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Building the Army Roadmap

for the 21st Century

A presentation by Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel (ret) U.S. Army

EVP Burke-Macgregor Group LLC 12 March 2018

U.S. Army War College Futures Seminar

Adaptation to Change in Warfare

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“Before the War began, I had time to think, but no money. When the war began, I had lots of money, but no time to think.” General of the Army George C. Marshall, 1945

What you should take away from this presentation:

“In 1940, a greater proportion of French manpower had undergone military training for a longer period than in any other nation. All this counted for little in the face of the shock of a comparative handful of up-to-date German forces.”

B. H. Liddell Hart, Defence of the West, 1950, p. 273.

“We have gone to war with a 1918 Army against a German Army of 1939.” General Maxime Weygand, French Commander-in-Chief, May 1940

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First, answer first order questions: Whom do we fight?

Where do we fight? How do we fight?

How do we get there?

Does the new strategic environment require change in C2, organization and technology?

What is the new “rule set” [the new Force Design Parameters: Time, Space, Lethality];

What are the new assumptions?

Roadmap for Change:

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Second, develop an appropriate response (military strategy) linking strategic ends with operational means.

Key Point: Military strategy must be congruent with:

national culture; geography, and; scientific-industrial capacity.

or risk failure.

Roadmap for Change (continued):

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Third, devise a new operational concept suitable to the new environment.

Identify the form warfare will take (& new

missions); Perform the analysis to link strategy with

concept and capabilities;

Develop the New Organization for Combat (people and technology);

Ensure capability integration and shared technological development across Service lines (R,D&A).

Roadmap for Change (continued):

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Fourth, Appoint New Military Leadership!

Identify the right people Character, Competence, Intelligence

(C3I); Difficult, Eccentric, Non-conformist,

Courageous;

Install the new leaders in power—

ruthlessly implement change.

Roadmap for Change (continued):

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Fifth, within the available fiscal means reorganize and redeploy the force into:

New Structure; (Extract savings, Shed Unneeded Equipment) ;

New Warfighting Paradigm.

Desired Outcome: The ‘about right’ combination of organization, technology and human capital (dynamic, not static).

Roadmap for Change (continued):

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Institutional Resistance to Change:

Military Institutions react to pressure for change in the following ways:

1. Question the intentions or legitimacy of the source for change (“kill the messenger”—ad hominem attacks);

2. Question the validity, or applicability of the demand for change (“that doesn’t apply to us”);

3. Revise the Institutional assumptions to make them less testable (resistant to refutation).

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After WW I, the German Military Leadership created a special purpose organization (1927-1935) to study the new technologies of war that was not subordinated to the existing German Army branch structure.

Free of interference from the Army’s conservative, branch-oriented hierarchy, the special purpose organization created new combined arms formations that included tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, signal, logistics and anti-aircraft elements, all designed to cooperate closely with German fighter and reconnaissance aircraft.

In 1935, Germany established the HQTRS for 5 new Panzer (armored) Divisions. By 1940, Germany fielded 10 Panzer Divisions.

The outcome in 1940 was revolutionary change in warfare. But the revolution began in 1933 with a special purpose

organization.

Is there a Way through Resistance to Change? Yes.

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Summary of Key Points

Wars are decided in the decades before they begin; through years of innovative field experimentation and rapid prototyping based on rigorous analysis and historical study:

•First, recognize the changed geo-strategic environment. Identify the new rule set / assumptions.

•Second, devise an appropriate response linking strategic ends with operational means.

•Third, identify the form warfare will take, then, build the new organization for combat.

•Fourth, with the right people in place, resolutely implement the change.

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Backup Slides

“If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old… People in any organization are always attached to the obsolete.”

Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21st Century, 1999

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Warfighting Environment: Contested (non-Permissive) battle space characterized by high lethality in all domains.

Joint Operational Concept: Integrated, “all arms-all

effects” warfare: Continuous tactical, operational, and strategic integration of Army Ground Forces with Aerospace and Naval Power;

Force Design Parameters: Formations on the

tactical/operational levels must be organized around the Joint Warfighting Functions of ISR, STRIKE, MANEUVER and SUSTAINMENT for employment under JOINT C2.

Implications of New National Defense Strategy

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ISR-Strike is the basis for an enduring paradigm shift in warfare. One salvo from 5 BM-30 Smerch (MLRS launchers) can devastate an area the size of NYC’s Central Park (843 acres or 3.2 square miles) in minutes.

Uragan-U Replacement for BM-27 and BM-30 MRL. Iskandar-M: SRBM and R-500 Kaliber Cruise Missile SRBM has 1500 lb warhead and a range of 500 km. R-500 Kaliber-M cruise missile has an alleged range of 2000 km. Containerized Kailber Cruise Missile Launched from standard 20’ and 40’ ISO containers.

ISR-STRIKE: The Paradigm Shift

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Russian Army conducts Offensive Operations with Smaller, Dispersed Formations Designed for Higher Mobility and Lethality.

Motorized Rifle Division: 8500 Soldiers Motorized Rifle Brigade: 3,000-4,000 Soldiers

Tank Division: 6,500 Soldiers Tank Brigade: 3,000 Soldiers

Battalion Tactical Groups

Recon UAVs

90 km

300mm Rocket Artillery

Max Engagement Range for 300mm Rocket Artillery Barrage.

Battalion or Brigade

50-70 km frontage

SPH artillery

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126 Russian Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) firing 20 volleys from each launcher in 8 hours can destroy a defending U.S. Division equivalent in an area the size of the Normandy Lodgment.

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-RSG ISR-STRIKE Capabilities offers greater dispersion, target acquisition, identification and tracking capabilities than opposing Russian Formations. -RSG is omnidirectional allowing it to rapidly alter its position without reorienting the whole formation.

RSG inside the ISR-STRIKE Dominated Battlespace:

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RSG

STRIKE BN

C4I BN SUST

BN

MNVRBN

Flexible distribution of integrated enablers to MNVR BNs • 10 SkyRanger SHORAD units (25 km

surveillance, 4-6 km engagement) • 5 NASAMS ADA firing units (120 km

surveillance with Sentinel radar, 50 km engagement)

• 4 ARTHUR radar targeting units (60 km weapon locating)

• 8 C3 support units (40-50 km point to point 4G communications)

Core Capabilities in Specialized BNs • Giraffe 4A radar (280 km surveillance, 100

km weapon locating) • 12 MRLS (150 km GLSDB) • 24 TARES Loitering Munition (200 km) • Long range communications to include

satellite communications.

Mobile Armored MNVR BNs • AGS (33 per battalion) • IFV (50 per battalion) • AMOS auto-loading 120mm mortars (12

per battalion)

RSG MNVR BNs can operate like battalion tactical groups for

independent action when needed.

RSG: Critical Features

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RSG plays a key role in helping to close the “ISR-area of responsive action and influence gap.” Action is measured in minutes.

RSG compels opposing IADs to displace or confront destruction. When IADS are destroyed/disabled AF weapons achieve maximum effect on all

levels. Joint Force connectivity along the operational axis is secure. JFC conducts deep operational maneuver with aerospace and land power. JFC integrates Army and AF capabilities into an operational axis in defensive or

offensive operations;

C4ISR is the critical target. Where are the Joint C4ISR nodes? Do we have redundancy? When can we see/know and act? How fast can we reload?

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Operational Reach and Tempo are Determined by Logistics: How much can the formation carry? How far can it move? Can it operate off-road?

WW II German Army attested to the need for tracked logistics carriers to cope with Eastern Europe’s poor road conditions and tough terrain. This lesson was not lost on the Russians resulting in the creation of the DT series of tracked logistics carriers manufactured by Vityaz shown below.

Chinese clone

Originally built off a 710 HP T-64 engine. The DT-30 can haul up to 30 metric tons of cargo through snow, swamp, soft sand, and muddy terrain without getting stuck.

Tracked logistics carriers using the PUMA’s compact but very powerful 1,100 HP engine can be rapidly constructed with added features such as the Palletized Load Handling System currently in use on LHS and PLS. PUMA logistics carriers will enable the operational distances in the hundreds of kilometers.