Burma campaign

THE BURMA CAMPAIGN

DEC 1941 – AUG 1945

AIM

• TO ACQUAINT WITH THE BURMA

CAMPAIGN (1941-1945) & ANALYSE THE

LESSONS LEARNT.

PREVIEW

• BURMA : GEOGRAPHY & PEOPLE.

• JAPANESE CAPTURE OF BURMA & THE ALLIED

RETREAT.

• PLANNING & CONDUCT OF THE ALLIED OFFN.

• NAVAL & AIR ASPECTS.

• PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS LEARNT.

BURMA

GEOGRAPHY & PEOPLE

• LOC & CLIMATE.

• POPULATION.

• MAJ RIVERS & COMN NW.

• TRN IMPERATIVES.

LOC & CLIMATE

LONGITUDE92° E TO 100 ° E

LATITUDE10 ° N TO 30 °N

AREA 262732 SQ MILES

MTN RGSNAGA HILLS

CHIN HILLS

ARAKAN YOMAS

SHAN HILLS

KAREN HILLS

DAWNA RANGE

IRRAWADDY

CHINDWIN

SITTANG

SALWEEN

MAJ RIVERSMAJ RIVERS

COMN NWRANGOON-MANDALAY RLY

NO RDS TO INDIA

COMNS WITH SIAM RESTD

RIVER TFC ON THEIRRAWADDY

AIR SERVICE

AIRFIELDS

LG

POPULATION

BURMESE

SHANS

KARENS

CHINS

KACHINS

TRN IMPERATIVES

TRN IMPERATIVES

• AREAS OF SOUTHERN SHAN STATES & THE

TENASSERIM TOWNS OF MOULMEIN, TAVOY,

MERGUI & VICTORIA PT VITAL FOR THE AIR

ROUTE TO SINGAPORE.

• BURMA RD SOLE LINK BETN CHINA & BURMA.

ALT ROUTE WAS BY FLYING THE 'HUMP'

ROUTE, AN AIR-FERRY SERVICE WHICH

CLEARED THE HIMALAYAS AT AN ALTITUDE

OF 23,000 FEET.

• TRN IN GEN WAS INFESTED WITH THICK

IMPENETRABLE JUNGLES & POOR RDS

• LAY OF THE LAND ; NORTH TO SOUTH

• DIFFICULT TO CUT ACROSS THE GRAIN

OF THE COUNTRY

• RANGOON WAS STRATEGICALLY IMP

TOWN

TRN IMPERATIVES

• GRAIN OF THE COUNTRY FROM NORTH TO SOUTH

WITH HIGH MTNS IN THE NORTH & GRADUALLY

DECLINING IN HT AT THE SOUTHERN END OF

TENASSERIM.

• LACK OF ADEQUATE COMN ROUTES.

• THICK IMPENETRABLE JUNGLES & POOR RDS.

• TROPICAL MONSOONS FROM MAY TO OCT.

• TROPICAL MONSOONS INCR THE DEGREE OF

DIFFICULTY

• AVENUE OF APCH FROM SOUTH

• IMP OF AIR ROUTE TO SINGAPORE & BURMA ROAD

• HUMP ROUTE

JAPANESE CAPTURE OF BURMA & THE

ALLIED RETREAT

• WHY BURMA ?

• JAPANESE CAPTURE OF BURMA.

• EARLY ALLIED REACTIONS.

IMPORTANCE OF BURMA

• CUT OVERLAND AXIS TO CHINA FROM BURMA

VIA THE FAMED BURMA RD.

• CAPTURE OF BURMA WOULD HAVE PLACE

THE JAPANESE AT THE GATE OF INDIA.

• RAW MATERIALS.

• PROTECT THE FLK OF THEIR MAIN ATTK

AGAINST MALAYA.

FORCED INVOLVED

• JAPANESE

– 33 INF DIV.

– 55 INF DIV.

– 56 INF DIV.

• ALLIED

– 17 INF DIV.

– 1 BURMA DIV (LATER RENAMED 39TH INF DIV).

– CHINESE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CONSISTING OF 5TH,

6TH & 66TH ARMIES EACH WITH STR EQUIVALENT TO A

BRITISH DIV.

CONDUCT OF JAPANESE OFFN

• CAPTURE OF SITTANG BR.

• FALL OF RANGOON.

• JAPANESE ADV TO THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

• ALLIED RETREAT.

• THAI ARMY ENTERS BURMA.

JAPANESE ADV

LESSONS LEARNT

• CONFLICTING GOALS.

• UNITY OF PURPOSE & UNITY OF COMD.

• JAPANESE AIR SUPERIORITY.

• UNPREPAREDNESS.

• BLOCKADE OF CHINA.

ALLIED REACTIONS

• OPS IN 1942-43.

– FIRST ARAKAN CAMPAIGN.

– THE FIRST CHINDIT EXPEDITION.

FIRST ARAKAN CAMPAIGN

LESSONS LEARNT

• FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE TPS.

• THE CDRS & THE STAFF MUST HAVE

INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUNTRY.

• ALLIED TAC & EQPT WERE NOT SUITED TO

THE JUNGLE COV HILLS.

• SURPRISE.

FIRST CHINDIT OP

SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS

• THE CHINDITS PROVED THAT BRITISH &

INDIAN SDRS COULD LIVE, MOV & FIGHT AS

EFFECTIVELY AS THE JAPANESE IN THE

JUNGLE.

• SAVAGE BLOW TO THE LEGEND OF THE

JAPANESE SUPERMAN

• THIS HAD A TREMENDOUS EFFECT ON THE

MORALE OF TPS IN INDIA.

• IN AUG 1943, THE ALLIES CREATED SE ASIA

COMD (SEAC), A NEW COMBINED COMD

RESP FOR THE SE ASIAN THEATRE, UNDER

ADM LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN.

CREATION OF SEAC

• NCAC.

• CHINDIT FORCE.

OTHER FORCES

• THE CAPACITY OF THE BENGAL – ASSAM RLY.

• THE PORT CAPACITY OF CHITTAGONG.

• IT WAS DECIDED TO CONSTRUCT A 15 CM OIL

PIPELINE FROM CALCUTTA TO TINSUKHIA & A 10 CM

PIPELINE FROM THERE ACROSS BURMA INTO CHINA.

• IT WAS DECIDED TO EXTEND RDS TO SITTAUNG &

KALEMYO IN BURMA TO FACILITATE PROG OF OFFN.

ADM PREP BY SEAC

JAPANESE PLANS

• MUTAGACHI’s CONCEPT WAS TO CAPTURE IMPHAL & ADV

TO BRAHMAPUTRA VALLEY THEREBY CUT OFF ALLIED SUP

LINES & AIR SUP TO CHINESE TPS ON THE NORTHERN

FRONT.

• SUBHASH CHANDRA BOSE PERSUADED MUTAGUCHI THAT A

VICTORY COULD LEAD TO COLLAPSE OF BRITISH RULE IN

INDIA.

• OP U-GO OR OPERATION C GOT A GO AHEAD AGAINST A

PASSIVE DEF OF BURMA, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE AS MANY

RFTS AS ATTK ON IMPHAL.

OPS 1943-45 : ALLIED PLANS TO

RECAPTURE BURMA

• CAPTURE OF ANDAMAN ISLANDS BY AMPHIBIOUS ASLT

(BUCCANEER) BY 33 CORPS.

• ADV ON THE ARAKAN COAST UPTO THE MAUNGDAW –

BUTHIDUANG RD BY 15 CORPS SUPPORTED BY 224 GP RAF & NAVAL

FORCES.

• ADV BY 4 CORPS SUPPORTED BY 221 GP RAF ACROSS THE

CHINDWIN R.

• ADV BY STILWELL’S CHINESE ARMY IN INDIA SUPPORTED BY THE

NORTHERN AIR SECT FORCE DOWN THE HUKAWNG VALLEY TO

THE MYTIKYINA – MOGAUNG AREA TO SECURE THE ALIGNMENT

OF THE LEDO RD TO CHINA.

• THE OPS ON THE NORTHERN COMBAT COMD AREA

(NCAC) SUPPLEMENTED BY :-

– ADV BY THE CHINESE EF FROM YUNAN SUPPORTED BY THE

14TH US AF TO SECURE THE CHINA END OF THE LEDO RD.

– OPS IN SP BY WINGATE’S SPECIAL FORCE NO 1 AIR CDO &

THE THIRD TAC FORCE.

– CAPTURE OF THE AIRFD AT RAIL INDAW BY 50 INDIAN PARA

BDE WITH SUBSEQUENT FLY IN BY TP CARRIER COMD OF 26

INDIAN DIV TO HOLD THE TOWN TILL STILWELL’S FORCES

REACHED MOGAUNG.

OPS 1943-45 : ALLIED PLANS TO

RECAPTURE BURMA

• OPS IN 1943-45.

– NORTHERN FRONT.

– YUNAN FRONT.

– SOUTHERN FRONT.

– CENT FRONT.

– RACE TO RANGOON.

OPS IN 1943-45

• OPS BY NCAC.

• ADV OF 38 CHINESE DIV IN OCT 1943 FROM

LEDO.

• THE SEC CHINDIT EXPEDITION.

NORTHERN FRONT

OPS IN NORTHERN FRONT

THE SEC CHINDIT EXPEDITION

• EFFICACY OF INFILT.

• THE CHINDITS ACHIEVED THEIR LTD OBJ .

• COORD OF LONG RG FORCES WITH THE MAIN

GRND FORCES.

• THE CONCEPT OF EMP THE CHINDITS IN

BLOCKING & MOV.

• ACTUAL DIVIDENDS.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC CHINDITS

EXPEDITION

YUNAN FRONT

• CHINESE ATTK STARTING IN THE SEC

HALF OF APR ON THE JAPANESE 56TH DIV.

• CAPTURE OF LUNGLING.

• HALT OF THE CHINESE ADV BY JAPANESE

RFT.

SOUTHERN FRONT

• IN 1944 GEN SLIM ORDERED 15 INDIAN

CORPS IN THE ARAKAN TO CLEAR THE

MAYU PENINSULA, WHICH COMPRISED OF

:-

THE SEC ARAKAN CAMPAIGN

LESSONS LEARNT

• ALLIED FORCES NO LONGER REACTED IN

PANIC TO THEIR L OF C BEING CUT BUT

INSTEAD THEY FOUGHT WHERE EVER THEY

WERE, LEAVING THE CLEARING OF THE

REARS TO THE DEPTH & RES FMNS.

• THE ADDN OF THIRD DIMENSION FOR AIR SUP.

CENT FRONT

• BACKGROUND

– NEW BURMA AREA ARMY (BAA) CREATED

UNDER LT GEN KAWABE IN 1943.

– 15TH ARMY OF BAA UNDER LT GEN MUTAGUCHI

RESP FOR CENTRAL FRONT.

STRAT IMP

• SECURE MOST SUITABLE BASE FOR FUTURE OPS INTO

INDIA.

• CUT OFF MAINT OF COMNS OF ALL ALLIED FORCES IN

NE ASSAM.

• FALL OF IMPHAL WOULD MAKE IT EASY TO OVERRUN

AIR FDS & THUS CUT AIR SUP ROUTES TO CHINA.

• CONC OF WAR MTRL WAS A PRIZE FOR A FORCE

WHICH WAS SHORT ON EVERY RESOURCE.

JAPANESE PLAN

• ALLIED UNITS FAR SPREAD.

• MUTAGACHI’s PLAN:-

– 33 INF DIV WOULD DESTR INDIAN 17 DIV AT TIDDIM FROM

THE SOUTH.

– YAMOMOTO FORCE (TPS FROM 33 & 15 INF DIVS) WOULD

DESTR INDIAN 20 DIV AT TAMU & ATTK IMPHAL FROM EAST.

– 15 INF DIV WOULD ENVLP IMPHAL FROM NORTH.

– 14 TK REGT & 3 HY ARTY REGTS WERE IN SP.

– A SDY OPS BY 31 INF DIV TO ISOLATE KOHIMA & EXPLOIT

TOWARDS DIMAPUR.

ALLIED FORCES

• 4 CORPS CONSISTED OF:-

– 20 DIV AT TAMU.

– 17 DIV (TWO BDES) AT TIDDIM.

– 23 DIV IN RES AT IMPHAL.

– 50 PARA BDE LOC NORTH OF IMPHAL.

– 254 INDIAN ARMD BDE NEAR IMPHAL.

• ALLIED PLAN.

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE

• JAPANESE COMMENCED OFFN ACROSS

CHINDWIN R ON 08 MAR 44.

• WITHDRAWAL OF 20 INDIAN INF DIV.

• 17 INDIAN DIV CUT OFF BY 33 JAPANESE

DIV.

• 31 JAPANESE DIV CUT OFF 4 CORPS.

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE

• ADV OF 33 JAPANESE DIV.

• YAMOMOTO FORCE & INA’s GANDHI REGT

COULD NOT BREAK THROUGH 20 INDIAN DIV

DEFS.

• 15 JAPANESE DIV ENCIRCILED IMPHAL, &

NUNSHIGUM (OVERLOOKING IMPHAL

AIRSTRIP) WAS CAPTURED BY 51 REGT.

• ALLIED CA.

END OF THE BATTLE

• MUTAGACHI FINALLY BROKE OFF ON 03 JUL.

• JAPANESE WERE REDUCED TO RABBLE AND FELL BACK TO

CHINDWIN R ABANDONING THEIR ARTY, TPT & SDRS.

• THIS WAS GREATEST DEFEAT SUFFERED BY THE JAPANESE

TILL DATE IN THEIR HISTORY.

• THEY SUFFERED 55,000 CAS INCL 13500 DEAD, MOST OF

THEM BY STARVATION, DISEASE & EXHAUSTION.

• ALLIED SUFFERED 17,500 CAS.

LESSONS LEARNT

• SURPRISE.

• RIGIDITY OF PLANS.

• LGS RISK.

• QUICK RFTS BY ALLIES.

• AIR SUP.

BATTLE OF KOHIMA

• TURNING PT OF U GO OFFN.

• FOUGHT FROM 04 APR TO 22 JUN 44.

• BATTLE CAN BE STUDIED IN TWO STGS:

– STG 1. FROM 03 APR TO 16 APR , THE JAPANESE

ATMT TO CAPTURE KOHIMA RIDGE.

– STG 2. FROM 18 APR TO 22 JUN, CA BY ALLIED

FORCES.

JAPANESE PLAN

• AS PART OF U-GO OFFN, 31 JAPANESE DIV

COMPRISING OF FOLLOWING WERE TO

CAPTURE KOHIMA & THUS CUT OFF IMPHAL

& THEN EXPLOIT TOWARDS DIMAPUR:-

– 58 REGT.

– 138 REGT.

– INDEP MTN ARTY BN.

PROG OF OPS

• JAPANESE CROSSED THE CHINDWIN R ON 15

MAR.

• CAPTURE OF SANGSHAK (UKHRUL), WHERE

PARA BDE LOST NEARLY 600 MEN & THE

JAPANESE APPROX 400.

• THIS ACTION HOWEVER DELAYED THE

JAPANESE BY SEVEN CRUCIAL DAYS ON THE

SHORTEST ROUTE TO KOHIMA.

ALLIED ACTIONS

• GEN SLIM WAS DELAYED IN ASSESSING

JAPANESE STR & REINFORCED THE IMPHAL

FRONT BY FLYING IN 5 INDIAN DIV FROM THE

ARAKAN FRONT.

• 2 BRITISH DIV, 23 LONG RANGE PENETRATION

GP & HQ 33 CORPS WAS ALSO ORDERED TO

MOV BY RAIL & RD.

SIEGE OF KOHIMA

• KOHIMA WAS ADM BASE OF NAGALAND.

• STR OF DEFENDERS

• THE SIEGE COMMENCED ON 06 APR & BY 17 APR

THE DEFENDERS SIT WAS DESPERATE.

• BATTLE OF THE TENNIS COURT.

• DEFENDERS DRIVEN INTO A SMALL PERIMETER

CALLED THE GRN HILL.

RELIEF OF KOHIMA

• BY 11 APR, 2 DIV HAD BULILD UP IN DIMAPUR FROM SOUTH

INDIA.

• BRITISH 5 BDR BROKE THROUGH TO 161 BDE IN JOTSOMA

ON 15 APR.

• 161 BDE NOW FOUGHT BITTERLY AND FINALLY REACHED

THE DESPERATE DEFENDERS AT KOHIMA ON 18 APR.

• ON 20 APR 6 INF BDE FROM 2 DIV RELIEVED THE GRN

AFTER BITTER FIGHTING WEST OF KOHIMA TOWN.

ALLIED CA

• COUNTER OFFN COULD NOT MATERIALISE

DUE TO HY OUTBREAK OF MONSOONS.

• IT WAS ONLY ON 13 MAY THAT KOHIMA

RIDGE COULD BE CLEARED OF JAPANESE.

JAPANESE RETREAT

• LACK OF SUPS WITH JAPANESE.

• 23 LRP BDE WAS PRIMARILY RESP FOR

CUTTING OFF OF JAPANESE Ls OF C.

• INDIAN 4 & 33 CORPS PUSHED SOUTHWARDS

ALONG THE RD.

• ON 22 JUN TPS OF 2 DIV MET TPS OF 5 INDIAN

DIV AT MILESTONE 109, APPROX 30 MILES

SOUTH OF KOHIMA.

AFTERMATH

• THE JAPANESE LOST MORE THAN 5,000 MEN IN

KOHIMA.

• BRITISH & INDIAN FORCES LOST AROUND

4,000 MEN; DEAD, MISSING & WOUNDED.

• THIS BATTLE WAS ULTIMATELY TO PROVE

THE TURNING PT OF THE BURMA CAMPAIGN.

• “PROBABLY ONE OF THE GREATEST BATTLES

IN HISTORY... IN EFFECT THE BATTLE OF

BURMA... NAKED UNPARALLELED HEROISM...”

- LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN

BATTLE OF MEIKTILA &

MANDALAY

• BACKGROUND

– 15TH ARMY HAD SUFERED DISASTEROUS DEFEAT AT IMPHAL

& KOHIMA.

– MOST JAPANESE DIVS NUMBERED 10,000 AS AGAINST AUTH

25,000 & WERE IN POOR HEALTH.

– THEY LACKED A TK WPNS & HAD FEW ARTY PIECES.

– JAPANESE 5 AIR DIV WAS LEFT WITH FEW DOZEN AC & 14 TK

REGT POSSESSED ONLY 20 TKS.

• REVISION OF PLANS.

JAPANESE PLAN

• GEN KIMURA WAS APPT NEW CDR OF BAA.

• KIMURA’s DPLY :-

– 28TH ARMY IN THE ARAKAN PROVINCE.

– 33RD ARMY TO FIGHT REARGUARD ACTIONS.

– 15TH ARMY TO WITHDRAW BEHIND IRRAWADY R.

• HE HOPED TO OVER STREACH ALLIES TO

OVERCOME IRRAWADY R & LATER EVEN ATMT A

CA.

ALLIED SIT

• SEAC HAD STARTED PLG RECAPTURE OF BURMA AS EARLY AS JUN

44 DURING THE BATTLE OF IMPHAL.

• OPTIONS FOR RECAPTURE OF BURMA WERE AS UNDER:-

– OPTION 1.

• CAPTURE NORTHERN BURMA, ALLOW LEDO RD TO BE COMPLETED. THIS WAS

REJECTED BEING AN OUTDATED STRAT PLAN.

– OPTION2.

• CAPTURE RANGOON BY A SEABORNE INVASION, BUT WAS REJECTED DUE TO LACK

OF LDG CRAFT OWING TO INVASION IN EUROPE.

– OPTION 3.

• OFFN INTO CENTRAL BURMA BY 14TH ARMY TO RECAPTURE BURMA FROM THE

NORTH CODENAMED OP EXTENDED CAPITAL TO ENCOMPASS A PURSUIT TO

RANGOON. THIS WAS THE PLAN ADOPTED BY THE ALLIED FORCES.

ALLIED FORCES

• 14TH ARMY.

– 4 CORPS.

– 33 CORPS.

• 15TH ARMY.

– TO LAUNCH DIVERSIONARY OFFN ALONG THE COAST ,

SIEZE AIRFD TO FORM BASES TO RESUP 14TH ARMY.

• AMERICAN NCAC.

– TO LAUNCH DIVERSIONARY OFFN FROM THE NORTH.

INT

• LACK OF INT.

• ALLIED SPL UNITS FORCE 136 & V FORCE

PASSED VITAL INFO, HOWEVER NOT DETL.

• JAPANESE ON THE OTHER HAND WERE

TOTALLY BLIND. LOCAL POPULATION WAS

BECOMING RESTIVE & DISILLUSIONED.

PROG OF BATTLE

• 33 CORPS.

• 4 CORPS.

• DUMMY HQ AT SITTAUNG.

• OPS BY 4 CORPS.

– 17TH DIV & 255 TK BDE HAVING CROSSED THE BR H ON 19TH FEB, MOV TO

NYANGU , TAUNGTHA (HALF WAY TO MEKTILA) BY 24 FEB.

– ABOUT 4000 TPS OF THE JAPANESE 168 REGT FROM 49 DIV WERE

DEFENDING MEIKTILA.

– WHEN THE JAPANESE THREW THEIR COMPLETE STR TO BEAT BACK OFFN

BY XXXIII CORPS IN NORTH THINKING IT TO BE COMPLETE IV & XXXIII

CORPS OFFN, IV CORPS LAUNCHED ITS OPS TOWADRS MEIKTILA.

– ON 01 MAR 45, 17 DIV ATTK MEIKTILA FROM ALL SIDES(DOUBLE ENVP) SP BY

ARTY & AIR. THE TOWN FELL AFTER FOUR DAYS OF HARD FIGHTING.

– HOWEVER 17 DIV WAS SIEGED IN MEIKTILA BY JAPANESE RFTS .

– JAPANESE LAUNCHED SEVERAL ATTKS FROM 12 MAR TO 22 MAR BUT WERE

BEATEN BACK WITH HY CAS.

BATTLE OF MEIKTILA

• OPS BY 33 CORPS

– BY 7 MAR , 19TH DIV HAD CROSSED IRRAWADY R & ITS LEADING TPS

COULD SEE THE MANDALAY HILL.

– 4/4 GR STORMED THE MANDALAY HILL ON 8 MAR & CAPTURED IT.

– THE DIV WAS HALTED BY FORT DUFFERIN ON WHICH HY ARTY &

BOMBERS HAD LITTLE EFFECT.

– BY 21 MAR , THE JAPANESE ABANDONED THE FORT VIA SEWERS,

BURNING THE FORT.

– ON 28 MAR THE SIEGE OF MEIKTILA TOO WAS BROKEN. WITH THE

FALL OF MANDALAY (AND OF MAYMYO TO ITS EAST), COMNS TO

THE JAPANESE FRONT IN THE NORTH OF BURMA WERE CUT.

– FURTHERMORE, WITH THE LOSS OF MANDALAY, THE BURMESE

POPULATION TURNED FINALLY AGAINST THE JAPANESE.

FALL OF MANDALAY

RACE TO RANGOON

CENTRAL BURMA TO

RANGOON

• ALLIED PLANS.

– 4 CORPS TO ADV ALONG RD MEIKTILA- TOUNGOO- PEGU

– RANGOON.

– 33 CORPS TO ADV ALONG RD MEIKTILA-PROME –

RANGOON.

– 15 CORPS TO CLEAR ARAKAN TO PREVENT JAPANESE

RFTS TO CENTRAL BURMA & CAPTURE AIR BASES TO SUP

THE MAIN THRUST.

– OP DRACULA. A SIMULTANEOUS AMPHIBIOUS OPS TO

CAPTURE RANGOON.

RACE TO RANGOON

It was a race against

two masters……the en & the

monsoonsFM Slim

RACE TO RANGOON

• VITAL TO CAPTURE RANGOON BEFORE ONSET

OF MONSOON TO AVOID A LGS CRISIS.

• PROG OF OPS.

– 33CORPS.

– 4 CORPS.

– D DAY FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS OPS WAS 02 MAY.

• JAPANESE 05 INDEP BDE.

OP DRACULA

• CONCEPT.

• LAUNCHED TO EASE SUP PROBLEMS ON 01

MAY.

• PARA DROPPING OF 50 PARA BDE.

• EVAC OF RANGOON

• LDG TPS OF 17TH & 26TH DIVS MET AT HLEGU 28

MILES NORTH OF RANGOON ON 06 MAY.

LESSONS LEARNT

• SELECTION & MAINT OF AIM.

• OFFN ACTION.

• CONC OF FORCES.

• FLEXIBILITY.

• SURPRISE & DXN

• ADM.

NAVAL & AIR ASPECTS

• NAVAL ASPECTS.

• AIR ASPECTS.

NAVAL ASPECTS

• SECURE SEA COMNS.

• MAINT OF 15 CORPS.

• SP THE ADV OF 25 INDIAN DIV.

• BLOCKING THE JAPANESE ADM SP.

• VITAL ROLE IN CAPTURE OF AKYAB &

RAMREE.

AIR ASPECTS

• OP C.

• OP THURSDAY & THE FALL OF IMPHAL.

• ADV TO RANGOON.

• STRAT BOMBING.

• PRINCIPLES OF WAR.

– SELECTION & MAINT OF AIM.

– OFFN ACTION.

– CONC OF FORCE.

– SURPRISE.

– FLEXIBILITY.

– COOP.

– ADM.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS

LEARNT


LEARNT

• BRITISH RETREAT FROM BURMA IN 1942.

– THE NECESSITY OF UNIFIED COMD.

– THE IMP OF PROPER TRG & EQPT.

– IMP OF INT & PROPAGANDA.

– NEED OF AIR SUPERIORITY.


LEARNT

• JAPANESE OFFN OF 1944.

– DISREGARD OF HIGHER CDR’S AIM.

– INADEQUATE ADM BACKING.

– LACK OF FLEXIBILITY & COORD.


LEARNT

• LESSONS FROM THE ALLIED RE CONQUEST

OF BURMA.

– UNIFIED COMD.

– AIR POWER.

– TRG.

– SPL FORCES.

– ADM.

CONCLUSION

Burma campaign

Education

Transcript of Burma campaign