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NEWS IN PHYSIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Neuron to Mind
main approaches to the study of mankind, and the corresponding
of man, are sketched and examined. The systemic model of man
a biopsychosocial entity is recommended. Likewise the multilevel
is favored over the holistic, the analytic, and the synthetic
Finally, the question of the reducibility of psychology
neurophysiology is discussed.
there was little com-
between physiologists and
ists. Typical ly the former were
in the various systems and
stems of the organism, whereas the
studied behavior. Hardly anyone
interested in the mechanisms where-
neural systems control behavior,
less in the nonmotor and nonsen-
of the central nervous
tem (CNS) of higher vertebrates. Con-
mind nonexistent.
That gap is now closing. Neuroscien-
are becoming more interested in
or, perception, emotion, and idea-
while psychologists and ethologists
happily ignoring the paralyzing in-
“Do not neurologize ” and are
to speculate on that which con-
and does the mentation.
fusion of neurophysiology with psy-
ogy, which Karl Lashley demanded
half a century ago, is fina lly start-
to happen.
Neurophysiologists are becoming
re that the nervous system is only
subsystem of the whole animal-
most interesting of all-and
hologists are realizing that real ani-
not black boxes. The great wall
body and behavior is being
from within (starting with the neu-
and from without (starting with be-
r). As the boring proceeds we real-
that the wall is not in nature but in
and theology.
Yet the fusion or merger tactics have
far been delineated in vague terms.
should introduce some precision if
want to know how best to integrate
Bunge is Professor of Philosophy in the
and Philosophy of Scienc e Unit,
University, 3479 Peel St., Montreal,
I-DA 1 W7, C anada.
the various approaches, methods, and
results of the various sciences, from neu-
rophysics to sociology, concerned with
the problem of accounting for behavior
and mentation. In the firs t place we
should tackle the matter of the variety
of approaches to this problem and weigh
their comparative merits.
Five approaches to the study
of mankind
Humans can be studied from different
points of view: as a physical entity, as a
chemical system, as an organism, as a
psychosystem, and as a component of
social systems (family, firm, school, etc.).
Each of these approaches has its virtues
and shortcomings, and each suggests a
one-sided view of man.
Approach 1 (physical). No doubt this
is the basic approach and one that has
proved fertile. But restricting the study
of man to its physical components and
aspects, i.e., adopting physicalism, is ig-
noring whatever physics fails to explain.
And trying to reduce the supraphysical
features of man to physics is quixotic if
only for being impractical. The mere at-
tempt to write down, and even more to
solve, the Schroedinger equation for a
brain, or even a neuron or an amino acid
molecule, is mind boggling. But even if
such tasks were feasible, a number of
essential features of life , such as evolu-
tion, would remain in the dark. And
overlooking evolution amounts to for-
saking the understanding of the com-
plexities of the nervous system and the
mental and social peculiarities of hu-
mans.
Approach 2 (chemical). First the
chemical theory o f heredity, then molec-
ular biology, and finally neurochemistry
showed that biochemistry is just as im-
portant a tool as biophysics for under-
standing the nervous system. However,
the successes of the chemical approach
should not be exaggerated, if for no other
reason than that we stil l do not have an
adequate understanding of a single or-
ganic molecule. (To be sure chemists
have discovered the composition and
gross structure of millions of molecules,
but they still owe us accurate theories of
even the simplest of molecules involved
in cell chemistry. Bear in mind that not
even HZ0 has been calculated quantum
mechanically.) In short, chemism is in-
adequate.
Approach 3 (biological). This is of
course the approach characterizing the
life sciences. This platitude bears repe-
tition in view of the fact that the alter-
native approaches are still going strong.
(Thus most psychologists believe that
they can afford to ignore biology, partic-
ularly neuroscience and the theory of
evolution.) And it also goes without say-
ing that the biological approach can and
should be combined with the other ap-
proaches rather than being adopted to
their exclusion. The latter stand, namely
biologism, is one-sided for it tends to
forget the physical and chemical com-
ponents of living matter as well as the
psychological and social dimensions of
man.
Approach 4 (psychological). The
proper task of psychology is of course the
understanding of behavior and ideation
patterns. To be sure, all such functions
are biological: they are performed by liv-
ing organs; hence all good psychology is
basically psychobiology. However, the
functions of the nervous systems of com-
plex organisms are different from those
of simpler systems such as the cardio-
vascular or the digestive ones. For ex-
ample, the former can learn and per-
ceive, two functions that are far beyond
the capability of all but highly evolved
organisms. Yet such behavioral and
mental abilities should not lead to psy-
chologism, i.e., the claim that psychology
owes nothing to biology or to sociology,
which is what behaviorists and psy-
choanalysts have been saying.
Approach 5 [sociological) . There is no
understanding the social animal apart
from social science. In particular, con-
sciousness and language seem to be prod-
ucts (and in turn modifiers) of social life ,
and so are stress, moral conscience, and
organizational ability. However, it would
be a mistake to adopt sociologism, or the
Volume 4/0ctober 1989
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attempt to explain man in purely socio-
logical terms, For, although sociali ty has
iological and psychological roots, it
transcends them. Indeed, unlike inver-
tebrates and lower vertebrates, higher
vertebrates possess social plasticity, i.e.,
the capacity to readjust their patterns of
social behavior in the face of internal or
external difficulties.
So much for the main legitimate, al-
beit one-sided, approaches to the study
of man. The engineering approach has
not been included for the simple reason
that animals are not machines: they are
alive and have not been designed. To be
sure, there are some similarities between
man and machine, in particular the com-
puter; if there were none we would not
use them as labor-saving devices. How-
ever, no analog is a substitute for the real
thing, particularly when the analogies in
question are so superficial that they
overlook the speci fically physical , chem-
ical, biological, psychological, and social
properties of man, such as rational think-
ing, planning, and abil ity to set up and
dismantle social groups. In short, ma-
chinism is inadequate.
To sum up, there are fi ve legitimate
and frui tful approaches to the study of
man. But the adoption of any of them to
the exclusion of the others, while una-
voidable given the enormity of the task,
should be regarded as only a temporary
expedient. We should carry on work
along each of the five approaches and
should attempt to integrate them, fo r hu-
mans are complex systems exhibiting all
five aspects.
Eight models of mankind
The understanding of a thing begins
and ends with some conceptual model of
it. The model is better the more inclusive
and accurate that it is. But even rough
models can be used to guide-or block-
research. Each of the five approaches
examined in the last section has given
rise to a set of models of man, In addition,
technological and religious approaches
have resulted in a certain model. Finally ,
an eighth model is in the making, which
brings together all five scienti fic ap-
proaches.
The first , or religious model, is that of
Plato and Christian theology. According
to it man is a spiritual being that uses
his body as a tool during his temporary
sojourn on earth. (As Sir John Eccles put
it, the self is to the brain what the pianist
is to the piano.) This animistic model
was demolished by Darwin and by phys-
iological psychology, but it still lingers
on among philosophers, psychologists,
and even neuroscientists unable to
match their philosophy with their sci-
ence. It has effect ively slowed down the
merger of neurophysiology with psy-
chology.
The second, or technological model,
regards man as a complex information
processor, This model has captivated the
imagination of many neuroscientists and
psychologists . To be sure the neuroen-
docrine system is, among other things,
an information system; so is the neu-
roendocrine-immune supersystem. How-
ever, it happens to be a biosystem, i.e.,
one characterized by biological proper-
ties. And computer science has no room
for such speci fic properties, not even for
specifi c physical and chemical proper-
ties. (As far as computer science is con-
cerned an information system can be
built out of modules of almost any kind.)
Besides, it is a mistake to compare bio-
systems to artifacts, for this suggests that
the former, too, have been designed to
some purpose. Finally , machinism is in-
compatible with evolutionary biology,
for machines are not subject to genetic
mutation or natural selection.
The third, or physicalist model, pre-
supposes not only that physics is the
basic science, which is true, but also that
in principle no other science is neces-
sary, which is false. Not even chemistry,
the nearest neighbor, is reducible to
physics without further ado. First, this is
because chemical systems have peculiar
properties such as lack of inertia that
physics knows nothing about, and sec-
ond, physical theory, although necessary
to understand chemistry, is insuff icient:
one must add subsidiary assumptions
concerning, e.g., chemical composition
and structure, that go beyond physics.
The fourth or chemicalist model o f a
human as a chemical reactor fares better
than the physicalist model because i t
is richer and, after all, the cell is con-
stituted by chemical subsystems. But
of course there is more to life than
just chemistry. In particular, animals
equipped with a neuroendocrine sys tem
have neural and hormonal control sys-
tems in addition to the genetic control
system. To be sure all such control sys-
tems are physicochemical, but they hap-
pen to regulate biofunctions such as
feeding, reproduction, self-repair, and
defense.
The fif th or biologistic model of man
although far superior to the preceding
ones, is defective in that it neglects the
speci fically human abilities and short-
comings. In particular, it overlooks the
unique psychological and social features
of human beings. Thus i t fosters the an-
cient animistic doctrine of the soul as a
separate entity. The practical conse-
quence is clear, namely an unwilling-
ness to use physical , chemical, and bio-
logical means to modify behavior and
mentation and the insistence on the po-
tency of logotherapy.
Likewise the sociologistic model of
humans exaggerates one aspect at the
expense of all others. This has two un-
desirable consequences. One is to view
society as a whole rather than as a sy
tem and therefore as existing by itse
and above the individual. The other con
sequence is to deny that there are di
orders of nervous cells and neural sy
tems and blame all behavioral an
mental disorders on society as a whole
(This is of course the g ist of antipsychia-
try. ) Like psychologism, sociologism i
nores biology and thus is scient ifical ly
unacceptable.
Finally the eighth model, or system
ism, pictures man as a biosystem com
posed of numerous subsys tems, eac
with its own specific functions, as we
as a component of suprabiological (s
cial) systems. This view includes what
ever is valuable in previous models
indeed the systemic model of humans
acknowledges physical and chemical
properties as well as biological, psycho
logical, and social ones. In particular,
man as a whole as well as his ever
component possesses physical properties
such as mass, but from the cell upward
all the subsystems have peculiar supra
physical properties, i.e., features n
studied by physics. Also primates ca
feel and dream, imagine and plan,
well as enter into social relations an
thus modi fy other animal’s mentation
and behavior
-all of which lie beyond
physics and chemistry although rooted
to the peculiar physical and chemical
properties of living tissue.
In conclusion, there are (at least) eigh
models of man, or rather kinds of model
Two of them, the religious and the e
gineering models, are unscienti fic, an
five are scienti fic but one-sided, for eac
accounts for just one side of the whole
Only the systemic model brings together
whatever is valuable in each of the fiv
one-sided or partial scientific models, b
depicting man as a biopsychosocial sy
tem with physical and chemical compo
nents,
Systems and levels
Every concrete thing is either a system
or a component of a system, i.e., a thin
composed of interconnected things.
particular, a human being is a compo
nent of several social systems (family
firm, club, etc.) and is in turn composed
of a number of macrosystems, in partic
ular the nervous system, which are
turn composed of smaller subsystems
This “hierarchical” organization goes
to the world sys tem and down to the ce
level and even further, to the level
cellular subsystems (e.g.‘, ribosomes) an
their molecular components (see Fig.
This being so, to understand the behav
ior of each module we must understand
its components, environment, and struc
ture, as well as the supersystem of which
it is a component. One may despair
the complexity of the task but may tak
consolation in the fac t that the task is
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performed by the entire scientific
nity, perhaps with the help of
eager to emphasize the
for integrating the various partial
Every leve l of organization is a set
material things, each of
ch is characterized by peculiar prop-
particular laws). The interlevel
ion in the “hierarchy” (or better
el structure) is this. Any system be-
to a given level is composed of
to preceding levels. The
ily of levels is thus ordered by the
relat ion defined in this way.
So far our sketch of the level structure
been static. But we know from var-
studies, in particular from studies
development and on evolution, that
leve l structure is far from being given
In fact we know that
stem has self assembled (or self
from things on the preceding
l (i.e., every system on a given leve l
preceded in time by its components,
ch are therefore rightly called its pre-
The systems of any given level have
properties in common with their
and others that the latter
are their emergent properties.
an atom has an energy
spectrum that its individual components
do not possess; likewise, a molecule has
an energy spectrum that is not the mere
superposition of the spectra of its com-
ponent atoms; and a neuronal system has
a connectiv ity that is absent from its
components. In short, at every level
some properties (in particular laws) are
gained (or emerge) while others are lost
(or submerge). In short, there is both
emergence and submergence along the
evolutionary process.
The methodolog ical morals of the pre-
ceding ontologica l considerations are
quite obvious:
1) identify the level(s)
crossed by your object(s) of study; 2) do
not skip any levels; and 3) recognize the
genealogy of the higher levels. These in-
junctions help evaluate research strate-
gies and projects. We may distinguish
four main such strategies or methodol-
ogies:
Holism. Holism is the study of every
thing as a whole and only on its own
level, e.g., the study of the brain as a
whole by means of the electroencepha-
logram or the holographic model of
memory.
Analysis. Analysis is the reduction of
the system to its components, or “top
down.”
Svnthesis. Synthesis is the bui lding up
J
World system
(e.g. hypothalamus)
(e.g. ribosomes)
Elementary particles and fields
The supersystems and subsystems of a human being.
Social levels
I
Biological levels
Chemical levels
hysical levels
of the whole from its components, or
“bottom up.”
Multilevel approach. The multilevel
approach is the study of every system on
its own level as well as a component of
a supersystemand ascomposedof lower-
level things.
Each of the first three strategies has
its virtues and shortcomings. Holism em-
phasizes that the whole has emergent
properties but refuses o explain them in
terms of composition and structure, so t
borders on irrationalism. The analytic
method stresses he importance of the
composition of a system but misses ts
emergent properties. The synthetic
method does not have the defects of the
other two methods but it is not always
practicable; for instance, so far biologists
have not synthesized a living cell. I sub-
mit that the multilevel approach is the
best of all four, for it recommends study-
ing each system on its own level as well
as on its adjoining levels.
The multilevel approach is an eclectic
or catch-as-catch-can strategy, allowing
one to use whatever approaches, tech-
niques, models, and data that may seem
promising. Hence it is integrative, al-
though not holistic, an undeniable merit
at a time when excessive specialization
leads to artificial fragmentation. In par-
ticular, it is the one strategy capable of
bringing together all the studies in neu-
roscience and psychology and thus the
one capable of bridging the gap between
neuron and mind.
The multilevel strategy has proved its
mettle in a number of domains. Thus the
solid-state physicist builds a mathemat-
ical model of his crystal structure the
ion lattice together with the electron
cloud) to explain such molar properties
as electrical and thermal conductivity.
The quantum chemist, even when intent
on adopting a purist or ab initio syn-
thetic or bottom up) approach, makesuse
of whatever knowledge he can get from
both classical chemistry and atomic
physics. And the neurobiologist studying
a particular system, such as the Wer-
nicke “area,” approaches it on at least
three levels: as a system of neurons, asa
molar system with peculiar properties,
and as the organ of the formation and
understanding of linguistic expressions.
Explaining behavior and mentation
The most ancient and popular expla-
nation of behavior is of course the an-
imistic or mentalistic one: it takes the
mind for granted and attributes to it the
ability to control behavior. The barren-
ness and untestability of mentalism
drove psychologists to the denial of the
mental, whereas the right attitude
should have been to regard the mental
assomething to be explained rather than
as self-explanatory. Behavioristic psy-
chology attempted to dispensewith the
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and to describe behavior in terms
stimuli. But, because it ignored the
system, behaviorism gave a su-
icial account of behavior-just as su-
as the description of motion
by pre-Newtonian kinematics.
Biopsychology, on the other hand,
admitting the valid results of be-
goes far beyond it by looking
(or neuroendocrine)
t “mediate” (actually
behavior. Thus it pro-
centr ifugal ly, from the CNS to be-
For example, it attempts to ex-
voluntary movement in terms of
specific activity of certain neuron
es located in the frontal lobes.
than regarding the CNS as a
information processor restricted to
(or encoding) external stim-
physiological psychology has learned
e CNS has a largely autonomous
activity, that nerv-
activity is modulated by environ-
rather than being
determined by them.
Physiological psychology is not re-
to the study of behavior: it also
s mentation where it exists, from
perception, and imagery to de-
n and self-consciousness. The
is the same in a ll cases, namely
tackle the data of observation and self-
as problems, to make neu-
mechanisms of behavior and subjec-
and to check such con-
by means of further observa-
measurements, or experiments.
ate goal is of course to put such
together into neatly stated
(or special theories) of the var-
behavioral and mental processes.
would like to know the modus
ndi of the smallest neuron assem-
feeling fear or anxiety, of
up a proposition, or of making
Traditional (mentalistic) psychology
s “pure” or untainted by physiology,
it dealt with the putatively immater-
oul or mind. Physiological psychol-
the other hand, is based on (pre-
poses) neurophysiology and, indeed,
other branches of biology as well,
h as endocrinology, immunology , and
besides, it needs social
nce to help explain some of the
functions, such as moral con-
Thus physiological psychology
effect brings together al l the studies
to the understanding of behav-
and mentation. In other words, phys-
gical psychology contributes power-
y to the synthesis we are after, the
capable of bridging the gap between
d whole animal , between pro-
sses at the subcellular leve l and bio-
Is this synthesis a reduction, in partic-
ular a reduction of psychology to neu-
rophysiology? Not quite , and this for the
following reasons. First, even at lower
levels the derivation of one theory from
another usually requires premises not
contained in the reducing theory. Sec-
ond, neuroscience itself needs the guid-
ance of psychology; thus the study of
perceptual systems is a matter not only
for neurophysiology but also for the psy-
chology of percept ion, which takes into
account characteristics of the environ-
ment, sometimes even of the social en-
vironment. (Recall that perceptual error
can be caused by social factors such as
social pressures.) Third , there is more to
neurobiology than neurophysiology,
namely developmental and evolutionary
biology. This poin t deserves clarifica-
tion.
Every contemporary organism is the
outcome of two different processes: the
result of an ontogenetic process and a
product of a mult imill ion year evolu-
tionary process. Either way nature ac-
complishes the integration we find so
difficult to conceptualize. Indeed the
processes leading from molecule to fer-
tilized ovum to adult primate, and from
primitive cell to highly evolved animal,
are processes of self-assembly (or self-
organization), hence integrative.
This has become a platitude, yet it is
apt to be temporarily forgotten by the
electrophysiologist or the psychologist.
In fact, the division of scientific labor has
reached such a ridiculous extreme that
many workers in neuroscience and psy-
chology tend to pay only lip service to
the importance of studies in develop-
ment and evolution for the understand-
ing of their subject. Such neglect of
development and evolution has had un-
desirable consequences, such as 1)
overlooking the biolog ical maturation of
the CNS, which, in the case of certain
systems such as the corpus callosum,
takes up to a decade, and 2) exaggerating
leaps at the expense of graduality (as is
the case with mentalistic psychology,
particularly of the information-process-
ing variety, and its refusal to learn from
animal psychology), or, conversely, 3)
exaggerating continuity at the expense
of quantitative novelty (as in the case of
animal psychologists who claim that hu-
man mental abilities differ only in de-
gree from prehuman ones).
To sum up, behavior and mentation
can be explained with the help of neu-
roscience and social science. The new
psychology, based on neuroscience and
willing to learn from social science, is at
the very heart of the attempt to explain
behavior and mentation in scientific
terms. And it constitutes a synthesis or
merger rather than a reduction, even
though the behavioral and mental proc-
esses are neurophysiological. (A philos-
opher would say that this is a case of
ontological reduction
temological reduction
without ful l epis-
.
1
Conclusion
Physiology and psychology share one
ultimate goal, namely the scientific un-
derstanding of behavior and mentation.
No one branch of physiology or of psy
chology can attain this goal single-hand-
edly, because he problem is a multilevel
one, and this becauseman himself exists
on all levels. Nor should philosophy be
left aside, because t too is interested in
the mind-body problem and can offer
valuable suggestions or facilitating the
integration or synthesis of disciplines
that the problem calls for.
Neurophysics, neurochemistry, neu-
robiology, psychology, and sociology
may be pictured as forming a pentagon
Philosophy lies at the center of it, some
times blocking the whole view, as in
psychophysical dualism; at other times
favoring the integration of research
fields; and at all times giving and receiv-
ing stimuli from the other disciplines.
To be sure one must specialize if one
wants to make original contributions to
knowledge. But specialization need not,
nay must not, exclude the elaboration of
a general scheme of things allowing one
to locate one’s problems and thereby to
make use of any relevant scraps o
knowledge found in other fields. Such
integration is indispensable in bridging
the gap between neuron and mind.
This paper is based on the author’s books
A World of Systems [Boston, MA: Reidel,
1979) The Mind-Body Problem [New York:
Pergamon, 1980), Philosophy of Science and
Techn ology, Part 2 (Boston, MA: Reidel, 1985),
and Philosophy of Psychology, with Ruben
Ardila [New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987), as
well as on his article s “From neuron to behav-
ior and mentation: an exercise in levelman-
ship,” in Information Proce ssing in the Nerv-
ous System, edited by H. M. Pinsker and W.
D. Will iam s (New York: R aven, 1980, p. l-16),
and “From mindless neuroscience and brain-
les s psychology to neuropsychology” (Ann.
Theor. Psych ol. 3: 115-133, 1985).
I 1
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Fifty Years Ago in Physiology
In a real sense, 1989 has been the
anniversary of modern cellular
In 1939, J. Z. Young (3)
d the full description, given
shorter accounts two or three
s earlier, of squid giant axons.
lly arising from the fu-
of smaller fibers, they were rec-
as single nerve cells, a dem-
revolutionized the
. In that same year, building on
of Gasser and Erlanger,
o had developed the cathode ray
for measuring electrical poten-
nerves essentially free of time
acts, Hodgkin and Huxley (2)
st published together. They re-
from inside a giant fiber im-
ed with a Ag-AgCl-sea water
and showed directly that
potential is a transmem-
event and that its magnitude
overshoots the resting
l (50 mV). And Cole and
(1) succeeded in demonstrat-
that action potentials in squid
accompanied by a 40-fold
in membrane impedance with
change in capacitance, all new
omena in 1939 for which the
bases are now well established.
Cole, K. S., and H. J. Curtis. Electrical
impedance of the squid giant axon during
act ivi ty. J. Gen. Physiol. 22: 649-670,1939.
Hodgkin, A. L., and A. F. Huxley. Action
potentials recorded from inside a nerve
fibre. Nature Lond. 144: 710-711, 1939.
Young, J. Z. Fused neurons and synaptic
contacts in the giant nerve fibres o f ce-
phalopods. Phil. Trans. R. Sot. Lond. B
Ser. 229: 465-503,1939.
Forty Years Ago in Physiology
Almost every issue of every jour-
reporting on cell physiology and
biology contains at least one pa-
in which the authors describe
experiments. A com-
n purpose is to determine trans-
more and more experimen-
are using micropipettes for in-
mRNA into Xenopus oocytes
express a desired protein product.
inject fluorescent or other
into a variety of cells to
cell-cell communication,
antibodies to block specific cyto-
c functions, or foreign pro-
measure their interactions
h endogenous metabolites, or any
a myriad of other compounds lim-
NIPS
Volume 4/0ctober 1989
ited only by the experimenters’
imaginations. All of this was made
possible in 1949 by Ling and Gerard
(l), who used micropipettes as elec-
trodes to impale frog muscle cells.
Others, including Ralph Gerard and
colleagues, had attempted this be-
fore but had found that the pipettes
damaged the surface, resulting in lo-
cal short-circuiting current leaks
and, in consequence, disturbingly
variable, unstable, and transitory re-
sults. Ling and Gerard showed that,
given sufficiently small tip diame-
ters
(Cl
pm), the cell membrane
sealed around the impaling pipette
and permitted highly reproducible
and stable (days) determinations of
the membrane’s electrical proper-
ties. What followed is history.
1. Ling, G., and R. W. Gerard. The normal
membrane potential of frog sartorius fi-
bers. I. Cell. Comp. Physiol. 34: 383-396,
1949.
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50 kHz Real Time Monitoring
Foruet in-the-dark data acouisition sessions. CODAS turns vour computer’s
monitor into a multichannel heads up display, plotting every data point as it
happens. Our patent-pending smooth scroll waveform presentatron and
unequaled plottmg speed keep you in command. No guessing. No surprises.
50 kHt Real Time Recording to Disk
Focus your attention on the real time display while up to 16 waveforms
simultaneously record to disk. To 50,000 samples per second, CODAS
ensures a gap-fr
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