tort isoffered in thehope that itmayservetoilluminatethedebateintheUnitedStatesandcommonlawCanada.

For present purposes, I focus my discussion on the theoreticalunderpinningsoftheserespectivetraditions’conceptionoftheprivacytort/civilliabilityandthereforemakenoattempttoprovideathoroughexaminationofthenormativeframeworkonpoint.37Tothisend,thearticlewilladoptthefollowingstructure. Following this introduction, Part 2 proposes an overview of the

32. Québec (Curateur Public) v Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital St-Ferdinand,<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1996/1996rcs3-211/1996rcs3-211.html>,1996:3Supreme Court Reports211.

33. Unlikegovernment.SeePopovici,supranote23.SeealsoAdrianPopovici,“Del’impactdelaChartedesdroitsetlibertésdelapersonnesurledroitdelaresponsabilitécivile:unmariageraté?”inConférence Meredith Memorial Lectures 1998–1999: La pertinence renouvelée du droit des obligations : retour aux sources / Back To Basics : The Continued Relevance of the Law of Obligations (ÉditionsYvonBlais,2000)49–94atpp.49–56.

34. Weinrib,The Idea of Private Law,supranote19.35. Insodoing,itthusensurescoherencethathasbeensomarkedlyabsenttodate.AsErnestWeinribremarks,

“privatelawstrivestoavoidcontradiction,tosmoothoutinconsistencies,andtorealizeaself-adjustingharmonyofprinciples,rules,andstandards.”Weinrib,The Idea of Private Law,supranote19atp.12.

36. AstheaboveexamplepertainingtopostSeptember11thwarrantlesswiretapping,supra note12,illustrates.SeeAngusReid,“ManyAmericansAcceptNSASurveillance,”supra note12,andLyon,“GlobalSurveillance,”supranote12.

37. ForathoroughexaminationoftheCanadianprivacyframeworkbeyondtortlaw,seeBenôitPelletier,“LaProtectionDeLaViePrivéeauCanada,”(2001)35:1–2Revue Juridique Thémis485–522,<http://www.themis.umontreal.ca/pdf/rjtvol35num1_2/pelletier.pdf>.


underlyingrationalesandhistoricaljustifications38animatingprivacyprotectionsatcommonlaw,fromwhencerecognizedprivacytortsintheUS(andcommonlawCanada)intheirvariousincarnationsderive.Insodoing,itwillhighlightthe“growing disconnect between people’s perception of privacy and the rapidgrowthofvariousformsofsurveillance.”39

Havingconductedanexaminationofthesalienthistoryandtheoreticalperspectivedefiningthenormativeframework,thesecondstageofanalysis(Part3) willengageinacomparativeexerciseaimedatexposingthecivillawtradition’sdistinctapproachtocivilliabilityforprivacyinfringements.

*2. THE MEAGER PRIVACY TORT: THE PROPERTY ORIGINS OF REASONABLE

EXPECTATIONS AND SECLUSION AT COMMON LAW

whereaS The Civil law TradiTion adhered To bythenationsofcontinentalEuropeandtheprovinceofQuebec,amongother jurisdictions,40 favoursabroadandflexibleconstructionof fault,41which isparticularlyamenabletocompensatingmodernprivacy intrusions,statesabidingbythecommon lawtradition42have,forvariousreasonselaboratedbelow,refusedtostrayfromrigidcategorizationsof tort. Instead they by and large chose to rely on “the expectation-drivenprivacytestfocusingonthecontextoftheallegedintrusionandthesocialnormsand customs that determine whether an expectation of privacy isreasonable.”43 Much has already been written respecting the normativeframework and caselaw in the US pertaining to torts,44 particularly in the

38. “Itisabanalitythatcomparativelawandlegalhistoryarekindreddisciplinesinthesensethattheformerlooksatlawacrossspacewhilethelatterlooksatlawacrosstime.Onemightthereforeexpectacloseworkingrelationshipbetweencomparatistsandlegalhistorians,perhapsevenatrendtowardaharmonizationorarapprochementofthecomparativeandhistoricalapproaches.”ReimanandLevasseur,“ComparativeLaw,”supranote15atp.1.

39. ToparaphrasefromLyon,“GlobalizingSurveillance,”supranote12.40. TheseincludethosewhichboastaCivilCodesuchasFrance,GermanyandBelgiumamongstmanyothers.41. Faultisthefirstelementofcivilliability.SeePart3belowforadetaileddiscussionoftheelementsofcivil

liabilityinthecivillawtradition.42. ThecommonlawtraditionischieflyCommonwealthcountries,withtheexceptionofCyprusandIreland

thatmaybedeemedpluralisticsystemswithCodalelements.SeeCraig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6.43. Spencer,“ReasonableExpectations,”supra note11atp.854.44. ForadetaileddiscussionofprivacytortsintheAmericancontext,seeMichaelSRaum,“Torts—Invasionof

Privacy:NorthDakotaDeclinestoRecognizeaCauseofActionforInvasionofPrivacy,”(1999)75:1North Dakota Law Review155–177atpp.162–165.


informationtechnologycontext.45Sufficeitthensimplytoobservethefollowing:thepertinent American common law tort of invasionof privacy46 thatmaybeinvokedinthiscontextispremisedonfourtheoriesofliability,47allbasedonthe“righttobeletalone.”48Mostrelevantamongsttheseforourpurposesis“theunreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another, if shown to be highlyoffensive to the reasonable person” category (the elements being “intrusion”that is “highly offensive” to a “reasonable person”). Telling in this vein is thefollowingexample:AmericanCourtsareinclinedtoframeemaileavesdroppingissuesintheworkplaceasmattersofpropertyrights49andtendtouseproperty-

45. SeeJarrodJWhite,“[email protected]:EmployerMonitoringofEmployeeE-Mail,”(1997)48:3Alabama Law Review1079–1104;ErinMDavis,“TheDoctrineofRespondeatSuperior:AnApplicationtoEmployers’LiabilityfortheComputerorInternetCrimesCommittedbyTheirEmployees,”(2002)12:2Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology683–713;CForbesSargentIII,“ElectronicMediaandtheWorkplace:Confidentiality,PrivacyandOtherIssues,”(1997)41Boston Bar Journal 6–21;DeborahMMcTigue,“MarginalizingIndividualPrivacyontheInternet,”(1999)5Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law95–117,<http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/scitech/volume5/5bujstl5.pdf>;JoshuaSBauchner,“StateSovereigntyandtheGlobalizingEffectsoftheInternet:ACaseStudyofthePrivacyDebate,”(2000)26:2Brooklyn Journal of International Law689–722;AlanFWestin,“PrivacyintheWorkplace:HowWellDoesAmericanLawReflectAmericanValues?”(1996)72:1Chicago-Kent Law Review271–283;AnneLLehman,“E-MailintheWorkplace:QuestionofPrivacy,PropertyorPrinciple?”(1997)5CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Policy99–112;MatthewFinkin,”Privacy&EmploymentLaw,”reviewofJohnDRCraig,Privacy & Employment Law(Hart,1999)andDieterSimonandManfredWeiss,eds.,Zur Autonomie Des Individuums: Liber Amicorum Spiros Simitis(NomosVerlag,2000),(2000)21:4Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal813–817;SamuelAThummaandDarrelSJackson,“TheHistoryofElectronicMailinLitigation,”(2000)16:1Santa Clara Computer and High-Technology Law Journal1–33;SarahDiLuzio,“WorkplaceE-Mail:It’sNotasPrivateasYouMightThink,”comment,(2000)25:3Delaware Journal of Corporate Law741–760;AlexanderIRodriguez,“AllBark,NoByte:EmployeeE-MailPrivacyRightsinthePrivateSectorWorkplace,”(1998)47:4Emory Law Journal1439–1473;JayPKesan,“Cyber-WorkingorCyber-Shirking?AFirstPrinciplesExaminationofElectronicPrivacyintheWorkplace,”(2002)54:2Florida Law Review289–332,<http://www.flr.law.ufl.edu/pdf/april2002/kesan.pdf>;RafaelGely,“DistillingtheEssenceofContractTerms:AnAnti-AntiformalistApproachtoContractandEmploymentLaw,”(2001)53:4Florida Law Review669–725,<http://ssrn.com/abstract=264021>;SElizabethWilborn,“RevisitingthePublic/PrivateDistinction:EmployeeMonitoringintheWorkplace,”(1998)32:3Georgia Law Review825–887;DanMcIntosh,“[email protected]:TheFutureofCommunicationPrivacyintheMinnesotaPrivate-SectorWorkplace,”(2000)23:2Hamline Law Review539–584;ToddMWesche,“ReadingYourEveryKeystroke:ProtectingEmployeeE-MailPrivacy,”(2002)1Journal of High-Technology Law101–118,<http://www.jhtl.org/docs/pdf/TWESCHEV1N1N.pdf>;RebeccaEbert,“MailerDaemon:UnabletoDeliverMessageJudicialConfusionintheDomainofE-MailMonitoringinthePrivateWorkplace,”(2002)1Journal of High-Technology Law63–83,<http://www.jhtl.org/docs/pdf/REBERTV1N1N.pdf>;GregoryIRasinandJosephPMoan,“FittingaSquarePegintoaRoundHole:TheApplicationofTraditionalRulesofLawtoModernTechnologicalAdvancementsintheWorkplace,”(2001)66:4Missouri Law Review793–825;BenjaminFSidbury,“You’veGotMail…andYourBossKnowsIt:RethinkingtheScopeoftheEmployerE-MailMonitoringExceptionstotheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct,”(2001)5UCLA Journal of Law and Technology<http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2001/05_010912_sidbury.php>.

46. Needlesstosaythisisbroadlyspeaking,withdifferencesamongthevariousstates.47. ThefourtheoriesofliabilityarguablyderivefromthewritingsofThomasMCooleyandareanimatedbythe

right“tobeletalone.”Cooley,Treatise on the Law of Torts,supra note30atpp.1–7,20,29.SeealsoKeetonet al.,Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts,supranote14atp.849,para.117,citingthe“righttobeletalone”asthechiefimpetusforprivacyprotectionintort,andWilliamLProsser,“Privacy,”(1960)48:3California Law Review383–423atp.389discussingfourdistinctkindsofinvasionorfourdifferentinterestsoftheplaintiffandreferringtoCooley.Foracritiqueofthefourcategories,seeEdwardJBloustein,“PrivacyasanAspectofHumanDignity:AnAnswertoDeanProsser,”(1964)39:6New York University Law Review962–1007especiallyatpp.964–966.

48. Forfurtherdiscussion,seeJoanTAGabelandNancyRMansfield,“TheInformationRevolutionandItsImpactontheEmploymentRelationship:AnAnalysisoftheCyberspaceWorkplace,”(2003)40:2American Business Law Journal301–353atp.313.Theauthorsdefinetherelevanttortinthefollowingmanner:“Thetortofintrusiononseclusionconsistsofintrusionintoamatterinwhichtheemployeehasprivacy(i.e.,theemployerhasnolegitimateinterest)andbymeansthatwouldbeobjectionabletoareasonableperson”(notesomitted).

49. Propertyrightsarebalancedbetweenprivacyandownership.SeeLawrenceERothstein,“PrivacyorDignity?:ElectronicMonitoringintheWorkplace,”(2000)19:3New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 379–412atp.382.


basedreasoningintheirdecisions.50

Thus,forinstance,theleadingcaseofSmythv.Pillsbury Co.51 pertainingspecificallytoemaileavesdroppingintheworkplacecanbesaidtostandforthepropositionthatemployeesdonothaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyatwork becauseno“reasonablepersonwouldconsiderthedefendant’sinterceptionof [his] communications to be a substantial and highly offensive invasion ofhis privacy.”52 Although this present article, as noted, intends to refrain fromdetailingthenormativeframework—ataskproficientlytackledbymanyscholarlywritings53—sufficeittoterselyandsuccinctlymakenoteofthefollowingrelevantpoints.

Generally speaking, American courts recognize four separate privacytorts: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, “false light”invasionofprivacy,andappropriationofpersonality.54The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for itspart,enshrinesprotectionagainst intrusionandeavesdroppingonone’s“seclusion,”anddisclosureofone’sprivateinformation.55Aspreviouslyalluded,thesereferencesto“seclusion”areparticularlynoteworthyinlightoftheabovehighlightedhistoricalreferencestopropertyandprivacybeingdelineatedspatially.Comportingwith theproperty rationale, the intrusionmustbe intoaprivateplaceor“aprivateseclusionthattheplaintiffhasthrownabouthispersonoraffairs”tobeactionable.56

AsVanderHaagremarksintheelectronicsurveillancecontext, intheUS,andindeedinthecommonlawworldgenerallyspeaking,“[p]rivacyisbesttreated as a property right. Property grants an owner the exclusive right todisposeofwhatheowns.Privacyistheexclusiverighttodisposeofaccesstoone’sproper(private)domain.”57

Althoughtherationalesjustifyingthisopticmayhavefoundlegitimacyinthepast,theyaretodaytheobjectofincreasingscrutinyandcritique.58Thisproperty-based or spatially based construction, which unconsciously, if nototherwise,continuestoanimatemodernAmericanprivacytortlaw,isawkwardintheinformationtechnologycontext,forthisantiquatedrationalewoulddictatethattheindividualhasfewornoprivacyrightsinthepublicrealmwhereitwouldbeunreasonabletoexpecttobeleftalone.59

Not surprisingly therefore, “[i]n the United States, judicial protection

50. Propertyreasoningisqualifiedonlybynarrowlytailoredexceptions.SeeKarenEltis,“TheEmergingAmericanApproachtoE-mailPrivacyintheWorkplace:ItsInfluenceonDevelopingCaselawinCanadaandIsrael:ShouldOthersFollowSuit?”(2003)24:3Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal487–523,<http://www.law.uiuc.edu/publications/CLL&PJ/archive/vol_24/issue_3/EltisArticle24-3.pdf>atp.489,footnote11;Seealso,KarenEltis,“Lasurveillanceducourrierélectroniqueenmilieudetravail:leQuébecsuccomberat-ilàl’influencedel’approchepermissiveaméricaine?”(2006)51:3McGill Law Journal475–502.

51. Smyth v Pillsbury Co.(USAEDistPA,1996),914Federal Supplement97.52. Smyth v Pillsbury,supranote51.Itshouldbenotedthatthiscaseissomewhatpeculiar,astheemailin

questionhadbeensenttotheemployee’sownsupervisor,thusseverelyunderminingalineofargumentbasedonanexpectationofprivacy.

53. Seesourcesmentionedinsupranote45.54. Prosser,“Privacy,”supra note47atpp.388–390summarizingtheevolutionofprivacycausesofaction.55. Restatement (Second) of Torts,supranote8atpara.652A:“onewhointentionallyintrudes,physicallyor

otherwise,uponthesolitudeorseclusionofanotherorhisprivateaffairsorconcerns,issubjecttoliabilitytotheotherforinvasionofhisprivacy,iftheintrusionwouldbehighlyoffensivetoareasonableperson.”

56. SeeRestatement (Second) of Torts,supranote8,para.652,formercommentC.57. ErnestvandenHaag,“OnPrivacy,”inJRolandPennockandJohnWChapman,eds.,Privacy(Atherton

Press,1971)149–168atpp.150–151(citationsomitted).AlsocitedbyRothstein,“PrivacyorDignity,”supranote49atpp.381–382.

58. SeeRuthGavison,“PrivacyandtheLimitsofLaw,”(1980)89:3Yale Law Journal421–471.59. Asthewiretappingexample,supra note12,soplainlyillustrates.


ofprivacydependsonwhetheranindividualhasareasonableexpectationthattheinformationinquestionwillremainprivate.Statedanotherway,thequestioniswhethersocietyrecognizestheindividual’sclaimedexpectationofprivacyasreasonable.”60

This approach arguably discounts context. Indeed, the tendency toassociateprivacywithpropertyandalonenessexternallyorspatiallydefined,61rather than with dignity inherent to personality, may not lend itself as well torealms outside the physical world (i.e. in cyberspace). Placing privacy in itshistorical context can serve to elucidate this seeming contradiction betweenthedecreasingexpectationofprivacyintheinformationageandthecommonlaw privacy tort’s misguided insistence on an expectation-based standard oflibertarianilk.

American scholars tend toembark ondiscussionsof privacywith theorigins of the invasion of privacy tort, born of Warren and Brandeis’s seminalarticletitledThe Right to Privacy.62Thoughseldomaddressed,thehistoricalrootsofthatveryrightatcommonlawinEnglandareparticularly instructive.UndertheEnglishcommonlaw,therighttoprivacywasfirstrecognizedbyvirtueofitsintricatelinktopersonalproperty.Thisisbestevidencedbythenowinfamoussaying“thehouseofeveryoneistohimashiscastleandfortress,”firstcoinedbytheHouseofLordsintheSemaynecase(nowcolloquiallyknownas“aman’shomeishiscastle”).63Thisphrasealluded to theconception thataperson’s right toprivacyfundamentallyderivesfromhispropertyrights.64Inviewofthat,therighttoprivacywasinitiallyrecognizedinrelationtotrespass,65thusconfirmingwhatformanyyearswasthereigningconceptionofprivacyasrootedinownership.66Thisbriefhistoricalaperçuservestoshedsomelightonthenarrowconceptionandrepeatedreferencesto“seclusion”offeredincontemporarytortlawdiscourse.Itsimilarlyelucidatestheunderstandingofprivacyastherighttobeleftalonein given spaces,definedexternallyratherthaninherentlytopersonhood.67

Butwhatrolemightthenotionofseclusionplaywhen,toparaphrasetheSupremeCourtofCanadainWise,“many,ifnotthemajority,ofouractivitiesareinevitablycarriedoutintheplainviewofotherpersons.”68Theviewtakenbycivilianjurisdictionsinthisveinisparticularlyenlighteningandmayservetoguidethedevelopmentofprivacytortlaw.

60. Spencer,“ReasonableExpectations,”supranote11atp.847.61. ThisisahallmarkofthehighlyindividualisticAmericanculture.62. WarrenandBrandeis,“RighttoPrivacy,”supranote1.63. Semayne’s Case(KB,1604),5Coke’s King’s Bench Reports91a,77English Reports194.64. SeeWarrenFreedman,The Right of Privacy in the Computer Age(QuorumBooks,1987)atp.3discussingthe

1818EnglishcaseofGee v Pritchard(36English Reports670)wheretheCourtofChanceryrestrictedthepublicationofapersonalletter“toprotecta‘propertyright.’”FreedmandiscussesthisandotherEnglishcaseswherecourts“basedtheirprotectionoftherightofprivacyupontheprotectionofa‘propertyright’”.

65. Prosser,“Privacy,”supranote47atpp.389–392.Seealso,AlanFWestin,Privacy and Freedom(Atheneum,1968)atpp.311,333.

66. SeeEltis,“TheEmergingAmericanApproach,”supranote50atp.496.67. Forageneraldiscussion,seeMortonJHorwitz,The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860(Harvard

UniversityPress,1977)atpp.31-34.Horwitzobserveshowtheconceptionofpropertychangedfromaneighteenth-centuryviewthatdominionoverlandconferredthepowertopreventothers’interferencetothenineteenth-centuryassumptionthattheessentialattributeofpropertyownershipwasthepowertodevelopitirrespectiveoftheconsequencestoothers.

68. R v Wise,<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1992/1992rcs1-527/1992rcs1-527.html>,1992:1Supreme Court Reports527atpp.564–565.


*3. THE CIVILIAN APPROACH

3.1. The General Codal Principle: Twin Pillars of Flexibility and Permanence

while CourTS in Common law CounTrieS Generally SeT forThspecificcategoriesof the privacy tort within which plaintiffs must fit—and whose rigid, at timesarchaic,criteriatheymustsatisfy—thecivillawtraditionsetsoutabroadCodalentitlementtocompensationforallwhosuccessfullyproveinjurycausedbythedefendant’s wrongful conduct.69 At common law, specific interests oncejurisprudentiallyrecognizedareprotectedbyparticulartorts;incontradistinction,according to continental thinking, all interests are protected by a generallywordedcatch-allprovisioncontainedintheprivatelawCode.70Thetraditionisthereforemarkedbytheabsenceofnominatetortsordelicts(alistofwrongs),underwhicheachboastsdistinctliabilityprinciples.71Byreasonoftheirgenerality,suchCodalprovisionsareendowedwithtremendousflexibility,allowingthemtoextendtoaplethoraofcasesandwithstandthetestoftime.72Thiseffectisallthe more pronounced, given that socio-economic considerations (les faits sociaux) are deemed sources of law by the civilian tradition, thus ensuringpermanenceandflexibility.73

AsCraigputsit,

[t]he inherent flexibility of the civil-law delict principle, which allows it to deal

easily with new forms of fault, should be contrasted with the rigidity of the

common law, where centuries of precedent have given rise to identifiable

categories of fault (i.e., “torts”), each with specific criteria that must be met

beforearemedycanbeawarded.74

Inafewwords,theconstituentelementsofcivilliability,assetoutinthegeneralCodalprovisionthatistypicalofcontinentalsystemsmaybesummarizedasharmcausedbywrongfulconduct.Inotherwords,andwhileitisbeyondthescopeofthispapertogointoanygreaterdetail,“threeprerequisites[…mustbe]met: thedefendanthascommitteda fault, theplaintiffhassufferedharm,andthereisasufficientcausalrelationbetweenthesetwoevents.”75Asageneral

69. Theproofisonabalanceofprobabilities.70. KnownastheCode Civilorcolloquially,the“NapoleonicCode.”Thecodetiesintoabasicassumptionof

civilianthinking,namely:“codificationpresumesthatlegalrulescanbeexpressedmeaningfullyatadegreeofgeneralitythatensurestheirrelativestabilityandpermanence,andthatprovidesflexiblebaselinesforself-regulation.”JohnECBrierleyandRAMacDonald,Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec Private Law(EmondMontgomery,1993)atp.99.

71. Thisisthecaseatcommonlaw,withdistinctprinciplesgoverningdifferenttortssuchastrespassornuisanceetc.

72. BrierleyandMacDonald,“QuebecCivilLaw,”supranote70atp.435:“[T]heCodeisnotspecificastothenatureoflegallyprotectedintereststhatmaygiverisetoaclaimindamages[…]Indeed,ratherthanlimitingthescopeofrecoverybycreatingparticularcategoriesfornon-compensabledamage,theCodeachievessimilarresultsthroughaflexibleuseoftheprinciplesofcausation.”

73. Craig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6.Regardingtheprovision’sflexibility,seealsoRenéHurtubise,“Lapersonne:Respectdelapersonnehumaine,”inPaul-AndréCrépeauet al.,eds., Codification: Valeurs et langage, Actes du colloque international de droit civil comparé(ServicedescommunicationsduConseil,1985)127–135,<http://www.cslf.gouv.qc.ca/publications/PubF115/F115A1.html#1>.

74. Craig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6,p.363.75. Khoury,“LiabilityofAuditors,”supranote5atp.450.


rule,therefore,theCivilCodeprovidesthatthe“tortfeasor”(toborrowcommonlawparlance)isheldtorepairall“bodily,moralormaterial”injuryattributabletoher.76Astheproximityrequirementisalientothecivillaw,abroaddutyofcarebeingowedtoall—ratherthantoaspecific“neighbour”—recognizingabroadcategoryofpotentialclaimantsappearstoposefewdifficulties.

Morespecifically,inFrance,forexample,therelevantprovisionsgivingexpressiontotheseelementsarearticles1382and1383oftheCode civil(FrenchCivilCode):

1382. Anyhumandeedwhatsoeverwhichcausesharmtoanothercreatesan

obligationinthepersonbywhosefaultitwascausedtocompensateit.

1383.Everyoneisliablefortheharmwhichhehascausednotonlybyhisdeed,

butalsobyhisfailuretoactorhislackofcare77

InQuebec,theequivalentprovisionisarticle1457oftheQuebecCivilCode(CCQ):78

1457.Everypersonhasadutytoabidebytherulesofconductwhichlieupon

him,accordingtothecircumstances,usageorlaw,soasnottocauseinjuryto

another.Whereheisendowedwithreasonandfailsinhisduty,heisresponsible

foranyinjurycausedtoanotherbytheactorfaultofanotherpersonorbythe

actofthingsinhiscustody.79

Relevantforourpurposesisageneralrightofaction(i.e.inthecommonlawparlance,“tortactions”)pertainingtocivilliability,80andbynomeansspecifictoprivacy.NotunlikeotherCodalprovisions,thisgeneralnormisarticulatedatthehighestlevelofabstractioninordertopresideoveranendlessandtimelessévantail of situations it is meant to capture. No reference is made to specificcircumstancesandthereare“fewrestrictions[…]onthenatureofthedamagethatmaybe compensated” includingpurely “moral” (emotional) or economicloss.81 Instead,therespectiveCodalnormscitedabove“aspire […]toprovidemeaningfulgeneralitiesthatcanaccommodatea[wide]rangeoffuturefactsin

76. Civil Code of Québec, Revised Statutes of Québecch.C-1991,<http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/CCQ/CCQ_A.html>atarts.1457,1607[CCQ].

77. Civil Code(FRA),<http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=22>.SeeCatherineValcke,“QuebecCivilLawandCanadianFederalism,”(1996)21:1Yale Journal of International Law67–121;EricHReiter,infranote86“PersonalityandPatrimony:ComparativePerspectivesontheRighttoOne’sImage,”(2002)76Tulane Law Review673–726atp.684.

78. ThehybridcharacteroftheQuebeclegalsystem,consistingofitsrelationshipwithFrenchlawfromwhenceitderivesandtheneighbouringcommonlawtraditionmakesitanimportantjurisdictiontostudy.

79. CCQ,supra note76atart.1457.80. “ThereisnoliabilitywithoutdamageinthelawofQuebec.”BrierleyandMacDonald,Quebec Civil Law,

supranote70atp.435.81. BrierleyandMacDonald,Quebec Civil Law,supranote70atp.435.Quebec (Public Curator) v Syndicat

national des employés de l’hôpital St-Ferdinand,supra note32.AccordingtoJacobs,“[i]nadditiontointerferencewithphysicalintegrity(one’sphysicalperson),damagesawardedforlossoforinterferencewithmoralintegrityalsoaboundinQuebecCivillaw.Generallyspeaking,moralintegritycomprisesthesubjectivequalitiesthatservetodefineapersonasanindividualsuchasone’sthoughtsandsentiments.TheCourtstendtoplaceinterferencewithallpersonalityrightsofanon-physicalnaturetogetherunderthistitle(includingtherightstohonour,reputation,privacyanddignity).”Jacobs,supranote22at293(hardcopyversion)or294(onlineversion).Seeforexample,Aubry v Éditions,supranote29,andDeschamps v Renault(QCSupCt,1972),18Les Cahiers de Droit 937.AccordingtoJacobs,p.294(onlineversion)atfootnote42,dignityisanautonomousright,notasubsetofintegrity.Jacobssupra note22atfootnote42.


alltheirdiversity.”82Again,thephilosophyunderpinningthisapproachisthetwinpillarsoftheciviliantradition:flexibilityandpermanence.

Infact,therelevantprovisionsenshrinedinboththeFrenchandQuebecCivilCodes83stipulateageneral obligationtocompensatealldamagescausedbyfault, ratherthanexpresslynamingtheclaimantsentitledtosueonprecisegrounds.Asnoted,theprovision’svaguenessisattributedtoadesiretoensureadaptability to changing social conditions.84 Significantly, for our purposes,“[t]hemissionof theCivil law is to situate the individual andhisorher rightswithin the framework of the private law—that is to say, the regulation of thesocial interactions of citizens as private persons,” regardless of technologicalchanges.85TheCivilLawwhere,asReiterobserves“thenotionsofpersonandpropertyhavebeenconceptuallydistinctsinceclassicalRomanlaw”86hassincetimeimmemorialrecognizedtherightofthirdpartiestodamagesresultingfrominfringementsonprivacyrelating—evenexclusively—todignity.

Forthatreason,therequirementthattheintrusionbe“highlyoffensive”toareasonablepersonsetforth intheAmericanprivacytortofCommonLawlineage is absent in articles 1457 and 35–36 of CCQ (dealing with breach ofprivacyspecifically)87andinarticles1382and1832oftheFrenchCivilCode.Thisissignificantinthatit illustratesthegreatergenerosityofthecivilianapproachinsanctioningprivacyinfringementsmorereadilyin“tort”/civilliability,astheselendthemselvestoaratherbroadconstruction.88

Thisapproachshouldcomeasnosurpriseinlightofwhatappearsasa

82. BrierleyandMacDonald,Quebec Civil Law,supranote70atp.107.83. Seeforexample,BrierleyandMacDonald,Quebec Civil Law,supranote70atp.154,discussingtheimpact

oftheFrenchCodeontheCodeofQuebec.84. SeeMauriceTancelin,“LeSilenceduCode,”(1994)39:4McGill Law Journal747–760.85. BrierleyandMacDonald,Quebec Civil Law,supranote70atpp.154–155.86. EricHReiter,“PersonalityandPatrimony:ComparativePerspectivesontheRighttoOne’sImage,”(2002)

76:3Tulane Law Review673–726atp.673(abstract).87. Article35oftheCCQreads:

Everypersonhasarighttotherespectofhisreputationandprivacy.Noonemayinvadetheprivacyofapersonwithouttheconsentofthepersonorhisheirsunlessauthorizedbylaw.

Article36oftheCCQprovides:

Thefollowingacts,inparticular,maybeconsideredasinvasionsoftheprivacyofaperson:

1) enteringortakinganythinginhisdwelling;

2) intentionallyinterceptingorusinghisprivatecommunications;

3) appropriatingorusinghisimageorvoicewhileheisinprivatepremises;

4) keepinghisprivatelifeunderobservationbyanymeans;

5) usinghisname,image,likenessorvoiceforpurposesotherthanlegitimate informationtothepublic;

6) usinghiscorrespondence,manuscriptsorotherpersonaldocuments.

SeeCCQ,supranote76.88. SeeJacobs,supranote22,atp.297:

A further general principle advanced in St-Ferdinand is that dignity incorporates both aninternalandanexternalcomponent.Theinternalcomponentrelatestotherespectmeritedbyahumanbeingfromotherssimplybecausethepersonisahumanbeing,whiletheexternalcomponentdenotesone’sself-respectincludinghissenseofprideandhonour.St-Ferdinandsuggeststhatbothcomponentsarenormallytobeconsideredandthat incaseswheretheperson isunable toappreciatehisworthasan individual, the internal componentmustbegivenprecedence. InSt-Ferdinand, thismeant that the fact that thepatientsmaynothavebeen able to appreciate that their dignity had been violated was of no consequence indeterminingthattheviolationhadoccurred.


convergenceofpersonalityrightsandcivilliability(tortintheciviliantradition).89Atthisjuncture,itisthereforeincumbentuponustoaddresstheciviliannotionofpersonalityrightsmorespecifically,withaneyetowardsstimulatingreflectionastothepertinenceofthistheoreticalapproachelsewhere.

3.2. Personality Rights and “Tort” Privacy in Civil Law Reasoning 90

Asalludedtopreviously,thecivillawtraditionembracesaconceptforeigntoitscommonlawcounterpart,whichitlabelsaspersonalityrights.Personalityrights,born in France and recognized throughout the civil law world,91 are aimed atprotectinghumanrightsinprivatelaw.Theyare,accordingtothegreatFrenchjuristHenriMazeaud, “[f]undamental rights, indissociably linked to thehumanperson”,92ortociteCarbonnier,“des droits de l’homme opposables aux autres hommes”(“humanrightsopposabletofellowhumanbeings”).93

In effect “the objective of personality rights is simple enough: theirraison d’êtreistomoreadequatelyprotecttheattributesofthehumanperson.Thepersonisdividedintodifferentcomponentstogivehimmaximumprotectionagainst infringements by others.”94 Privacy, considered by both French andQuebecauthorsasapersonalityright,95isthereforeassuredbytheexistenceofthesesubjectivepersonalityrights.96Thisfindsexplicitexpressioninboththesesystems’respectivecodesthatenshrinetherighttoprivacyasapersonalityright

89. AsdiscussedbelowinPartIII(Section3.2).90. “InFrance,thefirstlawreviewarticleonthemattercanbetracedbackto1909,writtenbyEHPerreau.

ThereisnodoubtthatGermanandSwissscholarswerethefirsttousethewordPersönlichkeitsrechtduringthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.”Popovici,“PersonalityRights,”supranote23atp.351.Seealso,EHPerreau,“Desdroitsdelapersonnalité,”(1909)8Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil501–536;FrançoisRigaux,La protection de la vie privée et des autres biens de la personnalité(Bruylant,1990)atpp.611–617;BernardTeyssié,Droit Civil: Les Personnes(Litec,1983)atpp.13–35;AlexWeillandFrançoisTerré,Droit Civil: Les personnes, La famille, Les incapacités(Dalloz,1983)atpp.18–44;RaymondLindon,Les Droits de la Personnalité(Dalloz,1983);PierreKayser,“Lesdroitsdelapersonnalité:Aspectsthéoriquesetpratiques,”(1971)69Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil445–509;GérardCornu,Droit Civil(Montchrestien,1980)atp.19,footnote500;Reiter,“PersonalityandPatrimony,”supranote85atpp.695–697.

91. Theirrecognition,however,wasnotwithoutcontroversy.SeeGregoireLoiseau,“Desdroitspatrimoniauxetdelapersonalitéendroitfrancais,”(1997)42:2McGill Law Journal319–353at328.AstheQuebecCourtofAppealdiscussesinAubry v Éditions,supranote29:

Desthèsesetdessolutionscontradictoiressesontaffrontées;autonomiedudroitàl’imageou assimilation au droit à la vie privée, caractère extra-patrimonial ou non de ce droit,rattachementaudroitdelapersonnalitéou,parfois,audroitdelapropriétésurlaformeelle-même,distinctionentresphèrepubliqueetprivée,interdictiondelapurecapturedel’imageouexigenced’unediffusionpourqu’ilyaitatteinteàlavieprivée(D.Tallon,loc.cit.,par.108;P.Berchon,loc.cit.atp.19,par.62).D’étudesimportantes,dont,entreautres,cellesde[…]PierreKayser, Laprotectionde la vieprivée (Economica, 1984)et […] JacquesRavanas, Laprotectiondespersonnescontrelaréalisationetlapublicationdeleurimage(LibraireGeneralDeDroitetdeJurisprudence,1978).

92. SeeHMazeaud,“Preface,”toPierreKayser,La protection de la vie privée,vol.1(PressesUniversitairesd’AixMarseille,Economica,1984)atpp.204–205(author’stranslation).

93. JeanCarbonnier,Les Personnes,vol.1ofDroit civil17thed.(PressesuniversitairesdeFrance,1991)atp.117.94. Thoughnotwithoutcontroversyinadifferentcontext.See,forexample,Loiseau,“Desdroits

patrimoniaux,”supra note91.Seealso,Popovici,“PersonalityRights,”supranote23atp.352.Regardingextrapatrimoniality,seeJacquesGhestinandGillesGoubeaux,Traité de droit civil:Introduction generalevol.1,2ded.(LibrairiegeneralededroitetdeJurisprudence,1983).

95. HPatrickGlenn,“Ledroitaurespectdelavieprivée,”(1979)39:1Revue du Barreau879–916atp.883;seealso,LouisePotvin,La personne et la protection de son image: étude comparée en droits québécois, français et de la common law anglaise(Yvon-Blais,1991);GabrielMartyandPierreRaynaud,Droit civil et personnes,vol.2,3ded.(Sirey,1976).

96. SeeDabin,Le droit subjectif(Dalloz,1952);PierrePatenaude,“Lazonedeprotectionaccordéeal’intiméauCanada,”(1977)8:1Revue de Droit de l’Universite de Sherbrooke121–137atp.128;Kayser,La protection de la vie privée,supranote92.


andjurisprudencethatinterminglessuchrightsandcivilliability(“tort“).97

Indeed, personality rights are often—though not always—integratedintocivilliabilityreasoningrespectingprivacy.98Sinceviolatingapersonalityrightcannotbutbeunreasonable,suchconductisinprinciplesaidtoconstitutefault(“tort”literallysignifyingfaultorwronginFrench).

Again,historyiselucidating.AsReiterhighlights:

DuebothtotheRomanreluctancetoallowpropertyrightsinincorporealsandto

theChristianconceptionsofthehumanbodyanditsattributes,thehumanbeing

wasnottobetreatedinmarkettermsasproperty[….][T]hepremodernworld

lackedthetechnologicalmeanstocommercializeattributesofthepersonality,so

thealternativeconceptionofthepersonalityaspropertysimplydidnotarise[….]

Theresultisthatthispremodernviewofpropertyanditsconceptuallimitations

continues to influence the treatment of the right to one’s image and other

attributesofpersonalityinthecivillaw.99

Thus,whiletheconduct’swrongfulnessintermsofprivacyinfringements—likeanyother—isassessedinreferencetotheobjectivestandardofthereasonableperson; the inherent unreasonableness associated with violating a personalityright suchasprivacy in theprivate law realmensures that suchconductmorereadilygivesrisetoadutytocompensatein“tort.”Moreover,personalityrightsareinprincipleinalienable100andcannotinprinciplebereasonablyviolated101astheyderivefromhumandignity.102

What is more, the “reasonableness” standard is said to refer to thealleged “tortfeasor’s” behaviour (to borrow common law terminology) ratherthanaprerequisitetotheplaintiff’scauseofaction(integratedwithinthenominaltort) or to recognition of the nature of harm suffered.103 Finally, and perhapsmost importantly, the reasoning to assess whether there has been a privacyinfringementintort/civilliabilitydiffersgreatlyundertheserespectivetraditions.

97. Article9oftheFrenchCivilCode,supranote77,andarticle35ofCCQ,supra note87.Article5oftheQuebecCharter of Rights and Freedoms,asdiscussedbelow,similarlysetsforththisprinciple.Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,Revised Statutes of Québecch.C-12,<http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/commun/docs/charter.pdf>atart.5.

98. SeePotvin,La personne,supranote95atp.56andfollowing,discussing“lecumuldelaresponsabilitécivileetd’undroitsubjectifd’unepersonnesursonimage”[thecumulativeremediesofcivilliabilityandpersonalityrights]inFrance.

99. Reiter,“PersonalityandPatrimony,”supranote86atpp.679–680.Seealso,Rigaux,La vie privée,supranote90,atp.115,observingthatpersonalityrightswerefirstrecognizedbyaGermanjuristPuchta(Personalichkeiterecte).

100. Popovici,“PersonalityRights,”supranote23,atp.355:“whileonecannotgiveupone’srighttobodilyintegrity,reputation,name,orprivacy,onecanattimesrenouncethepunctual‘exercise’oftheserights.”Forthedebatepertainingtothedivisibilityofpersonalityrights,seeLoiseau,“Desdroitspatrimoniaux,”supranote91.

101. SeealsoMadelaineCaron,“LeCodecivilquébécois,instrumentdeprotectiondesdroitsetlibertésdelapersonne?”(1978)56:2Canadian Bar Review197–232;Glenn,“Ledroit,”supranote95.

102. RenéDavid,Les systemes de droit contemporains XII, Le droit francais, principes et tendances du droit francais, vol.2(LibraireGeneraldeDroitetdeJurisprudence,1960)atp.16.

103. BrierleyandMacDonald,“QuebecCivilLaw,”supranote70atp.446:“Afaultnowamountstothefailuretotaketheprecautionsandexercisethecarethatareasonablepersonwouldhavetakenandexercisedifplacedinsimilarcircumstances.”SeealsoJean-LouisBaudoinandPatriceDeslauriers,La responsabilité civile des courtiers en valeurs mobilières et des gestionnaires de fortune: aspects nouveaux,6thed.(ÉditionsYvonBlais,1999).Inanyevent,somecommentatorsobservethat“theFrenchcourtshavehadandcontinuetohaveatendencytofindliabilitywithoutmuchdiscussionofthereasonablenessofthedefendant’sconduct.”SeeJeanneMHauch“ProtectingPrivateFactsinFrance:TheWarren&BrandeisTortisAliveandWellandFlourishinginParis(1994)68:5TulaneLawReview1219-1301atp.1233-1234.


Whereasincommonlawjurisdictionstheprocessappearstaintedbypubliclawnotions in the private law realm, prompting judges to ask whether a privacyviolationisreasonable(andthereforejustifiable),104intheciviliantradition,onceaprivacyviolationhasbeendetected,thatprocessendsandtheanalysisturnstocausationwithoutfurtherdiscussionsofreasonableness.

Therefore,

Civillawreasoningisasfollows.Thefirstquestiontoaskiswhetherafundamental

protected right—such as privacy or liberty, for instance, was violated; second

question:wasthisviolationillicit(wrongful).Onceplaintiffshowsthatanindividual

wrongfully/illicitly violated another’s fundamental right, the defendant cannot

justifyhisactionsbyarguingthatdespiteeverything,theviolationwasreasonable

orproportional.Theillicitinfringementnecessarilyviolatestherightandindeed

constitutestheviolationofthatright.105

Thepracticalimplicationofthisapproach,whichindirectlyamalgamatescivil liability (tort) andpersonality rights, is as follows.Conceiving the right toprivacyasapersonalityrightincivilliability(“tort”),allowsthecivilianlegalmethodtograspprivacyasazoneofintimacydelineatednotbyspaceorownership,butby the basic needs of personhood—as a right to preserve a state of mind oftranquility.106 Insteadofderiving frompropertyorbeingakin toseclusion, thecivilian notion of privacy relates to moral autonomy, such is encompassed byhumandignity,107whichinheresinlegalpersonalityandisconsideredanextensionthereof.108

Finally,broadly speaking, the roleof civil liability inprotectinghumanrights prompted a number of authors to highlight the Code’s importance inpromotingvaluessuchaslibertyanddignityinprivatelawincivilianjurisdictionssuchasQuebec.109Thus,forinstance,MadelaineCaronremarks:“Article1053of the Civil Code [1457 CCQ’s predecessor] by itself constitutes a true bill ofrightsforitprovidesvictimsofhumanrightsinfringementswithacauseofaction

104. JuneMaryZMakdisi,“GeneticPrivacy:NewIntrusionANewTort?”(2001)34:4Creighton Law Review965-1026atp.987.

105. Popovici,“LeRôledelaCourSuprêmeenDroitCivil,�supranote14atpp.620–623(author’stranslation).Popovicidiscussesadifferentsubject,namely,whatheconsiderstobethedangerousinterpretationofQuebecCharterprivatelawrightsbypubliclawcommonlawstandards.

106. Carbonnierdiscusses“ageneralrighttotranquility”(“cedroitgénéralàlatranquillité”).“Cettetranquillité,quiestunevaleurpsychologiqueprotégée,revêtdemultiplesaspectsconcrètementdissemblables:demeurerinconnu;n’êtrepasépié,suivi,sollicité,questionné,dépeint;nepasentendreprononcersonnomenpublic;nepasvoirdivulguersabiographieousagénéalogie,l’étatdesafortuneoudesesdettes;nepasêtrecomptabledesactesdesonexistencequotidienne,etc...”JeanCarbonnier,Droit civil,supranote93atpp.137–138;seealso,DParent,“Lareconnaissanceetlalimitedudroitàlavieprivéeendroitquébécois”inDéveloppements récents en droit administratif(ÉditionsYvonBlais,1994)atp.211.GaryMarxarguesthatprivacyviolationstranscendfourborders:natural;social;spatialortemporal;andephemera.SeeGaryMarx,“TheMurkyConceptualWaters:ThePublicandthePrivate,”(2001)3:3Ethics and Information Technology157–169.

107. Notcoincidentally,dignityisthechiefvalueinmostcontinentalconstitutions.SeealsoWhitman,“TwoWesternCultures,”supranote30.

108. SeePopovicigenerally,“PersonalityRights,”supranote23atp.351.109. SeeIrwinCotler,“RemediesAgainstRacistIncitementinaComparativePerspective,”inMélanges offerts

par ses collègues de McGill à Paul-André Crépeau—Mélanges presented by McGill colleagues to Paul-André Crépeau (ÉditionsYvonBlais,1997)221–227.


enablingthemtobecompensatedfortheharmtheyhavesuffered.”110

WhilethiswascertainlytrueoftheCode civilfortimeimmemorial,111inQuebec, it isnow reinforcedby the symbiotic relationshipbetween theCCQ,which houses the catch-all civil liability provision 1457 CCQ, and the QuebecCharter of Rights,112 which applies to private individuals and requires thatevery law conform to its first thirty-eight sections in the absence of expressderogation.113Theextra-patrimonialpersonalityrighttobothprivacyanddignityarethushousedbothintheCivilCodeofQuebecandintheQuebecCharter of Rights,therebyreinforcingthebearingofpersonalityrightsoncivilliability.114.

*4. COMPARING APPROACHES: DRAWING ON COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

liTTle doubT SubSiSTS aS To TorT law’S need To adjuST and respond to theimperatives of technological change.115 While this is generally the case, it is

110. Caron,“LeCodecivile,”supranote101(author’stranslation).Seealso,LouisBaudouin,“Lapersonnehumaineaucentredudroitquébécois,”(1966)26Revue du Barreau de la province de Québec 66–126.Seealso,LeBel,“LaProtectiondesDroits,”supranote24;LouisPerret,De l’impact de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne sur le droit civil des contrats et de responsabilité au Québec(1981)12:1Revue Generale de droit121–171.

111. Succinctly,theCCQ’sPreliminaryProvisiondefinesthe“droitcommun”(Quebec’scorpusofprivatelaw)astheCivilcode(CCQ)inharmonywiththeQuebec Charter.AccordingtoCraig,“[p]rivacyprotectionisflourishingincivil-lawsystems,andmuchcanbelearnedindevelopingaCanadiancommon-lawposition,”Craig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6atp.358.

112. Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms,supra note97.EachprovinceoftheCanadianfederationfeaturesitsownprovinciallegalsystem.QuebecboastsitsownConstitution,the Quebec Charter,whichhasconstitutionalstatusinthatprovinceandappliesequallytoprivateaction(unliketheCanadianCharter of Rights and FreedomsandtheUSConstitution).SeeReiter,“PersonalityandPatrimony,”supra note86atpp.695–696.

113. QuebecCharter of Rights and Freedoms,supra note97,s.52.114. Forourpurposes,section5oftheQuebec Charterexplicitlyrecognizeseveryperson’srighttorespectfor

herprivatelife.Specifically,section5states“everypersonhasarighttorespectforhisprivatelife.”Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms,supranote97.Theprovision,thecourtshaveheld,istobegenerouslyconstrued.Seetheleadingcases,Godbout v Longueuil,supranote14;andAubry v Éditions,supranote29.Seealso,Reiter,“PersonalityandPatrimony,”supranote86,atp.697,whereReiterdealswiththematteringreaterdepth:“theQuebecChartercontainedanumberofotherprovisionsrelevantfortheprotectionofprivacy,suchassection7ontheinviolabilityofthehome,section8ontherespectforprivateproperty,andsection9onvariousaspectsoftherighttosecrecy.”Seealso,Lebel,“LaProtectiondesDroits,”supranote24atp.245.AsJusticeLebelexplains:

wecanobservethattheCCQnowincorporatesanumberofverygeneralprinciplesthatalsorecognizefundamentalrightsattachingtojuridicalpersonalityandfacilitatingtheirapplication.Inthisvein,wecaneasilythinkoftheCode’srecognitionoftherighttophysicalintegrityatarticle10ortherighttoreputationandprivacy, forexample,atarticle35.TheseprovisionsreiterateorspecifythefundamentalrightsenshrinedintheQuebecCharter.

Lebel,“LaProtectiondesDroits,”supranote24atp.245(author’stranslation).RelevantcaselawinQuebecdiscussingtheharmonybetweentheCodeandCharterisBéliveau St-Jacques v Fédération des employés et employées de services publics inc.,<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1996/1996rcs2-345/1996rcs2-345.html>,1996:2Supreme Court Reports345;Québec (Curateur public) v Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital St-Ferdinand,supra note32;Augustus v Gosset,<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1996/1996rcs3-268/1996rcs3-268.html>,1996:3Supreme Court Reports268;Aubry v Éditions,supranote29.

115. WarrenandBrandeis,“RighttoPrivacy,”supranote1atpp.195–196,prescientlyidentified“moderntechnology”asachiefsourceofprivacyintrusion.


particularlytruewithrespecttocommonlawprivacytorts.116 Inmostcommonlaw jurisdictions, as this article sought to highlight, a pigeonhole approachpredicatedonexpectationsand“aloneness”endures.Thisapproachpersistsina world where reasonableness of intrusions has taken on new meaning andspatiallimitsonseclusionarerapidlywitheringaway.Rampantspam,repeatedcallsfromtelemarketers,ofteninadvertentpublichumiliationondatingwebsites,sale of customer data and misappropriation of personality have no doubtdesensitizedusbyattritiontowhatconstitutesareasonableintrusioninto“theseclusion”ofanother.

Inemphasizingthecommonlaw’sstruggleforpreciouslegitimacyintheeyesofthecommunity,GrahamMayedacitesJusticeIacobbuciinR. v Salituro,117acasewheretheSupremeCourtofCanada“consideredthedynamic,changeablenatureofthecommonlawandthewayinwhichthelawevolves.”118AccordingtoIacobbuciJ,“thecourtshouldmakeincrementalchangestothecommonlawtobringlegalrulesintostepwithachangingsociety.”119Insodoing,thispaperinvitescommonlawcourtsto“weighandconsiderthesolutionsofcompetingandneighbouringsystemsoflaw.”120

Ineffect,whilemorepublicizedinthepubliclawcontext,themigrationoflegalprinciplesandthecomparativeperspective—supplementedbyahistoricaloverview—canplayavaluableroleintheefforttoachievethisobjectiveinrespectofprivacytort.Asthisarticleendeavoredtoillustrate,acomparativeexaminationofneighbouring legaltraditions isofparticular interesttotheprivacytort—anareathatmightbenefitfromcogentevolution.

Byproposingcomparativeanalysisofprivacyincivilliability/tort,focusingon the underlying rationale animating the civil law tradition, with particularemphasisonQuebecandalsoFrance,thisarticleundertooktoshinethelightofcomparativeanalysisonthedilemmasofthecommonlawtort,facedbymanyjurisdictionsgiventheonslaughtonprivacy.Plainlyput,exposuretothecivilianexperiencecanhelpinformthecoherentevolutionoftortlawacrossthecommonlawworld.Morespecificallyforourpurposes,bijuridicalresearchsuchasthisisofferedtostimulatereflectiononthemeritandproprietyofcertaincommonlawdogmasthatmaybegtoberethought.121

116. Torthascometoplayanincreasinglyimportantroleinaddressingmoderninjusticeasgovernmentmaynolongerbetheprincipalrightsviolator.AsMacdonaldexplains,“inourday,themostgrievousandmostfrequentabusesofcivillibertiesoccurintheexerciseofprivatepower.Theoccasionsfordiscriminatorystateactionarebothcomparativelyfewandsubjecttorelativelyformalizedproceduresfortheirexercisewhencontrastedwithanemployer’spowertodismiss,alandlord’spowertoexcludetheneedy,oranentrepreneur’srefusaltoprovideservice.”SeeRoderickAMacdonald,“PostscriptandPrelude—theJurisprudenceoftheCharter:EightTheses,”(1982)Supreme Court Review321atp.347,citedinFrancesRaday,“PrivatisingHumanRightsandtheAbuseofPower,”(2000)13:1Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence103–136.Thus,theprivatizingofhumanrightscommandsrespectfortheirhumanrights,inRaday’swords,“notonlyasagainstthepowerofthestatebutalsointheirdealingswithoneanother”atp.103FrancesRaday,“PrivatisingHumanRightsandtheAbuseofPower,”(2000)13:1Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence103–136at103.

117. R v Salituro,<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1991/1991rcs3-654/1991rcs3-654.html>,1991:3Supreme Court Reports654.

118. GrahamMayeda,“UncommonlyCommon:TheNatureofCommonLawJudgment,”(2006)19:1Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence107–131atp.127.

119. GrahamMayeda,“UncommonlyCommon:TheNatureofCommonLawJudgment,”supranote118atp.127.120. AlfredMordechaiRabello,“TowardtheCodificationofIsraeliPrivateLaw,”inAlfredEKellermann,Kurt

Siehr,andTaliaEinhorn,eds.,Israel Among the Nations(Kluwer,1998)atp.307.121. QuestionsremainastowhetherthecivilianapproachcanlenditselftoahighlyindividualisticAmerican

culture.Ofcoursetheseideologicaldifferencesbetweenthepigeonholedlibertarianandtheprincipleddignityapproachestoprivacyreflectaprofounddifferenceinrespectivejuridicalcultures.


Thecivil law tradition’sconstructionofprivacy rightshasbeenbroad.Removed from the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, civilian jurisdictions’principledapproachtocivilliabilityisbetterabletoprotectindividualprivacy122in intangible spaces (such as cyberspace), regarding certain dignity-basedpersonalityrightsasinalienable.Humanbeingsenjoypersonalityrightssuchasprivacyinprivatelawbyreasonoftheirverypersonhood,regardlessofexpressstatutory or jurisprudential intervention or spatial or proprietary constraints.This is of great interest as a flexible (judicial) interpretation of tort best lendsitselftotheprotectionofprivacyinaneraofconstanttechnologicalandsocialchange. This is unlike the legislative response, which tends to be somewhatawkwardinthisrespect.Statutoryamendment(enshriningprivacyrights)canbeatedious,inflexibleprocess,whichhasdifficultykeepingupwithtoday’srapidlyevolvingrelationshipsandtheimperativesofmodernity.Inaddition,legislationonce passed, while addressing the issues of the day, may inadvertently omitproblems arising from new discoveries, unbeknownst to its framers.123 Hence,althoughsomecommonlawjurisdictionshavechosentoexplicitlyprotectprivacystatutorily,124 thecommon law’ssluggishevolutionrespectingprivacy tortshasgeneratedbothuncertaintyand lackofuniformity.125Thispiecemealapproachmay prove ill-suited to addressing the multiplicity of privacy issues raised byincreasingtraceabilityanddecreasinganonymity.

Thecivillaw’sconceptionofprivacyasapersonalityrightandthemannerinwhichthatimpingeson“tort”law(orcivilliability)appearstobecommensuratewithprivacymanagementinanageofrapidtechnologicaladvances.Theprivacytort’s coherent development away from the narrow “right to be left alone,”inhibited by connotations of both physical space and proprietorship, may beinformedbycomparativeinquiry.126Redefiningprivacytofocusonthesubjectiveaffective/psychological impact (i.e. tranquility) rather thanspatial limitsalone127bettercomportswiththe“simple idea”ofcorrective justice,accordingtowhich

122. ColinBennett,Regulating Privacy Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States(CornellUniversityPress,1992).“Inthiswork,Bennetdiscusseshowenforcementofprivacylawprinciplesvariesconsiderablyandisafunctionofculture.Seealso,JonBing,“AComparativeOutlineofPrivacyLegislation,”(1978)2Comparative Law Yearbook149–181;StevenBellman,EricJJohnson,StephenJKobrin,andGeraldLLohse,“RegionalDifferencesinPrivacyPreferences:ImplicationsfortheGlobalizationofElectronicCommerce,”GraduateSchoolofManagement,UniversityofWesternAustralia,WorkingPaperSeries.

123. SeeCraig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6,foradetaileddescriptionofthenormativeframeworkinplaceinvariousUS,Canadian,andEuropeancommonlawjurisdictions.

124. AsMakdisiwarns,“commentatorsworrythatcurrentstatutorysafeguardsareinadequatetoprotectprivacy.”Hercritiqueisvoicedinthecontextofgeneticinformation(forexample,sheobservesthattheUSPrivacy Actof1974seekstoprotectprivacygenerallyanddoesnotspecificallyprovidefortheprotectionofgeneticprivacy).JuneMaryZMakdisi,“GeneticPrivacy,”supranote104atp.975.SeealsoPatriciaICarter,“HealthInformationPrivacy:CanCongressProtectConfidentialMedicalInformationinthe‘InformationAge’?”(1999)25:1William Mitchell Law Review223–286atpp.226and228.

125. Thus,forinstance,thecurrentlackofcoherenceinthecommonlawworldhaspromptedfourCanadianprovincestoresorttolegislationtocreateaprivacytort,therebyacceleratingtheprocessofitsrecognition.SeetheprivacyactsofBritishColumbia,Manitoba,Newfoundland,andSaskatchewan,supra note6.

126. SeeCraig,“InvasionofPrivacy,”supranote6atp.378:“IntheUnitedStates,privacywaslinkedinPavesichtotheconstitutionalguaranteeoflibertyandtoFourthAmendmentprotectionagainststateintrusionsintoprivaterealmssuchasthehome.InGermany,privacywaslinkedinSchachttotheconstitutionalprotectionofhumandignityandpersonality.”

127. OnlyinasfarasAmericanculturepermits.AsIsraeliSupremeCourtPresidentBarakexplained:“Comparativeanalysisispossibleonlyifthetwolegalsystemsshareacommonideologicalbasis[….]Acommonbasisofdemocracyis,however,anecessarybutinsufficientconditionforcomparativeanalysis.Asjudges,wemustalsoexaminewhetherthereisanythinginthehistoricaldevelopmentandsocialconditionsthatmakethelocalandtheforeignsystemdifferentenoughtorenderinterpretiveinspirationimpracticable.”AharonBarak,“AJudgeonJudging:TheRoleoftheSupremeCourtinaDemocracy”(2002)116:1Harvard Law Review19–162atp.113.


“thepointofatortactionistoundotheinjusticethatthedefendanthasdonetotheplaintiff.”128

Comparativeanalysis,asPresidentAharonBarakof Israelobserves, isan“importantsourceofinspiration,onethatenricheslegalthinking,makeslawmorecreative,andstrengthensthedemocratictiesandfoundationsofdifferentlegalsystems.”129Whereascourtsinmanycommonlawjurisdictions,particularlyintheUS,haveyettomakefulluseofsuchinquiry,130theprecedingaperçuintothecivilianlegalmethod’suseofpersonalityrights in“tort”istenderedinthehopesthatitmightservetodojustthat.131

128. ErnestWeinrib,“Correlativity,PersonalityandtheEmergingConsensusonCorrectiveJustice,”(2001)2:1Theoretical Inquiries in Law107–159atp.108.

129. Barak,“JudgeonJudging,”supranote127atp.114.130. Barak,“JudgeonJudging,”supranote127atp.114,citingUSSupremeCourtJusticeStephenBreyer.131. Barak,“JudgeonJudging,”supranote127atp.114.

Can the Reasonable Person Still be “Highly Offended”? An Invitation ...

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