Bulletin2 Editorial

3 Human rights and disability

12 Premises and transport –

new duties under the DDA

21 The definition of disability

29 Taylor-made controversy

39 News in brief

53 DRC support for legal cases –

priority areas

Issue 10 / October 2006

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The Disability Rights Commission (‘the DRC’) was created in April 2000pursuant to section 1 of the Disability Rights Commission Act 1999 (‘the1999 Act’). Its aim is to create ‘a society where all disabled people canparticipate fully as equal citizens’. Section 2(1) of the 1999 Act requiresthe DRC: (i) to work towards the elimination of discrimination againstdisabled persons (ii) to promote the equalisation of opportunities fordisabled persons (iii) to take such steps as it considers appropriate witha view to encouraging good practice in the treatment of disabledpersons and (iv) to keep under review the working of the DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1995 and the 1999 Act.

The Disability Rights Commission Legal Services Team:

Director of Legal Services and Operations: Nick O’Brien

Head of Legal Services: Rebecca Howard

Senior Legal Officer: Chris Benson

Legal Officers: Martin CrickSarfraz Khan

Louise CurtisKeith AshcroftZem Rodaway

Head of Scottish Legal Affairs: Lynn Welsh

Legal Officer (Scotland): Irene Henery

Legal Bulletin editor: martin.crick@drc-gb.org

Legal Bulletin subscription enquiries: jackie.smith@drc-gb.org

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EditorialWelcome to Issue 10 of the Disability Rights Commission’s

Legal Bulletin.

As this issue rolls off the press, the DRC is about to embark upon itsfinal 12 months of existence. The Equality Act 2006 received RoyalAssent on 16 February and the new Commission for Equality andHuman Rights (CEHR) is scheduled to open its doors in October 2007.

Against this backdrop, the year ahead will present many challenges forthe DRC, not least in its legal work. The advent of the CEHR has, forinstance, invited new thinking about the relationship between humanrights and equality and about the role of a statutory commission.

As the DRC prepares for the transition, we explore the relationshipbetween human rights and disability, and explain how the DRC isalready using human rights arguments to address issues of realimportance to disabled people.

Also in this issue, we consider the implications of the recent Court ofAppeal decision in the employment case of Taylor v OCS Group Ltd andcomplete our look at the forthcoming changes to Part 3 of the DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1995 by examining the new duties for providers ofpremises and providers of transport services.

Meanwhile, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has considered its firstcase on the disability aspect of the European Employment FrameworkDirective, and a UK tribunal has made a further reference to the ECJ,this time on the question of ‘discrimination by association’ with adisabled person. These developments, and wider issues about thedefinition of disability, are considered at page 25.

The News section includes updates on some important recent DRC-supported cases, and a brief summary of the final report whichfollowed the DRC’s formal investigation into health inequalities. Finally,on pages 53 and 54 we list, as usual, a selection of the DRC’s currentlegal enforcement priority areas, which may provide a flavour of thechallenges that lie ahead in the run up to October 2007 and beyond.

RegardsMartin Crick

Humanrights anddisabilityRebecca Howard, Head of Legal

Services at the Disability Rights

Commission, considers the role

that human rights can play in

addressing issues of importance

to disabled people

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The Disability Rights

Commission has long

recognised the close inter-

relationship between

fundamental human rights and

the social model of disability,

upon which the Commission’s

philosophical approach rests.

Central to both are theconcepts of participation,autonomy, dignity and respect.Disabled people should not beprevented from fullyparticipating in the economicand social life of thecommunity by barriers placedin their way. Equally, disabledpeople’s right to exerciseautonomy over their lifechoices must be central togovernment policy in the fieldsof education, health and socialcare before we can beconfident that disabled peoplewill be afforded the samedignity and respect as non-disabled people.

These key concepts arereflected in the articlescontained within the HumanRights Act 1998 (HRA). TheHRA enshrined the rights setout in the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights(ECHR) and providedindividuals with a directlyenforceable set of rights in theUK courts for the first time.Articles of key (but not

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exclusive) relevance todisabled people are:

• right to life (Article 2)

• prohibition of torture andinhuman or degradingtreatment (Article 3)

• right to a fair trial (Article 6)

• respect for private andfamily life (Article 8)

• right to education (Protocol1, Article 2)

• right not to be subjected todiscrimination in theenjoyment of rights underthe ECHR (Article 14).

This article will explain howthe DRC, in a number of cases,has used human rightsarguments to address issueswhich the DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1995 (DDA),with its statutory limitations,cannot reach, but whichnonetheless are matters of realimportance to disabled people.It then considers the role ofhuman rights in theforthcoming Commission forEquality and Human Rights(CEHR).

Conceptional similarities

Disability, in particular, lendsitself to human rightsarguments. The underpinning

concepts of positive duties inhuman rights are similar to theproactive duty to makereasonable adjustments foundin disability legislation. Theparallels are reflected in casessuch as Botta v Italy (1998)

EHLRL 486, where the courtacknowledged a positive dutyon states to take appropriatemeasures to ensure thatcitizens are able to enjoy anormal social life, which wouldenable them to participate inthe life of the community.

This can be contrasted withthe more reactiverequirements of direct/indirectdiscrimination which provide abaseline of equality oftreatment. Unlike most aspectsof other equalities legislation,the DDA is asymmetrical,conferring no rights upon non-disabled people. This limits therole of the comparativeexercise – an exercise which isfundamental to otherequalities legislation. Disabilitydiscrimination is more closelyaligned with the HRA, whichdoes not engage in anessentially comparativeexamination of rights.

The HRA has a broader remitthan the equalities legislationand can be an effective way ofgetting to issues which thespecific equality legislation

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cannot reach – for example,around access to justice, theright to education and theright to life. The HRA is oftenat its most effective whenused to enhancediscrimination-basedarguments.

Of course, the HRA is not apanacea for the achievementof rights for disabled people,not least because it onlyapplies to public bodies orother bodies insofar as theyare carrying out ‘publicfunctions’. Consequently, it isof limited use to thesignificant proportion ofdisabled people who areeither employed by privateemployers or whose concernsrelate to private sector serviceproviders.

However, whilst the HRAcannot be directly enforcedagainst the private sector, itstill has an impact beyond theboundaries of the publicsector. If the public sector isobliged to address humanrights issues in their decision-making processes, it followsthat this will have implicationsfor the private sectororganisations with which theyinteract, whether asregulators, funders,contractors or partners.

Human rights arguments

through intervention

The DRC is able to intervene asan interested party in litigationusing its general functions,which are defined in Section 2of the Disability RightsCommission Act 1999 as‘including working towards theelimination of discriminationagainst disabled persons andpromoting the equalisation ofopportunities for disabledpersons’.

The DRC uses the power tointervene sparingly. TheCommission will only considerintervening if the casehighlights an issue of realimportance to disabled peopleand if the DRC can add adimension to the issues inquestion which the partiesthemselves cannot bring. TheDRC’s legal strategy envisagesintervention to be a means to:

• challenge administrativedecisions having an adverseimpact upon disabledpeople’s rights

• avoid the establishment ofunhelpful precedentswithout the courts first beingmade aware of the DRC’sinterpretation of relevantquestions of law

• challenge the compatibility

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of domestic legislation withthe Human Rights Act or EUlegislation

• gain publicity for, andrecognition of, the rights ofdisabled people.

In the following cases, the DRChas intervened on humanrights and DDA issues:

The Queen on the application

of Johnson, Thomas and

Manning v London Borough of

Havering

High Court: Queen’s Bench

Division: Case No

CO/08481/2005

This High Court case, which isthe most recent case in whichthe DRC has used its powers tointervene, explored themeaning of ‘public authority’under the Human Rights Act.

The Council which owns andcontrols the care homes inwhich Mrs Johnson and twoother claimants reside, hastaken a decision, in principle,to transfer residential carehomes to a private sectorprovider.

The claimants broughtproceedings for judicial review,on the ground that the closureand transfer of the homes

would lead to residents beingdeprived of effective protectionfor their human rights, whichthe Council is obliged toguarantee. The issue is ofparticular importance todisabled people due to thelarge number of disabledpeople currently residing inresidential care, the increasingtrend of local authoritiescontracting out thatresponsibility and theconsiderable evidence of poorpractice and abuse of disabledresidents in residential carehomes.

Both the DRC and theDepartment for ConstitutionalAffairs (DCA) intervened insupport of the claimants’argument that the definition of‘public authority’ under section6 of the Human Rights Actshould be construed morewidely to include bodies suchas private care homes. The DRCsubmitted that care homes inthe private sector, whichprovide accommodation andcare to residents in accordancewith arrangements made with alocal authority (pursuant to theauthority’s statutory powersand duties), are exercising‘public functions’ within themeaning of section 6(3)(b) HRA1998. If correct, this wouldmean that the residents of thehomes would still be able to

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enforce their human rightsdirectly against the privatesector provider,notwithstanding the closureand transfer of the Council’scare homes.

The case challenged the much-criticised Court of Appealauthority in R (on the

application of Heather and

others) v Leonard Cheshire

Foundation. The Judge, Mr Justice Forbes, however,concluded that he was boundby that case. It was held that aprivate care home providingaccommodation to elderlyresidents, pursuant toarrangements made with alocal authority, was not, itself,exercising functions of a publicnature for the purposes of theHuman Rights Act 1998.Consequently, the care homewould not be bound to actcompatibly with the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights.

This case is now on appeal tothe Court of Appeal and theDRC and DCA are bothcontinuing to intervene.

R v East Sussex County

Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y

High Court CO/4843/01/17

December 2002 and 18

February 2003

The DRC intervened in this

case to challenge the practicein a number of localauthorities of applying blanket‘no lifting’ policies that werehighly prejudicial to disabledpeople.

Such policies are a majorcause for concern as theyaffect the quality of life oflarge numbers of disabledpeople. A ban on lifting canresult in loss of dignity andautonomy for the disabledperson and can sometimescompel the disabled person togo into residential care.

The case concerned A and B,who were sisters withprofound physical andlearning disabilities. They hadalways lived in the familyhome, which had, to an extent,been specially adapted andequipped for them and wherethey were looked after on afull-time basis by their mother,X, and their stepfather, Y.

Both A and B had impairedmobility and in order to carryout many of their dailyactivities – including, forexample, getting out of bed orinto the bath – it wasnecessary for them to bemoved and lifted by theircarers. For health and safetyreasons, the council sought toensure that staff moved A and

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B using lifting equipmentrather than by ‘manualhandling’. Central to the casewas the balance to be struckbetween the needs of thedisabled sisters and theconcerns of the council toensure adequate protection forthe health and safety of itsstaff.

The DRC deployed argumentsunder Article 2 (the right tolife), Article 3 (the right not tobe subjected toinhuman/degrading treatment)and Article 8 (the right toprivate and family life).

The Judge concluded that fairlifting and handling policiesare fundamental to disabledpeople’s independence, dignityand inclusion. A and B’s rightsto participate in the life of thecommunity and to have accessto an appropriate range ofrecreational and culturalactivities are so important thata significant amount of manualhandling may be required.

He held that lifting policiesshould ensure that a properbalance is struck betweenmeeting the needs and rightsof disabled people on the onehand, and ensuring a safeworking environment for staffworking with disabled peopleon the other. The judgment

makes it clear that blanketpolicies do not allow such abalance to be struck and thatthe individual circumstancesof each case need to beconsidered.

R (on the application of C) v

Royal Devon and Exeter NHS

Foundation Trust

In this case, the DRC agreed toapply to intervene in judicialreview proceedings of theTrust’s decision that C couldno longer be guaranteed to beprovided with appropriatelytrained female staff to performintimate care tasks. The DRCargued that this decisionbreached the claimant’s rightsunder Articles 3 and 8.

The case gave rise to issues ofwider strategic significanceconcerning choice,independence, autonomy anddignity of disabled people inthe provision of health careservices, particularly intimatecare services.

Judicial review proceedingswere commenced and Cobtained an interim injunctionwhich required the NHS Trustto provide female nursingstaff to perform C’s intimatecare tasks until finaldetermination of this matter inthe High Court.

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Prior to hearing, the mattersettled, with the Trustproviding the guaranteesrelating to the provision ofintimate care tasks that C hadsought.

R (on the application of

Burke) v General Medical

Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003

In this case, the DRCintervened to makesubmissions on the guidanceissued to medicalprofessionals regarding thewithdrawal of artificialnutrition and hydration (ANH).

The DRC argued that theguidance placed too muchpower in the hands of themedical profession withouttaking sufficient account ofthe disabled person’s wishes,and that, therefore, aspects ofit were incompatible withArticles 2, 3, 6, 8 and 14 of theHRA. The DRC’s overarchingconcern was that somedecisions by medicalprofessionals on whetherdisabled people should live ordie are based on a backdropof negative images and poorlyinformed assumptions.

The High Court found for theclaimant, Mr Burke. The Courtof Appeal, however, allowedGMC’s appeal and did not

consider the GMC’s guidanceunlawful. Significantly, it didrecognise the importantprinciples of patientautonomy and choice; that acompetent person’s wishesmust be respected (apart froma right to demand a particulartreatment) and thatwithdrawal of life-prolongingtreatment contrary to acompetent patient’s expressedwishes could be murder.

The Court of Appeal furtherheld that the GMC guidanceshould be understood andimplemented at every level ofthe medical profession toensure people are treatedproperly and not ignored orpatronised because of theirdisability.

N v B

The DRC was grantedpermission to intervene in ajudicial review of a hospital’sdecision not to provide aseverely disabled 10-year-oldgirl with medical treatment.The hospital had decided notto provide ventilation, andhad placed a ‘Do NotResuscitate’ order on the girl’sfile against her mother’swishes.

The DRC felt that the caseraised issues of importance to

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disabled people generally;there was particular concernthat decisions by healthprofessionals relating to thecare of disabled people maysometimes be influenced bytheir perceptions of thedisabled person’s quality oflife.

The DRC submitted argumentsunder both the DisabilityDiscrimination Act (section 19,the provision of a service) andthe HRA (Articles 2, 3, 6 and14, as well as Article 8 inrelation to the mother’s rightto respect for private andfamily life).

The matter was resolved onconfidential terms.

Human rights in the

CEHR era

The Commission for Equalityand Human Rights (CEHR),which comes into being on 1October 2007, will be the firstnational, institutional supportfor the Human Rights Actsince its incorporation in 2000.The CEHR vision rests on the‘three pillars’ of equality,human rights, and socialcohesion. Its human rightsremit is broad with a range ofduties and powers.

Its duties are to:

• promote understanding of theimportance of human rights

• encourage good practice (asdistinct from merecompliance and to includeprivate as well as publicsector)

• promote awareness,understanding and protectionof human rights in all that theCEHR does

• encourage public authoritiesto comply with their dutiesunder the HRA

• monitor effectiveness andprogress on human rightsdelivery.

Its powers are to:

• conduct inquiries – general,rather than named partyinvestigations – either onfreestanding human rightsissues or blended withequality issues (this includesthe power to call forwitnesses and papers)

• provide guidance and adviceon human rights (but notcasework or legalrepresentation)

• intervene in human rightslitigation and bring judicialreview proceedings againstpublic authorities

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• undertake research andprovide education andtraining

• award grants for humanrights work.

This broad human rights remithas the potential to provide aneffective framework ofprinciples through which tobalance rights arising underthe equality ‘strands’ within theCEHR’s remit: disability, race,gender, sexual orientation,religion and belief and age.The underpinning concepts ofproportionality and positiveobligations derived fromhuman rights could be used to‘lever up’ protection forvulnerable or disadvantagedgroups in society, ensuring ajoined-up approach to theCEHR’s legal and enforcementstrategy and preventing keyissues affecting those groupsfrom falling between thelegislative cracks.

It is through recognition of thiskey role that human rights canplay in ensuring rights fordisabled people and inanticipation of the CEHRhuman rights remit, that theDRC has been proactive inintegrating DDA and HRAarguments where theappropriate opportunities havearisen. So far, this approach

has had a significant impactand the DRC hopes to buildupon these successes over thecoming year and beyond, intothe CEHR era.

Further information on thecases cited above andtranscripts of the judgmentscan be found on the lawsection of the DRC websiteat: www.drc-gb.org

Premises andtransport –new dutiesunder theDDAIn the second of two articles

examining the changes to

Part 3 of the DDA, Chris Benson,

Senior Legal Officer at the DRC,

explores how the changes affect

providers of premises and

transport services

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The Disability Discrimination

Act 2005 (‘the 2005 Act’)

makes, amongst other things,

various amendments to Part 3

of the Disability Discrimination

Act 1995 (‘the DDA’) which

covers access to goods,

facilities, services and

premises etc. In the previous

issue of the Legal Bulletin,

those changes relating to

public authorities and private

clubs were explored. Further

changes to Part 3 of the 1995

Act specifically affect premises

providers and providers of

transport services; these

changes are explored below.

A. Premises (sections 24A–

24L)

The original DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1995 madeno provision for the making ofreasonable adjustments inrelation to premises.

The 2005 Act, however,introduces a reasonableadjustment duty with effectfrom December 2006, whichaims to ensure that disabledpeople can rent and enjoypremises and facilitiesassociated with them in asimilar way as non-disabledpeople, by removing barriers totheir occupation or enjoyment.

The reasonable adjustmentduty will make it unlawful for‘controllers’ of premises todiscriminate against a disabledperson who:

• is a tenant

• is otherwise lawfullyoccupying the premises, orwho

• is considering taking aletting of the premises.

A ‘controller’ of premises is aperson:

• by whom premises are let

• who has the premises to let,or

• who manages the premises.

The duty to make adjustmentsis only owed to a disabledperson when certainconditions have been met; it isunlike the existing duty tomake adjustments contained inthe goods and servicesprovisions of Part 3 of theDDA, which is anticipatory innature. The duty in relation topremises only arises if thecontroller of premises is askedto make an adjustment by aperson who is letting thepremises or a person whowishes to take a letting of thepremises (or by someone ontheir behalf).

The request may be in writingbut does not have to be. Itdoes not have to specificallyask for an auxiliary aid or achange to practices, policies,procedures or terms; it willamount to a request for thepurposes of the Act if it isreasonable to assume fromwhat is said or written that anadjustment has beenrequested.

The duty to make adjustmentscomprises a series of dutiesfalling broadly into threeareas:

• the provision of auxiliaryaids and services

• changing practices, policiesand procedures, and

• changing a term of theletting (this latter provisionapplies only to premisesthat are let).

There is no obligation onpremises controllers to takeany steps that would involvethe removal or alteration of aphysical feature.

The duty to provide

auxiliary aids and services

Where certain conditions havebeen met, a controller has aduty to take reasonable steps

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• the auxiliary aid or servicewould enable or make iteasier for a disabledperson to enjoy thepremises, or to make useof any benefit or facility,but would be of little orno practical use to him ifhe were neither the tenantnor occupying thepremises; and

• it would be impossible orunreasonably difficult forthe disabled person toenjoy the premises or tomake use of the benefit orfacility if the auxiliary aidor service were notprovided.

• in relation to premiseswhich a disabled personwishes to rent:

• the auxiliary aid or servicewould enable or make iteasier for the disabledperson to take a letting ofthe premises but wouldbe of little or not practicaluse to him if he were notconsidering taking aletting of the premises;and

• if the auxiliary aid orservice were not provided,it would be impossible orunreasonably difficult forthe disabled person totake a letting.

to provide an auxiliary aid orservice. This might be, forexample, the provision ofinformation in accessibleformats, such as large print ortape, or the provision of a signlanguage interpreter at ameeting. In addition,Regulation 5 of the DisabilityDiscrimination (Premises)Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/887)provides that the following areto be treated as auxiliary aidsor services:

• the removal or replacementof any furniture, furnishings,materials or equipment; orthe provision of otherchattels (so long as theywould not be fixtures wheninstalled)

• the replacement orprovision of any signs ornotices

• the replacement of any tapsor door handles

• the replacement, provisionor adaptation of any doorbell or door entry system

• changes to the colour of anysurface.

The duty to provide auxiliaryaids and services is owedwhere a request has beenmade, as outlined above, and:

• in relation to let premises:

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For example, a disabled childof a tenant has started usinga wheelchair. She lives withher family in a rented ground-floor flat but is unable toleave the flat without beingcarried as she cannot getdown the one step at theentrance to the block of flats.A portable ramp would allowher to get down the step inher wheelchair and enableher to enjoy the premises.The tenant discusses thiswith his landlord, who agreesto provide a portable rampfor the family to use. This islikely to be a reasonable stepfor the landlord to have totake.

The duty to change

practices, policies and

procedures

The duty to change practices,policies and procedures ariseswhere:

a request has been made, asoutlined above, and:

• in relation to let premises, acontroller of premises has apractice, policy or procedurewhich makes it impossible orunreasonably difficult for adisabled person to enjoy thepremises or to make use of

any benefit or facility (suchas communal gardens); or

• in relation to premises to let,a controller of premises hasa practice, policy orprocedure which makes itimpossible or unreasonablydifficult for the disabledperson to take a letting ofthe premises; and

in relation to both let premisesand premises to let, thepractice, policy or procedurewould not have that effect ifthe relevant disabled persondid not have a disability.

For example, a tenant with alearning disability is accusedof antisocial behaviour by aneighbour who reports thathe is playing football againsther house late into theevening and is rude to her.The housing association’spolicy is to send a letter to atenant accused of antisocialbehaviour warning themabout the complaint anddetailing the potential effecton the tenancy if thebehaviour persists. Thehousing association isalready aware of the tenant’sinability to read letters andso it alters its policy byvisiting the disabled tenantpersonally to explain the

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complaint to him and talk tohim about his behaviour. Thisis likely to be a reasonablestep to take.

The duty to change terms

The duty to change termsarises where, in addition to arequest having been made asoutlined above, the followingconditions are met:

• a term of the letting makes itimpossible or unreasonablydifficult for a disabled personto enjoy the premises or tomake use of any benefit orfacility which he is entitled touse; and

• the term would not have thateffect if the disabled persondid not have a disability.

For example, a disabledtenant cannot access thedrying area in her block offlats because of her disability.The landlord agrees not toenforce the term of thetenancy which prohibits herfrom hanging out clothes onher balcony, so that she canuse her balcony to dryclothes. This is likely to be areasonable step for thelandlord to have to take.

There are also provisionsrelating to commonholdpremises, permission fordisability-related alterations topremises and victimisationrelating to the cost of makingadjustments.

These provisions, and thevarious other amendments toPart 3 of the DDA 1995affecting the housing sector (aswell as the changes affectingpublic authorities and privateclubs discussed in issue 9) arereflected in a revised Code ofPractice on Rights of Access:services and premises(services to the public, publicauthority functions, privateclubs and premises). Pleaserefer to page 48 of thispublication for more detailsabout this Code of Practice.

B. Transport (sections 19(5)

and 21ZA)

From December 2006, certainservices in respect of transportvehicles will be covered byPart 3 of the DDA 1995.

Prior to these changes takingeffect, any service so far as itconsisted of the use of ameans of transport wasexempted (by the operation ofsection 19(5)(b)) from Part 3 ofthe DDA 1995.

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However, not all servicesassociated with transport fellwithin the exemption. Thoseassociated with transportinfrastructure, for example,were covered by Part 3 of theDDA and were subject to thesame provisions as otherservices not associated withtransport.

This means that, irrespectiveof the changes introduced bythe DDA 2005 discussedbelow, most transportproviders are already subjectto Part 3 of the DDA 1995 inrespect of certain servicesprovided to the public. Theseinclude services at stationsand airports, or informationand timetabling services.

However, from 4 December2006, following amendmentsmade by the 2005 Act, andregulations made under thatAct, the exemptions regardingthe use of transport providedby means of certain vehicleswill be lifted.

As a result, forms of publictransport which will becovered by the 1995 Act willinclude:

• buses and coaches

• taxis and private hirevehicles

• trains

• trams and light railways

• rental cars

• breakdown recoveryvehicles.

Essentially, providers oftransport services in respect ofthe provision or use of avehicle covered by theDisability Discrimination(Transport Vehicles)Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/3190) (‘the 2005 Regulations’),are now providers of servicesto the public for the purposesof Part 3 of the DDA 1995.They must therefore complywith the relevant duties underthat Act.

The Act empowers theGovernment to lift thetransport exemption in respectof any form of transportservice. This could includeaircraft and shipping vessels,but these modes of transportare not specified in the 2005Regulations. The Act, asapplied by the 2005Regulations, sets out thescope of the duties as follows:

• A transport provider mustnot discriminate against adisabled person:

• when providing, or notproviding, a disabled

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person with a vehicle; or

• when providing, or notproviding, a disabledperson with services whenhe is travelling in a vehicleprovided in the course of atransport service.

• A transport provider alsohas a duty to make certainkinds of reasonableadjustments for disabledpeople in respect of theprovision or use of a vehicle.

‘Provision of a vehicle’ in thecontext of these duties meansprovision of the vehicle itself;it does not include anyservices ancillary to thevehicle (for example,arrangements for buying aticket for travel or accessingthe office of a vehicle rentaloperator).

Indeed, the 1995 Act has beenamended by the 2005 Act toclarify that Part 3 alreadyapplies to the provision oftransport infrastructureservices. This reflects theposition established in caselaw by the Court of Appeal inRoss v Ryanair and Stansted

Airport Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ

1751 and Roads v Central

Trains [2004] EWCA Civ 1541 –decisions which were analysedin Legal Bulletin issue 7.

What does the Act make

unlawful?

As is the case with all otherservice providers under Part 3of the 1995 Act, it is unlawfulfor a transport provider, inrelation to the provision or useof a specified transport vehicle,to discriminate against adisabled person:

• by refusing to provide (ordeliberately not providing)any service which it provides(or is prepared to provide) tomembers of the public; or

• in the standard of servicewhich it provides to thedisabled person or themanner in which it providesit; or

• in the terms on which itprovides a service to thedisabled person.

It is also unlawful for atransport provider todiscriminate by:

• failing to comply with anyduty to make reasonableadjustments, incircumstances in which theeffect of that failure is tomake it impossible orunreasonably difficult for thedisabled person to make useof any transport serviceprovided.

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The duty to make adjustmentsin respect of the use oftransport vehicles applies in aslightly different way to thereasonable adjustment duty inrespect of other services.Unlike the duty that applies toother services, there is noduty to overcome physicalfeatures. However, there aretwo exceptions to this:

• in the case of rentalvehicles, the full duty toovercome physical featuresapplies; and

• in the case of breakdownrecovery vehicles, the dutyapplies in part.

Full details of the duties areset out in chapter 5 of theCode of Practice: Provisionand use of transport vehicleswhich is available on the DRCwebsite at: www.drc-gb.org

Justification

The defence of ‘justification’applies to those providingservices in respect oftransport vehicles in the sameway as to other serviceproviders covered by Part 3 ofthe 1995 Act. The justificationmust fall within one of therelevant categories set out inthe 1995 Act, which are:

a. Health or safety

The Act does not require atransport provider to doanything which wouldendanger the health or safetyof any person. A transportprovider can justify lessfavourable treatment, or afailure to make an adjustment,if it is necessary in order toprotect the health or safety ofany person, including thedisabled person.

b. Incapacity to contract

The Act does not require atransport provider to contractwith a disabled person who isincapable of entering into alegally enforceable agreementor of giving an informedconsent. If a disabled personis unable to understand aparticular transaction, atransport provider may refuseto enter into a contract.

c. Transport provider

otherwise unable to provide

the service to the public

A transport provider canjustify refusing to provide (ordeliberately not providing) aservice in respect of provisionand use of a transport vehicleto a disabled person if this isnecessary because thetransport provider would

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otherwise be unable to providethe service to other membersof the public.

d. To enable the transport

provider to provide the service

to the disabled person or other

members of the public

A transport provider can justifyproviding service of a lowerstandard or in a worse manneror on worse terms (an inferiorservice) if this is necessary inorder to be able to provide theservice to the disabled personor other members of thepublic.

e. Greater cost of providing a

tailor-made service

A transport provider can justifycharging a disabled personmore for some services than itcharges other people. This isthe case where the service isindividually tailored to therequirements of the disabledcustomer or passenger. If ahigher charge reflects theadditional cost or expense ofmeeting the disabled person’sspecification, that would justifythe higher charge.

However, justification on thisground cannot apply where theextra cost results from theprovision of a reasonableadjustment.

Additional changes to Part 3of the DDA 1995 – affectingprivate clubs and publicauthority functions – wereexplored in issue 9 of theLegal Bulletin, which isavailable from our websiteat: www.drc-gb.org

Thedefinition of disabilityCatherine Casserley, Senior

Legislation Adviser at the DRC,

considers proposals to change

the definition of disability

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The definition of disability

contained in section 1 of the

Disability Discrimination Act

1995 (‘the DDA’) – and

supplemented by Schedule 1

to that Act, regulations and

guidance – remains one of the

most complex aspects of the

DDA. In an employment

context, it is also the subject

of the majority of appeals to

the Employment Appeal

Tribunal.

The definition of disability hasbeen the subject of muchcriticism by disabled people,representatives and otherswho find it complex andobstructive – and this remainsthe case despite changes tothe definition made by theDisability Discrimination Act2005 (which amendedschedule 1 to the 1995 Act toprovide that a person who hascancer, HIV infection ormultiple sclerosis is deemed tohave a disability and toremove the requirement that amental illness must be‘clinically well-recognised’).

Following a recent consultationon whether the DDA’sdefinition of disability shouldbe changed further (and if so,how), the DRC is makingrecommendations on this issueto Government. Beforeexploring these

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recommendations, it isworthwhile considering somerelevant developments in caselaw – specifically, the first caseto be referred to the EuropeanCourt of Justice (ECJ) on theissue of disability in thecontext of the EuropeanEmployment FrameworkDirective, as well as areference which has beenmade from a UK tribunalconcerning ‘discrimination byassociation’ with a disabledperson.

Sonia Chacon Navas v Eurest

Colectividades SA, ECJ,

C-13/05

This case is the first to beconsidered by the ECJ on thedisability aspect of theEuropean EmploymentFramework Directive.

It should be noted at theoutset that the decision doesnot reflect the definition ofdisability contained in thelegislation of countries whichalready have disabilitydiscrimination laws. As thedirective contains a provisionon non-regression, thedecision will not affect thedefinition of disability in thosecountries, such as the UK,which have a broaderdefinition than that implied bythis decision.

Facts

Ms Navas was employed byEurest, an undertakingspecialising in catering. On 14October 2003, she was certifiedas unfit to work on grounds ofsickness and she was not in aposition to return to work inthe short term. On 28 May2004, Eurest gave Ms Navaswritten notice of her dismissal,without stating any reasons,whilst acknowledging that thedismissal was unlawful andoffering her compensation.

On 29 June 2004, Ms Navasbrought an action againstEurest, maintaining that herdismissal was not valid as itwas discriminatory – based onher leave of absence from heremployment for eight months.She sought an order thatEurest reinstate her in her post.

Referral

In Spanish law, sickness is notexpressly referred to as one ofthe grounds of prohibiteddiscrimination. The Spanishcourt hearing the case referredthe matter to the ECJ; it wasthe view of the Spanish courtthat there is a causal linkbetween sickness and disabilityand that, given that sickness isoften capable of causing anirreversible disability, workers

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must be protected in a timelymanner under the prohibitionof discrimination on groundsof disability.

The referring court alsosuggested that, should it beconcluded that disability andsickness are two separateconcepts and that Communitylaw does not apply directly tosickness, it should be held that,in accordance with Communitylaw principles of non-discrimination, sickness shouldbe added to the attributes inrelation to which the directiveprohibits discrimination.

Issues

The ECJ summarised the firstquestion to be whether thegeneral framework laid downby the directive for combatingdiscrimination on grounds ofdisability confers protection ona person who has beendismissed by his employersolely on grounds of sickness.

On this issue, the ECJ held that‘disability,’ in the context of thedirective, must be understoodas referring to a limitationwhich results, in particular,from a physical, mental orpsychological impairment andwhich hinders the participationof the person concerned in

professional life; by using theconcept of ‘disability’ in thedirective, the legislaturedeliberately chose a termwhich differs from ‘sickness’.The two concepts cannotsimply be treated as being thesame.

The importance which theCommunity legislatureattaches to measures foradapting the workplace to thedisability demonstrates that itenvisaged situations in whichparticipation in professional lifeis hindered over a long periodof time. For the limitation tofall within the concept ofdisability, it must therefore beprobable that it will last for along time. There is nothing inthe directive to suggest thatworkers are protected by theprohibition on grounds ofdisability as soon as theydevelop any type of sickness. A person who has beendismissed on account ofsickness does not fall withinthe scope of the directive.

The ECJ went on to clarify therelationship between theprohibition of discriminationand the reasonable adjustmentprovisions in Article 5 of thedirective. It stated that, inrespect of dismissal, theprohibition of discriminationon grounds of disability

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is clear in the DDA), theconclusion on definition ofdisability is extremelydisappointing.

It is important that, as the courtpointed out, there is anautonomous and uniforminterpretation of the termdisability in this context.However, as is indicated above,the conclusion fails to reflectthe definition of disabilitycontained in the existingdisability legislation in many ofthe member states. Given thenon-regression principlecontained in the directive, thejudgment will not affect thosedefinitions.

It is inevitable, however, thatover time, the judgments of thecourt will develop and it is tobe hoped that they will betterreflect the social model ofdisability in future. Thejudgment fails, in particular, totake into account the stigmawhich may be faced by peoplewith disabilities and particularchronic conditions, which maynot fit within its concept ofdisability (ie the social modelof disability).

Although it is true thatdisability and sickness are notthe same, the judgment treatsthem as though they aremutually exclusive concepts –

contained in the directiveprecludes dismissal ongrounds of disability which, inthe light of the obligation toprovide reasonableaccommodation for peoplewith disabilities, is not justifiedby the fact that the personconcerned is not competent,capable and available toperform the essential functionsof his post.

On the second question –whether sickness can beregarded as a ground inrelation to which the directiveprohibits discrimination – theECJ rejected the suggestionsof the referring court. It heldthat the scope of the directivecould not be extended beyonddiscrimination based on thegrounds listed exhaustively inArticle 1. Therefore, sicknesscould not be regarded as aground in addition to those inrelation to which the directiveprohibits discrimination.

Comment

Whilst the ECJ’s comments onthe relationship between theanti-discrimination provisionsof the directive and thereasonable accommodationprovisions are particularlyhelpful (although of no impactin the UK, as this relationship

25

which is not the case. Theremay be an overlap betweensickness and disability – forexample, multiple sclerosismay be considered to be an‘illness’.

It is arguable that the judgmentmay still leave room for certain‘sickness’ to be covered –should it produce a ‘limitation’– if it is probable that it will be‘long term’. Although noindication is given as to whatperiod of time this would be,Ms Navas was off work foreight months, which wasclearly insufficient in this caseto amount to ‘long term’.

The reference, however,contained very little factualinformation to put the issuesinto context – for example,there was no informationabout the nature of Ms Navas’illness, nor about its impactupon her life – and this maywell have contributed to theapproach taken by the ECJ.

The UK’s definition of disabilitydoes attempt to address theissue of stigma and long-termconditions – with, for example,automatic coverage for peoplewith severe disfigurements,HIV, cancer and multiplesclerosis. However, it fails todo this fully and is anextremely complicated means

to achieving the end protectionof the DDA. This was indicatedin the recent consultation onthe definition of disability, andis reflected in the DRC’sproposals for change,discussed later on in thisarticle.

Coleman v Attridge Law and

Steve Law Case No

2303745/2005

The ECJ will be given a furtheropportunity to consider thedisability aspects of thedirective in the first referencefrom a UK court.

The case of Coleman vAttridge Law and Steve Lawconcerned a woman whoclaimed constructive unfairdismissal and disabilitydiscrimination. Her claim ofdisability discrimination wasbased not on her owndisability, but on being thecarer of a disabled person –her son. It is the DRC’s viewthat discrimination byassociation is covered by theEuropean EmploymentDirective’s provisionsprohibiting discrimination ‘ongrounds of’ disability.

The tribunal ordered that thefollowing questions bereferred to the ECJ for apreliminary ruling:

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employee has a disabledson for whom theemployee cares, is thatharassment a breach ofthe principle of equaltreatment established bythe directive?

The respondents haveappealed against the decisionof the tribunal.

DRC proposals on

definition of disability

When the Joint ScrutinyCommittee considered whatwas then the DisabilityDiscrimination Bill in 2004, itrecommended that the DRC,in line with its duty to keepthe working of the DDA underreview, should consider andconsult on whether, and if sohow, the law could beamended to provide:

a) protection againstdiscrimination on thegrounds of impairment,regardless of level or typeof impairment, and

b) entitlements to theremoval of disablingbarriers.

The DRC consulted fromDecember 2005 to March 2006on whether the definition ofdisability should be changed.

(1) In the context of theprohibition ofdiscrimination on groundsof disability, does thedirective only protect fromdirect discrimination andharassment persons whoare themselves disabled?

(2) If the answer to question (1)above is in the negative,does the directive protectemployees who, thoughthey are not themselvesdisabled, are treated lessfavourably or harassed onthe ground of theirassociation with a personwho is disabled?

(3) Where an employer treatsan employee lessfavourably than he treats orwould treat otheremployees, and it isestablished that the groundfor the treatment of theemployee is that theemployee has a disabledson for whom theemployee cares, is thattreatment directdiscrimination in breach ofthe principle of equaltreatment established bythe directive?

(4) Where an employerharasses an employee andit is established that theground for the treatment ofthe employee is that the

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104 responses were received,overwhelmingly in favour of achange from the presentdefinition.

Following this, the DRC isrecommending to theGovernment that disabilitydiscrimination law movesaway from protecting a groupof ‘disabled’ people and,instead, protects anyone whoexperiences discrimination onthe grounds of an impairment.This recommendation isbased on:

• experience through caselaw

• the observations of theJoint Scrutiny Committeeon the DisabilityDiscrimination Bill, and

• the results of theconsultation.

An example of how thepresent definition causesconsiderable difficulties – andan inequitable result – is thecase of Gittins v Oxford

Radcliffe NHS Trust EAT

193/99.

Mrs Gittins was a nurse whowas denied employment onthe basis that she had bulimianervosa. The hospital Trustconcerned did not seek tojustify their decision, but

rather they successfullyargued that since Mrs Gittins’impairment did not constitutea disability under the DDA,she was not legally entitledto challenge their decision.

The proposed change wouldhave made it easy for MrsGittins to establish that shewas entitled to protectionagainst discrimination; thecase would have focusedinstead on whether the Trustcould have justified theirrefusal to employ herbecause of their perceptionsof the risks associated withher impairment.

Specifically, it is proposedthat the DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1995’sdefinition of disability shouldbe changed to one whichgives protection fromdiscrimination to everyonewho has (or has had or isperceived to have) animpairment. There would beno requirement, as atpresent, to show that theeffects of an impairment are‘substantial’ and ‘long term’.

There would be strongbenefits from such a change,such as:

• ensuring clear protectionfor all those who need it

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• placing the focus on thefairness and reasonablenessof employers/serviceproviders, rather than onthe medical condition of theindividual

• producing a simpler, morecertain approach foridentifying who hasprotection

• providing better access tojustice

• producing a more positiveapproach, encouraging amore systemic approach tochange and bringing thelaw into line with bestpractice.

Of these, the chief impactwould be to shift the focus ofattention in disabilitydiscrimination disputes awayfrom the individual’s medicalcondition and on to thefairness of that person’streatment. More people wouldpotentially be able to claimprotection from disabilitydiscrimination.

The DRC does notunderestimate the significanceof this proposal. Indeed, theCommission has identified anumber of potential areas ofrisk. It is recognised thatfurther attention or actionmay be necessary, including:

• consideration of theexclusion of particular minorand transient conditions

• careful drafting of the law toretain the current approachto positive discriminationand reasonable adjustments

• wide public consultation

• regulatory impactassessment

• strong communicationscampaign.

The proposed change wouldonly apply to discriminationlaw and would not affect stateprogrammes or services suchas the blue badge orentitlements to welfarebenefits.

If the Government respondspositively to this proposal, it isexpected that it would conducta further, more extensivepublic consultation on whetherand how to make any changesto the definition of disability.

Any changes could beintroduced by a Single EqualityAct, which the government hassaid it will introduce in thenext few years.

Taylor-madecontroversy Martin Crick, Legal Officer at

the DRC, considers the recent

Court of Appeal judgment in

Taylor v OCS Group

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The Court of Appeal recentlyhanded down a somewhatcontroversial judgment in thecase of Taylor v OCS Group Ltd

[2006] EWCA Civ 702. It is adecision that will not bewelcomed by claimants andtheir representatives; potentiallyit makes discrimination moredifficult to establish in somecircumstances.

The controversy is focused onthe Court’s restrictiveinterpretation of ‘disability-related discrimination’ underthe Disability Discrimination Act(DDA) 1995. The Court ofAppeal decided that unless adisability-related reason for theless favourable treatment ispresent in and affected themind of the allegeddiscriminator, there is nounlawful discrimination. Unlessdistinguished, this raises thehurdle for claimants byintroducing a requirement todemonstrate that thediscriminator had a certain stateof mind. This is not good newsfor victims of discrimination.

The DRC is disappointed at thisdevelopment and believes thatthe restrictive interpretation of‘disability-relateddiscrimination’ adopted by theCourt of Appeal is open tochallenge.

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In the meantime, carefulconsideration of the Taylorjudgment should help ensurethat any adverseconsequences are properlyrestricted.

Facts

Following an investigation intoalleged misconduct, Mr Taylor,who is deaf, was invited toattend a disciplinary hearing.He was not provided with aBritish Sign Language (BSL)interpreter during the courseof the hearing; as a result hecould not participateeffectively and struggled tounderstand what washappening. At the end of thehearing he was dismissed. Anappeal hearing was held atwhich Mr Taylor wasrepresented by his sister. Aninterpreter was provided butwas unable to stay throughoutand so Mr Taylor’s sister tookover as interpreter for theremainder of the appeal. Thedecision to dismiss Mr Taylorwas affirmed.

Claims

As well as alleging that he hadbeen unfairly dismissed, MrTaylor brought claims underthe DDA 1995 of unlawfuldisability-related

discrimination and failure tomake reasonable adjustments.

Reasonable adjustments

It was submitted that MrTaylor had been at asubstantial disadvantage inunderstanding the nature andpurpose of communicationduring the disciplinary hearingand that there had been afailure to discharge theconsequent duty to make areasonable adjustment byproviding a BSL interpreter.

Disability-related

discrimination

It was submitted that thedecision to dismiss Mr Taylorconstituted disability-relateddiscrimination as the decisionresulted, in part, from MrTaylor’s communicationdifficulties and he may nothave been dismissed had theadjustment – the provision ofa BSL interpreter – beenmade.

Employment tribunal

The employment tribunal (ET)decided that Mr Taylor hadbeen unfairly dismissed andthat his employer had failed tomake reasonable adjustmentsby omitting to provide a BSLinterpreter at the disciplinaryhearing.

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Despite this, the tribunalconcluded that the decisionto dismiss Mr Taylor did notconstitute disability-relateddiscrimination. The tribunalwas of the view that thereason for dismissal wasconduct and this reason wasnot, therefore, disability-related.

Employment Appeal

Tribunal

On appeal, the EmploymentAppeal Tribunal (EAT)reversed the ET conclusionon disability-relateddiscrimination. The EAT heldthat the failure to make areasonable adjustment hadsufficient bearing on thedecision to dismiss so as toconstitute disability-relateddiscrimination. This couldnot be justified due to thefailure to make reasonableadjustments, as provided forin the DDA. Mr Taylor’sdisability had resulted inhim failing to give a properexplanation for his actionsand that had had asignificant influence on thedecision to dismiss him.

The EAT also upheld the ETdecisions on the reasonableadjustments and unfairdismissal claims.

Court of Appeal

The employer was refusedpermission to appeal to theCourt of Appeal in relation tothe finding that it had failed tomake reasonable adjustments.

In relation to the unfairdismissal claim, theemployer’s appeal wasallowed and the case wasremitted to a differentlyconstituted employmenttribunal. The Court held that,if a first disciplinary hearing isdefective, the appeal hearingcan cure the defect if thatappeal is comprehensive.

Additionally, the employer’sappeal in relation to thefinding of disability-relateddiscrimination was allowedand the order of the originalemployment tribunal –dismissing Mr Taylor’s claimof disability-relateddiscrimination – was restored.

It is this final aspect of theCourt of Appeal judgment –dealing with disability-relateddiscrimination – which hascaused particular concern.

Comment

At the heart of the Court ofAppeal’s controversial

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interpretation of ‘disability-related discrimination’ lies theassertion by Lady JusticeSmith that ‘discriminationrequires that the employershould have a certain state ofmind’.

Certainly, the incorporation ofa subjective element – arequirement to prove that thediscriminator had a certainstate of mind – into what waspreviously thought to be anobjective test is anunwelcome development. It ispotentially an additionalbarrier to justice for victims ofdiscrimination and an escape-route for those whodiscriminate.

In the present case, the Courtof Appeal considered therewas no evidence that thisemployer had a disability-related reason in his mindwhen he dismissed Mr Taylor.The reason for dismissal wasconduct and the employer’smind was not affected,consciously orsubconsciously, by adisability-related reason.

This was the case eventhough the Court of Appealclearly recognised that therecould be a causative linkbetween Mr Taylor’s disability

and the decision to dismisshim (presumably on anobjective assessment of thefacts). Despite this, theydecided that the subjectiveelement of proving theemployer had a disability-related reason in their mindat the time they decided todismiss him could not be metin this case. It seems theyaccept that reasonableadjustments would havemade a difference, butnevertheless, disability-related discrimination is saidnot to be made out in theabsence of a disability-relatedreason affecting theemployer’s mind.

In a revealing passage set outin paragraph 73 of the Courtof Appeal judgment, Smith LJstates:

‘Here, the contributoryreason relied on by MrTaylor is not said to haveaffected the employer'smind. It is said that MrTaylor's inability (on accountof his deafness) to explainhis conduct, contributed tohis dismissal. So it mayhave done, as a matter ofcausation. It may be that, ifMr Taylor had not been deafor had had an interpreterpresent at the first

33

disciplinary hearing, hemight not have beendismissed. But that is not theissue under section 5(1). Theissue is whether theemployer had a disability-related reason in his mindwhen he dismissed theemployee. There was noevidence that this employerhad; indeed that was neversuggested.’

Restricting the impact

The Taylor-test is certainly anunhelpful one. However, thereare a number of factors whichmay assist claimants and theirrepresentatives to restrict anyadverse consequences arisingfrom this decision.

Intention

1. The Court of Appeal wascareful to avoid suggestingthat this subjective state ofmind test imposes a need toprove that the employer hadan intention to discriminate.The court drew a distinctionbetween ‘having in mind’ and‘intention’ and held that it isonly necessary to show theformer (paragraph 71).

Subconscious affect on

employer

2. Further, the Court of Appealconceded that it would be

open to an employmenttribunal to find that theemployer’s decision had beenaffected by the disability-related reason even though theemployer had not consciously

allowed that reason to affecthis thinking. ‘What is importantis that the disability-relatedreason must affect theemployer’s mind, whetherconsciously or subconsciously.’(paragraph 72)

House of Lords on motive

3. Indeed, there is superiorauthority from the House ofLords on the question ofmotive in the context ofdiscrimination claims.Nagarajan v London Regional

Transport, HL [2000] 1 A.C. 501

is authority for the propositionthat direct discrimination (onthe grounds of race) does notrequire a conscious motivationon behalf of the perpetrator.Prior to this, the House ofLords in Reg v Birmingham

City Council, ex parte Equal

Opportunities Commission

[1989] A.C. 1155 unanimouslyrejected a test importing arequirement of intention ormotive in the context ofsection 1(1)(a) of the SexDiscrimination Act 1975. LordGoff of Chieveley observed, atpage 1194: ‘The intention ormotive of the defendant to

34

discriminate, though it maybe relevant so far asremedies are concerned… isnot a necessary condition ofliability; it is perfectlypossible to envisage caseswhere the defendant had nosuch motive, and yet did infact discriminate on theground of sex.’ In James v

Eastleigh Borough Council

[1990] 2 A.C. 751 – anotherHouse of Lords decision – thedictum in the Birminghamcase was adopted andapplied. Lord Ackner statedsuccinctly at page 770, that‘the council's motive for thisdiscrimination is nothing tothe point.’

More than one reason

4. It was also recognised bythe Court of Appeal in Taylorthat in some cases anemployer might have morethan one reason fordismissing an employee. Forexample, one reason fordismissal may be conduct,but the employer may alsohave in mind another reasonwhich does relate to thatemployee’s disability (forexample, their sicknessabsence record). It wasaccepted that in such cases, ifthe disability-related reasonhad a significant influence onthe employer’s decision, that

would be enough in order forthe dismissal to be for areason related to theemployee’s disability(paragraph 72).

Satisfying the test

5. The Court of Appealconsidered the EAT decisionin HJ Heinz Co Ltd v Kenrick

[2000] IRLR 144 EAT.Although they felt thisdecision supported theemployer’s assertion that thedisability-related reason mustbe present in the employer’smind, it may be of someassistance to claimants thatthe court went on to form theview that, in the Heinz case,the test would certainly havebeen satisfied. In that case,the employer dismissed theemployee because he hadbeen off work for so long andno date could be given forwhen he would be fit toreturn. At the time of thedismissal, a diagnosis hadnot been confirmed and theemployer sought to defendthe DDA claim on the basisthat it did not know that theemployee’s condition was adisability under the Act. TheEAT held that this did notmatter. The employer knewabout the condition and theabsence it caused and thatwas the reason for the

35

dismissal. The dismissal wasfor a reason related to thedisability. On these facts, theCourt of Appeal felt that theemployer did indeed have inmind a reason related to theemployee’s disability –namely his long-termabsence.

Reasonable adjustments

6. Importantly, it is to benoted that the Court of Appealjudgment is of no significancein a claim that an employerfailed to make reasonableadjustments. Indeed, theemployer was refusedpermission to appeal on thispoint to the Court of Appealafter the EAT upheld thefinding of the employmenttribunal that the employer hadfailed to make the reasonableadjustment of providing a BSLinterpreter at the disciplinaryhearing.

The Court of Appeal’s

restrictive interpretation

in practice

Notwithstanding that thereare limits to its application, itis recognised that, where itcannot be distinguished, theTaylor test is an unhelpfuldevelopment which imposesan additional burden onto theclaimant.

Inevitably, questions will nowarise about how the test willwork in practice. For instance,it has been mentioned that theCourt of Appeal was careful tostop short of requiring proof ofintention to discriminate. Yet,to discriminate, it was heldthat the employer must havethe disability-related reason inmind, and this reason mustaffect the employer’s mind.‘Unless that reason hasaffected his mind, he cannotdiscriminate’ (paragraph 72).

So, in practice, when does‘having one’s mind affected(by a disability-related reason)’become ‘motive’ or ‘intention’to discriminate? Unless thejudiciary are able to establishthis boundary with certainty,the Taylor-test becomesdifficult, if not impossible, toapply.

More fundamentally, howrelevant anyway is thequestion of what was in theemployer’s mind if it isaccepted that the employer’sactions had a discriminatoryimpact?

Certainly the judgment isdifficult to reconcile withprevious authority ondisability-relateddiscrimination, including the

36

leading case of Clark v TDG

Ltd t/a Novacold [1999] IRLR

318 where a wide constructionof what was then section 5(1)of the DDA (now section 3A(1))was preferred by the Court ofAppeal.

Beyond Taylor

This controversial judgmenthas, for now at least, thepotential to generate someconfusion in respect of thecorrect test to apply todisability-relateddiscrimination claims.

Despite those factors listedabove which should properlyrestrict the adverseconsequences of Taylor, thiscase, where it cannot bedistinguished, may muddywhat were previously clearwaters.

Indeed, the potentialimplications of Taylor can beillustrated quite starkly byreading across the Court ofAppeal’s restrictiveinterpretation into other partsof the DDA, such as Part 3 –which covers rights of accessto goods and services.

Consider, for example, the notuncommon scenario of a caférefusing entry to a blind

person because they areaccompanied by anassistance dog. The refusalby the café would give riseto a claim of disability-related discrimination undersection 20(1) in Part 3 of theDDA 1995. This provisionmirrors the provision in Part2 of the Act (section 3(A)(1),formerly section 5(1)) whichprotects employees fromdisability-relateddiscrimination and whichwas explored by the Courtof Appeal in Taylor.

The refusal of service by thecafé amounts to lessfavourable treatment of theblind person. The questionwhich must then arise iswhether this treatment isfor a reason related to theperson’s disability? It has tobe the case that it is, as thereason for the presence ofthe assistance dog is to giveassistance to the visually-impaired person whowishes to access theservice. As assistance dogsowners rely on their dogs toget around safely, refusingto allow an assistance dogon to the premises meansrefusing to provide aservice to the owner for areason relating to theirdisability.

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If the Taylor test is introducedinto the equation, however,the position is less clear. Thecafé owner who defends suchan action on the basis thatthe establishment operates a‘no dogs’ policy, might now(post-Taylor) seek to arguethat he did not have adisability-related reason inhis mind at the time. Instead,it might be sufficient todemonstrate a health andsafety reason for the policy.

According to the Court ofAppeal in Taylor, unless areason which is related to theemployee’s disability ispresent in the allegeddiscriminator’s mind and hasaffected his mind, there is nounlawful discrimination. So, ifit is accepted that the caféowner only had health andsafety concerns in mind (andnot a disability-relatedreason), the claim wouldappear to fail the Taylor test,regardless of the obviousdiscriminatory impact on thedisabled person.

It is respectfully suggestedthat this cannot be right andthis is not the correct test toapply in the context of anydiscrimination claim, whetherrelating to rights of access,education or employment.

With this in mind, it isanticipated that Taylor will notbe the end of this particulardebate.

The Disability RightsCommission, whichrecognises that these issuesneed further consideration,will consider supporting asuitable case that may enablethese principles to be exploredfully. In considering cases forpossible support, it isrecognised that anunsuccessful first instanceclaim under the provisions ofPart 3 of the DDA (coveringrights of access to goods andservices) may invite an appealon this important issuedirectly to the Court of Appeal.The DRC can be contactedusing the details on the backcover of this publication.

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News in brief

Equal Treatment:

Closing the Gap

DRC’s Formal

Investigation into

health inequalities

The DRC has recently publishedits final report following acomprehensive investigationinto physical health inequalitiesexperienced by people withmental health problems and/orlearning disabilities.

Data

The investigation, which wasfeatured in issue 7 of the LegalBulletin, is uniqueinternationally in bringingtogether three powerful sets ofdata to inform robustrecommendations. That dataconsisted of:

1. New research. The mostcomprehensive study of primarycare records and mental healthissues in the world (8 millionprimary care records), coupledwith Area Studies in four areas,extensive consultation with

39

service users and providers andevidence reviews. This enableda detailed exploration of healthinequalities, barriers to servicesand potential solutions to beundertaken.

2. Written and oral evidence

analysed by a high level InquiryPanel, who generatedrecommendations designed towork practically in the newly-configured national healthservices.

3. Existing evidence collatedthrough literature review.

Findings

The investigation found thatpeople with mental healthproblems have higher rates ofobesity, smoking, heart disease,hypertension, respiratorydisease, diabetes, stroke andbreast cancer than other citizens.People with learning disabilitiesexperience higher rates ofobesity and respiratory diseaseand high levels of unmet need.

One internationally new findingfrom the investigation is thatpeople with schizophrenia arealmost twice as likely to havebowel cancer as other citizens.People with mental healthproblems tend to get theseconditions younger and die of

them faster. They are morelikely than others to developcoronary heart disease,diabetes, respiratory disease orhave a stroke before the age of55. Once they have theseillnesses they are less likely tosurvive for five years.

Recommendations

The investigation report callsfor a step change in thedelivery of health services topeople with learning disabilitiesand/or mental health problems.The Disability Equality Duty(DED), in force from December2006, provides a legislativeimpetus for the public sector toimprove outcomes for disabledpeople. The investigationrecommendations identifypractical ways for healthorganisations and policymakers to make this stepchange and will assist them tocomply with the DED.

Further information

The Formal Investigation report,summary reports for targetaudiences, Welsh ExecutiveSummary report, backgroundevidence paper and supportingresearch reports are availableat: www.drc-gb.org/

healthinvestigation

4040

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DRC in partnership with Law Centres

Federation and IPSEA

The DRC has entered intopartnerships with the LawCentres Federation (LCF) andthe Independent Panel forSpecial Education Advice(IPSEA) to help address accessto justice issues and to increaseawareness of rights under theDisability Discrimination Act1995.

The partnerships form part ofthe DRC’s capacity-buildingprogramme, which washighlighted in issue 8 of theLegal Bulletin.

The DRC has long recognisedthat if we are to reach thosegroups of disabled people who,perhaps because of a variety offactors including their social andfinancial circumstances, theirrace, gender or age, find itparticularly difficult to obtainjustice through the legal system,we can’t simply wait for them tofind us.

There remains a worryingly lowlevel of awareness of basicrights under the DDA amongstall sections of the communityand even more so amongstthese groups. Even whendisabled people are aware of theDDA, they are usually thinkingof employment rights and not

the rights to equal access to goodsand services or to education thatthe DDA also provides.

The partnerships with LCF andIPSEA – both of whom haveimpressive track records in adviceprovision and representation –represent a major effort to tacklethese problems.

LCF

The DRC has funded 15 posts inLaw Centres for Disability RightsWorkers, spread across Englandand Wales. The Disability RightsWorkers are tasked with raisingawareness of rights under theDDA in their local communitiesand client groups. They will alsoprovide advice and representationon DDA matters, with a particularfocus on the under-utilised Part 3of the DDA, which deals withrights of access to goods andservices. By using each local LawCentre’s existing and developingnetworks and contacts, the DRCaims to take rights into the heartof local communities by raisingawareness and offering advice andrepresentation where it is mostneeded.

Scotland

In Scotland, the DRC hascombined forces with the Legal

42

Services Agency to fund a LawCentre post providing a similarservice. In conjunction withCitizens Advice Scotland,Capability Scotland, andUPDATE, the DRC is alsoemploying a solicitor, fundedby the Scottish Legal AidBoard, to work with adviceagencies and solicitors to raiseawareness of DDA rights andduties.

IPSEA

IPSEA is an independentadvisory service for parents orcarers of children on educationmatters arising in schools. Itprovides representation atSpecial Educational Needs andDisability Tribunals (which dealwith challenges to educationalprovision and statements ofspecial educational needs,disability discrimination andfixed-term exclusions) and atIndependent Appeal Panels(which deal with permanentexclusions).

The DRC has funded four postsfor advisers in IPSEA, coveringthe North West, North East,South West and South East ofEngland.

The advisers have a dual remit:

• to raise awareness ofeducation rights under Part 4

of the DDA, through existingnetworks such as localparent partnerships and bydeveloping new links withrepresentative groups; and

• to provide advice andrepresentation within theirregion on disabilitydiscrimination matters inschools.

The partnership project,launched in January 2006, will continue throughout theremaining life of the DRC.Both LCF and IPSEA arealready delivering greatoutcomes for disabled peopleand it is anticipated that, bythe time that the existingCommissions merge into theCEHR in October 2007, theproject will have producedsuch a proven track record ofsuccess that the CEHR willenthusiastically adopt it as amodel of rights-based adviceand representation provisionto the most vulnerable groupsin our society.

If you wish to refer a matter toIPSEA advisers or DisabilityRights Workers, please contactthe DRC Helpline – details areprovided on the back cover ofthis issue. Alternativelycontact details for theDisability Rights Workers canbe found on the DRC websiteat: www.drc-gb.org

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Advising parents on making a claim

A free half-day seminar provided by the

DRC/IPSEA Schools Project.

This seminar is designed for anyone whoprovides advice and support to parents/

carers and who would like todevelop their knowledge ofdisability discrimination rights

and remedies in schools. Theseminar will be facilitated

by specialist advisers fromthe DRC/IPSEA SchoolsProject. The topicscovered will include:

• Schools duties under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995

• Remedies available to parents

• How to make a Disability Discrimination claim to SENDIST andIndependent Appeal Panels

• The overlap with the special educational needs framework

Disability Discrimination

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This seminar will be held at the following venues:

Bristol 16 November 2006

Manchester 30 November 2006

Newcastle 5 December 2006

Birmingham 11 December 2006

London 13 December 2006

Cardiff 14 December 2006

in Schools

IPSEAIndependent Panel for Special Education Advice

For further details, including a booking form, please emailSteff Tharle at steff.ipsea@intamail.com or write to her at

IPSEA 6 Carlow Mews Woodbridge Suffolk IP12 IEA

with details of your organisation and number of delegateswho would like attend. Details of courses in other regionsare also available from Steff Tharle.

45

Employer directly discriminated

The first direct disabilitydiscrimination casesupported by the DRC to beconsidered by theemployment tribunalsconcluded recently.

The claimant in Tudor v

Spen Corner Veterinary

Centre Ltd and anor,

Manchester Employment

Tribunal (Case No

2404211/05), won her claimof direct disabilitydiscrimination and alsosucceeded in claims ofunfair dismissal, failure tomake reasonableadjustments and disability-related discrimination. Shewas awarded £20,352.85.

Facts

Miss Tudor had beenemployed as a veterinarynursing assistant. In May2005, she was admitted tohospital following a strokeand while in hospital wastold that she had gone blind.It was unknown when or ifher sight would return.

Miss Tudor’s mother informedher daughter’s employer thatthe claimant had lost sight inboth eyes and provided therespondents with relevantmedical certificates. After heremployer received thisinformation, Miss Tudor wasdismissed.

Direct discrimination

Direct discrimination requiresthat the treatment is on theground of the disabledperson’s disability, and is lessfavourable than the way inwhich an appropriatecomparator is (or would be)treated.

Her treatment is to becompared with that ofsomeone who does not havethe same disability but whoserelevant circumstances,including abilities, are thesame as, or not materiallydifferent from, her own. Directdiscrimination – unlike themore common claim of lessfavourable treatment for adisability-related reason –cannot be justified.

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The judgment

It is to be welcomed that, inassessing the directdiscrimination claim, thetribunal made reference to theCode of Practice onEmployment and Occupation.The tribunal was satisfied thatgeneralised and stereotypicalassumptions were madeabout Miss Tudor, theduration of her disability andits effects. At the time ofdismissal, her employer hadno means of knowing whetherMiss Tudor would make arecovery. Her employer didnot hold a meeting, did notseek input from the employeeand made no proper enquiriesas to what reasonableadjustments might be madebefore taking the decision todismiss.

It was accepted that anappropriate comparator couldbe an employee who hasbroken her leg, where thiscauses her to be unable towork and where it is unclearwhen she might be able toresume work again. The

Tribunal stated: ‘In respectof such an individual we donot consider that therespondents would havemade stereotypicalassumptions of theirlikelihood of recovery ortheir ability to do their jobagain. Further, therespondents would nothave been so quick to rushto judgment without aproper consideration of allthe relevant circumstances.’

Miss Tudor’s award for lossof earnings was reduced toreflect a finding that therewas only a 50 per centchance of her remaining inemployment even withreasonable adjustments inplace.

The decision highlights theneed for employers to giveproper consideration to allrelevant circumstances,including making enquiriesas to what reasonableadjustments might bemade.

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Debenhams confirms commitment to

making stores accessible for disabled people

Debenhams has signed aformal agreement with theDisability Rights Commissionto improve access in its retailstores in England.

The legally binding agreementwas made under theframework of section 5 of theDisability Rights CommissionAct 1999 (‘DRCA’). Thisprovision allows the DRC toenter into an agreement in lieuof enforcement action wherethe Commission has reason tobelieve that a person hascommitted or is committing anunlawful act.

The agreement follows legalaction brought againstDebenhams by Mr GregJackson, a 43-year-oldwheelchair user, in July 2005.

Mr Jackson had been unable toaccess part of the menswearsection in Debenhams, Derby.The part he found inaccessiblewas situated at mezzaninelevel and could only beaccessed by two routes, bothof which required customers toclimb four steps.

Since 1 October 2004, serviceproviders have had a duty to

make reasonable adjustmentsin relation to physical featureswhich make it impossible orunreasonably difficult fordisabled people to make use ofservices. Where this dutyapplies, the service providermust take reasonable steps toremove the feature, alter it sothat it no longer has that effect,provide a reasonable means ofavoiding it, or provide areasonable alternative methodof making the service availableto disabled people.

It was submitted that theoptions of providing the serviceby alternative means (such asinternet shopping or theprovision of staff assistance tobring goods down to thecustomer from the mezzaninefloor) were unacceptable.These would constitute theprovision of a lower standardof service as disabledcustomers would be preventedfrom being able to browsegoods personally and atleisure, without pressure orembarrassment.

The ‘section 5 agreement’commits Debenhams to have inplace suitable means fordisabled customers to access

48

previously inaccessiblemezzanine floor areas in 16 ofits stores, within six monthsfrom the date of the agreement.Debenhams will deliver awritten report to the DRC onthe measures it hasimplemented.

Under the terms of theagreement, the County Courtclaim brought by Mr Jacksonwas withdrawn. Theimprovements whichDebenhams committed toincluded the installation andmaintenance of an accessibleplatform lift to the mezzaninefloor area in their Derby store –the area which Mr Jackson hadpreviously been unable toaccess.

The agreement underlines theextent of the responsibilities forlarge retailers regarding what isreasonable under therequirements of the DDA.

It also highlights the value of a‘section 5 agreement’ inachieving wider changethrough outcomes which canbenefit disabled peoplegenerally. Had the matter beensuccessful following a trial, thequestion of remedy for MrJackson would have beendetermined within theconstraints of the Court’s morelimited powers in this regard.

Revised Code of

Practice under Part 3

of the DDA: Rights

of Access: services

and premises

(services to the

public, public

authority functions,

private clubs and

premises)

The revised Code ofPractice on Rights ofAccess under Part 3 of theDDA was laid beforeParliament on 8 June 2006for a period of 40 days. Itis being issued undersection 53A(4) of the DDAand will come into forceon a day to be appointedby the Secretary of State,which is planned to be 4December 2006. It willreflect the changes to Part3 of the DDA which arebeing introduced inDecember 2006 (includingnew duties for landlords,private clubs and publicauthorities). The revisedCode is available on theDRC website at: www.drc-gb.org

49

Human rights summit: Bringing human rights down to earth

The Disability Rights Commission convened a human rights summiton 11 July 2006 to address the current challenges to building ahuman rights culture in Britain.

The summit, which was chaired by DRC Chairman Bert Massie andCherie Booth QC, brought together a wide-range of stakeholdersincluding representatives from inspection bodies, the voluntary andadvice sector, and all the equality strands, as well as educationalists,lawyers, and individuals who have used the Human Rights Act toenforce their rights. Under consideration was the question of howhuman rights can be better understood and supported in Britain asthe foundation of a fair society.

Joint statement from DRC human rights summit

At the close of the summit, attendees agreed the following jointstatement:

‘We all came together because we are passionate about defendingand promoting human rights and the values of fairness, respect,equality and dignity. These are the values at the heart of the HumanRights Act.

We agreed the following actions and recommendations:

We call on all political parties to:

• strongly reaffirm the value and importance of human rights and theHuman Rights Act and champion them consistently.

We call on the Government to:

• ensure all public servants are provided with appropriate supportand training in human rights values and principles

• support and resource voluntary and community organisations touse human rights in their work

50

• work with us to deliver greater opportunities for people of all agesand backgrounds to find out about their human rights, and beempowered to use them to get a fair deal

• ensure that everyone can access quality legal advice, advocacy andrepresentation wherever they live, including by supporting andresourcing the advice sector, voluntary groups and Law Centres.

We call on the future Commission for Equality and Human Rights to:

• put human rights at the heart of its mission

• use its powers to spread awareness and understanding of humanrights and to enhance the dignity of all.

For our part, we will redouble efforts to:

• defend human rights principles and values, resisting attempts toscrap or water down the Human Rights Act, even where it may beunpopular to do so,

• challenge misinformation in the media about the Human Rights Act

• ensure public services build human rights into their decision-makingand delivery.’

Organisations and individuals who endorsed this statement include:

• Age Concern

• British Institute of Human Rights

• Ulele Burnham, Chair of the Discrimination Law Association

• Frances Butler, Human Rights Consultant

• Children’s Rights Alliance for England

• Disability Rights Commission

• Sandhya Drew, Barrister at Tooks Chambers

• Equal Opportunities Commission

• Equalities National Council for BME disabled people

• Help the Aged

• Justice

• Dr Francesca Klug, Professorial Research Fellow, Centre for theStudy of Human Rights, London School of Economics

• Liberty.

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Available now –

‘Your Human Rights’ guides

The British Institute of Human Rights (BIHR) has recently launched‘Your Human Rights’ – a series of four non-technical guidesfocusing on the practical relevance of human rights in the UK.

The guides are written directly for disabled people, people livingwith mental health problems, older people and refugees andasylum seekers who are in situations where they may needinformation on their human rights. They will also be useful forpeople working with these groups, or people who would like toknow more about the impact of human rights on these groups.

The DRC is pleased to have provided assistance in the preparationof the BIHR’s guide for disabled people.

The guides are now available from the BIHR website atwww.bihr.org.

BIHR is keen to make sure that the guides reach the people thatthey are written for. Please contact BIHR on 020 7848 1818 oradmin@bihr.org if:

• you belong to an organisation that may be able to helpdistribute or publicise the guides

• you would like to order printed copies of the guides; or

• you would like the guides in other formats.

The British Institute of Human Rights is an independent Charitywhich raises awareness and understanding about the importanceof human rights. It works for some of the most disadvantaged andvulnerable communities in the UK, seeking to ensure that theprinciples of equality, dignity and respect are incorporated intopractice and policy at all levels of public service.

52

New Education Regulations and

Code of Practice

The Disability DiscriminationAct 1995 (Amendment) (Furtherand Higher Education)Regulations 2006 (SI2006/1721) (‘the Regulations’)were laid before Parliament on10 July 2006 to come into forceon 1 September 2006. TheRegulations – outlined in issue9 of the Legal Bulletin – aim toimplement the anti-discrimination requirements ofthe European FrameworkDirective (EU Council Directive2000/78/EC of 27 November2000) in respect of vocationaleducation and training.

The new duties apply to mostfurther and higher educationinstitutions. The DRC hasprepared a revised Code ofPractice on Part 4 of the DDAfor post-16 education whichprovides guidance on theinterpretation of the newduties.

Production of the revised Codewas contingent on thepublication of the Regulationsby the Department forEducation and Skills (DfES).The Regulations werepublished later than expected,in July 2006. Since then theDRC has liaised closely with

DfES, for the most partsuccessfully, to ensure acommon interpretation of thenew duties.

The revised Code requiresministerial and parliamentaryapproval before it has statutoryforce (which in effect wouldrequire courts to consider theCode where relevant). Giventhe delay in finalising theRegulations, the revised Codedid not have statutory force atthe date the Regulations cameinto effect (1 September 2006).It is anticipated that obtainingthe necessary approvals in thisregard is likely to take untilDecember 2006. It is veryunlikely that any casesconcerning the new duties willbe heard by the courts beforethis date.

In the meantime, the revisedCode is available to view asnon-statutory guidance from the DRC website:www.drc-gb.org. Printedcopies and various formatswill be published when therevised Code has statutoryforce.

DRC support for legal cases – priority areas

The DRC has power to consider applications for assistance inrespect of legal proceedings brought or proposed by an individualunder the DDA.

To make best use of its limited legal resources, the DRC hasestablished categories of cases which should be regarded aspriority areas for support. In general terms, priority areas reflectcases which are likely to promote the rights of disabled peoplegenerally, by clarifying a point of legal principle or highlightingareas where the DDA has changed or been underused.

A selection of the types of cases which might currently attract DRCsupport by way of representation – over and above applicationsderiving from exceptional individual need – is included below. Thelist is not exhaustive, nor are cases that fall within these priorityareas guaranteed support.

However, the DRC encourages advisers and representatives to

contact our Helpline, referring to this section of the Legal Bulletin,

if they are aware of complaints that fall within these priority areas.

Please refer to back cover for contact details.

53

General

• cases that will test theamendments to thedefinition of disabilityintroduced by the DDA2005, namely thoseinvolving people withcancer, HIV infection ormultiple sclerosis(particularly where canceris in remission or wheredisability is contested after

diagnosis of a progressivecondition), or people with amental illness which is not‘clinically well-recognised’

• cases involving adults withlearning difficulties andother impairments whichmake access to justicedifficult

• cases that involve humanrights issues.

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Part 2 – Employment

• recruitment casesinvolving obtainingemployment at a levelcommensurate with ability

• cases involving theopportunity to progresswithin a given career

• cases that challengecautious occupationalhealth assessmentsconcerning risk, andhighlight the need toavoid makingstereotypical orgeneralised assumptions

• cases involving theopportunity to enter aprofession and/or pursuea chosen career path

• cases concerningemployment in the healthand social care sector.

Part 3 – Access to Goods,

Facilities and Services etc

• cases that will test theprovisions introduced by

the DDA 2005 relatingto:

• less favourabletreatment by privateclubs, or

• (from December 2006)public authorityfunctions, premises,services in respect oftransport vehicles orthe reasonableadjustments duty thatapplies to privateclubs

Part 4 – Education

• cases (including casesheard bySENDIST/SENTW) thatwill clarify theapplication of the newprovisions on educationcontained in Part 4 ofthe DDA

• cases that will showdifferences in theapplication of the law inpre- and post-16education.

The DRC’s current legal strategy explains further the DRC’s legalenforcement functions, and how it deploys its statutory powers tomaximum effect. The strategy includes a more comprehensive listof current priority areas for support and is available on our websiteat: www.drc-gb.org

Telephone 08457 622 633

Textphone 08457 622 644

Fax 08457 778 878

Website www.drc-gb.org

Post DRC HelplineFREEPOST MID 02164Stratford upon AvonCV37 9BR

You can email the DRC Helpline from our website: www.drc-gb.org

You can contact the DRC Helpline by voice, text, fax,post or email via the website. You can speak to anoperator at any time between 08:00 and 20:00, Mondayto Friday.

If you require this publication in an alternative formatand/or language please contact the Helpline to discussyour needs. All publications are available to downloadfrom the DRC website: www.drc-gb.org

Making rights a reality

LEGAL16