C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs

8/21/2019 C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs

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3 - 1XM33 Training MARCH 07

Maintainability & Maintenance Engineering + Maintenance Planning & Services

XM33 TrainingXM33 Training

3..Systemsystems Powerplantowerplant logicogic+CMRsMRsPrinciplesrinciples

based on Airbus experience

This document must be used for training purpose only.

Under no circumstances should this document be used as a reference.

It will not be updated.

This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S.

No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of itscontent.

This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express writtenconsent of AIRBUS S.A.S.

This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it issupplied.

The statements made herein do not constitute an offer.They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith.

Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased toexplain the basis thereof.


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SS.A.S.Allrightsreserved.Confid

entialandproprietarydocument.

MARCH 07XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es Pag e 2

Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles

1. Introduction 3

2. MSI Selection process 6

3. MSI Analysis 11

4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77

Table of Contents


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1.1. IntroductionIntroduction 33


3. MSI Analysis 11


Table of Contents


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Structures

Section

Zonal

Section

Systems and Powerplant

Section

MSIMSI--AnalysesAnalyses SSISSI--AnalysesAnalyses ZonalZonal--AnalysesAnalyses

1. Objectives1. Introduction

The respective content of the Systems & PP , Structures and Zonal sections (or programs) of the MRBReport is based on the results from the works performed by the different MWGs and the ISC in order to define the

initial minimum scheduled maintenance requirements , thanks to the MSG-3 method, through the MRB Processsettled for a dedicated a/c program.


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htsreserved.Confidentialandproprietarydocument.

MARCH 07XM33 Trai ning Systems & Powerpl ant l ogic + CMRs Principl es Pag e 5

1. Introduction

Systems &Powerplant

All systems & powerplant items are divided into a list of

Maintenance Significant Items (MSI)

The MSI are analysed according to MSG-3 methodology

MSI selection

MSI analyses


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1. Introduction 3

2.2. MSI Selection processMSI Selection process 66

3. MSI Analysis 11


Table of Contents


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2. MSI selection process

Before the actual MSG-3 analysis can begin, the aircrafts

Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs) have to be identified,

using a conservative approach (engineering judgement).

MSIs are those items identified by the manufacturer

whose failure:

could affect safety (flight or ground) and/or

could be undetectable during operations and/or

could have a significant operational or economic impact.

MSI Selection List

MSI Selection List will be kept up to date after Entry into Service

( MSI Validation List)

Selection Process

Before the actual MSG-3 logic can be applied to an item, the aircraft's significant systems and

components must be identified. A significant item for systems and power plant is called aMaintenance Significant Item or MSI. These are items fulfilling defined selection criteria for which

MSI analyses are established at the highest manageable level. Items fulfilling the selection criteria thatare analyzed at another, higher, level are not called MSIs but MSI Elements.

The process of identifying Maintenance Significant Items is a conservative process (using engineeringjudgment) based on the anticipated consequences of failure. Four selection questions have to beanswered for each item: safety?, hidden failure?, operational repercussions?, economic

repercussions?

The top-down approach is a process of identifying the significant items on the aircraft at the highestmanageable level.


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Could failure be undetectable

or not likely to be detected

during operations? Could failure affect safety

(on ground or in flight?)

Could failure have

significanteconomic impact?

Could failure have

significantoperational impact?

MSI Selection2. MSI selection process


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If at least one of four questions is answered with a "YES:

MSG-3 analysis is required

Highest manageable level must be confirmed

Highest manageable level should be:

high enough to avoid unnecessary analysis not too many

functions, not too complex

low enough to ensure that all functions, functional failuresand failure causes are covered but not too low, e.g. no

screw level analysis



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If all four questions are answered with a NO:

MSGMSG--3 analysis is not required.3 analysis is not required.

Examples:Examples:

items covered by zonal analyses (harness, tubingitems covered by zonal analyses (harness, tubing))

items covered by structure analyses (engine mountsitems covered by structure analyses (engine mounts))

items for maintenance purpose only (Access doorsitems for maintenance purpose only (Access doors))



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1. Introduction 3


3.3. MSI AnalysisMSI Analysis 1111


Table of Contents


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Analysis process & documentationAnalysis process & documentation 1212

Administrative data 15

MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20

Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25

Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30

Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39

Interval determination 58

Task summaries and task data 62

Sampling 71

Maintenance Programme Evolution 73

Table of Contents

4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis


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MSI Analysis Process

Establish data to allow traceability and historyof analysis

Provide MSI description and component data

Describe Functions, Functional Failures,Failure Effects and Failure Causes

Determine the Failure Effect Category foreach Functional Failure

Determine if a task is applicable and effectiveand for each selected task, determine an

interval

Establish other task data for the MRB Reportas well as task accomplishment data

Administrative Data

Functional FailureAnalysis

Failure Consequences(Level 1 Analysis)

Task & IntervalSelection (Level 2)

Task Summaries &Task Data

MSI Description &Component Data

Analysis Method

The method for determining the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for systems and power

plant, uses a progressive logic diagram laid down in the MSG-3 document. This logic is the basisof an evaluation technique applied to each Maintenance Significant Item (system, sub-system,

module, component, accessory, unit, part, etc.), using the technical data available.

Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, a work sheet will be completed that clearly

defines the MSI, its functions / functional failures / failure effects / failure causes and anyadditional data pertinent to the item.

The process to be followed comprises the following basic analysis steps:

1. Establishment of administrative pages of MSI analysis.

2. Collection of basic MSI data and establishment of an MSI description.

3. Development of the MSIs functions, functional failures, failure effects and failure causes.

4. Categorization of functional failures in accordance with their failure effects (Level 1 analysis).

5. Determination of tasks based on rigorous selection criteria (Level 2 analysis).

6. Determination of intervals for the selected tasks.

7. Summary and combination of tasks (if relevant).

8. Establishment of data for task planning and task accomplishment.


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MSI Analysis Documentation

Administrative Pages Data Sheet A

Data Sheet B

Level 1 and 2 Analyses

Task Summary Sheet

MRBR Interface Sheet

Task Data

The MSI analysis consists of the following types of form sheets:

Administrative pages

Cover sheet

List of Effective Pages (LEP)

List of Revisions (LOR)

History of Changes sheet Applicability

Assumptions

Data Sheet A

Component Data sheet(s)

Item Description sheet

Data sheet B

Level 1 & 2 Analysis

Level 1 sheets

Level 2 sheets

Task Summaries

Task Summary sheet MRB Report Interface sheet

Task Data sheet


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Analysis process & documentation 12

Administrative dataAdministrative data 1515







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Administrative Pages / Overview

Cover Sheet

List of Effective Pages

List of Revisions

History of Change

Applicability Sheet

Assumptions

Administrative Pages

These are pages intended to allow monitoring of the revision status and of the

scope/applicability of the analysis.

Cover sheet (1 page)

List of Effective Pages (LEP) (one or more pages)

List of Revisions (LOR) (one or more pages)

History of Changes sheet (one or more pages)

Applicability Sheet (one or more pages)

Assumptions (one or more pages)


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Administrative Pages / Applicability

Aircraft

SeriesAircraft

Series

Mod number and titleMod number and titleEngine/Propeller

(where applicable)Engine/Propeller

(where applicable)

All Modifications, that have an impact on the MSG-3 Analysis, shall be included and listed.


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Assumptions / Example

Typical Assumptions are on MMEL status or Airplane Flight Manual(AFM) procedures, but also on open technical issues, that have animpact on e.g. task selection

Assumptions

(open)Assumptions

(open)

Note: currently, assumption tables are appliedfrom A380 programme onwards

MMEL: Master Minimum Equipment List

MEL: Minimum Equipment List

The MMEL is an Airbus document, developed by the Flight Operations Support and Services

Department. Operators use the Airbus MMEL as a reference for creating their own MEL, which isprovided to their flight crews, line maintenance personnel, and/or flight operations personnel. It is

important to note that an Operators MEL cannot be less restrictive than the Airbus MMEL. Both the

MMEL and the MEL are legal documents that are either approved or accepted by AirworthinessAuthorities.

The MMEL and the MEL consist of component and system lists that are attributed a GO, GO IF, orNO GO status, depending on their impact on the safety of a flight. These attributes are defined as

follows:

GO or GO IF items can remain inoperative for a limited period of time.

NO GO items prevent the dispatch of the aircraft.

The MMEL and the MEL are both designed to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is respected,when an aircraft is dispatched with inoperative equipment.

The MEL enables Operators to rapidly dispatch an aircraft, and avoid unnecessary delays or flight

cancellations, without sacrificing safety.


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Typical Assumptions are on MMEL status or Airplane Flight Manual(AFM) procedures, but also on open technical issues, that have animpact on e.g. task selection

Assumptions

(open)Assumptions

(open)

Note: currently, assumption tables are appliedfrom A380 programme onwards

AFM: Airplane Flight Manual

The Airplane Flight Manual is a book containing the information and instructions required to operate

the aircraft safely. The pilot must comply with this AFM information. A typical AFM will contain thefollowing:

Limitations - the 'envelope' of maximum speeds; maximum weights; allowable centre of gravity

range; maximum engine RPM, temperatures and oil pressures, etc (for the specified powerplant); and

allowable manoeuvres and other limits, within which the aircraft must be operated to be safe.Operating procedures - aircraft procedures, speeds and configurations used to:

Achieve expected performance and behaviour in Normal situations.

Achieve safe outcomes in some specified Abnormal or Emergency situations (such as a

forced landing after engine failure).

Performance - the required variation of the aircraft's maximum allowable weights, as affected by airpressure and temperature, in order to:

Take-off or land in available runway distance.

Climb at the minimum required gradient, or greater gradient needed to clear obstacles in the

intended flight path following take-off or missed approach.


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Assumptions

(closed)Assumptions

(closed)


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MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA)MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 2020






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MSI Description / Data Sheet A

Data Sheet A consists of Component Data Sheet

lists all components which are part of the system provides information about part numbers, reliability (MTBF, MTBUR

figures)

Item Description provides information about system redundancies, experiences

from other programs and about MMEL status

describes the system and its components and providesinformation essential to understand defined functions,functional failures etc. to be analysed

provides information about systems normal operation and failurebehaviour, as well as fault detection and indication

DATA SHEET A

Data Sheet A / MSI Description

Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, data sheets will be established that clearly

define the MSI, its function(s), functional failure(s), failure effect(s), failure cause(s) and any additionaldata pertinent to the item; e.g.,

ATA chapter reference

fleet applicability

manufacturer's part number

brief description of the item

expected failure rate

hidden functions

redundancy (may be unit, system or system management), etc.

The descriptive part of the MSI analysis is an integral part of the analysis and will be included as part

of the total MSG-3 documentation for the item.


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Data Sheet A / Component Data Sheet

ATA

Reference on

component

level

ATA

Reference on

component

level

Item

DescriptionItem

Description

Qty:

Quantity per

Aircraft

Qty:

Quantity per

Aircraft

SupplierSupplier

Supplier

Part NumberSupplier

Part Number

Zone(s)Zone(s)

MTBF

MTBURMTBF

MTBUR

AccessAccess

Source

of DataSource

of Data

Data Sheet A / Component Data

This sheet shall be used to list all component data relevant for MSI analysis.

It is important to state the source of the reliability (MTBF/MTBUR) data quoted. Preferably, this

reliability information should be based on relevant service experience. However, if specification orguarantee values are quoted, this should me made clear in the analysis.

It is to be noted that the reliability data quoted need to be as realistic as possible in order to allow the

selection of the highest possible intervals commensurate with the inherent reliability characteristics.


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Data Sheet A: Item description

Data sheet A shall be used to establish all data necessaryto clearly define the MSI, its functional failure characteristics,

indications, maintenance means and any additional data

pertinent to the item.

All modificationsrelevant to, and

covered by, the design

are to be listed

Redundancies, in-serviceexperience, MMEL status

Data Sheet A / Item Description

The author should be aware of the fact that, normally, no other descriptive data will be supplied with

the MSG-3 analysis. The recipient / reader of the analysis, therefore, must be able to understand theitem under consideration in sufficient depth to critically appraise the analysis prior to the meeting.

The textual description should include a system overview (including reason for existence of system),

functional description (operation in normal and any other mode) and information on indication, system

interfaces, components, built-in tests and reference documentation (if applicable).


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Item description / Example


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Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB)Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 2525





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Failure Analysis / Overview

Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions

of the item.

Functional Failure(s) - how the item fails to

perform its function.

Failure Effect - what is the result of the

functional failure.

Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure

occurs.

The first step for the system analysis

procedure is the identification of:

Function

Functional

Failure

FailureCause

FailureEffect

Data Sheet B should consider single failures.Failure combinations are analysed in the subsequent

Level 1 Analysis (if the functional failure is hidden).

Data Sheet B / Functional Failure Analysis

After the basic MSI analysis data have been assembled, the actual analysis is begun by establishing

the functional failure analysis.

This means that the following must be identified for each MSI:

Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions of an item

Functional Failure(s) - Failure of an item to perform its intended function within specified limits

Failure Effect(s) - what is the result of a functional failure

Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure occurs

The functional failure analysis will be the basis for the categorization of the functional failures which inturn constitutes the basis for the task selection process.

For protective devices (e.g. a filter bypass), Function and Functional Failure can refer to an additional

failure, i.e. the failure or the event for what the device is designed for.

Example

Function: To bypass the hydraulic filter in the event of filter clogging.

Functional Failure: Fails to bypass the hydraulic filter in the event of filter clogging.

Failure Effect: No effect as a single failure. Under normal conditions the bypass is closed.

Failure Cause: Filter bypass failed closed.


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Failure Analysis Hierarchy

Function 2Function 1 Function 3

Functional

Failure B

Functional

Failure A

Functional

Failure C

Functional

Failure D

Failure

Effect

Failure

Cause

2

Failure

Cause

1

FailureCause

3

Failure

Effect

FailureCause

1

Failure

Effect

FailureCause

2

FailureCause

1

Failure

Effect

1

FailureCause

1

Failure

Effect

2

FailureCause

1

Failure Analysis Hierarchy

Each MSI will have at least one function. With increasing complexity of the equipment, the number of

functions will also increase.

For every function, there should be at least one functional failure; there is no function that cannot fail.

For every functional failure, there should be one failure effect only (if there is more than one failureeffect for a given functional failure, either the functional failure or the failure effect(s) are probably

incorrectly defined).

For every functional failure, at least one failure cause must be given.


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Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B

FunctionFunctionFailure EffectFailure Effect

Functional FailureFunctional Failure

Failure CauseFailure Cause

Important:

Start with functions and

not with failure causesData Sheet B is

critical for the quality

of the analysis

Data Sheet B / Functional Failure Analysis

When developing the Data Sheet B, it is essential to start with the functions and not with the failure

causes (as in the case of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis). If this is not observed, it can result inan analysis where complete functions are missing or where a failure cause is only covered once, even

though the item might have different functions and different failure modes (e.g. a valve might have oneor more electrical, and one or more mechanical failure modes).


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A380

Data Sheet B: Example

1D: Failure to regulate the heating of

one Floor panel at the correct operating

Temperature (MOD 45670)

1: To provide controlled and regulated

heating of the floor panels at

each passenger door/emergency exit

1D1: Insufficient or excessive heating

at the affected floor panel

1D12: One heated floor

panel defective(Temp Sensor)

The above sheet is one of several pages making up a complete Data Sheet B and only shows some

(not all) functional failures associated with function 1. The other sheets would also show that this MSIhas not only one, but some 25 functions.

The example shows that there is a one-to-one relationship between functional failures and failure

effects.

The example shows also that for some functional failures, there are more than one failure causes that

can cause the failure to occur.


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Consequences of Failure / Level 1 AnalysisConsequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 3030




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Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis

MSI Analysis Decision Logic

Level 1:Level 1: Questions (1, 2, 3 and 4) require theQuestions (1, 2, 3 and 4) require the

evaluation of each FUNCTIONALevaluation of each FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE for determination of theFAILURE for determination of the

Failure Effect Category (5,6,7,8,9).Failure Effect Category (5,6,7,8,9).

The decision logic hasThe decision logic has two levelstwo levels::

Level 2:Level 2: Questions (A to F as applicable)Questions (A to F as applicable)

then take the associated FAILUREthen take the associated FAILURE

CAUSES into account for selectingCAUSES into account for selectingthethe specific type of task(s).specific type of task(s).

The decision logic for systems and power plant has two levels:

Level 1

(questions 1, 2, 3 and 4)

requires the evaluation of each FUNCTIONAL FAILURE for determination of the Failure Effect

Category; i.e., safety, operational, economic, hidden safety or hidden non-safety.

Level 2

(questions "A" through "F", as applicable to the Failure Effect Categories 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)

then takes the FAILURE CAUSE (S) for each functional failure into account for selecting the specifictype of task(s).


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Level 1 Analysis: Questions

1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating

crew during the performance of normal duties ?

1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating

crew during the performance of normal duties ?

Safety effects

Yes

5

Yes

2) Does the functional failure or

secondary damage resulting from thefunctional failure have a direct adverse

effect on operating safety ?

2) Does the functional failure or

secondary damage resulting from thefunctional failure have a direct adverse

effect on operating safety ?

Yes

Operational effects

6

Economic effects

No

7

Non-safety effects

No

9

No

4) Does the functional failure have a

direct adverse effect on operatingcapability ?

4) Does the functional failure have a

direct adverse effect on operatingcapability ?

3) Does the combination of ahidden functional failure and

one additional failure of a

system related or back-upfunction have an adverse effect

on operating safety ?

3) Does the combination of ahidden functional failure and

one additional failure of a

system related or back-upfunction have an adverse effect

on operating safety ?

No

Safety effects

Yes

8

Level 1 Questions

The MSG-3 decision logic diagram for Level 1 has the aim of categorizing the failure consequences.

There are four first level questions, identified as questions 1 to 4.

1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of

normal duties ?

2) Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a directadverse effect on operating safety ?Direct: To be direct the functional failure or resulting secondary damage must achieve its effect by itself, not in combination with other

functional failures (no redundancy exists and it is a primary dispatch item).

Adverse Effect on Safety: Safety shal l be considered as adversely affected if the consequences of the failure condition would prevent the

continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft and/or might cause serious or fatal injury to human occupants.

Continued safe flight and landing is the capability for continued controlled flight and landing at a suitable airport, possibly using emergency

procedures, but without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength.

Operating: This is defined as the time interval during which passengers and crew are on board for the purpose of flight.

3) Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system relatedor back-up function have an adverse effect on operating safety ?

The question takes into account failures in which the loss of the one hidden function (whose failure is unknown to the operating crew) doesnot of itself affect safety; however, in combination with an additional functional failure (system related or intended to serve as a back-

up) has an adverse effect on operating safety.

4) Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability ?Adverse effect on operating capability requires: either the imposition of operating restrictions or correction prior to further dispatch; or flight

crew use of abnormal or emergency procedures (MMEL restrictions/procedures).

As a result of answering these first level questions, the functional failure is assignedto one of five failure effect categories, identified as categories 5 to 9:

Evident Safety (Category 5)

Evident Operational (Category 6)

Evident Economic (Category 7)

Hidden Safety (Category 8)

Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9)


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FEC 8 Hidden Safety / Example

Functional Failure 2A: fails to isolate the APUbleed duct line from engine bleed pressure

1) IS THE OCCURENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THEPERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES?

Answer: No, APU check valve malfunction in open

position is not evident to the operating crew because thecheck valve is not monitored


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FEC 8 Hidden Safety / Example (contd)

Functional failure 2A: Failure to isolate the APUbleed duct line from engine bleed pressure

88

3) DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDENFUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONALFAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP

FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ONOPERATING SAFETY ?

Answer: Yes, APU check valve in open positionin combination with APU bleed duct leakage in sensitive

areas may cause adverse effect to operational safetybecause A/C structure integrity may be affected.


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Special case safety / emergency equipments

For hidden failures of safety/emergency equipments,The additional failure is the event for which this function of

the system or equipment is designed,

A FEC 8 is to be selected. Safety/emergency = a device or system that:

Enhances the evacuation of the aircraft in an emergency or

If it does not function when required, results in a failure

condition that might have an adverse effect on safety.

Megaphone

CrashAxe

Oxygen

Escape

Ropes


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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example

Functional Failure 1A: Fails to protect the engine

against recirculating

1) IS THE OCCURENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILUREEVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THEPERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES?

Answer: Yes, because the engine indication is shown

on ECAM


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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example (contd)

Functional Failure 1A: fails to protect the engine


Answer: No, because engine shut-down does not affectsafety directly and adversely

2) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE ORSECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THEFUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE

EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY ?

Answers to Level 1 Questions

When answering the Level 1 questions, care should be taken to provide a sufficiently detailed

explanation to the answer provided.


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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example (contd)

Answer: Yes, engine shut-down affects operatingcapability because A/C cannot be dispatched with one

engine inoperative.

4) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECTADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING CAPABILITY ?

66

Functional Failure 1A: fails to protect the engine



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Task Selection / Level 2 AnalysisTask Selection / Level 2 Analysis 3939



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Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis

The Level 2 Analysis takes the FAILURE CAUSES of each Functional

Failures into account and provides a means whereby an applicable and

effective task - or a number of applicable and effective tasks - can be

selected.

According to MSG-3, the following maintenance tasks can be selected: Lubrication / Servicing Operational Check / Visual Check Inspection / Functional Check Restoration Discard

Task Selection and Failure Effect Categories

Once the applicable first level questions have been answered, the analyst is directed to one of the five

Failure Effect Categories:

a) Evident Safety (Category 5)b) Evident Operational (Category 6)

c) Evident Economic (Category 7)d) Hidden Safety (Category 8)

e) Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9)Task development is handled in a similar manner for each of the five Failure Effect categories. Fortask determination, it is necessary to apply the failure causes for the functional failure to the second

level of the logic diagram. There are six possible task resultant questions in the five Failure Effectcategories.


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Level 2 Analysis: Applicability & Effectiveness

Task ApplicabilityA set of conditions that leads to the identification of a task type when a

specific set of characteristics of the failure cause being analyzed wouldbe discovered and/or corrected as a result of the task beingaccomplished.

Applicability is dependent on the task type.

Task EffectivenessA specific set of conditions that leads to the selection of a task alreadyidentified to be applicable. Avoids, eliminates, or reduces the negativeconsequences of the failure to an extent that justifies doing the task atthe selected interval.Effectiveness is dependent on task type and failure effect category(FEC).

A selected task must be applicable and effective.


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Level 2 Analysis overview

LUBRICATION/SERVICIN G

INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK

RESTORATION

TASK/COMBINATIONMOST

EFFECTIVE MUST BE DONE

REDESIGNI SM ANDATORY

DISCARD

IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK

APPLICABLE &E FFECTIVE?

IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL

CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF

FUNCTION APPLICABLE &EF FECTIVE?

IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE

FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &

EFFECTIVE?

IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVO ID FAILURES

OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE

APPLICABLE &E FFECTIVE?

IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINAT ION OF

TASKS APPLICABL E & EFFECTIVE?

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

NOYES

OPERATIONAL/VISUA L CHECK

IS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERA TION

APPLICABLE &EFFECTIV E ?

YES

NO

Regardless of the answer on question A, the next

task selection question must be asked in all cases.

When following a safety effects path (FEC 5 and 8),all subsequent questions must be asked

In the remaining categories (FEC 6, 7, 9), subsequent

to the first question, a YES answer will allowexiting the logic. However, advancement to

subsequent questions after deriving a YES answer

is allowable, but only until the cost of the task is equalto the cost of the failure prevented.

For FEC 5 and 8, if no task becomes applicable andeffective a redesign is mandatory.


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Level 2 Analysis / Level 2 Formsheet

Functional

FailureFunctional

Failure

Failure

Cause(s)Failure

Cause(s)

Level 2

questions to

be answered

Level 2

questions to

be answered

Indication of

answer

(YES or NO)

Indication of

answer

(YES or NO)

Field for

Answers to Level 2

questions (YES/NO)

and

Explanation of answers

Field forAnswers to Level 2

questions (YES/NO)

and

Explanation of answers

Task

Number(s)Task

Number(s)

Task

Description(s)Task

Description(s)

Task Interval

Usage Parameter(s)Task Interval

Usage Parameter(s)

Interval

justificationInterval

justification

Level 2 Form Sheet

There is only a single form sheet for the Level 2 analysis (although there are five different ways of

progressing through the Level 2 questions).

The form sheet has been arranged so that the failure related information from Data Sheet B(description and reference of the functional failure and the failure cause) is placed at the top of the

sheet.

The left part of the form sheet is used for a graphical representation of the Level 2 logic chart with thesix task selection questions. On the left hand side of this graphical representation, the applicable task

selection questions for a certain FEC are indicated. It also allows an indication of the YES or NOanswer to each question.

The main part of the form sheet is used for the answers to the task selection questions (i.e. YES or

NO) and for the detailed explanation of these answers.

At the bottom of the sheet, there is space for the task(s) that has resulted from the analysis. Itcomprises of the

- The task number

- The task description

- The predominant (and the secondary) usage parameter selected for the interval

- The task interval expressed in the predominant usage parameter

- Optionally a secondary usage parameter and interval

- Interval justification

A single Level 2 form sheet may be used for the analysis of several failure causes only in those cases

where all the answers and the explanations of the answers given on the sheet apply equally to all thereferenced failure causes.


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S.A.S.Allrightsreserved.Confidentialandproprietarydocument.


AAAAA

98765

N

YIS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING

TASK APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?

LUBRICATIONSERVICING

The task must becost-effective.

The task mustreduce the risk of

failure to anacceptable level.

The task must reducethe risk of failure.

The replenishmentof the consumable

must reduce therate of functional

deterioration.

ECONOMIC

EFFECTIVENESS

(FEC 7, 9)

OPERATIONAL

EFFECTIVENESS

(FEC 6)

SAFETY

EFFECTIVENESS(FEC 5, 8)APPLICABILITY

Any act of lubrication or servicing for the purpose of maintaining

inherent design capabilities.

Purpose is: Failure Prevention

Level 2 Analysis: Lubrication, Servicing


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Level 2 Analysis: Operational / Visual Check

BB

98765

N

YIS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION

APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?

OPERATIONALVISUAL CHECK

An operational/visual check is a task to determine that an item is

fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require

quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task.

The question is only asked for Hidden FEC 8 & 9.

Purpose: Failure finding

task !!!


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Level 2 Analysis: OPC, VCK selection criteria

The task must

ensure adequateavailability of the

hidden function in

order to avoid

economic effects of

multiple failures andmust be cost-

effective.

(FEC 9)

Not applicableThe task must ensure

adequate availabilityof the hidden function

to reduce the risk of a

multiple failure.

(FEC 8)

Identification of

failure must bepossible.

ECONOMIC

EFFECTIVENESS

OPERATIONAL

EFFECTIVENESS

SAFETY

EFFECTIVENESSAPPLICABILITY


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Level 2 Analysis: Inspection / Functional Check

CCBBB

98765

N

YIS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL

CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF

FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?

INSPECTION /

FUNCTIONAL

CHECK

Purpose: Check fordegradation !!!

Potential Failure Finding

An inspection can be a General Visual Inspection (GVI), a Detailed

Inspection (DET) or a Special Detailed Inspection (SDI).

A functional check is a quantitative check to determine if one or more

functions of an item performs within specified limits.


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Level 2 Analysis: Inspections GVI, DET, SDI

GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION (GVI)A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation or assembly to detect

obvious damage, failure or irregularity. This level of inspection is made from withintouching distance, unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to enhance

visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection area. This level of inspection is

made under normally available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting,flashlight or drop-light and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors.

Stands, ladders or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked.

DETAILED INSPECTION (DET)An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage,

failure or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source ofgood lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirrors,

magnifying lenses, etc. may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate access

procedures may be required.

SPECIAL DETAILED INSPECTION (SDI)An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect damage,failure or irregularity. The examination is likely to make extensive use of specialized

Inspection Techniques and/or equipment. Intricate cleaning and substantial access ordisassembly procedure may be required.


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Level 2 Analysis: Insp / FNC selection criteria

The task must be

cost-effective; i.e.,the cost of the task

must be less than

the cost of the

failure prevented.

(FEC 7, 9)

The task must

reduce the risk offailure to an

acceptable level.

(FEC 6)

The task must

reduce the risk offailure to assure

safe operation.

(FEC 5, 8)

Reduced resistance to

failure must bedetectable, and there

exists a reasonably

consistent interval

between a

deterioration condition

and functional failure.

ECONOMIC

EFFECTIVENESS

OPERATIONAL

EFFECTIVENESS

SAFETY



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Level 2 Analysis: Restoration

DDCCC

98765

N

YIS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE

FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &

EFFECTIVE ?

RESTORATION

From cleaning to overhaul !!!

Purpose: Failure Avoidance

That work necessary to return the item to a specific standard.

Since restoration may vary from cleaning or replacement of single

parts up to a complete overhaul, the scope of each assigned

restoration task has to be specified.


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Level 2 Analysis: RST selection criteria

The task must becost-effective: i.e.,

the cost of the task

must be less than

the cost of thefailure prevented.

(FEC 7, 9)


failure to an

acceptable level.

(FEC 6)


failure to assure

safe operation.

(FEC 5, 8)

The item mustshow functional

degradation

characteristics at

an identifiable ageand a large

proportion of units

must survive to thatage.

It must be possible

to restore the item

to a specific

standard of failure

resistance.

ECONOMIC

EFFECTIVENESS

OPERATIONAL

EFFECTIVENESS

SAFETY



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Level 2 Analysis: Discard

EEDDD

98765

N

YIS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES

OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE

APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?

DISCARD

Safe life limitEconomic lifelimit

Purpose: Failure Avoidance

The removal from service of an item at a specified life limit.

Discard tasks are normally applied to so-called single celled parts

such as cartridges, canisters, cylinders, engine disks, safe-life

structural members, etc.


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Level 2 Analysis: DIS selection criteria

An economic-life

limit must be cost-

effective: i.e., the

cost of the taskmust be less than

the cost of thefailure prevented.

FEC 7 & 9

The task must

reduce the risk of

failure to an

acceptable level.

FEC 6

A safe-life limit

must reduce the

risk of failure to

assure safeoperation.

FEC 5 & 8

The item must show

functional

degradation

characteristics at anidentifiable age and

a large proportion ofunits must survive

to that age.

ECONOMICEFFECTIVENESS

OPERATIONALEFFECTIVENESS

SAFETYEFFECTIVENESS

APPLICABILITY


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Level 2 Analysis: Task combination

FE

98765

N

YIS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF

TASKS APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE ?

TASK MOST

EFFECTIVEMUST BE DONE

Since this is a safety category (FEC 5 or 8) question and a task is

required, all possible avenues must be analyzed.

To do this, a review of the task(s) that are applicable is necessary.

From this review the most effective task(s) must be selected.

All Level 2 analyses for FECs 5 and 8 that do not result in a task

must be brought to the attention of the ISC.


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Level 2 Analysis: No task for FEC 5 or 8 ?

FEC 5

For all failure causes, it is necessary to derive an applicable and effective

task. No exceptions are allowed.

FEC 8

Under exceptional circumstances, it may not be possible to derive an

applicable and effective task:

No redesign possible

Lack of a task can be justified, if the probability of the functional

failure occurring is low enough for ISC acceptance.

Failure becomes evident before scheduled fai lure-finding

If a failure is hidden and the Level 1 analysis results in a FEC 8,

the lack of a task may be justified by the fact, that the failurebecomes evident long before an applicable and effective task can

be carried out at any reasonable interval.


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Level 2 Analysis / Applicability & Effectiveness

APPLICABILITYTASK

+ Codes

+ Purpose

EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

CRITERIA SAFETYFEC 5 8 OPERATIONALFEC 6 ECONOMICFEC 7 9LUBRICATION

OR

SERVICING (LUB, SVC)FAILURE PREVENTION

The replenishment of the

consumable must reduce the rate

of functional deterioration.

The task must reduce the

risk of failure.

The task must reduce

the risk of failure to an

acceptable level.

The task must be cost

effective.

OPERATIONAL

OR

VISUAL CHECK

(OPC, VCK)FAILURE FINDING

Identification of failure must be

possible.

The task must ensure

adequate availability of

the hidden function to

reduce the risk of a

multiple failure.

Not applicable. The task must ens ure

adequate availability of

the hidden function in

order to avoid economic

effects of multiple

failures and must be

cost effective.

INSPECTION

OR

FUNCTIONAL CHECK(GVI, DET, SDI, FNC)POTENTI AL FAILUREFINDING

Reduced resistance to failure

must be detectable, and there

exists a reasonably consistent

interval between a deterioration

condition and functional failure.


risk of failure to assure

safe operation.



acceptable level.


effective; i. e., the cost

of the task must be less

than the cost of the

failure prevented.

RESTORATION(RST)FAILURE AVOIDANCE

The item must show functional

degradation characteristics at an

identifiable age, and a large

proportion of units must survive to

that age. It must be possible to

restore the item to a specific

standard of failure resistance.


risk of failure to assure

safe operation.



acceptable level.


effective; i.e., the cost

of the task must be less

than the cost of the

failure prevented.

DISCARD(DIS)FAILURE AVOIDANCE

The item must show functional

degradation characteristics at an

identifiable age and a large

proportion of units must survive to

that age.

The safe life limit must

reduce the risk of failure

to assure safe operation.



acceptable level.

An economic life limit

must be cost effective;

i.e., the cost of the task

must be less than the

cost of the failure

prevented.


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Level 2 Analysis / Level 2 example

8E) No: The item does not show functional degradation at an identifiableage; therefore, no discard task is applicable.

8D) No: The item does not show functional degradation at an identi fiableage; therefore, no restoration task is applicable.

8B) No: A failure finding check is not applicable because there are noappropriate means to verify operation on A/C.

8A) No: There is no appli cable lubrication or servicing task becausethere is no consumable to replenish.

8C) Yes: Detailed visual inspection of APU check valve is appli cable todetect degradation and is effective.

8F) Yes: detailed visual inspection is appli cable and effective.

Remove APU check val ve for detailed visual inspectio n10 Inter val selec ted based on reliability pr ediction and engineeri ng j udg ment FH 10 000 FH


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Interval determinationInterval determination 5858


Sampling 71


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Interval Determination

The MWGs should select the most appropriate interval for each

maintenance task based on available data and goodengineering judgment.

The information needed to determine optimum intervals isordinarily not available until after the equipment enters service.

In the absence of specific data on failure rates andcharacteristics, intervals for systems tasks are largely

determined based on service experience with similarsystems/components.

A task should not be done more often than experience or otherdata suggests simply because it is easily accomplished.

General Considerations for Interval Determination

As part of the MSG-3 logic analysis, the Maintenance Working Group has to determine the interval of

each scheduled maintenance task that satisfies both the applicability and effectiveness criteria. TheMWGs should select the most appropriate interval for each maintenance task based on available data

and good engineering judgment.


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Intervals / Sources of Information

In order to determine the 'best initial' maintenance interval

for each task, each MWG must assess the interval based on

all relevant data that is available:

Manufacturers tests and technical analysis

Manufacturers data and/or vendor recommendations(based on test data or failure analysis)

Customer requirements

'Best engineering estimates

Service experience gained with comparable oridentical parts, components and subsystems on other

aircraft


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Usage Parameters

Task intervals are established in terms of the measure of exposureto the conditions that cause the failure at which the task is directed.

The most widely used usage parameters are:

Flight Hours

Flight Cycles

Calendar Time (e.g. MO)

But also:

Engine Hours

Equipment Operating hours

Equipment Operating cycles

Interval Determination / Usage parameters


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Sampling 71


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Task Summary Sheet

Purpose: summarize tasks selected during Level 2analysis (including intervals, associated failure effect

categories and failure cause references).

Not to combine tasks derived from Level 2 analysis so thatthey agree fully with the proposed MRB Report.


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Task Summary Sheet

Each failurecause and the

related FEC to bestated

Each failurecause and the

related FEC to bestated

For each task stated on the Task Summary sheet, the task number, the task description, the usage

parameter of the task interval and the interval itself have to be provided. In addition, for each task, allthe failure cause references from which the task was derived and their associated failure effect

categories must be given.

The task numbers on the Task Summary sheet are normal sequence numbers, starting with 1 andcontinuing with 2, 3, etc.


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MRB Report Interface Sheet

Purpose:

To summarize task description and task interval so that

they can be directly transferred to the MPP (draft of

MRB Report)To specify all additional data not derived from the

analysis but required for the task section of the MRB

Report.

Once reviewed and agreed by ISC, the MRB ReportInterface sheet Sheet becomes the source document for

the Maintenance Review Board Report.


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MRBR Interface Sheet / Task Combination

Possible to combine tasks on the MRB Report Interfacesheet in order to

Combine tasks that should be performed together fortechnical reasons

Bring the wording of tasks proposed for the MPP/MRB

Report and those in the MSG-3 analysis in agreement with

each other

Tasks not affected by task combinations can be transferredfrom the Task Summary sheet to the MRB Report Interface

sheet without change


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MRBR Interface Sheet / Example

Task sequencenumbers (as

used in theMRBR)

Task sequencenumbers (as

used in theMRBR)

LUB, SVC,OPC, VCK,FNC, GVI,DET, SDI,RST, DIS

LUB, SVC,OPC, VCK,FNC, GVI,DET, SDI,RST, DIS

Task numbers(as used on

the TaskSummary

Sheet)

Task numbers(as used on

the TaskSummary

Sheet)

Description of taskas used in theMRB Report

(after combiningtasksfrom TSS)

Description of taskas used in theMRB Report

(after combiningtasksfrom TSS)

Most stringentevident and/or

hidden FEC(e.g. 5 only

instead of 5, 6, 7)

Most stringentevident and/or

hidden FEC(e.g. 5 only

instead of 5, 6, 7)

Transfer toZIP?

(YES or N/A)

Transfer toZIP?

(YES or N/A)

Should alwaysbe stated

(e.g. All, ModNo, A380-800)

Should alwaysbe stated

(e.g. All, ModNo, A380-800)

Interval expressed inthe appropriate

usage parameter

Interval expressed inthe appropriate

usage parameter

Anyadditionalremarks

Anyadditionalremarks

The MRB Report Interface sheet lists for each task the following data:

The task numbers of the task(s) from the Task Summary sheet that the task on the MRB Report

Interface sheet covers (after combining tasks)

The task number of each task

The three-letter task code

The task description

The Failure Effect Category or Categories

The task interval

The ZIP reference if the task is covered by the zonal program

The applicability of the task

Any additional remarks if applicable


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Task Data Sheet

Purpose of the Task Data sheet:

To provide procedural information for task accomplishmentTo provide additional task planning data.

Task Data sheet for every

task listed on the MRBR

Interface sheet (not for

every task on the Task

Summary sheet)


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Task Description and Planning Data

The level of detail for the task procedure should be such that aMWG is able to assess task accomplishment procedure

The planning data shall besuitable for direct useduring MPD development.

Under Reason for Taskit is necessary to providea brief statement on theintent/purpose of the task(e.g. To detect wear-outof thebefore it fails

completely).

Task Data Sheet


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Interval Justification

As part of the working group review of the analysis,substantiation/justification is to be provided for all intervals

The statement shall includethe reason why the

predominant usageparameter was chosen

the secondary usageparameter is.

This justification can beused as a basis for latertask intervaladjustments.

Task Data Sheet

Note: currently, interval justification is appliedfrom A380 programme onwards


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SamplingSampling 7171


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Applicability of Sampling

Sampling = examination of a specific number of items at definedintervals

to confirm that there are no unexpected degradation

characteristics.

Non-sampled items may continue in service until samplingresults highlight the need for change.

Sampling can be considered for tasks in the systems and powerplant program if

the characteristics of the task and the associated failure processesare such that a 100% - task accomplishment is not necessary and

the results of the sample task are equally applicable to the non-sampled items.


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Sampling 71

Maintenance Programme EvolutionMaintenance Programme Evolution 7373

Table of Contents



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Maintenance Programme Evolution

2 types of MP evolutions

OperatorOperator fleet in-service experience

(local A/A approval)

ManufacturerFleet in-service experience

(FAA/EASA approval)

MRB process

Operatorsencouraged to

participate to MRB

process

NOT COVERED BY THISPRESENTATION

The manufacturers evolution results shall be applicable to the whole fleet.

This means that the resultant interval will be used as minimum interval by all operators (even for new

operators), regardless of their previous in-service experience.


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Objective is to maintain safety, reliability, at minimum cost.

Optimize the initial interval, task by task

Exercise launched when the A/C manufacturer and the ISC

consider that sufficient in-service experience is collected.

The term 'Evolution' is used to clarify that the exercise considers all means to improve the

Maintenance Program and does not focus entirely on 'Escalation'. Although the goal is to justifygreater task intervals, it is equally important to assess the need for additional scheduled tasks or more

frequent intervals of some existing tasks.

The evolution is performed on a task-by-task basis (individual review).

The ISC will provide the new target / interval framework of the dedicated Maintenance ProgramEvolution.


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Task reports


Manufacturer domain

ISC(Industry Steering

Committee)

MPDrevis

ion

(Maintenance

Planning

Document

)MRB

R

IssueN+1

(Maintena

nce

ReviewB

oard

Report)

MWG meetings(Maintenance Working Groups)

Industry domain

Tasks

(Jobc

ards)

OMP

(Operator

Maintena

nce

Program)

Airline / MRO domain

Datacompilation& analysis

Manufacturer domain

Evolution

dossiers Nil findings / details of findings

Tasks

(Jobc

ards)

Task

(Jobc

ard)

Otherengineering

data

In order to conduct a complete study, the evolution exercise shall be handled in four phases that run concurrently.

Only when all phases are complete can the decision be made to propose task interval evolution and changes tothe MRBR.

Phase 1 - Operators investigation and data reporting

All operators is responsible for reviewing current in-service experience and reporting the necessary data to the

manufacturer in an agreed format.

Phase 2 - Data Compilation

The reported data are collected by Airbus in a dedicated database. The next phase of the evolution exercise areonly launched when Airbus, the ISC and the MRB are satisfied that the database contains a sufficient quantity

(e.g. number of tasks reported) and quality of data (e.g. geographical distribution, A/C age).The database is thenfrozen and supplied to the ATA specialist responsible for each MSI, SSI or ZIP task.

Phase 3 - Manufacturer's investigation

The manufacturer is responsible for:

-An engineering review of all tasks under consideration for evolution.

o a review of the basis for the original task and interval selection (e.g. MSG-3 analysis, MWG

minutes, ISC minutes).

o a review of available engineering data (reliability data, Inspection Service Bulletins (ISB),Service Information Letters (SIL), Technical Follow-Up (TFU), etc).

o a review with design/product support specialists to get their advice on the related task interval

evolution.

-Review of the database by the MSI, SSI, Zonal maintenance engineering specialists.

-Compilation of the evolution dossiers to be reviewed during MWG Meetings.


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Task reports


Manufacturer domain

ISC(Industry Steering

Committee)

MPDrevis

ion

(Maintenance

Planning

Document

)MRB

R

IssueN+1

(Maintena

nce

ReviewB

oard

Report)

MWG meetings(Maintenance Working Groups)

Industry domain

Tasks

(Jobc

ards)

OMP

(Operator

Maintena

nce

Program)

Airline / MRO domain

Datacompilation& analysis

Manufacturer domain

Evolution

dossiers Nil findings / details of findings

Tasks

(Jobc

ards)

Task

(Jobc

ard)

Otherengineering

data

Phase 4 Maintenance Working Group (MWG) meetings and Industry Steering Committee (ISC) meetings

By reviewing the evolution dossiers prepared by the manufacturer, the MWG discusses the evolution proposals on

a task-by-task basis to agree on appropriate usage parameters, intervals and any other changes to the program.

Operators are also requested to provide in-service experience during the Maintenance Working Group sessions.The MWG results are then summarized and presented to the ISC for acceptance.


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1. Introduction 3


3. MSI Analysis 11

4.4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRsCMRs)) 7777

Table of Contents


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4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs)

MRB Process / Type Certification interface

CMRs

CS 25.1309 Compliance

Selection of CMRs

Handling of CMRs

CMR document

Certification and Maintenance Coordination Committee(CMCC)

Coordination of MRB and CMR Processes

CMR document and MRB Report

Table of Contents


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MRB process / type certification interface

TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

(CS/FAR 25)

1.Safe Life items(25.1529 App. H 25.4

25.571)

2.Structure ALIs

(25.571 & 25.60325.1529 App.H 25.4)

3.Systems CMRs

(25.1309 SSA25.1529 App.H)

MPDMPD

MRB PROCESS (CS/FAR 25.1529)

EvaluationMethods

(MSG-3)

MRB Report25.1529, Appx H

ALSParts 1 to 5

Operators

Approved

MaintenanceProgram

CS/FAR 21/39

(AD, CN)Service

Bulletins

AD, CNService

Bulletins

L/HIRF (Assurance Plan)

ALS : AirworthinessLimitation Section

/

5.Fuel ALIs(SFAR 88 / CS25-981)

4. Ageing Systems

Maintenance

MRB Report : Means of compliance for 25.1529 Appx H

Airworthiness Limitation Section :

Part 1 Life Limited Parts

Part 2 ALI document (Structure)

Part 3 CMR document (Systems)

Part 4 Ageing Systems Maintenance (ASM)Part 5 Fuel ALI document

MPD: At EIS, MRBR tasks, ALS

The MPD is a repository document not to be considered as a source document.

Operator's approved maintenance : To be established from source documents.


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C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs

Documents

Transcript of C-Systems & Powerplants+CMRs