Business Ethics: A Compromise Between Politics and Virtue

ABSTRACT. This article examines and synthesizestwo different approaches to determining the contentof business ethics courses and the manner in whichthey ought to be taught. The first approach, from apolitical perspective, argues that the institutionalframework within which business operates ought tobe tested by theories of distributive justice. Thesecond approach, from the perspective of virtuetheory, argues that we ought to examine the characterof individual employees and the responsibilities asso-ciated with the roles which these individuals playwithin organizations. I argue that Gadamer’s inter-pretation of Aristotle’s notion of

phronesis shows aninseparable, bidirectional, conceptual link between theapproaches of politics and virtue as well as providinginsight into how business ethics might best be taught.

KEYWORDS: applied ethics, business ethics, dis-tributive justice, interpretation in moral reasoning,moral understanding, phronesis, virtue ethics

One of the most provocative issues currentlybeing debated in business ethics concerns whichparticular moral or political theory ought to beapplied to specific moral problems which arise ina business context. Although there are many sidesto this debate, a contrast in beliefs and pedagog-ical approaches has emerged between those who,on the one side, espouse what I will call the

“political” view and, on the other side, thosewho espouse the “virtue” view. Those who sharethe political view suggest that the institutionalarrangements permitted in our society have aserious impact on our capacity to be just, or onour ability to do the right thing by others. Hencein any discussion of business ethics pedagogicalpriority ought to be given to a macro politicalview which shows how the best intentions of thevirtuous may come to naught amidst the com-petitive pressures of a free market.1 On the otherside of the debate the voice of virtue claims thatour moral discourse is so flooded with irrecon-ciliable points of view that it is no longer possibleto come to a reasoned agreement to justify anappropriate course of action (MacIntyre, 1981).Hence the most important concern of businessethics, according to the virtue view, is to focuson the responsibilities which individuals have quabusinesspeople or qua members of the largercommunity (Solomon, 1993). The virtue viewpedagogically, takes a micro perspective. It isconcerned with the concrete cases in whichindividuals are embedded. The political view, onthe other hand, is concerned with the wideperspective of policy issues which regulate orhelp structure the institutions of our society. Thevirtue view is skeptical of moral and social-polit-ical theory, the political view takes the fruitful-ness of such theory as its starting point.2

This debate raises several questions: Is onemoral theory more appropriately suited tobusiness ethics than others? What is the relationbetween moral theory and particular problems?Is there a deductive relationship between theoryand practice as the notion of “applied ethics”suggests? What is the appropriate scope of abusiness ethics course - micro problems involving

BUSI ART NO. PP19 PIPS. NO. 129921

Business Ethics:A Compromise BetweenPolitics and Virtue Stephen Maguire

Journal of Business Ethics

16: 1411–1418, 1997.© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Dr. Maguire has taught philosophy and business ethics inthe Philosophy Departments of Queen’s University,Wilfrid Laurier University, and Carleton University. Hehas also taught Organizational Behavior in the Schoolof Business at Carleton University and in theDepartment of Management and Policy at the Universityof Arizona. This paper was written while Dr. Maguirewas a Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Managementat the University of Calgary.

business expertise or macro problems involvingphilosophical expertise? In this paper I will arguethat both sides of the debate could benefit fromcloser attention to the nature of moral under-standing. Moral understanding, I will try to show,is in constant flux between principles and cases,between politics and the workplace, betweentheory and practice, and as a consequence, boththe micro and the macro view are conceptuallyrelated and pedagogically important.

By way of proceeding I will first examine eachside of the debate to contrast their differences.Secondly, I will review their different criticismsof the “applied ethics model” approach tobusiness ethics. These criticisms will provide abridge to subsequently establishing in a latersection an alternative approach to the appliedethics model. Third, a brief discussion of theimplicit acknowledgements each side accords tothe other’s position will provide a basis forestablishing the ways in which the virtue andpolitical views are conceptually related. Fourth,by introducing the Aristotelian notion of phronesisI hope to show that the nature of moral under-standing provides an additional conceptual bondbetween the two sides of the debate. Finally Iwill consider the pedagogical ramifications of myproposed synthetic solution to this debatebetween politics and virtue.

The virtue view

The virtue view is skeptical of the usefulness ofstudying moral theory in a business ethics course.Robert Solomon, one of the proponents ofvirtue theory, argues that the study of varioustheories actually encourages relativism – “if youare a utilitarian, you’ll do this, if you’re a Kantian,you’ll do that” (Solomon, 1993, p. 202). Thisrelativistic impasse is difficult to overcome forthose who have to make decisions withouthaving had “the leisure to sort out wherethey stood in these debates” (Winkler, 1993, p.350).

Virtue theorists also argue that Kantian andUtilitarian theories have nothing to say about thescope of business ethics, are oblivious to theparticular responsibilities associated with the

various roles in which employees find themselves,are completely inattentive to the rich personaldimension in ethics and finally both theoriesyield ambiguous practical advice (Solomon,1993; DesJardins 1995; Koehn, 1995).

According to virtue theory “our basic unit ofunderstanding” ought to be the roles individualsplay within a corporation (Solomon, 1993, p.204). The purpose of business ethics, virtuetheorists argue, is “the description of and con-templation about – individuals in (and out of )business roles, as well as of the role of businessand businesses in society” (Solomon, 1993, p.204). Presumably, a description of the rolesemployees play within a corporation will leadto a better understanding of employee ethicalobligations. Secondly, business ethics ought tofocus more on the personal dimension of ethics,that is say it ought to encourage amongst studentsand employees an appreciation of the virtues andvalues of the business world. Thirdly, we oughtnot to worry about any conflict between businessvalues and the greater public good mainlybecause the values of individuals, and we maypresume corporations, are largely fashioned bythe larger community of which they are a part.Hence the values of corporations are only asubset of the community’s values and these arepredominantly shaped, or ought to be shaped, bythe pursuit of excellence (Solomon, 1993).Fourth, business ethics ought to encourageindividuals to develop what Aristotle callsphronesis, that is to say “the ability to makereasonable decisions in situations in which thereis no right answer” (Desjardins, 1995, p. 97b).This ability, or capacity to make good judge-ments, becomes all the more important if wereject the applied ethics model of deducing rulesfrom principles and applying these rules to situ-ations in order to determine the right course ofaction. If the applied ethics model goes out thewindow, there is no longer a methodology forsolving ethical problems; we are left to muddleour way through as best we can. The hope thatphronesis offers is the suggestion that the more wemuddle our way through various problems thebetter we become in making good judgementsin difficult situations.

In summary it is clear that according to virtue

1412 Stephen Maguire


theory it is individual virtue and integrity thatcount. With such virtuous individuals in ouremploy, adherents of this theory believe, goodcorporate and social policy is bound to follow(Solomon, 1993).

The political view

The problem with which teachers of businessethics ought to be concerned about, the polit-ical theorists argue, is not the character ofbusiness people, it is the free market of unregu-lated competition which “creates the conditionswhich are ripe for unethical behavior” (Sethi,1994, p. 805b). Only if market arrangements aremorally acceptable and only if businesses operatein a manner not contrary to the public interestcould we then endorse the view of the virtuetheorists (Macleod, 1993). Possessing personalintegrity, a virtuous character, and good judge-ment matter little if the role one plays happensto be the public relations officer of a largetobacco company. According to the politicaltheorists the so called micro issue of determiningappropriate judgement in particular cases pre-supposes that the institution one works for ismorally acceptable and that the market pressureson that particular institution are also morallyacceptable (Macleod, 1993). Only then could wesay that attentiveness to one’s corporate role is avirtue.

Consider these three different possibleapproaches to business ethics described byMacleod (1993). The first approach, which wecan call the virtuous role player, focuses on theperformance of the role related duties ofemployees. The second, the morally responsibleexecutive approach, believes that the moral realmof business consists in a corporate willingness togo beyond what is legally required or requiredby one’s corporate role so that executives act inmorally responsible or laudatory ways, wayswhich improve the lot of their employees or theircommunity. They might improve employeeworking conditions, or adopt more informativelabelling practices, or implement more effectivepollution controls. The third approach is that ofthe politicized morally responsible executive,

someone who is not only willing to act in amorally progressive way but someone who is alsowilling to encourage others to do so by pressingfor reform of the legal, economic, and politicalenvironment.

The advantages of the politicized morallyresponsible executive over the simply morallyresponsible executive are threefold. First, thepoliticized executive is more likely to sustain hermoral actions if she is successful in convincingothers to do so as well. If not, the companywhich acts alone in discharging its moral respon-sibilities may soon find that the costs associatedwith executing these responsibilities have left itin an uncompetitive position (Hoffman, 1995).Secondly, encouraging others to take similaraction is a way of ensuring fairness; all competi-tors will now share similar burdens. Third, thepositive effects of such actions on the commu-nity will be greater, the more these actionsbeome industry wide practices.

It ought to be clear that politicized or not, theapproach of the morally responsible executive ismore likely to be correlated with morally accept-able actions than is the approach of the virtuousrole player. As has been mentioned previously,there is nothing virtuous about aiding a corpo-ration in undermining the public good or inperforming a morally dubious but commonlyaccepted industry practice. Not surprisinglyvirtue theorists tacitly agree. They acknowledgethe importance of these macro issues by dis-cussing with their students the wisdom of seekingemployment in a morally reputable company(Solomon, 1993) or by arguing that the role ofcorporations is to produce goods and services ofexcellent quality. This acknowledgement,however, does not adequately recognize thepriority of the effects of market arrangementson shaping the responsibilities and roles ofemployees.

Criticisms of the applied ethics model

Many of the concerns virtue theorists have withmoral theory result from their dissatisfaction withthe applied ethics model of soving moralproblems. There seems to be a consensus

Business Ethics: A Comprise Between Politics and Virtue 1413


developing that such an approach, which beginsat the level of theory and works down to aproblem embedded in a particular stituation, isfundamentally flawed. According to the appliedethics model, the way to sort out moral problemsis at the level of moral theory. From moral theoryrelevant moral principles are extracted whichthen suggest a specific moral rule which is usedto justify a judgement in a particular situation(Winkler, 1993). This approach, virtue theoristsagree, is an attempt to force principles to fitpractice. The more we try to make this fit asuccess the more we realize that something iswrong. What we often discover is that ourdeductive efforts have fallen by the wayside as thecomplexities of a particular situation unravell andan appropriate response is sought.

Political and virtue theorists have differentresponses to the problems associated with theapplied ethics model. Virtue theorists argue thatwe should jettison the model and in its placeadopt a situational approach to business ethics,one in which we concentrate on the characterand responsibilities of our employees. Politicaltheorists agree with virtue theorists that theapplied ethics model has substantial flaws. Theyagree that the approach of establishing princi-ples from which rules are derived and thenapplied to a rich diversity of cases is likely torun into trouble. They agree that there will becases in which the application of a rule will bemorally obligatory while in other cases theapplication of the same rule will be morallyobjectionable (Macleod, 1993). One way inwhich this problem might be solved is toformulate rules which specify their range ofapplication. The problem, however, is that newor different situations from the ones previouslyexamined may still demand further revision ofthe rule, limit its range of application evenfurther, or perhaps even raise questions which arebest addressed at the level of moral theory.

On the virtue side we have a case drivenapproach which examines how people of goodcharacter would exercise their responsibilities indifficult situations. This approach, I would argue,is most commonly adopted in schools ofmanagement. Most business professors whoteach ethics are often trained in organizational

behaviour or policy. They pay some attention tophilosophical theory, but lacking training in thisarea, prefer to concentrate on what managersought to do when stuck in messy situations – i.e.salvage the ship in a financially successful andpublicly presentable way. Practitioners of man-agement theory examine these messy situationson a case by case basis and, although for differentreasons, share the view with philosophical virtuetheorists that a case driven or micro approach isthe appropriate content of a business ethicscourse.

From the political viewpoint, charting theethical course of a business requires that themarket arrangements in which it operates bemeasured against principles of distributive justice.Otherwise, according to the political view, thedecisions of the most well intentioned employeeswill be overwhelmed by the competitive pres-sures of the marketplace. Far better, under thisview, that market activity be appropriately regu-lated to ensure that the ethical decisions ofemployees or corporations do not leave thecompany competitively hindered by whateverextra costs may be associated with doing the rightthing. Usually, but not always, this macroapproach is the one adopted by philosophers whoteach business ethics. Although political theoristsacknowledge the importance of situation inchallenging the application of rules, the practiceof examining cases which describe complexsituations is seldom adopted. Despite the polit-ical position’s recognition of a bidirectionalrelationship between theory and rules, an orien-tation to the macro issues of theory and marketregulation persists. In the political paradigm casestudies have marginal or no use at all in a businessethics course.

A compromise between the virtuous andthe political

We have already seen how virtue theoristsacknowledge the importance of macro issues byencouraging their students to join a morallyreputable company. This implicitly acknowledges,at least at the organizational level, that individualmoral behaviour may be undermined by organi-



zational culture or by its purposes and proce-dures. Recent virtue theorists have gone beyondthe organizational level and flatly stated theimportance of politics in business ethics, rightlypointing out that Aristotle’s ethical theory, fromwhich virtue theory is derived, is part of thelarger study of politics (Koehn, 1995). InAristotle’s thinking, humans (at least of a certainsort, i.e. Greek males) are fundamentally polit-ical animals. Their association in a communityembodies their common conception of the good,permits the legislation of laws prohibiting actionslikely to undermine virtuous character, andprovides opportunities for its members to leadthe good life. The relationship between a com-munity and the living of a virtuous life is anintimate one.

When political theorists acknowledge thebidirectional relationship between moral theoryand situation they are beginning to soundsomewhat Aristotelian. According to Aristotle,virtue is situation specific; a virtuous act cannotbe described independently of the situation inwhich the act is performed. Political theoristsnow acknowledge that rules cannot be formu-lated without attention to the situations to whichthey apply. If political theorists recognize theimportance of situation, and virtue theorists rec-ognize the importance of politics, then both sidesmust implicitly agree that any determination ofmoral behaviour depends on an inseparableconceptual connection between micro and macroperspectives.

I now want to turn to the nature of moralunderstanding and argue that it is the source ofanother profound connection between the microand the macro perspectives in two distinct ways.First, I hope to show that moral understandinghighlights an intimate connection betweentheory and practice, between macro and micro,a connection quite different from the appliedethics model, but one which is consistent withthe criticisms which the political and virtueviews direct at the applied ethics model.Secondly, I will argue that the nature of moralunderstanding, while anchored in a specificsituation, is nonetheless necessarily open tohistorical reflection, including reflection on theways in which the practices of our community

have shaped the present situation in which wefind ourselves. To make sense of moral under-standing we need to subject Aristotle’s ahistoricalconception of phronesis to the historically sensi-tive criticisms of Gadamer and MacIntyre.

Phronesis is the capacity to exercise goodjudgement in difficult situations. It is an intel-lectual virtue upon which the exercise of thevirtues of character depend (MacIntyre, 1981).Even the exercise of virtues which are inheritedcharacter traits depend on an acquired skill ofrecognizing situational differences which willmodify how virtuous action is to be performed.On some occasions, for example, generosity maybe received as a warm expression of friendship,on other occasions it may be taken as humiliatingcharity. Without the exercise of phronesis we riskbecoming Dostoeyevski’s idiot. We need toinquire, then, into the features of human expe-rience which facilitates the good judgementcharacteristic of phronesis.

The key to developing good judgement liesin the learning experience of every individual.Hans-Georg Gadamer in his theory of philo-sophical hermeneutics, portrays the learningexperience (Erfahrung) as an open, uncontrolledprocess of interpretation (Gadamer, 1989). It isour openness to new experience which allows usto learn. We do so, at the most fundamental level,by comparing the new with the old, by lookingat similarities and differences, and on this basisrevising our prejudgements (Vorurteile) of whatsomething is or of what we expected somethingto be. In fact, it is when our expectations arecontradicted that we learn the most (Gadamer,1989). This comparing and contrasting ofexperience is an interpretive enterprise. It is thebasis of simile and metaphor by which we learnto look at previous experience in new ways. Itis from comparison and contrast that conceptsdevelop and come into play. I use ‘play’ (Spiel)deliberately here as Gadamer does (Gadamer,1989). It is meant to indicate that the concep-tual basis of language ensures that all linguisticphrases will have a certain amount of slack orroom for interpretation. This includes of course,the moral traditions of a culture.

Aristotelian phronesis is also an interpretiveenterprise and is central to Gadamer’s



hermeneutic theory. The judgement of the rightbalance to strike in our actions depends both onknowledge of principles and of the situation inwhich we find ourselves. What exactly is thisrelationship between principles and situation?Consider Aristotle’s metaphor in which hedescribes the interaction of principle and situa-tion in making moral judgements (Gadamer,1986). An archer, he suggests, cannot improveher aim (Aristotle’s archer was very likely not awoman) without a target to shoot at. Similarly,she cannot improve her aim without someknowledge of how to handle the bow.Knowledge of the good, Aristotle suggests, is likea target at which we can take general aim.Phronesis is similar to learning how to draw thebow. Accordingly moral understanding requiresboth a knowledge of the good and the exerciseof practical reasoning in specific situations. Moraljudgement, therefore does not depend first onknowledge of moral principle and then a subse-quent application of this knowledge. Rather theapplication of understanding is codetermined bysituation and principle (Gadamer, 1989). Onlyby understanding what is an appropriate actionin a specific situation do we truly come tounderstand the meaning of the relevant moralprinciple.

Take, for example, our understanding offairness. We have a broad understanding offairness as the equal treatment of individuals.Formulating the principle this way, however, isunsatisfactory as our experience with specificcases will show. We do not treat those who arephysically challenged in the same way as thosewho are not. We spend more of the community’sresources on a per capita basis on those who arehandicapped. We provide wheelchair ramps,automatic doors, books in braille, modified vansfor transportation, etc. If these facilities were notprovided, however, these individuals would notenjoy the same opportunities that many of usmay easily take advantage of, the opportunity,for example, to pursue higher education andmeaningful employment. To treat people fairly inthis situation involves initially treating themunequally. So we need to understand the prin-ciple of fairness differently in different situations.We might say that the principle of fairness or

equality implies that people ought to be treatedthe same except where relevant differences exist.But to claim this clearly throws the onus ofdeterming the right thing to do back to specificsituations where we need to be attentive torelevant differences. Our knowledge of moralprinciples and our conception of the good life,therefore, are continuously being articulatedthrough our experience of new situations.

Clearly moral knowledge relies on an insepa-rable relationship between theory and practice.One does not deduce the right course of actionfrom a knowledge of the good as one wouldapply a theorem to a specific mathematicalproblem. Gadamer refers to this complementaryrelation of moral knowledge and experience asa pointless distinction; “for moral knowledgecontains a kind of experience in itself ”(Gadamer, 1989, p. 322). In this respecthermeneutic and moral knowledge are similar topre-Kantian notions of humanistic knowledgesuch as common sense, judgement and tact. Itis not surprising then, that with regard tointerpretation, Gadamer claims that the most“experienced” are the most capable of renderinggood judgements. Any interpretation of a par-ticular situation always occurs within its historyof previous interpretations, (Wirkungsgeschichte)whether we are explicitly aware of these inter-pretations or not (Gadamer, 1989). The extentto which previous interpretations effect ourconsciousness depends on the frequency withwhich we have previously immersed ourselves insimilar problems and on the depth of our knowl-edge of our own cultural history as it pertainsto the problem at hand. That is why, in cases ofcommon law, which exemplify the importanceof the interpretation of precedent, judicialappointments ideally ought to go to the mostexperienced (the tendency to politicize SupremeCourt decisions is a fairly recent one, especiallyin Canada). And being the most experienced atgetting and securing the good for man, asAristotle puts it ( Joachim, 1951), entails beingconcerned with politics. Politics, in Aristotle’sview is a branch of ethics, knowledge of whichbecomes crucial to right action.

Aristotle, however, thought that knowledge ofpolitics was an ahistorical activity. The city state



embodied the good for humankind. While thestate continually provided the conditions whichpresupposed the exercise of virtue, these condi-tions were not seen as subject to change. HenceAristotle’s notion of the good as embodied by thestate is itself ahistorical (MacIntyre, 1981). If,however, we agree with Gadamer (1989) that thegood represents the moral principles suggested byour historically evolving traditions, then our con-ception of the good is a living tradition and itsinfluences on members of the community willchange over time. Contemporary conflict overconceptions of the good need not indicate afragmentation of tradition as MacIntyre suggestsin After Virtue. It could as easily be interpreted,as MacIntyre himself suggests in an earlier work,as conflict which is vital to the continuance of aliving tradition (MacIntyre, 1977).

In conclusion, phronesis, especially Gadamer’sinterpretation of this Aristotelian intellectualvirtue, reveals a profound connection betweenprinciple and practice which highlights themanner in which moral understanding pre-supposes the traditions of a community. Theinterpretive play inherent in language shows thatmembers of a community are, by their interpre-tations and actions, also able to change theirtraditions. To act on good judgement, in otherwords, is to be willing to participate in ourcollective vision of the good life.

Pedagogical implications

Where does this leave the practice of businessethics? Proponents of the political view oftenoverlook the usefulness of examining situatedethical problems as a way of illuminating marketand organizational constraints on ethical delib-eration. Proponents of the virtue view, in theircase oriented descriptions of role determinedappropriate behaviour, often overlook the priorityof the political in determining the roles whichemployees dutifully fulfill. Both views minimizethe indispensabililty of theory and practice informing moral understanding. Moral principlesand situational experience are woven into thefabric of our lives. The risk of focussing on oneat the neglect of the other ought not to be taken

lightly. What we endanger, by focussing on oneside of the debate at the expense of the other, isthe project of developing moral understanding.

What are the practical pedagogical implica-tions of this compromise between virtue andpolitics? Emphasizing the connections betweenthe ethical and the political, between theory andpractice, between principles and situations willundoubtedly raise questions about (a) the waysin which organizations could and should besupportive of ethical criteria in the decisionmaking process and (b) the ways in which marketarrangements or principles of business practiceundermine organizational commitment to socialresponsibility. But where do we jump into thistight connection between theory and practice?Should we start our discussions at the level ofpolitical theory or at the employee or organiza-tional level of analysis?

If we take the historicity of moral under-standing seriously and if we recognize theinherent interpretive enterprise of moral under-standing, this seems to suggest that sense makingbegins with the situations in which we find our-selves. Why not begin our approach as ourunderstanding does? Why not begin from thepersonal and historical perspectives we all bringto the complex situations we encounter in thebusiness world? If phronesis is as important asmany have thought why not begin with a casedriven approach to business ethics whichacknowledges the importance of moral and socialtheory and in which no questions are forsworn?

Notes

1 One inevitably risks minimizing the differencesbetween authors when ascribing to them the sameschool of thought. In the writings of the authors dis-cussed herein there are significant differences.Nevertheless, when I speak of the “Political” view, Ihave in mind primarily A. M. Macleod (1993) andS. P. Sethi (1994). Both authors are concerned withthe way in which market practices undermine the bestintentions of individuals. They hold widely differentviews as to how this problem ought to be treated.One is philosophical, the other more practical. In thispaper I focus on Macleod’s philosophical position.Similarly the authors I have ascribed to the “Virtue”



position, R. Solomon (1993) and J. R. Desjardins(1995) also have important differences as well as sim-ilarities. They differ in particular over the importanceof phronesis. The position I discuss in this paper is asynthesis of Solomon and Desjardins.2 Two recently published articles defending virtueethics could be read as critical of earlier articulationsof the role of virtue theory in business. Both empha-size the importance of politics or political theory invirtue ethics. Neither emphasize, as I do in this paper,the role of phronesis in providing a conceptual linkbetween practical problems and politics. See D. Koehn1995, ‘A Role for Virtue Ethics in the Analysis ofBusiness Practice’, Business Ethics Quarterly 5(3),533–539 and also J. McCracken and B. Shaw: 1995,‘Virtue Ethics and Contractarianism: Towards aReconciliation’, Business Ethics Quarterly 5(2), 297–312.

References

DesJardins, J. R.: 1995, ‘Virtues and Business Ethics’,Moral Issues in Business (Wadsworth, Belmont,California), pp. 95–99.

Gadamer, H. G.: 1986, The Idea of the Good inPlatonic-Aristotelian Philosophy (Yale, New Haven).

Gadamer, H. G.: 1989, Truth and Method (Crossroad,N.Y.).

Hoffman, W. M.: 1995, ‘Business and EnvironmentalEthics’, Moral Issues in Business (Wadsworth,Belmont, California), pp. 567–573.

Joachim, H. H.: 1951, Aristotle, The NicomacheanEthics (Oxford, Great Britain).

Koehn, D.: 1995, ‘A Role for Virtue Ethics in theAnalysis of Business Practice’, Business EthicsQuarterly 5(3), 533–539.

MacIntyre, A.: 1977, ‘Epistemological Crises,Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science’,The Monist 60, 453–472.

MacIntyre, A.: 1981, After Virtue (Notre Dame,Indiana).

Macleod, A. M.: 1993, ‘Moral Philosophy andBusiness Ethics: The Priority of the Political’,Applied Ethics (Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass.), pp.222–228.

McCracken, J. and B. Shaw.: 1995, ‘Virtue Ethics andContractarianism: Towards a Reconciliation’,Business Ethics Quarterly 5(2), 297–312.

Sethi, S. P.: 1994, ‘Imperfect Markets: Business Ethicsas an Easy Virtue’, Journal of Business Ethics 13,803–815.

Solomon, R. C.: 1993 ‘Corporate Roles, PersonalVirtues: An Aristotelian Approach to BusinessEthics’, Applied Ethics (Blackwell, Cambridge,Mass.), pp. 201–221.

Winkler, E. R.: 1993, ‘From Kantianism toContextualism: The Rise and Fall of the ParadigmTheory in Bioethics’, Applied Ethics (Blackwell,Cambridge, Mass.), pp. 343–365.

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Business Ethics: A Compromise Between Politics and Virtue

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