Cameroon Democratic Transition and Human Rights_article_ Dicklitch

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Human Rights Quarterly24 (2002) 152176 2002 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

Failed Democratic Transitionin Cameroon:A Human Rights Explanation1

Susan Dicklitch*

I. INTRODUCTION

Respect for human rights in Africa is more often the exception than the rule.Some African leaders claim cultural relativism in defending the withholdingof fundamental human rights to women, other leaders claim the need torepress individual human rights and freedoms to preserve stability andeconomic growth for the whole country. Yet others claim that calls forminority language and cultural rights simply promote sectarianism andtreasonous secessionist movements. Whatever the particular case, the rightsand freedoms of individual Africans have often been sacrificed at the altar ofculture, economic growth, political stability, and national unity.

Much of the recent literature on Africa focuses on the prospects fordemocratic transition and the role of civil society in bringing about atransition to and ultimate consolidation of democracy.2 But few African

* Susan Dicklitch is Assistant Professor of Government at Franklin and Marshall College inLancaster, PA. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto. She is also the author ofTheElusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda (1998).1. I would like to thank Christa E. Frank for the excellent research she conducted. Christa

also helped write the section on colonial legacies. This research would not have beenpossible without a grant from Franklin and Marshall College and the Hackman scholarsprogram.

2. See, e.g., MICHAEL BRATTON & NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTSIN AFRICA: REGIMETRANSITIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1997); Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: CivilSociety and Associational Life in Africa, 41 WORLD POLITICS 407 (1989); POLITICAL REFORMIN

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA (John C. Clark & David Gardinier eds., 1997); Rene Lemarchand,Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality, 30 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.177 (1992); AFRICAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY (Mahmood Mamdani &Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba eds., 1995); Celestin Monga, Civil Society and Democrati-zation in Francophone Africa, 33 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 359 (1995); JULIE FISHER, NON


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2002 Failed Democratic Transition in Cameroon 153

countries have achieved a genuine democratic transition3 or consolidation4

beyond a mere adoption of multiparty politics. I argue that this is becausefew African societies are rights-respective societies, and few African regimes

are rights-protective regimes. The focus should not simply be on what typeof democracy exists (whether liberal, social, no-party/one-party) but rather,the foundation upon which it is laid. In other words, too much scholarshipfocuses on the institutions necessary for democracy, but not enoughexamines the level ofhuman rights culture or rights-respective culture thatis a necessary foundation for democracy.5

Ironically, it comes as some surprise to analysts that once stable,relatively economically developed, and so-called democratic countrieslike Cote dIvoire or Zimbabwe can quickly degenerate into authoritarian

and human rights abusive regimes and societies. Cameroon is a similarcountry, in that it has been a relative paragon of stability and economicgrowth (at least until the mid-1980s) in Africa. But Cameroons politicalstability has been artificially based on the suppression of political participa-tion. Cameroon lacks both a rights-respective society and a rights-protectiveregime, yet, it is formally considered a multiparty democracy. I argue, in thecase of Cameroon, that the lack of a rights-respective society and a rights-protective regime not only undermines the prospects for democraticconsolidation, but also heightens the potential for future violence and

chaos. When formal mechanisms of democracy are grafted onto a politicaland social system that lacks a rights-respective culture, competition breedsviolence and chaos, not democratic progress.

Unfortunately, too many donor countries are satisfied with the mereformal display of democracy, ignoring issues of substantive democracy andhuman rights abuses. It is important to note that economic and politicalrights are fundamentally intertwined. Civil and political liberties, for

GOVERNMENTS: NGOS AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD (1998); CELESTINMONGA, THE ANTHROPOLOGYOF ANGER: CIVIL SOCIETYAND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (1996).3. In their seminal work, Diamond et al. argue that a transition to democracy is

completed only when the freely elected government has full authority to generate newpolicies, and thus when the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by thenew democracy are not constrained or compelled by law to share power with otheractors, such as the military. LARRY DIAMOND, MARC F. PLATTNER, YUN-HAN CHU & HUNG-MAOTIEN, CONSOLIDATINGTHE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES: THEMESAND PERSPECTIVES xix (1997).

4. A consolidation of democracy is brought about by, a number of institutional, policy,and behavioral changes. Many of these improve governance directly by strengtheningstate capacity; liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures, securing social andpolitical order while maintaining basic freedoms; improving horizontal accountability

and the rule of law; and controlling corruption.Id. at xviii.5. Even the UN and African Charters of Rights fail to argue that political rights can beguaranteed only within a competitive, multiparty framework. From a human rightsperspective, it is thus genuine political participation that is key, not political competi-tion. SeeRHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTSIN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 133 (1986).


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Vol. 24154 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

example, are sometimes violated because of a lack of economic rights.Instead of narrowly approaching the issue of democracy by focusing onpolitical democracy alone, a human rights approach takes into account

both the political and economic aspects of democracy and thus gives us afuller appreciation of the factors necessary for a successful transition to andconsolidation of democracy.

This article will first examine the theoretical importance of developinga rights-respective society and a concomitant rights-protective regime, andthen apply it to the case study of Cameroon, to explain the lack ofdemocratic development there, and the prospect for future violence andchaos.

II. DEFINING A RIGHTS-RESPECTIVE SOCIETY ANDRIGHTS-PROTECTIVE REGIME

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 human rights arerights that one is entitled to simply because one is a human being. Theserights apply universally to all people, at all times, and under any circum-stances. Human dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all peopleare fundamental for freedom and justice. A rights-respective society would

embody these fundamental values and civil/political, social, economic, andcultural rights as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights7 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights.8 Although regimes are often the worst violators of humanrights, human rights also protect people against society. Human rights giveindividuals the right to conduct their lives as they see fit, even when theirchoices challenge societal or community norms.9 A rights-respective

6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess. (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in43 AM. J. INTL L. SUPP. 127 (1949).

7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (entered into force23 Mar. 1976for all provisions except those of Article 41; 28 Mar. 1978 for the provisions of Article41), available at (visited 18 Nov.2001) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Current signature, ratification, and reservation status isavailable at (visited 18 Nov. 2001).

8. International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted16 Dec. 1966,

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force3 Jan. 1976), available at (visited 18 Nov. 2001) [hereinafterICESR]. Current signature and ratification status is available at (visited 18 Nov. 2001).

9. RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTSANDTHE SEARCHFOR COMMUNITY 8 (1995).


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society would thus help ensure that citizens must treat each other withconcern and respect.10 This interpretation is based on the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and the international covenants on human

rights that state that: All human beings are born free and equal in dignityand rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should acttoward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.11

A rights-respective society not only is a watchdog of the regime, butalso of itself. A rights-respective society does not develop overnight, nor canit be destroyed overnight.

Intricate to the existence of any rights-respective society is the develop-ment of a civil society, a fundamental respect for human dignity anddifference, and a rights-protective regime that ensures the securement of

basic rights (security, subsistence, and liberty) and the rule of law. In short,there are differing degrees of rights-respective societies and regimes, butultimately, a minimal level of respect for the basic rights of others (eitherethnically, religiously, economically, linguistically, racially, or sexually)must be maintained so that all can live a life of dignity and freedom.

III. THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CAMEROON

Cameroon is far from a rights-protective regime. There have been across-the-board violations of civil/political, social, economic, and cultural rights.This situation does not seem likely to improve in the near future.

A. Civil Liberties and Political Rights Violations

Within the International Covenant on Civil Liberties and Political Rights(1966),12 civil liberties include the right to life, the right not to be tortured or

taken into slavery, the right to liberty, the security of the person, and theright to due process (including protections against arbitrary arrest). Politicalrights, according to the International Covenant on Civil Liberties andPolitical Rights13 include the right to freedom of thought,14 expression,15

10. Id. at 17.

11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6.12. ICCPR, supra note 7.13. Id.14. Id. art. 18.15. Id. art. 19.


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peaceful assembly,16 association,17 and the right to take part in the conductof public affairs18 including genuine periodic elections.19

Political rights and civil liberties are crucial for democracy. As Rhoda

Howard argues, the centralization of power into the hands of a ruling classcannot be challenged by ordinary peasants, workers, women, or ethnicminorities unless they have the right to freedom of expression andassociation and can present their views in an organized manner.20

The human rights record of the Cameroonian government from a civil/political rights standpoint has been miserable at best.21 Complaints ofmilitary and police brutality are widespread. Torture and illegal detentionare frequent, while extra-judicial executions are still evident, especially inthe Far North Province.22 Since March 1998, some 700 people have been

extra-judicially executed by the brigade anti-gang, a joint unit of the armyand gendarmerie in the Far North Province.23 The security forces havecontinued to brutalize the public with the brandishing of automaticweapons, bribery and the resurgence of kale kale,24 especially in theAnglophone provinces.

16. Id. art. 21.17. Id. art. 22.18. Id. art. 25.

19. Id. art. 25(b).20. HOWARD, supra note 5, at 119.21. Freedom House gave Cameroon a rating of 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties

with an overall Not Free rating. A 7 is the worst score on civil liberties and politicalrights, with a 1 as the highest score. See Freedom in the World (2000), available at (visited 12 Oct.2001).

22. The police forces also seem to be rounding up suspected Anglophone secessionistsympathizers in the southwest and northwest provinces. For example, police arrestedabout 100 people in various bars and nightclubs in Kumba (SWP) because they weresuspected of being SCNC members. Cameroon: About 100 Secessionists ReportedlyArrested in Anglophone Southwest(Radio France Internationale, 25 Apr. 2000).

23. This brigade anti-gang unit was set up to end the attacks by armed robbers, known ascoupeurs de route who operated mostly in the Far North region. See AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2000: CAMEROON (2000) [hereinafter AI CAMEROON REPORT].

24. Kale kaleis a term used to describe security force actions in which security forces swoopinto villages or troubled suburbs in early morning raids, allegedly to apprehend thieves.Kale kale, however, also serves to intimidate innocent civilians who are often forced outof their homes and ordered to sit in the mud while the security forces pillage, loot andbrutalize the local population. The author had the unfortunate opportunity to witness akale kale operation that was wrapping up in Mutengene in the Southwest Province.People of all ages were walking around, sitting in the mud and generally looking dazedand confused, while swarms of gendarmes, police, and military personnel rounded upsuspected thieves, and supposed opposition members. SeeGendarmes raid Ndop to

Recover Missing Gun, THE CAMEROON POST, 26 May 2000, where it was reported thatgendarmes made massive and indiscriminate arrests to recover a gun seized on 19 May.Angry civilians apparently seized the gun when gendarmes invaded homes and beat upoccupants on allegations that they were planning to boycott the 20 May manifestations(reunification celebrations) as advocated by the SCNC.


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The 1999 United Nations Special Rapporteur delivered a damningreport on widespread torture in Cameroon.25 Detention centers are usuallyovercrowded with inadequate sanitary and medical facilities as well as

insufficient food.26

Many accused of crimes in the Anglophone provinceswere jettisoned to prisons in Yaounde or Douala, and tried in Francophoneprovinces.27 In Yaounde, there are approximately 400 beds for 2700prisoners.28 Bruises from machetes and lashes indicate that those incarcer-ated have been tortured, even though Cameroon recently criminalizedtorture. This persistence of torture in the prison system reveals an inad-equate and corrupt system in which the law is flagrantly violated. Eventhough public officials have admitted to the Rapporteur that they need tocreate a human rights culture among the public and the forces of law and

order, little has changed.29

The accused often do not have a right to anattorney or even to compensation for damages suffered.30 To compoundthese problems, there is no independent authority to conduct inquiries intooffenses committed by members of the forces of law and order.31 In effect,there is little control over the police or the gendarmes, so human rightsviolations continue largely unabated.

Traditional rulers have also committed many serious human rightsabuses with absolute impunity throughout Cameroon, but especially in theNorth and Extreme North provinces. Many of these traditional rulers are

members of the CPDM (Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement) andsupport President Biya.32 They have often used their powers to pressure theirsubjects to vote for the CPDM.33 Some traditional leaders have instilled fear

25. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS (UNCHR), CIVILAND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDINGQUESTIONSOF TORTUREAND DETENTION, REPORTOFTHE SPECIAL RAPPORTEURTO CAMEROON 4 (1999)[hereinafter UNCHR REPORT].

26. Id.27. For example, Justice Ebong, a respected Anglophone judge who was involved in the 31

January 1999 proclamation of Independence of the Southern Cameroons on RadioBuea, was taken to Yaounde, held incommunicado with no formal charges, eventhough his alleged crime was committed in the Anglophone Southwest province.

28. UNCHR REPORT, supra note 25, at 13.29. Id. at 8.30. Id. at 24.31. Id. at 23.32. For example, the Fon of Bali, Northwest Province (a traditional ruler) ordered the

killings of three men from the semi-nomadic pastoral Mbororo community over a stolencattle dispute. An official investigation was launched and an arrest warrant issuedagainst the Fon, but he was not arrested, nor was any further action taken. U.S. DEPT. OFSTATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2000, at 43 (2000) [hereinafter

COUNTRY REPORTS 2000].33. For example, the Lamido of Gashiga village in Demra, North Province, reportedlyforced his inhabitants to vote for the CPDM on 12 October. SeeForceful Voting, THEHERALD (Cameroon), 2021 Oct. 1997, at 5. The Fon of Bafut, Abumbi II advised hispeople to vote CPDM, because such a vote will attract enormous development in our


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in the general population, and have been the instigators of arbitrarydetention and ill treatment.34

The press is also severely restricted; journalists are detained, harassed

and sometimes tortured. Press censorship is severe and self-censorship onthe increase. Papers are routinely banned, and since 1995, many journalistshave been arrested and detained without charge or subjected to attacks.35

Overall, the Cameroon regime has significantly repressed the civil andpolitical liberties of its citizens.

B. Economic Rights

There are three basic economic rights: physical subsistence (food), access tohealth care, and education. The economic rights of Cameroonians have notfared well. In fact, they have worsened since the onset of the economiccrisis commonly referred to as la crise. This crisis developed during andafter the period of civil disobedience known as operation Villes Mortes(Ghost Town) and the governments often violent response to it. Opponentsof Paul Biyas regime called for a general strike in June 1991 that lasted untilJanuary 1992, in an attempt to immobilize the economy by shutting downevery city and town in Cameroon from Monday through Friday.36 The

Cameroon economy experienced a decline in gross domestic product(GDP) as outlined below and a significant reduction in the states revenuebase.37

Cameroon has traditionally had a politically and economically stablesystem. From 1961 to the mid- 1980s, Cameroon had a strong economy. Asa low-income developing country, Cameroons economic indicators are notterrible, but what is significant is that the economic conditions areworsening. Structural adjustment programs introduced in 1989 and 1990and CFA devaluations, as well as a rising level of corruption throughout

area and I want to congratulate all those who came out to exercise their civic rights.See alsoBafut Fon Calls for Peaceful Coexistence Between CPDM and Opposition, THEHERALD, 2728 Oct. 1997, at 2.

34. UNCHR REPORT, supra note 25.35. Each publisher must submit a copy of his publication to the administrative authority

prior to circulation. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTSON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICESFOR1998, at 44 (1998).

36. See Jean-Germain Gros, The Hard Lessons of Cameroon, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 5, 118(1995); Piet Konigs and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon,35 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 215, n.28 (1997).

37. SeeMilton Krieger, Cameroons Democratic Crossroads, 19904, 32 J. OF MOD. AFR.STUD. 624 (1994).


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society, have contributed to more difficult economic conditions for averageCameroonians.38

Cameroons gross national product (GNP) per capita annual growth rate

fell substantially in the 1990s. From 1975 to 1990, the GNP per capitagrowth rate was 2.5 percent, but fell to 2.2 percent from 1990 to 1998.39

Available economic data from 1975 to 1998 shows that the economyexperienced significant growth from 1980 to 1985, but that growth declinedfrom 1985 to 1998. The GNP per capita overall did not fare well either, asindicated below.

GNP per capita (1995 US$)40

YEAR GNP per capita

1975 $6161980 $7301985 $9901990 $7641998 $646

The decline continued in 1999, with the GNP per capita a mere $588.41

The daily per capita supply of calories also fell, from 2,301 in 1970 to2,111 in 1997, below the required amount for adequate nutrition.42 Given

these trends, it seems as though the population below the national povertyline most likely increased from the available 1984 figure of 40 percent.43

The disparities between the rich and poor are striking with extreme povertyin the North and Extreme North provinces and an abundance of MercedesBenzes between Yaounde and Douala. Meanwhile, total external debtincreased from US$ 6.68 billion in 1990 to US $9.83 billion in 1998.44

Overall, the economic rights of Cameroonian individuals are eroding withcorruption and economic recession eating into their overall entitlement.

38. For example, hotel workers had not been paid in over six months at one of the hotels Istayed at in Limbe, Cameroon in June 2000. Finally, the workers went on strike anddemanded to be paid immediately. The owner was quite reticent and claimed that hedid not have the money to pay them. He called in the police and gendarmes. If theworkers were paid, they certainly did not receive any interest on the money that theywere owed for over six months.

39. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, tbl. 13,at 204 (2000) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT].

40. Id. tbl. 8, at 180; WORLD BANK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 20002001, tbl. 1, at 274

(2000) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT].41. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 40.42. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, supra note 39, tbl. 23, at 239.43. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, supra note 40, tbl. 4, at 236.44. Id. tbl. 21, at 314.


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C. Communal/Group or Social Rights and the Minority Rights Problem

A communal group can be defined as any group based on the shared

ethnicity, origin, religion, or language of its members.45

In a country likeCameroon, with over 250 ethnic groups, a discussion about group orcommunal rights seems appropriate. Given the linguistic divide betweenthe majority Francophones and the minority Anglophones, such a discus-sion is not only appropriate, but extremely necessary. The Francophone-Anglophone division has proven to be one of the most divisive factors inCameroonian politics. At times called les nemies dans la maison (theenemies in the house) because of their perceived dedication to thedismemberment of the nation, the Anglophones have suffered from an

economic, political, and cultural marginalization in the Republic ofCameroon.46 This marginalization has helped to create rising disaffectionamong the Anglophone minority, and spurred the growth of the SouthernCameroons National Council (SCNC), and its affiliated Southern CameroonsYouth Council (SCYC) which advocates secession from FrancophoneCameroon. Issues of self-determination thus become juxtaposed withminority human rights issues.

Anglophones feel like second-class citizens, exploited, mar-ginalized and assimilated by the Francophone-dominated state and

Francophone population.47

Anglophones feel that their resources (oil, cashcrops) are exploited for the rest of Cameroon (especially in the SouthwestProvince) with little benefit. They have unequal access to education(because of French language deficiencies) and thus to high-paying jobs.Anglophones have also been marginalized in high-ranking appointments toparastatal organizations and government positions, as well as in the military,with only three Anglophones among 2000 new armed forces recruits.48

The Republic of Cameroon has also resorted to more severe humanrights repression to quell Anglophone dissent. The government has re-

45. HOWARD, supra note 5, at 91.46. SeeJoseph Takougang, 1992 Multiparty Elections in Cameroon: Prospects for Democ-

racy and Democratization, 31 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 52 (1996); Dickson Eyoh, ConflictingNarratives of Anglophone Protest and the Politics of Identity in Cameroon, 16 J.CONTEMPORARY AFR. STUD. 249 (1998); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Reconciling the Dual Heritage:Reflections on the Kamerun Idea, in AN AFRICAN EXPERIMENTIN NATION-BUILDING: THE BILINGUALCAMEROON REPUBLIC SINCE REUNIFICATION (Ndiva Kofele-Kale ed., 1981).

47. Konigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 207.48. In the Cameroonian English newspaper, The Herald, Anglophones sent a bitter petition

to President Biya denouncing the marginalisation of Anglophones and tribalism in thearmy. In particular, the argument was made that junior and less qualified Beti soldierswere often promoted while more qualified Anglophones were simply sidelined anddiscriminated against. See Anglophone Soldiers Petition Biya over Discrimination inArmy, HERALD, 47 July 1997.


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sponded to the rise of the secessionist SCNC with torture and violent tacticsin an attempt to suppress their freedom of expression.49 Overall, Camerooniansociety suffers from torture, especially in the Anglophone provinces, and

widespread extrajudicial murders, especially in the Extreme North prov-ince.50 Anglophones also suffer from economic, political, and culturalmarginalization. Psychological torture is ubiquitous, while the rule of lawremains far from secure.

IV. ACCOUNTING FOR THE LACK OF A RIGHTS-PROTECTIVE REGIMEAND A RIGHTS-RESPECTIVE SOCIETY IN CAMEROON

A rights-repressive regime did not develop overnight in Cameroon. Struc-tural and historical factors must be examined in order to understand both theorigin and perpetuation of human rights abuses in Cameroon. Thus, four keyfactors will be examined, including colonial legacies, the centralization andpersonalization of power, ubiquitous corruption, and external intervention.

A. Colonial Legacies

Authoritarian colonial policies and the authoritarian political culture thatevolved during the colonial and post-colonial period under PresidentAhidjo and President Biya contributed to the development of a rights-repressive regime. Cameroon was a unique African colony in the sense thatit had three former rulers: Germany, France, and Britain. Germany ruledCameroon from 1884 until it was defeated in World War I. German rule hasbeen described as featuring economic development and modest prosperity,though accompanied by much brutality and harshness.51 A League ofNations mandate divided post-German-rule Cameroon between the French

and the British. The new French and British rulers divided Cameroon intotwo sections: the former taking 4/5ths and the latter taking 1/5th of the

49. In March 1997, approximately fifty-seven people were arrested after they weresuspected of terrorism. The government blamed the attacks on administrative andsecurity officials on the SCNC. Many of the people arrested were tortured, bothphysically and emotionally. Some were forced to rape married women and walkbarefoot on glass bottles while others were beaten and starved. Many have died becauseof the torture, several are still serving their sentences, while others have been released.

The trial was widely regarded as a charade and a travesty of justice. Even the chargesthat were brought against the detainees were read in French even though the detainedwere mostly Anglophones. UNCHR REPORT, supra note 25.

50. AI CAMEROON REPORT, supra note 23.51. TAMBI EYONGETAH MBUAGBAW et al., A HISTORYOFTHE CAMEROON 63 (1987).


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country.52 It is this separation which has divided Cameroon geographically,culturally, socially, politically, and psychologically. The two colonizersruled Cameroon very differently: the British practiced indirect rule and

instituted British common law, while the French centralized rule andpracticed French civil law with the ultimate goal of assimilating theCameroonians into French culture.53 For nearly half a century, Britain andFrance inculcated quite contrasting political and legal systems into theirrespective territories.

The British divided their territory into two regions: British NorthernCameroons and Southern Cameroons. Much of the governing was done inconjunction with neighboring Nigeria. This was much more efficient forGreat Britain. British Northern Cameroons was under the administration of

Northern Nigeria and maintained very little contact with Southern Cameroons,largely because of poor infrastructure.54 Southern Cameroons was under theauthority of the Eastern region of Nigeria. In 1922, the League of Nationsaccepted this arrangement and France and Great Britain ruled theirrespective areas as Class B mandates.55 World War II, the elimination of theLeague of Nations, and the rise of the UN completely changed the nature ofcolonial rule. British Cameroons became a UN Trust Territory in 1946. Theultimate end of the trusteeship was self-government or independence.56

Until that point was reached, the UN was to be involved in the political and

economic inner workings of the colony. French Cameroon achievedindependence in 1960 and established itself as a self-governing entity, albeitmaintaining strong ties with its former colonial power, France.

The British Cameroons were governed as an extension of Nigeria withBritish Northern Cameroons part of Northern Nigeria and British SouthernCameroons as part of Eastern Nigeria. Ultimately, British Northern Cameroonsjoined Nigeria, since there was a greater cultural tie between the tworegions. However, Southern Cameroons never really belonged anywhere.They fought for years to be recognized as a separate region in Nigeria.

When Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain on October 1, 1960,

52. See id. at 79.53. Id. at 9193.54. Nicodemus Fru Awasom, Colonial Background to the Development of Autonomist

Tendencies, 15 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 163, 166 (1998).55. As such, France and Great Britain were responsible for peace and good governance. In

addition, they had, full powers of administration and legislation in the area, subject to

the mandate. France and Great Britain were thus under no obligation to prepare theirrespective territories for self-government. See Victor Julius Ngoh, The Origin of theMarginalization of former Southern Cameroonians (Anglophones), 16 J. THIRD WORLDSTUD. 3 (1990).

56. MBUAGBAW et al., supra note 51, at 99101.


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Southern Cameroons continued to govern itself, no longer a part of theNigerian Federation.57

In 1959, John Ngu Foncha, head of the Kamerun National Democratic

Party (KNDP), won the election over E.M.L. Endeley of the KamerunNational Council (KNC), on a platform which supported secession fromNigeria and reuniting with French Cameroon after independence.58 How-ever, when the Cameroon delegation went to the United Nations later thatyear, it returned with a plebiscite that had only two choices. The first choicewas independence through unification with the Federation of Nigeria, thesecond independence through unification with French Cameroon, with thestipulation that the actual plebiscite would be held no later than March1961.59 Self-government was not an option. Foncha accepted these choices

without the full support of the KNDP. Nevertheless, on 11 February 1961,despite the confusion and complaints about limited choices, SouthernCameroons voted overwhelmingly to join French Cameroon, not Nigeria.60

At the Foumban Constitutional Conference in 1961, the Anglophonedelegates had only several hours to review a constitution which they hadnever seen before. In many areas, Foncha fell short. He did not distributethe constitution earlier, nor did he secure legal assistance or insist on a looseconfederation. The Constitution was subsequently adopted by FrenchCameroon without the vote of the Southern Cameroons House of Assem-

bly.61

The Southern Cameroons in 1961 became part of the new UnitedFederal Republic of Cameroon.Even though Cameroon became a united federal republic, it was far

from a nation; the society did not share common customs, a commonhistory, a common language, or common origins. All it shared was a specificterritory and government.62 Cameroon thus developed as a divided nation-state along linguistic lines, in addition to the religious divisions between theMuslim North and the Christian and animist South. These divisions wereexacerbated by the policies of Cameroons first President, Amadou Ahidjo,

and his successor, Paul Biya.

57. SeeAwasom, supra note 54, at 16870.58. SeeKonigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 21112 & n.11; seealsoMBUAGBAW et al.,

supra note 51, at 11519.59. The plebiscite read: a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the

independent federation of Nigeria, or b) do you wish to achieve independence byjoining the independent Republic of Cameroon? Self-government was not an option.

60. SeeKonigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 212.61. See id. Because of this, many Anglophones argue that the Southern Cameroons are notliving under a legal constitution and that Cameroon needs to pick up where it left offwith the Foumban Constitutional talks.

62. BERNARD A. MUNA, CAMEROONANDTHE CHALLENGESOFTHE 21ST CENTURY 21 (1993).


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B. Centralization and Personalization of Power

President Amadou Ahidjo continued to centralize power in the Federation.

In 1972, Ahidjo abolished the United Federal Republic of Cameroon thatwas put in place after reunification, and in its place established acentralized, unitary state. He divided the country into ten provinceseightFrancophone and two Anglophone (the Northwest and Southwest Prov-inces).63 He claimed that the unitary system was necessary becauseCameroon was such a small country, and therefore could not afford theexpense of maintaining a complex and cumbersome system of threeseparate governments and assemblies.64

Power was increasingly centralized in the hands of the President, while

the position of Vice-President as well as West Cameroons separateAssembly and House of Chiefs were abolished.65 These actions, along witha growing brutal repression of any group in opposition to Ahidjo, furtherconfirmed Anglophone suspicions that they would be marginalized in thisnew system. Ahidjo used force to try to unify two different countries, twodifferent cultures, two different economies.66 The abolition of the federalsystem created the basis for future Anglophone claims of marginalizationand exploitation.

In 1982, Ahidjo hand-picked his successor, Paul Biya. Many had hoped

that Biya would push the country further along the democratic path.Although Cameroon became a multiparty democracy in 1990, this transi-tion, like many other African transitions, was in name only. Biya carved upthe North into three administrative provinces (Adamawa, North, and FarNorth) to undermine the power of the Muslim leaders in the North.67 Biyastarted out with a democratic agenda, but following the bloody 1984 coupattempt, began to centralize and personalize power even more thanAhidjo.68 Beti and Bulu ethnic groups (from Biyas region) began todominate government and parastatal organizations.

Repression was justified in the name of national unity, political andeconomic stability, and the security of the state. Many citizens were willingto forgo their short-term individual liberty for the sake of economicdevelopment and national unity.69 Under President Biya, the National

63. SeeGros, supra note 36, at 11415.64. MBUAGBAW et al., supra note 51, at 132.65. See id. at 13233.66. Id. at 128.

67. See id. at 13940.68. The minister of armed forces, Gilbert Andze Tsoungui (a Beti) alleged that the 1984was 99.9 percent northern-inspired. See Cameroon Coup Attempt: 99.9 PercentNortherners,3479 W. AFR. 865 (1984).

69. MUNA, supra note 62, at 14.


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Assembly became a rubber stamp, and the judiciary became corrupt,inefficient, and far from independent.70 For example, the President is thehead of the Supreme Command of Magistrates and signs promotions,

transfers, and the like. This has helped to undermine the rule of law andpromote the personal/patrimonial rule of Paul Biya. As Gabriel argues,Both Ahidjo and Biya practiced presidentialism, built up an excessiveclientelistic network to control a highly diverse country, and in order toobtain the loyalty of their clients, engaged in a massive redistribution ofstate resources.71 Co-optation of potential and real opposition forces wasthe crowning achievement of Biya and the CPDM.

The CPDM has remained an important actor in Biyas personal/patrimonial rule, remaining in power since Biya took over in 1982, creating

a virtual one-party state. Opposition parties were only legalized in 1990following widespread riots, many concentrated in Bamenda, NorthwestProvince. There are now some 150 political parties operating legally, butonly three main opposition parties: the Social Democratic Front (SDF), theUnion Nationale pour la Democratie et le Progres (UNDP), and the Uniondes Populations du Cameroun (UPC).72

C. Co-optation

Until 1992, elections were simply a formality, with the CPDM and Biyaassured of victory. Multiparty presidential elections were held in 1992 and1997 with legislative elections in 1997.73 Biya and the CPDM remained inpower, but the elections were widely criticized as fraudulent by bothinternational and domestic observers.74 The UNDP and a faction of the UPCparty joined the CPDM in a coalition government after the 1997 elections.75

Biya used patronage to win the support of individuals as well as regions,offering plumb ministerial posts to new coalition members and maintaining

an alliance between his southern-based tribe and the northern Muslims.76

70. SeeJoseph Takougang, Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform, in POLITICAL REFORM INFRANCOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 2, at 165.

71. Jurg Martin Gabriel, Cameroons Neopatrimonial Dilemma, 17 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD.187 (1999).

72. Id. at 178; see alsoCOUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 2b.73. COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3.74. Id. at 43.

75. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 19992000: Cameroon, available at (visited 12 Oct.2001); see alsoCOUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3.

76. For example, Biya appointed Bello Bouba Maigari, the leader of the UNDP (a party withsignificant Northern Muslim support) the lucrative position of senior minister in charge


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Biya also used patronage and key appointments to divide the Anglophoneopposition. In 1997, Biya appointed Peter Musoke, an Anglophone elitefrom the Southwest Province, Prime Minister. Musoke replaced Simon

Achidi Achu, an Anglophone elite from the Northwest Province.77

Thisappointment created greater Southwest Anglophone loyalty to the CPDMand further widened the gulf between the Southwest and Northwestprovince Anglophones. As Eyoh argues, cleavages between regionalfactions of the Anglophone elites have been sustained by a state-centeredprocess of elite formation.78

Biya seems determined to remain in power, either through the use of thestick or carrot (co-optation). In 1996, President Biya had the constitutionamended to allow the president to remain in power for seven years. Thus in

2004, Biya can run for another seven year term. If he wins, he will have heldpower in Cameroon for almost three decades.79

This centralization and personalization of power has led to thedevelopment of the big-man syndrome. The man with power (from thePresident to lower civil servant officials) uses his power as he sees fit, andthe population generally looks up to the man with power to solve all theirproblems. The big man is thus above the law. This creates a negativehuman rights culture where the man with the most power can and doesabuse the rights of men (and women) beneath him, because he has the

power to do so, and because he makes the argument that it is in the nationalinterest to do so. In other words, when you are the big man you donthave to respect the rights of others.

In short, the centralization and personalization of power in Camerooncreated a negative human rights culture, whereby the rights of some couldbe sacrificed for the so-called rights of others. This alienated the Anglophoneminority, and undermined the rule of law, further promoting chop politics.80

D. Ubiquitous Corruption

One of the greatest obstacles to the realization of a rights-protective regimeand rights-respective society is the ubiquitous corruption throughout

of industrial and commercial development for bringing his UNDP party into a CPDMcoalition government.

77. COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3.78. Eyoh, supra note 46, at 259.

79. COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3.80. Chop politics or politics of the belly refers to the insidious corruption that hasdeveloped within the state structure. Individuals justify corruption on the basis ofeating or needing to feed their families. SeeJEAN-FRANCOIS BAYART, LETATEN AFRIQUE: LAPOLITIQUEDUVENTRE (1989).


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Cameroon. It pervades the entire system, beginning with President Biya, andworking down to the lowest public official.81 Cameroon has been rankedthe most corrupt country in the world for 1998 and 1999 by the German

NGO Transparency International.82

There is little recourse to justice for the poor in Cameroononly for therich or those with access to bribery money.83 This is exacerbated by the factthat very few lawyers are willing to take on human rights cases. The systemclearly does not lend itself to this work, and often those who needrepresentation on human rights cases cannot afford it. At a lower level in thejustice system, the theme appears to be, as long as you dont cough it up,youre going to jail.84 At a higher level, there is the 30 percent rule: toget anything through the Finance Ministry you had to pay a 30 percent

fee.85

More disturbing, however, is the fact that mob/vigilante justice is on therise, partly because the rule of law is not enforced, and people arebecoming frustrated and disillusioned by the lack of recourse to justice.Police and gendarmes routinely stop cars for bribes, thieves are able to buytheir way out of prison, and traditional rulers rule with impunity, as long asthey support the CPDM.86 This has resulted in a rise of mob justice and casesof necklacing, and the beating to death of suspected thieves.87 An overall

81. In an example of high level corruption, Prime Minister Peter Musonge signed a twobillion CFA contract to modernize the deteriorating telephone system in the Southwestprovince. The contract went to a French firm that had been disqualified by experts at theNational Tenders Board, because it was incapable of handling all aspects of thecontract and because the equipment it was offering was obsolete.See Musonge PicksDisqualified French Firm to Modernise SW Phones, HERALD, 1719 Sept. 1997.

82. Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Transparency International 1999 Corruption PerceptionsIndex, available at (visited 12 Oct.2001).

83. Judges move back and forth between the bench and the bar. This movement creates asystem in which the magistrates feel that they have to protect one another, thereby

preventing any just decisions. SeeInterview, Eta Besong, Jr., (Barrister) Buea, Cameroon(10 June 2000).84. INTER PRESS SERVICE, 20 Nov. 1999.85. Howard W. French, Outcome of Cameroon Vote: Fear of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, 14 Oct.

1997, at A3.86. For example, two policemen in Kumba, SW province on 7 July 1997, beat a taxi car

driver to near death because he dared to frown at their extortionist tendencies at Metaquarters junction. HERALD, 2122 July 1997, at 5. In another case, a gendarme left atailor from Yaounde incapacitated for twenty-one days after the tailor asked for hisidentification card back. See Gendarme Brutalizes Tailor in Yaounde, HERALD, 56 June2000.

87. See, e.g., Mundemba: Soldiers at War with Population, HERALD, 57 Feb. 1996; Abeng

Kingsley Muna, Mob Lynches Thief, HERALD, 2831 Mar. 1996 at 5; Morara Victor,Ndiam: Irate Youths Threaten to Lynch Chief, HERALD, 2528 Apr. 1996; Abeng KingsleyMuna, Douala: Mob Action Claims Two, HERALD, 35 June 1996, at 5; Mob Justice,HERALD, 47 July 1997, at 5; Fru Ndi Says Any Soldier Who Kills a Civilian Will beLynched, HERALD, 89 Oct. 1997; Mob Justice, HERALD, 2729 Oct. 1997; Bandit Loses


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increase in insecurity and violent crime has developed throughout Cameroonin the 1990s.88 It is not democracy per se that has resulted in an overallincrease in insecurity and violence crime in Cameroon, but rather, the lack

of a rights-protective regime and a rights-respective society. This can beapplied to other case studies such as democratic Russia and South Africa.Corruption undermines the fabric of trust and working together for the

common good in a society. The depth of corruption in Cameroon hasresulted somewhat in a free-for-all. Once you get the opportunity to takeadvantage ofeating you do so, whether you are a gendarme, a teacher, ora lowly civil servant. This is reflective of an overall collective wearinessand discouragement89 among the general population and the lack of eliteinvestment in democracy and human rights. As one analyst observed, the

problem in Cameroon is not that one group has its hand in the public tillbut that all of them do!90

E. External Intervention

No understanding of the development of a rights-repressive system inCameroon would be complete without examining the role of externalforces. As noted earlier, Cameroon had three colonial masters: the Germans,

the British, and the French. The Germans and British have essentiallyremoved their presence from Cameroon. Although Cameroon became partof the Commonwealth in 1995, the British have had little influence, and itseems little interest in influencing, the political, economic, or culturaldevelopment of Cameroon.91 Germany and the United States actuallysuspended economic aid to Cameroon in 1992 after Biya fraudulently won

Eyes, HERALD, 2930 Oct. 1997, at 5; Peter Adi Fonte, Population Tortures Bandit to

Death, POST, 8 Nov. 1999, at 2; SDF Mobilizes to Lynch DOs, Magistrates, POST, 6 Mar.2000.88. For example, The Heraldreported that a young Canadian was shot four times on 20

January as he drove into the family residence. Others have been attacked and carsstolen. A Russian was intimidated and his passport seized, while within the span of twoyears, there have been 150 cases of assault on diplomats. SeeEmmanuel Tumanjong,Acute Insecurity in Yaounde: Diplomats Poised to Sanction Biyas Regime, HERALD, 57Feb. 1996, at 1. Even the United States Ambassador to Cameroon was pistol-whipped inan attack outside his official residence in March 2000. See alsoCOUNTRY REPORTS 2000,supra note 32, 1a.

89. See, e.g., CELESTIN MONGA, THE ANTHROPOLOGYOF ANGER: CIVIL SOCIETYAND DEMOCRACYIN AFRICA53 (1996).

90. Gabriel, supra note 71, at 177.91. Even though Cameroon has been a member of the Commonwealth organization headedby Queen Elizabeth II for five years, and has failed to fulfill its commitments to the ruleof law and human rights as set forth in the Harare Declaration, it has not been castigatedby the organization.


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the elections. Yet the World Bank and Western diplomats (the United States,the Netherlands, Germany, and France) have been trying to persuadeopposition party leaders to join the government.92

As part of la Francophonie and the CFA zone,93

Cameroon hasremained heavily under French political, economic, and cultural influence.The French have been willing to support the Biya regime and its bad humanrights record, in order to maintain political and economic stability as well ascontinued French influence and access to Cameroonian oil and othernatural resources. The Villes Mortes (Ghost Town) campaigns of 19901992 helped precipitate la crise and destroyed the small savings that theaverage Cameroonian had.94 Biya was able to withstand the impact of theGhost Town campaigns because of continued funding that the French

government provided.95

This had the effect of deflating the hopes ofopposition members and average Cameroonians that sustained mass protestcould actually influence peaceful change in Cameroon. French aid helpedensure that Biya was firmly entrenched in Cameroon.

Even though the 1992 elections were widely recognized as fraudulent,France sent a congratulatory letter to Biya along with millions of dollars inforeign aid throughout the 1990s.96 France also wrote off US$ 534 million ofCameroons debt in 1994.97 As Gabriel argues: [To] a large extent . . .clientelistic politics were financed from non-Cameroonian sources.98 In

essence, through inaction and continued aid to Cameroon, France hascondoned continued regime human rights abuses in Cameroon.However, the French were not alone in supporting the Biya regime. The

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank also provided Biyasregime with crucial economic support. In 1997, the IMF extended a US$220 million enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) loan, whichallowed for a major debt rescheduling deal with the Paris Club amounting

92. See SDF Admits Being Moved to Join CPDM Government but Fru Ndi Says No Way,HERALD, 1113 July 1997; Mukong Says SDF Has Lost Track, Wants Rebirth Conventionin Bamenda, HERALD, 12 Nov. 1997, at 1.

93. The CFA Zone is the CommunautFinanciere Africaine. The former French colonies inWest and Central Africa are linked to France and its economic policies and the Frenchfranc.

94. Operation Villes Mortes, the general strike called by Biyas opponents in June 1991(lasting until January 1992) was an attempt to get the government to agree to a sovereignNational Conference. The campaign effectively shut down major cities and towns in theLittoral, West, Northwest, and Southwest provinces. SeeGros, supra note 36, at 18; seealsoKonigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 215, n.28.

95. See Gros, supra note 36, at 120.96. Mark Huband, A Flawed Victory, AFR. REP. 43 (Jan.Feb. 1993); Krieger, supra note 37,at 625; Gros, supra note 36.

97. Edith Hodgkinson, Cameroon: Economy, 29 AFRICA SOUTHOFTHE SAHARA 266, 268 (2000).98. Gabriel, supra note 71, at 176.


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to US$ 2 billion over a three-year period.99 Meanwhile, foreign debtremains at 98 percent of the GNP,100 but Biya continues to refuse to accountfor oil revenues from off-shore oil sources in the Southwest province.

It has become apparent that many Cameroonians are frustrated withboth the corruption and the violation of their human rights. These peoplecome from all segments of society, but the majority tend to be Anglophones.They have looked to the international community to enforce the Interna-tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and various other human rightstreaties, as well as to foreign countries. While the UN has sent a SpecialRapporteur who has made critical statements about the government, verylittle has changed.101 If anything, external engagement (especially French)has helped perpetuate a rights-repressive regime and encourage continued

endemic corruption.Overall, structural and historical conditions have not aided in thedevelopment of a rights-protective regime or a rights-respective society inCameroon.

V. THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARIGHTS-RESPECTIVE CULTURE

In addition to the above structural/historical factors, the weak developmentof civil society must be examined, to understand the factors that not onlycontribute to the development of a rights-repressive regime, but also impedethe development of a rights-respective society.

A. A Weak and Divided Civil Society

Hope for change rests with civil society, but not just any civil society. Civil

society needs to be democratic, rights-respective, and organized. If civilsociety is not democratic, how can it promote democratic institutions? Ifcivil society is not rights-respective, how can it promote a rights-protectiveregime? Unfortunately, Cameroonian civil society is far from either demo-

99. Hodgkinson, supra note 97.100. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 40, tbl. 21, at 314.101. For example, Special Rapporteur Nigel Rodley stated that he had no doubt that, torture

is condoned if not encouraged at the level of the heads of the places of detention where

it takes place and that if the top leadership of these forces and those politicallyresponsible above them do not know what [his] delegation was able to discover in a fewdays, it can only be because of a lack of will to know. United National Press Release,UN Special Rapporteur Reports Widespread and Systematic Torture in Cameroon, U.N.Doc. HR/oo/19 (28 Feb. 2000).


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cratic or rights-respective. Traditional rulers are allowed (by the state andcitizens) to abuse the human rights of others in the name of tradition; onegroup (the Francophones) is willing to marginalize another group (the

Anglophones) economically, politically, and culturally, while the elite inpower greedily engage in rampant eating and the poor struggle to put foodon the table.

As Bratton and Van de Walle argue, Cameroon has no forcefulprofessional organizations, unions, bar associations or human rights move-ments.102 Overall, Cameroonians are cowed down as one human rightsactivist put it; they fear torture, they are afraid, and they are not preparedto sacrifice.103 Many fear losing their relative political and economicstability, and possible access to the spoils of patronage politics. More

importantly, Cameroon society is divided: regionally, linguistically, ethni-cally, and religiously.

B. Civil Disobedience

But Cameroonian civil society has not been without its activism. In responseto the governments unwillingness to call a sovereign national conference,in June 1991, members of a newly formed opposition coalition, the

National Co-ordination Committee of Opposition Parties (NCCOP), calledfor a general strike: Operation Villes Mortes(Operation Ghost Town). Thisgeneral strike was supposed to shut down every city and town in thecountry from Monday through Friday until the government capitulated andcalled a sovereign national conference. The campaign was most effective inthe South, with major cities and towns effectively shut down in the Littoral,West, Northwest, and Southwest Provinces.104

The campaign of civil disobedience ended in mid-October 1991following government repression and detention of opposition members and

protestors.105

Biya offered a trilateral meeting with opposition members toestablish a ten-member committee to draft constitutional reforms. Forty ofthe registered forty-seven opposition parties agreed to sign the agreement.106

The Social Democratic Front (SDF), led by Fru Ndi, and several other partieswithin the NCCOP rejected the agreement, causing a severe fragmentationwithin the opposition coalition. As Gros suggests, once one group agreedto the trilateral meeting, they all fell in because they didnt want to lose out

102. BRATTON & VANDE WALLE, supra note 2, at 14749, 24955.103. Interview, Human Rights Defence Group Activist, Bamenda, Cameroon (June 2000).104. Gros, supra note 36, at 118.105. In April 1991, more than 100 people were killed in riots and demonstrations.106. Gros, supra note 36, at 119.


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on the national cake.107 The dissenting opposition parties that didntaccept the tripartite agreement formed a political coalition called the AlliedFront for Change.

But there was no sustained countrywide protest after the 1992 elections.Certainly the ability of the Biya regime (aided by French aid) to withstandthe Villes Mortes campaigns deflated opposition hopes of peacefullyunseating Biya. In 1997, the SDF, UNDP, and UDC boycotted all of theelections, including the presidential elections, because of a lack of anindependent electoral commission. Yet the UNDP leader, Bello BoubaMaigari and a handful of other UNDP and UPC members were madeministers in Biyas new cabinet. This move helped to bring Biya greatersupport in the North and further divide the opposition.

C. Weak Opposition

Most of the major political parties have experienced internal divisions andfactions as well as external divisions. The UNDP has a predominantNorthern and Muslim constituency, while the SDF has a predominantAnglophone and Northwest province constituency. The UNDP split in 1994over a decision by the vice-chairman, Hamadou Moustapha, to accept a

cabinet portfolio without obtaining the partys prior consent. The UPC alsohad a breakaway faction form in May 1996.108 The UNDP and the UDC alsorefused to join a new informal alliance of 16 opposition movements (Frontdes allis pour le changement) because it was dominated by the SDF andFru Ndi.

Even the SDF had a breakaway group, called the Social DemocraticMovement (SDM), which formed under the leadership of the formersecretary-general of the SDF, Siga Asanga. In 1998, ten of the forty-threeSDF parliamentary deputies resigned from the party in protest because of

perceived tribalism and authoritarianism of its leadership.109

The SDFeven expelled its first national vice-president because of his criticism of FruNdis authoritarian style of leadership.110

Within the Anglophone movement there are also serious divisions.Anglophones in the Southwest Province fear domination by NorthwestProvince Anglophones. This division dates back to the colonial period when

107. Id.

108. The Secretary-General of the UPC, Augustin Frederic Kodock, who held a ministerialportfolio of agriculture, was dismissed from the party and formed a breakaway faction.109. Pierre Englebert, Cameroon: Recent History, 29 AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 260, 265

(2000).110. Id.


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the Anglophones from the Northwest province were brought to work in thecoastal plantations of the Southwest Province. Many of the forest zoneAnglophones (Southwest province) view the grassfield Anglophones from

Bamenda (Northwest province) as the stranger or settler population.111

There is even a deeper animosity between the Southwest and Northwestpeoples, that some could call racist. Many in the Southwest refer to peoplesfrom the Northwest as former slaves and say that they do not wish to haveformer slaves as their masters (in an independent Southern Cameroons).112

Thus, there is heated disagreement among the Anglophones on what needsto happen to secure Anglophone minority rights. The Anglophones from theSouthwest province are less hesitant to adopt a position of secession fromthe rest of Francophone Cameroon because they fear Northwest Anglophone

domination. A faction of Anglophones within the SDF prefer a return to afederal system in Cameroon, while more radical elements in the SCNC andthe SCYL want outright secession.113

Opposition parties suffer from external divisions and lack of unity aswell as internal fragmentation. As a result, they are easy prey for govern-ment co-optation and sell-outs as discussed earlier. The temptations forjoining in on the eating tend to be too high, with many oppositionmembers selling out to the CPDM and President Biya. Opposition partiesand politicians thus represent a weak vanguard force for the promotion of

democratic values and human rights.

C. The Role of Indigenous Human Rights NGOs

Since the international community has failed to provide the impetus forchange in Cameroon, and the opposition parties have been weakened byco-optation, internal divisions, and external bickering, what role haveindigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played in helping to

develop a rights-respective society and rights-protective regime? There areseveral human rights NGOs operating in Cameroon, but the largest is the

111. Ngoh, supra note 55, at 178; Krieger, supra note 37, at 618.112. Informal conversations with author and Southwest elites and intellectuals in Buea,

Limbe, and Tiko, Cameroon (MayJune 2000).113. Even with the federal system option, there is division. Some advocate a return to the so-

called two-state option, which would be a return to the pre-1972 federal arrangement.Others argue for the ten-state option, which would result in a radical decentralization of

power to the current ten provincial administrative units. SeeEyoh, supra note 46, at261. For example, Fru Ndi advocates a four-state federation as a panacea for theAnglophone problem, creating a further divide between the SCNC and the SDF. SeealsoFru Ndi Dissociates SDF from Southern Cameroons Independence, POST, 12 May2000; SCNC Youths Recommend Widespread Guerrilla Warfare, POST, 15 May 2000.


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Human Rights Defence Group (HRDG).114 Human rights NGOs tend to beweak, headquartered and focused in Yaounde (with the exceptions of theMDDHL and the HRDG), with little cooperation among them.

Francophone human rights NGOs tend to be more subdued whencriticizing government human rights abuses, not wanting to raise the ire ofthe government.115 Most indigenous human rights NGOs focus more onmonitoring rather than education. They remain largely uncoordinated andunder heavy attack from the government if they become too vocal andcritical of the regime.116 There is a National Commission on Human Rightsand Freedoms, but it lacks independence from the government.117 Thecommittee is appointed by the government and led by a former minister ofgovernment.118

Although monitoring of human rights abuses is a very importantwatchdog role that human rights organizations play, there needs to be morehuman rights education at the grassroots level to ensure the development ofa rights-respective society and a rights-protective regime. If individuals donot know their rights, then how can they demand them?119

In addition to human rights organizations, there are a plethora ofassociational organizations, Common Initiative Groups (CIGs), and secretsociety organizations throughout Cameroon. Because of space constraints,

114. These include the National League for Human Rights, the Organization for HumanRights and Freedoms, the Association of Women Against Violence, The CameroonianAssociation of Female Jurists, the Cameroonian Association for Childrens Rights,Conscience Africaine, the Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties(MDHRL), the Human Rights Defense Group, the National Association of Non-tribalistsand Non-racists, the Committee of Action for Womens and Childrens Rights (CADEF),the Human Rights Clinic and Education Center, the Association of Women AgainstViolence, the Cameroonian Association for Childrens Rights, the Cameroon NationalAssociation for Family Welfare (CAMNAFAW), Tribes without Frontiers (TSF), theAssociation for the Promotion of Communal Initiatives, the League for Rights and

Freedoms (LDL), and Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT). Thesegroups have also been very active in monitoring human rights abuses as well as holdingseminars on human rights.

115. Interview, Human Rights Defense Group Activist, Bamenda, Cameroon, June 2000.116. For example, members of the MDDHL (Mouvement pour la dfense des droits de

lhomme et des liberts), a Marou-based NGO, who investigated extrajudicial killingsby the brigade anti-gang in the North, received threats from the brigade anti-gang, whileothers were arrested by the gendarmerie. SeeAI CAMEROON REPORT, supra note 23.

117. Id.118. The CNDHL was established by Presidential Decree and members are appointed in the

same way. Their findings have never been published.119. Human rights organizations that focus their attention on urban, elite populations may

play an important role in advocacy and monitoring. But more human rights organiza-tions need to invest in grassroots, lower-cost, rural and urban poor level educationcampaigns. The HRDG has had to do this because of a large cut in international funding(due to an increasingly exclusive focus on the abuse of Anglophone rights and itsalignment with the SCNC).


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this paper cannot deal with an adequate appraisal of the impact of thesegroups on the development of a rights-respective society and a rights-protective regime.120 In short, it seems that autonomous civil society

organizations tend to be weak vis--vis the Cameroonian state. Given thepolitical climate of neo-patrimonialism121 and the economic climate ofcrisis, few individuals have the time or the desire to get involved inorganizations that could jeopardize their physical well-being.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

With the rise in general violent crime, significant human rights abuses,

vigilante/mob justice, ubiquitous corruption, and Anglophone secessionisttendencies, it seems that Cameroon is well on its way to becoming onemore African tragedy and certainly not a democratic success story. How canthis be given Cameroons relative political and economic success in the firstthree decades of Independence? This article has examined the historical andstructural factors that account for Cameroons failure, including the coloniallegacies, the centralization and personalization of power, ubiquitous cor-ruption, and external intervention. The structural and historical foundationof Cameroon encouraged the development of a rights-repressive regime and

impeded the development of a rights-respective society and a strong civilsociety.If Sidney Tarrow is correct when he argues, leaders can only create a

social movement when they tap more deep-rooted feelings of solidarity oridentity,122 then Cameroon has a problem. Cameroonian civil societyremains divided and fragmented, even within the Anglophone movement.

One of the most important lessons is that international support to theBiya regime must end. Although the economic system may become worseand hardships may increase as a consequence, in the long run, only a

change in the status quo will incite people to overthrow the illegitimate,

120. One excellent study has already been conducted on the role of the Takumbengwomenof the Northwest province in local and increasingly, national politics. SeeCatherineRussell, One Hand No Fit Tie Bundle: Women, Groups and Power in the Grassfields ofCameroon, Paper presented at the 43rd annual meeting of the African Studies Assn.,Nashville, Tenn. (19 Nov. 2000).

121. Neo-patrimonialism refers to the patron-clientage system that encourages ubiquitouscorruption and is based on favorable relationships between the patron (state official)and the client (individual). As Richard Sandbrook suggests, Neo-patrimonial rule

inhibits economic development by subordinating economic objectives to the short-runexigencies of political survival. RICHARD SANDBROOK, CLOSING THE CIRCLE: DEMOCRATIZATIONAND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 97 (2000).

122. SIDNEY TARROW, THE POWERIN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION & POLITICS 5, n.85(1996).


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rights-abusive regime of Paul Biya. In the end, only the Cameroonianpeople can bring about a rights-respective and rights-protective regime inCameroon. Cameroonians need to unite to overthrow Biya and the neo-

patrimonial system. But they need to go beyond simply ousting Biya frompower; they need to make sure that another Biya (Big man) does notsimply take over the reigns of power.

Even though Cameroon is technically a multiparty democracy, thereality is far from democratic. With growing economic crisis and ethnic andlinguistic divisions, the current multi-party system will only serve toincrease overall frustrations and promote chop politics and ubiquitouscorruption. If people do not have confidence in the institutions of justiceand government, they are more likely to resort to violence to settle disputes.

Vigilante/mob justice will likely increase, as will secessionist tendenciesamong the Anglophones. As Monga argues,

The gulf between the political realm and the rest of society is so large that the

concept of citizenship remains a slogan. The tendency to resort to violence innumerous countries is a simultaneous reflection of the peoples desire for

revenge against illegitimate governments and of the governing elites inability to

see what is really at stake.123

Until Cameroonian elites embrace the virtues of a rights-respective cultureand wider Cameroonian society demands human rights protection, theCameroonian reality will remain one of failed democratic transition.

123. MONGA, supra note 89, at 188.

Cameroon Democratic Transition and Human Rights_article_ Dicklitch

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