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    i:A ~ R O J E D FOR RELEASE. DATE: JUN 2 0 0 7 '19 January 1960OCI No. 0235/60Copy No.

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    CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY/,/'lJHRUSHCHEV ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

    " (Reference Title : CAESAR XI.-60)E O 1 2 9 5 83 . 3 ( b ) 1) 2 5 Y r s

    H R 7 0 - 1 4( U )

    Office of Current IntelligenceCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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    CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

    Khrushchev on N u c le a r S t r a t e g yTh i s i s a working paper. I t i s i n t e n d e d as a s m a l lc o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e w ork of t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i th e v a lu a t -i n g S o v ie t i n t e n t i o n s , a nd as t h e f i r s t of s e v e r a l p a p e r so n probl em s i n t h e S i no -S ov ie t m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thec o n c lu s io n s of t h e paper appea r as pages 14 and 15.The Sino- Sovie t S tu di es Group would welcome comment,addressed t o Matthew Gallagher o r W. P. Southard, whoj o i n t l y p r ep ar ed t h i s p ap er . I

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    RHRUSHCHEV ON NUCLEAR STRATEGYINTRODUCTION

    The ra p id growth of S ovi et ICBM c a p a b i l i t i e s p o s - s cri-t i c a l probl em s f o r i n t e l l i ge nc e . The t a sk , i n i t s broades tterms, is t o d et er m in e t h e s t r a t e g i c a ss u mp ti on s u n d e r ly i n gt h e Sov i e t Un ion' s p re sen t m i l i t a r y development programs.T h i s p a p e r o f f e r s a mod est c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s end by ana-l y z i n g s t a t e m e n t s on w a r that Khrushchev h a s made i n p u b li cspeeches and i n i n t e rv i ew s f rom sp r i ng 1957: t h rough h i s re-p o r t t o t h e Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960.Khrushchev's views when excel lent ana l y ses of Sov i e t m i l i -t a r y t ho u gh t a l r e a d y e x i s t , e .g . Raymond L. G a r t h o f f ' s So-v i e t S t r a e e g y i n t h e Nu cle ar Age (1958) and h i s The S o v E tImage o r p u t ure 2 War (1959) . One reason i s t h a t t h e t h ink- .i n g of a p o l i t ic a l l e a d e r l i k e Khrushchev may di ve rg e i nsome re s pe c t s f rom t h e t h i nk i ng of h i s m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s .Another reason is t h a t t h e r e may be a l a g of t heo ry beh i ndp r a c t i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a p e r i o d o f r a p i d t e c h n o l o g i c a ldevelopment. Khrushchev's s t a t e m e n t s , if f o r no o t h e r rea-s o n t h a n t h a t he, ,is .$he idominirnt f kgure.,o l athe -r eg im e, mqyprov i de a u s e f u l s u pp le me nt t o t h e w r i t i n g s of Sov i e t m i l i -t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s .a t one ex t reme, could adopt a minimum , ' de t e r re s t d t r a t eg p , . ,f r e e i n g i t s r e s o u r c e s f o r o t h e r p u r po s es w h il e r e l y i n g oni t s posses s i on o f a good r e t a l i a t o r y c a p a b i l i t y t o d e t e r t h eWest from w a r . A t t h e ot h e r extreme, Moscow cou ld adopt ap r e v e n t i v e war s t r a t e g y , b u i l d i n g i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r a s u r -p r i s e knockout blow aga ins t t h e U n it ed S t a t e s . The s e l e c t i o nmade from th e spect rum of ch oi ce s depends on t h e S o v i e t e s t i -mate of such matters as th e balan ce of power, t h e consequencesof a g e n e r a l w a r , W estern i n t e n t i o n s , t h e c o s t s of a c h i e v i n gv a r i o us l e v e l s of c a p a b i l i t y , e tc .

    I t may be asked whg an e f f o r t should be made t o descr l;be

    Khrushchev h a s a range of ch oic es . The Sovie t Union,

    Khrushchev has spoken d i r e c t l y on some of t h e matterst o be c o n s i d e r e d i n s u c h a S o v i e t estimate; H i s genuine be-l i e f s a r e , of course, d i f f i c u l t t o determine , because h i sstatements on w a r have been c a l c u l a t e d f o r p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t .

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    N ver the les s , such s ta tements s e e m t o reveal certain assump-t io n s wh ic h are of i n t e l l i g e n c e v al u e.ers may interpr et the data d i f f er ent ly , a compi la t ion of Khru-shchev 's pr inc ipa l s ta tements on war since e a r ly 1 9 5 7 i s ap-pended.

    Because other observ-

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    I. The Sa la nc e of Power

    Communist do ct r i ne e n j o i ns Khrushchev t o keep under .s t u d y t h e " r e l a t i o n of f o r c es " i n o r d e r t o a v o i d " adven-tu r i sm " (haza rdous cour ses ) on t h e one hand, and "r i gh t op-p or tu n is m " ( e x c e s s iv e c a u t i o n ) on t h e o th e r . H i s s t a t e m e n t sin t h e p a s t t h r e e y e a r s h ave e xp r es s ed a c a l c u l a t i o n of re-cen t ach ievemen t .of an approximate ba lance of fo rces be tweenth e s o v i e t U n io n and t h e U nit ed S t a t e s , w i t h a n i n c r e a s i n g l yc o n f i d e n t estimate of t h e S o vi et p o s i t io n i n t h i s b a la nc e.In 1957, t he ye a r of t h e Sov ie t ICBM t e s t s a n d t h e f i r s tsp ut ni ks , some of ZXhrushchev's s ta te me nt s seemed t o imply ac a l c u l a t i o n o f a d e c i s i v e So v i e t a d v a n t a g e . He c la imed , f o re xa mp le , t h a t t h e So v i e t Union had " o u t s t r i p p e d " t h e US i nt h e development of t h e ICBMs a n d t h a t t h e ICBM had "solvedt h e q u es t io n of d e l i v e r i n g a hydrogen charge t o a n y p o in t ont h e g lo b e . " H e w a s carefu l , however , a t t h e same t ime, t od e s c r i b e t h e S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t y a g a i n s t t h e Americanc o n t i n e n t a s composed not only of ICBMs: bu t of "submarinem i s s i l e s and o t he r means which now ex is t , " in d i ca t i ng a judg-m e n t t h a t t h e ICBM a l o n e a n w ha te v er l e v e l o f d ev elop me nt i tw a s a v a i l a b l e t o the Sov ie t Un ion ld id no t g ive a d e c i s i v em i l i t a r y advantage . Moreover, subsequent s t a t em en ts gave am or em od es t a p p r a i s a l of t h e So v i e t m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n v i s -a -v i s t h e US.In autumn 1958, i n an ap pa re nt ly cand id moment, Khru-s h c h e v t o ld an American v i s i t o r : 'We have ke p t up wi t h youi n t h e a r m s race. In f a c t , i n some ways I t h i n k w e a re a-head." In t h e same month, an ot he r American who had ta l k e dwi th Khrushchev repo r te d t h a t Khrushchev d i d no t ap pea r t obe l ieve tha t the USSR.had b roken o r was abou t t o b r e a k t h ee x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y stalemate w i t h t h e US.In spr ing 1959 Khrushchev again spoke of t h e b a la n ce asb e in g so n e a r l y e q ua l t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n s were no t mean ingfu l .R e f e r r i n g t o i n s t r u m e n t s w hich me as ur e t h e r e s i s t a n c e o f m a - at e r i a l s , Khrushchev observed that a n i n s t r u m e n t d e s ig n e d t om e a s u r e s t r e n g th i n p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s w ould showt h a t t h e B loc a nd t h e " i m p e r i a l i s t s ta tes" were b o t h " s u f f i -c i e n t l y s t r on g a t presen t . "I n h i s r e p o r t t o the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960,Khrushchev expressed confidence in t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f S o v ie tm i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . ' A t t h e same time, he acknowledged t h a tt h e W e s t c ou ld i n f l i c t "great calami t ies" on t h e USSR i n ag e n e r a l w a r , Fu r th e r , w h i l e a s s e r t i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l S o v i e tlea d i n th e deve lopmen t of miss i l e s , h e o b s e r v e d t h a t t h erace i s n o t o v e r a nd t h a t t h e West "may so on er o r l a t e rdraw even with us."

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    In urn, Khrushchev -,asnot claimed a decis ive advantagefor the Soviet Union -- i . e . , such an advantage as wouldguarantee a S o v ie t v i c t o r y i n a general war o n terms accept-able t o - a respons ible Sovie t leader. He does notappearto believe that such an advantage has been achieved.

    . .

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    11. Consequences of a General warRhrushchev has commented many t i m e s i n . r e c e n t y e a r s ont h e q u e s t i o n o f w h eth er u n de r c u r r e n t c o n d i t i o n s a meaning-f u l v i c t o r y would be p o s s i b l e , f o r e i t h e r t h e U S S R o r t h eU. S., i n a g e n e r a l war.H i s f o r e c a s t s o f t h e o utco me o f a m i l i t a r y c l a s h w i tht h e West h av e b ee n ex p r e ss e d i n s t r i k i n g c o n c e p t s of d e s t r u -t i o n . I t a l y c ou ld be knqcked ou t i n " two hours, " and Turkeyi n " f i f t e e n m in ut es 1' ; US bases cou ld be at tacked i n a **matterof minutes" ; West Germany could be d es t roye d i n " ten minutes."F ' w t h e r , " i t s u f f i c e s t o p r e s s b u t one b u t t o n a n d n o t onlya i r f i e l d s and th e means of communications of va ri ou s ( m i l i -t a r y ) headquar te r s , bu t whole c i t i e s , w i l l be blown sky-high,

    who le co un t r ie s can be d e s t r o y e dKhrushchev has emphasized t h a t th e Amer ican c on t ine n twould be wi t h in t h e range o f ac t i on o f a f u t u r e g e n e r al w a r ,an d t h a t t h e U ni te d S t a t e s would s u f f e r great d e s t r u c t i o n ." I t /Fhe war7 w i l l rage no t on ly i n Europe and A s i a , " he hassaid, "but Gith no less f u r y r * i n t h e U ni te d S t a t e s ; he po in tedo ut t h a t i n su ch a w a r "the American people w i l l s u f f e r e nor -mous losses.1r "It i s h ig h t i m e s t t he declared on a n o t h e r occas-i o n , " f o r t h e American s t r a t e g i s t s t o come out of t h e i r fool'sp a r a d i s e ( i n whic h t h e y b e l i e v e ) t h a t i n t h e e ve nt of a m i l i -t a r y c on f l i c t t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e Un i ted S t a t e s wou ld remainin v u lne r a b le . 1 1 Most r e c e n t l y , i n h i s 14 J a nu a ry r e p o r t t o t h eSupreme Soviet, Khrushchev declared t h a t t h e USSR llwould be

    able l i t e r a l l y t o wipe t h e c ou nt ry o r c o u n t r i e s which a t t a c kus /Fhe B l oc 7 o f f t h e f a c e of t h e e a r t h ."f o r t h e USSR as w e l l . H e admitted t o an American j o u r n a l i s ti n 1 9 5 7 t h a t the Sovie t Union would "suffer grea t lossesf1 na f u t u r e w a r; on ano the r occas ion he spoke of t h e l o s s e s --"and grea t ones" -- t h a t t h e So v ie t Union c o u ld e x p e c t . Inh i s l e t t e r t o R u s s e l l h e d e s c r ib e d n u c l e a r w a r a s r l excep t ion -a l l y d an ge ro us f1 f o r the l t t w o l ' warr ing s t a t e s " i n t e r m s ofd i r e c t d e v a s t a t i o n a nd d e s t r u c t i o n of human bei ngs . " In h i sDnepropetrovsk speech , he s a i d : "W e know t h a t i f s u c h a w a rb r e a k s o u t , great damage w i l l be i n f l i c t e d on us t o o , a n dt h a t w e t o o s h a l l h ave t o make great s ac r i f i ce s . War d o e s noone any good . . . Most recen t ly (14 January ) he acknowl-e dg ed a g a in , t h a t llWe, too, would su f fe r grea t ca lami t i e s ;

    - -Khrushchev has conceded tha t a new w a r would be grim

    *'we would have many losses . . . , 1

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    . . . . -. ... .. -_,

    Khrushchev has sometimes qual i f ied h i s assessmen t o f theconsequences of w a r f o r t h e USSR b y a s s e r t i n g t h a t Sov ie t capa -b i l i t i e s f o r s ur v iv a l a re s u p e r i o r . I n t h i s co n ne c ti o n, h eh as s p e c i f i e d t h a t t h e w i d e d i s p e r s a l of popu la t ion and in -d u s tr y i n t h e USSR'gives the USSR a d e g r ee of r e s i l i e n c e whic hthe US'does not have.r e p o r t , K hrus hch ev o b se r ve d t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e "great calami-t i es" and "many lossesfvwhich the USSR would s u f f e r i n a neww a r , "ye t w e would surv ive , f a n d t h e West "would suffer in-comparably more. ((

    In making t h i s p o i n t i n h i s 1 4 J an ua ry

    .. Si nce autumn 1959, Khrushchev ha s most o ft en spok en of. ' t h e consequences of a g e n e r a l w a r i n t e r a s o f t h e t e r r i b l er e s u l t s Tor mankind" ra th e r th an f o r s p e c i f i c p e op l es o r b l o c s .He h a s observed t h a t t h e number of v ic t i ms would run i n t o hun-d r e d s of m i l l i o n s ; t h a t n u c l e a r weapons c o u ld s t r i k e a n y p o in ton t h e og l o b e; t h a t "no country" would be able t o e s c a p e a%ru shin g b low"; t h a t a new w a r w o u ld e n t a i l t h e " d e s t r u c t i o nof a l l t h a t h a s be en c r e a t e d " i n t h e c o ur s e of h i s t o r y ; a n dt h a t w a r I1.would no t s p a r e anybody and would ca us e mankind un-p re ce de nt ed s a c r i f i c e s , d e v a s t a t i o n an d s u f f e r i n g . . . . . fIn sum, j u s t a s he has spoken of t h e b a l a nc e o f f o r c e sa s being so n e a r l y e q u a l t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n s a re not meaning-f u l , Khrushchev has tended t o speak of g e n e r a l w a r a s e n t a i l i n gconsequences so s e v e r e f o r each p a r t i c i p a n t a s t o be unaccep t -a b l e . Even when he h a s asserted a s u p er i o r So vi et a b i l i t y t oemerge from a nuc l ea r exchange , he has no t i nd i ca t ed w i l l i n g -ness t o a c c e p t l o s s e s on t h i s sca le .

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    I t

    111. American PnztentionsKhrushchev holds t h e or thodox v iew t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e sI s i n t r a n s i g e n t l y h o s t i l e t o t h e Soviet Union and t h a t Ameri-can d e f e n s i v e m e a s u r e s a re i n f a c t a n e xp re ss io n of this hos-t i l i t y . He h a s m a i n t a in e d s i n c e 1956, however, t h a t g e n e r a l ~war is n o t i n e v i t a b l e and i n d e e d that t h e p r o s p e c t o f w a r d i -m i n i s h e s as t h e bloc becomes s t r o n g e r a nd t h e Y e s t i n c r e a s i n g -l y r ec og ni z es t h a t s i t u a t i o n ,

    Late i n 1958, Khrushchev no ted aga in (as i n May 1958)t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of war b e g in n in g a s a r e s u l t of Americanm i s c a l c u l a t i o n on a p a r t i c u l a r d i s pu t ed i s s u e .t o a n o t h e r Am er ic an v i s i t o r , A merican s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e e f fec tth a t t h e U S would e mp lo y m i l i t a r y m eans i n B e r l i n -- s t a t e -ments made a p p a r e n t l y in t h e bel ief t h a t the USSR would not

    He ci ted ,

    In s p r i n g 1957 Khrushchev d e n i e d that he b e l i e v e d t h eUS t o be p r e p a r i n g war a g a f n s t t h e USSR. He repeated t h i sl a t e r in 1957, b u t a t t h e same t i m e he referred to Americanbases a s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the US i s "p repa r ing" t o s t r i k e ab l o w a t t h e S o v i e t Uni,or o r a t ' l eas t "wants" t o do so.S e v e r a l times i n 1957 KhruShchev noted the p o s s i b i l i t yof a general w a r b e g i n n i n g by a c c i d e n t , such as an a c t i o n bya deranged p i l o t .spec i f ied p o s s i b i l i t y w a s t h e a c c i - d e n t a l dropping of a bombon some t e r r i t o r y (non-Sov ie t ) be i ng ove r f lown by a n Ameri-can p lane , which would be %aken a s a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a nd woulds e t ,off a g e n e r a l w a r .

    t i c a l l y i n e v i t a b l e , " K hr us hc he v o b s e r v e d t h a t any at tempt tochange t h e e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n by f o r c e woul d r e q u i r e t h e re in-s t a t e m e n t of t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e " i n e v i t a b i l i t y of w a r , "i m p l i c a t i o n w a s that a n y a t t e m p t by t h e US t o s p l i t one oft h e ' s a t e l l i t e s away f r o m t h e USSR woiild lead to war.t h a t he had some a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and t ra -d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s i n h i b i t i n g t h e US from i n i t i a t i n g war.s h c h e v o b s e r v e d t o a n A merican v i s i t o r t h a t ' * t he So v i e t Uniond o e s n ' t want w a r , and under your system t h e U n i t e d Statesc a n ' t s t a r t a w a r . "

    He made o t h e r s u c h r e f e r e n c e s in 1958; one

    In May 1958, w h i l e r e a f f i r m i n g t h a t wars a re n o t " fa t a l i s -The

    In autumn 1958 Khrushchev f o r tne f i r s t t i m e i n d i c a t e dKhru-

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    ... .. ..r e t a l i a t e w i t h m i l i t a r y means.a be l i e f w a s fa l se .Wrush chev mentioned a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y of i nduc ing a gen-e r a l w a r -- namely, a f a u l t y estimate by t h e US of i t s owncapabi l i t ies v i s - a -v i s t h e USSR. Khrushchev c i t e d "Ameri-can ge ne ra ls and s ta tesmen" who contend t h a t t h e Americanm i l i t a r y p o s i t io n is s u p e r i o r b ec a us e US bases su r round t h eUSSR w h i l e t h e Soviet Union has only a f e w ICBMs.. Khru-shche v admonished those who may be tempted " t o u s e t h i s p r o p i -t ious moment f o r s t a r t i n g a w a r , " and warned of t h e d i s a s t r o u sconsequences" of I'strategic p l a n s . . . b u i l t on a fa lse pre-m i s e . . . .t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an American de ci s i on t o a t tack t h e USSRwhi le American c a p a b i l i t i e s were r e l a t i v e l y high.e n c e to u n r e a l i s t i c p l a n s co ul d be projected, however, t oc o v e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an American a t t a c k a t a t i m e whent h e US would know i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o be much i n f e r i o r b u twould decide t o s t r i k e w h i l e i t still had any c a p a b i l i t i e sa t a l l .

    Khrushchev warned t h a t s u c hA t t h e t w e n t y - f i r s t pa r ty co ngress i n January 1959 ,

    ,

    I?

    In t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t e m e n t , Khrushchev w a s concerned w i t hHis r e fe r -

    J u s t as he had no ted i n au twnn '1958 t h a t t h e Americassys tem i n h i b i t e d a de l ibe ra te r e c o ur s e t o w a r , so i n J u n e1959 he offered no demurral when ano the r Amer ican v i s i t o rs t a t e d t h a t it shou ld be obvious t h a t t h e US would "neverunder any c i rcumstances s t a r t a w ar . " On s e v e r a l o c c a s i o nssubsequ en t ly i n 1959 he conceded , i n ef fec t , t h a t it i s un-l i k e l y t h a t American leaders a r e , c o n t e m p l a t i n g an a t t ack ont h e Soviet Union.

    In h i s 14 January re po r t , Khrushchev fmplied a t s e v e r a lp o i n t s t h a t he d o es n o t b e l i e v e that t h e United States isa b o u t t o s t r i k e t h e USSR. " I t i s h a r d t o b e l i e v e , " h e said ," t h a t anyone i n t h e United States i s not aware of t h e catas-t r o p h i c c o nse qu e nc es t o which a new world'war would lead,ftF u r t h e r , in d i s c u s s i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e West would"draw even" i n weapons development, he minimized t h e possi-b i l i t y t h a t t h e West would then under take a s u r p r i s e a t tack ,He r e t u r n e d i n t h i s r e p o r t t o h i s concep t of a n a t t ack by"madmenv1--a term used t h i s t i m e in a p o l i t i c a l ra ther t h a nc l i n i c a l s en se -- bu t he d i d n o t su g g e s t t h a t %admen" now sitin "government , pa r l i amen t and o t he r r es pon s ib le posts" i nt h e West.

    ,

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    . .Drush chev may genu ine ly be l ie v e ' i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t v ofa g e n e r a l w a r a r i s i n g f rom a n a c c id e n t , f r o m a m i s c a l c u l a t i o non a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , or from an American estimate t h a t t h et i m e has come t o s t r i k e w h i l e A m e r i c a n c a p a b i l i t i e s a re h ig ho r e x i s t a t a l l . A t leas t a t t h i s time, however, he a p p e a r st o - b e l i e v e i t p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e United States , c a l c u l a t i n gt h e ba la nce of power and th e consequences of n u c l e a r w a r ,w i l l r e f r a i n from i n i t i a t i n g a general w a r .

    .

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    I V . S o v i e t I n t e n t i o n s

    K hr us hc he v, l i k e S t a l i n , t akes t h e p o s i t i on t h a t t h eSov i e t Union is n e ve r t h e a g g r e s s o r . H i s s t a t e m e n t s onS o v i e t s t r a t e g y ha ve i n v a r i a b l y assumed a We s te r n a t t a c kon the USSR--an a t t a c k which, what ever i t s i n i t i a l r e s u l t ,would leave t h e USSR i n a s t r o n g eno ugh p o s l t i o n t o wint h e war. However, some of Khrushchev ' s s ta t em ent s bearo n - t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e USSR would a c t u a l l y d e l i v e rt h e f i r s t blow, under t he concept of "pre-emptive" ac t ion , ,And some of these s t a te m e nt s a r e r e l e v a n t to a considera t- ion6 f w h e t h e r . Khrushchev may be tempted t o go beyond t h e"pre-emptive" concept t o adopt a s t r a t e g y of p r e v e n t i v ewar.It is app are nt t h a t Khrushchev has a ve ry h igh re-g a r d for t h e ICBM. As e a r l y a s autumn 1957, Khrushchevwas desc r ib ing t h e ICBM a s th e "absolu te weapon"--in t h a ti t c o u l d be l a u n c h e d v e r y r a p id ly , c o u ld be d e l i v e r e d t oany po i n t o f th e $ Idbe, and cou ld no t be de fended ag a i ns t .Be h a s r e af f i rm e d t h i s e v a l u a ti o n on e e v e r a l o c c as i o nss i nce t h a t t ime, add ing de ta i l s . In the same pe r iod hehas d i spa raged o th e r weapons , r emarking fo r example t h a tb om bers, f i g h t e r s a n d s u r f a c e f l e e t s a l l a r e becomingo b s o l e s c e n t .Khrushchev's 14 January report w el l i l l u s t r a t e d h i sa p p r e c i a t i o n of m is ss al es , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e ICBM. H e ob-s e r v e d t h a t "almost t h e e n t i r e m i l i t a r y a i r force is bealng

    rep l aced by rocke t equ ipment , " and t h a t , w h i l e the submarinef l e e t "assumes gre&$ importa nce, '' s u r f ace ves se l s "can nol o n g er p l a y t h e p a r t t h e y on ce d i d . " F u r t h e r , he arguedt h a t t he new weapons make fe as i b l e h i s proposed red uct ionof t h e armed fo rces - - inc lud ing t h e ground forces (whichis a b s o l u t e terms w i l l probably bear t h e l a r g e s t s h a r eof t h e reduction). Be went on t o s p e c i f y t h a t t h e S o v i e tarmed forces have "combat means and f i repower never be fo repossessed" by any armed fo rc es , t h a t these weapons enablet h e USSR t o wipe the a t t a c k e r s ?'off t h e face o f t h e e a r t h , "t h a t e v e r y s t r a t e e c ce n t e r i n t h e enemy camp ccpuld be a t -t a ck e d i n t h e f i r s t minutes of a war, and so on.Wrushchev appea rs i n h i s 1 4 J a nu a ry r e p o r t t o have

    moved some d i s t a n c e from e x i s t i n g S o v i e t doctrine--whichh as h e l d t h a t a new general. war would be p r o t r a c t e d- 10 -

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    and wou ld r eq u i r tfa us;e of v e ry l a r g e o n v e n t i o n a lf o r c e s . H e does not appear, however, t o have committed 1h i ms e lf t o t h e c o n t r a r y p r o p os i t io n s t h a t t h e war wouldbe s h o r t and would re qu ir e only sm al l fo rc es . He note da t one p o i nt i n h i s r e p o r t t h a t t h e USSR, s h o u ld it beth r ea t ene d , co ,uld inc rea se "cons iderab ly" th e s i ze ofi t s a rmed fo rces .

    K hrus hchev im p l i e d i n h i s 1 4 J a n u ar y r e p o r t t h a t h i sp o s i t i o n s a re a c c e p t e d by So v i e t m i l i t a r y l eader s ands p e c i a l i s t s .t i o n ' o f t h e armed fo rces , he s a i d t h a t "We h a v e s t u d i e dt h i s q ue st io n i n d e t a i l from e v er y a n g l e , . c o n s u l t e d w i t ht h e m i l i t a r y and t h e g e n e r a l s t a f f , " and a re a b l e t os t a t e f i r ml y t h a t "our defense w i l l be f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t . "Defense Minis ter Malinovsky*s speech t o t h e Supreme So-v i e t , l a t e s t h e same day, d i d i n f a c t g i v e e mp ha ti c su p p o r tt o Khrushchev Os p o s i t i o n s .

    In c o nn e ct i on w i t h h i s p r o p o s al f o r a reduc- ,

    \

    Khrushchev seems t o b e l i e v e i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a tt h e So v i e t Union c o u ld i n f a c t s t r i k e t h e f i r s t bl w i fan enemy a t t a c k appeared imminent . Th is concept has beend i sc u ss e d i n S o v i et m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e as "pre-emptive"a c t i o n . The d i s c u s s i o n s have g e n e r a l l y af f i r m e d t h a t t h eUSSR would be cable t o g e t in t h e f i r s t blow by trirtae ofd isc over ing the enemy's p rep a ra t ions t o a t t a c k . Th i s w ouldmean beat ing the enemy t o the punch, as d i s t i n c t from ab-s o r b i n g t h e blow and r e t a l i a t i n g .

    a c t i o n , c o n c e iv e d r a th e r n a r r o w ly , in a May 1959 s ta teme n t'in which he took n o te of suaittements about American a b i l i t yt o d e v a s t a t e t h e U S S R wi t h a i r a t t a c k s " i n a m a t t e r ofhours ." H e o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e USSR d i d not depend on a i r -c r a f t a n d c o u ld l a u nc h more d e v a s t a t i n g a t t a c k s i n a " m a t -t e r of minutes from missi le b a se s w i th in t h e U S S R . "

    Wrushchev may have been referring t o "pss-qmptivett

    In h i s 1 4 January r e p o r t , Wr u s h c h e v t w i c e im p l i e d t h ep o s s i b i l i t y of e f f e c t t v e p r e - e m p t i v e a c t i o n . He s a i d t h a tt h e s o v i e t armed f o r c e s h a v e th e n e c e s s a r y f i r e p o w e r t o -d e t e r an enemy a t tack or t o "give him a proper rebuf f shou ldhe a t tempt ( s i c ) to a t t a c k . " Again, i n noting t h e h y p o th e t i -c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , he i m p li e d t h a t sur-pr i s e wou ld p robab ly no t be achieved . H i s f o r m a l a t i o n w a s ,"even i f one supposes fo r a moment t h a t it me a t t a c k e r 7s uc ce ed ed i n i n f l i c t i n g a su rp fkse a t t ack . . ? '

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    -- . . .-. . .

    . .

    . .

    I t is obv ious , however, t h a t Khrushchev is n o t r e l y i n gon t h e mere p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e f f e c t i v e p re -e mp ti ve a c t i o ncould be taken . R e h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e ld t h a t t h e S o v i e tUnion, however hard i t might be ; ih i t , shoaldcbe. able a$d wouldbe a b l e t o r e t a l i a t e w i th even g r e a te r fbrce.Khrushchev p u t t h i s c l e a r l y i n h i s 14 J a n u a r y r e p o r t .Assuming th a t a su rp r i se blow cou ld i n f a c t be s t r u c k , h es a i d , would the a t t a c k e r " be a b l e t o p u t olit-of o r d e r im-m e d ia t e ly a l l ;the stocks of nuclear weapons, a l l t h e r o c k e ti n s t a l l a t i o n s , on t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e power attacked?C e r t a i n l y n o t. " A l a r g e s t a t e t h u s a t t ac k ed , he went on,would "always be able t o give a powerful rebu ff t o t h ea g g r e s s o r .'Itf a c i l i t i e s were so s i t e d sts " to t n s u r e d u p l i c a t i o n a ndt r i p l i c a t i o n , " so t h a t if some r e t a l i t o r y c a p a b i l i t i e swere knocked i-xxdt .; ' t h e USSR' cou ld ye t " h i t t h e t a r g e t sf ram r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n s . "

    K hr ush che v s p e c i f i e d t h a t So v i e t mi s s i l e

    Khrushchev * s a p p a re n t p o s i t i o n a s a d e d i c a t e d missile-man, and a s one-mavfncted of t h e m i l i t a r y a nd t e c h n i c a lsoundness of his p o s i t i o n , m igh t s u g g e s t t h a t he would betempted t o go beyond the concept of "pre-emptive" ac t ionand t o adopt a s t r a t e g y o f p r e v en t i v e w ar . Th a t is,Rhrushchev ' s assessment of the speed w i t h which an ICBMa t t a c k c a n be l a un c he d , of t h e accuracy wi t h wh ich itcan be de l i ve re d , and of t h e enormous damage it c a n i n -f l i c t , cou ld conce ivab ly lead h im t o b e l i e v e t h a t th eadvan tages of a f i r s t s t r i k e would be decisive--and con-s e q u e n t l y , t h a t t h e USSR shou ld a t t empt t o se i ze these ad-vantage s by preven t ive war.Khrushchev' s 14 January rep or t a rgues aga in s t t h i sl i n e of though t . H i s pos i t i ons (noted above) on the un -l i k e l i h o o d of a s u c c e s s f u l s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , a nd on t h er e t a l i a t o r y p o w e r -which w o u ld s u r v iv e a n a t t a c k , weres t a t e d a s a pp ly in g t o any l a r g e s t a t e , n ot s im p l y t h eUSSR. A t a n o th e r p o in t in his r e p o r t , he ob s er v ed t h a tmodern methods of waging war do not give "any country" ad e c i s i v e a dv an ta ge t h ro u gh s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .

    1 4 J a n u ar y r e p o r t does n o t g e n u in e ly r e p r e s e n t h i s viewsa nd t h a t he h a s r e a l l y a d op te d a s t r a t e g y of p r e v e n t i v ewar, he would be e x p e c te d t o be t h i n k i n g i n terms of a

    In i hiS:.uOnneCtiOn, , If ' . i t i s - :a rguedl tha t Khrushchev ' s

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    . ..

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    * .

    . . . . . - .. . ..

    . '

    p a r t i c u l a r per iod of t i m e i n which t o i n i t i a t e h o s t i l i t i e s - -a p e r i o d in which h i s f o r c e s would have overwhelming sup er -i o r i t y and t h e r i s k of employing them a g g r e s s i v e ly would besmall. On t h i s h y p o th e s i s , t h e concep t of !!pre-emption'*c o u ld be used as a p l an n in g a nd t r a i n i n g d o c t r i n e t o c o v e rsecret p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a p r e v en t i v e s t r a t e g y . S u i t a b l eA merican i n t e n t i o n s c ou ld e a s i l y be "discovered '? a t what-e v e r time t h e USSR was prepa red t o s t r i k e .c a n r e t a l i a t i o n t o an ICBM a t tack w i l l become more nearlyau tomat ic as t h e American ICBM system becomes hardened,and hence t h a t s u r p r i s e at tack w i l l tend i n c r e a s i n g l y t olose i t s a d va n ta g es . The p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e ,are (1)whether Khrushchev foresees a p e r i o d i n t h e n e x tfew yea rs in whkch t h e r e l a t i v e S o v ie t and American capa-b i l i t i e s c o u ld make f eas i b l e a S o v i e t - i n i t i a t e d generalwar, and (2), if so, whether Khrushchev is t a k i n g s t ep st o e x pl o i t t h e a r r i v a l of such a per iod , beg inn ing h i sp r e p a r a t i o n s now and c o n c e n t r a t i n g h i s m i l i t a r y a nd eco-nomic re so urc es t o t h a t end.

    However, Khrushchev presumably re co gn iz es t h a t Ameri-

    - A t l e a s t one of Khrushchev ' s in te rv iews seems t o beard i r e c t l y on these q u e s t i o n s , In June 1959 Khrushchev t o l d an&nerPGan Visitor.; t h a t i f t h e So v ie t Union were t o spend30 b i l l i o n r u b l e s on missiles in t h e n ex t f i v e o r six y e a r s ,it c o u ld a c h i e v e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o d e s t ro y ev er y i n d u s t r i a lc e n t e r in t h e United S t a t e s and Europe. Khrushchev wenton t o remark t h a t he was speak ing on ly of t h e S o v i e t po-t e n t i a l , n o t of S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s .

    This s t a t e m e n t is i n t e r e s t i n g , on t h e one hand, asa n i n d i c a t i o n of K h ru sh c he v' s p o s s i b l e t h in k in g i n termsof a p o i n t i n t i m e a t which h i s fo rces cou ld have ove r -whe lming supe r io r i ty . The statement is of greater i n t e r e s t ,on t h e o t h e r h an d, a s a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Khrushchev w a sn o t t h i n k i n g in t e r m s of a S o v i e t d a sh toward an e a r l yx n t in t i m e a t which S o v i e t c a p a b i l i t i e s would be i n anoptimum position r e l a t i v e t o US d e f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s .A s i mi l a r l ack of commitment t o a program of maximumm i l i t a r y d e ve lo pm en t w a s r e f l ec t ed i n Khrushchev' s 14 Jan-u a r y r e p o r t .

    m i l i t a r y were w e l l below Soviet economic c a p a b i l i t i e s , andt h a t a d d i t i o n a l " t e n s of b l l l i o n s " of r u b l e s c o u l d be a l -l o c a t e d -f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d e v e lo p m e n t s were t o r e qu i re t h a t .He s a i d t h a t p r e s en t S o v i e t a l l o c a t i o n s to t h e

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    CONCLUSIONSThe pa t t e r n o f s t r a t e g i c t h ink ing which emerges fromKhrushchev ' s s t a t ement s on w a r p r o j e c t s a f u t u r e w hich i snot immediate ly a l a rming , bu t is h a r d l y r e a s s u r i n g , i nterms of U.S. s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s .The c e n t r a l e l em ent i n Khrushchev's thou ght appea rst o be a b e l i e f t h a t t h e USSR and t he U.S. h o ld i n r o u g h lyeq ua l measure weapons of t e r r i b l e d e s t r u c t i v e power. Inconsequence, he seems t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a tt h i s t i m e ' i s d e t e r r e d f ro m i n i t i a t i n g g e n e r a l w ar, a nd hehimsel f seems t o be deter red .The prospect of a p e r i o d of m i l i t a r y s ta l e m at e , i nwhich g en er al war w i l l be unaccep t ab le t o e i t h e r s i d e , i si n h i s v ie w co m pa ti bl e w i t h S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s . H e probab l yb e l i e v e s t h a t S o v i e t s t r a t e g y s h ou l d aim t o m a in t ai n a ndr e i nf o r c e t h i s s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t t h e USSR can e f f e c t i v e l ye x pl o i t t h i s s i t u a t i o n by va r i ous fo rm s of a c t i o n s h o r t ofgenera l war .

    regard l i m i t e d w a r a s u n l ik e l y i n t h e next f e w y e a r s .Khrushchev's c a lc u la t i o n of an approximate balance of power,d e t e r r i n g b ot h s i d e s f rom genera l war , describes a s i t u a t i o ni n which it m i g h t be concluded th a t l imi t ed war could bew aged w i t h r e l a t i ve l y s m a l l r i s k s .a p p a r e n t l y t o r e t a i n t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r l i m i t ed w a r a sw e l l as f o r g e n e r a l w a r .Khrushchev appears t o b e l i e v e i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y ofef f ec t i v e Sovie t l l pre -empt ive" a c t io n aga ins t an enemy a t -t a c k . A t p r e s e n t , t h e da ng er seems s m a l l t h a t Americans t a t e m e n t s a nd a c t i o n s w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d by Khrushchev.a s i n d i c a t in g American i n t e n t i o ns which would j u s t i f y t h eUSSR i n s t r i k i n g t h e f i r s t blow under t h e "pre-emptive"conc ept . The dang er would, of course , i nc rea se i f Khrushchevwere t o see s i gn s o f A merican r e s t l e s s ne s s t o employ U.S.n u c le a r c a p a b i l i t i e s , o r of American d i s t r e s s or d e s p e r a t i o no v er a d e t e r i o r a t i n g U.S. p o s i t i o n .

    In t h i s connec t ion , Khrushchev does no t ne ce ss ar i l y

    Soviet armed E orces a re

    In anypose&bi$it yt o m ai nt ai ncas e , Khrushchev c l ea r ly does no t r e l y on t h e.C)f . e f f e c t i v e .T'px#?eemptfae"a c t i d n . H e i n t e n d sa m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y wh i ch w i l l enable t h e

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    I

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    .

    Sov i e t Union t o absortPve5y..

    a he av y blow and t o r e t a l i a t e effec-The l i m i t e d e v id e nc e c o n s id e re d i n t h i s p a pe r d o es n o tpermi t a judgment a s t o whether Khrushchev is s e r i o u s l ytempted by a s t r a t e g y of prevent ive war.appea r s , on balance, t o give some smal l suppor t t o th e v iewt h a t Khrushchev t o date has no t adop t ed such a s t r a t eg y andis no t a t t h i s t i m e a t t em p t i ng t o a c h i ev e t h e c a p a b i l i t i e swhich would make such a s t r a t e g y f e a s i b l e ,

    The evidence s imply

    ;

    I

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    APPENDIX

    A SELECTION OF KERUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS ON WAR, 1957-591. CBS In ter vi ew , 29 May 1957

    (Cutler r e c a l l e d K h r us hc he v 's r e c e n t s t a t e m e n t (toC at l edge ) t h a t t h e US i s unques t ionab ly p repa r ing a w a ra g a i n s t t h e USSR and asked f o r comment.)s a 4 d w hat y ou r p o l i t i c i a n s , y ou r generals , your commandersand admirals say . Gdd knows how many speeches are made i nyour c o u n t r y a nd a l l of them t r y t o prove t h a t th e US i scapable of d e s t r o y i n g th e So vi et Union i n a matter of hours.We, on t h e c o n t r a r y , do n o t i n d u l g e i n such t a l k ; e m o l i -t i c i a n s do n o t make speeches showing how w e are going t od e s t r o y t h e US.....

    (Khrushchev:) That is no opinion of mine. I merely

    (Schorr recalled Marshal Zhukov say ing someth ing t ofghrushchev:) Let us r e c a l l what Marshal Zhukov s a i d .

    t h a t e f f e c t . )I t h i n k Zhukov d i d n o t s a y t h a t . Why d o you n o t i n d i c a t ewhen and where ZhUaov s a i d a n y t h i n g l i k e w e are going t od e s t r q y America? H e r e i s what w e s a i d , and I d o n o t d e nyi t : If m i l i t a r y and c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l beaders i n t h e USs a y t h a t t h e y can d e s t r o y the Sov ie t Un ion , if p r e s e n t - d a y 'weapons m a k e i t possible t o d e s t r o y a n o th e r c o u n t r y , t h a tc o u n t r y which t h e y w i s h t o d e s t r o y e a p p a r e n t l y i s a l socapable of d e s t r o y i n g a c e r t a i n c ou nt ry .our s t r e n g t h on t h i s s c o r e . .2.. Res ton In te rv iew, 7 October 1957

    The p r e s e n t per iod i s something l i k e a t u r n i n g p o i n t ,M i l i t a r y s p ec i a l i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t p la n e s , whether bomberso r f i g h t e r s , are i n t h e i r d e c l i n e . Bombers have such speedsand a l t i t u d e s t h a t t h e y are v u l n e r a b l e t o at tack by modernrockets TmissilesT. Fig h t e r s , o n t h e other hand, now havesuch a g r e a t speed t h a t t h e i r u s e a g a i ns t f i g h t e r s i s becoming

    W are s u r e ofFBIS Daily Repor t , 4 June 1957

    L

    a

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    d i f f i c u l t , w h i l e agains t bombers they are a l so i n s u f f i c i e n t l ye f f e c t i v e . Moreover, f i g h t e r s a re manned by people, whom ofc o u r s e w e do not want t o l o s e .I am n o t im p ly in g t h a t a l l t h i s is t r u e of o u r o o n t r yonly . Al though t h e U n i t e d Sta t es d o es n o t h av e t h e . r o c k e ttoday, you w i l l have i t , s i n c e s c i e n c e i s c o n s t a n t l y de-ve lop ing . The same may be s a i d of t h e Soviet Union: i ft o d a y w e do not trave someth ing tha t you have , w e w i l l havei t , too. . . NYT, 10 October 1957

    3. Toronto Telegram I n t e r v i e wThe p r o d u c i n g ' o f i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s l e s h a s s o l v e dt h e q u e s t i o n of d e l i v e r i n g a hydrogen charge t o any po in t

    .of t h e g lobe . Dis tance no l o n g e r p r e v e n t s t h i s . If r e f e r e n c ehas t o be made t o t h e m i l i t a r y bases i n Europe, Africa, andA s i a , t h e n there h av e be en i n e x i s t e n c e f o r a l o n g t i m e a l -r e a d y miss i les which can reach a ny r e gio n of t h e s e c o n t i n e n t s .I t h in k t h a t it i s n o t a secret now t h a t there i s a n a s s o r t -ment of miss i l es w i t h which any t a s k of a i r o p e r a t i o n s ofs t r a t eg ica l charac te r can be s o lv e d . I t is , of course ,a l s o no l o n g e r a secret t h a t such missi les have now bothatomic and hydrogen war-heads.. .. 18 itt-t1%~%3l.go s s i b l e topresume t h a t m i l i t a r y bases are known on ly t o t h o s e whose t them up? And when t h e p o s i t i o n of these bases i s knownt h e n , c o n s id e r in g p r e s e n t d ev elop m en ts i n r o c k e t a nd o t h e rt e c h n i c s , these bases can be incapac i ta ted qu ick ly . . . .4 November 1957

    S o v i e t N e w s Bulletin (CPnada)4. Shan i ro In te rv iew. 14 November 1957

    German mil i t a r i s t s unders tand t h a t i f t h e y were t o l auncha war now, s ev e ra l hour s would be s u f f i c i e n t t o c ru sh a l lt h e bases i n West Germany which are of m i l i t a r y importance.Such a re r e a l i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s . Th e r e f o r e w e t h i n k t h a ti n t h e l o n g run it w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o b r in g t h e most war-l i k e peop le t o t h e i r senses . However much t h e y are s p o i l i g gf o r a f i g h t , a s t r a i t j a c k e t cou ld be p u t on them a l s o . . . .The American people however do not want war and f e a r i t .And n o t withou t reason , I b e l i e v e , f o r w a r t oday is a g r i m

    war, and t h e United Sta tes , b a r r i n g t h e C i v i l War and t h esmall campaign aga ins t Mexico, s t i l l does n o t know what w a rb

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    .

    means. If war i s n o t a v e r t e d , t h e Americans w i l l e x p e r i e n c et h e most d e v a s t a t i n g war e v er known by mankind. I t w i l lrage n o t o n ly i n Eur op e and A s i a b u t , w i t h no less?fufyy . ; ,i n t h e United States.

    Some American leaders t h r e a t e n t h e So v i e t Union, s a y in gt h a t t h e y ha ve e n c i r c l e d o u r c o u n t r y w i t h m i l i t a r y bases.It i s t r u e , we are surrounded by American bases. B u t i tshouid be borne i n mind t h a t modern m i l i t a r y t e c h n iq u e smake it poss ib le t o k ee p a l l of America's v i t a l c en t er sunder f i r e from submarines and w i t h t h e h e l p of b a l l i s t i cmissiles, and t o blockade t h e US coast . This means t h a tt h e United Sta tes is now j u s t as v u l n e r a b l e as any o t he rcountry. . . .w i t h t h e development of rocket weapons?

    (Shapiro :) A r e m i l i t a r y bases l o s i n g t h e i r importance

    (Khrushchev:) Unquestionably. Bombers c ou ld i n t h e i rt i m e be s topped by a n t i a i r c r a f t f i r e , a r t i l l e r y , o r r o c k e t s ,b u t there is no s t o p p i n g t h e i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i cm i s s i 3 e .You w i l l say: W t t w i l l n o t t h e Sov ie t .Un ion su f fe rtoo? O f c o u r s e , w e t o o w i l l s u f f e r grea t losses. Butlook a t t h e v a s t spaces on our map and look a t Germany,France, and Bri tAf n. One do es nb t have t o be a s t r a t eg i s t ,a m i l i t a r y man, t o see t h e difference.( S h a p i r o : ) America t o o has v a s t e x p a n s e s .(Khrushchev:) N o t q u i t e a s vast. And it should bekep t i n mind t h a t American c i t i e s such as N e w York, Chicago,San Franc isco and o t h e r s have a l a rge c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f in-d u s t r i e s . Our d n d u s t s i e g are more widely dispersed . More-o v e r , t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of i n d u st r y t h a t w e have carriedo u t i n s u r e s a more autonomous management of i n d u s t r y , whicha l s o i s a p l u s s t r a t e g i c a l l y . . .The United Sta tes has z r o ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ h t : ~ ~ ~t i n e n t a l . o n e s . Fo r us, t h e i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i cm i s s i l e i s a s e t t l ed q u e s t i o n . If n e c e s s a r y , w e canlaunch any number of sputniks w e w a n t . And w e w i l l ' l a u n c hthem, for the re i s no t e c h n i c a l p ro bl em t o i t . I t i s -.

    mere ly a matter of p l a c i n g t h e necessary equipment in placeof t h e hydrogen charge. W e have al ready developed anC

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    i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c missi le w i t h a hydrogen warhead.However, th e tes ts were conducted w i t h blanks. W e wouldl i k e n e v e r t o have t o launch rockets wi th hydrogen warheads.(Shapiro:) You s a i d ear l ie r t h a t bombers have beenmade obs ol et e by th e development of ro ck et tec hniq ues , buto ur m i l i t a r y l e a d er s s a y t h a t t h i s is no t so.

    (Khrushchev:) But t h e y c an n ot s a y d i f f e r e n t l y . I ft h e y a d m i t t e d t h a t i t is so, t h e American taxpayers wouldsay : - You have taken so many b i l l i ons f rom us a n d b u i l tbombers., What a re you going t o do w i t h them? Your m i l i t a r yl e a d e r s are h a rd p u t t o i t t o g i v e up t h e p o l i c y t h eyhave pu r sued t hus f a r w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e t e c h n i c a l e q u i p-ment of the army.su rpas sed t h e United Sta tes no t on l y r ega rd i ng t h e i n t e r -c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e , b ut a l s o i n t h e manufactureof rockets i n g e n e r al ?

    (Wrus hchev :) Most assuredly. . . .Our de si gn er s havea l s o d ev el op ed r o c k e t s t h a t can , i n t h e even t of an a t t a c kon our coun t ry , d i spose of any base i n Europe, Asia, andAfrica. On t h e v ery f i r s t t r y o u r rocket h i t t h e t a rge t . . .5 . Hearst In te rv iew, 22 November 1957

    t i o n of new typ es of weapons w e have ou t s t r ipped your count ry .W e now posses s t he ab so l u t e weapon, pe r f ec t i n eve ry res-p e c t and created i n a s h o r t p e r io d of time. I am n o t sayingt h i s t o i n t i m i d a t e , t h e r e is no need f o r t h a t ; I am s implys t a t i n g a f a c t ! Our s c i e n t i s t s , e n g i n e e rs , t e ch n ic a ns ,and workers have produced t he most up-to-date weapon. TheSov i e t Union posse s se s i n t e r con t i n en t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s .I t has mi s s i l e s of d i f f e r e n t s ys te ms for d i f f e r e n t p u rp os es ;a l l o u r missiles can be f i t t e d w i t h atomic and hydrogen w a r -heads. Thus, w e have p roved ou r supe r i o r i t y i n t h i s ques t i on .And I f w a r now breaks out--and it can be unleashed only bp- . thea g g r e s s i v e c i rc l es of t h e United St a t e s of America, becauseo t h e r c o u n t r i e s w i l l no t dare to un leash i t - - then t h i s w i l lbe a g r e a t m is f o r tu n e f o r t h e peop l e s of t hose coun t r i e s onwhose t . e r r i to r i e s American bases are s i tua ted , and f rom which

    (Shapiro:) You be l i eve t ha t t he Sov i e t U n i on h a s

    FBIS Dai ly Report , 19 November 1957

    I a l so w a n t t o t e l l you, M r . Hearst, t h a t i n t h e crea-

    d

    i

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    t h e USA is p r e p a r i n g t o s k r i k e a blow a t t h e Sov i e t Unionand t h e o t h e r g o c i a l i s t count r i es . Obvious ly , t h e p e o p l e swhose governments have, behind t h e peoples ' backs , per-m i t t e d American m i l i t a r y bases t o be se t up on t h e te r r i -t o r y of t h e i r c o u n t r i e s , may s u f f e r s e v e r e l y . T h i s is n o ta t h r e a t e i ther . But s i n c e t h e USA has se t up m i l i t a r ybases and wants t o s t r i k e blows a t t h e S o v i e t Union fromthese bases, w e are forced t o take p r o t e c t i v e m ea su re s.The American bases are n o t s i t u a t e d on p l o t s of w as t e l and ,bu t on d e n s e l y p o pu l at e d t e r r i t o r i e s , and w e hope t h a t t h epeoples of t h o s e c o u n t r i e s , where t h e m i l i t a r y bases ares i t u a t e d , w i l l s o b e r l y appraise t h e s i t u a t i o n and w i l lunde r s t and what m i l i t a r y blocs , NATO i n th e f i r s t place,lead t o . That i s t h e f i r s t po i n t .

    The second po in t i s t h a t i t should be t a k e n i n t oaccount t h a t t h e U n i t e d States o f America h a s never ac-t u a l l y waged war on i t s own t e r r i t o r y a nd y ou r p e op l e donot know what w a r m e a n s . If a w a r i s unleashed now byt h e a g g r e s s i v e c i r c le s of t h e USA, it w i l l be waged n o to n l y in &rope, A s i a , o r Africa; t h i s w a r w i l l immediatelybe c a r r i e d o n t o t h e t e r r l k o r y of t h e United Sta t es o fAmerica because now t h e i n t e r c o n t i n e n t k l ' b a l l i s t i c m i s -s i l e s make it p o s s i b l e t o h i t nt&rg@:$ in any area of t h eglobe., In t h i s case, t h e American people w i l l s u f f e renormous losses . A l l means- - in t e rcont inen ta l b a l l i s t i emissi les , subm ar i n e ' m i s s i l e s , and o t h e r means which nowe x i s t - - w i l l be used in case of an armed co n f l i c t . Youyourse l f unde r s t and t h a t t h i s is t h e l o g i c of war, t h el o g i c of s t rugg l e . . . .

    B e l i eve m e , gentlemen, t h a t w e want only peace a n df r i e nds h i p . The Sov i e t Union has i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s -t i c missi les w i t h hydrogen warheads. But I have a l r eadys ta ted on beha l f of o u r pa r t y and t h e Government of theSoviet Union, on behalf of t h e Sov i e t people, and I repeatnow, t h a t w e s h a l l never l aunch such a m i s s i l e a g a i n s tt h e US A if t h e USA i t s e l f does not compeP us t o t h i s bybeginning a war a g a i n s t u s d i r e c t l y o r th ro ug h i t ssa t e l l i t e s . The Soviet Union w i l l n ev er r e s o r t t o armsf i r s t , atomic and hydrogen weapons included, ; : -bhtwwil l i ikeep them t o d e a l any aggressor an appropriate counterblow. . . .

    e

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    . ..

    (Cons idine in t e r j ec t e d : You s a i d t h a t i n case of bar,American bases , bo t h i n t h e count ry and abroad, w i l l bed em olis he d by S o v i e t i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s .Does t h i s mean t h a t a l r e a d y t o da y t h ey are s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e don a l l these t a r g e t s ? )

    (Khrushchev con tinu ed:) Th is is a q u es t io n f o r t h eChief o f th e Genera l S t a f f , as it l i e s o u t s i d e t h e scopeof my du t i es . Th a t ' s what th e Genera l S ta f f e x i s t s f o r , t obe ready in case of w a r t o h i t t hose cen t e r s w h i ch ared e c is i v e f o r t h e speedy ending of t h e war, f o r d e f e a t i n gt h e enemy.In c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s , I would l i k e t o express m yviews wi th regard t o s t a t e m e n t s made by c e r t a i n r e p r e s e n t a -t i v e s of m i l i t a r y c i rc l es an d publ i shed i n t h e p r e s s. I t

    w a s r e p o r t e d t h a t , a l l e g e d l y , a p a r t of th e American bomberforce, with hydrogen and atomic bombs, * is : c o n s t a n t l y i nt h e a i r , and always ready t o s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union.Repor t s have it th a t one-half of t h e p l a n e s are i n t h e a i r .This is ve ry dangerous. Such a s i t u a t i o n s e r v e s a san i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e e x t e n t o f t h e m i l i t a r y p s yc h os i s i nt h e USA. When planes w i t h hydrogen bombs take o f f t h a tm e a n s t h a t many people w i l l be i n t h e a i r p i l o t i n g them.Thiere-3s always t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a men t a l blackout whent h e p i l a t may t a k e t h e s l i g h t e s t s i g na l as a s i gn a l f o ra c t io n and f l y t o t h e t a r g e t t h a t he had b e e n i n s t r u c t e dt o f l y to . Under such co nd i t io ns a war may s t a r t p u r e l y b yc ha n ce , s i n c e r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n would be taken immediately .Does t h i s n o t g o t o show t h a t i n s u ch a case a w a rmay s t a r t as a r e s u l t of a sh ee r misunderstancling o r ofa derangement in t h e normal psychic s t a t e of a person, whichmay happen t o anybody. Such a h o r r i b l e p o s s i b i l i t y must beexcluded. I t may be tha t bo th s ides w i l l be a g a i n s t war,and ye t w a r may s t i l l s t a r t a s a r e s u l t of t h e m i l i t a r ypsy cho sis whipped up i n t h e United S t a t e s of America....The f a c t t h a t ' t h e Sov i e t Union was t h e f i r s t t ol aunch an a r t i f i c i a l e a r t h s a t e l l i t e , which within a monthw a s fo l lowed by another one, speaks of a l o t . If neces sa ry ,tomorrow w e c a n l aunch t en o r t w ent y sa t e l l i t e s . A l l t h a tis r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s i s t o r e p l a c e t h e warheads o f an i n t e r -

    c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c rocket w i t h t h e neces sa ry i n s t rum en t s ,and launch t h e whole t h i ng wi th t h e i n s t rum en t s . T he re ' sa s a t e l l i t e f o r you. . . . PRAVDA, 29 November 1957

    !

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    6 . In t e rv i ew w i t h W. Sinnbeck, e d i t o r of Dansk F o l k s t y r e ,15 January 19 st h e o u t s t a n d i n g s u c c e s s e s s c o r e d by t he S ov i e t Union i n t h edevelopment of sc ience and t echnology and a l s o t h a t t h eUSSR h a s o u t s t r i p p e d t h e l e ad i ng c a p i t a l i s t c ou nt ry , t h eU n i t ed S t a t e s , i n t h e f i e l d of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l pro-g r e s s .t h a t a s e r i o u s c h an ge has occurred i n t h e b a l a n c e . of f o r cesbetw een t he co un t r i e s o f soc i a l i sm and c a p i t a l is m i n f a v o ro f t h e s o c i a l i s t - . n a t i o n s .7 . London Times In te rv iew. 31 January 1958

    The l au n c hi n g o f t h e S o v i e t s p u t n i k s f i r s t of a l l shows

    The l aunchi ng of t h e spu t n i k s a l s o shows, wi thout doubt ,

    FBIS Dai ly Report , 15 January1958

    Now t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union is n o t a l o n e and t he mightys o c i a l i s t camp, embracing almost a b i l l i o n p eo pl e, i s grow-i n g s t r o n g e r , h op es t o d e s t r o y t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i es byf o r c e a re i l l u s o r y . This is o u t of t h e ques t i on . T ha t iswhy we m a i n t a i n powerful armed forces-- they se rv e t o coolt h e a r do r o f t h e i m pe r i a l i s t madmen.8. A r m e d Forces Day C e l e b r a t i o n , 23 February 1958

    Khrushchev s a i d t h a t t h e armed f o r c e s were beingequipped w i t h " t h e most t e r r i fy ing weapons of a l l t i m e . . .such weapons as have neve r ex i s t ed be fo re . "NYT, 24 Feburary 1958

    FBIS Dai ly Report , 15 Februa ry=

    9. . Second Let ter t o Russell , 5 March 1958The Soviet Union, of course , has weapons a g a i n s t t h e s em.S.7 bases. I t a l s o has i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s & i c rockets.Knd a t h o u g h t h e U nit ed Sta tes of America l i e s a c o n s i d e r a b l eway from t h e Soviet Union, t h e So vi et Union now pos se ss est h e means of f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t t h e USA i f t h e l a t t e r s h o u l dun l eash war a ga in s t us . The Sov iet Union had the se meansp r e v i o u s l y a l so , i n t h e f o r m of in t e r -c on t in en ta l bombers ,b u t t h e b a l l i s t i c r o c k e t is of course an improved weapon....

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    .. . . . . . , . -. .

    You know very well, b r d Russell, that modrn arma-ments, atomic and hydrogen bombs, will be exceptionallydangerous during a time of war not only for the two warn-ing states, in terms of direct devastation and destructionof human beings; they will also be deadly for states wish-ing to stay aside from the military operations, since thepoisoned soil, air, food, etc., would become the source ofterrible torments and the slow annihilation of millions ofpeople. There is in the world today an enormous quantityof atom and hydrogen bombs. According to the scientists'calculations, if'they were all to be exploded simultaneously,the existence of almost every living thing on earth wouldbe threatened. Soviet News, London,21 March 1958

    12. Luncheon for Finnish President, May 1958In order to establish stability in the world and averta new war, it is necessary to recognize the status quo--that is, the prevailing situation--and not to try to changethat situation by force. Otherwise, the inevitability ofwar will have to be recognized. FBIS RPB, REI., %8,:25LStine 1958

    h

    . . .

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    . /

    14.

    .

    October 1958

    13 . L e t t e r t o Pres iden t E isenhower , 7 September. ' 1958Does i t n o t seem t o you, M r . P r e s id e n t , t h a t s uc hd i s p a t c h of w a r s h ips now i n o n e d i r e c t i o n , now i n a n o t h e r,l o ses today much of i t s s e n s e , a t l ea s t w i t h r e s p e c t t oc ou n tr ie s posses s ing modern weapons? I do not know whaty ou r m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r s t e l l you, but it seems t o u s t h e ycannot but know tha t t h e heyday of su r fac e navy powers i so v e r . I n t h e a g e of nuclear and rocket weapons of un-p receden t*ed power and ra p i d ac t i on , th ese once formidablewarsh ips a re f i t , ili f a c t , f o r n ot hi ng b u t c o u rt e sy v i s i t sand gun sa lu te s , and can se rv e a s t a rge ts for t h e r i g h tt y p e s o f r o c k e t s . Th i s may h u r t t h e p r i d e of t h e peoplec l o s e l y c o nn e ct e d w i th t h e na vy , b u t t h e s e are t h e i n c o n -t e s tab le f a c t s one canno t ignore .FBIS Daily Report ,

    9 September 1958

    Khrushchev asserted t h a t t h e USSR had no navy no rany submarines i n t h e Black Sea, b u t y e t S o v i e t m i s s i l e s"could wipe ou t Turkey i n 15 minutes." \(During t h e walk he sa id : ) "There a re t w o t h in g s y o umust unders tand . The So vie t Union do es n ' t want war, andunder .your system t h e U ni te d S t a t e s c a n ' t s t a r t a war.I s n ' t i t f o o l i s h therefore t o c o nt i nu e e n d le s s l y t h i sco I d war?''"We have kept up w i t h you i n t h e armaments race. I nf a c t , i n some ways I t h i n k w e are ahead."

    I I15. Lippman Interview, 25 October -1958

    h r u s h c h e v ' s view of t h e e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y b al an ceof poGez7 rests. . .on h i s c o n f id e n c e t h a t t h e Sovie t Unionh a s mastered t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e an d s h o r t r a n g e m i s s i l e s t oa p o i n t there it can dominate w i t h them Germany and west-e r n Europe , Turkey and I r an . I do not know, of c o u r s e ,whe the r h i s c o n f id e n c e i n these m i s s i l e s is j u s t i f i e d . B u tt h e r e i s no doub t t h a t h e a ssumed t h e i r e x i s t e n c e i n h i st h in k in g , a n d t h a t they have now become, a s t h e s a y i n g goes,a p r i n c i p a l i n st r um e nt of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y .

    i

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    On t h e o t h e r h an d, n o th in g t h a t he s a i d impl ied t h a th e t h i n k s t h e USSR h a s l o n g r a n g e missiles which have broken,o r are a bo ut t o b r e ak , t h e e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y stalemate w i tht h e U ni te d S t a t e s . His c on ce pt io n o f h i s m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o nin r e l a t i o n t o t h e U ni te d S t a t e s is t h a t n e i t h e r c o u n t r y c a ndefea t t h e o t h e r i n a d i r e c t c o n f l i c t , b u t t h a t the Americanfo rward po s i t i on s , pa r t i c u la r ly i n Germany and Turkey, can ,because of the development of th e rocke t , no longer bede fended , H e f e e l s , t h e r e f or e , t h a t American p o l i c y restson a n o b s o l e t e estimate of th e ex i s t i ng ba lance of power.N e w York Herald Tribune,10 November 195816. Remarks a t Kremlin Reception, 7 November 1958

    Khrushchev sa id t h a t t h e So vi et Union coul d knock I t a l yo u t i n two hours by us ing rockets based on S o v i e t t e r r i -t o r y , b u t s ince t h i s would invo l ve shoo t ing ove r o t he r peop les 't e r r i t o r y , t h e Sov ie t Union would e s t ab l i s h adequa te basesi n A lb a n i a , if I t a l y p e r s i s t e d i n h e r p r e se n t p la n s.

    17. M i l i t a r y Academy Spe ech , 14 November 1958Given modern means of d e s t r u c t i o n , t h e emergence ofa tomic and hydrogen weapons, the c re a t io n o f in t e rco n t i nen -t a l b a l l i s t i c rockets and winged rockets , and submarinesarmed w i t h b a l l i s t i c and winged rockets, of what s i g n i f i c a n c e

    is t h e f a c t t h a t th e NATO armed fo rc es can now i ns ur e t heestablishment of communications between Paris and Oslo i na f e w seconds?n o t o n l y a i r f i e l d s and the m e a n s ^ o f communications ofvar iou s headquar te r s , bu t who le c i t i e s w i l l be blown sky-high, whole co un tr ie s can be des tro yed , Such is t h eenormous d e s t r u c t i v e power of modern weapons created by man.

    Now i k s u f f i c e s t o press b u t one but ton and

    Moscow Radio Broadcast15 November 195818. Humphrey Interview, 1 December 1958

    (Regarding Be rl in , Khrushchev s a i d : ) Some of yourm i l i t a r y men have made s t u p i d s t a t em e n t s l a t e l y , s t a t em e n t st o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e U n it ed S t a t e s w i l l break th rough wi th

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    . . . . ._

    3EeMiz

    t a n k s i f t h e E a s t German Republic t r i e s t o g et i n the way .The Sov ' ie t s have tank s, too, l o t s of them,and I warn yout h a t be w i l l use them. W have rocke t s , too, and w e don' teven have t o f i r e them from E a s t Germany.' W can send themfrom t h e USSR.

    [Kegarding n u c le a r weapons, Khrushchev made t h r e ep o i n t g , a c c o r d i n g t o Humphrey:' (1) The'Soviet Union now h a sa superabundance of atomic and hydrogen bombs of a l l s i ze sand missiles t o del iver them anywhere it chooses ; (2)The S ov ie t Union se r io u s ly wan ts an agreement t o suspendf u r t h e r - t e s t s of nuclear weapons; (3) The Soviet Union h a sno i n t e n t i o n of a g r e e in g t o any t h i ng t h a t w i l l re s t r i c ti t s a b i l i t y t o d e l i v e r s u r p r is e a t t a c k s 7Humphrzy a r t i c l e LIFE12 January 195919. Concluding Speech at :.TWenQpyfirst Pa rt y Congress, 5 ,February 1YbY....American gen e ra l s and s t a t e sm en o f t en s ay t h a t t h eU n i t ed S t a t e s i s i n a more f a v or a bl e p o s i t io n m i l i t a r i l ytha n th e Sov ie t Union, because i t h a s a s t r i n g of m i l i t a r ybases in t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of European and Asian co un t r ie swhich may be used t o s t r i k e a t ouf coun t ry , whereas t h eSoviet Union, t h e y s a y , s t i l l has f e w i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a lr o c k e t s .

    For t h i s r ea son , t hey assert t h a t w a r is n o t r e a l l ya g re a t menace t o t h e United S t a t e s . For example, U.S.D efense Sec re t a ry McElroy s ta ted t h e o t h e r d ay t h a t t h eU n it ed S t a t e s would oonduc t m i l i t a ry ope ra t i ons f rom t h et e r r i t o r i e s of i t s a l l i e s l o c a t e d n e a r t h e borders of t h eUSSR, w h i l e th e So vi et Union would have t o depend so l e l yon r o c k e ts t h a t it can l aunch from i t s own t e r r i t o r y , , . .When s t ra teg ic p l a n s are b u i l t on a f a l s e premise t h i scan l e a d t o e r r o r s heading d i sa s t rous consequences f o r t h ec a u s e of peace. If a s t a t e t h i n k s t h a t a t any given momenti t s a d v e r s a r y lacks t h e weapon t o s t r i k e a t i t s t e r r i t o r y ,t h e t em p t a t i on may a r i s e t o use t h i s propi t ious moment f o rs t a r t i n g a w a r . If any US statesmen happen t o t h i n k t h a $t oday t h e i r t e r r i t o r y is i n v u l n e r a b l e t h ey mi gh t a r r i v ea t t h e conc l us i on t h a t t h e r i g h t t i m e h a s come f o r t h e m t os t a r t a w a r , and t o pay-the pr ice of war w i t h t h e blood

    k

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    and l i v e s of Englishmen, Frenchmen, I t a l i a n s , Germans,Turks, and t h e i r o t he r a l l i e s , whose t e r r i t o r y would i n :t h e even t o f w a r be l a i d bare w i t h i n t e rm ed i a t e and sho r t -r ange rock e t s , w h i le t he United St a t es would , i n t h eopin ion of these myopic m i l i t a r y " s t r a t e g i s t s , '' be ab let o s a fe g ua r d i t s e l f f rom des t ruc t ion . . . . .

    I t h i n k it is h i g h time f o r t h e American s t r a t e g i s t st o come o ut of t h e i r f o o l ' s p a r ad is e t h a t in t h e e v e n t o fa m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e U n i t e d St a t e swould remain inv uln er abl e . For a l ong t i m e now t h i s h a sno t accorded w i t h r e a l i t y , and has been no th ing m o r e t hanw i s h f u l t h i n k i n g on t h e p a r t o f America's g e n e r a l s . I npo i n t o f f a c t , t he So v i e t Union has today t he means t od e l i v e r a c rush i ng b low t o t he agg re s so r a t any po in t o ft h e globe . A f t e r a l l , it is n o t a mere f i gu re of speechwhen w e s a y w e have organized s e r i a l product i on o f i n t e r -c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c rockets . Nor do w e say i t t ot h r e a t e n an yon e, b u t r a t h e r t o b ri n g c l a r i t y i n t o t h ee x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s . PRAVDA, 6 February 1959

    20. Remarks a t B e r l i n A i r po r t en r o u t e t o I e i p z i g , 4 March1959-here e x i s t i n s t r u m e n t s which measure t h e resistanceof mater ia ls . If it were p o s si b le t o i n ve nt an i n S t r k e n twhich would measure with t h e same prec i s ion , i n p o l i t i c s

    , and i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , t h e resistance of both s i d e s , t h esoc ia1 i s t : camp and t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s , it would showyou t h a t both s i d e s a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o ng a t presen t . . . .

    W e do no t w a n t war, and w e w i l l d o e v e r y th i n g t o p r e -ven t it. But if t h e Western powers were t o s t a r t w a r , i t soutcome, given modern m i l i t a r y technology, would be f a t a lt o them. A f t e r a l l when t h e y s a y t h a t t h e y have m i l i t a r yb as es c l o s e t o o u r - . f r o n t i e r s , i t is t o be unde r st ood t h a tt h e s e bases are no t lo cat ed on th e moon, but in d e n s e l ypopula t ed areas. And i f t h e s e bases are c l o s e t o us ,th i s ,means t h a t w e are c l o se t o them.FBIS Dai ly Report- 5 March'195921 . Kremlin Press Conference. 19 March 1959

    Some exceed ingl y bo as t f ul American ge ne ra ls andadm i ra l s s a y t h a t t h e US, i f it s t a r t e d a war now, would1

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    des t roy t h e USSR in se ve ra l days . Obvious ly they arew e a k in mathematics. O t h e r w i s e t h e y might ask themse lvest h e q ue s ti on : and how lo ng would it take t o d e s t r oy t h eU ni te d S t a t e s i f i t unleashed a w a r ? For w a r is n o t aone-s ided ope ra t ion ; it can t u r n b a d l y a g a i n s t t h e s i d ewhich begins i t . I t is common knowledge t h a t t h e o t h e rs i d e h as no fewer f o r c e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s thah t h o s erep resen ted by Tay lo r and Burke. FBIS Daily Repor t20 March 185922. In te rv ie w wi th ,Gennan SPD E d i t o r s , 5 May 1959

    You may s a y : But would t h e So v ie t Union s u f f e r nol o s s e s in t h e e v e n t o f w a r ? Y e s , i t would have losses ,and g r e a t o n e s . But , whi le w e would s u f f e r l o s s e s , t h eWestern powers would be l i t e r a l l y wiped o f f t h e f a c e oft h e e a r t h . FBIS D a i l y Report11 May 195923. I n t e r v i e w w i t h F l o r i d a Businessmen, 19 May 1959

    Khrushchev s a i d t h a t t h e USSR had no i n t e n t i o n ofi n s t i g a t i n g a w a r ; t h a t f o r a l l of t h e bragg ing US generalshad dorie about t h e i r a b i l i t y t o d ev as ta te t h e USSR w i t ha i r a t t a c k s i n a m a t t e r of hours , the USSR d i d n ' t dependon a i r c r a f t , bu t cou ld launch mmwddvas ta t ing a t t a c k s i na "matter of minutes from m i s s i l e bases w i t h i n t h e USSR."When one of o u r . F z 7 g e n e r a l s makes a n i r r e s p o n s i b l es t a t e m e n t about how our count ry could des tr oy t h e USSR i na hklf hour , he f b - u s h c h e v 7 is f o rc e d t o r e p l y in s i m i l a rv e in by i u d i c a t i z g t h a t wXThin a f e w minu tes Sov ie t missi lesc o u ld d e s t r o y o u r m i s s i l e bases l o c at e d i n c o u n t r i e s t h a tare o ur a l l i e s . He added t h a t when these s t a t e m e n t s con-t i n ue t o be r e p e a t e d h e may e ven ha ve t o p o i n t o u t t h a tt h i n g s c o u l d be done t o t h e U S i n a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t t i m e .As l o n g as w e have , ,ou r roc ke t s in A l l i e d t e r r i t o r y t he ycan be c o n s id e r e d a s n o th in g b u t a t h r e a t t o t h e USSR.H e t h e n went on t o s a s " t h a t t h e i r miss i les o u td a t e dour bomber force.fense p o s s i b l e a g a i n s t S o v i et missi les . He remarked t h a t

    t h e USSR deci ded s e v e r a l years ago t h a t bombers never wouldH e s t a t e d f l a t l y t h a t t h e r e is no de-

    m

    7 - - - --___-__ - - - _ _ _ ____

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    f l y much above 45 t housand fee t , nor f a s t e r t h a n twice t h espeed of sound f o r more than a few minutes, and t h a t there-f o r e , t h e y were e a s y t a r g e t s t o d es tr oy ., ,; wH ;e wi ll n e O e ruse o ur missiles f i r s t . " m-24. Speech a t Writers' Congress , 23 May 1959

    W are e x p e r i e n c i n g an expansive development ofscience and technology. Our technology changes and o u ra r t i l l e r y changes. "hinge happen now as in t h e song: **Thecudgel and t h e wooden plow have been l a i d up. The machineis queen in t h e i r place."been rep lac ed by th e rocke t , which has al ready been launchedi n t o t h e cosmos and is a s a t e l l i t e of t h e sun. You mustmatch th e development of techn ology, Sharpen and improveyour weapons, so t h a t you may f i r e a t a longer range andmore accura te ly .

    The a r t i l l e r y and a i r f o r c e h av e

    PRAVDA, 24 May 195925. Vlore, A l b a n i a , Speech, 31 May 1959

    The i m p e r i a l i s t s know our might. To at tack u s i st an tamount t o su i c i de ; one would be i n s an e t o do so. Id o n o t b e l i e v e t h e y are a s s t u p i d as a l l t h a t ; I b e l i e v et h e y are aware of th e conseq uence s whdch t h e unlsasMgg o f i fa w a r a g a i n s t t h e s o c i a l i s t c o un t r i e s may have f o r them.'F'BIS F i l e26. Harriman In ter vie w, 23 June 1959

    (Khrushchev d i d n o t o b j e c t when H a r r i m a n s t a t e d t h a tit should be o b v i o u s t h a t t h e US would never under any c i r -cumstances s t a r t a w ar . . . . )(Khrushchev:) W develo ped t h e hydrogen bomb bef or ethe US. We have an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l bomb which you haveno t . P e r h a p s t h i s is t h e c ru c ia l symbol o f our pos i t ion , . . .

    c o u l d d e s t r o y a l l of Europe. One bomb w a s s u f f i c i e n t forBonn and t h ree t o f i v e would knock ou t France, England, Spain,and I t a l y . The US had a winged, p i l o t l e s s p l ane whosespeed w a s 1,000 k i lom eter s per hour , which w a s w i t h i n ea syrange of S o v ie t f i g h t e r s . US missiles, he said, c o u l d c a r r y

    The West seemed t o f o r g e t t h a t a f e w Russian missiles

    n

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    a warhead of on ly te n k i lograms, whereas Russian miss i le scould c a r r y 1300 ki lograms. Under these c i rcums tances ,it w a s u n r e a l i s t i c t o t h r ea t e n t h e S o v i e t s . . . . m ew e ig h t s c i t e d by Khrushchev apparently referrex t o .h e USa nd S o v i e t e a r t h sa te l l i t e s .7 :-: '. * . ? : e * ' > a j%x t ,>--

    W e w i l l p u t an en d t o y our r i g h t s i n B e r l i n . I fyou w ant t o u s e f o r c e t o p r e s e r v e yo ur r i g h t s , you can bes u r e t h a t w e w i l l respond w i t h fo r ce . You can s t a r t awar.-if you want , bu t remember it dll be you who a re s t a r t -i n g it, not w e . If you w ant t o p e r p e t u a t e o r p r o lo n g y o u rr i g h t s , t h i s means w a r . You recognlzed West Germany onc o n d i t i o n s c o n t r a r y t o those ag reed upon d u r i n g t h e w a r . . . .I f you cont inue t o o p e r a t e f ro m a p o s i t i o n of Is'tresgXh,then you must decide f o r y o u r se l ve s . W t o o a re s t r o n gand w e w i l l d e c id e f o r o u r s e l v es .What good does it do you t o have 11,000 t r o o p s i nB e r l i n ? I f it came t o w a r , w e would swallow them i n o n eg u l p"WestTQsrmany knows t h a t w e c o u ld d e s t r o y it i nten minu tes . If Germany faces t h e q u e s t i o n of whe the r t oe x i s t o r n o t , i t s d e c i s i o n may be d i f f e r e n t from t h a t oftoday." When i t w a s sugges ted t h a t Moscow and Lepingradwere e q u a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o d e s t r u c t i o n , Khrushchev re-t o r t e d t h a t Wningrad is n o t R u ss i a. I r k u t s k a nd o t h e rS i b e r i a n c i t i e s would remain, but "one bomb i s s u f f i c i e n tt o d e st r oy Bonn and t h e Ruhr, and t h a t is a l l of Germany.Paris i s a l l of France, London is a11 of England.. You

    have surrounded us w i t h bases, b u t o u r r o c k e t s c a n d e s t r o ythem. I f you s t a r t a war, w e may d i e , b u t t h e r o c k e t sw i l l f l y a u t o ma t ic a ll y . *t o B e r l i n s h o u l d n o t be t a k e n t o o l i g h t l y . M r . Khrushchevr e p l i e d t h a t i t had a l l been ca re fu l l y thought . ioh t. Wo n ' tyou think otherwise, '* he s a i d . l'Your gen era ls t a l k oft a n k s a n d guns defendi ng your Be r l in po s i t i on . They wouldburn , " he sa id .

    Ear rima n s u g g es t e d t h a t So v i e t d e c i s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d

    "I am g iv ing you a secre t of t h e G e n e r a l S t a f f whichy ou r m i l i t a r y c an u s e in compe t i t ion i n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s .I am t a l k i n g - s e r i o u s l y now.on b a l l i s t i c m i s s f l e s , in t h e next 5-6 y e a r s , w e can d e s t r o y

    If w e spend 30 b i l l i o n r u b l es

    0

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    SE E T

    e ve ry i n d u s t r i a l c e n te r i n t h e US and Europe. T h i r t yb i l l i o n r u b le s is no g r e a t sum f o r us. In the SevenYear Plan, w e a re spending on power, gas, e t c . , nol ess t h an 1 2 5 b i l l i o n r u b l e s . Y e t t o d e s t r o y a l l Europeand t he US would cos t u s o nl y 30 b i l l i o n . W h a v e t h i s 'p o s s i b a l i t y . If we s a v e 11 b i l l i o n i n one y e a r , i f w eo v e r f u l f i l l o u r p la n by 5 % , . t h i s w i l l g i v e u s a s a v i n g sof 55 b f l li o n s :* i n f i v e y e a r s . Y e t w e only need 30 b i l l i o n. , . . I am t a l k i n g ab ou t p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . Of cou r se , w ew i l l make some missi les , b u t w e won't use them, W e knowi f you u s e y o u r s , it would be s i l l y . Who would lose more?L e t us k e e p o u r r o c k e t s loaded and i f at tacked w e w i l llaunch them. v t

    " A t any t i m e w e d es i r e , w e can dest roy Formosa. Iw i l l t e l l y o u c o n f i d e n t i a l l y , w e have given t h e Chineser o c k e t s which are i n t h e C hin es e h i n t e r l a n d b u t w i t h i nrange of Formosa and can dest roy i t a t w i l l . Your SeventhF l e e t w i l l be of no a v a i l . Flee t s t oday are made t o bedes t royed . If t h e Chinese dec ide t o take Formosa, we w i l lsupport them even i f it means war."

    27 . Dnepropetrovsk Speech, 28 J u l y 1959Lf u r t h e r t o ld . . . f i r . Nixon7,. . t ha t i f t h e West Germanm i l i t a r i s t s went t o war, w e c a r d i n a few hours by re -t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n w ipe West Germany from t h e f a c e of t h ee a r t h , a l on g w i t h t h e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s w here m i l i t a r y b a s e sare located t h a t are aimed aga ins t t he Sovie t Union andt h e Warsaw Pact c o u n t r i e s . W know t h a t i f such a warb r e a k s o u t , grea t damage w i l l be i n f l i c t e d on u s , t o o ,a n d t h a t w e , too, s h a l l have t o bear g r e a t sacrbfices.War does no one any good ...

    Comrades, t h e Central Committee of o u r p a r t y a nd t h eSo vie t Government be l ie ve t h a t a s i t u a t i o n h a s a t p r e s e n tbeen crea ted i n which t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s w i l l h a r d l y dare t ol aunch a w a r ag a i n s t ou r m o the r land and ag a i n s t t h e coun-t r i e s of socia l i sm. Our f o r c e s and those of our s o c i a l i s ta l l i e s are c o l o s s a l , and in t h e West, a p p a r e n t l y , t h P s i snow understood. FBIS Daily Report30 July 1959

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    n. * S

    28, Letter t o Adenauer, 18 August 1959 ( r e l ea sed 26 August)The Federal Republ ic does no t ye t pos se s s such an a rmy- i s t r o n g a m y 7 , b u t i t can create one i f it wants t o do so,and, as realizts, w e r ecogn i ze t h i s . But i t should beborne i n mind t h a t i f t h e West Germans use a l l t h e economicp ot en t i a l and manpower reso urc es of t h e i r coun t ry f o rc r e a t i n g t h e m o s t powerful army i n West Europe, even t h es t r e n g t h o f t h a t army would not be e q u a l t o the power ofour army and those of o u r a l l i e s . . .FBIS f i l e

    29. Veshenskaya Meeting, 30 August 1959Despi t e a l l these n e g a t i v e f e a t u r e s , we regard t h ei n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n as no t be i ng bad a t a l l . Why? Is

    i t n o t a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ? No, Although the dyed-in-the-wool,m i l i t a r i s t s a p p a r e n t l y h av e n o t y e t f i n a l l y dr op pe d t h ea t t em p t s t o " t r y t h e i r 1ubk"--to undertake a m i l i t a r y ad-v e n t ur e a g a i n s t t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s - - i t is a fac t t h a tevery year the number of t h e advoca t e s of such adven t u re si s dimi nish ing. .Even many block-headed im p er ia l i s t s comet o r ea l i z e t h a t a c t i n g w i t h m i l i t a r y means a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e tUnion and the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s i s a v e r y r i s k y a n ddangerous bus iness , t h a t i t is a double-edged weapon. Someo f th e f a n a t i c a l m i l i t a r i s t s admit t h a t having un leashedwar they may p e r i s h i n i t s flames.FBIS Dai ly Report1 September 1959

    30. N at i ona l Press Clul) Speech, 16 September 1959I n t h e Twentieth Century mankind h as a l r e a d y had t w oworld wars, and t hey claimed more v i c t i m s t h a n a ny o t h e rwar i n t h e pas t . Now t h a t people have l earned t o c o n t r o lt h e energy of the atom, and rockets have been developedcapable of cove r i ng t housands of k i l o m e t e r s i n a matter ofm i nu t e s , t he most advanced planes, warsh ips , and t a nks u sedi n World War I1 look l i k e t o y s compared w i t h t h e l a t e s t meansof warfare, Under th es e ci rcums tances it would be sheermadness t o al low a new world war t o come t o a head.FBIS Supplement "Speeches byN. S. Khrushchev during h i s USvis t('

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    31. UN Speech, 18 September 1959I t is hard to . i rnag ine the consequences f o r mankind ofa war i n which th es e monst rous means of de st ru ct io n and an-n i h i l a t i o n were used. If i t w e r e a l lowed t o s t a r t , t h enumber of vict ims-would run n o t i n t o m i l l io n s b ut i n t o t e n sand even hundreds of mi l l io ns of human l i ve s . , I t would bea w a r i n which th e re would be no di f f e r en ce be tween th ef r o n t and t h e rear, between s o l d i e r s and c h i l d r e n ,FBIS Supplement, "Speeches byN. S. Khrushchev du ri ng h i s USv i s i t .

    32. Los Angeles Speech, 19 September 1959I n t he no t -so-d i s t an t pas t g r e a t s p a n s of l and and

    oceans se rved as a n a t u r a l b a r r i e r a g a i n s t t h e ex t ens i onof armed c o n f l i c t s , a g a i nS t t h e i r l e a p i n g from c o n t i n e n tt o c o nt in e nt . Both World War I and World War I1 d e v a s t a t e dmain ly Europe, and sane areas of A s i a and Africa. Thes i t u a t i o n is d i f f e r e n t today. The dis tances b e t w e e n mostremote po in t s on t h e globe a re measured now i n mere t e n s ofminutes , and t h e most devaStzkting means of d es tru ct i on- -n uc lea rweapons--can be carr ied t o any area of t h e globe.FBIS Supplement "Speeches byN. S. Khrushchev du rin g h i s USv i s i t . "33. Article i n F o r ei gn A f f a i r s ,

    The p o i n t i s t h a t w i t h m i l i t a ry t echn i ques what t hey aret oday , t he re are no i n a c c e s s i b l e places i n t h e world. Shoulda world war break ou t , no count ry w i l l be a b l e t o s hu t it-s e l f off from a crushing blow...Is it p o s s i b l e t h a t when mankind h a s advanced t o ap l ane where i t has proved capab l e of t h e g re a t e s t d i scov -e r i e s . . . f o r t h e e s t ab l i sh m e n t of a s t ab l e peace. . . /ha t i tw i l l i n s t e a d t u r n t o /. . .t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of ano t he r yar and. . , t h e d e s t r u c t i o n ' z f a l l t h a t has been created by i t s l a b o rover many mil leniums??

    r

    Foreign Affairs, October 1959

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    b . .

    34 . Speech i n &&ping , 1 October 1959The s o c i a l i s t count r i es . . .baue created m ig ht y p o t e n t i a lforces . . .They have th e means t o defend themselves from t h ea t t a c k s of i m p e r i a l i s t a g gr e s so r s .. . Bu t w e must th ink rea l i s -t i c a l l y a n d u n de rs ta nd t h e c on te mp or ar y s i t u a t i o n c o r r e c t l y .T h i s , of c o u r s e , does no t by any means s i gn i f y t ha t i f w eare so s t r o n g t h en we must t e s t by force t h e s t a b i l i t y oft h e c a p i t a l i k t s ys te m... FBIS Dai ly Report (Far East).-, 1 October 1959

    35. Vladivostok Speech, 6 October 1959Some t i m e ago a prominent Western s t a t esm an dec la r ed

    , t h a t Khrushchev i s a f r a i d of w a r and t h a t the re fore h e w i l ln o t s t a r t i t . In a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h M r . Eisenhower, Iasked him: "What do you think? Is t h i s s ta te me nt c o r r e c to r not? If t h a t p u b l i c f $g ur e s a y s t h a t I f e a r war, and Iwould r e p l y t h a t h e f e a r s war, t o what would t h i s l ead? Ist h i s wise? T h i s would resemble two cocks f a c i n g e a c h o t h e rr eady t o l a y h o l d and peck each o t h e r . What do you thinkabout t h i s q u e s t i o n , M r . Pres iden t?" . . H e r e p l i e d : ama m i l i t a ry man, and f r an k l y I am very much a f r a i d of war.""You are q u i t e r i g h t , " I t o l d h i m . Wnly an unreasonableperson can be fea r less of war i n o u r days:'FBIS Dai ly Repor t8 October 195936. Speech t o Supreme Soviet , 31 October 1959

    A t l a s t e v e r broader c i r c l e s . . . b e g i n t o unde r s t andt h a t a w a r u nd er t h e p r e s e n t c m d i t i o n s , w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c eof nu cle ar and roc ke t weapons , t h re a t en s wi th unprecedentedsacr i f ices a nd d e s t r u c t i o n p r i m a r i l y t h o s e c o u n t r i e s whichwould venture t o un l eash a new world w a r . . .Under t h e p r e s e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p of fo rc es i n , t G i nt krha ti odala r en a .. ., nobody c an , w i t h o u t l o s i n g h i s s e n s e o f r e a l i t y ,propose any o ther way toward dev l op i ng r e l a t i ons am ongs t a t e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l sys t ems t han peac e fu l coexis-t ence . .In a f e w minutes t h e most po t e n t means of de s t ruc t i on . . .

    c an be t r a n s f e r r e d t o a ny p o i n t on t h e g l obe . A new w a rwould n o t spare anybody and would ca us e mankind unpre cen den teds a c r i f i c e , d e v a s ta t io n , a nd s u f f e r i n g .. .FBIS D a i l y Report2 November 1959

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    I

    - -- . .... .

    I 37. Report t o Supreme Sovie t , 14 January 1960

    . . . e a r e s e v e r a l y e a r s ah ea d of o t h e r c o u n t r i es i nth e c r e a t i o n a n d m a s s r p r o d u c t i o n of i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l-l i s t i c r o c k e t s of v a r i o u s t y p e s . . .is n o t a wa re o f t h e c a t a s t r o p h i c c on se q ue nc es t o which anew world war would l e a d . N e i th e r m i l l i o n s , n or