HOW THE WAR ENDED

BY

PHILIP BUCCI 2LT, USA

Chemical Corps ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to establish for the reader the major areas of El

Salvadoran historiography that are covered by notable authors, to highlight some areas

that are lacking in exposure and address this shortfall. The subject, in particular, that is

most lacking in this exposure is El Salvadoran rebels or the Faribundo Marti National

Liberation. Specifically their reasons for signing the peace treaty in relation to their

reasons for fighting the war.

This essay will lay out the historiography and writings of several different

authors, how they explain the causes and issues leading up to the war, and how their

perspectives shaped the way El Salvador is seen after the war. Several interviews from

prominent historians, academics, and even a former member of the Faribundo Marti

National Liberation Front will shape the discussion of the reasons that the cease fire was

signed.

Much has been written on the nation of El Salvador, its history, its people, and its

conflicts. Not as much has been written on the reasons to end fighting in comparison

with the writings on the reasons why to fight. In light of this research this essay has

found that the reason that the Civil War in El Salvador ended was that the FMLN reached

a point that they could no longer win due to its inability to win the people’s support. As

long as there has been war, man has tried to predict its outbreak and mitigate its causes,

but far less effort has been made to study conflict termination; what it takes to make an

aggressor stop and accept a deal far less than victory.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to establish for the reader the major areas of El

Salvadoran historiography that are covered by notable authors, to highlight some areas

that are lacking in exposure and address this shortfall. The subject, in particular, that is

most lacking in this exposure is El Salvadoran rebels or the Faribundo Marti National

Liberation. Specifically their reasons for signing the peace treaty in relation to their

reasons for fighting the war. This essay will lay out the historiography and writings of

several different authors, how they explain the causes and issues leading up to the war,

and how their perspectives shaped the way El Salvador is seen after the war. Several

interviews from prominent historians, academics, and even a former member of the

Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front will shape the discussion of the reasons that

the cease fire was signed.

The writings of well-known Latin American scholars and historians covers the

vast history of the region. However, they have been found to be somewhat lacking in the

area of the war, yet despite this, the present writings are vital to understanding the war

itself. To understand how the war began, tracing its roots to the beginning of

independence and looking at how what happened to El Salvador after the war is

important to understanding how it was fought and why it ended. This essay will looking

into these writings, their gaps, and what the Author feels is the history to fill them. In

order to facilitate the reader’s understanding, we will start with a literature review.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Aldo A. Lauria-Santiago first examines some of the faults of the present

historiography on El Salvador. Lauria-Santiago points out that now with the relative

peace on El Salvador, scholars can make up for the “years of difficult and repressive

conditions.” Lauria-Santiago states that the lack of significant primary sources is due to

the intense struggles in the region, discouraging scholars from making the journey to find

them. This unfortunately means that the current historiography is limited to what primary

sources are available to the scholar in the United States and the wealth of secondary

sources that have been written based on the same primary sources. Lauria-Santiago

admits that attempts have been made to rectify the present situation by scholars, but the

state of library facilities in El Salvador, and other Latin American countries, are in such

disorganized chaos, that it is hard to find the document or documents one needs, and even

more difficult to prove them to be useful at all.

Lauria-Santiago also writes about uneven dealings with the Indian natives in

Central America by both the El Salvadoran government and the foreign agriculture

conglomerates, mainly from the United States. The inability of the El Salvadoran

government to establish land reforms that were equally beneficial to all the citizens of a

country, rather than favoring the foreign investor, fueled a deep distrust and hatred

among the common person and the lower class. New government regulations eventually

put community land holdings into the hands of the Ladino controlled government. This

move put the Indians on a lower level economically, and hurt their community. As a

result, the rapport between the Indians and the Ladinos was forever filled with conflict

and suspicion.

Franklin D. Parker writes the book The Central American Republics, a

comprehensive book covering the history of the Central American Republics in several

key aspects. Parker covers local and state government, national boundaries, state money

issues, agriculture and nonagricultural professions, foreign trade, both education and

religion, and the future outlook of the people. Parker’s in depth work on the nation of El

Salvador is essential for anyone who is studying El Salvador in any aspect, but especially

if one is studying the economic changes within the nation of El Salvador from

independence to the early 1960s. Parker describes the population demographics and how

these cause the many issues in El Salvador, many of which led to the insurgency later in

the 20th century. He also describes the ever-changing political situations in El Salvador

that also forced the nation down a path that led to the rise of the Faribundo Marti

National Liberation Front and the war.

Lauria-Santiago and Leigh Binford collaborated as editors on a project that

collected a series of essays and articles on politics and society in El Salvador. The areas

covered are the history of the causes of the civil war, the war itself and its effects, and the

present state of society in contemporary El Salvador. The articles and essays go into

great depth and detail on the subjects they cover. This is a work that should be read and

studied by the scholar doing research on numerous topics ranging from civil war in El

Salvador to causes of political revolutions to intellectual developments in third world

nations.

E. Bradford Burns writes about the intellectual development in El Salvador. After

Independence was gained from Spain, the Church was still the primary source of

education in both El Salvador and greater Latin America. The introduction of

enlightenment ideals to El Salvador sparked a wave of education reform that ranged from

the creation of a national university to secondary schools; even girls were being educated.

Intellectuals from outside El Salvador were brought in to encourage the spread of ideas,

subsequent schools were started, and literature was written to compliment these newly

developed thoughts and ideas. The educated made their way into government, replacing

the clergy, influencing the political policies of the nation.

Edward T. Brett writes about the apparent lack of Catholic involvement in the

everyday activities of El Salvadoran society. As Brett describes the situation within El

Salvadoran history, the Catholic Church was a major player in the creation of more left-

leaning liberal social and political reforms, and then later it was known for standing up to

the communist aggressors to protect the people. As a result of their stance on the

question of communism, many of the outspoken clergy were targeted by communist

death squads and martyred, includes priests and nuns as well as foreign missionaries.

Brett discusses the many different biographies of those martyred, and their usefulness to

scholarly endeavors.

One of the more cited writings from an unlikely source, the military, is the

American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador. This study, written

by four colonels who were National Security Fellows at the Kennedy School of

Government, is a comprehensive report on the United States’ involvement in the conflict

in El Salvador. The authors make it clear from the beginning that it is not a “…narrative

of the Salvadoran civil war or a theoretical discussion of ‘low intensity conflict’…” The

report discusses the background, the reasons for involvement, the restrictions in place on

the aid and support, and the nature of the military support given to the Government

forces.

Hugh Byrne writes about his experiences as the “…political director of the

Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador…” from 1987- 1991 working on

human rights abuse investigations in El Salvador. He discusses the history of the causes

of the revolution, and the strategy the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front used to

fight the El Salvadoran Armed Forces throughout the war. He also relates the different

strategies used in both revolution and counter-revolutionary tactics in the areas of

interests, objectives, and resources. He concludes with a comparison of the competing

strategies, the role of strategy in revolutionary conflicts, and how government agents

should be used within it.

Brian J. Bosch uses his experience as both the United States Defense and Army

Attaché to El Salvador discuss the involvement of the El Salvadoran Officer Corps in the

internal political struggles of El Salvador. He expressly stated that his work was not to

present or evaluate United States Policy in El Salvador, but rather to discuss the events

surrounding the Officer Corps both leading up to and during the Faribundo Marti

National Liberation Front’s “Final Offensive” of 1981. In his work he discusses the

Officer Corps’ history from the early 20th century until just before the Final Offensive.

He also describes the ever escalating political and military crisis that was occurring

immediately previous to the opening of general conflict in 1980. He delves into great

detail on both the conduct of the Officer Corps during the Final Offensive and the effects

the peace had on the same.

David E. Spencer and Jose Angel Bracamonte co-authored the book Strategy and

Tactics of the Salvadoran Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front Guerrillas, based

on both Spencer’s experience as an American soldier, his time in El Salvador for both

academic and consulting reasons, and Bracamonte’s twelve years of experience as a

combatant in the war. The unique perspective given to this work as a result of

Bracamonte’s time in service warrants this work be given more study and consideration

then most other writings on the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front’s strategies

and tactics. Together Spencer and Bracamonte write a very informative work that

includes the background of the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front insurgency, its

strategy, and various force categories. They include the Faribundo Marti National

Liberation Front’s general and urban battlefield tactics as well as defensive guerrilla

tactics. The authors also delve into the guerilla supply and support chains and their

sanctuaries. There is even a chapter on the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front’s

Special Select Forces, used for special missions, similar to the American Special Forces.

The work is both informative and well written and is a must-read for the person studying

the El Salvadoran insurgency.

Cynthia McClintock writes about both the Faribundo Marti National Liberation

Front and the Shining Path of Peru from her experience with the political aftermath of

both movements as an election monitor in both El Salvador and Peru. She establishes the

theoretical frameworks for revolutions and research methods at the beginning of her

work. McClintock makes an interesting assessment of these two movements.

McClintock points out that no revolutionary movement that has risen against the

popularly elected government has succeeded. Despite this she points out that both the

Shining Path and the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front came dangerously close

to accomplishing just that. McClintock goes on to further her point by laying out the

political situations that existed in the regions and how the movements wished to change

them. She also points out that without help from foreign sources the governments of El

Salvador and Peru would not have survived. McClintock states that in Peru where

foreign help was almost nonexistent, the government was able to succeed only because it

captured the leader of the Shining Path.

Despite these extensive writings, there is still a gap. The bulk of the

historiography that exists is focused on the events leading up to the El Salvadoran Civil

War and the events immediately after it. Any writings that cover the war are either

general strategy on one side or the other, or they indicate how incidents during the war

influenced the outcome of the conflict. The author felt that there was a major lack of

historiographic writings that analyzed the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front’s

decision to agree to the peace deal offered by the El Salvadoran government in the early

1990s. This lack of writings is directly connected to the inability of historians to go to El

Salvador to do the interviews with the leaders of the Faribundo Marti National Liberation

Front during this time period. The author also points out that the apparent lack of writers

and historians who attempted to gain this knowledge after the war had ended, shows how

powerful the draw of explaining the causes of war, rather its methods of ending it, is on

historians. As a result of this draw to explain the causes, historians have written ad

nauseam about the cause of this revolution, in hopes of making it possible to predict the

next conflict, a feat that has not been accomplished in the thousands of years of warfare

throughout history.

THESIS

“Why did the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front choose to accept a peace

agreement in 1992, after they had turned down the ‘same’ treaty in 1984?” One answer

to this question is that the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) chose to

accept the peace deal as a direct result of the El Salvadoran government meeting their

demands for both social and political reform. The writings mentioned above allow the

reader to see how the conditions which allowed the FMLN to be able to put pressure on

the government were set, and how the government was able to slow the FMLN down.

Following several interviews that the author conducted, the information that may fill in

these blanks in the historiography was discovered.

The Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front agreed to peace on 17 January,

1992, ending a brutal and bloody Civil War that had waged for over ten years. Dr.

Lawrence Yates of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College recalled teaching

that the insurgency in El Salvador had “no end in sight” in the mid-1980s and being

“surprised” by the sudden peace talks. Commander in Chief of the People’s

Revolutionary Army, Joaquin Villalobos stated “Nothing can stop us from winning our

Freedom.” We will focus on the cease fire agreement that established and met the

following goals of the FMLN, a separate National Police and acceptance of the FMLN as

a political party. The El Salvadoran Government was prompted to make many of these

changes by the United States Government as requirements to gain aid and support for the

war. One of the largest points of contention between the two groups was reparations for

war crimes, a major part of the Peace Agreement and large focus of the United Nations

efforts after the war. The United Nations in the opinion of the Defense attaché from El

Salvador to the United States, COL Jorge Lara, “did good work” and that without them

“peace would have been more difficult.” BG Grijalva, former Defense Attaché and

officer in the El Salvadoran Military, gave the United Nations credit for enabling the

peace process, stating that “The United Nations had credibility with the FMLN.”

Although the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front stated that their reason

for fighting was “to build a communist society.” In actuality, they lacked much of the

popular support they claimed to have, and in the opinion of COL Lara were truly fighting

to gain power and not liberate the people. BG Grijalva made similar statements, pointing

out that the FMLN attempted to make changes and gain power though the use of force

and not ballots. COL John Waghelstein, Military Group Commander, stated in reference

to the goals of the FMLN, that “you get down to power sharing and it’s not going to

happen.” One FMLN commander, Miguel Castellanos (Commandant of an insurgent

force from 1973-85) supported the “FMLN in their attempts to take power.” One of the

other goals of the FMLN according to BG Grijalva, was the demilitarization of the El

Salvadoran government. It was believed that without the military, the government would

collapse. This is more than likely true, a dependency that resulted from not only years of

cooperation in government by the military, but also having the National Police as a

branch of the Armed Forces. At the end of the war, one of the major points of contention

was the future of the Armed Forces. A State Department report lists this and the FMLN

disarmament as the two most important elements of the peace accords. This was also

pointed out by BG Grijalva, who agreed with the State Department’s assessment. In the

end, the National Police were separated from the Armed Forces, a move the BG Grijalva

says was not wise. COL Lara concurs with the general, that “the new police are corrupt”

BG Grijalva attributes this to the desire to make the new National Police different from

the old, even to the point of removing the old values and discipline that were shared with

the military. Professor John Fishel, Professor Emeritus at the National Defense

University, with whom an interview was conducted and discussed later, revealed that

there was already a plan to separate the National Police from the Military before the

treaty was signed.

After the Peace Accords were signed, a great many senior officers were removed

from service in attempt to eliminate the old corps of officers that may, or in some cases

may not, have committed war crimes. COL Lara feels that this was an unwise move, as it

resulted in the loss of many innocent senior officers with years of experience and

influence. Also throughout the war, the officer corps had been struggling to maintain

enough officers for the ever-growing army- case in point, both COL Lara and BG

Grijalva were Battalion Commanders at the rank of Captain, usually a position given to

Lieutenant Colonels. The cadets at the Academy were also given Platoons to command

when they were juniors and seniors. Many of the officers in the military had also been

trained at the School of the Americas in Georgia, Fort Benning, and even West Point, and

removing the senior officers eliminated much of this experience from the military’s

collective knowledge base.

COL Lara and BG Grijalva both agreed that the training they received from the

United States Military was vital to winning the war, as was much of the equipment.

Professor Fishel also supports the idea that without United States Military aid stated the

war would have much more costly without the United States’ intervention. BG Grijalva

recalls capturing weapons from FMLN troops whose quality exceed the general’s

equipment, and being relieved to get new weapons and artillery pieces from the US. The

helicopter was also of great use in the conflict, both COL Lara and BG Grijalva stated;

both pointed out the greater speed and maneuverability the craft gave their forces over

those of the FMLN, who were mainly on foot or in vehicles. The intervention of the US

into the war also helped increase the size of the Armed Forces from “7,000 to 70,000”

over the course of the war. By the end of the war, over 11,500 El Salvadoran troops had

been killed, and the cost to repair the country’s infrastructure was over 1.6 billion dollars.

Many of these deaths came from the Final Offensive of 1988, which came after two years

of peace talks and was soundly defeated despite the two years of preparation on the part

of the FMLN.

The United Nations, according to both COL Lara and BG Grijalva, played a

pivotal role in achieving peace. The FMLN did not trust the Unites States backed

Organization of American States (OAS). The FMLN did however trust the United

Nations as an independent organization, and therefore agreed to work with them in the

peace process. The United Nations provided military observers to monitor both sides of

the cease fire, ensuring a better transition into the peace talks. Professor Fishel remarked

that the United Nations “facilitated peace.” COL Lara said the “[UN] made the peace

work.”

The United Nations also facilitated the investigations into war crimes committed

in the war by both sides. It was agreed by the FMLN and the government that general

amnesty should be given to the members of the armed groups, whether rebel or military,

who participated in such actions. The Ad Hoc Commission was convened to determine

what should be done to improve the Armed Forces. The commission decided that

removing many of the senior officers in the military was a wise decision. COL Lara felt

that this was an unwise decision because it punished officers who had done nothing

wrong as well as those few who had. BG Grijalva also felt that this eliminated many of

the seasoned and experienced officers from the military, leaving a vacuum to be filled by

the less experienced few. Professor Fishel felt that the impact was not as deep, since the

officers that were let go were up for retirement anyway. Professor Fishel also remarked

that the arresting of the General responsible for the killing of the Jesuit Priests, the Abu

Ghraib of this war, was a turning point for the Government forces, in that it held the

officers accountable to the nation rather than their classmates. Another decision made by

the Commission was to separate the National Police from the Armed Forces. BG

Grijalva points out that by removing the National Police they had lost their discipline and

values. COL Lara points to the widespread corruption as well.

The nation of El Salvador was considered a country in which it would be difficult

to sustain a rebellion. BG Grijalva points to several critics’ assessment that the nation

was too small for rebels, including that many considered the size to favor the Armed

Forces in their ability to control the nation. To the FMLN however, the size did not

matter, as Vietnam demonstrated to the world. The FMLN was headed by five men, who

maintained control of the organization throughout the conflict, contrasting with the

several presidents the El Salvadoran people had in the same time frame. The FMLN had

a very intricate guerilla supply and support chain and sanctuary network. The FMLN

even had Special Select Forces, used for special missions, similar to the American

Special Forces. The FMLN claimed that it was fighting for the people, against the

government that was driven by the rich. The FMLN also sought to gain more land

reform and distribution, a task that was also being accomplished by the sitting president

at the time. The FMLN decided that they could make more changes using “bullets not

ballots.”

Despite the claims of the conflict being a people’s war, both BG Grijalva and

COL Lara agree that the guerrillas did not have the support of the people. This was

demonstrated during the already mentioned 1989 Final Offensive. Another major factor

in the lack of popular support was violence against the church and the population.

Edward T. Brett writes about the Catholic Church’s stance on the question of

communism, many of the outspoken clergy were targeted by communist death squads

and martyred, both priest and nuns to include foreign missionaries. BG Grijalva recalls

that his brother in law was killed by the FMLN because an Armed Forces artillery

position was temporarily emplaced on his land. Forced cooperation was the main staple

of FMLN support, BG Grijalva argues, as does COL Lara. As a result, the FMLN Final

Offensive failed, as did their war effort.

One question that must be answered is “why did the Government not offer the

peace deal sooner?” The truth is that back in 1984, the Government did offer a peace that

contained almost the same terms as 1992. Professor Fishel points out that FMLN

demands such as a separate national police force was a change already in progress before

the peace agreement was negotiated. Another important fact Professor Fishel stated was

that “the ESAF [El Salvadoran Armed Forces] did not declare victory.” This is important

in that it did not lower the FMLN to the level of the defeated; rather the treaty elevated

the FMLN to the level of counterpart. This can be seen in an anecdote told by Professor

Fishel where he sat with a FMLN Commander and an ESAF Colonel during a

conference. As it turned out, all three of the men had been in the same province at the

same time during the war. No hard feelings were stated; rather the men became good

“pals.”

Professor Fishel also discusses that the officers who were removed from the

FMLN after the war were allowed to retire on schedule, and not in disgrace. One

interesting fact about the El Salvadoran Army is that its officer corps is entirely

composed of Academy graduates. This led to loyalty a chain with the individual’s class

on top, then the army, and lastly the nation. It was not until after the killings of the Jesuit

Priests did this chain begin to reverse, according to Professor Fishel. Professor Fishel’s

view of the United Nations’ part in the peace treaty is one of support and affirmation. He

believes that the United Nations facilitated the peace process, however, it was not the

reason for the peace occurring. The aid provided by the United States throughout this

period was vital to the victory in respect to its timely end; Professor Fishel believes that it

would have ended eventually with the victory going to the Government, but the results

would have higher body counts, higher hatred for the other side, and more issues in the

country at large.

The fall of the Soviet Union was important to the end of the war. McClintock

discusses this in her book by first pointing out the political situations that existed in the

region and how the movement wished to change them. She also points out that without

help from foreign sources, the governments of El Salvador and Peru would not have

survived. McClintock states that in Peru, where foreign help was almost nonexistent, the

government was able to succeed only because it captured the leader of the Shining Path.

In El Salvador, the FMLN also had outside help from both Cuba and Nicaragua. When

the Soviet Union fell, the support dropped out from underneath the Communist effort in

the region, pointing out the failures of communism as a form of government and as a

social revolution. By 1992, the FMLN realized that the people did not support them, the

goal of communism could not be reached, and the outside logistical support resources

were no longer available. As a result, the peace treaty was signed that established terms

offered back in 1984. The fall of the Soviet Union was not the reason for the end of the

war, but it was a significant contributing factor.

There are practical military applications that can be drawn from the war in El

Salvador and applied to today’s battlefields. For many years, military theorists and

strategists have tried to determine where the center of gravity in war lies. The center of

gravity is that location, for lack of a better term, which if attacked or pressured will cause

the enemy to be defeated. Clausewitz, nineteenth century Prussian military “genius,”

marked the center of gravity as the battle itself, while B. H. Liddell Hart, British armor

theorist in the early twentieth century, pointed to the command and control. Sun Tzu, the

three thousand year old Chinese master, tells that the center of gravity is the mind of the

enemy commander alone. In the case of El Salvador, the center of gravity was not the

people as many would claim, especially the new US Army counter insurgency manual,

but rather the enemy will. The ability of the government forces to win on the battlefield

was assured with the aid and training provided by the United States Military. The

majority of the population stayed loyal to the government throughout the war. This can

be shown by examining the failed Final Offensive of 1989. If battle and people were not

the center of gravity in the war, then what was? The FMLN realized that without the

people, who were the perceived center of gravity by them, they could not overcome their

lack of ability in battle. As a result, the FMLN was forced to surrender and accept the

terms that they had rejected in 1984.

Today, many military theorists and strategists are trying to discover the center of

gravity in the war in Iraq, comparing that conflict to Vietnam and El Salvador. The

United States Military is torn between two opposing factions, one that supports the

people being the center of gravity, and the other supporting battle. The attempts to

connect the war in El Salvador and say that the way it was fought should be a model for

Iraq is flawed and unwise. The take-away that the United States Military should gain

from El Salvador is that a nation with a popular government and military will be able to

withstand the threat of rebels or insurgents. The reverse of this can be seen in Vietnam,

where the US government supported the unpopular government in South Vietnam, and

the efforts failed. The United States Military should see the El Salvadoran conflict for

what it was; a model for foreign internal defense, not counter insurgency.

CONCULSION

In conclusion, much has been written on the nation of El Salvador, its history, its

people, and its conflicts. Not as much has been written on the reasons to end fighting in

comparison with the writings on the reasons why to fight. Most of the writings that I

found have been fairly balanced, placing blame equally on the foreigners for their part in

creating the situation in Latin America and on the shoulders of the local people as well. I

think that more could and should be written on why the war ended, more specifically on

why the side who believed themselves to be operating from the position of strength

would voluntarily give up and agree to peace. As long as there has been war, man has

tried to predict its outbreak and mitigate its causes, but far less effort has been made to

study conflict termination; what it takes to make an aggressor stop and accept a deal far

less than victory. It has been said that, mankind put more effort into the pursuit of war

than it ever did in the pursuit of peace. I feel that this is especially relevant to this topic in

that the people who have written the historiography surrounding El Salvador and the

Civil War have spent more time on what went wrong rather than on what went right.

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Parker, Franklin D. The Central American Republics. Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. 1. Lauria-Santiago, Aldo A. “Historical Research and Sources on EL Salvador,” Latin American Research Review 30, no. 2 (1995), pg 151. 2. Franklin D Parker, the Central American Republics, Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. 3. E. Bradford Burns, “The Intellectual Infrastructure of Modernization in El Salvador, 1870-1900,” The Americas 41, no. 3 (Jan, 1985). 4. Edward T Brett, “The Impact of Religion in Central America: A Bibliographical Essay,” The Americas 49, no. 3 (Jan, 1993). 5. A. J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, (Pergamon-Brassey’s: New York), 1. 6. Hugh Byrne, El Salvador's Civil War: A Study of Revolution. (Lynne Rienner: CO), Publishers, ix. 7. Brian J Bosch, the Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1999). 8. José Angel Moroni Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995). 9. Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998). 10. Lawrence Yates, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 28 February 2008. 11. Joaquin Villalobos, “The Primary Objective Remains the Same,” in El Salvador at War: An Oral History, ed. Max Manwaring, (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 1988), 372. 12. A. J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, (Pergamon-Brassey’s: New York), 1. 13. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 14. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 15. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 16. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 17. COL John D Waghelstein, “The Military View of the Problem,” in El Salvador at War: An Oral History, ed. Max Manwaring, (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 1988), 376. 18. Miguel Castellanos, “The FMLN Cannot Win the War,” in El Salvador at War: An Oral History, ed. Max Manwaring, (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 1988), 475. 19. It can be argued that two Officers in the Armed Forces would of course say the FMLN were not entirely honest in their stated reasons for fighting, but seeing as how members of the Academic community and even accepted historical data concur with their assessments, it should be accepted as fact. 20. US Department Of State El Salvador Negotiations: Outstanding Issues. 21. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 22. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 23. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 24. This is unusual for most militaries, to give that level of command to such low ranking officers, and is indicative of a shortage of available officers. 25. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 26. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 27. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 28. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 29. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 30. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 31. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 32. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 33. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 34. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 35. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 36. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008.

37. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 38. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 39. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 40. COL Jorge Lara, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 18 March 2008. 41. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 42. BG Juan Grijalva, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 20 March 2008. 43. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 44. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 45. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 46. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 47. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008. 48. Prof John T Fishel, interview by Philip Bucci, USMA Oral History Department, 09 April 2008.